waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <2076@rwing.UUCP> pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes: >I think this is no accident.  It comes from the same philosophy that >the government rules/controls the people, not the people controlling >the government, that the unconnected citizens are not sophisticated enough >to know what is best for them, so the government must tell the people >what they need or do not need ... "we know best...".  And the idea that >that a commoner can defend himself against government eavesdropping >or unlawful attack is totally unacceptable to people with this outlook. > > >Combine this all with pushing for national identity cards with 'smart >chips' to encode anything they please (internal passport) under the >guise of streamlining the State People's Health Care System, and with >(you can be certain) more jewels yet to come, and one sees an extremely >ominous trend.  So what if "1984" will be ten years late... it still is >turning out to be an amazingly accurate prophecy... unless a LOT of >people wake up, and in a hurry. > >One should ALWAYS have every red warning light and bell and danger flag >come up when the government seeks to set itself apart in regard to >rights, etc.  from the unconnected/unprivileged citizen (or should we >now be saying 'subject' instead?)...  Why SHOULDN'T the average person >have a good, secure system of data security, not dependent on nebulous >'safeguards' for maintaining that security?  Why SHOULDN'T the average >person be able to defend himself from an agency gone rogue?  0I am sure >the Feds could break into any data they really wanted to (but it would >take some WORK), and using the same logic, one should not be allowed to >have a good safe, unless a duplicate of the key(s) or combination are >submitted for 'safekeeping' by the government?  I don't really see a >difference, philosophically.  Encrypted data sure won't evaporate, not >with such high-tech tools as a TAPE RECORDER... >  The average amerikan today seems to think that the government should be able to eavesdrop on everyone (else).  Opinion polls show that most people belive the Bill of Rights to grant too much freedom to people, when it is not identified as such (BTW, if anyone knows of a cite for that, I'd love to have it).  Not only does this mean that these people are  willing to give up everyone (else's) rights, they don't even know what  the Bill of Rights actually says.  How can we show the average person (not the average USENET reader) that people are actually entitiled to these rights?  So many people don't care if the government is taking more and more control of us all, a little  at a time.
pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: > I'm a political dissident. I'm scared shitless of the feds listening in  > on my calls. My opinions are the sort that would get me  > "disappeared" in a slightly less free society -- and who knows what  > sort of society we will be in in five or ten years? I have friends who  > have had their phones tapped -- none of this is theoretical to me.   I understand, believe it or not, and there are any number of kinds of  conversation and communication I engage in that I wouldn't even consider  using this scheme for.  On the other hand, I don't see "Clipper" as providing  a secure channel--it just prevents casual eavesdropping.  This is part of why  I am not worried about it per se.  Trying to look at Clipper as a serious  security tool is simply ludicrous.  It's a voice scrambler, nothing more.  There is still plenty of market for real crypto.  > As for "its better than the status quo", well, first of all, you can  > get a cryptophone from companies like Cylink today -- and they work  > well.  They cost an arm and a leg, though. "Clipper" is obviously aimed at the mass  market.  It certainly won't put Cylink out of business.  > In addition, a number of groups are now working on building  > software to turn any PC into a privacy enhanced phone right now -- and  > they are all working in overdrive mode.   This is old news.  I can do this now.  > There ARE no crypto restrictions... yet. You can use anything you want  > RIGHT NOW. The point is to maintain that right.   There ARE restrictions.  Example: We're a networking software vendor with a  large overseas share of our market.  We cannot currently ship PEM, or even  simple DES, in our products without case-by-case approval from the Department  of State.  ITAR presents a material trade barrier to US firms trying to  compete in international information systems markets.  Sure, you can use whatever freebie software you want to talk over BBS's in  the USA.  I, on the other hand, want strong crypto (PKCS, for example) to be  the *default* for electronic mail, worldwide.  I want priests to be able to  hear confession over email.  I want lawyers to be able to talk to clients in  confidence over email, or doctors talk with patients.  I want to be able to  order products from my favorite Japanese mail-order catalog over the net.  I  want to be able to sign contracts, transact business, and so on  electronically.  This is so far infeasible as a result of the current restrictions on  crytographic systems, especially beyond the borders of the USA.  Clipper is irrelevant, and if it distracts the authorities into feeling safe,  all the better.  Its only danger is if it emboldens them into trying to put  more restrictions into place, on the theory that it is "good enough for  anyone who has nothing to hide."  That argument is, of course, utter BS, just  as much as "no one needs an assault rifle".
In article <sfpzMNz0BwwbMDwhUC@transarc.com> Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com writes: >martin@world.std.com (Martin J Hannigan) writes: >> Hello. I am the David Sternlight keeper of the FAQ. Unfortuantely I cannot >> find it at the present time. > >Cool it, will you?  Let people form their own opinions. >Even Mr. Sternlight might be right sometime, and you guys >are setting things up so that the only way he can regain  >any credibility is to renounce his previous statements and >move towards the mainstream of net.opinion.  This does not >bespeak tolerance, IMO. > >>                          C       _)           David Sternlight >>                           |  ,___|            Net.Police > >Indeed...   > >Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street >412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219   Hopefully, he doesnt take it personal...
In article <C5nMB1.CoF@news.claremont.edu> ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu (Eli Brandt) writes: > >I probably shouldn't say this, but they could try to detect the use >of an illegal cypher by transmitting in the clear some statistical >properties of the plaintext.  An old-fashioned wiretap could then >detect the use of pre-encryption, which would drastically increase >the measured entropy of the input.  A countermeasure to this would >be to use steganographic techniques which put out voice.  This way to detect pre-encryption may be defeated ; one can do   transformation of the spectrum of encrypted signal just by adding some  pre-arranged (in the beginning of communication) function. I think so. Say, you can do FFT of your encrypted signal. Just thinking ...   --  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------       For PGP2.1 public key finger mkagalen@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu
>At the moment PGP is available in executable format for MS-DOS and Mac, >and source code for most other platforms including UNIX. Many FTP sites >keep a copy (although the Mac version is getting hard to find). Try the >following site: > >soda.berkeley.edu           /pub/cypherpunks/pgp  For those with out FTP access, try NitV-BBS (see .sig).  I have the following: (all from nic.funet.fi, garbo.uwasa.fi, sony.com, and ftp.uni-erlangen.de)  PLATFORM    EXECS   SOURCE   PATCH4SRC   XTRAS  BBS FILE AREA    FIDO FREQNAME  DOS           x       x                    x      LOGIN         PGPDOS, PGPSDOS MAC           x       x                           NONIBM        PGPMAC, PGPSMAC AMIGA         x       ?                           NONIBM        PGPAMI ARCHIMEDES    x       ?                           NONIBM        PGPARC OS/2          x       ?                           WIN           PGPOS2 NeXT                            x                 NONIBM        PGPNXT UNIX          x       x                           NONIBM        PGPUNX  ? = haven't looked in the archive to see if it has source or not (usually  because I can't handle the format).  For FidoNet FREQ magic-names, the PGPS??? names are source code, others are either execs or execs + src  [+ extras], or in the case of NeXT, just a patch (you still need one of the full source code packages).  NitV-BBS is FREE.  This is not an ad, it is a public service announcement.
1) I think that most of us can afford a stamp and an envelope, and the cost of printing out a letter.  2) If some kind soul out there would write a letter, and upload it to  the net, everyone could capture it, print it out, and snail-mail it out to their local congressional critter.  BTW>> I'm working on one.  -nate
In article <1993Apr17.061326.16130@clarinet.com> brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:    Once it hits land you can record it if you have telco access.  The    telco isn't supposed to give that without a warrant.  That's the rule today.     But even so, the evidence would not be admissible, I think, unless the    judge so ordered.  I think that even interception of the crypttext    without a warrant would be illegal.   Cops can't record today's plain    cellular calls and then ask a judge, "Hey, can we have permission to    listen to those tapes?" can they?  How long do you think it will be before it becomes legal for the police to record encrypted conversations "It's not violating your privacy because we can't read the encryption without a warrant", with the usual good-faith exception if they accidentally record a non-encrypted conversation.  Besides, it's covered by the Drug Exception to the Fourth Amendment...
douglas craig holland (holland@CS.ColoState.EDU) writes: > > With E-Mail, if they can't break your PGP encryption, they'll just > call up one of their TEMPEST trucks and read the electromagnetic  > emmisions from your computer or terminal.  Note that measures to  > protect yourself from TEMPEST surveillance are still classified, as  > far as I know.  steiner@jupiter.cse.utoledo.edu (Jason 'Think!' Steiner) writes:  > are LCD displays vulnerable to tempest?  I can see high-voltage type display devices being vulnerable (CRTs, plasma displays, etc.)  But Jason beat me to this question.  What about EM radiation from low-voltage items like LCD displays?
In article <1qnupd$jpm@news.intercon.com> amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes: >jhesse@netcom.com (John Hesse) writes: >> Oh great. Wonderful news. Nobody can listen in--except the feds.  > >Hey, it's better than the status quo. > >I am far less worried about "the feds" tapping my phone than high school  >scanner surfers who get their kicks out of eavesdropping on cellular and  >cordless phone calls. >  Really? Why are so you worried about high school kids "getting their kicks" with scanners, as compared to what the feds can do, and have done, to their targets?  "Better than the status quo" isn't good enough, I'd say. The same  technology could be implemented WITHOUT a back door open to the state.  We all know about power and corruption. But we all know that abuse is something that only happens to the other guy.  > >Amanda Walker >InterCon Systems Corporation > >   --  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Hesse           |          A man,      jhesse@netcom.com    |                 a plan,  Moss Beach, Calif    |                         a canal, Bob.
The following is available in some FTP archive somewhere, I insert my comments liberally throughout this demonic memo of Big Brotherdom:  >	White House Announcement on Screw Thread Standards >	-------------------------------------------------- > >	This is to announce that the American National Standards >Institute (or whatever it is) has been given the authority to define >standard dimensions for screw threads.     Look! This is clearly the first step toward outlawing our    own screw thread specifications. If this madness isn't fought,    tooth and nail, every step of the way, it'll be a crime to use    screw threads other than those our Fearless Leaders so *graciously*    define for us.  >	The purpose of this is to permit industry to draw upon a standard >pool of specifications and designations, to ensure interoperability of >various threaded objects across vendors.     Rubbish, I say! ANSI standard screw threads will have subtle weaknesses,    allowing their agents to disassemble our automobiles more easily,    causing our mufflers to fall off at inoppurtune moments.  >	Questions and Answers on the ANSI screw thread standards >	-------------------------------------------------------- > >Q: Will the screw threads defined by ANSI be as good as other screw thread >designs available elsewhere? > >A: Yes.  	Hah! "trust us"  >Q: Will I be able to use my own screw threads if I desire? > >A: Of course, but this will make your threaded objects unlikely to >interoperate correctly with others within the industry.  	See??! See? This is the first step.  	It is clear we must band together, write your congressman! Use Pretty Good Screw Threads, not this devil-inspired ANSI trash. Protect your constitutional right to use whatever screw thread you desire. Guerilla Screw Thread Activism must become the order of the day. Boycott GM, and build your own car, using screws from STZ Screw Thread Associates.  	Screw you, Bill Clinton! You and your totalitarianist thugs!  ------------------------------------------------------------------------ amolitor@nmsu.edu | finger for PGST personal screw thread pitch, or Screw Threads     |  see the screw thread servers. must be freed!    |
In <1r9av2$bg6@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:  >In article <1993Apr21.163929.21149@eff.org> A. Charles Gross <acg@eff.org> writes: >>The NRA is successful because (among a number of things), on the drop of >>a hat, they can get a congresspersons office flooded with postcards, >>faxes and phone calls.  Certainly, with our way-cool Internet powers of >>organization, we can act in the same way, if such action is appropriate.  >I don't know about you, but I have nearly forgotten how to generate paper >mail.  >If I had e-mail to Congress, I would have written many letters by now. >I haven't written one yet, as it turns out.  Writing on paper is such >a complicated job, for those of us hooked on our way-cool Internet.  That's what MCI Mail is for!  (CompuServe also has "CongressGrams" (TM).)  This is not intended as an advertisement; that really is what MCI Mail WAS intended for (according to their ads).
In article <tcmayC5z3yE.F38@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:  >(alt.security.clipper added, to keep them informed of this issue) > > >David Sternlight (strnlght@netcom.com) wrote: >.... >: The proposal could be modified so that if they get a court order to tap you >: and don't charge you with a crime within, say, 90 days, they have to buy you >: a new phone. >:  >: If they do charge you, and you are found innocent, they have to buy you a >: new phone. >:  >: :-) > >Yes, but will they buy you a ticket on a time machine to allow you to >go back and use the phone with the new key instead of the phone whose >key they obtained? > >It is unclear whether obtaining the key at time 0 also unlocks >messages recorded (by whomever) at earlier times. The announcement was >silent on this. The betting seems to be that once your key has been >obtained (by the authorities, by divorce lawyers, by the Mafia, by the >FBI, by lost or stolen backup tapes, by the NSA, etc.). all previous >conversations are unsecure. (Session keys are negotiated, but knowing >the private key is believed by many commentators here to break the >security. No doubt more details will emerge.) >  Doesn't matter if we assume they are obeying the law, since they won't have had a court order to tap calls prior to the date of the court order, and thus won't have them available.  If they aren't obeying the law, we are in an entirely different discussion, in which this is the least of one's worries.  David
In article <1993Apr25.024032.26935@ringer.cs.utsa.edu> whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (William W. Hughes) writes: >In article <1993Apr24.233742.26839@lehman.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: >>whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (William W. Hughes) writes: >>>Hell, just set up a spark jammer, or some other _very_ electrically-noisy >>>device. >> >>As I've noted, you can likely get around that with a directional >>sensor. Phased array systems could completely defeat this scheme. > >True, but the basic idea behind any communications security system is not >to absolutely deny access, but to make access more expensive (in time, >money, manpower) than it is worth. > Another idea: Use a laptop computer.  As mentioned earlier, the LCD screen is a lot less noisy than a standard CRT, but since many laptops have power supplies that run at 3 volts instead of 5, they would be considerably  quieter.  Doug Holland
Well, it now seems obvious what Professor Denning was doing last fall when this key escrow trial balloon was raised!  All the more need for end-to-end encryption schemes that bypass the government-approved system.  By the way, the "Clipper" name...isn't this already used for the Clipper processor from Intergraph? I doubt they're the ones making the chip, so a name conflict may be present.  -Tim May
grady@netcom.com suggests using a common but restricted-distribution private key to allow public key system encrypted postings. In theory that will work fine as long as the privae key remains secure.  In practice it would be a good idea to check to see if that would be a violation of some net rule, practice, custom, etc. I don't say it would be, just that it would be a good idea to check. This is not like rot13 where everybody can have the key trivially.  It would also be a good idea to check to see if such posts would be forwarded by the sites needed to make the chain work.  Of course there'd be no problem with a discussion group travelling over facilities entirely under the control of the members. Probably there would also be no problem with a mailing list approach. It might even  be fun for some.
The *security* of the system does depend only on the secrecy of the keys.  The ability to tap is an inherent *insecurity* which depends fundamentally on the secrecy of the algorithm.  To spell it out, because so many people seem to miss the point, if the algorithm were published, anyone could create a chip which would work correctly with the Skipjack chips but which would not have its key registered.  I believe there is no technical means of ensuring key escrow without the government maintaining a secret of some kind.  For example, the secret could be the private keys of the escrow agencies; their digital signatures would be required before a key could be used.  In this case, the NSA/NIST/whoever has decided that protecting the entire algorithm is easier/cheaper/more secure than other possible protocols.
In article <Apr18.194927.17048@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes:  >Note that measures to protect yourself from >TEMPEST surveillance are still classified, as far as I know.  I think this to be inaccurate. One can buy TEMPEST equipment commercially. Even Macs.  David
How about this:  The TelCo has your Clipper key.  The TelCo has your intended partner's key, if he is using one.  Whenever you call, the message gets decrypted and reencrypted wihtout y key exchange.  I know it's a stupid system, but for the feds, it'd be great.  The point of this isn;t to take over the crypto market, BTW.  Clinton doen not want people to have any sort of crypto at all (just like Busch).  But he needs some support for the "technology initiative" garbage he's pushing (industrial policy stuff) and a computer hip designed by the gov't is just the thing.  Who's going to thing about the (literal) Billions of Dollars it took for a government agency to design?
In article <1993Apr21.131510.3215@memex.co.uk> peter@memex.co.uk writes:  >I thought it was quite difficult to record a modem session at some >intermediate point on the line. Maybe they have taken a crash course >in data comms and have a unit that demodulates the tones and stores the >digital stream for decryption later. This would still suffer from the  >called BABT. It has been stated, either here or in the uk.telecom group, >that they will not approve equipment that does encryption. I don't know >if this is true or not, but this would make a good test case. > >                Peter Ilieve            peter@memex.co.uk  You forget the obvious! If it is an *authorised* tap then it can be done at the exchange. If the exchange is *digital* then I suspect that you can auto-monitor a line and pickup the full link. Therefore syncing a piggyback modem on the line would not be impossible - I suspect. --
In article <tcmayC5o715.Mrs@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:     I know that at least one person on that list says the first he heard    of Clipper was in the Friday morning newspaper! And another has    already fired off a letter of protest to NIST.     My point? I suspect this list, interesting as it is for various    reasons, does not represent the cabal that put this proposal together.    Some of them, yes. Others, no.   I received mail from Mitch Kapor saying that he did not ask to be on the list, and does not know why he was added.  I'm sure the same applies to others on the list.  So, I guess my initial theory was right, that the clipper list was just someone's idea of a bad joke.  I guess I should be happy it wasn't a conspiracy.  		Marc
rlglende@netcom.com (Robert Lewis Glendenning) writes:  >In article <1993Apr20.203756.20667@kronos.arc.nasa.gov> hanson@kronos.arc.nasa.gov (Robin Hanson) writes: >>I'm attempting to write a serious policy paper examining whether the >>proposed wiretap (or "Clipper") chip is a cost-effective tool for >>police investigation.  That is, ignoring concerns about government >>intrusions into individual privacy, is the value of easy wiretaps to >>investigators greater than the cost to the communications industry, >>and their customers, to support this wiretap technology?   >>[...]  >First, what the fuck is NASA doing wasting my tax dollars doing >policy papers on stuff far outside of their purvew/mission? >[...]                                                                          >Do us a favor.  Resign rather than right this paper for NASA.  Go >do useful work for the society.  Whew!  Take it easy on the guy.  Maybe he's going to do this in his spare time.  Maybe he's going to do this to see how much a wiretap *really* costs.  Maybe he's going to do this so he can add to the opposition to Clipper.  I don't know fully why he might do this, but maybe we shouldn't start flaming at the drop of a hat.
In article <122723@netnews.upenn.edu>, feeley@cattell.psych.upenn.edu (Wm. Michael Feeley) writes: > Just curious, how would the Clipper Chip system handle > conference calls?