waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
>Andrew Molitor (amolitor@nmsu.edu) wrote: >:  >: 	1) Monitor my phonecalls. >: 	2) Monitor usenet.  They may collect the data, but making sense of it is another matter.  On sci.crypt I'm a graduate CS major (with strong math background) and experienced programmer taking a cryptology course.  (<< keyword for alleged NSA filters).  On sci.skeptic I'm an ex-physics major who's a new-age flake, talking about silly things like how a person's expectations colors what he sees.  On talk.religion.newage I'm a physics geek who enjoys squashing interesting idea with WASP science, although I do write occasional posts showing a minimal knowledge of Zen, mythology, etc.  I could go on, but I'm sure you see my point.  I'm a single person, but I react differently on different groups (admittedly, in part because I'm a contrarian you always shouts "but, on the other hand..."). On top of that, I _loath_ certainty and have taken public positions in the past for no reason other than to challenge "conventional wisdom". I wish them luck in figuring out who "I" am based on that information.  (They can probably figure out I'm liberal, with a technical degree but humanistic interests, from a common thread throughout my posts. But that describes a fair portion of the users of Internet).
amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes: > >> We *do* need an alternative to NSA-bugged telephones, but  >> we're talking inexpensive *telephones* here, including hand-sized  >> cellulars, that need strong crypto, real privacy. > >So start a company and build them.  This is still mostly a capitalist  >economy...  Qualcomm had spare cycles in the DSPs for their new CDMA digital cellular phones. They wanted to put strong crypto into them since they had the capacity. The government decided to "discourage" them.  Really, none of this stuff is especially hard. All you need for a true private phone is an ISDN codec, a vocoder (either a chip or software), an encryptor (a chip is fine, but software is more than fast enough), a V.32 or V.32bis modem module, and maybe a microcontroller to run the whole thing. Its easy to do, its cheap. And any "normal" company trying to put one out will likely get a visit from the boys in the dark suits from Washington, just like Qualcomm did. I suspect that companies like Cylink are tolerated because their products are too expensive.  However, no law yet stops one from building really private phones, in spite of the hints the administration has made when discussing the new "crime bill" and in connection with the Clipper/Skipjack Big Brother chip. Someone out there WILL build a unit to do all this. Better yet, prehaps someone will produce a package that turns any 486 box with a sound card into a secure phone.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
In article <strnlghtC5yBKA.Dp5@netcom.com> (sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper), strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > The easiest way is a user fee for each clipper chip manufactured. This makes > the funding separate from government. >  > It also has the neat side property that if the chip doesn't catch on, the > scheme breaks down, and the government is back to the drawing boards, > assuming that they haven't prohibited alternatives in the meantime. >  > In fact, maybe this should be part of the "official" system. Before the > government is allowed to move this past the "experimental" stage, they > should have to demonstrate economic viability by mass adoption.   David,    While I disagree strongly with you on the issue of our trusting the government, I think you have a good idea here. There is danger that, with funding coming from asset forfeitures, the government could continue to promulgate a bad product in spite of poor acceptance. Making the product pay its way (as it must for private ventures) would be a good incentive for quality and listening to we, the ranters. :)    -mel
In article <ygoland.735123994@wright>  (The Jester) writes:   > Proof Windows is a Virus:It is very widespread, It eats up your disk > space, It slows down your computer, It takes control over your > computer, It performs disk access at random times, It displays silly > messages on your screen, It randomly crashes the computer-Vesselin
In article <bontchev.735226256@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes: <strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: < <> Here's a simple way to convert the Clipper proposal to an unexceptionable <> one: Make it voluntary. < <As usually, you are not reading. The proposal -does- say that it is a <"voluntary program". This doesn't make it more desirable, though... < <> That is--you get high quality secure NSA classified technology if you agree <> to escrow your key. Otherwise you are on your own. < <"Secure"? How do you know? Because NSA is trying to make you believe it? <"Trust us." Yeah, right. < <"Otherwise you are on your own"? How do you know that tomorrow they <will not outlaw encrypring devices that don't use "their" technology? <Because they are promising you? Gee, they are not doing even that - <read the proposal again.  One minor nitpick:  It is not a proposal.  It is a *DECISION* ... from their point of view it is a DONE DEAL.  The chips are being manufactured, it obviously has been budgeted, the whole thing.  THAT IS WHAT IS SO UPSETTING. THIS WAS ALL DONE IN SECRET.  Because they DIDN'T want the people to know what was going on until it is too late.  Otherwise, I agree with you 100 percent.  How come it always takes someone who has lived under the Eastern Bloc to remind us about how precious and fragile our liberties are?  Please, keep up the good work.  Hopefully you will wake SOMEONE up...  < <Regards, <Vesselin <--  <Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg <Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN << PGP 2.2 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C <e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
Paul Robichaux (robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov) wrote: :  : As a private citizen, I would feel much more "secure in my person and : papers" knowing that an organization committed to individual civil : liberties- the ACLU and the NRA come to mind- was safeguarding half of : my key. Both the ACLU and the NRA are resistent to government pressure : by the simple expedient fact that they are not supported, funded, or : overtly controlled by the government. : -------------------------- Thats one problem that has so far been overlooked. These two escrow agencies will have to create a secure database and service the input and output of Keys. Who pays for this? If they refuse an illegal request from some congressman to deliver a key can their budget by cut to punish them? Will congress be forced to fund them forever?  The problem is that laws can change. Congress may pass a law setting up an escrow agency with instructions that keys are private. Some future congress may change that law. Suppose pre-nazi Germany had a clipper system. Do you think the escrow agencies would have told Hitler that he could not have the keys without a valid  court order?  In effect you must set up escrow agencies as a fourth branch of the goverment and isolate them from any outside interferance.  They will be able to directly tap into Federal funds with no accountability to anyone except through a court challenge.
In article <1qsvfcINNq9v@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@moink.nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: > >	The following is available in some FTP archive somewhere, I insert >my comments liberally throughout this demonic memo of Big Brotherdom: > >>	White House Announcement on Screw Thread Standards >>	-------------------------------------------------- >> >>	This is to announce that the American National Standards >>Institute (or whatever it is) has been given the authority to define >>standard dimensions for screw threads. > >   Look! This is clearly the first step toward outlawing our >   own screw thread specifications. If this madness isn't fought, >   tooth and nail, every step of the way, it'll be a crime to use >   screw threads other than those our Fearless Leaders so *graciously* >   define for us.  [Sarcastic text deleted, No value judgement implied]  >	Screw you, Bill Clinton! You and your totalitarianist thugs! > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ >amolitor@nmsu.edu | finger for PGST personal screw thread pitch, or >Screw Threads     |  see the screw thread servers. >must be freed!    | >------------------------------------------------------------------------  At first I was going to complain that your analogy was completely irrelevant.  But then I remembered something.  Remember that move to get the U.S. to the metric system all those years ago?  As far as I know we were supposed to be there by now.  The government sold it as better for the people, easier to be in tune with the rest of the world.  They had decided it was for our own good.  Then, when the plan was released, it soon became apparant that the government were a bunch 'o' thickies.  Think about it, change all the railroad track widths, signs, screws, abolish the old regime.  At the cost of millions of dollars.  Your point is well taken.  You think there is nothing to worry about, you could care less who designs your cryptography, any more than who designs your screws or the system of measurement you use.  Sit back, that's right, just relax, we'll take care of all your needs Mr. Molitor.
In article <1993Apr27.114659.28363@spdcc.com> jin@spdcc.com (Jerry Natowitz) writes: >I am looking for some Public Domain (and exportable) code for >encryption.  Nothing elaborate, just something that will satisfy >a marketing need :-) >Oh yes, UNIX platform.  You can find what you're looking for on hundreds of sites worldwide.  Try  	anonymous ftp to nic.funet.fi (Finland)  	/pub/unix/4.3bsd/net2/lib/libc/gen/crypt.c.Z  This includes source code for fully-functional DES encryption and decryption.  There are some who believe that public domain code is exportable, some who don't.  Make your own judgements, but it seems obvious to me.
steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes:   > > I'm afraid I have to disagree with you on that point.  NSA will *not* > >tell RSA or any other non-DOD entity anything that its eavesdropping > >reveals.  >  I don't know about that; they might if they find it the most expedient >way to keep people from using something they can't crack.  Let's put it this way, they have a charter and several executive orders to obey, among other things which *explicitly* prohibit sharing this information (unless things have changed withing the last little while). I suppose they could ignore it, if they choose.  But I doubt they would. For an authoritative look at the NSA, get Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace". That's all I can say.
"Jon \\lnes" <jon@ifi.uio.no> writes: > A person I know, belonging to a research lab of a rivate > company, claimed to me during a priavte conversation that, given the > equipment in his lab, he could crack a Kerberos ticket in 15 minutes to > an hour. He had access to rather powerful DES hardware, but not of an > extraordinare kind, I believe. The attack was possible because of the > amount of known plaintext in the ticket, which itself constitutes a small > message. This was two years ago.  That would be a V4 ticket, presumably, not a V5 ticket.  The V4 ticket format can even be complicated several more orders of magnitude...
In article <Apr22.185314.14420@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> ns111310@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (Nathaniel Sammons) writes: >1) I think that most of us can afford a stamp and an envelope, and the >cost of printing out a letter. > >2) If some kind soul out there would write a letter, and upload it to  >the net, everyone could capture it, print it out, and snail-mail it >out to their local congressional critter. > >BTW>> I'm working on one.
: From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)  : Indeed, were it not for the government doing everything possible to : stop them, Qualcomm would have designed strong encryption right in to : the CDMA cellular phone system they are pioneering. Were it not for : the NSA and company, cheap encryption systems would be everywhere. As : it is, they try every trick in the book to stop it. Had it not been : for them, I'm sure cheap secure phones would be out right now.  In the UK, it's impossible to get approval to attach any crypto device to the phone network.  (Anything that plugs in to our BT phone sockets must be approved - for some reason crypto devices just never are...)  I was wondering some time ago how big a market there was for good old- fashion acoustic coupler technology to build a secure phone :-) ... is it possible to mask out all the real voice well enough so that none of it strays into the mouthpiece?  Perhaps a well-sealed coupler attachment that was as well blocked as possible, then a white noise generator on the outside to muffle any real speech?
In previous postings by Hellman, Bellovin, etal it was reported the Big Brother (Clipper) chip will encrypt plaintext in 64 bit blocks as is done with DES.  The users key K which can be derived from RSA, Diffy-Hellman, etc. is used to encrypt plaintext M and is then used to form a "three part message".      This three part message consists of E[M; K], K encrypted with some other key, and the chip serial number.  This three part message is then encrypted by still another key.      My question is: What is a message?      For example, say we are dealing with an encrypted digitized voice application.  The speech waveform is sampled and digitized and then some number of samples are grouped into a 64 bit block. This block is then encrypted and transmitted over a non-secure communications link.      Where is the three part message?  Is something appended to each 64 bit block?  Is a header sent at the beginning of the session?      If the header is sent at the beginning of the session, how do they insure the equipment manufacturer using the chip does just that?  Can just anyone manufacture products using the chip? Is a facility clearance required to manufacture?      Any ideas?
In article <1qmugcINNpu9@gap.caltech.edu> hal@cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney) writes: >The key question is whether non-Clipper encryption will be made illegal. > >>     The Administration is not saying, "since encryption >>     threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, >>     we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have >>     effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every >>     American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an >>     unbreakable commercial encryption product."  There is a >>     false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is >>     an "either-or" proposition.  Rather, both concerns can be, >>     and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, >>     balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper >>     Chip" and similar encryption techniques. > >The clear middle ground implied by these statements is to say that Americans >have the right to Clipper encryption, but not to unbreakable encryption. >This implies that, ultimately, non-Clipper strong encryption must become >illegal.  [Text deleted, no value judgement implied]  >It's shocking and frightening to see that this is actually happening here. > >Hal Finney >hal@alumni.caltech.edu  More than shocking.  What this says to me is no less than that government is very interested in monitoring the public.  This does more than scare me, it mortifies me.  PGP and RIPEM must become widespread enough to resist what Mr. Finney has [IMHO correctly] identified as the next logical step.  What was once an academic discussion with regard to concealing cyphertext, has now become a real consideration.  The rhetoric that the clinton administration seems obsessed with, harmony, either or propositions, tension, tells me that they know how difficult it will be to sell this proposition.  The phrase I hear more and more is "I can't believe this is actually happening here."  Call me conserative, Clinton was a huge mistake that we'll all be paying for tommorow and many years from now.  Have we approached the age of speakeasy public key depositiories?  uni (Dark)
In article <2073@rwing.UUCP> pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes:  > fishing expeditions without the target's knowlege.  Don't give up the > right to be safe from that - that should be non-negotiable, and Clinton > and Co. know it (which is probably why they quietly developed this thing, > figuring if they get it this far, they can ram it on through).  It always amazes me how quick people are to blame whatever administration is current for things they couldn't possibly have initiated.  This chip had to take *years* to develop, yet already we're claiming that the Clinton administration sneaked it in on us. Bullshit.  The *Bush* administration and the career Gestapo were responsible for this horror, and the careerists presented it to the new presidency as a fait accompli.  That doesn't excuse Clinton and Gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it, but let's lay the body at the proper door to start with.
What is the status of cruptology for private citizens throughout the world? or, more clearly, is there a listing of countries and their policies on citizens encrypting electronic data?    I'm curious how the Europeans handle this, for instance.
From: Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@cs.indiana.edu>  	The majority of the discussion involving this "Clipper Chip" seems to 	pertain to the encryption of telephone conversations.  Does anyone 	know if that means this chip is designed to work primarily with analog 	signals?  The language sort of suggests this, but it's hard to say.  I'd lay a few bucks that its just data-in-data-out in parallel.  I suspect to make it a phone you'd need a codec and speech compression.  There would be a loss of bandwidth on the speech signal, which I suspect would scupper any of the suggestions I've seen here about putting a different encryption front end on it.  There's no hint of any modulation scheme in the docs.  I'm sure it's purely a digital chip.  The back end will come later, but I'm *positive* it won't be left to the manufacturers - they all have to be the same modulation scheme to make it easy for the NSA to tap them.  The only other possibility is that this is intended only for ISDN phones. (Puts a whole new spin on EFFs obsession about ISDN if true, bwahahaha! ;-) )
In article <1r24us$oeh@agate.berkeley.edu> shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff) writes:    In article <15469@optilink.COM> brad@optilink.COM (Brad Yearwood) writes:    >Finally, because there is essentially no possibility of intercepting in    >realtime the scrutable content of communications between stolen instruments,    >there will exist strong motivation to record and archive _all_ communications    >in the network for ex-post-facto scrutiny (once some criminal act is    >discovered, and the instruments involved have been identified).  "All" is a *very* big number.  The AT&T Long Distance network has around 20,000 T3 trunks (45 Mbit/sec), which is on the order of 10**12 bits/sec. That doesn't even count the amount of traffic in the LOCAL phone companies, or our long-distance competitors.  It's about 200 Exabytes tapes / second, which is pretty large even for the NSA :-)  On the other hand, I can easily see them recording the traffic for "interesting" people, such as dissidents, suspected criminals, foreign telephone calls, and anybody noticed using encryption. As Ken Shiriff speculates, recording encrypted traffic will probably be judged not to be an invasion of privacy pretty soon ....
Q:   Who was consulted?  The Congress?  Industry?  A:   We have on-going discussions with Congress and industry on      encryption issues, and expect those discussions to intensify      as we carry out our review of encryption policy.  We have      briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the      decisions related to this initiative.  Congress??  So we're playing politics before we talk to CPSR, academia, the public, internet users?  I`ve heard of top-down design, but top-down  democracy?? [Just whose state/district are the chip manufacturers in?]  Q:   If the Administration were unable to find a technological      solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be      willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more      powerful encryption devices?  A:   This is a fundamental policy question which will be      considered during the broad policy review. [...bs about      the wonderfulness of the key escrow system...]       The Administration is not saying, "since encryption      threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement,      we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have      effectively done);   They'll just provide an easily-compromised version to JQ Public.                           nor is the U.S. saying that "every      American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an      unbreakable commercial encryption product."    Maybe we need a CRA -- Cryptographic Rights Amendment.                                                    There is a      false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is      an "either-or" proposition.  Rather, both concerns can be,      and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned,      balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper      Chip" and similar encryption techniques.  Nice lullaby.  But why am I not soothed?  ---------------- Also,   In article 15472@leland.Stanford.EDU, arc@leland.Stanford.EDU (Andrew Richard Conway) writes: >P.S. I can't work out why the US government doesn't want to sell >them overseas. After all, they are rather easy for US interests to decode, >so make a perfect tool for industrial/military espionage...lulling  >anyone stupid enough to buy it into a false sense of security. You will >notice that there is NO mention anywhere about safety for non-Americans. >  Why repeat themselves?  It appears to some (and the story looks pretty convincing to me, too) that the Justice Department stole a case-tracking system, modified it, and distributed it to "friendly" police and suchlike agencies around the world, eg. the Canadian Mounties.  Of course, I have  no doubt they swore Scout's Honor that there were no backdoors.  With that kind of intelligence, who'd want to be swamped with terabytes of commercial traffic?
Mark Riordan writes:  	[a list of large-integer arithmetic packages elided]  I thought I would note that except Lenstra's packages, none of the large-integer packages are in the public domain. As an alternative, a straightforward *PD* implementation of Knuth's algorithms may be found as a part of Uof Arizona's ICON distribution.  oz