waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <1993Apr20.161838.13213@coop.com> felixg@coop.com (Felix Gallo) writes: <pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes: < <>If the Clinton Clipper is so very good, [...] < <Please note that Bill Clinton probably has little if anything to do <with the design, implementation or reasoning behind this chip or behind <any "moves" being made using this chip as a pawn.  Uh, I notice he has not either asked for or allowed public input, and he damn sure has not stopped it...  <Remember, when you elect a president of the united states, it's not <the case that all the Republicans, etc. in the NSA and FBI and CIA <immediately pack their bags and get replaced by a team of fresh young <Democrats.  Most of the government -- say, 96% -- is appointed or <hired rather than elected.  Since this Clipper device has been in <production for over six months, it probably has little or no  <foundation in the currently elected Democratic Executive body.  Again, if it was something Clinton didn't like, how come he did not stop it, or get PUBLIC input before implimenting the DECISION?  He sure has asserted his authority on other things he did not agree with from the Bush administrationk, I notice.   He is the president, therefore he is RESPONSIBLE for the actions of the Execuitive Branch.  I have not the slightest bit of doubt you would be holding Bush or Reagan to that standard had they been in office when this thing was cast into stone...  <>BTW - those who suggest that this is just an attack on Clinton, believe <>this:  I would be going ballistic reagardless WHO seriously proposed <>this thing.  It is just another step in a gradual erosion of our rights <>under the Constitution or Bill of Rights.  The last couple of decades <>have been a non-stop series of end-runs around the protections of the <>Constitution.  It has to stop.  Now is as good a time as any, if it <>isn't too late allready. < <Could be.  However, the sky hasn't fallen yet, Chicken Little.  Thanks for the name-calling.  That really makes your position higly credible.  Lenin had a term for folks with your outlook.  Do you REALLY have THAT MUCH faith in the trustworthiness and honesty of the government that is primarily concerned with people control?   I suspect you will be in for an unpleasant surprise.  I would just as soon see this nipped in the bud while/if it still can be done, instead of waiting for yet more abridgements of our Bill of Rights, thank you...
Looking for PostScript or Tex version of a paper called: 	"PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY"  Written by: 	James Nechvatal 	Security Technology Group 	National Computer Systems Laboratory 	National Institute of Standards and Technology 	Gaithersburg, MD 20899  	December 1990  The version I obtained is plain text and all symbolic character formatting has been lost.
Hi !  I am interested in the source of FEAL encryption algorithm. Does someone of you know where I can get the source from, or where I can find documentation about FEAL.  Thanks in advance   Ciao Hermann
In article <1qsvfcINNq9v@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@moink.nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: [A lot of this article has been deleted for space.]  >   Look! This is clearly the first step toward outlawing our >   own screw thread specifications. If this madness isn't fought, >   tooth and nail, every step of the way, it'll be a crime to use >   screw threads other than those our Fearless Leaders so *graciously* >   define for us.
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  > Here's a simple way to convert the Clipper proposal to an unexceptionable > one: Make it voluntary.  As usually, you are not reading. The proposal -does- say that it is a "voluntary program". This doesn't make it more desirable, though...  > That is--you get high quality secure NSA classified technology if you agree > to escrow your key. Otherwise you are on your own.  "Secure"? How do you know? Because NSA is trying to make you believe it? "Trust us." Yeah, right.  "Otherwise you are on your own"? How do you know that tomorrow they will not outlaw encrypring devices that don't use "their" technology? Because they are promising you? Gee, they are not doing even that - read the proposal again.  Regards, Vesselin
In article <strnlghtC5M2Cv.8Hx@netcom.com> (sci.crypt), strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > Here's a simple way to convert the Clipper proposal to an unexceptionable > one: Make it voluntary. >  > That is--you get high quality secure NSA classified technology if you agree > to escrow your key. Otherwise you are on your own. >   David,    As an economist, I'm sure you can see the flaws in this logic. If the (naive) market is flooded with proprietary, but weak, encryption, then truly strong  encryption will be unable to compete. Suppose the govt had a secret TV broadcast standard, and then sold TVs below cost. Private industry has a better standard, but it's not as widespread due to the govt early flooding of the market with cheap proprietary sets. Even though the industry's technology is better, the programming is being broadcast to the govt's unduplicatable standard. Who could compete?    The other flaw, of course, is that making something voluntary today ensures that it will be voluntary in the future. I went to renew my CA drivers license last week and was required not only to give my SSN, but to PRODUCE AN SSN CARD to veryify the number!  Note that a federal law once said that no state or local govt could ever require the use of SSNs for drivers license registration (specifically!).     I do not trust the govt that says "trust me on this even though we could have an arrangement that doesn't require your trust."  Something is big time fishy. If you look more carefully, you'll see it.    -mel
Hmmm.... CELP takes up about 12.6 MIPS for full duplex, and has been implemented on about a million DSP chips... the 56001 card in my PC only cost about $700, and I'm sure once demand goes up the prices would drop. The Analog Devices 21020 board that we're looking at now cost about $500 (academic price). I don't think hardware is something to worry about... if you get it working, people will snap up internet phone cards like there was no tomorrow. What we need here is a good implementation of CELP (the government code is absolute crap, I got a 30% speedup after looking at it for a couple of hours), and modifications to pgp to allow it to compress/decompress 144 bit frames every 30msec... I think the AD21020 should have enough juice for this (50MIPS). As part of the project I'm working on now, we're trying to get CELP up and running in realtime full duplex mode... I gotta find the source to pgp and see how tough it would be to integrate the en/decryption parts into the code. I'll play with it. Anyone else out there got an AD21020 setup? 	- Ed _____________________________________________________________________________ :-)  ('')  (-:  (,,)  :-)  ('')  (-:  (,,)  :-) | see lidflip instructions on Edward Hutchins, eah1@cec1.wustl.edu            | other side of card
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > Chances are the government has thought of this, and "just anyone" won't  > be permitted access to enough of the internals to make a "fake" clipper  > chip.   Once the chips are released (in phones, or whatever), they are vulnerable to  phsyical inspection and observation.  Now, I will grant that there will no  doubt be safeguards against "peeling" the chip, but the NSA has no monopoly  on cleverness.  The chip, and the algorithms it uses, will not remain secret  for very long.  Any university with a VLSI lab has the required equipment, as  does any offshore semiconductor manufacturer.
In article <RENS.93Apr22153654@stimpys.imsi.com> rens@imsi.com (Rens Troost) writes:   >>   In this giant bally-ho over this Clipper chip I noticed a rather >>   disturbing trend in some of the E-mail and posts I've tossing back and >>   forth.   > >Me too. A tendency on the part of some people to hide their head in >the sand.  I never advocated "hiding in the sand."  I'm advocating a peaceful solution while a peaceful solution is possible.  Unless you want blood on your hands.  >How many people do you want jailed for their convictions, for their >insistence on real privacy? Why sit by quietly while the preconditions >for a real civil war are put in place by a short-sighted government.  Read the above.  >>   Everybody is jumping up and down and screaming about it, and I'm worried >>   that people are going to reach for their hammers and rifles before their pens >>   and paper.   > >The terminal is mightier than the pen :)  I type corrected.  (:-)  >Really? I guess you mean the U.S. revolution. How about England, >India, Mexico, France, Holland....  English revolution-> what revolution?  They never had one.   India-> If they could get around their religion restrictions Mexico-> Point Taken, I forgot about this one.   France-> Napoleon Bonepart would have something to say about this. Holland-> I didn't know they had one, won't comment because I don't know enough.  >>   That's not very good odds.   > >You are misinformed. But this whole issue is off the topic.  Actually, I consider the issue on topic.  When you start gambling with fire crackers, sooner or later, somebody is going to lose a hand.  >When the cops kick in your door for using PGP, tell them that. All >we're doing here is exercising our (so-called, rapidly narrowing) >right to free speech.   Fine.  Exercise the right to free speech.  That's great!  But don't resort to armed violence until there's no other possibility.  >Perhaps you should talk to the government about that. Or are you a >disciple of David "The cops are our FRIENDS" Sternlight?  No.  I believe there are bad cops, and good cops.  There are bad people, and good people.  (And all that grey inbetween.)    I have had the pleasure of knowing a police officer who did his best to uphold the laws he swore to defend.  I have also seen what happens when police power is abused.  Don't generalize in either direction.  It just causes problems.  >The implied threat of the illegalization of private crypto, the >not-so-subtle subtext of the clipper announcement, is what worries me. >I don't want my children growing up in a police state.  Me either.  Nice can of worms, ain't it?
In article <C63Ly7.GBx@sugar.neosoft.com> georgel@NeoSoft.com (George Livsey) writes:       I am aware of the restrictions imposed by the munitions act    on the export of cryptographic technology, however, is it illegal to    transmit encrypted data from the U.S. to another country?  If so,    then which laws apply to this situation?  From the US law perspective, unless you're engaging in illegal speech, it's not illegal to use encryption.  Yet.  The NSA is allowed to try to listen, but you're not obligated to make it easy for them.  Yet. The other country may have more repressive laws about that; I gather France's bureaucracy wants to know what you're saying,  and in the old Soviet Union, they didn't need laws to make things illegal :-(  (paranoia follows, for those of you who want to play it safe :-) The fact that the NSA is listening may affect your willingness to use wimpy crypto technologies, but it may also affect your willingness to use technologies that violate RSA's patents, e.g. if you use PGP, the NSA may tell RSA that you're doing so, and if the Secret Service catches on, they may decide that the mere fact that RSA hasn't filed a lawsuit against you doesn't mean that you don't deserve to have your computer confiscated for possible patent violation, munitions law violation, espionage, money laundering, drug importation, and creatin' a disturbance, and then not give it back because you *did* violate the patent even though they had to drop all the other charges, unlike that nasty Steve Jackson who had the gall not to be guilty of *anything*.
In article <1r21t1$4mc@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: < < > I wonder if she landed such a fat fee from cooperation with the NSA in < >the design and propoganda stages that she doesn't care any more?  < <  Which is to say: is the NSA -totally- perfidious, or does it at least <have the redeeming virtue of taking care of its own? <g>  Of course they take care of their own ... very well ... until the person has 'outlived his/her/undefined usefulness'... then 'elimination' becomes a consideration...  :-)
In <1r74a4$h2t@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:   >I've been reading the sci.crypt, alt.privacy.clipper and comp.org.eff.talk >discussions about the Clipper chip and find (as usual) that most of us >think alike -- so there's a lot of repitition.  If each of these messages >were sent to Clinton as well as to the net (or instead of to the net), we >might actually have some effect.  >	0005895485@MCIMAIL.COM  (White House)  I've already written a 5000 char commentary (from my MCI MAIL account, so I can't be accused of being a "hacker".)
In article <1993Apr16.195927.3952@natasha.portal.com> bob@natasha.portal.com (Bob Cain) writes: >Charles Kincy (ckincy@cs.umr.edu) wrote: >: In article <1993Apr16.001321.3692@natasha.portal.com> bob@natasha.portal.com (Bob Cain) writes: [...] >: Oh, I see, flame someone, tell them that they are immature, tell them >: they are wrong, and then don't offer any proof for your assertions. >:  >: You really *are* a putz.  Put up or shut up. >:  > >I will provide any proof you wish in private.  Name it, dickhead.  Don't bother.  <C5J0t.K52@blaze.cs.jhu.edu> has pretty much made your pathetic ass superfluous.  You lose.  Pack up your bags and go home.  >Putz Cain  Well, if the shoe fits....
For example, I don't own a cordless phone.  With Clipper, I would.  If the     local men in blue really want to listen to me talk to my friends or order     pizza, I'm no worse off than I am now, and I don't have to worry about    local kids or nosy neighbors. I do tend to agree.  Sigh.     So, where can I buy a DES-encrypted cellular phone?  How much does it cost?  Of course, if we didn't have government monopolies on cellular phone service, there probably *would* be some available.     > How can you reconcile the administrations self proclaimed purpose of     > providing law enforcement with access to encrypted data without making     > the clipper system the only crypto available in the U.S... ?    The Second and Fourth Amendments do come to mind.    The Second Amendment is especially apt, given the ITAR definitions of crypto equipment as munitions, and the gun-control people's increasing ability to define things as "assault weapons" and make them illegal. Triple-DES is obviously used for "assault phones", while Cripple will be legal, and Triple-Cripple may fall into the gray area of "illegally upgrading to an assault phone"...
>security of the key-escrow system.  In making this decision, I do >not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the >government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that >are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key- >escrow system.
>cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes: >For example, if I had a program on my disk which created totally random >files looking like encrypted messages and could demonstrate that the file >in question *could have been* created by that program, then my claim that >it was, in fact, created by that program must stand as true (since I'm >innocent) unless someone can prove me wrong.  HMMM... that brings up a neat idea.    Unfortunately, it's SOOO neat, I think I ought to patent it.  So I can't tell you about it.  Sorry.  :-)  	-Bill  Copyright 1993 William S. Yerazunis (aka Crah the Merciless) All rights reserved, no responsibility taken.
Just a little nitpicking. Wasn't it the government that required a standard railway gauge ? Didn't that improve things ?  Please don't misunderstand. I'm utter suspicious of this Clipper chip. Why hold the design TOP SECRET ? Was this a work around the law that says that any discoveries made by people working for the government is public domain. ( e.g. NIH Class Library, etc. ) DES has its designs published all over the place and it is considered fairly strong ( although could be stronger ).
In article <C5so84.Hxv@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >In article <2073@rwing.UUCP> pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes: >:If the Clinton Clipper is so very good, why not make its algrithm public >:so many people can exchange ideas and examine it, rather than a few >:isolated 'respected experts' (respected by whom?  for what?  Perhaps a  One more time...      If they released the algorithm, it would be possible for someone     to come up with an implementation which was identical, but     lacking an escrowed key.      Note that the press announcement mentioned that the algorithm was     being kept secret for security of the key escrow system.  In this     case security means "an escrowed key for EVERY clipper chip".       Assuming you believed all that is said about the effective of     the algorithm, and the escrow system, which would you buy :       (a)  Chip from firm A with the escrowed key      (b)  Second source chip from reputable firm B with no key           in government escrow.
In article <WARLORD.93Apr20175546@deathtongue.mit.edu> warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins) writes:   > >The point here is not the specific instance of the Wiretap Chip. >Rather, it is like having the government telling you that they want a >copy of your house key, safe-deposit box keys, etc., and telling you >that "they wont use them unless its totally neccessary."  I sure >wouldn't want that.  Why should encryption be any different?  Actually the govrnment is telling you that if you want to use their "product" the manufacturer (actually better yet, some "trusted" pair of escrow agencies) has to have the key.  Most of us already are in this situation--our car makers have keys to our cars (or can get them quickly from the VIN  number), and I have no doubt that if presented with a court order, they'd surrender copies to the government.  Chances are that many locksmiths have the code numbers for house locks they've installed, and in an emergency can cut keys; thus they'd also provide such keys to the government pursuant to a court order.  The state has no difficulty gaining access to your safe deposit box if they have a court order.  Bad analogy.  This is not to argue for or against the proposal, but rather better distinctions are required in thinking about it than "house key, safe-deposit keys, etc.".  David
In article <1993Apr21.041033.16550@news.clarkson.edu>, tuinstra@signal.ece.clarkson.edu.soe (Dwight Tuinstra) writes: > The clear implication is that there are "legal" authorizations other > than a court order.  Just how leaky are these?  I don't have the wiretap statute handy.  But here's what the law says on pen registers.  This is all from Title 18 of the U.S. Code.  Note how vague S. 3125(a)(1)(B) is....  I haven't had a chance to check out 50 U.S.C. 1801 yet.  ----  18 USC  S. 3121 Pen Registers (as of 4/93)   S. 3121. General prohibition on  pen register  and trap and trace device use; exception     (a) In general. Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a  pen register  or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this title or under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).  .....  S. 3125.  Emergency  pen register  and trap and trace device installation     (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter , any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines that--     (1) an emergency situation exists that involves--     (A) immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person; or     (B) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime,     that requires the installation and use of a  pen register  or a trap and trace device before an order authorizing such installation and use can, with due diligence, be obtained, and     (2) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this chapter to authorize such installation and use "may have installed and use a  pen register  or trap and trace device if, within forty-eight hours after the installation has occurred, or begins to occur, an order approving the installation or use is issued in accordance with section 3123 of this title."     (b) In the absence of an authorizing order, such use shall immediately terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied or when forty-eight hours have lapsed since the installation of the  pen register  or trap and trace device, whichever is earlier.
In article <115863@bu.edu> uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt) writes:  > >I wish I could agree with you.  Ask yourself this.  Why would any private >sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was KNOWN to be at least >partially compromised? (Key escrows in this instance)  Why would any >private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that had not been properly >evaluated?  (i.e. algorythm not publically released) >The answer seems obvious to me, they wouldn't.  There is other hardware out >there not compromised.  DES as an example (triple DES as a better one.)  What follows is my opinion. It is not asserted to be "the truth" so no flames, please.  It comes out of a background of 20 years as a senior corporate staff executive in two Fortune 50 companies.  I'd be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the NSA for business, if they told me it was more secure than DES, and in particular resistant to attempts by Japanese, French, and other competitive companies and governments to break.  I'd be happy to do so even with escrowed keys, provided I was happy about the bona fides of the escrow agencies (the Federal Reserve would certainly satisfy me, as would something set up by one of the big 8 accounting firms).  I'd trust the NSA or the President if they stated there were no trap doors--I'd be even happier if a committee of independent experts examined the thing under seal of secrecy and reported back that it was secure.  I'd trust something from the NSA long before I'd trust something from some Swiss or anybody Japanese.  This may seem surprising to some here, but I suggest most corporations would feel the same way. Most/many/some (pick one) corporations have an attitude that the NSA is part of our government and "we support our government", as one very famous CEO put it to me one day.  Just some perspective from another point of view.
I think I should also point out that the mystical DES engines 	are known plaintext engines (unless you add a ton of really smart 	hardware?)  Assume the ton of smart hardware.  It doesn't really have to be that smart.
Some of the messages here seem to reflect the view that the government is listening in on everything and one will have to hide one's clipper messages somehow if non-escrowed crypto goes away.  A little perspective might be in order.  The number of court ordered wire taps is pretty low. Law enforcement has to present pretty good evidence to get even that limited number of authorizations.  Thus the overwhelming majority of conversations are neither tapped nor recorded by the government, and for that to happen they have to: a) Have a pretty good reason, with evidence; b) Use this sparingly on highest priority "pretty good reasons."  Though the system may be imperfect, it is a long way from the horror stories some here seem to believe or anticipate.