waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <1993Apr22.125402.27561@fripp.ri.cadre.com> rj@ri.cadre.com writes: >Someone in Canada asked me to send him some public domain DES file >encryption code I have.  Is it legal for me to send it?  I believe it's legal to send DES code or equipment from the US to Canada with no export license.  I think this is the only place you can do this - all other countries require a license.  As an aside, I've always thought it should be legal to send DES software anywhere, if you follow these rules:     1.  Encrypt your DES software with DES.    2.  Send the encrypted software to the recipient.    3.  Send the key to the recipient.  The only way the person on the other end can use your DES software is if he/she already *has* DES available - otherwise, they can't decrypt your program, and it is useless.  If you've guaranteed they already have DES, have you really violated any law by sending it to them in the form of your program??  I'm sure it's still illegal, but it seems like a good idea...
] gtoal@news.ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal) writes: ] > Try reading between the lines David - there are *strong* hints in there  ] > that they're angling for NREN next,  ] Where?  I honestly didn't see any...  Hint 1:  : Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to : protect electronic funds transfer.  It is now being used to : protect electronic mail and computer files.  While encryption   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  Hint 2:  : This new technology will help companies protect proprietary : information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations : and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ : electronically.  At the same time this technology preserves the   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  :      --   the privacy of our citizens, including the need to :           employ voice or data encryption for business purposes;                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ :      --   the ability of authorized officials to access telephone :           calls and data, under proper court or other legal                   ^^^^^^^^ :           order, when necessary to protect our citizens;  VERY BIG HINT 3:  # The Administration is committed to working with the private # sector to spur the development of a National Information # Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer # technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to # information.  This infrastructure of high-speed networks # ("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV # programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone # system transmits voice.  VERY BIG HINT 4: (See above)  ## Since encryption technology will play an increasingly important ## role in that infrastructure, the Federal Government must act ## quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding ## its use.  ] > and the only conceivable meaning of  ] > applying this particular technology to a computer network is that they  ] > intend it to be used in exclusion to any other means of encryption.   ] I disagree, if for no other reason than that there are already other  ] standards in place.  Besides, even if they restrict encryption on the NREN,  ] who cares?  Most of the Internet is commercial anyway.  The NREN is only for  ] geovernment and university research (read the proposals--it's a "data  ] superhighway" for Cray users, not anything having to do with the Internet).  Oh, I see your point.  I think you're wrong.  But if you sit back and wait to find out if I'm right, it'll be too late.  Just listen *very* carefully for the first 'such and such will not be permitted on network XYZ' shoe to drop.
geoff@ficus.cs.ucla.edu (Geoffrey Kuenning) writes: >Bullshit.  The *Bush* administration and the career Gestapo were >responsible for this horror, and the careerists presented it to the >new presidency as a fait accompli.  That doesn't excuse Clinton and >Gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it, but let's lay >the body at the proper door to start with.  The final stages of denial... I can hardly imagine what the result would have been if the Clinton administration had actually supported this plan, instead of merely acquiescing with repugnance as they've so obviously doing.  I don't believe the chip originated with the Clinton administration either, but the Clinton administration has embraced it and brought it to fruition.  Both of the major parties have what they consider excellent reasons for limiting your freedoms and violating your privacy, and even seem to feel that they're doing you a favor.  If this is really surprising to anyone it means they've been willfully ignoring quite a bit of previous evidence.  There's only one political party (not calling anarchists a party) that considers your freedom and privacy goals worthy in and of themselves.  If you're voting for the big two, you're supporting a reduction of those rights (given their goals and their histories), regardless of whether you personally support that reduction.  To paint Clinton and Gore as unwitting tools is really stretching things.
Notwithstanding all the legitimate fuss about this proposal, how much of a change is it?  ATT's last product in this area (a) was priced over $1000, as I suspect 'clipper' phones will be; (b) came to the customer  with the key automatically preregistered with government authorities. Thus, aside from attempting to further legitimize and solidify the fed's posture, Clipper seems to be "more of the same", rather than a new direction.    Yes, technology will eventually drive the cost down and thereby promote more widespread use- but at present, the man on the street is not going to purchase a $1000 crypto telephone, especially when the guy on the other end probably doesn't have one anyway.  Am I missing something?    The real question is what the gov will do in a year or two when air- tight voice privacy on a phone line is as close as your nearest pc.  That has got to a problematic scenario for them, even if the extent of usage never surpasses the 'underground' stature of PGP.
I posted an informational request about any electronically available articles on cryptographic algorithms a couple of days ago.  As I mentioned, I was interested, in particular, in DES and Public-Key -- but also wouldn't mind learning about others.  As I said, I can read an intro-graduate level text book, having had some mathematics, though not much number-theory per se.  I'd like to see the technical details of the mathematics of cryptography, as oppossed to the popularizations of things like _scientific am_ which just say, "then you find a *really* big prime number....".  Following my request, several people were so kind as to suggest reading-lists, which I hope to get around to.  Two other people were so *very* kind as to send large documents, which I presume were actual articles (about 1000 lines each); but I've stupidly deleted them accidentally before having a chance even to skim them.  If they can forgive me for my careless use of file-commands, would the original senders be so kind as to resend? Or anyone else who has good crypto-articles at a fairly technical mathematical level? Also, ftp-able or gopher-able docs would be nice to know about.  Yours, Lulu...
In article <Apr13.011855.69422@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes: >I'm not a lawyer, so correct me if I'm wrong, but doing that could be >considered obstruction of justice, which could land you in prison for >quite a while. > >The thing that's great about the secret key is it is IDEA encrypted, so >even if the FBI do get the key, they're SOL unless they know the magic >word.  If they try to force you to give them your pass phrase, just say >"Oops, I forgot."  Since the burden of proof is still on the prosecution >in this country, if you keep your mouth shut, how can they prove that you >didn't forget your pass phrase. >   OK, Doug is right, it would be obstruction of justice, blah blah blah, BUT, saying "I forgot" is a lie, which is just as bad from a moral point of view _IF_ you think "lawfulness" is a good in and of itself (which  admittedly most people do not.)  But there's an even better way out of this. PROVIDED the government is prosecuting you criminally, you can probably plead the fifth amendmeent and thus LEGALLY avoid revealing your key.  The government cannot demand information from a criminal defendant which "may tend to incriminate" that defendant.  Though this has never been applied in the cryptography context (at least as far as I can tell) it seems an obvious application to me.     This may be a common suggestion in this group, but if it's not (I'm new here) I'd love to hear what people have to say about it.  Since I don't really read this group (and since the subject matter is more legal than cryptoid) maybe misc.legal.computing would be an appropriate place?    Steve.
> > Criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications  > >(specifically the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow  > >cite as threats) will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of  > >a legitimate user, and to kill this person or hold them hostage so  > >discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed.   >Why doing it in such a rough manner? It is much more professional to  >steal the chip from the phone and even to replace it with a  >pin-compatible do-nothing chip that does not encrypt at all. Chances  >are that the victim will not notice anything, especially if it is done  >professionally.    Assuming that the bad guys can easily obtain substitute chips which don't cause any noticeable effect to either the user or the person at the other end of the line (if there is any significant difficulty to obtaining such chips, some of the criminals will decide to fall back on the murder/kidnap method).   > > Once a suitable collection of devices is stolen, criminals can communicate  > >with impunity (assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from  > >key escrow) until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other  > >means.   > No, because the Feds will still be able to decrypt the conversations.  >True, they'll blame the wrong guys, but nevertheless one cannot say  >something like "The drugs arrive tommorrow on the ship 'Terminus'"  >when the Feds are listening, even if they cannot identify who the  >speaker is.   This assumes that the Feds are tapping Clipper phones belonging to ordinary citizens (getting such a phone is the whole point of the crime under discussion).  To be sure, I wouldn't put it past them -- but raising the possibility of such crime has the benefit of forcing the Feds to either 'fess up about such intentions in advance or state that using Clipper exposes the user to an additional criminal threat. <g>   > No, the criminals will just use some secure encryption. The new  >proposal does not stop criminals; it ensures that the government will  >be able to wiretap the average citizen and stops the casual snooper.  >To me, it also clearly looks as a step towards outlawing any other  >strong encryption devices.
>encryption's dual-edge sword:  encryption helps to protect the >privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield >criminals and terrorists.  We need the "Clipper Chip" and other  "Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves." -- William Pitt
I have a question about digital communications encryption:  	The Fact Sheet mentioned encryption/decryption microcircuitry with  special "keys" for law enforcement for wire tapping purposes.  	If I wanted to, couldn't I develop  encryption of my own?  That is, if me and a partner in crime had unique Encryption/decryption devices installed before the "tappable" one, couldn't we circumvent the "keys" system?  Or replace it?  	I'd be really interested in knowing how the E/D microcircuits might be made to prevent such befuddlement! (Laymans' Language, please! maybe a bit technical...)  Please E-mail to me, as I'm not in Net News as much as I'd like to be!   Pete deuelpm@craft.camp.clarkson.edu
Alan Barrett (barrett@lucy.ee.und.ac.za) wrote: > In article <C5LGAz.250@dove.nist.gov>, > clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) writes: >  >> In making this decision, I do >> not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the >> government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that >> are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key- >> escrow system. >  > "In making this decision, I intend to prevent the private sector from > developing, except with the government's approval, other microcircuits > or algorithms that are more effective in assuring privacy." >   Doesn't this just mean that the government might not approve something for use by other government agencies.  This does not sound to me to be any form of threat that Joe User can't develop and use his own encryption algorithm.
Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >Actually, I am *completely* baffled by why Dorothy Denning has chosen >to throw away her academic respectability like this.  It looks to me >like a *major* Career Limiting Move.  There can be very few people >who know what she's been saying who take her seriously any more.  I'm not sure it is a major limiting move... in the academic circles I've seen, arguing for increased government intervention and management is almost always a plus (not the least because it usually means more high paying jobs for academics as "advisors").  Also consider that it looks like Denning has some decent NSA / government connections, which is always a plus for an academic institute that wants more government funding and work tossed their way.  Despicable, yes; career limiting, well, the publicity probably outweighs the drawbacks.  And there are a whole bunch of people who think the whole thing is just peachy keen. If it's only going to be used against drug dealers, child pornographers, and terrorists, well it must be good. :p
In <nagleC5w79E.7HL@netcom.com> nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle) writes:  >       Since the law requires that wiretaps be requested by the Executive >Branch and approved by the Judicial Branch, it seems clear that one >of the key registering bodies should be under the control of the >Judicial Branch.  I suggest the Supreme Court, or, regionally, the >Courts of Appeal.  More specifically, the offices of their Clerks.  Now THAT makes sense.  But the other half must be in a non-government escrow.  (I still like EFF, but I admin their security has not been tested.)
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  > Some of the more notorious self-styled dissidents here, for example, have > already got their heads so high above the tall grass that they'd have little > chance of getting a clearance.  If there are many as..., er, people in the USA who reason like the above, then it should not be surprising that the current plot has been allowed to happen...  Regards, Vesselin
In article <1qnav4$r3l@transfer.stratus.com>, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes... >In article <C5LGAz.250@dove.nist.gov> clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) writes: >  >>Further, the Attorney General >>shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture >>Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase. >  >Talk about adding insult to injury ...  >  >I, for one, believe that the use of civil forfeiture should be abolished by >a decent administration, not continued.  Instead, it looks like that >ill-gotten gain will be used to help pay for wiretap equipment.  I wholeheartedly agree.  Knowing that WE have let our law enforcement agencies seize our property against the Fifth Amendment of OUR Constitution tells me that we are absolving ourselves of our responsibility for SELF-GOVERNANCE.  WE have to take our government back from the self-serving politicians who create laws and rules only to better their positions within the government.  WE have allowed them to take too much power from the people of this nation.  That situation has to be changed.  Allowing the law enforcement agencies to use the seized property to pay-off drug informants who lie and continue to deal in drugs is tantamount to making a pact with the Devil himself.  It's a vicious cycle.  The law enforcement agencies are motivated to seize property to fund their own activities.  And having no easy way for the citizen to regain the property intact once taken gives even more incentive for the agencies to take property.  It's also interesting to note that two months ago Rush Limbaugh said that Clinton would have the "plumbers" out in force shortly.  Clinton and his henchmen firmly believe in strong ubiquitous government control.  Anytime a leader believes in that, the leader will use every means possible to retain that control and take more.  WE have to take OUR government back.  Otherwise we will end up living in the equivalent of a high-tech third world dictatorship.  We have to take responsibility for ourselves, our personal welfare, and our actions.
brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton): }And yes, this has to be a public key system or it would be almost }impossible to handle.  It might not be RSA, but that does not mean }that PKP doesn't get paid.  Until 1997, PKP has the patent on the }general concept of public key encryption, as well as the particular }implementation known as RSA.  Hmm, my first thought was that they're using Diffie-Hellman exponential session key exchange, or an equivalent.  However, the Diffie-Hellman patent, like the Hellman-Merkle one on public key systems, claims all equivalents, so the basic point stands.  Interestingly, a quote from Jim Bidzos showed up in the media real soon after the announcement, and he sounded very pissed.  Maybe he hadn't yet realized that PKP might have just struck gold?  All they have to do is get someone to admit the general scheme that the Clipper uses. --- Jef
In article <tcmayC5z3yE.F38@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: >It is unclear whether obtaining the key at time 0 also unlocks >messages recorded (by whomever) at earlier times. The announcement was >silent on this. The betting seems to be that once your key has been >obtained (by the authorities, by divorce lawyers, by the Mafia, by the >FBI, by lost or stolen backup tapes, by the NSA, etc.). all previous >conversations are unsecure. (Session keys are negotiated, but knowing >the private key is believed by many commentators here to break the >security. No doubt more details will emerge.)  It is completely clear. You have to assume that each byte that was encrypted by this 'Clipper Chip' has been compromised.  Some people wondered, why Denning, Hellman and others did not respond, when asked what would be done about such compromised phones, or if compromise could not be restricted in time. (I did too) Let us just assume that a) They do not know and b) Those who know don't tell and c) They do not care. It seem's to be an 'Other Person's Problem' ...   gec
Sorry, my news reader doesn't seem to know how to copy a subject header. This tracks the thread "why people don't need strong crypto....."  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 expressly forbids *thinking* about building nuclear devices.  While I was in grad school, a friend of mine got a  security clearance to work on the defense for the Progressive magazine. He found lots of articles which were public domain *removed* from the local engineering library (Madison Wisconsin).  So the lawyers sent him all over the states to other libraries to show that the information in the article was already public.  What pissed everyone off was a local underground paper went and published the article anyway (it had been precensored by the feds, that's what this was all about) so the judge declared the case moot.  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has never been tested in court.  From my discussions with several people familiar with the case, only 2 other times has this preemptive clause been used.  In every case the people simply did what they felt like and courts tossed the cases out.  For all intents and purposes, the government *does* have precidence for declaring things classified *after* it has been published.  While I was working on Star Wars this happened to me: my clearance was in the works and I developed a method for tracking particle beams.  It was good enough to classify, so I was no longer allowed to work on it.  A friend from Canada was in the same boat: he developed a method to compute stripping cross sections, but because the subject was classified *he was not allowed to present his own paper at a conference!*.  He later published it in an open journal without problems.  When the going gets wierd, the wierd turn pro.  The feds can do whatever they want whenever they feel like it, and they will make up rules to let themselves get away with it.  Since the mass media can't tell the difference between a joke and the real thing (like "ranch appocolypse" for the Waco massacre) don't count on them to help spread the word about their loss of freedom.  The government *can* make strong crypto illegal.  SO WHAT? Since the government does not obey any of its own rules, why should we?
In article <C5uup3.5wp@news.claremont.edu> ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu (Eli Brandt) writes:    In article <1993Apr21.132318.16981@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes:    >Remember that they've promised to let a committee of outside experts see    >the cryptosystem design.     I hope there are some silicon jocks on the committee who can follow    the algorithm through to hardware.  While I doubt the NSA would pull    any monkey business on this point -- they have to expect that the    chip will be reverse-engineered sooner or later -- it's an obvious    opportunity to introduce additional holes.  The chip isn't the place to pull the monkey business - you do it in the key generation, either by having a mathematical backdoor, or by having the program on the laptop that supposedly generates the keys also save a copy of S1 and S2 and leak it out somehow, or by having the program that supposedly puts the official keys on the chip actually put a *different* key there (VERY hard to detect, since the escrow agents have to either trust the NSA laptop or give each other the S* keys, and they still don't know the algorithm.) Or have the chip-burner at the factory make copies of the keys. Or whatever.
Charles Kincy (ckincy@cs.umr.edu) wrote: :  : All I have to say is...yeah, right.  If you're willing to pay them : mucho big bucks and/or use the routines *they* tell you to do.   : Doesn't sound very reasonable to me.  All I have to say is this is full of shit.  I have negotiated a license and the bucks are incredibly reasonable with an upfront charge on a sliding scale depending on your capitalization.  If you are a startup and can't afford it you can't afford to start up in the first place. Why do people insist on making unequivocal statements about that which they know nothing.  :  : But I don't guess PKP and RSA are interested in big bucks.  Maybe : they have some other agenda?  Secure communications only for  : government agents, perhaps?  Have you considered treatment for paranoia?  The government is the single biggest thorn in RSA's side.  :  : Some limitation.  Let me guess:  don't use the code in any way PKP or : RSA doesn't like....such as...providing secure communications for the : average citizen.  That was exactly its purpose if you know anything about it.  There is nothing at all preventing the average citizen using it, only selling it.  :  : I hope my cynicism is misplaced here.  Go ahead...I'm not afraid to : be wrong every once in a while.  But, I have an uneasy feeling that I : am right.  :(  It is and you are wrong yet you emotionally state a bunch of crap as fact with a tiny disclaimer at the end.  Check your facts first and grow up. Why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography and immaturity I wonder.