waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
*** SOURCE code to Macintosh PGP 2.2 now available via anonymous FTP ***  FTP netcom.com CD pub/grady MGET MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx MGET MacPGP2.2srcSIGNATURE  Convert to a Compact Pro self-extracting archive with BinHex 4.0.  If appropriate, check the digital signature of the .hqx file with your copy of PGP.  (Non-Macintosh users wishing to check the digital signature please note that 'CR' denotes the end-of-line on a Macintosh, not 'LF' or 'CRLF'.)  For the purposes of the ITAR act, this 'unclassified technical documentation' is hereby released into the public domain.  (However no representation is made as to copyright or other commercial rights that may exist in this package.)  Full source code, Symantec THINK C 5.0.4 projects and full user documentation is included for both 68020 and 68000 versions of Pretty Good Privacy, a strong public key encryption and digital signature application using the RSA algorithm patented in the United States and the IDEA cipher patented in Switzerland.  No executables are included.  Executables are available via anonymous FTP from:  leif.thep.lu.se (Sweden) night.nig.ac.jp (Japan) van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca (Canada) soda.berkeley.edu (P.R. of Berkeley) src.doc.ic.ac.uk (United Kingdom) ghost.dsi.unimi.it (Italy) plaza.aarnet.edu.au (Australia) nic.funet.fi (Finland)   Other's public keys are available from anonymous server sites: (Send message subject "help" for more information.)  Internet sites:         pgp-public-keys@junkbox.cc.iastate.edu                 Michael Graff                 explorer@iastate.edu                 FTP: tbird.cc.iastate.edu:/usr/explorer/public-keys.pgp         pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu                 Derek Atkins                 warlord@MIT.EDU                 FTP: toxicwaste.mit.edu:/pub/keys/public-keys.pgp         pgp-public-keys@phil.utmb.edu                 John Perry                 perry@phil.utmb.edu                 FTP: phil.utmb.edu:/pub/pgp/public-keys.pgp         pgp-public-keys@demon.co.uk                 Mark Turner                 mark@demon.co.uk                 FTP: ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp/pubring.pgp  UUCP site:         pgp-public-keys@jpunix.com                 John Perry                 perry@jpunix.com  The executable application built from these sources has NOT been licensed by RSA Data Security, Inc. nor has the RSA public key algorithm or the IDEA block cipher algorithm been approved by the National Security Agency.  This unclassified technical documentation is made available for EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY; possession, distribution, or use of an executable binary built from this source may be a civil or criminal offense.  Suggested improvements, bugs, or comments should be directly posted to alt.security.pgp or to the principal developers listed among the source documents.  General questions and comments about public key cryptography or the IDEA cipher may be posted to alt.security.pgp or to the sci.crypt Usenet groups.
In article <1r3jgbINN35i@eli.CS.YALE.EDU> jgfoot@minerva.cis.yale.edu writes: >Tarl Neustaedter (tarl@coyoacan.sw.stratus.com) wrote: > >: It means that the EFF's public stance is complicated with issues irrelevant >: to the encryption issue per se. There may well be people who care about >: the encryption issue who don't care to associate themselves with the >: network erotica issue (or may even disagree with the EFF's position). > >Perhaps these encryption-only types would defend the digitized porn if it >was posted encrypted? > >These issues are not as seperable as you maintain. >  Now why would anyone "post" anything encrypted? Encryption is only of  use between persons who know how to decrypt the data.  And why should I care what other people look at?   What does concern me is the continued erosion of my constitutional rights. ( Amendments I, II, IV, and V to note a few. )
>>>>> On 30 Apr 1993 21:16:29 -0400, steve-b@access.digex.net (Steve Brinich) said:  Steve>   Hmmm... given the error corrections in modern audio CDs, is Steve> it sufficient to simply instruct your agent to decrypt using Steve> the bit stream from the second cut of the latest Garth Brooks Steve> CD, or are the usual number of bit errors found acceptable in Steve> commercial CDs because of that error correction enough to Steve> garble the message if such a method is used?  One unreliable data point: while looking over the shoulder of a recording engineer, I decided that he was seeing a raw error rate of about 1 in 1e6 on a CD ``master.''  Both the extrapolation to mass-market CDs and my state of mind while doing the arithmetic (I was waiting for him to finish so we could go get something to eat) are questionable.
neuhaus@vier.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern)) writes:  >[Lots of stuff.]  I hate to follow up to my own posting, but I should perhaps clarify some things so I won't get flamed.  First of all, when I'm talking about ``factoring the modulus'' or a ``breakthrough in factoring'', what I really mean is a breakthrough in the cryptanalysis of RSA.  I know that factoring and breaking RSA are not proven to be equivalent; it's just so damn convenient not to repeat this every time.  I also have to admit that I don't really know if the ``non-group'' property of a cipher is essential only for key chaining.  I have thought about it a little while, but I can't find a way that a cryptanalyst could exploit a group structure.  That, of course, means nothing at all.  Then I wrote,  >Please note that as long as it is much harder to factor a RSA modulus >than it is to generate it, the increase in computer speed alone will >keep key lengths and modulus factoring in lock-step, i.e., people will >simply start using longer moduli and still be safe.  What I meant was that as long as the only advantage of the cryptanalyst is a faster computer, then we will probably have RSA for a long time to come, because even if 1024-bit moduli somehow could be broken with fast computers (not with a new algorithm), then people would simply use longer moduli.  Both users and cryptanalysts benefit from better technology in the same way.  Hope this keeps the flames away...  Have fun.
In article <MARC.93Apr17211937@oliver.mit.edu> marc@mit.edu (Marc Horowitz N1NZU) writes: >Just who is that, I asked myself, or rather, I asked the computer. > >    % telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov 25 >    Trying... >    Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov. >    Escape character is '^]'. >    220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:42:56 EDT >    expn clipper >    250-<csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov> >[...] >    221 first.org closing connection >    Connection closed. > >Well, isn't that interesting.  Dorothy Denning, Mitch Kapor, [...]  Even more interesting: the SMTP server at csrc.ncsl.nist.gov no longer recognizes the 'expn' and 'vrfy' commands...     telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov smtp    Trying 129.6.54.11...    Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov.    Escape character is '^]'.    220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Tue, 20 Apr 93 17:01:34 EDT    expn clipper    500 Command unrecognized  Seems like sombody didn't like your snooping around, Marc.
The actual algorithm is classified, however, their main thrust here is for cellular phones, and encryption is only over the radio end, not end to end, I think.   End to end will come later.  And of course you have to identify yourself to the phone company, and since the phone company complies with court orders, they will know the magic number of your chip when they sign out a warrant on you, and then can present the warrant to the key escrow house.
Markowitz@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL writes:  > It is interesting to note in this regard that permission to export > PKZIP's encryption scheme has twice been denied by NSA.  Draw you own > conclusions.  Uh, I'm afraid that your information is slightly out of date... PKWare has obtained a license to export their program to the whole world, except a very limited list of countries... Draw your own conclusions about the strength of the algorithm... :-)  Regards, Vesselin
tuinstra@signal.ece.clarkson.edu.soe writes: [...] >  It would be a strong incentive, as Vesselin points out, for more >police agencies to "go rogue" and try to get keys through more efficient >(but less Constitutional) means.  Notice what the release said: > >   Q:   Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on >        a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation >        encrypted using the device.  What would they have to do to >        decipher the message? > >   A:   They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a >                                                       ^^^^^^^^^^ >        court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. >        ^^^^^^^^^^^  >The clear implication is that there are "legal" authorizations other >than a court order.  Just how leaky are these?  (And who  >knows what's in those 7 pages that authorized the NSA?).  There [...]  I was a cryptologic tech in the US Navy (CTRSN, nothing big).  All 'spooks' in the Navy are required to know the "gist" of "USSID 18", the Navy-way of naming a particular Presidential "Executive Order".  It outlines what spooks can and can't do with respect to the privacy of US nationals.  The following information is (of course) UNCLASSIFIED.  The whole issue hangs about what you mean by "wiretap".  If the signal can be detected by "non-intrusive" means (like radio listening), then it may be recorded and it may be "analyzed".  "Analyzed" means that it may be either deciphered and/or radio-location may be used to locate the transmitter.  The catch is this:  Any and all record of the signal and its derivatives may only be kept for a maximum of 90 days, after which they are destroyed unless permission is obtained from the US Attorney General to keep them.  Didn't you ever wonder how Coast Guard cutters *find* those drug-runners in all those tens of thousands of square miles of sea, even in the dark?!?
In article <C5x2xs.EF0@lerami.lerctr.org> merlin@lerami.lerctr.org (David Hayes) writes: > >This company routinely sent most of the manufacturing data to the field  >offices. The Japanese had simply intercepted it. So my friend, the computer >systems admin, came up with a solution. He started sending the data out >double-block-encrypted with DES.  > >Two days after this new distribution plan was implemented, the president of >the company got a visit from a pair of government agents. They told him to >"knock it off". The president gave in, since his company did a considerable >business with the federal government. > >Now, if the government wasn't monitoring the communications, how would they >even know that the encryption system was installed?  How can you be sure the two visitors were really government agents? :-)  --John
You're drifting off topic.  In any case, if you check on any of the topics devoted to gun rights issues, you will find ample evidence that the "misinformation" is your assertion that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment has mysteriously taken on a meaning diametrically opposite the meaning of the exact same term in the First and Fourth Amendments.
Charles Kincy (ckincy@cs.umr.edu) wrote: : In article <1993Apr16.001321.3692@natasha.portal.com> bob@natasha.portal.com (Bob Cain) writes: :  : >: I hope my cynicism is misplaced here.  Go ahead...I'm not afraid to : >: be wrong every once in a while.  But, I have an uneasy feeling that I : >: am right.  :( : > : >It is and you are wrong yet you emotionally state a bunch of crap as fact : >with a tiny disclaimer at the end.  Check your facts first and grow up. : >Why is there such a strong correlation between interest in cryptography : >and immaturity I wonder. :  : Oh, I see, flame someone, tell them that they are immature, tell them : they are wrong, and then don't offer any proof for your assertions. :  : You really *are* a putz.  Put up or shut up. :   I will provide any proof you wish in private.  Name it, dickhead.
In article <1r1otuINNdb2@dns1.NMSU.Edu> 	amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes:  >	The 'plaintext' is digitized voice, and exists for a very short >time, probably in a couple inches of copper, tops. It's flatly not >available -- your bug in my office can hear my voice, and even digitize >it, but it's going to get a different bitstream.  	I am an idiot. The plaintext that's relevant is the session key. If you know that, you probably don't need a roomful of chips, do you? If you were going to brute force something interesting, that'd be the message stream, which is sort of approximately known by, say, a bug in my office. Then your roomful of chips could get the session key. Which I change every morning.  	Really, it's just a whole lot easier for the illicit wiretappers to stick a bug in your phone.
In article <Apr23.215306.83257@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes: > >At this point, what kind of trouble >could I get into if I ignored the ITAR and sold my program to international >customers anyway? 	I'm not sure it has been established that the government can 	prevent you from sending an algorithm abroad.  The NSA seems 	to have won by intimidation so far.  Why don't you try it? ;-) 	Of course you could just distribute your algorithm widely for 	free and screw them up big time.  (That would be my approach ;-))
Jeff Hupp (jhupp@shockwave.win.net) wrote: :          :         I am facinated by the things I have heard about the PGP : encryption program.  Does anybody out there know where I might get a : version of this program that runs under Windows 3.1, MS-Dos, Unix : w/source?  As of this writting I have no UNIX access and am running on a : nifty windows implamentation of uucico.  At the moment PGP is available in executable format for MS-DOS and Mac, and source code for most other platforms including UNIX. Many FTP sites keep a copy (although the Mac version is getting hard to find). Try the following site:  soda.berkeley.edu           /pub/cypherpunks/pgp  Jon
O.K.- if you've read this group for a while, you know all about the one-time-pad, but here's a question I haven't seen.  The one-time-pad yeilds ideal security, but has a well-known flaw in authentication.  Suppose you use a random bit stream as the pad, and exclusive-or as the encryption operation.  If an adversary knows the  plaintext of a message, he can change it into any other message.   Here's how it works.  Alice is sending Bob a plaintext P, under a key stream S Alice computes the ciphertext C = S xor P,  and sends it to Bob.  Eve knows the plainext P, but wants the message to appear as P'. Eve intercepts C, and computes  C' = C xor P xor P' = S xor P'. Eve sends C' to Bob.  Bob decrypts C' by computing  C'xor S = P',  thus receiving the  false message which was substituted by Eve.   Now the question is how can this attack be defeated with information theoretic security, not just computational security. Can we define something like "ideal authentication" which is the analog of ideal security.  Can we obtain ideal authentication ?  If not, how much can we limit Eve's control over the message ?  If we can achieve ideal authentication, does the solution use more key bits or expand the message ?  Can we show the solution to be optimal in one or more parameters ?  Does anyone know if these questions have been aswered before ?
johnson@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Steve Johnson) writes: >>-Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime >  A remark I heard the other day is beginning to take on increasingly >frightening significance.  The comment was made that "In other parts >of the world the Democrats [note the big "D"] would be known as >Socialists"   And in other parts of the world, European "Socialists" would be known as fascist capitalist pigs.  Get your head out of your labels and think carefully for once:  According to the EFF announcement on this thing, the NSA has been developing this turkey for *four* years.  The manufacturing contract was let *14 months ago*.  Anyone out there who believes that the fact that Clinton's name was on this White House announcement means that Bush or any other Republican is a staunch supporter of personal privacy is a fool.
The points raised about checking what is actually -in- the chip, as 	opposed to what is allegedly programmed therein, raise yet another trust 	issue.  Even if we assume that these "trusted agents" are really entering 	a wide range of S1 and S2 seeds (rather than using the same one all the 	time to reduce the key search space to 30 bits), I assume they are not 	doing so by picking up an iron filing and poking it into the circuitry 	at carefully selected points to encode data.  They would presumably be 	punching numbers into a computer, which for all they know could program 	the chips in a manner completely independent of the S1 and S2 values they 	are feeding into the system.  S1 and S2 are clearly the backdoor - we should assume they are all compromised.  If they're not compromisable, why the hell not use a hardware true random number source.  There isn't a random number source *anywhere* in this proposal.  The whole thing is deterministic from the day the serial number is stamped on the chip.  Nope, it can't be trusted.  This is all about two levels of access - the (possibly honest) key escrow that police forces have to use, and ostensibly the FBI; and the back door that lets the NSA decode *everything* on the fly - and maybe some back-handers to the FBI when they want a warrantless tab in exchange for favours.
gtoal@news.ibmpcug.co.uk (Graham Toal) writes: > Try reading between the lines David - there are *strong* hints in there  > that they're angling for NREN next,  Where?  I honestly didn't see any...  > and the only conceivable meaning of  > applying this particular technology to a computer network is that they  > intend it to be used in exclusion to any other means of encryption.   I disagree, if for no other reason than that there are already other  standards in place.  Besides, even if they restrict encryption on the NREN,  who cares?  Most of the Internet is commercial anyway.  The NREN is only for  geovernment and university research (read the proposals--it's a "data  superhighway" for Cray users, not anything having to do with the Internet).
In article <1993Apr20.021846.2423@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: > >each of the two escrow databases. Fits conveniently on a single very >valuable Exabyte tape. This can only get easier with time, but who >cares -- I can already hold all the clipper keys in the country in my >pocket on two 8mm tapes.
In article <1r60ue$102@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com writes: >  The only theory that makes any sense is that S1 and S2 are either the >same for all chips, or vary among very few possibilities, so that anyone >trying to break the encryption by brute force need only plow through the >possible serial numbers (2^30, about one billion), multiplied by the number >of different S1, S2 combinations. > Iff the phones transmit their serial nos. as part of the message then what is to say that each phone can take that serial number and use it to generate the required key....
Robin Hanson (hanson@kronos.arc.nasa.gov) wrote: :               WOULD WIRETAP CHIP BE COST-EFFECTIVE?  :   SUMMARY: Compared to an average monthly phone bill of sixty dollars, :   wiretaps are only worth two cents a month to police.  So the :   proposed wiretap chip must raise phone costs by less than one part  :   in three thousand to be cost-effective.   Robin's calculation is interesting and important, even if it's off by an order of magnitude (for example).  Even if hardware costs for the Clipper Chip phones were ZERO, the protocol overhead in transmitting the escrow field would be much higher than the 1 part in 3 thousand...it depends on the exact details of the phone call length, protocol, etc. (shorter calls get a proportionately greater hit).  However, I suspect most Americans will not find this line of reasoning as persuasive as the analogies about escrowing keys to one's house are.  -Tim May
After reading the debate over the Clipper, I have a few things to add.  	First, most of the people I know who activly use encryption privately do not care about most of the issues that surround this debate, and any questions about what is or is not ok to use in the US. All they care about is wether or not what they are using is secure or not. That, after all IS the bottom line.   	Second, if I look at all the people I know who use any form of encryption at all, and this group spans people from the morons who still insist that the DES is a good and secure standard, to people  looking at trying to improve upon existing strategies, I can not think of anyone of them who would approve blindly of a strategy that leaves their methods open to abuse. The Clipper does this, because people make mistakes by nature, and the US government is made up of people who are just as vulnerable to mistakes as everyone else.   	Third, since most of the people I know are at least marginaly familiar with the vulnerabilities present in current software encryption stratigies, I can't see how most of them are going to blindly trust that someone will not figure out a good way to compromise the Clipper Chip. That despite any strengths or weaknesses that may exist in it. So, I can  not see a high degree of confidence developing in the chip.  	Fourth, when it comes to criminal abuse, sure there are many stupid people out there. And yes, some will be open to being caught via the  built in back door of the Clipper Chip. However, anyone who is going to do any serious investigation of how best to secure their data is going to run into that problem pretty damned fast and, I would assume, start looking around for other easily obtainible methods of encryption.    	If nothing else were avalible, none of this would be an issue. However, the truth is that most private encryption users that I've ever run into simply do not give a damn about the legal status of RSA or PGP or anything else. If it works, they use it. This is not going to change either. I do not think for a moment that anyone with serious criminal intent will be slowed down by the advent of the Clipper Chip. It is all to easy to  convert encrypted data into unintellgible garbage as it is, if anything, the Clipper Chip just adds another tool to the user.   	The bottom line here is that people will use what works, and unavoidibly, I'm sure most criminals would rather face an encryption related charge than one which could potentialy lead to death penalty charges in the case of criminals who murder as part of their conspiricy. 	The other thing that has struck me since the advent and wide  useage of public encryption has begun is that quite simply the cat is out of the bag (Or if you have an interest in snooping, Pandora's Box has been opened), and this is not going to change. I've seen a blindness to this that I've found utterly stunning, and the Clipper Chip, along with the way it has been presented only confirms this to me to a larger degree.   			Sincerly,  			Tim Scanlon  --