waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <1qpg8fINN982@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >In article <tcmayC5M2xv.JEx@netcom.com> >	tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: >> >>But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much >>worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper" >>to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main >>concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.) >> > >	Not to pick on Mr. May in particular, of course, but isn't this >kind of the domino theory? When one little country falls, its neighbor >will surely follow, and before you know it, we're all mining salt >in Siberia for not turning in our Captain Crunch Secret Decoder Rings. > >	Surely the hypothesis relying on the least wild assumptions is >to take this at face value. Our lads at the fort were asked to cook up >something that's pretty secure, with a key that can be escrowed neatly, >and they did. The government plans to sell this thing, for the reasons >they state. Yes, those evil guys in the FBI can probably, with some >effort, abuse the system. I got news for you, if the evil guys in >the FBI decide they want to persecute you, they're gonna, and you're >gonna hate it. Fact is, the FBI doesn't want to listen to your phone >calls, and if they do, and if you're using triple-DES, they'll just >get a parabolic microphone and point it at your head. > 	With E-Mail, if they can't break your PGP encryption, they'll just call up one of their TEMPEST trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions from your computer or terminal.  Note that measures to protect yourself from TEMPEST surveillance are still classified, as far as I know.  >	This is pretty clearly an effort by the government to do exactly >what they're saying they're doing. As is typical with governments, >it's mismanaged, and full of holes and compromises. As is typical >with our government, it's not too bad, could be worse. > >	My interpretation. > >	Andrew > >>-Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime >                           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > >	Isn't this just a little melodramatic?  	If the new regime comes to fruition, make sure you protect your First Amendment rights by asserting your Second Amendment Rights.
Actually, many of us have noted this. We have noted that the program 	started at least 4 years ago, that the contracts with VLSI Technology 	and Microtoxin were let at least 14 months ago, that production of the 	chips is well underway, and so forth.  	Nobody I know has claimed Clinton intitiated the program. But he chose 	to go ahead with it.  Perhaps the NSA realised that *no-one* would even contemplate falling for the dual-escrow bluff while under the Bush administration and *had* to wait for a Democrat govt to con into promoting this because people *might* just believe they were honest.  (Didn't work, did it? :-) )
>>If you have access to FTP, try FTPing to rsa.com, login as anonymous. >>There are several documents there, including a "frequently asked questions >>about today's cryptography" document.  It has FAQ in its name. >>I believe this document explains the idea behind the certifying authorities. >> >>Good luck >> >>--John Kelsey, c445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu  Thanks.  I've ftp'ed the FAQ file and it is just what I was looking for.
In article <1993Apr20.030538.1@cc.curtin.edu.au> zrepachol@cc.curtin.edu.au (Paul Repacholi) writes: <>  <> QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S <> TELECOMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE <>  <> Q:   Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on <>      a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation <>      encrypted using the device.  What would they have to do to <>      decipher the message? <>  <> A:   They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a <>      court order, to do the wiretap in the first place.  They <>      would then present documentation of this authorization to <>      the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and <>      obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug <>      smugglers.  The key is split into two parts, which are <>      stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key <>      escrow system.  I apologize for being so dense but this sentence reads as if it was lifted from a Luis Bunuel screenplay.  Am I missing something? Why on earth would drug smugglers even _use_ the device then? Obviously, they'll be using something like triple encryption DES instead. As long as alternatives to Clipper remain legal, Clipper accomplishes absolutely nothing, ZERO, as far as law enforcement is concerned. The whole scheme is an absolute, total, incredible, waste of government time and money AS LONG AS other encryption schemes that are any good  remain legal.  In order for Clipper to work as intended all strong cryptosystems have to be outlawed.
rsilvers@nynexst.com (Robert Silvers) writes: >	Send something to Rush Linbaugh about Clinton taking away our right >to privacy and how if the govt. standard takes off, only people with lots >of money (drug dealers) will be able to justify DES stuff.  He will slam >Clinton for this on the air. >						--Rob.  I seem to recall Rush saying that he has a CompuServe account.  If anyone wants to E-mail him, all we need is his account number (i.e.: 12345,6789) and then we could e-mail him via gateway by using a dot instead of a comma like so: "12345.6789@compuserve.com".  (THIS IS *NOT* HIS ADDRESS.)  So, does anyone know his e-mail address?  He *says* he uses it all the time. (I wonder if he reads alt.fan.rush-limbaugh...   His ego is big enough!)
May as well look at one piece of this at a time.  This paragraph:  >To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the >Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new >devices.  In addition, respected experts from outside the >government will be offered access to the confidential details of >the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report >their findings.  means they aren't planning to make it public, as was done with DES.  As it says in both sci.crypt FAQs, there's no way we are going to achieve the same level of comfort with Clipper that we finally have with DES if we can't actually get our hands on the bits and watch them flow around.  Even the best experts aren't going to think of everything: look how long it took Biham and Shamir to get a handle on just how good DES is... and for all we know there's still more to learn.
In article <2112@rwing.UUCP> pat@rwing.UUCP (Pat Myrto) writes: >A personal desire for 'privacy' most certainly will not be regarded as >a 'legitimate NEED':  >"Why do you want such strong security, especially from 'legitimate law >enforcement'? An individual with 'legitimate' endeavors would not be so >concerned - government is not in the business of revealing your personal >secrets to the public... so you must be trying to conceal or planning >to conceal some unlawful or criminal activity...  DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING >TO HIDE, HMMMM?" 	You have underlined here the battle that must be fought.  It is 	a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the american public. 	People must realize that the government is not their a fit 	"father confessor".  The government does not have a right to 	share our every thought the moment we decide to share that 	thought with someone else at a distance.  In order to protect 	ourselves from a government bent on undermining the constitution 	we must realize that our government is our enemy as much if not 	more than the Soviet Union ever was.  This is hard for  	some people who have been brought up with loyalty to our government 	cast as being synonmous with patriotism.    >I expect that initially there will be some people selected either at >random, or who happen to have been 'troublemakers' for the purposes of >'making an example' for those who think the Feds are not SERIOUS about >this... (mega ':-('s) 	We must be vigilant and make sure that we do not let such 	events go by unprotested.  We must be willing to fight the 	government at every step of the way.    >THAT is what has me going so damned ballistic...  It is EXACTLY how >the logic goes when someone gives a 'tip' that your home has been >used to store DRUGS...  Note no trace of drugs need to be found on >the property... only some bozo who will say 'yup.  I stored stuff in >that dude's house...' (probably to get out of a 10 year sentence for >dealing).  Much more cost effective to let him walk, to bust another >day, and hit the jackpot with YOUR assets... 	Its time we rolled back this nonsense.  Civil forfeiture is 	the most effective end run around the constitution that has 	ever been promulgated.  Our enemy used to be the Soviets now 	it is clearly our own government.
uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt) writes: > I wish I could agree with you.  Ask yourself this.  Why would any  > private sector entity wish to buy a crypto system that was KNOWN to be  > at least partially compromised?  (a) To use for sensitive but not strategically important traffic, (b) if the system was cheap.  For example, I don't own a cordless phone.  With Clipper, I would.  If the  local men in blue really want to listen to me talk to my friends or order  pizza, I'm no worse off than I am now, and I don't have to worry about local kids or nosy neighbors.  That is to say, Clipper "raises the bar" on insecure channels.  It doesn't  make them secure, by any means, but a wall, even if the FBI can get a master  key by court order, is still better than a "keep off the grass" sign.  > The answer seems obvious to me, they wouldn't.  There is other hardware  > out there not compromised.  DES as an example (triple DES as a better  > one.)   So, where can I buy a DES-encrypted cellular phone?  How much does it cost? Personally, Cylink stuff is out of my budget for personal use :)...  > How can you reconcile the administrations self proclaimed purpose of  > providing law enforcement with access to encrypted data without making  > the clipper system the only crypto available in the U.S... ?  The Second and Fourth Amendments do come to mind.
In article <1qg8m2$2e5@nigel.msen.com>  (Edward Vielmetti) writes:   > I would suggest that 50 attractive MIME formatted news messages a day would be > sufficient to get a few people thinking about adding MIME support to news > readers, esp if the content is really worth it.          But that's just the problem. There is no such thing as         "MIME-Formatted". By analogy, MIME is a content-labelling         standard for the box, not a specification for the contents         themselves. It provides a standard for "like-minded"         individuals to exchange mail containing an agreed-upon data         format.          You say tomahto, I say tomaeto; you say postscript, I say         SGML...                  Cheers,                 Marc  ---  Marc Thibault        | CIS:71441,2226     |  Put another log  marc@tanda.isis.org  | NC FreeNet: aa185  |  on the fire.  -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.0
smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes:     >Thousands?  Tens of thousands?  Do some arithmetic, please...  Skipjack    >has 2^80 possible keys.  Let's assume a brute-force engine like that    >hypothesized for DES:  1 microsecond per trial, 1 million chips.  That's    >10^12 trials per second, or about 38,000 years for 2^80 trials.  Well,    >maybe they can get chips running at one trial per nanosecond, and build    >a machine with 10 million chips.  Sure -- only 3.8 years for each solution.     But there is a MUCH more pernicious problem with the scheme as proposed.  Building a brute force machine to test 2^40 possible keys if you have the other half from one escrow agent is EASY.  (One chip, one test per microsecond gives you one break every two weeks, and that break gives you all messages involving that phone.)     The XOR scheme so that the files from one escrow agent gives you nothing is an improvement, but notice that XORing with (truely random) bit strings allows for an arbitrary number of escrow agents.  Using + for XOR, SK for the escrowed key, and A and B for two random bit strings, hand SK+A+B, SK+A, and SK+B to three escrow agents.  It is possible to come with an encoding scheme to match any escrow pattern, for example 3 of 4, such that fewer cooperating escrow agents gives the cracking agency no benefit.  --  					Robert I. Eachus
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >Some of the messages here seem to reflect the view that the government is >listening in on everything and one will have to hide one's clipper messages >somehow if non-escrowed crypto goes away. >A little perspective might be in order.  Right.  People here believe the government is listening in on everything.  Sure.  If you can't provide an answer, change the assumptions to something you can deal with.  It's not a matter of the government listening on on everything, it's a matter of the government listening on anyone they take an interest in. Say, if you do something heinous like attend a computer meeting at a mall, the Secret Service decides to go for a warrantless search, and acquires your name.  It's a matter of any number of possible wiretap abuses that cryptology makes far less likely, and this chip can sabotage.   Par for the course, though.  I predicted that you'd be jumping in in favor of this.  The reply was that you'd justify anything up to and including death camps as long as the government backed them and had a written policy statement.  Perhaps a little extreme, but not much.
In <1993Apr18.225502.358@iecc.cambridge.ma.us> johnl@iecc.cambridge.ma.us (John R. Levine) writes: (quoting someone else here)  >>The cryptographic protocol, though, is another matter.  I see no valid >>reasons for keeping it secret, and -- as I hope I've shown above -- there >>are a lot of ways to do things that aren't (quite) as bad.  >It just occurred to me why the algorithm is secret.  If it were >published, one could then build physically identical clone versions >of the chip that would interoperate with official Clipper chips.  But >the cloner wouldn't provide the keys to the escrow houses.  Hmmn.  								Yeah!  	The algorithm is classified because a military contract (or similar government equivalent to military) has been let for this "proprietary" design that the Feds say that NSA developed.  Is there a patent?  Is that patent publicly available?  My betting is that that too is classified.  	If the algorithm were made public, or reverse-engineered, it would compromise not only the goal of Justice of being able to read every chip users cypto-data but would reduce profits for the selected chip maker.  	Wouldn't that just be too bad?
In article <rdippold.736035556@qualcom> rdippold@qualcomm.com (Ron "Asbestos" Dippold) writes: >george@tessi.com (George Mitchell) writes: >>Guns are offensive.  Cryptography is defensive.  See the difference? >No.  They're both neutral.  Whether they're offensive or defensive >depends on how you use them.  Nonsense.  Mike, in Heinlein's "Moon is a Harsh Mistress" decides that a weapon is some mechanism which allows you to deliver energy at a distance.  (I don't have the book handy or I'd find the exact quote).  Guns do that.  Cryptosystems do not.
I've been reading the sci.crypt, alt.privacy.clipper and comp.org.eff.talk discussions about the Clipper chip and find (as usual) that most of us think alike -- so there's a lot of repitition.  If each of these messages were sent to Clinton as well as to the net (or instead of to the net), we might actually have some effect.  	0005895485@MCIMAIL.COM  (White House)
In article <4014.Apr2003.03.4093@silverton.berkeley.edu>  djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein) writes: > >I want to see an organization which will combat such statements. >Encryption does _not_ threaten the public safety, any more than ski >masks do. Every American _is_ entitled to use strong encryption which >ensures his own privacy and is _not_ crippled by a key-escrow system. >I guess I'm looking for a ``League for Cryptographic Freedom.'' Or a >``National Cryptography Association.''  An excellent idea.  > >To what extent does the EFF serve this purpose? Is a new organization >necessary? Does it already exist?  While I don't know the full scope of the activities of the EFF,  from what little I've seen I think it would be better to lobby for  strong cryptography through a distinct organization.  The EFF has been associated with efforts to prevent the banning of sex and pictures newsgroups at various universities. Horror stories about the contents of those groups (e.g. exploitative pictures of possibly underaged models) have already surfaced in the press. The White House bulletin already raised the specter of drug-dealing and terrorism, which is only one step removed from the old "crypto-wielding child molester" argument.  An EFF lobbying effort for cryptography would be too easily derailed by the connection to child pornography and the like.  Similarly, LPF is connected with Stallman and his Gnu project.  In light of, say, the Gnu Manifesto, this means that in a public debate it stands to be labelled as "communist", "anarchist hackers", radical, etc.    I don't know about CPSR, but if it is an offshoot of Physicians for Social Responsibility (best known for Helen Caldicott and her hysterical antinuclear lobbying) then it probably also carries unwelcome political baggage.  Perhaps for practical reasons a lobbying organization for cryptography would best be formed under the umbrella of EFF or some other existing group, but its charter should then be distinct, independent, and limited to advocacy for the right to cryptography.  To reiterate Dan Bernstein's question: does any suitable organization exist?  If not, what are you going to do about it?  Having mentioned the possible dangers of unwelcome political associations, I would be remiss not to suggest something in the opposite direction: gathering the support of the NRA by emphasizing the RKBA side of the issue as well as the First-Amendment side.
I've been asked to supply more specific directions for automated fetching of the source and documentation for "agrep," the powerful similarity pattern matching tool.  It is at  cs.arizona.edu 192.12.69.5  in directory  /agrep/README /agrep/agrep-2.04.tar.Z /agrep/agrep.ps.1.Z /agrep/agrep.ps.2.Z  (The .ps suffixed files are the optional postscript docs;  a reasonably good research report with benchmarks is included.)  Note for Macintosh MPW users: after a few hours of drudgery, I ported the tool to MPW 3.2.3 running under System 7.1. If you would like me to e-mail a binhexed copy of the tool suitable for dropping in to your MPW/tools folder, please write...  Other than the more purely cryptographic uses for the tool I've been having lots of fun picking up the "lost" references to things I'm interested in. For example, starting a search like:  agrep -1 -i 'Burning Chrome' cyberpunkspool   immediately finds references like 'burning crome' that I have always missed before.  See how many times John Gilmore's name is mentioned in the CUD archives (and how often misspelled).  How about _your_ name?  As usual, I will e-mail the uuencoded tar.Z upon request if you cannot do anonymous FTP.
In article <1raeir$be1@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: > >  Well, actually, this one's easy. It's their job. The NSA is > >supposed to develop cryptosystems. If the government chooses to go > >ahead and sell those cryptosystems to the masses, so be it. > >  Ah, but developing cryptosystems which are specificially designed to >protect the government's domestic spying capabilities takes them beyond >that mandate, into the forbidden field of domestic wiretapping. >  Unlike the CIA, the NSA has no prohibition against domestic spying.  Read Bamford's THE PUZZLE PALACE.
jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Han) writes: >As one of the happily sleeping people, I would just like to ask this-> >aren't people just slightly overreacting to this?  Or are we all of a >sudden going to draw parallels to Nazi Germany and Communist Russia? > >The point of the matter is that; yes this is a serious problem.  But it is >not the end of the world.  Guess what?  We're doing something now you >can't do in a Communist country or Nazi Germany.  We're complaining about >it, (or rather, you're complaining about it) and nobody is shooting at us.    We would like to keep it that way. Thats the point. By reacting strongly and forcefully now, we will assure that we continue to remain free. You cannot overreact to a threat like this. The worst that happens if we overreact is that we waste time and effort. The worst that happens if we underreact is tyranny. I prefer overreaction myself.  >GUESS WHAT PEOPLE?  You live in one of the few countries in the world >where a person can complain without getting shot at.    Doesn't that tell you how precious and hard to maintain freedom is?  Only through centuries of overreaction have we managed to maintain ourselves in this state of even moderate freedom. I suggest that overreacting now and in the future is a good thing.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
Brad Templeton (brad@clarinet.com) wrote: : It occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you, and the escrow : houses release your code to the cops, your code is now no longer secure. :  : It's in the hands of cops, and while I am sure most of the time they are : good, their security will not be as good as the escrow houses. :  :  : What this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you, : at the end of the wiretap, they should be obligated to inform you that : a tap was performed, and replace (for free) the clipper chip in your : cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the : escrow houses.  Getting the court order to reveal the key *also* makes decipherable all *past* conversations (which may be on tape, or disk, or whatver), as I understand the proposal. I could be wrong, but I've seen no mention of "session keys" being the escrowed entities.  As the EFF noted, this raises further issues about the fruits of one bust leading to incrimination in other areas.  But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper" to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)  And it may also become much worse if the ostensible security is increased, thus allowing greater access to "central office" records by the government (the conversations being encrypted, who will object to letting the government have access to them, perhaps even automatically archiving large fractions...). This was one of the main objections to the S.266 proposal, that it would force telecom suppliers to provide easy access for the government.  One the government has had access to months or years of your encrypted conversations, now all it takes is one misstep, one violation that gets them the paperwork needed to decrypt *all* of them!  Do we want anyone to have this kind of power?  -Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime