waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
Since the wiretap chip is being distributed internationally, allowing the U.S. government to spy on foreign governments, companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens, this is a world-wide issue.  Please put DISTRIBUTION: WORLD on the  Distrubution: line.  Thank you.  ygoland@wright.seas.ucla.edu (The Jester) writes:  >However assuming that I can still encrypt things as I please, who >cares about the clipper chip?   You don't care that people are being lied to, fooled into believing the chip gives "privacy" when it fact it allows wiretaps?  You don't give a shit about anybody's privacy except your own?  (And not even your own; are you so smart that you know when you're talking to somebody who has a wiretap chip on their phone instead of a privacy chip with private keys?)  >attitude that everyone else should have. Instead of worrying about a >clipper chip, simply connect your handset to your computer and feed >the voice single through, process, encrypt, and transmit over the >phone. The guy on the other hand then does the same in reverse.  "Simply?" "Everyone" should have this attitude?   The only people who can have this attitude are the most hard-core computer hackers, who never make phone calls away from their computer, who apparently never call anybody except another computer  hacker, or perhaps another spook (U.S. classified agents refuse to use their own system, only oblivious civilian dupes get that dubious privilege). Only spooks and hard-core hackers need privacy, huh?  We *do* need an alternative to NSA-bugged telephones, but we're talking inexpensive *telephones* here, including hand-sized cellulars, that need strong crypto, real privacy.  Make-shift computer hacker rigs that require living by your computer to talk privately over the phone are just a dumb stunt that doesn't  do anything for anybody's privacy in the real world.    What we need is a true *privacy chip*.  For example, a real-time  voice-encryption RSA, put it into a silicon compiler and spit out ASIC.   Put this chip on the market as a de facto standard for international  business, diplomats, and private communications.  If the U.S. bans  it, we make it somewhere else and import it.  The Japanese, German, Dutch, Taiwanese, Korean, etc. electronics companies don't want the  NSA spying on them.  U.S. workers lose more jobs to government fascist stupidity.
In <1r1om5$c5m@slab.mtholyoke.edu> jbotz@mtholyoke.edu (Jurgen Botz) writes:  >Even more interesting: the SMTP server at csrc.ncsl.nist.gov no longer >recognizes the 'expn' and 'vrfy' commands...  >   telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov smtp >   Trying 129.6.54.11... >   Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov. >   Escape character is '^]'. >   220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Tue, 20 Apr 93 17:01:34 EDT >   expn clipper >   500 Command unrecognized  >Seems like sombody didn't like your snooping around, Marc.  Then it is a good thing we already have this:  The csspub mailing list: csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov, and address on the clipper mailing list, seems to contain basically the members of the NIST security board.  In addition to the names already posted, their true names are as follows:  burrows@ecf = James Burrows a director of NIST's National Computer Systems Laboratory  mcnulty@ecf = F. Lynn McNulty an associate director for computer security at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Computer Systems Laboratory  Gangemi@dockmaster.ncsc.mil = Gaetano Gangemi is director of the secure systems program at Wang Laboratories Inc. He wrote: Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G. T.  Gangemi, Sr. -1991, O'Reilly and Associates  slambert@cgin.cto.citicorp.com = Sandra Lambert is vice-president of information security at Citibank, N.A.  lipner@mitre.org = Lipner is Mitre Corp.'s director of information systems.  gallagher@dockmaster.ncsc.mil = Patrick Gallagher, director of the National Security Agency's National Computer Security Center and a security board member  walker@tis.com = Stephen Walker a computer security expert and president of Trusted Information Systems, Inc. in Glenwood, Md  willis@rand.org = Willis H.  Ware a the Rand Corp.  executive who chairs the security board.  whitehurst@vnet.ibm.com = William Whitehurst is a security board member and director of IBM Corp.'s data security programs.  --  Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991
pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes:  > Can you, while my mind is on it, give us one good reason that the > algorithm should be a secret algorithm, unless this encryption scheme > either is a joke, or contains features like a 'master key' or other back > door for UNAUTHORIZED eavesdropping?  Hmm, here are a couple:  1) If the algorithm becomes known, it will be easy to produce pin-compatible non-crippled chips that provide -real- encryption and privacy, because their keys are only in their users' hands.  2) Since SkipJack is a symmetric key cypher, it needs some way to agree on a session key. The released information says that any protocol may be used (e.g., DH). From a theoretical point of view, this is probably true. However, from a practical point of view, those chips must have some kind of key exchange protocol built-in. What if it is good old RSA? This will mean that the producer will have to pay lots of bucks to PKP. By keeping the details secret this can be avoided...  Regards, Vesselin
In article <1993Apr14.055903.5358@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes: > > >I say "in theory" because in another case, a woman was held in >contempt for refusing to reveal the location of her child even after >taking the 5th. In this case, the woman was suspected of having >murdered the kid, so taking the 5th wasn't surprising. Sure, so she >was probably guilty, but that's not good enough. In our system you're >not supposed to be able to force a suspect to confess to a crime, no >matter how strongly you think they're guilty.  You have to develop >your evidence independently. Doing otherwise might catch a few more >crooks, but only at the cost of turning the clock back to the middle >ages, when confessions were routinely tortured out of suspects both >guilty and innocent. >  OK, I should have read the thread before posting my own $0.02.  I would just add to Phil's very infomative discussion the following caveat: the fifth amendment applies ONLY in crinial cases.  ("...nor shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..."). Thus if the father sued for custody of the children, the case would be civil and the defendant mother would not have fifth amendment protection. Oddly enough, her refusal to give information in a civil case can lead to criminal contempt charges (thus landing her in jail.)  The interesting part of all this is that in a murder trial, the woman CAN plead the fifth as  to the location of the child--this is routine.  A "computer crime"  prosecution thus would seem to be fertile ground for this kind of defense,  where a suit by a party injured by "hackers" would not.  If I am accused,  for example, of sending encrypted kiddie porn over the nets the fifth should  protect my key.  If I am accused of sending copyrighted material, however, it proabably will not (copyright infringement not being a "crime" in the technical sense.)  The REALLY tricky question is, say I do both (naughty boy that I am) can the government use the information gained in the civil trial (ie. my key) to gain access to my files for use in the criminal prosecution.  The answer should certainly be no, but lord only knows how this would work out.  Steve.
Andrew Richard Conway (arc@leland.Stanford.EDU) wrote:  : P.S. I can't work out why the US government doesn't want to sell : them overseas. After all, they are rather easy for US interests to decode, : so make a perfect tool for industrial/military espionage...lulling  : anyone stupid enough to buy it into a false sense of security. You will : notice that there is NO mention anywhere about safety for non-Americans.  Don't forget, you are in the country that wouldn't let the Russians buy Apple II's because of security concerns.
In article <C5so84.Hxv@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >I am *completely* baffled by why Dorothy Denning has chosen >to throw away her academic respectability like this.  She hasn't.  Dorothy Denning has spent many years earning the professional respect of her colleagues, and something won in this manner is not easily lost.  Her support of the clipper -- no matter how unpopular that position may be -- serves far more to enhance the clipper's respectability than to diminish her own.                             :: Jeff Makey
tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much  > worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper" to  > argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main  > concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)   I agree.  This is the danger I see, not the system itself.  That is to say,  this is a political issue, not a technical one.
In article <C5xxGA.GAv@ms.uky.edu> morgan@engr.uky.edu (Wes Morgan) writes: > >You should realize that form letters are the *worst* way to influence >your congresscritters; exact copies are routinely placed on the lowest >rung of the opinion ladder. > >If you want to write (and I think you should!), take the time to really >*write* a letter.  Things to emphasize:    [excellent and helpful list deleted]   >	- Be concise; don't ramble.  Rants are *definitely* out of place. >	  Cite references, if necessary, but only use "accepted" references >	  like academic journals.  "My neighbor Jim" is *not* a real refer- >	  ence.  8)    Wes's list is of "do"s and "don't"s for writing your Congressional representatives is a fine one but I'd like to encourage people to pay extra attention to the point above.  As cliched as the saying may be it's nevertheless true that you can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.    While the writing styles prevalent on the net possess a certain charm please remember that the person reading your letter is likely to be uninfluenced or negatively influenced if you express your concerns in a way that makes you sound like a flake or a paranoid crackpot.  Wild and unsupported accusations about the menace from the NSA will not carry much weight, nor are overblown conclusions about the inevitable consequences of the proposal likely to convince (especially not ones that attempt strained analogies to the rise of the Nazi party.  Please save the Niemoller quote for another letter..)    If you want your opinions to be taken seriously it is *very* important that you state those opinions in a manner that is understandable and  seems reasonable to a layman.  Don't overburden your reader with technical details or expect them to know the history of various encryption  technologies.  Before you mail it, hand your letter to a non-technical friend and ask them to sanity-check it.    Above all, realize that legislators are often motivated as much by self-interest as by anything else.  Try to point out risks in terms that will be meaningful and motivating to them such as the loss of individual privacy rights or the damage restrictive export regulations do to American businesses' ability to compete in the global marketplace.  Pull the  strings that you think will work with your legislator -- if your legislator is unlikely to be swayed by civil-rights concerns then point out how a government-granted monopoly for Mycotronx damages the competitiveness of businesses in your district that manufacture or market phone or crypto technology.
I sent a response to the White House at  	0005895485@MCIMAIL.COM (White House)  and received a nice, automatic reply from MICMAIL noting, in passing, that if I had included a SNail address, I would get a reply in due course.  For those who care, my reply was:  	1.	yes, let's protect the voice network  	2.	privately-developed crypto has always been available and 		always will be -- so let's think about how to do law 		enforcement given that fact not about how to hope to 		legislate against it  	3.	my needs for crypto as a system designer are not met by the 		Clipper Chip.  I want freely to export uses of algorithms 		(like DES & RSA) which are already freely available in the 		destination country
I forwarded an old posting about CELP speech compression:  	In case you'd like to experiment with CELP, you can obtain a software 	implementation of the 4800 bps Fed Std CELP coder for free:  	The U.S. DoD's Federal-Standard-1016 based 4800 bps code excited linear 	prediction voice coder version 3.2 (CELP 3.2) Fortran and C simulation source 	codes are now available for worldwide distribution at no charge (on DOS 	diskettes, but configured to compile on Sun SPARC stations) from:  I've since been told that the source of this is on cygnus.com in /pub/celp.speech.tar.Z  I'm not in a position to; any Sun tcp/ip gurus out there who think they can marry this with netfone by the end of the week? ;-)  Seriously.  I think someone with real net access and two sparcs could have this running by the end of the week.  Then we ask the pgp guys to add a bytestream crypto filter.  Two weeks at the most.  [Damn, I wish I had my sparc back... I'm stuck on a 25mhz 386sx]   Share and Enjoy!
In article <1993Apr27.075011.12624@wuecl.wustl.edu>  eah1@gauguin.wustl.edu (Edward Anthony Hutchins) writes: >[modify] pgp to allow it to compress/decompress 144 bit frames >every 30msec...  >As part of the project I'm working on now, we're trying to get CELP up and >running in realtime full duplex mode... I gotta find the source to pgp and >see how tough it would be to integrate the en/decryption parts into the code.  I presume you are just going to use IDEA for the session encryption and transmit the session key with RSA?  David R. Conrad		"No his mind is not for rent/To any god or government"
In article <1993Apr22.014646.28445@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> andersom@spot.Colorado.EDU (Marc Anderson) writes:  >I just found out from my source that this article was a joke.  Heh heh..   >It seemed pretty damn convincing to me from the start -- I just didn't >notice the smiley at the end of the article, and there were a few other >hints which I should of caught.  	People took this article seriously?  I mean, I know it's the Net and all, but the prankster didn't even have Clinton's sound-bites right.
>As a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist (:-), I'at a loss for  >specific objections that don't sound frighteningly technical.
In <strnlghtC5uIJ4.76t@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  >In article <ELEE9SF.93Apr21095141@menudo.menudo.UH.EDU> >elee9sf@menudo.menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus) writes:  >> >>Would you trust a black-box from the NSA versus an "open system" from >>elsewhere?  >Absolutely, if I were assured by someone I trusted that the black box was >more secure. I have nothing to conceal from the government, but I would like >to be sure that any Russian, Japanese, French, or other competitors for my >services can't read my traffic. I'd like to be sure that competitive bid >information was safe from commercial competitors and foreign governments >which would aid them.  >I believe the NSA has identical motivations with respect to my activities. >The President and many other senior government officials have made it very >clear that they share these motivations. Thus I'd trust them on the >"coincidence of interests" argument as well as on a basic trust in their >professionalism and a high confidence in their skills.  >David >--  >David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of >                         our information, errors and omissions excepted.    Nothing but errors and omissions here!
In article <1r74ta$hcs@transfer.stratus.com> cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes: >In article <1r3jgbINN35i@eli.CS.YALE.EDU> jgfoot@minerva.cis.yale.edu writes: >> >>Perhaps these encryption-only types would defend the digitized porn if it >>was posted encrypted? > >To paraphrase, I may not agree with what you're encrypting, but I defend >your right to encrypt it.  I suppose after Waco, it's only prudent to leave the "to the death" part out.
: From: brad@optilink.COM (Brad Yearwood)  : Assume in this case the usual canard-adversary of narcotraficantes.  They : probably have more cash than the KGB did, and they're probably more generous : at handing it out.  It will be easier than ever to find or cultivate Walkers : and Pollards for the keys, and it will be easy enough to find someone to : reverse-engineer the chip (unless the tamper proofing is damned clever and : effective).  If the administration *really* believes big-time drug dealers are the threat (personally I thought it was the CIA and the air force that did all the real drug shipping :-) ) then they *ought* to take this seriously: unlike the KGB, drug dealers can make a most convincing argument for cooperation: "help us and we'll be nice and give you some money, don't help us and we'll start cutting off your favourite body parts"  After all, it was probably an argument like that that persuaded Jack Ruby to shoot Oswald in full view of the police.  Life in jail probably seems much more preferable to most people than several weeks of something nasty followed by no life at all...
There are some issues which come to mind when one considers the law enforcement aspects of the use of the Big Brother (Clipper) chip.      The drug dealers and terrorists aren't going to let themselves be caught by using this type of encryption.  In 1985 the New York Times reported that government investigators broke up a narcotics ring that was operating highly sophisticated equipment capable of allowing the leaders of the ring to eavesdrop on the law-enforcement agents who were trying to arrest them.      A Mr. Deely, an NSA official, said "There are a lot of medium-sized countries that would have been proud to have the signals intelligence operation of this group."      For every John Gotti there are probably many more people who have the sophistication to know what the risks of unsecure communications are.  The press given to the Big Brother chip will only increase their numbers.      Even if there is some benefit to law-enforcement through the use of Big Brother, it must be weighed against the constitutional and civil liberties questions involved.      For example, in some areas of the world torture is used as an investigative tool by the local "law-enforcement" people.  I suspect it is an effective means of obtaining information and shortening many investigations.  It probably also helps keep the conviction rate high.      The fact that the torture tool is not used in this country (even with a court order obtained by showing "probable cause") is because we have rightly balanced the questions of expediency and what is ethically and morally right.      I think that the same question of expediency versus morality should come into play when considering the use of Big Brother.  I vote for morality.      I am quite disturbed by what I interpret as a veiled threat to prohibit the use of all encryption if this Big Brother chip is not put into wide spread use.  After a quick reading of the White House press release I came away with that impression.      To most of the American public, the word "hacker" has rightly or wrongly come to mean "high tech adolescent vandal". It has struck me that most of the people posting to sci.crypt regarding this issue are intelligent, thoughtful individuals who have genuine concerns about the privacy and constitutional issues surrounding Big Brother.  I hope that the use of Big Brother does not become mandatory and other encryption become illegal.  I would hate to see this become some kind of high tech Volstead Act.      The high speed digital communications revolution is coming at us with the speed of an SST.  The times they are a changing, and just as IBM is learning that they can't do business the same way they have done it for the past 40 years, maybe NSA should evaluate another approach.      EFF, who have correctly questioned the cryptographic strength of Big Brother, may need to send a stronger message out regarding the constitutional issues involved.      Al Gore may want to think this one through a little more.      And as for Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning: En quoi cela vous concerne, cheri?
Perhaps one way of getting away from this cripple chip that the U.S. government seems to be pushing would be to come up with a good alternative. For example, how about a scheme using RSA, and some hybrid of DES-CFB and another strong stream cipher (Maybe IDEA-CFB)?  This could be substantially the same as the cripple chip, except that instead of key-registration, the police could demand that you give up your secret key to them (with a court- issued warrant).  Then, they could read the last few months of wiretapped messages you've sent, and assuming you've committed no crimes, you could generate a new key pair and go about your business.  I find that I'd be willing to pay RSA for the right to use such a system, especially given the alternative.  If you were unwilling to give up your secret key, then you'd probably stay in jail (has anyone got a real legal precedent for this?).    This would allow court-issued warrants to be used to gather information on suspected criminals, but it couldn't be done in secrecy, and there would be enormously less likelihood of corruption or theft of escrowed keys. (Maybe someone from the law-enforcement or intelligent community will correct me, but this doesn't *seem* like such a big loss in terms of law-enforcement capabilities.)      Any comments?
In article <strnlghtC5toC6.KIu@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >> > >er, excuse me but since the escrow agencies aren't yet chosen, how can you >say they have a "history of untrustworthy behavoir[sic]"? > >I'm sure each of us can think of agencies without such a history. Price >Waterhouse has kept the secret of the Academy Awards for many years, even in >  Damn, you're dead right! That pretty much settles it. Not to worry.  --  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Hesse           |          A man,      jhesse@netcom.com    |                 a plan,  Moss Beach, Calif    |                         a canal, Bob.
It is my intent to cut the government off at the knees with the pen (and keyboard).  True, the lawyer and the lawbook only go so far, but I agree that it is best to use those resources to the maximum extent before seriously contemplating anything more... disruptive.