waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <C61rDq.5v5@chinet.chi.il.us>, schneier@chinet.chi.il.us  (Bruce Schneier) writes:   |> Unlike the CIA, the NSA has no prohibition against domestic spying.  Read |> Bamford's THE PUZZLE PALACE.  We had a senior NSA scientist in Cambridge at one of our workshops recently (in fact he was here when the Clipper announcement was made, but we didn't learn of it till after he'd gone). He said on this point that he was forbidden by law to monitor conversations between US nationals (and he is a chap who is  very precise about his choice of words). So I don't expect he'd have any qualms about monitoring a domestic US conversation if one of the parties was an alien.  However it got me thinking of the Navajo code talkers. Just imagine:  + `Hello, is that the Iraqi mission in New York? This is the Iraqi foreign + ministry in Baghdad, I am Farouq Hussein, US citizen, social security number + so-and-so'  + `Yes, indeed, this is the New York mission, Mustafa Jadid speaking, also a + US citizen, my social security number is such-and-such, here is our report + on activities against the Satan Clinton'
In article <1qsip1INNnj2@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >al@escom.COM (Al Donaldson) writes: >>amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes:  >	This appears to be generic calling upon the name of the anti-christ. >Just for the hell of it, let's destroy this remark. Let us imagine that >the executive branch actually could extract keys from the escrow houses >without anyone knowing, or telling. Now what? Dick has 80 bits of data. >What the hell's he gonna do with it? > >	1) Trot around to the telco and say 'we'd like an unauthorised >decrypting tap'. Uh huh. >	2) Break in to watergate and install his own tap (so his people still >do have to break in, neat, huh?) record some noise, then get the Executive >Branch Phone Decryption Box (huh? they've got one? Goodness, wait 'til the >washington post gets hold of this) and decrypt the noise. >	3) More likely, stare at the key, and say 'Oh, hell it's not >worth all this bloody hassle'   No, he gives the keys to the FBI (who may then give them to the local police on request) who then simply put some alagator clips on your phone junction box and conduct an illegal tap. They then decrypt when they recover the tape. Its just doing what the government does best: breaking the law.
In article <C5uvn4.MF7@austin.ibm.com> arussell@austin.ibm.com (AG Russell) writes:  > >At the company I worked for previously, I received a file that was des encryped >and the person that had sent it, went on vaction.  Rather than wait two weeks >I set up a straight frontal attack with one key at a time.  It only took two(2) >days to crack the file.  No, I don't have any faith in DES. >  Taking this at face value (though it seems quite dissonant with much else that has been published here about brute force DES cracking, unless Russell was lucky with respect to the key), I'd be very interested in whether the program Russell used is available? In whether he used a cleartext recognition algorithm in the program or whether he had to examine each decryption by hand? In whether he used a known plaintext attack?  He probably should also tell us, given his address, what machine he used--a desktop, workstation, or super-computer.  Depending on his answer, this could be an appalling development calling into question both DES and RSA/DES. Dunno about RSA/IDEA.  If any bright programmer with a little idle machine time can crack a single DES message in a couple of days (assuming no tricks that are message-specific), then here's my Clipper key, NSA; give me the chip at once.  :-)  David
What are the typical sizes for keys for commercial secret key algorithms? I know DES is 56 bits ("tripple DES" is 112 bits) and IDEA is 128 bits.  Is there anything made in the US that has 128 bit keys?  Anything anywhere that has larger keys?  I've heard that RC2 can be scaled to arbitrarily large keys, but is this actually implemented anywhere?  Finally, can anyone even concieve of a time/place where 128 bit keys aren't sufficient?  (I certainly can't - even at a trillion keys a second, it would take about 10 billion years to search just one billionth of that keys space.)
In article <artmel.735538777@well.sf.ca.us> 	artmel@well.sf.ca.us (Arthur Melnick) writes: >     We are strongly opposed to the clipper/capstone chips.  In a >press release today, our president, Dr. Stephen Bryen stated: > >          "It seems as if the government has an unlimited source >     of funds to use to push its new bugged chips on the American >     Public.  But do we not understand how the National Security >     Agency, which is not supposed to be involved in domestic >     spying, can fund the development of a commercial chip >     intended to accommodate U.S. government domestic spying >     activities." >  	Well, actually, this one's easy. It's their job. The NSA is supposed to develop cryptosystems. If the government chooses to go ahead and sell those cryptosystems to the masses, so be it.  	This sounds a lot like slamming the competition, not a cry for justice. These guys are way out on a limb, if I read that right. They've commited their new algorithm to silicon before it's been made public. What are they gonna do if Shamir writes a paper showing how to crack the entire class of algorithms in 5 minutes with a slide rule and a pencil?  	If they weren't busy throwing muck to smear their competitors, I'd feel kinda sorry for 'em. Still do, a little.
This may be a stupid question, but how does the government know which keys to ask for?  Will owners be required to REGISTER their phones, faxes, modems, etc., and inform the government when they are moved to a different phone number? Will there be penalities if the public does not do this?  Will identification (the National Health Care ID, perhaps) be required when purchasing a Clipper-equipted phone?  Or will each chip transmit identifying information at the start of a conversation?  Identification which could be used to automatically log who calls whom?  (The _phone_ company keeps records, but this  information would be accessable by a well-placed van near a microwave relay station).  This raises the question of how the two phones agree on a communications encryption key.  Will it be something that is derived from information exchanged at the start of the conversation -- and hence derivable by an eavesdropper?
In article <1r1f62$rh5@news.intercon.com>, amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) wrote: > One thing that Clipper offers is interoperability, at a higher degree of  > security than we currently have in non-proprietary voice encryption systems. > This means it will be cheaper than anyone's proprietary scheme, and easier to                          ^^^^^^^ Probably cheaper than you think.  I'll bet some of my (and yours) tax dollars become a subsidy for these chips.  If these chips don't sell well, what's to stop the US government from 'giving' them away (in the interest of National Security)?  > deploy.  This is, of course, either a bug or a feature depending on how you  > look at it :). >  > Amanda Walker > InterCon Systems Corporation  --  Steven P. Holton Network Administrator - RTP FAST Northern Telecom, Inc. Replies To:  cmsph02@nt.com on bounce: [ sholton@aol.com | 70521.2430@compuserve.com ]
>	encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK,  >	and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part  >	message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK  >	producing > >	     E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK} > >My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the >"family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by >law enforcement.  Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this?  I >will also check it out, but this is 7am Sunday so I did not want to wait.  Ok, so there are in fact two distinct components transmitted by the chip; the real message encrypted with the "conventional" key, and the serial number and encrypted "conventional" key encrypted with the (IMHO kind of bogus, as the whole concept of "one key that millions of people use which can't be changed" doesn't seem reasonable) "family key".  Suppose I analyze the output of this chip and I'm able to determine which bits are the encrypted packet which contains the serial number and session key.  Suppose I also design a simple algorithm based on this information which takes the data containing the encrypted session key and twiddles a bit (or several) before it's sent down the line.  Mind you, I'm sure the NSA thought of this along with a dozen other attacks I can't imagine, and the system is probably somehow designed so that manipulation of this information will cause a compliant receiving chip to somehow fail to decrypt successfully.  But how? What if the two parties agree in advance on some kind of consistent bit-twiddling scheme, so the decryption chip sees the restored "proper" bitstream but an eavesdropper gets a E[K; UK] packet that's wrong?  I suppose this could be easily defeated if the chip "sends" that information out many times in slightly different ways, making it effectively impossible to be certain you know all the information being sent.
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  > dwight tuinstra posts a very interesting message in which he comments on the > effects of the Clipper chip on state and local police. Actually, reading > between the lines, it could be a very good thing for civil liberties in one > respect, since it will at least prevent cowboy cops and cowboy state and > local agancies from reading your traffic if they tap it illegally.  Instead of reading between the lines, try to think a little bit. OK, if that's way too difficult to you, here are some hints.  Indeed, the new proposal imposes some additional burocratic burden on the local police, if they badly want to tape the magic cookie recipie that your mom is telling you on the phone. So, guess what they will do? Propose that the new technology is removed? Or implement some "facilitations"? Of course, you won't want to wait until they get the approval from two different agencies to decrypt the conversation between two child molesters, because meanwhile those two child molesters might be conspiring about molesting your child, right? So, there should be some way for them to get access to those keys -quickly-, right? Like, they could have a copy of the database, and worry about a warrant later...  Regards, Vesselin
In article <1993Apr21.204036.13723@rick.dgbt.doc.ca>  (Jerry Han) writes:  > GUESS WHAT PEOPLE?  You live in one of the few countries in the world > where a person can complain without getting shot at.            Only guessing, but from his address I'd say that Jerry, like         me, lives in Canada. Unlike me, he thinks that our friends in         the US enjoy the same freedom that we do, and he has not seen         the slow but steady erosion to the south of us.          We have the benefit of relatively slow politicians and         ineffective law enforcement. Our rednecks tend to be the         objects of derision rather than elected officials. It's         everything LE can do to keep up with the real criminals. Any         time they actually go after somebody just because they don't         like his or her attitude, it's national news (It also often         blows up in their faces: eg. the well-intentioned but flawed         Zundel case, which resulted in a scolding from the Supreme         Court, not only to LE for prosecuting the case but to         Parliament for passing the law it was prosecuted under).          Our friends south of the border don't have as easy a time of         it. Among other things they have as many LE agencies as we         have agencies, and some of them have teeth. They also have the         War on Drugs which gives law-enforcement agencies exceptional         powers to ignore individuals' rights (the DEA has more         arbitrary power than that given to Canadian agencies under the         War Measures Act). We have the RCMP and CSIS who can't stop         fighting each other long enough to do any really effective         suppression of private citizens' rights. Not only that, our         Police Commissions have teeth, as I learned when I had to fend         off a bent cop.          It may be ironic that the nation founded on Life, Liberty and         the Pursuit of Happiness is getting government-imposed order,         while the nation founded on Peace, Order and Good Government         is getting in-your-face liberty.          That's not to say our time won't come. It looks like Chretien         is going to run on a law-and-order platform. Be afraid.          Cheers,                 Marc  ---  Marc Thibault                             | marc@tanda.isis.org  Automation Architect                      | CIS:71441,2226  R.R.1, Oxford Mills, Ontario, Canada      | NC FreeNet: aa185
gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes: > Oh, I see your point.  I think you're wrong.  But if you sit back and  > wait to find out if I'm right, it'll be too late.  Just listen *very*  > carefully for the first 'such and such will not be permitted on network  > XYZ' shoe to drop.   I've been a very intent NREN spectator of the NREN for years.  As a  commercial IP software vendor, it really is my professional opinion that the  NREN, at this point, is irrelevant to private sector networking.  If it had  been deployed five years ago, it would have been a major development.  Now, however, it's just an upgrade to the NSFnet, and an attempt to revive the  lagging use of the national supercomputer centers.  You could cut out the  NSFnet completely, and the Internet would continue chugging along without a  hiccup (aside from a few universities).  Long-haul networking and Internet connectivity have long since ceased to be  under federal sponsorship or regulation, at least in the USA.  The success of  the CIX (Commercial Internet Exchange) is a prime example of this.  While our  dear VP has been promoting his "data superhighway," the private sector has  been building it, without the NSFnet's restrictions.  To illustrate, a connection from the machine on my desk to the machine your  article was posted from (pizzabox.demon.co.uk) involves *only* commercial IP  providers until it hits Amsterdam.  No NSFnet.  No NREN.  No "appropriate  use" restrictions.  It's even 1.544mbps (T1) until it hits the EUnet  gateway...  QED.
rlward1@afterlife.ncsc.mil (Robert Ward) writes: > It refers to the right of the people to organize a militia, not for  > individuals to carry handguns, grenades, and assault rifles.    False, as federal courts have affirmed on many occasions.  This is getting  out of sci.crypt territory, though...
In <305@VisiCom.COM> makey@VisiCom.COM (Jeff Makey) writes:  >In article <C5so84.Hxv@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >>I am *completely* baffled by why Dorothy Denning has chosen >>to throw away her academic respectability like this.  >She hasn't.  Dorothy Denning has spent many years earning the >professional respect of her colleagues, and something won in this >manner is not easily lost.  Her support of the clipper -- no matter >how unpopular that position may be -- serves far more to enhance the >clipper's respectability than to diminish her own.  I wouldn't think so.  Asking people to trust a secret algorithm seems unsound to me.
In article <1r0nov$p3e@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes:   > > 1. American manufacturers peddling Cripple Chips with a secret untested >     algorithm whose keys are held by people with a history of untrustworthy >     behavoir, or >  er, excuse me but since the escrow agencies aren't yet chosen, how can you say they have a "history of untrustworthy behavoir[sic]"?  I'm sure each of us can think of agencies without such a history. Price Waterhouse has kept the secret of the Academy Awards for many years, even in the face of an aggressive press. The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee has successfully kept decisions from leaking for the statutory period until publication. Even the Department of Agriculture has successfully kept crop forecasts from leaking prematurely.  Frankly, I'd trust the above (not the D of A, of course since they might be subject to political pressure) far sooner than the ACLU, EFF, or CPSR which, though not exactly government apologists, have no particular track record for internal security that I know of.  David
wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes: >Fascinating.  Most of the content of the White House announcements was >in what was *not* said.  It gives us almost nothing of value, threatens to >take away a lot, and does it with a sincere smile on its face, >and the nice friendly word "Management".  The computer, err, government, is your friend.  Have a nice day (under penalty of law).
In article <1993Apr20.014135.24134@fsl.noaa.gov> bear@kestrel.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles) writes: >In article <C5pstr.Lu2@panix.com> dfl@panix.com (Danny O'Bedlam) writes: >>      The algorithm is classified because a military contract (or similar >>government equivalent to military) has been let for this "proprietary" >>design that the Feds say that NSA developed.  Is there a patent?  Is that >>patent publicly available?  My betting is that that too is classified. > >Unless there has been a _major_ change in the law, there's no such beast >as a "classified patent."  Patents exist to encourage communications and >develop the state of the art.  	Yes there is, the patent can be classified as secret.  I recently 	saw a patent from 1947 (dealing with nuclear weapons technology) 	that was only declassified in the last couple of years.  There 	is of course the problem of enforcing the patent.  >The same thing applies in civilian development: you can't patent something >_and_ declare it a "trade secret."  However, you can (and should) mark all >software (including proprietary code) "unpublished copyright" so that it >ever does get exposed you still have some legal protection.  	This is absolutely right.
In article <C5uxGv.Dv7@panix.com> habs@panix.com (Harry Shapiro) writes: >In <1r1om5$c5m@slab.mtholyoke.edu> jbotz@mtholyoke.edu (Jurgen Botz) >writes: > >>Even more interesting: the SMTP server at csrc.ncsl.nist.gov no longer >>recognizes the 'expn' and 'vrfy' commands... > >>   telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov smtp >>   Trying 129.6.54.11... >>   Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov. >>   Escape character is '^]'. >>   220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Tue, 20 Apr 93 17:01:34 EDT >>   expn clipper >>   500 Command unrecognized > >>Seems like sombody didn't like your snooping around, Marc. > >Then it is a good thing we already have this: > >The csspub mailing list: csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov, and address on > [rest of names deleted]  Sigh... my version of 'rn' asked me whether I really want to send this posting!  You may as well know that all this stuff about the secret source of the Clipper announcement is because of a silly mistake.  I am the administrator of csrc.ncsl.nist.gov, alias first.org.  It's a system set up to help out the needs of FIRST, a Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, which  includes a number of world-wide incident response teams such as CERT/CC and other places in Europe.  As to the VRFY and EXPN commands, they are normally disabled, since early on we didn't want crackers to find out the names of incident response folks on our mailing lists.  We had a disk crash several months ago which required completely rebuilding the O/S files - same old story, our backups weren't especially helpful.  As you can guess, I didn't remember to re-disable VRFY and EXPN until I saw people on the net trying to find out who was behind clipper@csrc...  When I saw people's names posted here, I felt it was time to clear things up.  So, EXPN and VRFY on csrc have always been disabled in the past for reasons having nothing to do with  Clipper.  I posted the White House announcements at the request of policy folks here because csrc also provides Usenet service.  I posted them from an account called 'clipper.'  I also created an alias called 'clipper' that contains the addresses of members of the NIST Computer Security Privacy and Advisory Board, set up under law of the Computer Security Act of 1987, and addresses of other individuals not affiliated with NIST but involved in cryptography, security, and privacy - I believe that these individuals were included on this list because NIST felt it important to get them the Clipper information first-hand.  The 'clipper' alias is there for the benefit of those named above.  It is  not a source for information, it was set up solely to monitor any initial traffic.  Individuals on the list have requested that they continue to get traffic that is not already duplicated on Usenet.  While you can rightfully say we were a bit disorganized in handling this, I would ask that people stop speculating about any hidden agendas or motives of the individuals on the 'clipper' alias - I've already apologized to them for what's happened.  Disabling EXPN and VRFY is an increasingly common practice (albeit unfriendly to some), and any effect of disabling it again was unintentional.
In article <1993Apr16.204207.24564@eff.org> Danny Weitzner <djw@eff.org>  writes: >The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of whom >hold 40-bits of each key.   I somehow started to doubt technical competence of the people who designed the system.  Why on the Earth split the 80-bit key in 40-bit parts to keep them in escrow separately (having 40 bit and large volumes of data voice links produce it should be relatively easy to break it) when they simply could keep 80-bit sequences in N (N>=2) independent places and then XOR all the partial keys to get the actual key (N-1 sequences should obviously be selected randomly and Nth is the actual key XOR-ed with the random sequences).  (Or is it a conspiracy? 1/2 :-)
In article <WCS.93Apr21204048@rainier.ATT.COM>, wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes: > On the other hand, I can easily see them recording the traffic for > "interesting" people, such as dissidents, suspected criminals, > foreign telephone calls, and anybody noticed using encryption. > As Ken Shiriff speculates, recording encrypted traffic will probably > be judged not to be an invasion of privacy pretty soon ....  As I read the current wiretap law, it would not be legal now.  On the other hand, assuming a legislative change, recording but not decrypting Clipper conversations would probably be found constitutional by the Supreme Court, using the same reasoning (or the lack thereof...) by which they permit random roadblocks to check for drunk drivers.  Incidentally, if we use that as our model, the Court will likely not uphold selective recording.  (On the other hand, I don't think they've thrown out ``drug courier profiles'' yet.  Must be that exception to the Fourth Amendment that I can never find in my copy of the Bill of Rights.)  A lot -- and I mean a *lot* -- will depend on exactly how Clippertaps (or Tipperclaps, for encrypted music?) are used.  Don Alvarez showed in the latest RISKS digest that it's possible to prevent the cops from reading traffic after their warrant expires.