frank@D012S658.uucp (Frank O'Dwyer) writes: > In article <930422.113807.7Q9.rusnews.w165w@mantis.co.uk> mathew  > <mathew@mantis.co.uk> writes: > #Got it in one.  Similarly, a moral relativist will not judge one moral syste > #to be better than another in every possible circumstance.  This does not, > #however, preclude him from judging one moral system to be better than anothe > #in a specific set of circumstances.  Nor does it preclude a set of moral > #relativists from collectively judging a moral system, from some set of > #circumstances which they all agree they are in. >  > O.K., this makes sense to me.  (I'm serious, you've explained something > to me which I never understood before).  But just for grins, suppose we > almost all agree that we are in a set of circumstances called "reality". > What then?  Then we all live happily ever after. :-)  Seriously, if we all agreed on the circumstances we're in, I suspect we'd all agree on the best course of action.  Unfortunately, I have no confidence that such a situation will ever arise.   Some of us think there's a big God in the sky, some don't.  Some think they've been chosen by God, others disagree.  Some think they are infallible, others think otherwise.  Until those disagreements over circumstances can be ironed out, there's little hope of everyone agreeing.  >     Or say, for all practical intents and purposes, there is no frame > of reference in which thus and such is good, isn't that approximately > objective, in the same way that we usually expect a speeding bullet to > outrun a snail?  Yes.  I think that, for example, only a vanishingly small number of people would hold that there's a frame of reference in which gassing six million Jews is good.  So that's probably about as close to an objective moral value as I've encountered in my life so far.  >                       For example, if we hear of a bomb in a crowded area, > isn't it a rather sensible first guess that this is an immoral act, even > though there conceivably might be some tail-end case that would justify it?  Well, I think your example's poor.  If the bomb's in Iraq, for example, and was dropped by an American plane, many people would hold that it was a moral act.  > #> #> And what weasel word do you use to describe that frame of reference, if > #> #> it isn't an objective reality for values? > #> # > #> #I'm sorry, I can't parse "an objective reality for values".  Could you tr > y > #> #again? > #>  > #> s/an objective reality for values/some values are real even in the face > #> of disagreement/ > # > #I still don't quite see what you're trying to say.  I assume by "values" you > #mean moral values, yes?  In which case, what do you mean by "real"?  What is > #a "real" moral value, as opposed to an unreal one? >  > I mean to say that values are as real as horses, whatever you understand > by a horse being real is pretty much what I mean about a value being real.  Hmm.  So these moral values have a perceptible physical presence?  > #> If you are saying that some moral systems are better than others, in > #> your opinion, then all you get is infinite regress. > # > #Sorry, but in what way is it an infinite regress?  It looks extremely finite > #to me. >  > I meant that it's never more than your opinion.  Right, and the chain ends right there.  The buck stops with me.  It's not an infinite regress.  >                                                       You've clarified this > for me above.  My understanding is now that if a supermajority of relativists > agree that thus and such is wrong in almost any or all frames of reference, > then they're saying something which is to all practical intents and purposes > no different than what I'm saying.  Right.  The key point, however, is that there are vanishingly few of these moral issues where we can get 99.9% of people to agree on the outcome for all frames of reference (and agree on the frames of reference...)  > #>                                                    What you do not get > #> is any justification for saying that the moral system of the terrorist > #> is inferior to that of the man of peace. > # > #Sorry, but that's not so.  I can provide a justification for asserting that > #the moral system of the terrorist is inferior to that of the man of peace.   > #I just can't provide a justification which works in all possible > #circumstances. >  > Logically possible, or actually possible?  I can't manage either.  Killing Hitler using a car bomb would have been a terrorist act, but I have to admit that I couldn't exactly condemn it.  Although there are tricky philosophical issues to do with hindsight...  >                                              By which I mean, are you > stretching possible to include events such as the atoms in my terminal > switching places so that the terminal turns upside down, or do you > think it likely that circumstances will arise in which terrorism is > superior to peace.  I think that circumstances have already arisen where terrorism would have been better than peace.  Better in terms of numbers of innocent people killed.  Assuming it was successful terrorism, of course.