waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <strnlghtC5wC3z.Erw@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >psionic@wam.umd.edu, whose parenthesized name is either an unfortunate >coincidence or casts serious doubt on his bona fides, posts a message in >which he seems willing to take the word of a private firm about which he >knows little that their new encryption algorithm is secure and contains no >trapdoors, while seemingly distrusting that of the government about clipper.  Will someone please post the David Sternlight FAQ to alt.privacy.clipper before someone unfamiliar with him takes him seriously and starts yet another flame fest?
artmel@well.sf.ca.us (Arthur Melnick) writes: >     Ever since Craig Rowland posted his piece "New Encryption" >to sci.crypt there has been some discussion of our company, >Secured Communications Technologies, Inc, and on encryption >algorithm, NEA.         The classic comment on new encryption algorithms comes from Friedman:  	"No new cypher is worth considering unless it comes  	from someone who has already broken a very hard one."  Historically, Friedman has been right.  It's really hard to develop a good cypher.  IBM's Lucifer, the precursor to DES, turns out to have been fatally flawed.  Most of the DES-like systems other than DES seem to be vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis.  The first two tries at public key encryption (remember knapsack cyphers?) were broken.  Most if not all of the machine cyphers of the electromechanical era were broken eventually.  Attempts in the computer era to home-brew encryption have been disappointing; the classic "A survey of data insecurity packages" in Cryptologia contains analyses and breaking techniques for a few of the popular "security packages" of the late 1980s.          A new, proprietary algorithm?  No way.          If the US is permitting general export of this thing, it has to be weak; that's how the current regulations work.  Currently there's a willingness to allow systems with short keys (32 bits appears to be no problem; the 56 bits of DES are too many) or weak algorithms (I think Word Perfect qualifies under that rule) to be exported. I can't believe these guys shepherded their technique through the  PTO and the State Department's Arms Control Division without finding that out.  					John Nagle
In article <strnlghtC5wJAG.46L@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > >Doug Holland claims Tom Clancy has provided the recipe for nuclear bombs. >Clancy himself says he has omitted certain crucial steps. Further, how do we >know Clancy knows, rather than repeating what he's read or been told in the >unclassified domain? > Tom Clancy omitted these key steps to try to prevent groups of people from building a nuclear bomb.  However, he asserts that you can find these key steps in any university library.  The main point of _Five Minutes To Midnight_ is that it is impossible to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since it has become easy to acquire the knowledge to build one, and fissible materials are nearly impossible to control.  Read this article, or better yet, run to your library yourself and dig up some stuff on constructing a nuclear weapon.  Doug Holland
jhart@agora.rain.com (Jim Hart) writes: > You don't care that people are being lied to, fooled into believing the  > chip gives "privacy" when it fact it allows wiretaps?  It does give privacy, just not absolute privacy.  The announcement was very  up front about this, and about allowing wiretaps.  How is this "fooling"  anyone?  > are you so smart that you know when you're talking  > to somebody who has a wiretap chip on their phone instead of a privacy  > chip with private keys?)   Sure.  The two don't interoperate.  You couldn't talk to, say, a Cylink phone  from a Clipper phone.  I would expect even multiprotocal phones to come with  indicators saying which kind of link encryption is in use...  > We *do* need an alternative to NSA-bugged telephones, but  > we're talking inexpensive *telephones* here, including hand-sized  > cellulars, that need strong crypto, real privacy.  So start a company and build them.  This is still mostly a capitalist  economy...  > What we need is a true *privacy chip*.  For example, a real-time  > voice-encryption RSA, put it into a silicon compiler and spit out  > ASIC.  Put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for  > international business, diplomats, and private communications.  I agree.  Go for it.
>In article <1raeir$be1@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: >> >  Well, actually, this one's easy. It's their job. The NSA is >> >supposed to develop cryptosystems. If the government chooses to go >> >ahead and sell those cryptosystems to the masses, so be it. >> >>  Ah, but developing cryptosystems which are specificially designed to >>protect the government's domestic spying capabilities takes them beyond >>that mandate, into the forbidden field of domestic wiretapping. >> > >Unlike the CIA, the NSA has no prohibition against domestic spying.  Read >Bamford's THE PUZZLE PALACE. > >Bruce >         I have that book, and the way I read it is, one side of the conversation MUST be from outside the United States.         Of coures, that ASS U MEs that the NSA plays by the rules...
I am currently writing a paper on computer protocols security. I would  appreciate your help.  I currently have no insight into these topics except that they relate to security in multilevel security network.  Please semd me any references, books, FAQs or contact persons names and Internet addresses. The topics I am interested in: 1.  The "firewall gateway model" as implemented in Internet gateways. 2.  Kerberos Authentication Service  Please send me a private e-mail at eldar@sfu.ca and/or post it on the board.  Thanks a lot,
> I'm afraid I have to disagree with you on that point.  NSA will *not*  >tell RSA or any other non-DOD entity anything that its eavesdropping  >reveals.
I suspect that the decisive element in the political battle will be the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt) factor.   If the people who would be end users of the Cripple Chip hear of the whole debate only vaguely -- the government says it's solid; other people in the field say it's Swiss cheese -- the balance of doubt could shift against the Feds.  Any attempt to limit other forms of encryption could then be presented as the government covering its own butt by protecting its poor product from superior competition.   Comments?
( Below is my response to Dr. Denning's letter to Steven Bellovin. Comments   are invited. - Paul )  In alt.privacy.clipper, Steve Bellovin posted your message to him, which included a brief passage concerning selection of agencies as escrow agencies.  I am glad to see that the proposal as written states that the escrow agencies won't be law enforcement agencies. I would argue, however, that *one* of the escrow agencies shouldn't be federal at all.  As a private citizen, I would feel much more "secure in my person and papers" knowing that an organization committed to individual civil liberties- the ACLU and the NRA come to mind- was safeguarding half of my key. Both the ACLU and the NRA are resistent to government pressure by the simple expedient fact that they are not supported, funded, or overtly controlled by the government.  Of those federal and federally funded candidate agencies that you mentioned, I have the following comments:  	- SRI, Rand, Mitre, and national labs: I agree that they have         great experience safeguarding sensitive information. I am not         convinced that they would adequately safeguard _this_ 	information, since in any case requiring disclosure, there's       	likely to be sigificant pressure for disclosure- possibly  	*wrongful* disclosure.  	- GAO: perhaps. I would like to see more concrete evidence of  	their fidelity and ability.  	- *TREASURY*? Surely you're joking. Perhaps you'd ask BATF 	to safeguard keys. Maybe the Federal Reserve would be a  	better choice.  Ever since last fall's "trial balloon" was posted in sci.crypt, your name has been synonymous with those who place a great deal of trust in the ability of government agencies and agents to act within the law.  I agree with you in part: those agencies and agents *almost always* act properly. However, there have been enough cases where _sworn agents of the Federal Government_ have acted wrongly to make me feel that having two federal agencies as key repositories is unacceptable.   Respectfully, -Paul Robichaux  (not speaking for NTI, BCSS, or NASA)
douglas craig holland (holland@CS.ColoState.EDU) writes: > > With E-Mail, if they can't break your PGP encryption, they'll just > call up one of their TEMPEST trucks and read the electromagnetic  > emmisions from your computer or terminal.  Note that measures to  > protect yourself from TEMPEST surveillance are still classified, as  > far as I know.  are LCD displays vulnerable to tempest?  > 	If the new regime comes to fruition, make sure you protect your First > Amendment rights by asserting your Second Amendment Rights.  i'll second that.  jason
In article <1993Apr20.032623.3046@eff.org> kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie) writes: >Clipper might be a good way to cover the use of another layer of >encryption.  Could somebody provide an overview of the proposed systems using the chip?  (Ought to see if ATT has a spec sheet)  Skipjack sounds like a normal digital encryption algorithm, so the data path will have to be 	voice --> digitize --> compress --> encrypt  Compression will be necessary to fit the data on the wire, unless they want to wait for ISDN (that we should be so lucky...).  Feeding pre-encrypted data into the compressor will cause it to chuckle at you; you'd have to tap into the guts of the phone and hack either the compressed data stream, or selected parts of the output stream before it hits the modem.  Unless you want to pay for two fast modems on top of the encryption, and just plug the box in between your phone and the wall.  >- Carl
In article <1993Apr21.023319.13965@midway.uchicago.edu> smk5@quads.uchicago.edu (Steve Kramarsky) writes:    > OK, I should have read the thread before posting my own $0.02.  I would   > just add to Phil's very infomative discussion the following caveat: the   > fifth amendment applies ONLY in crinial cases.  ("...nor shall any person .   > . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...").      Maybe you are using the wrong amendment.  If someone were to seize a safe containing your (paper) records, and demand that you produce the combination, the applicable defense would be on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure.  The police would be entitled to subpoena documents relating to a specific matter, but any broad search such as implied by impounding all your records would be unconstitutional. In the case of the safe, they would probably get a locksmith and assert that they ONLY examined documents covered by the warrent. (Sure!)  In the cryptographic case, their only resort would be rubber-hose cryptography.      (This would also make a good "mental experiment" to use in choosing escrow agents.  Would you trust this proposed agent with a key to your hard disk?--or half the key for that matter.)  --  					Robert I. Eachus
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > If the crooks use an innocent person's clipper phone on the tapped line > there's no problem. The Feds don't care whose phone instrument is used, just > that the conversation is by the suspect on the tapped line. They get the > serial number, get the keys, and they are in business. >  > No clipper chip to person association is ever needed.  celular phones...........
May I suggest that any any proposed cipher system having less entropy than the user's key and message can have an embedded subliminal channel as big as the difference in entropies between the entropy of the user input (message) and the entropy of the output?  For example, take plain DES.  The unsuspecting user inputs a string "PLAINTEXT" to be enciphered.  He cranks the algorithm which has been hacked by George Quisling and comes out with j*3H4902d.  Nine char in and nine chars out.  Right?  The unsepecting user ships the ciphertext to be decrpyted and the message "PLAINTEXT" is produced.  Everything fine, right?  Nope.   Imagine the algorithm did a LZ compression on PLAINTEXT before DESing. (Compressing is down to four characters with more entropy:  9#wj  The opponent now pads the message with his own message, also compressed  *3dk@  before applying DES to the concatenated compressed pairs.  When decrpyted, the first compressed message is stripped off and declared sent.  Unbeknowst to the receiver, the opponents accomplice collects the remaining message in the bit bucket and uncompresses to KILL NOW.  And to prevent all such subliminal or covert storage channels you would need to have  maximal entropy all the time -- which is a priori impossible because (for example) a stereotypical message might be replaced by one bit in the output reserving the rest of the output bits for the long covert message.  In other words, if you opponent get to muck with the algorithm -- you either have got to muck with it LAST or concede his possible  embedding of covert channels.  In other words, if you present a message to an opponet with less than maximal entropy then you have given him free bits of storage.
In article a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes: >In strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > [...] >>I'd be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the NSA for business, if >>they told me it was more secure than DES, and in particular resistant to >>attempts by Japanese, French, and other competitive companies and >>governments to break. > >(It's NIST, not NSA.  NSA is not supposed to have anything to do with this.)  With all the activity in sci.crypt these past few days, I am not supprised you missed it... NIST got Skipjack from the NSA :)  [...] >>I'd trust the NSA or the President if they stated there were no trap >>doors--I'd be even happier if a committee of independent experts examined >>the thing under seal of secrecy and reported back that it was secure. > >I wouldn't trust the NSA.  I think I would trust the President on this, but >I'm not certain he would be told.  "I am not a crook." President Richard M. Nixon                     ^^^^^^^^^
I am eager to hear the legal theory behind restricting exchange of cryptographic data and encrypted messages, given the first admendment; the theory behind regulating the *personal* encryption of one's personal *thoughts and feelings* seems even less tenable.  Perhaps if we make a *treaty* with, say, Iceland, to restrict crypto paraphernalia can a good "end run" around the Constitution happen... (Treaties -- as someone pointed out -- has the force of any other "law of the land".  Like the Bill of Rights.)       Amendment 1      Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.      Amendment 2      A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.      Amendment 3      No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.      Amendment 4      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.      Amendment 5      No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.   Well -- at least for a few minutes we had some privacy...
In <16BB91429.C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu> C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu (John Kelsey) writes:  >   I've recently been reading a paper of Merkle's (publixhed only on the >net, I think) discussing three potential replacements for DES.  Was >anyting ever done with these?  Are Khufu, Khafre, and/or Snefru still >being discussed anywhere?  (I know Snefru is referenced in the RSA >FAQ, and I think it may also be in the sci.crypt FAQ.)  The paper was distributed (against the wishes of the NSA - I have a copy with a few 'illicit distribution' footnotes scribbled on it :-), and eventually published at one of the crypto conferences.  Things were looking good.  Then Xerox patented the algorithms.  <Plonk!>  I don't know of anything which uses them.  Also, Khafre was broken at a later conference and from work on a related algorithm I don't think the existing Khufu would hold up too well against a converted differential cryptanalysis attack, although it can probably be changed to resist this type of attack....  Peter.
In article <strnlghtC602KA.IFD@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >  > Brad Yearwood posts a long response to the issue of registering a > phone-clipper relationship. >  > It doesn't wash. >  > Recall that law enforcement gets a court order to tap a suspect's phone > calls. They do what they do now--figure out which lines to tap. They then > record the stuff. If it's Clipper, they read the law enforcement block, > extract the serial number, and get the keys using the court order. >  > No new difficulties (such as using someone else's phone instrument or phone > line) are introduced that wouldn't have existed absent clipper. If the > crooks were going to use a pay phone (say), they could have done so without > clipper. If the government figures out they're so doing, they listen in, and > if it's a clipper conversation they get the serial number and then the keys. >  > If the crooks use an innocent person's clipper phone on the tapped line > there's no problem. The Feds don't care whose phone instrument is used, just > that the conversation is by the suspect on the tapped line. They get the > serial number, get the keys, and they are in business. >  > No clipper chip to person association is ever needed. >  > David > --  > David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of >                          our information, errors and omissions excepted.   >  >
In <1993Apr19.134346.2620@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: >Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:56:39 EDT >From: denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) >        The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in  >The algorithm operates on 64-bit blocks (like DES) and the chip supports >all 4 DES modes of operation.  The algorithm uses 32 rounds of scrambling >compared with 16 in DES.   So in a few years there could be millions of these chips in the USA, all networked together? Sounds like a good science fiction story - the government wants to crack foreign DES (or whatever) messages, so they con the public into individually buying all of the components and installing them. Soon the US could be covered by the largest parallel computer in the world, built on top of our current phone net.
zeev@ccc.amdahl.com (Ze'ev Wurman) writes:  >But do we really believe that the various governments >(including ours) won't have the full lists of all the keys ever manufactured?  Yes, but they'll be encrypted with Cripple Chip encryption, the encryption algorithm so great it's TOP SECRET and so unbreakable they WON'T EVEN LET YOU LOOK AT IT!  Doesn't that make you feel SECURE?
I just signed up for this group, so I hope I'm not missing something in a FAQ, but I'm looking for a good introduction to the mathematics of encryption -- particularly DES and Public-Key, though others would be interesting also.  Probably a good library could help me out, but I thought it might be even easier if I could obtain a nice article entirely electronically (besides, I have this rather *rational* phobia of libraries for reasons stemming from this "dissertation" thing hanging over my head :-)).   	I have a basic knowledge of mathematics... number-theory is a bit unfamiliar to me, but I've had a few graduate-level math courses in some other areas; anyway, I'm not a complete novice to the field. So probably something aimed at a basic graduate introductory level would be about right.  Something, anyway, which is more specific than "a really big prime number is generated to code the message". 	If someone knows of a good text available by ftp (or gopher), or would like to email me one... please let me know.  I'll probably keep reading this group; but it would be nice if you would email me at the same time, so I don't miss it.  Thanx, Lulu...
In article <1993Apr19.052005.20665@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: > Nothing was said about where K_P comes from.  Oh? Hellman said ``each user will get to choose his or her own key.'' That's the key which I called K_P, the session key. According to Hellman, if Alice and Bob are communicating with the Clipper Chip, then Alice chooses ``her own key'' and Bob chooses ``his own key.'' This is incompatible with the suggestion that when Alice and Bob are talking, they use a _common_ K_P, chosen by classical or public-key approaches.  The protocol/key-management description published so far is either incomplete or incorrect. It leaves me with no idea of how the system would actually _work_. I hope the CPSR FOIA request succeeds so that we get full details.
From article <67@cyberia.win.net>, by johnston@cyberia.win.net (Robert Johnston): > Encryption technologies are currently reguarded as arms by the > Feds, hence the export ban.  While the Second is under enough > attack for guarrentteing our rights to fire arms, perhaps we > should reflect on this as well.  (Perhaps fire arms are not the > only weapons covered under the Second Amendment)  Hmmm... I wouldn't consider encryption to be a weapon.  How would the government classify encryption?  Seems to me that encryption ought to be covered by the first amendment.   Using this line of reasoning, the government shouldn't be able to restrict what data people encrypt and what encryption algorithms they use because this would be restricting one's freedom of speech.  In other words, encrypted data---text, graphics, or other information---is just another form of free speech. For this reason the government shouldn't be able to regulate the use of encryption algorithms and encrypted data.  The only time the government should be able to 'force' someone to reveal his or her encryption keys for some encrypted data is when the encrypted data in question may be something that isn't protected by the first amendment such as kiddy porn.  Even in a case like this the government should be required to get a search warrant before coercing someone into revealing the keys.  BTW, what encryption methods are considered to be state-of-the-art nowdays.  Have the feds relaxed export restrictions on DES yet? Also, is DES still regarded as a good form of encryption?  > Robert Johnston > johonston@cyberia.win.net   Scott Kennedy,  Brewer and Patriot  Before:  "David Koresh is a cheap thug who interprets           the Bible through the barrel of a gun..."  --ATF spokesman After:   "[The ATF] is a cheap thug who interprets           [the Constitution] through the barrel of a gun..."  --Me