waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes: >Quoting pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) in article <1993Apr21.012011.27470@shearson.com>: >>Whats the difference between a V.32bis modem and a V.32bis modem?  >How fast do the fastest modems go? >How far can voice be compressed? >I've seen various assertions about this, but anyone with the >straightforward bits-per-second figures will be my friend forever...  How about half a friend?  The Motorola Codex preliminary V.Fast modem (which you can by right now) does 24.4 kbps (raw) over standard phone lines.  28.8 kbps is what is usually claimed for the "final" v.fast, but you can't go out and buy that right now, the standard isn't done yet.  Again, voice can be compressed quite well down to 4000 or 8000 bps depending on how good you want it to be, but that requires a DSP or a special ASIC to do in real-time.
In article <bontchev.735336144@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes: >No, because the Feds will still be able to decrypt the conversations. >True, they'll blame the wrong guys, but nevertheless one cannot say >something like "The drugs arrive tommorrow on the ship 'Terminus'" >when the Feds are listening, even if they cannot identify who the >speaker is.   It's not a question just of who is holding the phone.  It's a question of what circuit to wiretap in the first place.  If two drug dealers are both using stolen cellular phones, the FBI doesn't know which lines to tap -- unless of course they're tapping *all* phones (maybe *all* cellular phones).  If they haven't tapped the connection (ie., at least one end of the connection) then they don't know what key to request.
In article <gradyC5wGrz.CvC@netcom.com>, grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221) wrote: >  > Victor Iseli (victori@xetron.com) wrote: > :  > :  > : "Numerical Recipes in C"..Fortran..Pascal  has a nice section on > : encryption and decryption based on the DES algorithm.  There is > : also source code provided (I think some versions of this book are  > : distributed with the source code on disk; the source code can > : also be ordered from the publisher). > :  > : --Victor Iseli > : victori@xetron.com >  > Yes I benchmarked the DES implementation in the Recipes in C > book.. it is about 1 1/2 orders of magnitude SLOWER than the > Outerbridge/Karn/Gillogly/et al implementation. >  > It may be instructional, but it isn't very fast.  It has also apparently been excised from the second edition.
In article <strnlghtC5wCMo.Fx5@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  > In article <C5uvn4.MF7@austin.ibm.com> arussell@austin.ibm.com (AG Russell) > writes: >  > > > >At the company I worked for previously, I received a file that was des encryped > >and the person that had sent it, went on vaction.  Rather than wait two weeks > >I set up a straight frontal attack with one key at a time.  It only took two(2) > >days to crack the file.  No, I don't have any faith in DES. > > >  > Taking this at face value (though it seems quite dissonant with much else > that has been published here about brute force DES cracking, unless Russell > was lucky with respect to the key), I'd be very interested in whether the > program Russell used is available? In whether he used a cleartext > recognition algorithm in the program or whether he had to examine each > decryption by hand? In whether he used a known plaintext attack? >  > He probably should also tell us, given his address, what machine he used--a > desktop, workstation, or super-computer. >  > Depending on his answer, this could be an appalling development calling into > question both DES and RSA/DES. Dunno about RSA/IDEA. >  > If any bright programmer with a little idle machine time can crack a single > DES message in a couple of days (assuming no tricks that are > message-specific), then here's my Clipper key, NSA; give me the chip at > once.  :-) >  > David > --  > David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of >                          our information, errors and omissions excepted.   >  >   A person I know, belonging to a research lab of a rivate company, claimed to me during a priavte conversation that, given the equipment in his lab, he could crack a Kerberos ticket in 15 minutes to an hour. He had access to rather powerful DES hardware, but not of an extraordinare kind, I believe. The attack was possible because of the amount of known plaintext in the ticket, which itself constitutes a small message. This was two years ago. DES is no longer usable for encryption of really sensitive data. For a lot of purposes, however, it is still very adequate.
> Maybe so, but it's quite common. There are millions of Macintosh users who  >have no idea what's in Apple's patented ROMs. Many have modems connected.  >How do you know all your business secrets aren't being stolen? Answer:  >1. Because you trust Apple;  >2. Because if any such attempt, however sophicsticated, came out, it would destroy Apple's credibility forever.
In the article "At last! Now you can talk to your computer." in the May issue of FORTUNE magazine, it was mentioned that phoneme prediction used Hidden Markov Modeling.  This was the statistical method that Markov developed to predict letter sequences in Pushkin's novel, _Eugene Onegin_. It was then said that this technique worked so well that the NSA used it to crack codes. Does anyone have any references for HMM and how the NSA used it? Or is this just an extension of the letter frequency tables that we are all using anyway?
>In article <122723@netnews.upenn.edu>, feeley@cattell.psych.upenn.edu (Wm. Michael Feeley) writes: >> Just curious, how would the Clipper Chip system handle >> conference calls? > >It's not Clipper, it's any encryption system.  I've seen a number of >designs; they generally involve a multi-line cleartext bridge. >         A 'multi-line cleartext bridge?"                       ^^^^^^^^^         And just were would you put that bridge?  If it isn't at one of the receiptants location, forget encryption at all.  You have blown any security you thought you might have had.
In article <1993Apr26.121052.9530@esseye.si.com> jongsma@tws4.si.com writes: >In <1993Apr23.153320.4568@henson.cc.wwu.edu> n9045178@henson.cc.wwu.edu (Sean Dean) writes: > >>But I have no idea of a Compuserve e-mail address... > >70277.2502@compuserve.com  However, he said on his radio show today that he won't read anything from the two alt groups. He simply deletes them without reading them. He says that some of the people in the two groups are vicious.
Marc Thibault (marc@tanda.isis.org) writes: > (The Jester) writes:   > > Proof Windows is a Virus:It is very widespread, It eats up your disk > > space, It slows down your computer, It takes control over your > > computer, It performs disk access at random times, It displays silly > > messages on your screen, It randomly crashes the computer-Vesselin  >         This sounds like a version Unix. Solaris?  as someone who just lived through a switch from SunOS4.x.x. to Solaris, i'll heartily agree with this.   ObCrypt: one of my main gripes with Solaris is its braindead mailx, which is -almost- enough like mail to get you hoping, but crashes horribly when you try to do anything useful with it. (like use pgp- capable sendmail replacements.)  jason
In article <strnlghtC5wJAG.46L@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:    Doug Holland claims Tom Clancy has provided the recipe for nuclear bombs.    Clancy himself says he has omitted certain crucial steps. Further, how do we    know Clancy knows, rather than repeating what he's read or been told in the    unclassified domain?  On the other hand, when John Aristotle Phillips was a junior at Princeton trying to keep from flunking physics by doing a terrific term paper, his atom bomb design was good enough that it got classified. A few of the steps were derived from social engineering  (e.g. the name of the explosive), but it was fundamentally sound (and DID get an A.) The Pakistan embassy also called him up trying to get a copy; at the time they were lobbying the US government to get some nuclear reactors for "purely non-military" electrical power generation.
In article <1993Apr21.204036.13723@rick.dgbt.doc.ca> jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Han) writes: >As one of the happily sleeping people, I would just like to ask this-> >aren't people just slightly overreacting to this?  Or are we all of a >sudden going to draw parallels to Nazi Germany and Communist Russia? > >The point of the matter is that; yes this is a serious problem.  But it is >not the end of the world.  Guess what?  We're doing something now you >can't do in a Communist country or Nazi Germany.  We're complaining about >it, (or rather, you're complaining about it) and nobody is shooting at us.   > >(Or, rather, if they're shooting at me, they have real bad aim.  (:-) ) > >GUESS WHAT PEOPLE?  You live in one of the few countries in the world >where a person can complain without getting shot at.   > >People are always complaining that somebody did this wrong, or somebody >did that wrong, or whatever.  Sit down and figure out two things: > >1)  What have they done right? >2)  How much worse can it get? > >And you'll find that you and I, are pretty damn lucky. > >So let's talk about it, get some action going, decide what's going on.  >But let's not overreact!   > Us having the liberties to talk about this doesn't make the problem go away.  It doesn't make it right.  Rather the opposite, if we do not do  anything about it, you can bet it's going to get worse.
In article <1993Apr20.054308.15985@Celestial.COM> bill@Celestial.COM (Bill Campbell) writes: >In <strnlghtC5p7zp.3zM@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > >:In article <Apr18.194927.17048@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> >:holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes: > >:>Note that measures to protect yourself from >:>TEMPEST surveillance are still classified, as far as I know. > >:I think this to be inaccurate. One can buy TEMPEST equipment commercially. >:Even Macs. > >Sure you can buy a TEMPEST approved Mac -- if you have enough >money.  I haven't had any reason to look at this type of pricing >for about 10 years, but a TEMPEST rating in 1982 would raise the >price of a $2,495.00 Radio Shack Model III to something around >$15,000.00. > Or just dig a deep enough hole in the ground. 50 feet should do it.
In article <1993Apr26.145937.3570@wdl.loral.com> koontzd@phobos.lrmsc.loral.com (David Koontz ) writes: >>Clipper also allows an extraordinary opportunity for the criminal to >>conceal use of super-encryption.  An automated full-system surveillance >>mechanism (quite feasible across radio bandwidth) which knows family key F, >>can validate Clipper wrappers and N:ESN associations, but it cannot reveal >>in realtime the use of super-encryption, unless it knows all unit keys, >>which we are being assured are only to be made available in two separate >>pieces, upon specific wiretap-like order. > >The serial number will be in a 64 bit block, with a 34 bit filler.  Doesn't >take a lot to check to see if that is correct.
If Clipper comes to cellular phones along with legal proscriptions against using other cipher systems on these phones, a new and potentially dangerous class of crime is created.  Criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications (specifically the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats) will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user, and to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the device will be delayed.  Once a suitable collection of devices is stolen, criminals can communicate with impunity (assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from key escrow) until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means.  Because life-is-cheap criminals are currently willing to kill people to steal very large and conspicuous property (luxury cars), it is reasonable to assume that they will be willing to kill people to steal small and inconspicuous property (a cipher cellular phone).  Just as we have seen in the past with "blue box" technology, and in the present with modified cellular phones, we can expect to see among high-stakes criminals a lucrative market for stolen cipher phones which can be used for a few days.  The high-stakes criminals will pay the life-is-cheap types substantial amounts for stolen instruments.  Because a person is typically discovered as missing or dead in a few days, a stolen instrument will be usable for only a few days.  There will be a continuing demand for fresh phones: fresh bodies.  In other words, Clipper and similar systems have the potential to turn a current inconvenience to law enforcement into a direct, vicious, and persistent threat to the general public.  On the other hand, if a criminal were to apply some arbitrary cipher to a device in a mostly non-ciphered network, the communication will at least stand out as being unusual, and perhaps worthy of other means of investigation.  Finally, because there is essentially no possibility of intercepting in realtime the scrutable content of communications between stolen instruments, there will exist strong motivation to record and archive _all_ communications in the network for ex-post-facto scrutiny (once some criminal act is discovered, and the instruments involved have been identified).  While recording and archiving may not be feasible for wireline networks, it is probably feasible across the more limited bandwidth of radio networks.  The existence of these recordings could open up vast potential for abuse.
In article <1993Apr16.165423.27204@linus.mitre.org: ptrei@bistromath.mitre.org (Peter Trei) writes: :Judge: "I grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key :	itself" :You:    "The keyphrase is: "I confess to deliberately evading copyright;  :	the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of  :        copyrighted Peanuts strips."" :Judge and CP: "Oh." :     How will they get you now? I'm not saying that they won't, or :can't (or even that they shouldn't :-), but what legal mechanism will :they use? Should we be crossposting this to misc.legal?  Hm, could another court try you via a bypass of the double jeopardy amendment like they are doing in the LAPD trial?  Ie your judge is a state judge, and then a federal judge retries you under the justification that its not the same trail.
In article <C5tBpD.Lt@cs.uiuc.edu> kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie) writes: >[...] >>The EFF has been associated with efforts to prevent the banning of sex >>and pictures newsgroups at various universities. >[...] > >So what? Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, John Paul >Stevens, and Byron White are associated with [...]  It means that the EFF's public stance is complicated with issues irrelevant to the encryption issue per se. There may well be people who care about the encryption issue who don't care to associate themselves with the network erotica issue (or may even disagree with the EFF's position).
ns111310@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (Nathaniel Sammons) wrote: >2) If some kind soul out there would write a letter, and upload it to  >the net, everyone could capture it, print it out, and snail-mail it >out to their local congressional critter. > >BTW>> I'm working on one.  You should realize that form letters are the *worst* way to influence your congresscritters; exact copies are routinely placed on the lowest rung of the opinion ladder.  If you want to write (and I think you should!), take the time to really *write* a letter.  Things to emphasize:  	- It's been said that Usenet is available to the 'technical 	  elite', i.e. the techies at corporate sites and universi- 	  ties.  Emphasize that you are part of the group that will 	  be making/developing/using Clinton's 'data superhighway.'  	- Explain how you are intimately familiar with both computing 	  and data communications. (if this is the case; don't call your- 	  self an 'expert' after wiring in a 1200 bps modem.)   This 	  will distinguish your letter from the random flamers.  Don't 	  turn it into braggadocio; just tell them that you know the 	  technical sides of the issue.  	- Don't overdo jargon and gobbledygook.  Remember, your letter 	  will be first read (in all likelihood) by a staffer who may 	  even be a college student; if they don't understand it, your 	  views won't even make the 'running total' sheets.  	- Be concise; don't ramble.  Rants are *definitely* out of place. 	  Cite references, if necessary, but only use "accepted" references 	  like academic journals.  "My neighbor Jim" is *not* a real refer- 	  ence.  8)  	- Unfortunately, very few Congresscritters *really* understand 	  electronic communications.  Encourage them to pick up access 	  to Compuserve, America Online, or one of the Free-Nets.  Offer 	  to send them samples.  If you are in a position to do so, offer 	  them (or their staffers back in the home state) access to your 	  systems.  Offer to give a demonstration the next time they're in 	  town.  Your offer to get *personally* involved in helping them 	  *will* give your opinions more credence.  	- In addition to sending mail to your representatives, send mail 	  to the members of the committee (or subcommittee) that is dealing 	  with the issue.  If your Congresscritter isn't on the committee, 	  they can't be of much help until the matter comes to the floor.  --Wes  ps> I'd suggest drawing analogies between digital communication and the     more traditional media, but Usenet doesn't have a decent track record     in the analogy department.  8)
In <1993Apr20.151718.2576@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes:  >In article a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:  >>I wouldn't trust the NSA.  I think I would trust the President on this, but >>I'm not certain he would be told.  >"I am not a crook." President Richard M. Nixon >                    ^^^^^^^^^  THIS President.  (And I could easily be wrong.)
In article <1regq0INNn7u@gap.caltech.edu> hal@cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney) writes: :I tried this code yesterday.  On my Sparcstation ELC it takes over :300 seconds to compress 22 seconds' worth of speech.  This means that it :needs to be "optimized" by over a factor of 10 before it will be usable :in even a half-duplex mode.  Ouch!  Thanks for trying it.  :I question whether CELP is the best approach for this application.  It produces :great compression but at the expense of tremendous CPU loads.  We want :something that can be run on ordinary workstations or even high-end PC's :without DSP cards.  My guess is that some other algorithm is going to be :a better starting point.  Yes.  I'm not sure if my xposting to comp.speech made it to here too, but I've found that a low sample rate (3300 samples/sec at 8 bits per sample) plus the pd 'shorten' lossless sound compression code actually does get speech into 14.4K with a simdgen left over.  This is *definitely* worth working on, folks.  And shorten works in well under real-time.
Pat Myrto says if law enforcement wants keys, let them get a court order and then ask him for them.  Most use of probably cause wiretapping warrants isn't to decrypt historical traffic, but for prospective listening once probably cause is established. Pat's approach would tip off the crooks.  David
In article <C61rDq.5v5@chinet.chi.il.us> schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier) writes: >In article <1raeir$be1@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: >>  Ah, but developing cryptosystems which are specificially designed to >>protect the government's domestic spying capabilities takes them beyond >>that mandate, into the forbidden field of domestic wiretapping. >> > >Unlike the CIA, the NSA has no prohibition against domestic spying.  Read >Bamford's THE PUZZLE PALACE.  I did.  You're mistaken.  NSA's communications intelligence mission is strictly against foreign governments.  Here's an excerpt from the enabling charter (24 Oct 52, Truman) that should clarify this.  The charter was declassified in about Feb 1990 when an FOIA request made it public.  Mind you, I don't know that they never collect anything they're not supposed to... but spying on US citizens isn't in their charter.      b. The COMINT  mission of the National  Security Agency 	(NSA) shall be to provide an effective,  unified organization 	and control of the communications  intelligence activities of 	the United States  conducted against foreign  governments, to 	provide for  integrated operational  policies and  procedures 	pertaining thereto.   As  used in  this directive,  the terms 	"communications intelligence"  or "COMINT" shall be construed 	to mean all  procedures and methods used in  the interception 	of communications  other  than foreign  press and  propaganda 	broadcasts  and  the  obtaining  of   information  from  such 	communications by other  than intended recipients,  but shall 	exclude censorship  and the  production and dissemination  of 	finished intelligence.  They're also tasked with protecting the US's communications, but I haven't seen the specific enabling memo on that.  I assume that's the role under which Skipjack was developed.  NSA is not in the standard-setting business, though -- that's why this Clipper stuff came from NIST, which I believe is tasked with coming up with standards based on their best inputs from other government agencies, which would include NSA.