waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
: From: shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff) : Message-ID: <1r24us$oeh@agate.berkeley.edu> : It seems likely to me that that a large subset of encrypted communications : would be archived to tape so they could be read if sometime in the future : probable cause arises and a warrant is obtained.  I think it is unlikely that data like this could be used in court. Currently LEAs can install wiretaps on large numbers of phones, record calls without listening to them, and then post-facto obtain warrants and listen to calls after probable cause is established.  But this strategy wouldn't get the stuff admitted in court.  (At least, not in the near term.)  In other words, near as I can tell, the thing that makes such evidence inadmissable is the interception without a warrant, not the attempt to interpret what was intercepted without a warrant.  I'd be surprised that archiving data without consent would be interpreted as anything but analogous to a wiretap by the courts.  Note that that doesn't mean I think it won't be done if technically feasible.  Just as I'm sure many wiretaps are done now without warrants, just to fish for avenues to investigate.  So in the future, start surveilance, start archiving data, trump up some probable cause, decrypt post-facto after the warrant is in hand, and the investigation gets a boost from data that, sadly, won't ever be presented to a jury.  While I'm posting...  for an interesting cautionary tale projecting this archiving scenario to extremes, read "Lacey and his Friends", a collection of sf stories by David Drake.  The US starts down the slippery slope by archiving *everyghing*.  But don't worry folks, it's stored in a secure repository where nobody but LEAs with warrants can get to it.  And by the way, we'll be installing cameras on all major streets.  Hey, this is nothing new, we already have cameras in banks and teller machines, don't we?  And then we'll pass laws requiring cameras covering *all* public places.  Then in some private places.  Then we'll make it a crime ever to be out of range of a camera, except in legally licensed privacy cubicles.  Only alone.  And with a thorough body search before and after.  But, see, there's still a right to privacy.  We haven't curtailed any rights, not really.  And just think how much easier it'd be to solve crimes in such a situation: just obtain a warrant, put on a VR helmet and take a walk down memory lane.  And hey, nobody'll be tracking *you* or *me*, no need to be self-conscious.  After all, if you're not doing anything illegal...  Funny, though.  While speeding and the radar detector industry became pretty much a thing of the past, somehow all this didn't elminate all crime in the story.  And somehow, politicians got exemptions on grounds of national security, and rich corporations got exemptions for their execs on grounds of industrial espionage and the preservation of competition.  And not everybody was exactly happy with the system.   I can't imagine why.
brad@optilink.COM (Brad Yearwood) writes: >If Clipper comes to cellular phones along with legal proscriptions against >using other cipher systems on these phones, a new and potentially dangerous >class of crime is created. > >Criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications (specifically >the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats) >will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user, and >to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the >device will be delayed.  You obviously haven't read the information about the system. The chips put out serial number infomation into the cypher stream to allow themselves to be identified. The system does not rely on registering people as owning particular phone units.  I am against the proposal, but lets be accurate in our objections.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
sdoty@odie.santarosa.edu (Scott Doty) writes:  > But it does look like csrc.ncsl.nist.gov has become an > un-machine.  If someone would try ftp'ing to it, or knows what's up,  > I'd really appreciate the info.   csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (129.6.54.11) is ftp-able from here...
Since the AT&T wiretap chip is scheduled to be distributed  internationally, allowing the U.S. government to spy on foreign  governments, companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic  citizens, this is a world-wide issue.  Thus Distribution: world.  ygoland@wright.seas.ucla.edu (The Jester) writes:  >However assuming that I can still encrypt things as I please, who >cares about the clipper chip?   Why do we hackers care about the Clipper chip?  Do we give a shit about anybody's privacy accept our own?  And perhaps not even our own; are we so smart that we always know when we're talking to somebody who has a wiretap on their phone?  I find the "call thru your computer" ideas may reflect this attitude. Ideas that are of, by, and for hackers, and don't help anybody in the real world, aren't going to do anybody much good, including ourselves where voice phones are concerned.  We *do* need an alternative to NSA-bugged telephones, but we're talking inexpensive *telephones* here, including hand-sized cellulars, that need strong crypto, real privacy.  Make-shift computer hacker rigs that require living by your computer to talk privately over the phone are just a dumb stunt that doesn't  do anything for anybody's privacy in the real world.    What we need is a true *privacy chip*.  For example, a real-time  voice-encryption RSA, silicon compile it and spit out ASIC.   Put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for international  business, diplomats, and private communications.  If the U.S. bans  it, we make it somewhere else and import it.  The Japanese, German, Dutch, Taiwanese, Korean, etc. electronics companies don't want the  NSA spying on them.  U.S. workers lose more jobs to government fascist stupidity.
I was wondering if anyone knew of where I could find source code for a program to solve a substitution cipher?    Thanks! Kevin
kckluge@eecs.umich.edu (Karl Kluge) writes:  >In article <1993Apr17.071859.9555@csus.edu> sphughes@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Shaun P. Hughes) writes:  >      Just a random passing thought, but can anyone cite a documented use >   of encryption technology by criminals and terrorists. >      (Excluding the Iran-Contra Gang)  Just a couple of days ago, I heard on the radio news that a Neo-Nazi organization had set up a BBS to keep its members informed.  According to the radio man, the Nazis were using encryption to reduce their risk if they were prosecuted.  No, I do not have any more information.  Have fun.
In <ad.735831059@cat> Axel Dunkel writes: >how sensible is DES encrypted data towards bit errors? How much data per >bit will be lost in average (I assume you still have the correct key)?  It depends on the mode you're using.  For a single 64-bit input block, a one-bit error will have a 50 percent chance of corrupting each of the 64 output bits - in other words, it essentially turns the output block into a random number.  If you're encrypting data in CBC mode, however, only the one 64-bit block will be affected.  The next block, and all that follow it will be decrypted properly.  It's a good idea to have some kind of error correction in your system if corrupted bits are likely.
In article <1993Apr20.032623.3046@eff.org> kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie) writes:   >So, don't just think of replacements for clipper, also think of front >ends.  This only makes sense if the government prohibits alternative non-escrowed encryption schemes. Otherwise, why not just use the front end without clipper?  David
In article <1993Apr21.113152.395@gems.vcu.edu> langford@gems.vcu.edu writes: >1)  Second Amendment gives us the right to keep and bear arms. > >2)  Strong cryptography is "arms", according to the U.S. government (that's >    why it's so hard to export). > >Therefore, we have a constituitional right to strong cryptography!     Better, I think, is our right peacably to assemble.  I have a right to meet you in a park and talk privately.  I have a right to see if anyone is nearby, listening.  In cyberspace, cryptography gives us a right to assemble with control over who overhears us.
gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes: >Absolutely.  I just meant that no secure *dedicated* crypto device has >ever been given approval.  Guerrilla underground devices should be well >possible with today's high-speed modems (not that I can think of many v32bis >modems that are approved either mind you - just the overpriced Couriers) > >Can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run >digital speech down 14.4K?  I think it is; I've heard it's not.  Lets >say 8 bit samples.  Would *raw* data at the corresponding sampling rate >be usable?  If not, how fancy does the compression need to be?  It is said that CELP vocoders can run on the highest speed 486s with some room to spare -- they turn 64kbit (8 bit samples, 8k samples/sec) into 4800 baud. However, DSP is hairy, and I have yet to see actual proof of this in the form of an implementation. I have heard fairly reliable rumors to the effect that a famous internetworking guru has a CELP implementation that runs on Sparcstation 1+'s with some room to spare, but I have not succeeded thus far in getting my hands on a copy -- the guru in question has a reputation for not releasing code without having beaten on it for a very very long time first.   DSP experts are heavily encouraged to try their own hand at this problem.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes: > Let's assume, for the moment, that the system really is secure unless > you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent > escrow houses.  Let's say you even trust the escrow houses -- one is > the ACLU and the other is the EFF.  (And I'm not entirely joking about > those two names) >  Hi, I'm new to Internet, so this is a bit of a test message, so even a  token reply would be very appreciated.
In article <1qpg8fINN982@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >	Not to pick on Mr. May in particular, of course, but isn't this >kind of the domino theory? When one little country falls, its neighbor >will surely follow, and before you know it, we're all mining salt >in Siberia for not turning in our Captain Crunch Secret Decoder Rings.
I recently saw a message here (posted by Bob Silverman, I think) which  referred to a "birthday" attack on a cryptosystem. I'm looking for  references on, and explanations of, this type of attack.
There are chips which perform the voice compression/expansion.  They can't be expensive, because they exist in many phones connected to PBXs or on the PBX line cards, as well as in a lot of equipment which compresses voice-grade circuits to save the cost of long-distance, leased T1s or satellite circuits.  I can't remember the generic term for these chips.  My impression is that this was a big deal 10 years ago, but circuits have gotten so cheap that it isn't done much now.  Lew
In article <C5vMF3.MBt@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU>, lfoard@hopper.Virginia.EDU (Lawrence C. Foard) writes: > In article <1993Apr22.065357.9667@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes: > [article deleted] > > > >Just doing a quick reality check here - is this for real or did someone > >invent it to provoke a reaction from people?  It sounds more like the > >sort of thing you'd have heard, suitably rephrased, from the leader of a  > >certain German political party in the 1930's.... >  > It sounds like a joke (but then the war on drugs has always been a joke...).
pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes: > As for the cleaners, I'll stick with my 850W Electrolux and damn the  > carpet.   Nah.  Nothing sucks like a VAX :)...
In article <1qp9d1$e37@dorothy.ibmpcug.co.uk>, gtoal@news.ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal) writes: > Try reading between the lines David - there are *strong* hints in there > that they're angling for NREN next, and the only conceivable meaning of > applying this particular technology to a computer network is that they > intend it to be used in exclusion to any other means of encryption.  Umm...  I beg to differ with the phrase ``only conceivable meaning''. The SDNS protocols, for example, make explicit provision for multiple encryption systems, as does PEM.  (And I'd love to see how they'd mandate this new system for PEM without disclosing it....)
Don't get fooled by exponents 2^80 (possible keys) is not in the same league with 10^80 (particles in the universe).  2^80 < 10^25. Remember Avagadro's number?  There are about that many elementary particles (not molecules) in one mole.  Pretty small universe!  Or if you can put 5 Gigabytes on one tape, you would need about 10 trillion tapes (allowing several bytes per entry).  Still more than all of the existing magnetic media on the planet, but wait a few years.  (I'm including existing audio and video cassettes in the total.  Ten trillion is about 2,000 per person worldwide...  Gives new meaning to the suspicions of hiden messages.)  --  					Robert I. Eachus
Hello,  how sensible is DES encrypted data towards bit errors? How much data per bit will be lost in average (I assume you still have the correct key)?  Thanx for hints, Axel  --- Experience is what you get if you don't get what you want...
In article merlin@lerami.lerctr.org (David Hayes) writes: >In article amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >>If you can get it for a buck, 2nd hand, it must be true, eh? I'm pretty >>sure the NSA is supposed to, among many other things, provide high-quality >>cryptosystems to a variety of places. I don't recall reading anywhere >>reliable that they're supposed to: >> >>	1) Monitor my phonecalls. >>	2) Monitor usenet. >>	3) Provide only cryptosystems they can easily crack. >>	4) etc etc. >> >>	This is not to say that they *don't*, they might. But you don't >>know that they do, and you have no evidence that they do, for almost >>all values of you. It follows, therefore, that for most values of 'you', >>your claims about the NSA border on paranoia. >> >>	Andrew >> > >OK, Andrew, I'll provide some evidence. A friend of mine worked for an >electronics manufacturer on with a west-coast office. They routinely sold [story deleted]  Let me give you another story that actually happened to ME.  We sell communications boards that use a 68000.  They used to be high tech. Our agent in the UK sold a system to a company in CH which packaged it in a product for CZ (London-Bern-Prague).  I telexed the Brits and told them the Swiss need to pass export paperwork through the US as, at the time, you needed an export lisence for these systems.  Now I knew the NSA was watching this traffic (just like they are watching THIS traffic.)  And what do you know... two weeks later an agent of the US government shows up in my office to remind me if we or our agents sold systems into the Evil Empire, we had better make sure the export lisences were handled properly.  He was part of a FIVE man office in COLUMBUS OHIO!! who did this stuff based on sources he could not reveal. (I assume most of the time these guys sat around the office with their thumbs up their ass as there isn't that much stuff coming out of Columbus :)  Wow, the electric utility in Prague sure is a big worry for these folks :)  The point is, we have created a giant bureaucracy (NSA) with a budget bigger than the CIA's who, like all bureaucracies, fill their time looking for things to do.  The Evil Empire is gone.  The NSA is not.  They will do something to fill their time and justify their budgets.  (I just wish they too would sit around with their thumbs up their ass... but that is too much to hope for... they will spy on us and do things like skipjack and subvert people like Dorothy Denning.)  Sigh...
Fascinating.  Most of the content of the White House announcements was in what was *not* said.  It gives us almost nothing of value, threatens to take away a lot, and does it with a sincere smile on its face, and the nice friendly word "Management".  			      FACT SHEET 		     PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT  The first thing it doesn't say is "We're giving you stronger encryption". what it says is     the U. S. Government has developed a microcircuit that not only    provides privacy through encryption that is substantially more robust    than the current government standard, but also permits escrowing of    the keys needed to unlock the encryption.  The system for the    escrowing of keys will allow the government to gain access to    encrypted information only with appropriate legal authorization. But DES is strong enough that only the government can break it now, so the major effect is to make it EASIER for government to break! *At best* it makes it more difficult for the NSA to break, since they need to get one of the two escrowed keys to do a brute-force search for the other 40-bit key.  Similarly, it didn't say "We're making encryption is commercially available." because encryption *is* already commercially available, including forms the NSA may not be able to break, like triple-DES or IDEA. And phone companies could offer DES-based systems *now* if they were convinced the government would let them and they could make enough money.  The next thing it didn't say is "We're making encryption legal", because of course encryption *has always been* legal, and the President can't change the First Amendment merely by decree. What it *did* say was: 	In making this decision, I do not intend to prevent the 	private sector from developing, or the government from approving, 	other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in 	assuring both privacy and a secure key- escrow system. which clearly means "We're making encryption illegal unless we get your keys. Soon.  Once business buys into this."  Another thing it didn't say is "We're going to ask Congress for money to do *lots* more wiretapping", because of course, there's a budget crisis, and Congress might debate the policy issues or not give them the cash. What it *did* say was:    The Attorney General will procure and utilize encryption devices to    the extent needed to preserve the government's ability to conduct    lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure    law enforcement communications.  Further, the Attorney General    shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture    Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase. which means "We've got money Congress can't control and we're going to buy lots of wiretapping equipment with it to detect NON-APPROVED CRYPTO (that's what "preserve the government's ability to conduct ... surveillance"  means.)
johng@ecs.comm.mot.com (John Gilbert) writes: >This must have been in the works for some time.  The Bush administration must >have been working on it for quite a while.  --Clinton simply took the credit (or >blame, depending on how you look at it).  And the initiative for actual implementation.  Clinton is not just an innocent bystander here - They didn't just slap his name on it without consulting him.  What exactly is his extensive history of individual rights advocacy that people are assuming he really has nothing to do with this?  He just went back on his pledge to cut the espionage budget, and is now asking for more money than even Bush wanted.
In article <C5so84.Hxv@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >Actually, I am *completely* baffled by why Dorothy Denning has chosen >to throw away her academic respectability like this.  It looks to me >like a *major* Career Limiting Move.  There can be very few people >who know what she's been saying who take her seriously any more.  	Actually, I've been following her remarks for some time, with interest. I'm also a member of academia, and her remarks have nothing but elevate her respectability in my eyes. It remains to be seen whether you are the radical fringe, or I.  	It is generally an error to assume that your beliefs are held by the majority, or even a sizable minority. Especially when you're seeing tens, nay dozens, of people on usenet agreeing with you.
Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >Yes.  I'm not sure if my xposting to comp.speech made it to here too, but >I've found that a low sample rate (3300 samples/sec at 8 bits per sample) >plus the pd 'shorten' lossless sound compression code actually does get >speech into 14.4K with a simdgen left over.  This is *definitely* worth >working on, folks.  And shorten works in well under real-time.  	I don't think that this should be worked on just in the context of cryptography. That's sure to pose all sorts of problems for all sorts of people.  	What's needed is for someone to develop a portable telephone quality speech<->RS232 converter. Imagine, if you will, a little box that takes data on its serial port and puts out sound, and takes sound and codes it to signals on its serial port. Full duplex. Now, this device is not a cryptographic device. It's a portable poor man's sound blaster or whatever you want to call it. It's got loads of perfectly legitimate applications for: 	a) speech synthesis (with a few nifty libraries and some samples) 	b) speech recording for electronic messaging 	c) building voicemail systems 	d) internet talk radio 	e) internet relay chat  	Of course, some of the electronic messaging in item b might be encrypted, possibly realtime, but that's the user's decision. One would need 2 of these talky boxes and a pair of modems and some kind of cutout to switch over, and some code on, say, a 486 laptop.  	I'd really like to see such a thing developed so that interactive internet talk radio could be done. Ideally, though, it should be a general purpose device. It should be a general purpose enough device that nobody should be able to balk at its widespread use. Obviously, to make it easy for homebrewers, it should use pretty common hardware.  	It's interesting to note that I'd already talked with a couple of folks about building such a thing, before this whole clipper thing started. I even went so far as to track down a couple of folks who are able to make sample units, given incentive and some time. I'd envisioned finding a couple of folks interested in such a project and helping fund development of a public domain board layout and parts set, that could be published in the form of CAD drawings for a couple of major CAD packages, and in PostScript.  	Anyone interested? I'll start a provisional mailing list. Let me know if you want on.
>>>>> In article <1r60ue$102@access.digex.net>, >>>>> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes:   > Second question: Why!?!? Why is such a strange procedure used, and  >not a real RNG ? This turns those S1,S2 in a kind of bottleneck for  >system- security.  	>> The only theory that makes any sense is that S1 and S2 are 	>> either the same for all chips, or vary among very few 	>> possibilities, so that anyone trying to break the encryption 	>> by brute force need only plow through the possible serial 	>> numbers (2^30, about one billion), multiplied by the number 	>> of different S1, S2 combinations.   Suppose instead that S1 and S2 can be reconstructed given 3 or 4 of the unit keys generated in a single batch (through some sort of known plaintext attack, say).  Suppose further that 3 or 4 of the chips programmed in each session never find their way into commercial products, but instead end up "elsewhere".  Suppose the folks at "elsewhere" can determine a unit key, given physical access to one of these chips.  Then those same folks can determine S1 and S2 for the whole batch...  Too many suppositions?  Yeah, probably.
The "low radiation" claims one sees on monitors these days pertain to allegedly harmful electromagnetic emissions, which does not necessarily have anything to do wtih TEMPEST security.   (I think the alleged hazard is BS, but that's another topic.)