The latest Israeli "proposal", first proposed in February of 1992, contains  the following assumptions concerning the nature of any "interim status"  refering to the WB and Gaza, the Palestinians, implemented by negotiations. It states that:        >Israel will remain the existing source of authority until "final status"     is agreed upon;    >Israel will negiotiate the delegation of power to the organs of the      Interim Self-Government Arrangements (ISGA);    >The ISGA will apply to the "Palestinian inhabitants of the territories"     under Israeli military administration. The arrangements will not have a      territorial application, nor will they apply to the Israeli population      of the territories or to the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem;    >Residual powers not delegated under the ISGA will be reserved by Israel;    >Israelis will continue to live and settle in the territoriesd;    >Israel alone will have responsibility for security in all its aspects-     external, internal- and for the maintenance of public order;    >The organs of the ISGA will be of an administrative-functional nature;    >The exercise of powers under the ISGA will be subject to cooperation and      coordination with Israel.     >Israel will negotiate delegation of powers and responsibilities in the      areas of administration, justice, personnel, agriculture, education,     business, tourism, labor and social welfare, local police,     local transportation and communications, municipal affairs and religious     affairs.  Several question do come to mind concerning the "success" we all hope for  in the ongoing negotiation process. These arrangements certainly seem to  be essentially a rejection of any Palestinian "interim" self-control.  Without exposing itself to unwarranted risks and creating irresversible  vulnerability, can Israel reasonably put forward (at later points in the  negotiating process) more "relaxed" proposals for this"interim" period?  How should proposals (from either side) be altered to temper their  "maximalist" approaches as stated above? How can Israeli worries ,and  desire for some "interim control", be addressed while providing for a   very *real* interim Palestinian self-governing entity?  Tim  >Later comment: > >There seem to be two perceptions that **have to be addressed**. The >first is that of Israel, where there is little trust for Arab groups, so >there is little support for Israel giving up **tangible** assets in  >exchange for pieces of paper, "expectations", "hopes", etc. The second >is that of the Arab world/Palestinians, where there is the demand that >these "tangible concessions" be made by Israel **without** it receiving >anything **tangible** back.  Given this, the gap between the two stances >seems to be the need by Israel of receiving some ***tangible*** returns >for its expected concessions. By "tangible" is meant something that >1) provides Israel with "comparable" protection (from the land it is to  >give up), 2) in some way ensures that the Arab states and Palestine  >**will be** accountable and held actively (not just "diplomatically)  >responsible for the upholding of all actions on its territory (by citizens  >or "visitors"). > >Israel is hanging on largely because it is scared stiff that the minute >it lets go (gives lands back to Arab states, no more "buffer zone", gives >full autonomy to Palestinians), ANY and/or ALL of the Arab parties >could (and *would*, if not "controlled" somehow) EASILY return to the  >traditional anti-Israel position. The question then is HOW to *really* >ensure that that will not happen.