waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <1993Apr18.022011.15502@ringer.cs.utsa.edu>, whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (William W. Hughes) writes:  |>In article <1qpg8fINN982@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@nmsu.edu |>(Andrew Molitor) writes: |>>In article <tcmayC5M2xv.JEx@netcom.com> |>>tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: |>> |>>>-Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime |>>                           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |>>Isn't this just a little melodramatic? |> |>Not at all. Two weeks ago I registered a concern about some programming |>that was being conducted by a student organisation here at the |>University of Texas at San Antonio.  As a result, I was interrogated |>by the capus police, who also attempted to create a positive-identification |>file (photo, fingerprints, etc.). I refused to permit this, and filed a |>complaint with the University administration.  The Vice-President for |>Business Affairs (the 'boss' of the campus police) stated that he had no |>interest in the legal/Constitutional implications of those actions.  In article <johnson.735025464@trwacs>, johnson@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Steve Johnson) writes:  |>  A remark I heard the other day is beginning to take on increasingly |>frightening significance.  The comment was made that "In other parts |>of the world the Democrats [note the big "D"] would be known as |>Socialists"   We might get further if we begin by accepting that the government  really couldn't be bothered less about the political opinions of the  right wing pro establishment types. Just about the only circumstances  in which I could think that they would be interested in their political  views would be to recruit them as spooks. They can be guaranteed to give the government line when it counts. In US history it has been the  socialists such as myself who have been persecuted.    Now before people start asserting that there is no mechanism by which the administration can get their new chip adopted without legal force lets try thinking.  In the first place the clipper chip must have existed for several years as a defense project. Therefore this is not a party matter at all. George Bush was in any case hardly adverse to tapping calls, he was chief spook  remember.  Secondly the govt can quite easily apply pressure. They simply "ask" their chums who they give huge defense contracts to (motorola etc) to be "nice" boys. After all Bill is giving them a nice little trade monopoly since the chips won't be avaliable to foreign firms.  Thirdly the people who consider the Democrats to be socialist are not the same as the ones who consider socialists to be communist. People might know this if the US education system did not suffer from the Mcarthyite and  Dewy version of political correctness - the sort with tribunals and show  trials. Ever seen Ed Meese pissed? I have, it was when he said that socialism and communism were the same thing and brought the house down with laughter. It took several minutes before we realised that he was serious.   Phill Hallam-Baker
Arthur Melnick posts an interesting first-hand message about his NEA algorithm. Though I have no reason to disbelieve anything he says, I want to clarify one point:  He says he has no connection with the NSA. If he was part of an "NSA plot", of course he'd say that.  Now I don't think he is. But the level of some discussion here is of that sort, and very quickly we reach the point where it's impossible to continue rationally discussing some issues.  "I am not a crook"  "Well, if you were, of course you'd say that"   or the ever popular favorite:  "Please prove the following negative."  I don't know what to do with such messages, so I have taken to ignoring them.  Comments?  David
In article <WCS.93Apr26141950@rainier.ATT.COM> wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes: > >It is still easy to conceal super-encryption, at least until the >inquisitors get ahold of the K key, which can take a while, >presumably not in near-real-time.  (Worst-case, in which the escrow agencies >provide the U key to the local cops, still only gets one side of the >conversation per warrant, unless the same key is used for both directions, >which I suppose the CAPSTONE version of the chip will probably insist on.)
amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes: >> The answer seems obvious to me, they wouldn't.  There is other hardware  >> out there not compromised.  DES as an example (triple DES as a better  >> one.)  > >So, where can I buy a DES-encrypted cellular phone?  How much does it cost? >Personally, Cylink stuff is out of my budget for personal use :)...  If the Clipper chip can do cheap crypto for the masses, obviously one could do the same thing WITHOUT building in back doors.  Indeed, even without special engineering, you can construct a good system right now. A standard codec chip, a chip to do vocoding, a DES chip, a V32bis integrated modem module, and a small processor to do glue work, are all you need to have a secure phone. You can dump one or more of the above if you have a fast processor. With integration, you could put all of them onto a single chip -- and in the future they can be.  Yes, cheap crypto is good -- but we don't need it from the government. You can do everything the clipper chip can do without needing it to be compromised. When the White House releases stuff saying "this is good because it gives people privacy", note that we didn't need them to give us privacy, the capability is available using commercial hardware right now.  Indeed, were it not for the government doing everything possible to stop them, Qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to the CDMA cellular phone system they are pioneering. Were it not for the NSA and company, cheap encryption systems would be everywhere. As it is, they try every trick in the book to stop it. Had it not been for them, I'm sure cheap secure phones would be out right now.  They aren't the ones making cheap crypto available. They are the ones keeping cheap crypto out of people's hands. When they hand you a clipper chip, what you are getting is a mess of pottage -- your prize for having traded in your birthright.  And what did we buy with our birthright? Did we get safety from foreigners? No. They can read conference papers as well as anyone else and are using strong cryptography. Did we get safety from professional terrorists? I suspect that they can get cryptosystems themselves on the open market that work just fine -- most of them can't be idiots like the guys that bombed the trade center. Are we getting cheaper crypto for ourselves? No, because the market would have provided that on its own had they not deliberately sabotaged it.  Someone please tell me what exactly we get in our social contract in exchange for giving up our right to strong cryptography? -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
In article <1993Apr27.190451.25650@lehman.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:   > >No one has mentioned violence other than you, Mr. Han. I believe you >are imagining things.  This is factually incorrect. There was at least one message that said that Waco and Clipper justified "anything" in response.  David
David Sternlight says:   >It discredits the writer with third parties to claim Clipper has a back >door. It does not.      Actually, David, I don't think it's any more intellectually honest to say there are no backdoors than to say there are backdoors, unless you've had a chance to examine the algorithm and the silicon closely.  For all we know, skipjack could be easily broken, or impossible to break.  And clearly, if skipjack is not secure, then the clipper chip is not worth much.
In article <930424031634.176183@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL> Grant@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL (Lynn R Grant) writes:  >About 50 people so far have asked, "Once the FBI gets your Clipper keys, >won't they be able to read all your future and past traffic?" > >There has been no response from NIST, NSA, Ms. Denning, Mr. Hellman, or >anyone else who might be able to give us an authoritative answer. >This is troubling.  The proposal could be modified so that if they get a court order to tap you and don't charge you with a crime within, say, 90 days, they have to buy you a new phone.  If they do charge you, and you are found innocent, they have to buy you a new phone.  :-)  David
In article <1993Apr23.134422.25521@rick.dgbt.doc.ca>  (Jerry Han) writes:   > "A smart warrior defeats the enemy in ambush on the battlefield" > "A smarter warrior defeats the enemy in open warfare on the battlefield" > "The smartest warrior defeats the enemy without using the battlefield"          Y'all got the first two reversed.
In article <1993Apr22.185330.20976@zip.eecs.umich.edu> dmuntz@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Dan Muntz) writes: >In article <strnlghtC5wC3z.Erw@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >>psionic@wam.umd.edu, whose parenthesized name is either an unfortunate >>coincidence or casts serious doubt on his bona fides, posts a message in >>which he seems willing to take the word of a private firm about which he >>knows little that their new encryption algorithm is secure and contains no >>trapdoors, while seemingly distrusting that of the government about clipper. > >Will someone please post the David Sternlight FAQ to alt.privacy.clipper before >someone unfamiliar with him takes him seriously and starts yet another >flame fest? > >  -Dan >   Hello. I am the David Sternlight keeper of the FAQ. Unfortuantely I cannot find it at the present time.  From the original FAQ:  Question: Does anyone take David Sternlight serious?  Fact: No one takes David Sternlight serious. They review his opinions and in most cases immediately discard them or jerk them over to alt.fan.david-sternlight which actually should be alt.flame.david-sternlight.  A photograph of David Sternlight for the curious:                             |\/\/\/\|                          |       |                          |  (o)(o)                          C       _)           David Sternlight                           |  ,___|            Net.Police                           |    /              a.k.a. PROUD               _0--------/\/----\/\-------0_   DICK OF              /         /0 \----/ 0\        \  THE INTERNET             /     |      \ \||/ /     |     \            /     /|DAVID    ||  POLICE|\     \          _/_____/ ||     ]  ||  | [#] || \_____\_         |_______/ |\____/   ||  \__*_/| \_______|                       Question: Why does David continue to relate mis statements regarding encryption and other topics?  Fact: David Sternlight has a chemical imbalance of the right side of his brain.
In article <strnlghtC5t4D6.Jn8@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:     Some countries have laws about importing crypto gear--I believe the U.S.    does. Without a license the above scheme won't work (at least not legally)    in such countries, including at least France and the U.S.     David  BZZT!  Wrong.  The US does NOT have crypto import laws.  -derek
In article <115713@bu.edu>, uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt) writes: > More than shocking.  What this says to me is no less than that  > government is very interested in monitoring the public.  This does more  > than scare me, it mortifies me.   If this is any surprise to you, *I'm* shocked.
In article <1993Apr22.223906.25929@lehman.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: >Qualcomm had spare cycles in the DSPs for their new CDMA digital >cellular phones. They wanted to put strong crypto into them since they >had the capacity. The government decided to "discourage" them.  You're blowing smoke.  Qualcomm wants to sell to nice, lucrative overseas markets like Japan and the EC.  The government told them "don't do encryption if you ever hope to export this technology".  The reason that CDMA doesn't have encryption is NOT because the G-men came a'knocking at Qualcomm's door. It's because Qualcomm doesn't think that the US market for digital cellular is big enough for them.  This is just the International Traffic in Arms Regulations all over again.  If you don't believe me, call Qualcomm and ASK THEM.  Don't just throw out conspicracy theories.  At least, don't do it on sci.crypt--there are whole other newsgroups devoted to this kind of uninformed claptrap.  >any "normal" company trying to put one out will likely get a visit >from the boys in the dark suits from Washington, just like Qualcomm >did. I suspect that companies like Cylink are tolerated because their >products are too expensive.  Hah.  They're not that much more expensive.  Besides, if a drug dealer can afford a Rolex and a Mercedes, he can darn well afford Cylink phones. No, Cylink sells their phones because they're willing to make different stuff for domestic use vs. export.  Qualcomm isn't.  So Cylink makes money--that's capitalism, comrade.  >Someone out there WILL build a unit to do all this. Better yet, >prehaps someone will produce a package that turns any 486 box with a >sound card into a secure phone.  "Someone" this and "someone" that.  If you think it's so easy, why are you whining on the net instead of getting your butt in gear and writing it?  Your name would become known and loved by dozens!  But no, that would require actual EFFORT.
whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (William W. Hughes) writes:  > Hell, just set up a spark jammer, or some other _very_ electrically-noisy > device.  This doesn't work, due to the near-field far-field effect. You may stop someone five yards away from listening in, but someone fifty yards away will be relatively unaffected - unless you pump out hundreds of watts and jam all  the neighbourhood TV's as well. In that case the government will stomp on you - ask any radio ham! Democratic governments care even more about their voters'  right to watch soap operas than they do about national security, and dictators  consider their propaganda to be an integral part of their national security.  And holland@cs.colostate.edu (Doug Holland) writes:  > Another idea: Use a laptop computer.  As mentioned earlier, the LCD screen > is a lot less noisy than a standard CRT, but since many laptops have power > supplies that run at 3 volts instead of 5, they would be considerably  > quieter.  I'm afraid this doesn't work either. We can pick up laptop screens without any problem.  Most of the so-called `low radiation' monitors are also useless. The description turns out to a marketing assertion rather than an engineering one.  We thought there might be a market for a monitor which was not as hugely expensive as the military Tempest kit, but which was well enough shielded to stop eavesdropping using available receivers. We built a prototype, it works, and it's still sitting on my lab bench. Commercial interest was exactly zero.  In the absence of open standards, a monitor which really is `low radiation' (and costs 500 dollars more) can't compete against a monitor which just claims to be `low radiation' (and whose only extra cost of production is the pretty blue sticker on the box).
pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes:   >The problem is, the people are not having the scope, or implicataions >pointed out to them.  Hell, most haven't even heard of Clipper, and >when they do, it will be in soothing language telling everyone how >nice the government is at 'letting them have' privacy.  [much more deleted]  >The people at large need to be informed.  BUT HOW?   I am but one person. >I try to talk to everyone that will listen, but I can hardly make any >kind of dent.  Here is how! Lets write a DOCUMENT which includes all the reasons we oppose Clipper, in clear, concise, non-techincal manner. I urge  everyone of you to take the (very simple) "start" below and repost it with changes. Let the text evolve until we reach something most of us like. Then, all of you should send a copy (with a personnel letter) to your congress critter, local reporter on sci/tech, etc.  Please, to make this a success, try to post only an "agreed" version, not flames. To respond to a flame to this, please change the subject to, e.g, "clipper scope - discussion".  -- Michael Golan    mg@cs.princeton.edu  [all of these are points - which should be made into paragraphs]  What is wrong with the clipper chip - By usenet users -----------------------------------------------------  1) It is secret.  2) How can we trust the escrow agencies? 3) It is not cost-effective 4) We want other encryption systems, the government seems to want to    disallow it in the future 5) Anyone can build a non-key system 6) We are worried about a back door 7) Once everyone uses a clipper chip, the mechanism for a Big-Brother    government is in place, a change of government can lead to it.     Especially since the escrow agencies operation is not governed by    law (so the president can change the rules to allow free access to    the keys at any time, e.g., during war) 8) Few criminals are caught by wiretaps, the cost [and risks] are unjustified 9) Once the FBI get hold of a key, it can decrypt past and future conversations
In article <strnlghtC5wHo2.1FK@netcom.com> (sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.org.ieee), strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > Maybe so, but it's quite common. There are millions of Macintosh users who > have no idea what's in Apple's patented ROMs. Many have modems connected. > How do you know all your business secrets aren't being stolen? Answer: > 1. Because you trust Apple; > 2. Because if any such attempt, however sophicsticated, came out, it would > destroy Apple's credibility forever. >   David,     Neither (1) or (2) apply with the government, though. The feds, unlike Apple, have repeatedly demonstrated that trust is an unsafe thread on which to hang your freedom. Why?  Because unlike Apple in (2), the govt has no credibility to lose. I'm serious about this. One can name just about any agency -- the IRS, RTC, FCC, FAA, FBI, NSA, CIA -- and find numerous examples of the public trust run roughshod over. Worse, one can rarely find in such  examples any serious consequences to the offending agency. Even supposing we could get a reign on trust somehow, there's always the matter of competence in govt agencies. Can they even trust themselves?    -mel    P.S. I was amused when you mentioned the USDA as an example of an agency capable of managing the an escrow. I'm a consultant to the USDA, and while those *I* work with are wonderful <grin>, the agency itself is ranked in industry publications such as Govt Computer News as one of the worst caretakers of its computer resources. Recently, Prime Time Live did a long segment on the USDA's computer troubles. They are making a concerted effort to change, but intentions don't make a track record.
It occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you, and the escrow houses release your code to the cops, your code is now no longer secure.  It's in the hands of cops, and while I am sure most of the time they are good, their security will not be as good as the escrow houses.   What this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you, at the end of the wiretap, they should be obligated to inform you that a tap was performed, and replace (for free) the clipper chip in your cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the escrow houses.  Do the police normally reveal every tap they do even if no charges are laid?   In many ways, it would be a positive step if they had to. Judges set time limits on warrants, I assume.  At the end of the time limit they should have to renew or replace your chip.   That's if we go with this scheme, which I am not sure I agree with.
I've recently moved from Unix to a DOS box and have a number of files  that I used crypt to "protect".  Does anyone know of a DOS version of  crypt?  I've found one, but it insists on six letter keys and I used  some shorter ones.  Thanks for your help.  -- Doug
In article <1993Apr16.055100.1@cc.curtin.edu.au>, zrepachol@cc.curtin.edu.au (Paul Repacholi) writes: ... > If you can't be bothered reading, get the video "Manufacturing Consent". >   In reply to mail queries; I don't know if a video is available yet. I asked about a month ao and was told RSN.  Several have also asked which of Chomskys books. My answer is ALL of them, and anything else you can get as well. How ever, due to irritations like the 24 hr day etc, I would say 'Manafacturing Conscent' first, them th last parts of 'Detering Democracy' ie the bits about the "domestic 3rd world". Chilling.  Anyone at MIT have a good St. Noam bibliography?
rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) writes:  >In article <1993Apr2.050451.7866@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>, cuffell@spot.Colorado.EDU  >(Tim Cuffel) writes:  >This suggests a new PC security product design approach - first fill the hard >drive with 50% random files and 50% files encrypted under a number of known  >keys. Then whenever a new secret file is created, you delete a random file and >replace it with real encrypted data. New non-secret files are encrypted under >a known key.     Better yet, instead of thrashing around on the DOS file system, take it a step further.  Write yourself a minimal "file system" program that is used to create/delete files, en/decrypt them to ramdisk, list a directory. Put the util, password protected, on a floppy.     The catch is that the storage space used by this util is NOT part of the DOS file system.  Instead, defrag your disk, thus packing all allocated clusters into clusters 0-n.  Then use the back end of the partition to hold your 'stealth' file system.  Or, leave a small 2nd partition on the disk that is not assigned to DOS.  Another approach might be to use a directory that contains a set of invariant files (DOS system files, for instance).  Due to DOS allocating a minimum storage  unit of a "cluster" there is unused physical space on the disk between the tail end of each file and the end of its associated cluster. These dead spaces could be concatenated and used to hold your stealth file system.     Now you have a situation where no encrypted data "appears" on your disk at all :-).
The only way to view this method of generating unit keys is as a back-door. What else can you call a key deterministically generated from the serial number?    To generate the unit key for a serial number N, the 30-bit value N is    first padded with a fixed 34-bit block to produce a 64-bit block N1.    S1 and S2 are then used as keys to triple-encrypt N1, producing a    64-bit block R1:  	   R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] .     Similarly, N is padded with two other 34-bit blocks to produce N2 and    N3, and two additional 64-bit blocks R2 and R3 are computed:    	   R2 = E[D[E[N2; S1]; S2]; S1]  	   R3 = E[D[E[N3; S1]; S2]; S1] .     R1, R2, and R3 are then concatenated together, giving 192 bits. The    first 80 bits are assigned to U1 and the second 80 bits to U2.  The    rest are discarded.  The unit key U is the XOR of U1 and U2.  U1 and U2    are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow    agencies.
I've got an idea that would remove most of the political complaints I have about the Clipper chip.  Pass a law stating that if, within a year of performaing a wiretap on someone, a police agency hasn't managed to convict the suspect of the crime the warrant/wiretap was for, then that agency owes the suspect $1 million to repay him/her for lost privacy.    Of course, there are *still* problems with the technical aspects of Clipper, and with the one-size-fits-all mentality that would be behind an attempt to enforce it as a standard.  But this would be a way for those in favor of allowing continued wiretaps to assure us that it will only be used in cases where the crime is important and the police are all but certain that there really will be a conviction....