waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
Forwarded from libernet@dartmouth.edu:  Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:30:47 PDT From: ald@clipper.clipper.ingr.com (Al Date) Subject: "Clipper Chip"  --NOT! To: libernet@Dartmouth.EDU  Clipper TM chip is a registered trademark of Intergraph Corp.  The so-called Clipper chip which was recently mentioned here and in other media with respect to encryption is being used in violation of that trademark.    The Intergraph Clipper chip is a Unix microprocessor, originally  developed by Fairchild Semiconductors, and has no relationship to the encryption chip whatsoever.    I mention this here with the hope that someone reading this will intercede before the group alt.privacy."clipper" is established.
In article 29778@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU, holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes: >In article <1993Apr19.130132.12650@afterlife.ncsc.mil> rlward1@afterlife.ncsc.mil (Robert Ward) writes: >>In article <bontchev.734981805@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes: >>>and since the US constitutions guarantees the right to every American >>>to bear arms, why is not every American entitled, as a matter of >> >>Have you read the applicable part of the Constitution and interpreted it IN  >>CONTEXT?  If not, please do so before posting this misinterpretation again. >>It refers to the right of the people to organize a militia, not for individuals >>to carry handguns, grenades, and assault rifles.   > >Read the Constitution yourself.  The Second Amendment says the right to bear >arms shall not be infringed, so a well regulated militia may be more easily >formed.  I have an interpretation of the Second that shows there are no  >qualifications to the right to keep and bear arms.  If you want, I can E-mail >it to you.  By the way, gun talk belongs in talk.politics.guns. >							Doug Holland  Mr. Ward, before you start blathering about your skill "interpreting" the Constitution, it might be helpful to learn to read.  After a review with a high school English teacher emphasizing participial phrases, you might start with the Second Amendment, and follow it up with:   97th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print, *The Right To Keep and  Bear Arms*, of the Subcomittee on the Constitution of the Committee on  the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Congress, Second Session,  February, 1982.  GPO No. 88-618-O  This authoritative, heavily researched and annotated document clearly turns your "interpretation" into specious claptrap, which is a polite way of saying utter bullshit.  In spite of your false assertion to the contrary, the Second Amendment DOES protect the right of the individual citizen, in his capacity as an individual, to keep and bear arms.  And, Mr. Holland, IMHO, blatantly and harmfully false information, asserted as fact and globally distributed, deserves globally distributed rebuttal in the forum in which it is posted.  (And besides, this site doesn't carry t.p.g...:-)  harryb%phred@data-io.com phred!harryb@data-io.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------- No free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms.  The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and bear arms is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government. 					--Thomas Jefferson
If we do not trust the NSA to be a registrar of Clipper Chip key halves, I would not trust Mitre either.  Mitre does lots of work for NSA, at least in the Trusted Product Evaluation Program (evaluation of commercial off the shelf software for its efficacy in safeguarding classified information), and I assume in other, less open, programs.  There are at least two other FFRDCs (Federally Funded Research and Development Corporations) that work for NSA: Aerospace Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis.  Now, if NSA were to be untrustworthy (a position that I am neutral about, for purposes of this posting), it would be in a position to exert economic pressure upon Mitre to release key halves on demand.  It could just say, "If you don't cooperate with us, we'll place all our evaluation contracts with Aerospace and IDA."  I am not saying that people at NSA, Mitre, Aerospace, or IDA are dishonest folk.  But since they are people, and people occasionally go bad, the system works better if organizations that you are depending upon to be independent really are.  And, of course, I speak for myself, not my employer.
> >This is stupid.  Won't it cost more to those companies hoping to  >serve the gov't and private markets if they DON'T use the same >technology? >         I would guess that they won't use Clipper at all.  What they will do is use their STU-IIIs amoung themselves and the governmental agencies they need to talk to, and ignore Clipper.  After all, if it's not secure enough for the agency/department they are communicating with why should the coprations trust it?
In article <rdippold.735253985@qualcom> rdippold@qualcomm.com (Ron "Asbestos" Dippold) writes: > >geoff@ficus.cs.ucla.edu (Geoffrey Kuenning) writes: >>Bullshit.  The *Bush* administration and the career Gestapo were >>responsible for this horror, and the careerists presented it to the >>new presidency as a fait accompli.  That doesn't excuse Clinton and >>Gore from criticism for being so stupid as to go for it, but let's lay >>the body at the proper door to start with. > >The final stages of denial... I can hardly imagine what the result >would have been if the Clinton administration had actually supported >this plan, instead of merely acquiescing with repugnance as they've so >obviously doing.  I don't believe the chip originated with the Clinton >administration either, but the Clinton administration has embraced it >and brought it to fruition.  [...]  (the date I have for this is 1-26-93)  note Clinton's statements about encryption in the 3rd paragraph..  I guess this statement doesen't contradict what you said, though.  --- cut here ---
In article <1993Apr22.092959@magic.mcc.com>, croley@magic.mcc.com (David Croley) wrote:  >  > It would seem that the one fact that the government has overlooked in this > whole fiasco is the economic standpoint.  As others have mentioned, the most > difficulty the Clipper chip faces is an economic one.  Let's face it, the > average consumer doesn't care or know that the Clipper is a bad idea.  If > there is a perceived need for cellular encryption, then the companies will > provide one.  Most likely, a standard will emerge.  But if the Clipper is > too expensive (and $25 a chip is way too much) then they will develope their > own or buy a cheaper one.    This is an interesting point.  As a VERY COARSE rule of thumb, you can figure that the final price of a product is 3 to 5 times the Cost Of Goods. (The exact multiplier depends largely on economies of scale: Products that sell tens of millions of units/year will be at the low end, those that sell thousands of units/year will be at the high end.  I suspect cellular phones are in the middle).  This implies that adding a $25 chip would increase the cost of the phone by approx $100, or about 25% - 30%.  I don't think you'll get a lot of consumer support for this.   -tony
>amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >>	Not to pick on Mr. May in particular, of course, but isn't this >>kind of the domino theory? When one little country falls, its neighbor >>will surely follow, and before you know it, we're all mining salt >>in Siberia for not turning in our Captain Crunch Secret Decoder Rings.  There was an interesting column on the editorial page of the Dallas Morning News on Saturday by Walter Williams, who I believe is a professor at Georgetown (I wonder if he knows of Dorothy "you're not in Kansas anymore" Denning).  The article was titled "Government slowly eroding our liberties", and in it he tells a story attributed to the late Leonard Read who          explained that if you wanted to take liberty away from         Americans, you had to know how to cook a frog.  Mr. Read         said you can't cook a frog by boiling a pot of water and         then throwing the frog in.  His reflexes are so quick that         as soon as his feet touch the water, he will leap away.         You must put the frog in a pot of cold water and heat it         up bit by bit.  By the time the frog realizes he's being         cooked, it is too late.  It is the same with Americans.         If anyone tried to take our freedoms all at once, we         would naturally rebel and suppress the tyrant.  But as         with successful frog cooking, our liberties can be taken         a little bit at a time.  The last line of the article says, "It's not too late for us, but the water is getting pretty warm."  I'd have toagree that it's warm and the Clipper is keeping the temperature on an upward course.  NOTE: followups redirected to alt.privacy.clipper
In article <1993Apr18.150259.1748@escom.com>, Al Donaldson writes:  > Unrelated question...isn't the term "Clipper," as neat as it is, > already taken by Intergraph? >   Yes, "Clipper" is a trademark of Intergraph.  Its the RISC chip used in some of thier workstations.   I wonder what Intergraph is going to do to this infringement on thier name sake?
pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: >Really, none of this stuff is especially hard. All you need for a true >private phone is an ISDN codec, a vocoder (either a chip or >software), an encryptor (a chip is fine, but software is more than >fast enough), a V.32 or V.32bis modem module, and maybe a >microcontroller to run the whole thing. Its easy to do, its cheap. And >any "normal" company trying to put one out will likely get a visit >from the boys in the dark suits from Washington, just like Qualcomm >did.  	Have the feds shut down the people making Sound Blaster? What about Apple and NeXT? Apple, NeXT, Sun, and others make systems that can handle CD-quality audio in and out, and can perform arbitrary transformation on it in the process of transmitting it across a network or modem.  	Perhaps there's a market for a portable vocoder. Not a crypto device, simply an RS232<->voice converter. Make it capable of recording speech and playing it back simultaneously. It has applications for multimedia, computing for the handicapped, Internet Talk Radio, IRC, etc, etc, etc.  It wouldn't be a cryptographic device at all - but I suppose someone could have it hooked to a 486 laptop with a V.32bis modem and some crypto software. I'd market the thing with an API for text-to-speech using simple phonemes and the ability to use speech samples. And, of course, I'd publish the interface to it so other folks could write any applications they wanted to talk to the thing.
In article <116664@bu.edu>, uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt) writes: > Think again.  You won't see me using apple's new signature from the  > finder feature.   Why not?  It hasn't been released, so there's no way for you to evaluate it  yet.  After all, Apple could have been smart and had AOCE use an MD5 hash  encrypted with RSA, just like PKCS signatures.  They could even be actually  PKCS compliant, for all you know; why not wait until it is released, and hard  information is available, before passing judgement on it?  AOCE's algorithm's aren't secret because Apple's being fascistic--AOCE itself  remains secret (except for Apple demos at MacWorld :)), simply because it's  not done yet.  It may be flawed, and it may not.  However, you can't tell which until you  actually see it.  I, at least, am quite impressed with what I have seen so  far, and have no expectation of being disappointed.
jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes:  (regarding NSA monitoring of US military code traffic)  >[BTW, folks, NSA wasn't being given the keys.  And the Walker spy case >shows for some of the systems, the KGB didn't need them either.]  On the contrary- The Walker spy case is one where the KGB was given keys (as I recall) --
gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes:  >Can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run >digital speech down 14.4K?  I think it is; I've heard it's not.  Lets >say 8 bit samples.  Would *raw* data at the corresponding sampling rate >be usable?  If not, how fancy does the compression need to be?  It's all easy with a DSP. The Olivetti Quaderno, for example [*great* 1kg subnotebook/palmtop PC -- sorry for the plug, folks, but Olivetti don't seem to be doing a good job marketing it themselves :-)] includes sound digitisation hardware; they provide vocoders for their DSP which produce varous bit-rates. There's one which gives pretty acceptable voice quality at 13Kbit/sec, just right for a V.32bis modem.  Their DSP can play and record at the same time, too -- so you wouldn't need to play "two-way-radio". You can also download code to the DSP subunit, though you'd need a software development kit for the DSP in  question [dunno which it is...] if you wanted to produce your own  vocoder for, say, V.32 speeds.  Paul
Read this through once or twice.  Then replace "prince" with "government" or "president", as appropriate, and read it again.    [From Chapter XX of _The Prince_, by N. Macchiavelli, as translated by Daniel Donno.]  	In order to keep their lands secure, some princes have disarmed their subjects; others have prompted division within the cities they have subjugated.  Some have nurtured animosities against themselves; others have sought to win the approval of those they initially distrusted.  Some have erected fortresses; others have destroyed them.  Now, although it is impossible to set down definite judgements on all of these measures without considering the particular circumstances of the states where they may be employed, I shall nevertheless discuss them in such broad terms as the subject itself will allow.  	To begin with, there has never been a case of a new prince disarming his subjects.  Indeed, whenever he found them disarmed, he proceeded to arm them.  For by arming your subjects, you make their arms your own.  Those among them who are suspicious become loyal, while those who are already loyal remain so, and from subjects they are transformed into partisans.  Though you cannot arm them all, nonetheless you increase your safety among those you leave unarmed by extending privileges to those you arm.  Your different treatment of the two categories will make the latter feel obligated to you, while the former will consider it proper thoat those who assume added duties and dangers should receive advantages.    	When you disarm your subjects, however, you offend them, by showing that, either from cowardliness or from lack of faith, you distrust them; and either conclusion will induce them to hate you. Moreover, since it is impossible for you to remain unarmed, you would have to resort to mercenaries, whose limitations have already been discussed. Even if such troops were good, however, they could never be good enough to defend you from powerful enemies, and doubtful subjects.  Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a newly acquired state has always taken measures to arm his subjects, and history is full of examples proving that this is so.  	But when a prince takes posession of a new state which he annexes as an addition to his original domain, then he must disarm all the subjects of the new state except those who helped him to acquire it; and these, as time and occasion permit, he must seek to render soft and weak.  He must arrange matters in such a way that the arms of the entire state will be in the hands of soldiers who are native to his original domain.  	...
It might be nice to:  1. cut out the ad hominem attacks on Prof. Denning, Mr. Sternlight, etc.  If you have something objective to say about their views, go ahead and say it (subject to point 2.).  Personal attacks reflect more on the attacker more than on the attackee.  Throw light, not heat!  2. restrict the discussion to appropriate newsgroups. I submit that comp.org.acm and comp.org.ieee are not appropriate for this discussion.  You have now made subscribers to these newsgroups aware of the issue.  If they want to know more or participate in the discussion, they can easily join sci.crypt, comp.security.misc, alt.security, or comp.org.eff.talk. --
>encryption's dual-edge sword:  encryption helps to protect the >privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield >criminals and terrorists.  We need the "Clipper Chip" and other  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^      Just a random passing thought, but can anyone cite a documented use of encryption technology by criminals and terrorists.    (Excluding the Iran-Contra Gang)   --                Shaun P. Hughes  sphughes@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu
>In article <930424031634.176183@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL> Grant@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL (Lynn R Grant) writes: > >About 50 people so far have asked, "Once the FBI gets your Clipper keys, >won't they be able to read all your future and past traffic?" > >There has been no response from NIST, NSA, Ms. Denning, Mr. Hellman, or >anyone else who might be able to give us an authoritative answer. >This is troubling.      It was implied in the first technical posting by Dorothy Denning that the FBI would do the decryption *for* the law enforcement agencies.  It wasn't clear to me from the post whether this would be done in realtime or not, or whether the FBI would just decrypt the session keys for the locals, or would do the whole message.      One thing I'm a bit puzzled by:  Why aren't they doing this with a public key scheme of some sort?  You could generate two uniqe public/private pairsor for each chip.  Then, escrow the private keys with the escrow agencies.  Set the protocol up to encrypt the session key with both public keys.  To decrypt a message, both escrow agencies (in the right order, for most PK schemes) have to decrypt with the escrowed private key.  This way, there wouldn't be thecconcern that, once the police had asked fo  a warrant/wiretap, they would have your key forver.
In article <1993Apr26.193801.12416@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu> angel@Foghorn_Leghorn.coe.northeastern.edu (Kirill Shklovsky) writes: >In article <1993Apr26.104320.10398@infodev.cam.ac.uk> rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) writes: >>I'm afraid this doesn't work either. We can pick up laptop screens without any >>problem. >> >>Most of the so-called `low radiation' monitors are also useless. The description >>turns out to a marketing assertion rather than an engineering one. >> >>We thought there might be a market for a monitor which was not as hugely >>expensive as the military Tempest kit, but which was well enough shielded to >>stop eavesdropping using available receivers. We built a prototype, it works, >>and it's still sitting on my lab bench. Commercial interest was exactly zero. >> >>In the absence of open standards, a monitor which really is `low radiation' >>(and costs 500 dollars more) can't compete against a monitor which just >>claims to be `low radiation' (and whose only extra cost of production is the >>pretty blue sticker on the box). >> >>Ross > >I heard somewhere (can't name the source) that TEMPEST does not necessarily >pick-up just CRTs, but it can pick up emissions from almost any chip.  If >that is true, the kind monitor would not make any difference becuase everything >on the screen can be picked-up from the video controller.  Can anybody verify >or refute this? > Just thought of something.  Yes, laptops can still be read, but it's not quite as easy as a normal pc with a CRT.  My thought, Airline pilots lately have been complaining about how laptops being used in flight mess with the plane's instruments.  If this can be hyped up, manufacturers may start building laptops with even lower emmisions.  It would probably still be possible to pick up with surveillance equipment, but at this point, it would be a lot cheaper to mask the remaining signals with TEMPEST techniques.  Doug Holland
My earlier argument that "Clipper will encourage state and local cops  to commit criminal acts" is largely moot, now that we've learned that  the FBI will perform the actual tap.  [It will encourage the *FBI* to commit (even more) criminal acts, but that's not the point here.]  But this gives another avenue of attack on the Clipper proposal.  When the EFF/ACLU/CPSR FOIA requests are made, they should ask for details on the bureaucratic and equipment infrastructure that is proposed (or  even already budgeted) for the FBI to service tapping requests -- for now and the projected future.   From these figures, estimate the number of Clipper-tap requests the FBI is expecting.  Publish this figure.  Compare it on a per-capita basis with the amount of tapping now known or suspected.  Also estimate how expensive it would be for the FBI to install more Clipper-tapping stations, and how rapidly they could be built and installed ... ie, get the "plus or minus" epsilon for the near future.  Might be a mite disturbing for J. Q. Public to know these things.  And despite all the technical details [BTW, thanks to those who've been providing them!], we still don't know   1) how the tapping requests will be transmitted and authenticated (though    it isn't too hard to guess a good scheme).  2) how the results will be securely transmitted (Fed Ex the audio tapes?)  3) how privacy will be re-established when an investigation is complete.
In article <19930419.155204.305@almaden.ibm.com> 	ameline@vnet.IBM.COM (Ian Ameline) writes:  >  I also believe that someone will reverse engineer the clipper chip, >and knowlege of the algorithm will likely be fairly widespread.  The chip and algorithm are classified.  If you reverse engineer it and tell people, you are likely to go to jail.  Perhaps some foreign governments or corporations could help us out by cracking the system outside the USA.  The US government could probably stop importation of clone hardware, but a software implementation should be practical.
>This actually supports Bill's speculation - IF there is a backdoor in >RSAREF and IF PKP is supported secretly by the NSA, then it is more >than natural that they will welcome ANY public-key implementation that >uses RSAREF and will strongly oppose themselves against ANY >implementation that doesn't.  My speculation does not include or depend upon a trapdoor in RSAREF. I do not believe that RSA would consent to such.    However, there are other limitation in the concept of RSAREF in which NSA has an interest.  It has an interest in a limited number of implementations, i.e., targets.  It has an interest in fixed key or maximum modulus size.    It has a legitimate (literally) right to pursue such interests.  Within bounds, it probably has a right to pursue those interests by covert means.  At least it has the same right as the rest of us not to disclose all of its motives and intentions.  (Institutions are not self-aware; they do not know their intentions in any meaningful sense.)