waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  Meeting of the UK Cryptoprivacy Association - -------------------------------------------  Saturday, 8 May 1993, 1500  To be held at the offices of:    FOREST   4th floor   2 Grosvenor Gardens   London  SW1W 0DH  This is located at the corner of Hobart Place, a couple of blocks west of Victoria Station, and almost directly across from the dark green cabbie shelter.  If you have trouble finding the place, please call the office on 071-823-6550.  Or, call me (Russell Whitaker) on my pager, 081-812-2661, and leave an informative message with the telephone number where you can be reached; I will return the call almost immediately.  Discussion will range from the usual general topics, such as the use of secure public key cryptosystems to protect message data, to specific topics, such as recent moves by the U.S. government to restrict choice in data privacy (reference recent discussion on Usenet groups, e.g. sci.crypt and alt.security.pgp).  All are invited.  Particularly welcome are members of the newly-formed UK CommUnity group ... the local EFF-in-spirit-if-not-in-name folks.  Those who plan to attend should email me and let me know. Please.  All attendees are requested to bring diskettes - preferably MS-DOS - with their PGP 2.+ public keys.  As is usual at these gatherings, several of us will bring our laptops, and will sign public keys, subject to the usual caveats (reference the documentation for PGP 2.2, specifically files PGPDOC1.DOC and PGPDOC2.DOC).  If you do not already have a copy of PGP 2.2 (MS-DOS), and would like to have a copy of this public domain program, please bring a formatted, medium or high density 3.5 inch floppy PC diskette; you will be provided a copy of the program.  Of course, you might prefer to ftp a version of the program from one of the various archive sites.  I suggest trying Demon Internet Systems, which carries the full range of PGP (Phil Zimmerman's "Pretty Good Privacy") implementations: directory /pub/pgp at gate.demon.co.uk.  Meetings are of indeterminate time.  Those who are interested are invited to join the rest of us at a pseudorandomly determined pub afterwards.  Please note: - ------------ In the past few months, interested people have emailed me, requesting FAQs and special information mailings.  I regret that, except in very unusual cases (e.g. working press), I cannot, in a timely manner, respond to these requests.  I will, however - and for the first time - do a writeup of this meeting, which I will post in various places.  What I *am* willing to supply is general information on our activities for the maintainers of existing FAQs, such as that for alt.privacy.  FAQ maintainers can contact me at whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk  Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) ================ PGP 2.2 public key available =======================  -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2
jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes: > (I assume most of the time these guys sat around the office with their > thumbs up their ass as there isn't that much stuff coming out of > Columbus :)   CompuServe is in Columbus, OH.  So are the corporate headquarters of several  major insurance companies, the largest private R&D company in the world  (Batelle Memorial Institute), DCSC (The Defense Construction & Supply  Center), Ohio State University (one of the three largest US universities),  OCLC (the Online College Library Center), and so on.  You'd be amazed,  actually.  Columbus only *looks* like a cow town.
something that no one has discussed yet (or I missed it):  The FBI sets up a wiretap AFTER the court order was handed.  Only at this point they can access the line and detect  the serial number N.  What happens next, does the FBI simply asks for the keys for N, and, since a warrant was issued for the line, the FBI  simply gets it? What if multiple phones are used from the same house, the FBI just asks for N1, N2, etc.?  Exactly who is to prevent the FBI from claiming some other serial number, X, was also used over the wirtapped  line and get the keys for X?   Either a second court order (for the specific serial/key) is required (and I have seen no indication of this), or the FBI can effectively ask for any pair of keys at any time, so the escrow key holders are a total fake.  An unrelated issue: if and when all phones always use the clipper chip, how are call-transfers going to take  place?!
In article <C5K1CE.51A@sunfish.usd.edu>, vkub@charlie.usd.edu (Vince Kub) writes: |> Now, |> the original scheme as suggested here would be to have the key disappear if |> certain threatening conditions are met. Once the key is gone there is no |> question of Contempt of Court as there is nothing to compell, the key is no |> longer there to be produced.  Getting rid of the keys is actually pretty easy to do automatically on a communications link, as opposed to storage where the keys have to be retained somehow as long as the owner wants to be able to retrieve the data.  The right way to do communications security is to generate a random session key with Diffie Hellman, use it for a while and then destroy it. Once it's gone, there's no getting it back, and no way to decrypt recordings of the conversation.  To make sure you aren't being attacked by a man in the middle, you have to authenticate your DH exchanges. The AT&T secure phone does this by displaying the DH key so you can compare them verbally over the phone. This is nice and simple, but it relies on user awareness plus the inability of the man in the middle to duplicate the users' voices.  A better way is to authenticate the exchanges with RSA. Since you'd never use RSA for actual encryption, compromising your RSA secret key would only allow someone to impersonate you in a future conversation, and even that only until you revoke your public key.  They would still not be able to decrypt recordings of prior conversations for which the session keys have been destroyed.  I'm convinced that this is how the government's own secure phones (the STU-III) must work. Neat, eh?
In article <C5nMB1.CoF@news.claremont.edu> ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu (Eli Brandt) writes: >get their copy of your key.  Any criminal who's going to use >encryption will do it under cover of Clipper.  The only way to avoid >this will be to try to prohibit strong encryption.  This isn't true.  Today's criminals regularly use all sorts of unsafe methods, from cordless phones to cellular phones to plain old copper wire analog phones that you can put alligator clips on to plan and execute their crimes.  It is amazing how stupid they are, which is why the FBI was so keen on the digital telphony law, and its successor the clipper chip.  They're hoping here that most crooks will remain stupid, feel safe using clipper chip phones and get caught.
jfc@athena.mit.edu (John F Carr) writes: >	pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: >>Well, I'm not a lawyer, but from what I can tell this is completely >>and utterly untrue. > >>The U.S. does NOT have an official secrets act. We do have laws that >>will punish you for revealing what classified information you learned >>in your capacity as a government official, contractor, etc, and we >>have laws that prohibit stealing such information. However, if they >>sell you the chip, I can't see that they can make reverse engineering >>it and revealing the details illegal. > >In most cases information you come by properly is yours to use as you wish, >but there are certainly exceptions.  If you write a paper which includes >sufficiently detailed information on how to build a nuclear weapon, it is >classified.  As I understand the law, nuclear weapons design is >_automatically_ classified even if you do the work yourself.  I believe you >are then not allowed to read your own paper.  Oh? What about the precedent in which nuclear weapons information was published in "The Progressive"? I was under the impression that the court held that prior restraint could NOT be used. Any lawyers out there?  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
Exactly.  But I'll add another observation: if the chip does become a standard, the algorithm won't _remain_ secret.  Leaving the government with the only remaining option: to make use of un-escrowed keys illegal. Which won't begin to bother the terrorists and child abusers the government is so fond of referring to.  Note that the Federalist papers stress _one_ reason for the right of citizens to bear arms: to defend themselves _against_ the army. _Our_ army.  IMHO the _primary_ purpose of private crypto is defend ourselves _against_ the government. The odd terrorist I'm not worried about; the goverment damages my quality of life every day.  Rob
In some hobby shop, they sell a flexible tube (1/4-inch diameter, 18-inch ling) that will illuminate if you bend or shake it (it is also sold in amusement parks in the evenings). The brightness can last 2 to 4 hours. If it is left in refrigrator (in coldness), you can prolong its life of illumination.
In article <1993Apr18.233112.24107@colnet.cmhnet.org>, res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli) writes: |> >Sadly, it does not. Suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and |> >voice exemplars, and to take blood and DNA tests. |>  |> I am sure that Mike is correct on this point.  I am also pretty sure that |> administering "truth serum" would be ruled a violation of your right |> not to incriminate yourself.  But, what is the salient difference?  You can find the salient difference in any number of 5th amendment related Supreme Court opinions. The Court limits 5th amendment protections to what they call "testimonial" evidence, as opposed to physical evidence.  The whole question would hinge on whether a crypto key would be considered "testimonial" evidence. I suppose arguments could be made either way, though obviously I would hope it would be considered testimonial.
In article <strnlghtC5LGFI.JqA@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > > >Though I share many of the concerns expressed by some, I find the proposal >less threatening than many others, since right now most Americans have no >secure telephony, and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a "goat" can >eavesdrop. This would also plug up the security hole in cellular and >cordless phones. >  Oh great. Wonderful news. Nobody can listen in--except the feds. You believe that the feds offer the least threat to liberty of anyone, and I'm sure I do too.  Glad that jerk won't be tapping my phone anymore. --  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Hesse           |          A man,      jhesse@netcom.com    |                 a plan,  Moss Beach, Calif    |                         a canal, Bob.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  In article <1pq0re$gc2@network.ucsd.edu> loki@sdphu3.ucsd.edu (Lance M Cottrell) writes:     BTW I have not been able to get pgp to produce a signature    that I can attatch to the end of this message.  What is     the procedure?  Thanks.  try: 	pgp -sat +clearsig=on  This will do the clearsig signing...  Enjoy!  - -derek  PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server: 	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu  -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2  iQBuAgUBK8DNazh0K1zBsGrxAQFoZQLEC/XKXMoDhCPf/AZ3aOQSLfz+6w400UDk Ng6prxnPuEuSZQEiiusMCVcRcGnWbaVrxFjA1o4yubh01Czcg3ZC9wLJolXlxJn7 iSJh/eTZxmJnNynJxlGs0Ao= =4eZb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
U23590@uicvm.uic.edu writes: >The cryptographic algorythm MUST be kept secret, or >private individuals could make ClipperClones with >which they could transmit messages which the feds would not have >ready access to.      Not necessarily.  I've been thinking about this, and if this chip/scheme is to provide any real security, there must be some sort of key exchange, either using a public-key encryption scheme, or using a key exchange scheme like Diffie-Hellman.  If there's an out-of-band transmission of a shared session key, then what protects that band from eavesdropping?  If the phone company or some other online central authority generates a session key and sends it to both users, then what's the point of going to the trouble of having some complicated key-depositories?  Just ask the phone company for a copy of the session key for each call.      Now, it's probably not practical for each user to keep an online copy of every public key used by anyone anywhere, right?  So, probably, there will be some way of getting these keys verified.  This might be a digitally- signed (by the chip manufacturer) copy of the public key in this unit, stored by this unit.  It might also be an online directory with access to everyone's public keys.  (This would introduce another weakness to the security of the scheme, of course.)  Presumably, if you don't use your designated key, you can't get a verified connection to other standard chips.      It might be useful to have a modified chip, which would allow you to use either the original public/private key pair, or some other key pair and verification scheme.  Unfortunately, this would not allow you to call most people and establish secure communications....
In article <WARLORD.93Apr24232556@podge.mit.edu> warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins) writes: <In article <strnlghtC5t4D6.Jn8@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: < <   Some countries have laws about importing crypto gear--I believe the U.S. <   does. Without a license the above scheme won't work (at least not legally) <   in such countries, including at least France and the U.S. < <   David < <BZZT! < <Wrong.  The US does NOT have crypto import laws.  I'd not be so sure about that:  Are there any MUNITIONS import laws, and could those be used against importation of crypto hardware/software as well as firearms?  Importing so-called 'assault weapons' for use by commoners come to mind....  NOTE - talk.politics.guns added to Newsgroups for possible feedback...
>Clipper also allows an extraordinary opportunity for the criminal to >conceal use of super-encryption.  An automated full-system surveillance >mechanism (quite feasible across radio bandwidth) which knows family key F, >can validate Clipper wrappers and N:ESN associations, but it cannot reveal >in realtime the use of super-encryption, unless it knows all unit keys, >which we are being assured are only to be made available in two separate >pieces, upon specific wiretap-like order.
Clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of encryption.  Currently, when you send an encrypted message, an opponent can usually tell 1) that you are using encryption 2) which encryption method you are using [because that information is usually in the clear].  With clipper, most opponents will only know that you are sending clipper-text, they won't know that your clipper-text is itself encoded.  Only those few opponents who get your clipper-keys will know that your message is double encrypted.  ... kind of like a safety deposit box containing a lock box.  So, don't just think of replacements for clipper, also think of front ends.  - Carl
D. Wigglesworth (smhanaes@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca) wrote:  : Do you know of any freely distributable c++ (or c) code for public : key cryptography (such as RSA)?    : I've tried various archie searches to no avail.    Have you heard of PGP? I assume from your post that you have not. PGP 2.2 is a freeware RSA encryption program which includes digital signatures and comprehensive key management facilities. Most sites also keep the source code. A growing number of people are using this excellent software to encrypt (to a very high standard) their email and data. Get it before Clinton outlaws it.  Two of the many sites are:       rsa.com     /pub/pgp       soda.berkeley.edu      /pub/cypherpunks/pgp  Hope this helps,  Jon
In article <WCS.93Apr26141950@rainier.ATT.COM> wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes:  >   The serial number will be in a 64 bit block, with a 34 bit filler.  Doesn't >   take a lot to check to see if that is correct. > >Depends on whether the filler is a constant (makes checking easy, >but susceptible to replay), or variable (e.g. timer, counter, random), >which makes replay harder and can also make it easier for the >inquisitors to know if they've missed messages, or gotten them out of >sequence, or other interesting things that sort of person might care about.  I'd use a secret (nope, obscure) cryptographic encoding to expand the  30 bit serial number to a 64 bit block. The redundancy hereby introduced  can be used to detect tampered Clipper signals where some public enemy  replaced the L.E. block by random data.   And of course the L.E. block would be used to initialise the encryption  of the user data so that at the receiving end the correct L.E. block must  be processed in order to have any chance of getting the plaintext back.   For those of you who might want to mangle the L.E. block (e.g. by xor-ing  a constant pattern) on the transmission line and restore it before feeding  it into the receiving Crippler Chip I would add further encrypted copies  of this block (perhaps created by repeated application of the encryption  algorithm or so) at regular intervals during the transmission. If the  receiving chip detects a mismatch it must assume that the line is bad and  it will cease to work; in your own interest you are protected from getting  faulty plaintext, you know -- it's just like a checksum for your own  safety ;-(.   The `monitoring agencies' won't have the famous black box which is needed  for actual decryption and will be kept by the FBI; but nothing prevents  them from using special boxes which will do the redundancy check for the  serial number block and consistency checks on the embedded L.E. blocks  within the transmission. These boxes will turn a red light on as soon as  they detect a bitstream that violates the correct protocol.  So don't anyone think that you can use the chip and fool L.E. about the  tapping key -- I bet the developpers have provided much better checks  than those suggested above. Of course it's absolutely crucial that the  algorithms (and protocols) remain secret. Personally I doubt they will.
In article <1qnupd$jpm@news.intercon.com> amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes:     From: amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker)     jhesse@netcom.com (John Hesse) writes:    > Oh great. Wonderful news. Nobody can listen in--except the feds.      Hey, it's better than the status quo.     I am far less worried about "the feds" tapping my phone than high school     scanner surfers who get their kicks out of eavesdropping on cellular and     cordless phone calls.  I'm a political dissident. I'm scared shitless of the feds listening in on my calls. My opinions are the sort that would get me "disappeared" in a slightly less free society -- and who knows what sort of society we will be in in five or ten years? I have friends who have had their phones tapped -- none of this is theoretical to me.  As for "its better than the status quo", well, first of all, you can get a cryptophone from companies like Cylink today -- and they work well. In addition, a number of groups are now working on building software to turn any PC into a privacy enhanced phone right now -- and they are all working in overdrive mode.     And yes, I'd rather just see all crypto restrictions lifted, but this is at     least an incrememental improvement for certain applications...  There ARE no crypto restrictions... yet. You can use anything you want RIGHT NOW. The point is to maintain that right.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
In article <1993Apr16.001321.3692@natasha.portal.com> bob@natasha.portal.com (Bob Cain) writes:  >: I hope my cynicism is misplaced here.  Go ahead...I'm not afraid to >: be wrong every once in a while.  But, I have an uneasy feeling that I >: am right.  :( > >It is and you are wrong yet you emotionally state a bunch of crap as fact >with a tiny disclaimer at the end.  Check your facts first and grow up. >Why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography >and immaturity I wonder.  Oh, I see, flame someone, tell them that they are immature, tell them they are wrong, and then don't offer any proof for your assertions.  You really *are* a putz.  Put up or shut up.  cpk
brad@optilink.COM (Brad Yearwood) writes: >In article <1993Apr22.222016.25628@lehman.com>, pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: >> You obviously haven't read the information about the system. The chips >> put out serial number infomation into the cypher stream to allow >> themselves to be identified. The system does not rely on registering >> people as owning particular phone units. >>  >> I am against the proposal, but lets be accurate in our objections. >>  > >Do not presume to tell me what I have and have not read.  The system may >not rely upon registering people as owning particular phone units, but >it is necessary to know which phone units are likely to be used for some >suspected criminal communication before you can obtain their unit keys >from escrow.  Big deal. If you are a legitimate law enforcement agent and have a legitimate wiretap order, you just listen in on the line for 10 minutes, get the serial number, and then take the order and go to the escrow agencies. If you notice the criminal is now using a different phone instrument, take your still-valid wiretap order to the escrow agency with the new serial number. (This provides opportunities for abuse by law enforcement, but thats not what we are discussing right now.) I oppose Clipper, but the mechanics here are simple and easy to understand. The whole rest of your article is based on a large series of false premises, all predicated on the notion that this simple act is somehow impossible.  I feel free to presume to tell you that you do not seem to understand the mechanics of the proposal. Arguing that terrorists will be killing people for their clipper phones is silly because its pointless. Lets be alarmist about what really would show up as a problem, shall we?  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
In article <49@shockwave.win.net> jhupp@shockwave.win.net (Jeff Hupp) writes: >  >>In article <1raeir$be1@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: [some deleted] >> >>Unlike the CIA, the NSA has no prohibition against domestic spying.  Read >>Bamford's THE PUZZLE PALACE. >> >>Bruce >> >        I have that book, and the way I read it is, one side of the >conversation MUST be from outside the United States. >        Of coures, that ASS U MEs that the NSA plays by the rules...  One thing that seems ambiguous is whether a signal being echoed down from geosynchronous orbit is "...from outside the United States."  Also, being able to assess whether NSA is playing by the rules requires knowing what the rules are. We only know a subset. For those even more suspicious, there could be other surveillance organizations "blacker" than the NSA.
|>    > Just curious, how would the Clipper Chip system handle |>    > conference calls?   |> Depending on the encryption system, so long as everyone has the same |> key, it can be done.  For example, I was using "vat", which is an |> Internet Audio tool, for a conference call, and we were encrypting the |> session.  (Unfortunately, one site was doing more work, and didn't |> have the CPU for it, so it didn't sound all that good at a different |> site)  You would have to use something other than the AT&T black box - in other words, I don't think public key would work.  The session key would have  to be agreed upon prior to the conversation and distributed to all  sites beforehand.  Or go out and get a STU-III ;-)  --  Doug Bank                       Private Systems Division dougb@ecs.comm.mot.com          Motorola Communications Sector dougb@nwu.edu                   Schaumburg, Illinois dougb@casbah.acns.nwu.edu       708-576-8207