waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <1993Apr18.034352.19470@news.clarkson.edu>, tuinstra@sunspot.ece.clarkson.edu.soe (Dwight Tuinstra) writes: |> It might pay to start looking at what this proposal might mean to a |> police agency.  It just might be a bad idea for them, too. |>  |> OK, suppose the NY State Police want to tap a suspect's phone.  They |> need a warrant, just like the old days.  But unlike the old days, they |> now need to  |>  |>    (a) get two federal agencies to give them the two parts of |>        the key. |>  |> Now, what happens if there's a tiff between the two escrow houses? |> Posession/release of keys becomes a political bargaining chit.  	While I think it is unrealistic to suppose that the federal agencies will fail to promptly comply with a court order, there is  still a good point here.  Local law enforcement will be unable to perform a wiretap without bringing in federal agencies.   Based on the (possibly incomplete) understanding of the system quoted from D. Denning, only the FBI will be able to decrypt the system key encryption layer, which seems to be needed even to identify what escrowed keys to request.  This moves a great deal of law enforcement power to the federal level. 	The reason I like this point is that it may sway or even persuade people who don't generally line up with the civil liberties crowd.  A national police force is opposed by people from a broad range of political  viewpoints.
> Second question: Why!?!? Why is such a strange procedure used, and not  >a real RNG ? This turns those S1,S2 in a kind of bottleneck for system-  >security.
Quoting strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) in article <strnlghtC5t3nH.Is1@netcom.com>: >In article <1993Apr20.032623.3046@eff.org> kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie) writes: > > >>So, don't just think of replacements for clipper, also think of front >>ends. > >This only makes sense if the government prohibits alternative non-escrowed >encryption schemes. Otherwise, why not just use the front end without >clipper?
Since the law requires that wiretaps be requested by the Executive Branch and approved by the Judicial Branch, it seems clear that one of the key registering bodies should be under the control of the Judicial Branch.  I suggest the Supreme Court, or, regionally, the Courts of Appeal.  More specifically, the offices of their Clerks.         Courts already operate substantial record-keeping operations.  Some of these records are confidential.  So the concept of a court holding information in confidence in accordance with law has longstanding legal  precedents.  The judiciary is more immune to pressure from the executive branch than any executive branch agency or contractor can be.  So judicial control of keys is appropriate.         For the other half of the key, I suggest a unit of Congress, the General Accounting Office.  The GAO is Congress's staff unit for keeping tabs on the Executive Branch, and has an excellent reputation.  It's controlled strictly by Congress; the Executive Branch has no authority over it.         With keys split between the Legislative and Judicial branches, we might have a chance of this system working honestly.  If, of course, a way can be found to keep the keys from being siphoned off before they reach the repositories.         This should not be construed as an endorsement by me of the whole Clipper concept.  But if we have to have it, splitting control across all three branches of government might make it work.
Yes -- my error -- you will need the DIFF between the standard console.h and console.c supplied with Symantec's THINK C 5.0.4 and the specially modified one that works with MacPGP 2.2.  I added the two DIFFs to the end of the signature file "MacPGP2.2srcSIGNATURE" in pub/grady of netcom.com  Please download via anonymous FTP and, using SED (oops), cutting and pasting, fix-em-up.          Will one of you Mac-geniuses PLEASE port this to MacApp or AppMaker, or...?  Grady
Nathaniel Sammons (ns111310@LANCE.ColoState.Edu) wrote on Mon, 19 Apr 1993 02:36:36 GMT:  > If the gov establishes a cryptography standard that has to be used by > everyone, and everyone's personal key is divided into two segments > and stored at two separate, albeit easy to find places, and that key is > only 80 bits to begin with, we are screwed (pardon the allusion to the  > affore-mentioned article)!  > The gov, I believe, as do many others probably already have the cracking chips > for this Clipper Chip made.  Hell, they probably based the encoder on the  > chip that cracks it, that way it's easier to break the code, but since it is a  > classified algorythm, no one knows that they can crack it so easily.  Agreed. No agency such as the NSA (or whoever) would approve the public  release of a crypto-system, if they didn't already have the technical means or the know-how to decrypt everything at their whim. Surely the whole point of all this madness is to make Joe Public think that his/her communications will be kept safe, while James Bond at the NSA can, if need be, have full, decrypted access to someone's communications? That'll be quite a heist, if they can pull it off.    I thought that the US Government were going to release the algorithm to a panel of "carefully chosen experts", who would then "study it deeply, and report their findings"? Exactly who will these people be? Academics? Or Government-sponsored researchers? Tiny-toons?  > I, for one, and quite scared of this kind of thing, and plan to support  > organizations (and even disorganizations) who are fighting against this > Clipper Chip in any way that I can.  I can only hope that the same sort of thing doesn't start filtering over into the ears of the UK Government, and if the European Parliament gets wind of it, well, we can kiss goodbye to any form of Democracy in Europe  at all.  > I do not want the government to be able to have access, even with a search > warrant, to my keys... and I don't want those keys to be only 80 bits long > to begin with!  Hallelujah! :-)
In article <1993Apr26.193801.12416@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu> angel@Foghorn_Leghorn.coe.northeastern.edu (Kirill Shklovsky) writes:    In article <1993Apr26.104320.10398@infodev.cam.ac.uk> rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) writes:    >I'm afraid this doesn't work either. We can pick up laptop screens without any    >problem. [...]     I heard somewhere (can't name the source) that TEMPEST does not necessarily    pick-up just CRTs, but it can pick up emissions from almost any chip.  If    that is true, the kind monitor would not make any difference becuase everything    on the screen can be picked-up from the video controller.  Can anybody verify    or refute this?  Yes, that's true.  TEMPEST is nothing magic, it's just listening to any available electromagnetic emissions and using all the analysis techniques   you know to separate out the interesting stuff.   The nice thing about old CRTs is that they used to put out LOTS of signal, so they're easy to detect, and if you do your sync carefully, you can watch the output on the monitor in your deceptively-marked Chevy Step-Van.  Some brands of electric typewriters were even worse. In both cases, it's especially nice because it gets you the data the user is looking at, rather than whatever stuff the paging algorithm is paging out to disk, etc.  With newer, quieter equipment, there isn't as much signal, and it's harder to isolate the fun parts.  TEMPEST-rated equipment has much lower signal levels. But "Everything has vibrations", as Master Chuan said.
bear@tigger.cs.Colorado.EDU (Bear Giles) writes: >I wish them luck in figuring out who "I" am based on that information.  >(They can probably figure out I'm liberal, with a technical degree >but humanistic interests, from a common thread throughout my posts. >But that describes a fair portion of the users of Internet).
I was annoyed to find that this guy posted my private e-mail response to him, but since I believe what I said, I'll defend it anyway.  In article <gfpo=Wu00WC70qOQ4O@andrew.cmu.edu> jb7m+@andrew.cmu.edu (Jon C. R. Bennett) writes: >Jim Gillogly <jim@mycroft.rand.org> writes (in private e-mail):  >> They're betting that you can't [cryptanalyze E to get U given N]. >> ...  But we can't >> do this right now with DES, even knowing the encryption method without >> doing almost the whole 56-bit search. > >That is not true, with chosen plaintext attacks DES keys can be determined >without the full search.  By "almost" I mean the differential cryptanalysis attack.  The chosen plaintext attack requires a detailed analysis of about 2^36 chosen plaintexts drawn from a total of about 2^47 that need to be run, if I understand the situation correctly.  This is certainly a "break" under the meaning of the Act, but does not constitute much less work than the brute force keysearch.  The rest of his article assumes that we can figure out the Skipjack encryption algorithm E by choosing the correct data to send through it and observe the results.  I wish him joy of it, and choose not to try that attack.  I am not defending the system, and in fact am offended by the ideas of escrowed keys or a secret algorithm becoming a de facto industry standard. However, I also object to opposing it for the wrong reasons, since that weakens the case against it.  I said (in my private e-mail): >> It's not clear that the "experts" will be told F.  In fact, I'd be surprised. >> I'd expect something more of the form of the FIPS pub describing DES, so that >> they could look at the algorithm in general, rather than with the specific >> set of keys chosen. > >Oh come on, thats like saying you could evaluate DES without the S-box >constants.....  No, it's quite different.  The government would have no percentage in choosing F to be a weak key, since it's not to their advantage to have anybody else know it.  The "experts" could thus assume that F is no worse than anything else during their analysis.  Totally different situation from unknown S-boxes.  Again, I'm not saying it would be good or satisfactory for the experts to just be given the raw algorithm without the rest of the surrounding details regarding the chip and protocols and so on -- simply that I doubt that they <would> be given all the information.
"Jon \\lnes" <jon@ifi.uio.no> writes: >A person I know, belonging to a research lab of a rivate >company, claimed to me during a priavte conversation that, given the >equipment in his lab, he could crack a Kerberos ticket in 15 minutes to >an hour. He had access to rather powerful DES hardware, but not of an >extraordinare kind, I believe. The attack was possible because of the >amount of known plaintext in the ticket, which itself constitutes a small >message. This was two years ago.  I don't believe you, and I don't believe your friend.  Why?   Because DES is not known to have any known plaintext attacks readily availble. Unless your friend knows something and is keeping it secret, he was bullshitting you.  Now, it IS possible that he noted a weakness in the *implementation* of the Kerberos protocol. For instance, using a weak RNG to generate keys might cut down on the keyspace (not for the user keys -- for the other kind who's name I can't remember). However, this is not what was claimed. You are claiming a general weakness in DES, which is not known to exist in the open literature.  Don't get me wrong -- DES is weaker than it should be. However, cracking it in 15 minutes requires more money be spent on the cracking machine than ANY organization I know of has available.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
In article <1993Apr21.225435.6292@wam.umd.edu>, psionic@wam.umd.edu (Haywood J. Blowme) writes: |>    As promised, I spoke today with the company mentioned in a Washington |> Times article about the Clipper chip announcement. The name of the company |> is Secure Communications Technology (Information will be given at the end |> of this message on how to contact them). |> |>     ... |>  |>    His belief is that AT&T was made known of the clipper well before the |> rest of the industry. This is for several reasons, several of which are: |>  	This is a very good point.  AT&T obviously knew and participated in the development of the Clipper chip.  This amounts to unfair business practice and gives AT&T an early monopoly on the market [hopefully a non-existant market]. Other companies that compete with AT&T in the cellular market (Motorola, NEC, etc) have grounds to file a complaint over this.  |>  |> Right now the company is afraid that the new clipper chip will put them out |> of business. This is a very real possibility. So they really need help in |> stopping the clipper chip from becoming a standard. If you want to contact |> them, they can be reached at.. |>  |> Secure Communications Technology |> 8700 Georgia Ave. Suite 302 |> Silver Spring, MD |>  |> (301) 588-2200 |>  |>  ...  It would seem that the one fact that the government has overlooked in this whole fiasco is the economic standpoint.  As others have mentioned, the most difficulty the Clipper chip faces is an economic one.  Let's face it, the average consumer doesn't care or know that the Clipper is a bad idea.  If there is a perceived need for cellular encryption, then the companies will provide one.  Most likely, a standard will emerge.  But if the Clipper is too expensive (and $25 a chip is way too much) then they will develope their own or buy a cheaper one.  I give SCT my full support, and hope the Clipper chip goes the way of the Beta video tape format.  Also hope they get sued over re-using the name Clipper.  --   ---------------------------------------Cyberspace:-------------------------- | David T. Croley | MCC - Exp Sys Lab | A place not real, no stone, no steel.| | croley@mcc.com  | UT Austin, Texas  | A ghost unseen...the world "between".|
martin@world.std.com (Martin J Hannigan) writes: > Hello. I am the David Sternlight keeper of the FAQ. Unfortuantely I cannot > find it at the present time.  Cool it, will you?  Let people form their own opinions. Even Mr. Sternlight might be right sometime, and you guys are setting things up so that the only way he can regain  any credibility is to renounce his previous statements and move towards the mainstream of net.opinion.  This does not bespeak tolerance, IMO.  >                          C       _)           David Sternlight >                           |  ,___|            Net.Police  Indeed...
In article <1993Apr17.085358.18460@clarinet.com> brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes: >"Your honour, the suspect suddenly started using another level of >cryptography and we can't tap his phone calls any more.  He must >have something to hide.  Please sign the warrant to search his >house..."  What they would need to do, though, is make sure that nobody has access to decent crypto in the first place.  They probably can't tell Clippered voice from Clippered triple-DESed voice until they get their copy of your key.  Any criminal who's going to use encryption will do it under cover of Clipper.  The only way to avoid this will be to try to prohibit strong encryption.  I probably shouldn't say this, but they could try to detect the use of an illegal cypher by transmitting in the clear some statistical properties of the plaintext.  An old-fashioned wiretap could then detect the use of pre-encryption, which would drastically increase the measured entropy of the input.  A countermeasure to this would be to use steganographic techniques which put out voice.  You can tell if the NSA built this feature in: blow on the mike, and observe whether a band of thugs comes through your ceiling.
jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Han) writes: > Can people work within the system before trying to break it?  Examine your > history books, and find out how many armed revolutions led to Democratic > (or Democratic style) governments.  I think you'll only find one in over > five thousand years of written history. >  > That's not very good odds.    I may be misreading you here.  Are you saying the American Revolution  wasn't a good idea because it was bad odds?  I kind of doubt that any revolution, armed or otherwise, was ever started  without vast amounts of failed "working within a system".  A good sign of  a system being not worth preserving would probably be that very inability  to work within it productively.
psionic@wam.umd.edu, whose parenthesized name is either an unfortunate coincidence or casts serious doubt on his bona fides, posts a message in which he seems willing to take the word of a private firm about which he knows little that their new encryption algorithm is secure and contains no trapdoors, while seemingly distrusting that of the government about clipper.  I suppose it depends on how paranoid one wishes to be, but how does the writer know the firm isn't, for example, an NSA front? For purposes of this message, how do we know "psionic" isn't?  I don't suggest that, but post this to point out that there is a class of speculation that has no more truth value, without lots of hard evidence, than the contrary one.  By the way, if "psionic" had said, in lower case letters, that the firm CLAIMS there was no back door, I'd have no problem with that phrasing.  David
In article <strnlghtC5t42t.J9B@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >  > Chances are the government has thought of this, and "just anyone" won't be > permitted access to enough of the internals to make a "fake" clipper chip. > Chances are that the government has classified some details of the internals > at a very high level, and manufacturers are required to observe security > safeguards and clearances corresponding to that level.  Assume in this case the usual canard-adversary of narcotraficantes.  They probably have more cash than the KGB did, and they're probably more generous at handing it out.  It will be easier than ever to find or cultivate Walkers and Pollards for the keys, and it will be easy enough to find someone to reverse-engineer the chip (unless the tamper proofing is damned clever and effective).
> Nonsense! I wasn't asked if Larry O'Brien should trust Nixon with his keys,  >but whether I would.
In article <1993Apr16.181040.9381@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes: >It looks like Dorothy Denning's wrong-headed ideas have gotten to the >Administration even sooner than we feared.  I'd lay long odds that it was the other way around.  Clinton didn't just pull this plan out of any bodily orifices; the NSA has to have been working on it for years.  While it's possible that Denning (and other prominent people) just happened to start arguing for such a system, it seems more likely that there was a suggestion involved. If this guess is wrong, I apologize.
>  Well, actually, this one's easy. It's their job. The NSA is  >supposed to develop cryptosystems. If the government chooses to go  >ahead and sell those cryptosystems to the masses, so be it.
>Sternlight) writes: >>>(Gideon Yuval) writes: >>>>If these personal attacks are what stopped Prof. Denning from >>>>replying on issues of substance, they have cause real harm >>>>to the serious debate here. >>>They are and they have.  If Prof. Denning is afraid of posting here due to personal attacks, perhaps she should use an anonymous posting service.  That is why they are there, to allow heated debate to occur without the personal attacks.    Is anon@penet back up yet?
In article <1993Apr26.193801.12416@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu> angel@Foghorn_Leghorn.coe.northeastern.edu writes:  >I heard somewhere (can't name the source) that TEMPEST does not necessarily >pick-up just CRTs, but it can pick up emissions from almost any chip.  If >that is true, the kind monitor would not make any difference becuase everything >on the screen can be picked-up from the video controller.  Can anybody verify >or refute this?  You are correct (several times). TEMPEST is a codeword for a standard, shared between the NATO governments, to limit the inadvertent emission of information by either electromagnetic radiation or conduction. The limits set in the  standard are classified but there is open source information to the effect  that either the electrical or magnetic components of electromagnetism can be  exploited. It is a basic rule of physics that there is an electromagnetic  field associated with any path that conducts a flow of electrons.  Among other things, I drive a 1987 Korean built AT clone and an associated 24 pin dotmatrix printer. The major source of unintentional emission is the CRT. To that can be added the video driver card, the RS232 parallel cable and the  printer head. The emissions from these are gross can be detected with the  crudest of equipment. Were I to apply good test equipment and some  intelligence to measuring emission levels, I would find many other potential  sources of leaked information.  Where cryptography is used for serious purposes, poor TEMPEST protection  becomes an important security hazard.  In the early eighties, the need to allow some commercial concerns,  particularly financial institutions, a level of protection against TEMPEST  threat led to a series of briefings to invited corporations and to the  'release' of a cut-down TEMPEST stansard for commercial use. I say 'release'  for while equipment to meet the standard is available (at a price and to  approved customers) AFAIK even the commercial standard remains classified. If you think about it, it would really have to wouldn't it?      --
In article <16724@rand.org> jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) writes:    I did.  You're mistaken.  NSA's communications intelligence mission is    strictly against foreign governments.  Here's an excerpt from the enabling    charter (24 Oct 52, Truman) that should clarify this.  The charter was    declassified in about Feb 1990 when an FOIA request made it public. Interesting!  Where can I get the whole thing?     NSA is not in the standard-setting business, though -- that's why this    Clipper stuff came from NIST, which I believe is tasked with coming up    with standards based on their best inputs from other government agencies,    which would include NSA.  Several of the newspaper reports have made it fairly clear that the NSA did all the real work.  You can't believe everything you read in the papers :-), but the package of information the NIST is faxing out has so little information beyond what's widely known that it sounds like it's true.
In article <C5pstr.Lu2@panix.com> dfl@panix.com (Danny O'Bedlam) writes: >	The algorithm is classified because a military contract (or similar >government equivalent to military) has been let for this "proprietary" >design that the Feds say that NSA developed.  Is there a patent?  Is that >patent publicly available?  My betting is that that too is classified.  Unless there has been a _major_ change in the law, there's no such beast as a "classified patent."  Patents exist to encourage communications and develop the state of the art.   (The 17-year lock is a nuisance, but historically has been pretty trivial. It's only in an industry which doubles performance every three years (or 18 months, for some hardware) that 17 years is an eternity).  The same thing applies in civilian development: you can't patent something  _and_ declare it a "trade secret."  However, you can (and should) mark all software (including proprietary code) "unpublished copyright" so that it ever does get exposed you still have some legal protection.  (Post-Berne this isn't required, since everything is "born copyrighted." But it takes a while for people to learn the new rules).
In article <9304201003.AA05465@pizzabox.demon.co.uk> gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes: >Can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run >digital speech down 14.4K?  I think it is; I've heard it's not.  Lets >say 8 bit samples.  Would *raw* data at the corresponding sampling rate >be usable?  If not, how fancy does the compression need to be?  As far as I know ISDN (call it Swissnet here, and it's being plugged in) it's 8 bit 8000Hz (gives you one channel of 64kBit/sec) I guess you should not go below a sampling rate of 6000 Hz if you want to have same quality as on an analog-line. Anybody knows compression-algorithms & -factors for voice ?  Greetings,  	Germano Caronni