waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev) writes: > If there are many as..., er, people in the USA who reason like the  > above, then it should not be surprising that the current plot has been  > allowed to happen...   The willingness of the majority of the people to give up their freedom in  exchange for a sense of safety is hardly limited to the USA, and is an  endemic problem in any human society of any appreciable size.  The structure  of the US government does try to combat this tendency to some extent, but  fighting entropy is always a losing battle.  Most people would rather have  comfort than freedom.  The paradox is that you can't really have the former,  in the long term, unless you have the latter.  One of the reasons that I probably come across to some people as a weird  cross between a libertarian and an "establishment tool" is that I end up  taking an utterly pragmatic view of government.  I don't get up in arms when  the government fails to protect the interests of the people, because in my  lifetime it never has--therefore, I have no expectation that it will.    As a result, I protect my own interests rather than expecting the government  to be "fair".  I will use strong cryptography when I think it is needed,  whether or not it is legal at the time.  Same thing with anything else the  government would rather not see in private hands--that's their problem.   What's important to me is using the right tool for the job.  If it's legal,  so much the better.  If it is not, but does not violate my (very strong)  sense of personal ethics, I will use it anyway as long I think it is worth  it.  Expecting the government to actually protect the interests of its  citizens, except by accident, is utter folly.  Even Jefferson, one of the  major architects of the American system of government, figured that in a  couple hundred years it would become so corrupt and self-serving that it  would be time dismantle it and try again, by revolution if necessary.  I  agree, and while I don't go around trying to spark one, I'll certainly  participate if it happens when I'm around.  There is a reason I am such a  strong supporter of individual rights while being so cynical about politics.   I've already written off politics.  And yes, this may get me in trouble some day.  If so, so be it.  I drive  faster than 55 MPH, too.
tedwards@eng.umd.edu (Thomas Grant Edwards) writes: >>> If these personal attacks are what stopped Prof. Denning from >>> replying on issues of substance, they have cause real harm >>> to the serious debate here. >> They are and they have. > If Prof. Denning is afraid of posting here due to personal attacks, > perhaps she should use an anonymous posting service.  That is why > they are there, to allow heated debate to occur without the personal > attacks.  Er, people are going to make personal attacks on Prof. Denning whether she posts here or not.  That much should be obvious from looking at the traffic over the last few weeks.  Therefore I conclude that the existence of personal attacks is irrelevant to any decision concerning whether to post.  I suspect that Prof. Denning is actually using the attacks as an excuse for not posting, and that the real reason for the silence is that Clipper is not the sort of proposal any self-respecting cryptographer can support via reasoned argument.   mathew
In <C5x2xs.EF0@lerami.lerctr.org> merlin@lerami.lerctr.org (David Hayes) writes:  >OK, Andrew, I'll provide some evidence. A friend of mine worked for an >electronics manufacturer on with a west-coast office. They routinely sold >equipment to the Japanese. One day, the Japanese started showing up with >discount demands that were amazingly close to the cost to manufacture the >products.  >This company routinely sent most of the manufacturing data to the field  >offices. The Japanese had simply intercepted it. So my friend, the computer >systems admin, came up with a solution. He started sending the data out >double-block-encrypted with DES.   >Two days after this new distribution plan was implemented, the president of >the company got a visit from a pair of government agents. They told him to >"knock it off". The president gave in, since his company did a considerable >business with the federal government.  >Now, if the government wasn't monitoring the communications, how would they >even know that the encryption system was installed? Further, since encryp- >tion isn't illegal, and DES certainly isn't, what is the basis of the >government's cease-and-desist demand?  Something similar has happened to me - ages ago when we were working on PGP we used to send short messages about development issues or simply to test  new features around.  Now at this time PGP (and certainly the newer version) was unknown over here.  Suddenly the admin at the site I was using received a request that I stop sending encrypted email.  Now there is almost no way that some automatic scanner could have found this, since they wouldn't have known about PGP - they *must* have checked for unknown data types in the message, tried to unscramble it, found they couldn't get past the PEM armour part, and then contacted the sysadmin and asked me to stop.  Luckily the current email carriers are less picky about what goes over their networks :-).  In case people think email scanning doesn't take place, I can assure you that it is done regularly by many sites - usually not by government agencies (or at least not that I know of), but by local administrators who, for reasons of their own, have decided to monitor all communications (I'm sure you can all think of a whole mess of reasons - stop hackers/ terrorists/child pornographers/drug dealers/evil commies/whatever).  There have been several occasions when I've got people into trouble simply by including the traditional NSA bait in a message (I don't try it any more now :-).  A friend of mine was once picked up for mentioning the name of the UK town of Scunthorpe (hint: look for words embedded in it).  I'm sure there are many more examples of this happening (in fact if anyone has any examples I'd appreciate hearing from them - I could use them as ammunition during talks on privacy issues).  Peter.
In article <1993Apr22.134214.18517@rick.dgbt.doc.ca>, jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Han) writes: |> In this giant bally-ho over this Clipper chip I noticed a rather |> disturbing trend in some of the E-mail and posts I've tossing back and |> forth.   |>  |> Somebody asked me what was wrong about overreacting in cases such as this. |>  |> The reason is very simple:  How many people do you want to die in a riot?  |> In a new Civil War?  |>  |> Everybody is jumping up and down and screaming about it, and I'm worried |> that people are going to reach for their hammers and rifles before their pens |> and paper.    Well, I know one person who is ready to kill.  Me.  And the victim is this whole topic, damnit.    PLEASE STOP COPYING ALL THIS CRAP TO comp.org.acm.  PLEASE? --
Bennett Todd @ Salomon Brothers Inc., NY (bet@sbi.com) wrote: : However, unless I : missed something, the only source they suggested (aside from a hardware RNG) : that seems available, and unguessable by an intruder, when a Unix is : fresh-booted, is I/O buffers related to network traffic. I believe my : solution basically uses that strategy, without requiring me to reach into : the kernel.  A few more sources are statistics on your filesystems (easily and quickly obtained) and the output from the "rusage" system call.    You can also exec a finger to one or more favorite heavily-used systems, though this can take several seconds.  cf. the source code to RIPEM on ripem.msu.edu.
In <strnlghtC5p7zp.3zM@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  :In article <Apr18.194927.17048@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> :holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes:  :>Note that measures to protect yourself from :>TEMPEST surveillance are still classified, as far as I know.  :I think this to be inaccurate. One can buy TEMPEST equipment commercially. :Even Macs.  Sure you can buy a TEMPEST approved Mac -- if you have enough money.  I haven't had any reason to look at this type of pricing for about 10 years, but a TEMPEST rating in 1982 would raise the price of a $2,495.00 Radio Shack Model III to something around $15,000.00.  Bill
In article <strnlghtC5puCL.6Kp@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >In article <Apr18.204843.50316@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> >holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes: > > >>	Let me ask you this.  Would you trust Richard Nixon with your >>crypto keys?  I wouldn't. > >I take it you mean President Nixon, not private citizen Nixon. Sure. >Nothing I'm doing would be of the slightest interest to President Nixon . > >David > > >--  >David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of >                         our information, errors and omissions excepted.   > >  Ergo, if your life is sufficiently boring, you have no need for privacy?  (This is not meant to be personal, just the logical conclusion of your statement.)
: The cops/feds do *not* need to be able to get hold of your private key to : listen in to cellular conversations.  Encryption is not end-to-end, but  : cellphone to base-station - it *has* to be this way so that cellular users : and fixed installations can talk to each other.  For cellular to cellular : calls, the transmission is decrypted at the base-station, passed to another : base-station and re-encrypted.  The cops/feds can listen to the unscrambled : call *provided* they get a warrant to tap into the cellular provider's : equipment.  The only reason for wanting a crackable system is so they can : listen without having to obtain a warrant.  : But, maybe the Clipper system is secure, and they really do need a warrant : to get the key out of escrow before they can listen in using a scanner (see : above - they don't *have* to go down this route anyway).  I have my doubts, : but even if true once they have the key they will *never* again need a : warrant to tap into that particular phone whenever they want.  `Well, Judge, : it appears he wasn't a drug-dealer after all, so naturally we'll stop : listening in'...  That was true for the UK Paul, but I'm fairly sure they're talking about building end-to-end encryption phones out of this chip.  It's *not* for cellular (though it certainly could be used there in the way you suggest)
mathew <mathew@mantis.co.uk> writes:  > bena@dec05.cs.monash.edu.au (Ben Aveling) writes: > > Don't forget, you are in the country that wouldn't let the Russians > > buy Apple II's because of security concerns.  > That's nothing.  They wouldn't let the British buy Inmos Transputer systems > because of security concerns.  And we designed the damn things!  Funny, we had plenty of them in Bulgaria, regardless of the embargo... :-) So much for export controls...  Regards, Vesselin
In article <C5wMu9.MqJ@cs.uiuc.edu> kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie) writes:    strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:     [...]    >The Attorney General publishes the number of court-ordered taps each year.    [...]     I believe you are mistaken. I don't believe the AG publishes the    number of state wiretaps.     - Carl     --     Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.     = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =  Hmmm.... now if we could have *3* keys kept in escrow, with one of the  groups keeping a key being the government, then the states would need federal permission to run a wiretap.... interesting possibility:-)
In article <1993Apr30.004519.7741@csus.edu> sphughes@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Shaun P. Hughes) writes: > >Perhaps someone should ask Zippy the Pinhead for his opinion. :) >  Yow! Am I ENCRYPTING yet?  Didn't we go over this guns'n'crypto discussion a few months ago? Must we go over it again?
I have seen various references to 'triple des' recently. Could anyone tell me what it is ? From context, I would guess that it means encrypting each block 3 times, with a different key each time, but I'd like to be sure.  Replies by email preferred - our news is unreliable.  Thanks, 	Richard  --   -------------- PGP Public Key available on request -------------- --   -------------- PGP Public Key available on request
In article <1993Apr19.130132.12650@afterlife.ncsc.mil> rlward1@afterlife.ncsc.mil (Robert Ward) writes: >In article <bontchev.734981805@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes: >>and since the US constitutions guarantees the right to every American >>to bear arms, why is not every American entitled, as a matter of > >Have you read the applicable part of the Constitution and interpreted it IN  >CONTEXT?  If not, please do so before posting this misinterpretation again. >It refers to the right of the people to organize a militia, not for individuals >to carry handguns, grenades, and assault rifles.
In article <1qg8m2$2e5@nigel.msen.com> emv@garnet.msen.com (Edward Vielmetti) writes: >W C Newell Jr (wcn@u.washington.edu) wrote: > >>Before we can have a global multimedia e-mail solution, there must be some >>definition of a minimum service level, and MIME does not provide for this >>(yet).   > >Before the Internet will invest in software, people need to see content.  >I would suggest that 50 attractive MIME formatted news messages a day would be >sufficient to get a few people thinking about adding MIME support to news >readers, esp if the content is really worth it. > >>IMHO, we have a long way to go before the Unix-specific MUAs, newsreaders, etc >>reach the service levels of the other commercial platforms.  There ought to be >>such a definition, consisting of known object data types and rules for their >>handling, included in the transport specification document. > >Yes.  But there is also a long way to go before most Mac, PC, and Windows >MUAs and newsreaders are ready to handle the sheer volume of news and mail >that many Unix specific tools are able to cope with.  When the choice is >"more feechurs" or "make the damn thing fast enough to keep up with the >flood", you have to bet that "fast enough" wins.  Ed, as usual, makes a very good point.  One time a friend of mine at Sun sent me an e-mail.  He composed it using the Sun OpenWindows 3 "mailtool" which handles (non-MIME) "attachments" and the like.  Since I don't use "mailtool", I had to manually save it, cut & paste, and then "uudecode" the actual attachment.  What I got - after a not-inconsiderable amount of time spent doing this - was an audio file.  The original message was over 32Kb of mail headers and uuencoded data; the resulting audio message was a single sentence that I transcribed as a 135 character message.  If he had sent me the sentence in plain text, the e-mail would have been around 250 bytes, and it would have taken me about 3 seconds to process it at most.  Instead, it was 32k and it took at least a minute.  A complete waste of (my) time and bandwidth, as far as I'm concerned.  Sending plain text is still the most efficient method of transmission, given the same transport mechanism. I shudder to think what would happen if everyone started posting their Usenet articles as audio files instead of plain text!  Meltdown of the Net predicted! Film at Eleven!  Back to Mono!	(-:  [This sub-thread no longer has anything to do with PEM or administrative] [policy, so I've redirected followups back to comp.mail.mime ... - Greg ]
whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (William W. Hughes) writes: >Hell, just set up a spark jammer, or some other _very_ electrically-noisy >device.  As I've noted, you can likely get around that with a directional sensor. Phased array systems could completely defeat this scheme.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
In article <1993Apr21.222016.18990@leland.Stanford.EDU> arc@leland.Stanford.EDU (Andrew Richard Conway) writes:  >Of course don't over react --- but don't under react. > Better yet: act.  John
Lawrence C. Foard (lfoard@hopper.Virginia.EDU) wrote: > In article <1993Apr22.065357.9667@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes: > [article deleted] > > > >Just doing a quick reality check here - is this for real or did someone > >invent it to provoke a reaction from people?  It sounds more like the > >sort of thing you'd have heard, suitably rephrased, from the leader of a  > >certain German political party in the 1930's.... > It sounds like a joke (but then the war on drugs has always been a joke...).  I remember seeing it several months ago, and it was marked as a joke. Funny how things circulate!
marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault) writes: >        Looking at it from up here in the Frozen North, it looks like >        you could do worse than get the NRA involved. They have a >        kindred problem, a large number of voters, the right attitude, >        and lots of funds.  They also have a lot of the other voters really irritated at them.  >        From an ethical _or_ constitutional viewpoint, I haven't seen >        a good argument for cryptographic rights that doesn't also >        support the NRA position on guns (and vice-versa).  Okay, folks, I know I'm in the minority on this issue, but I can't let this assertion go unchallenged yet again.  I'm going to say this ONLY ONCE, in the hopes of NOT starting a flame war off of the main topic.  Guns are offensive.  Cryptography is defensive.  See the difference? The only way you can use a gun is to hurt somebody else.  Crypto- graphy helps prevent other people from hurting you.
Marc Horowitz N1NZU (marc@mit.edu) wrote: : The message from the NIST about the clipper chip comes from the : following address: :  : 	clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) :  : Just who is that, I asked myself, or rather, I asked the computer. :  :     % telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov 25 ...list of name elided for brevity...... :  : Well, isn't that interesting.  Dorothy Denning, Mitch Kapor, Marc : Rotenberg, Ron Rivest, Jim Bidzos, and others.  The Government, RSA, : TIS, CPSR, and the EFF are all represented.  I don't suppose anybody : within any of these organizations would care to comment?  Or is this : just the White House's idea of a cruel joke on these peoples' inboxes?  I know that at least one person on that list says the first he heard of Clipper was in the Friday morning newspaper! And another has already fired off a letter of protest to NIST.  My point? I suspect this list, interesting as it is for various reasons, does not represent the cabal that put this proposal together. Some of them, yes. Others, no.   This may be nothing more than a mailing list of people who get crypto-related announcements from NSA, er, I mean "NIST."  -Tim May
> More accurate is that the government says its solid, other people  >in the field who might be able to find out haven't yet done their  >review of the chip design, and there's been a lot of wild speculation  >and guesswork from those with little information that it might be  >Swiss cheese.    Oh, that puts the debate on -excellent- terms for our side:    FEDS:  You people saying that Clipper is insecure don't have any real information to support that judgment.   ME:  Fine -- show me this "information" that would prove me wrong.   FEDS:  That's secret!
In article <1rf04s$jqu@sol.TIS.COM> mjr@tis.com (Marcus J Ranum) writes: :	I'd really like to see such a thing developed so that interactive :internet talk radio could be done. Ideally, though, it should be a general :purpose device. It should be a general purpose enough device that nobody :should be able to balk at its widespread use. Obviously, to make it easy :for homebrewers, it should use pretty common hardware.  I suggest we start with the ubiquitous Sun, to get a lot of momentum going.  Custom hardware isn't going to go anywhere until there's a user base.  :	Anyone interested? I'll start a provisional mailing list. Let :me know if you want on.  Count me in.  I need someone at the US end to experiment on the  protocols with, and I like the way you code.  Give me 3 weeks to move house and settle in then we'll go for it seriously...
Generally, an organization has influence in proportion to:  	The narrowness of its objectives 	The number of members 	The strength of belief of its members  This is why the pro- and anti-abortion groups are so strong: narrow objectives, lots of interested members who are real passionate.  For this reason, mixing with the NRA is probably a bad idea.  It diffuses the interests of both groups.  It may well diminish the Passion Index of the combined organization.  It is not clear it would greatly enlarge the NRA.  So, I believe a new organization, which may cooperate with NRA where the two organization's interest coincide, is the optimum strategy.  lew
In article <1993Apr20.182038.12009@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu> butzerd@maumee.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer) writes:   >Finally, can anyone even concieve of a time/place where 128 bit keys aren't >sufficient?  (I certainly can't - even at a trillion keys a second, it >would take about 10 billion years to search just one billionth of that keys >space.)      It depends on the attack.  Adding a bit to the key doubles the amount of work to be done in a straight brute-force attack, where you try every single possible key until one works.  Processing and storage requirements for this kind of attack on a 128-bit key seem like they ought to make it effectively impossible.  However, there may be other attacks whose difficulty is (for example) proportional to, say, 2**sqrt(n), or some such.  Also, a long key does you little good if there is a way to incrementally guess a little of the key at a time....
In <1993Apr17.032828.14262@clarinet.com> brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:  :It occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you, and the escrow :houses release your code to the cops, your code is now no longer secure.  A very good point!  :It's in the hands of cops, and while I am sure most of the time they are :good, their security will not be as good as the escrow houses.  Why should we expect the cops to be honest!  They're underpaid for the risks they face every day.  The media dumps on the all the time and blames them for all sorts of discrimination, brutality....  How can we expect them to be more than human?  Besides there are lots of cases of police abuses ranging from protection scams to outright robbery (when I worked in D.C. there was a breakin at a local Radio Shack and the alarm company heard the cops responding to the call over the audio pickup in the store:-).  :What this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you, :at the end of the wiretap, they should be obligated to inform you that :a tap was performed, and replace (for free) the clipper chip in your :cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the :escrow houses.  Then you would know that Big Brother had been listening.  Does he really want to let you know?  :Do the police normally reveal every tap they do even if no charges are :laid?   In many ways, it would be a positive step if they had to. :Judges set time limits on warrants, I assume.  At the end of the time :limit they should have to renew or replace your chip.  :That's if we go with this scheme, which I am not sure I agree with.  I'm completely against anything that makes it easier for the government to encroach on the rights of individuals.  The founders of this country spent a lot of effort limiting the power of the government and specifying exactly what the governments rights were (and this didn't include a gov't spy in every bedroom).  IMHO, there are entirely too many things going on today designed to preserve the government organism at the expense of individuals.  Look around and reread 1984 and many early Heinlein books.  Aren't there many parallels between the thought police (can you spell Waco Texas?), and Heinlein's ``Crazy Years''?  Bill