waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:  >Brad Templeton (brad@clarinet.com) wrote: >: It occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you, and the escrow >: houses release your code to the cops, your code is now no longer secure. >:  >: It's in the hands of cops, and while I am sure most of the time they are >: good, their security will not be as good as the escrow houses. >:  >: What this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you, >: at the end of the wiretap, they should be obligated to inform you that >: a tap was performed, and replace (for free) the clipper chip in your >: cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the >: escrow houses.  >Getting the court order to reveal the key *also* makes decipherable >all *past* conversations (which may be on tape, or disk, or whatver), >as I understand the proposal. I could be wrong, but I've seen no >mention of "session keys" being the escrowed entities.  >As the EFF noted, this raises further issues about the fruits of one >bust leading to incrimination in other areas.  >But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much >worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper" >to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main >concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)  >And it may also become much worse if the ostensible security is >increased, thus allowing greater access to "central office" records by >the government (the conversations being encrypted, who will object to >letting the government have access to them, perhaps even automatically >archiving large fractions...). This was one of the main objections to >the S.266 proposal, that it would force telecom suppliers to provide >easy access for the government.  >One the government has had access to months or years of your encrypted >conversations, now all it takes is one misstep, one violation that >gets them the paperwork needed to decrypt *all* of them!  >Do we want anyone to have this kind of power?  >-Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime    A remark I heard the other day is beginning to take on increasingly frightening significance.  The comment was made that "In other parts of the world the Democrats [note the big "D"] would be known as Socialists"     A [note the small "d"] democrat who wonders what Thomas Jefferson, on this the 250th anniversary of his birth, would have thought of the state of affairs between the government and the governed.   ------- Any views expressed are those of myself and not my employer. -------- Steven C. Johnson, WB3IRU / VK2GDS      | TRW                                     | johnson@trwacs.fp.trw.com FP1 / 3133                              |         [129.193.172.90] 1 Federal Systems Park Drive            | Phone:        +1 (703) 968.1000 Fairfax, Virginia  22033-4412  U.S.A.   | Fax:          +1 (703) 803.5189
In article <1993Apr23.183655.13710@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: > >That is -- the cops send the LEF to the F-holder.  The F-holder strips >off F, and sends U[K],N to the escrow agents.  They send either U or K >to the cops.  (Don says U, I say K.)  The cops can't use U in the >future, because they can't strip off F.  The F-holder never sees U.  In >Don's model, the escrow agents can't read the traffic, because they >don't have K; in my model, they have K, but not the message itself. >And I trust that more because I think the cops and the FBI (the >F-holder) are more likely to collaborate on breaking the rules.  The >net result is that by involving the F-holder and the escrow agents on >every tap, we can avoid extending permission to tap.  I've been reading this board passively for a while now and find the subject absolutely fascinating, especially from the point of view of a civil rights nut like myself.  My problem is that I'm new to the field and paragraphs like the above keep popping up.  I'm sure what Mr.  Bellovin is writing about is both fascinating and important, but I have  NO IDEA what it means.  :-)         Anyway I'm keen to learn and will read anything I can get my hands on that explains this stuff in lay terms (I have a decent CS background, but not a huge amount of hyper-advanced math).  Can anyone point me to a FAQ or a decent source of information about the guts of current cryptography and maybe a little history as well?  I read the piece in this month's WIRED, can anyone tell me how much I should trust the references they suggest?    Thanks in advance,    Steve.
In article <1993Apr21.132318.16981@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes:     In article <C5sy1z.4tD@demon.co.uk>, Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes:    > In article <1993Apr20.192105.11751@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes:    > :Thousands?  Tens of thousands?  Do some arithmetic, please...  Skipjack    > :has 2^80 possible keys.    >     > We don't yet know if all 80 bits count.     That doesn't worry me at all; they're not going to cheat at something    they can get caught at.  And key size is one of the things that can be    verified externally.  Feed lots of random key/input pairs into the    chip, then try flipping random key bits, and see what happens to the    output.  We already know what *should* happen -- about half the output    bits should vary, on average, from a 1-bit key change or input change.     If they were out to build a weak cryptosystem, it might be the case that    some of the bits are much less powerful than others, in the sense that    they only enter into the encryption very late in the game.  By contrast,    DES was designed to use each key bit as early as possible; the 50% output    change rate appears as early as round 5.  Again, though, I don't think    NSA is going to cheat that crudely; they're likely to get caught.  Consider a cryptosytem that starts out by XORing bits 23 and 47, and not using either of these bits except through this XOR. This system makes early use of every bit. but an exhaustive key search would now only have 2^79 keys to search. Your test by varying single key bits wouldn't turn up anything interesting.     Remember that they've promised to let a committee of outside experts see    the cryptosystem design.  If you assume something DES-like, a biased    subkey generation schedule will stick out like a sore thumb.  The algorithm I suggest above would stick out like a sore thumb, but I'm sure I could design a system with a more subtle key redundancy which was well-hidden, but would still make an exhaustive key search take far less than 2^80 encryptions. I don't believe your claim that the real keysize can be verified externally.
In article <strnlghtC5t3K6.InF@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >>After the Waco Massacre and the Big Brother Wiretap Chip, any tactic >>is fair. > >This is pernicious nonsense! 	In what way David?  Our government is totally out of control, 	whether you realize it or not.  I know you find it painful to 	think of your old buddy Uncle Sam as evil but it's true.  Other 	democracies have fallen before.  Ours is on its way and knee-jerk 	sheep that instinctively trust government are helping it slide. 	Power corrupts David, why is that so hard to understand?
Shaun P. Hughes (sphughes@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu) wrote: : In article <1r3jgbINN35i@eli.CS.YALE.EDU> jgfoot@minerva.cis.yale.edu writes: [deletion] : >Perhaps these encryption-only types would defend the digitized porn if it : >was posted encrypted? : > : >These issues are not as seperable as you maintain. : >  : Now why would anyone "post" anything encrypted? Encryption is only of  : use between persons who know how to decrypt the data.  : And why should I care what other people look at?
In article <bontchev.734787730@fbihh>, bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev) wrote: >  > ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley) writes: >  > > : Coca-Cola has always understood it. >  > > Coca-cola is made under licence in dozens of countries around the > > world.  You're crazy if you think PepsiCo doesn't know the recipe. >  > In all those countries Coca-cola is distributed in a form of > concentrate what the local producers simply mix with water and other > simple ingredients. The trick is to know what is in the concentrate... >   I don't know if this is still true, but at one time Coca-Cola took elaborate measures to keep the formula secret.  For instance, several plants in different cities each made one of six partial concentrates, which were then shipped back-and forth and remixed in a complicated scheme so that no single plant made the whole formula.  By now, I would guess that PepsiCo's chemists would have reverse-engineered it; can't be all that exotic.  Actually I prefer Pepsi anyhow; in about 3 minutes I'm gonna put money into a Pepsi vending machine...  Matt Healy "I pretend to be a network administrator;  the lab net pretends to work"
In article <1r1f62$rh5@news.intercon.com> amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes: >One thing that Clipper offers is interoperability, at a higher degree of  >security than we currently have in non-proprietary voice encryption systems. >This means it will be cheaper than anyone's proprietary scheme, and easier to  >deploy.  I may be an anarchist nutcase, but I wouldn't have frothed overmuch had the government proposed a secure encryption standard.  In fact, if the NSA had come up with a privacy chip rather than a wiretap chip, I would have been happy.  They *could* have done this -- set up an ANSI committee, picked a secure cryptosystem, defined a protocol and interface, and said, "Hey, start building them."  Instead we have a deliberately brain-dead version of a cryptosystem that has not even been peer reviewed.  Yes, the NSA owns some smart people.  But if they pulled a FEAL, well, AT&T is going to be left with a lot of dud phones on its hands.  >Perry said: >> Someone please tell me what exactly we get in our social contract in  >> exchange for giving up our right to strong cryptography?  > >Can you tell me where exactly we have given up that right?  Heh heh.  The government already gave it up for us.  Remember in the announcement they described this scheme as balancing the two extremes of having no privacy and claiming that citizens had a Constitutional right to encryption?    So much for Clinton's support of the "right of privacy".
In article <1993Apr17.122651.1874@sugra.uucp> ken@sugra.uucp (Kenneth Ng) writes: >In article <1993Apr16.165423.27204@linus.mitre.org: ptrei@bistromath.mitre.org (Peter Trei) writes: >:Judge: "I grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key >:	itself" >:You:    "The keyphrase is: "I confess to deliberately evading copyright;  >:	the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of  >:        copyrighted Peanuts strips.""  Can we use murder instead of copyright violation, just to keep things straight?  The 5th applies only to criminal cases which copyright  infringements are not (they are civil).  Steve  P.S. I'm sorry to waste bandwidth on a quibble, I just don't want anyone to get confused.  I think a bunch of kiddie porn GIFs make a better test case than a bunch of Peanuts strips and that IS criminal both in posession and distribution.
In article <strnlghtC5puCL.6Kp@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >In article <Apr18.204843.50316@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> >holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes: > > >>	Let me ask you this.  Would you trust Richard Nixon with your >>crypto keys?  I wouldn't. > >I take it you mean President Nixon, not private citizen Nixon. Sure. >Nothing I'm doing would be of the slightest interest to President Nixon . > 	Are you sure you aren't being watched?  Let me remind you that  Watergate was only the tip of the iceberg.  Nixon extensively used the NSA to watch people because he didn't like them.  According to _Decrypting the Puzzle Palace_:  	Presumably, the NSA is restricted from conducting American surveillance 	by both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978(FISA) and a 	series of presidential directives, beginning with one issued by 	President Ford following Richard Nixon's bold misuse of the NSA, in 	which he explicitly directed the NSA to conduct widespread domestic 	surveillance of political dissidents and drug users.
In article <1993Apr20.032623.3046@eff.org> kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie) writes: >Clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of >encryption.  True, but will traditional encryptions schemes, when further encrypted by Clipper, be _more_ vulnerable to attacks such as partially known plaintext?
> > :Thousands?  Tens of thousands?  Do some arithmetic, please...  Skipjack  > > :has 2^80 possible keys.  > >  > > We don't yet know if all 80 bits count.  >  > That doesn't worry me at all; they're not going to cheat at something  >they can get caught at.  And key size is one of the things that can be  >verified externally.  Feed lots of random key/input pairs into the  >chip, then see what happens to the output....
In article <a_rubin.735498087@dsg4.dse.beckman.com>, a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:  |> In <nagleC5w79E.7HL@netcom.com> nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle) writes: |>  |> >       Since the law requires that wiretaps be requested by the Executive |> > Branch and approved by the Judicial Branch, it seems clear that one |> > of the key registering bodies should be under the control of the |> > Judicial Branch.  I suggest the Supreme Court, or, regionally, the |> > Courts of Appeal.  More specifically, the offices of their Clerks. |>  |> Now THAT makes sense.  But the other half must be in a non-government |> escrow.  Good idea, But why put all the eggs in one basket?  Given that the escrow keys are generated 200 at a time on floppy disks, why not keep them there rather than creating one huge database that will have to be guarded better than Fort Knox.  Give each floppy to a different bank for safekeeping. The USA has over 10,000 banks and thrifts - there are not likely to be more than 2,000,000 Clipper phones sold.
AG Russell (arussell@austin.ibm.com) wrote: : At the company I worked for previously, I received a file that was : des encryped : and the person that had sent it, went on vaction.  Rather than wait : two weeks : I set up a straight frontal attack with one key at a time.  It only : took two(2) : days to crack the file.  No, I don't have any faith in DES.  Then it was either _really_ good luck or you had some _very_ fast machine.  DES has 2^56 possible keys, each two of which are simply to convert into each other, so you have to expect 2^54 trial encryptions in the mean case, assuming known plaintext. 2^54 / 2 / (24*60*60) / 1000000 is ca. 104250. So you must have managed to do 104250 encryptions per microsecond. CE Infosys builds a very fast DES chip that manages 2 (!) encryptions per microsecond.  Yes, I'm not very seriously bothered about the security of DES yet; though you might prefer to use triple DES or IDEA, both of which use more key bits.  joerg  -- Joerg Czeranski                EMail czeranski@rz.tu-clausthal.de Osteroeder Strasse 55          SMTP  injc@[139.174.2.10] W-3392 Clausthal-Zellerfeld    Voice (at work)  +49-5323-72-3896 Germany                        Voice (at home)  +49-5323-78858
In article <1993Apr26.193801.12416@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu> angel@Foghorn_Leghorn.coe.northeastern.edu (Kirill Shklovsky) writes:  [...] >I heard somewhere (can't name the source) that TEMPEST does not necessarily >pick-up just CRTs, but it can pick up emissions from almost any chip.  If >that is true, the kind monitor would not make any difference becuase everything >on the screen can be picked-up from the video controller.  Can anybody verify >or refute this?  As anyone who attended HoHoCon will attest, you can pick information off the video chip.  It's surprisingly easy too.  The guy did it with a portable TV, with very minor mods.  It only worked from 3 feet, but then it was just a demonstration.  	RA  rogue@cs.neu.edu (Rogue Agent/SoD!)
I have a bunch of questions about the encryption scheme referenced in the Subject of this message.  What is the relative data privacy provided by the above sequence as compared with straight DES? Does the addition of compression then encrypting make the cyphertext significantly harder to crack using current methods than straight DES? Would running crypt after DES provide greater data privacy?  Is it important to remove the (constant) compress header before encryption? Thank you, net, for your wisdom.
rick@ee.uwm.edu (Rick Miller) writes:  >rsilvers@nynexst.com (Robert Silvers) writes: >>	Send something to Rush Linbaugh about Clinton taking away our right >>to privacy and how if the govt. standard takes off, only people with lots >>of money (drug dealers) will be able to justify DES stuff.  He will slam >>Clinton for this on the air. >>						--Rob.  >I seem to recall Rush saying that he has a CompuServe account.  If anyone >wants to E-mail him, all we need is his account number (i.e.: 12345,6789) >and then we could e-mail him via gateway by using a dot instead of a comma >like so: "12345.6789@compuserve.com".  (THIS IS *NOT* HIS ADDRESS.)  >So, does anyone know his e-mail address?  He *says* he uses it all the time. >(I wonder if he reads alt.fan.rush-limbaugh...   His ego is big enough!)  >Rick Miller  <rick@ee.uwm.edu> | <ricxjo@discus.mil.wi.us>   Ricxjo Muelisto >Send a postcard, get one back! | Enposxtigu bildkarton kaj vi ricevos alion!
It might pay to start looking at what this proposal might mean to a police agency.  It just might be a bad idea for them, too.  OK, suppose the NY State Police want to tap a suspect's phone.  They need a warrant, just like the old days.  But unlike the old days, they now need to      (a) get two federal agencies to give them the two parts of        the key.  Now, what happens if there's a tiff between the two escrow houses? Posession/release of keys becomes a political bargaining chit.  State and lower-level police agencies have to watch the big boys play politics, while potentially good leads disappear, lives and property are lost, statutes of limitations run out, etc.  Not to mention: a moderately clever person who suspects the police are after her/him will be buying new phones faster than tap requests can be processed.  Or using stolen ones.  [Will the Turing Police come and arrest you for transmitting without a dialing license?]  There's also bureacracy and security problems -- within each escrow house,  how will requests for key disclosure be authenticated?  Put in enough safeguards of the kind bureaucrats and activists feel comfortable with, and  it might take a LONG time to get that key.  [Even when a request is approved,  how is the key going to be disclosed?  Will it be encrypted by a Clipper-type chip for transmission?  In a bureaucracy the size of the Federal Government, with a databank of the necessary size, and data traffic of the projected volume, there's going to be a lot of weak links.  How many of  these kinds of problems will be open for public or "expert" scrutiny?]    Furthermore, the Feds might be leery of handing completed keys around,  even to State Police agencies: a trust and security issue.  This would be  an especially acute issue if some other State's Police had mishandled a  key, resulting in lawsuits, financial settlements, and political  embarassment.  So, the Feds implement it this way:      (b) some federal agency gets the keys, performs the tap, and        turns the results over to the NY State Police.  But let's say Cuomo's been causing some problems over a Clinton Aid-To-Urban-Areas proposal.  Or there just happens to be a turf war going on between the State cops and the Justice department on a case. Now, not only do we have the keys as a political chit, we have an extra player in the game *and* we have the tap's tapes as another bargaining chit.  Again, the State Police lose.  I understand that (legal) wiretaps are quite expensive to maintain. In scenario (b), who pays the bill?
In order to have formulate a rational position on what cryptography policies are acceptable, we must set forth a list of basic requirements. I would propose the following as a starting point:    1. The algorithm must be publicly known, and must have a record of        surviving attempts by outside experts to find weaknesses.    2. The system implementation must make it possible to verify that the        advertised algorithm is, in fact, the one that is being used.    3. The key must be quickly changeable by the user, and must be of a        sufficient length and complexity to defeat any brute-force search        possible now or in the reasonably near future.
gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes:  >I forwarded an old posting about CELP speech compression: >[...] >I've since been told that the source of this is on cygnus.com >in /pub/celp.speech.tar.Z  >I'm not in a position to; any Sun tcp/ip gurus out there who think they >can marry this with netfone by the end of the week? ;-)  Seriously.  I >think someone with real net access and two sparcs could have this running >by the end of the week.  Then we ask the pgp guys to add a bytestream >crypto filter.  Two weeks at the most.  [Damn, I wish I had my sparc >back... I'm stuck on a 25mhz 386sx]  I tried this code yesterday.  On my Sparcstation ELC it takes over 300 seconds to compress 22 seconds' worth of speech.  This means that it needs to be "optimized" by over a factor of 10 before it will be usable in even a half-duplex mode.  I question whether CELP is the best approach for this application.  It produces great compression but at the expense of tremendous CPU loads.  We want something that can be run on ordinary workstations or even high-end PC's without DSP cards.  My guess is that some other algorithm is going to be a better starting point.
I am writing an article on Clipper for Network World.  I am looking for comments and opinions (that I can quote) on the scheme, its implications for security and privacy, its acceptance here and overseas, etc.   I hope this to be a balenced article, with opinions from various quarters. The only  catch is that your name and company affiliation will appear in print.  I am on very tight deadline (I need to finish this Wednesday night).  Please call or E-Mail responses.
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >>  Well, that explains it.  The government has no real need to spy on people >>who already love Big Brother; it's the people who are inclined to talk >>back who need to be watched.  >Though I think this an overstatement, it does contain a grain of truth. It's >drug dealers, spies, terrorists, and organized crime figures (assuming >enough probable cause to convince a judge) who need to be watched, not >law-abiding citizens.  And thus, COINTELPRO, in which horrible people who threatened the republic by disagreeing with the Government were systematically kept track of for years...  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
dwight tuinstra posts a very interesting message in which he comments on the effects of the Clipper chip on state and local police. Actually, reading between the lines, it could be a very good thing for civil liberties in one respect, since it will at least prevent cowboy cops and cowboy state and local agancies from reading your traffic if they tap it illegally.  There has been extensive discussion in the eff forum, for example, about inadmissible taps being used to develop information that could then lead to admissible evidence.  This might put a stop to such things, which must from time to time be simple fishing expeditions.  David