waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
MADDISON,David wrote: : I am a new reader of sci.crypt I would like to obtain a copy of a : public domain program that can encrypt files, preferably using DES, : that runs under MS-DOS.  : I would also like to obtain a program which will password protect : floppy disks, if this is possible.  : Thanks.  : David Maddison : Melbourne, Australia  When you find out a floppy password protect program, could you e-mail me. Thanks
bena@dec05.cs.monash.edu.au (Ben Aveling) writes: > Don't forget, you are in the country that wouldn't let the Russians > buy Apple II's because of security concerns.  That's nothing.  They wouldn't let the British buy Inmos Transputer systems because of security concerns.  And we designed the damn things!
The RISC processor made by Fairchild, sold to Intergraph, much the same story as the R4000.
The clipper chip's User key is formed by:              R1 = E[D[E[N1;S1];S2];S1]            R2 = E[D[E[N2;S1];S2];S1]            R3 = E[D[E[N3;S1];S2];S1]      Why is the triple-encrytion used?  Is it just to gain an effective increase in keyspace to defeat a potential keysearch?  (If so, why use 80 bit keys?)  Not knowing anything about the Skipjack algorithm, it's not really possible to guess whether this makes it harder or easier to guess S1,S2.      Why are N1, N2, and N3 formed as they are?  It would be facinating to see the Skipjack algorithm, to look for ways of attacking it that require three ciphertext blocks formed in that odd way.      Where do the 34-bit constant values that are concatenated with the serial number to form N1,N2,N3 come from?  Are they changed from chip to chip, or session to session?  (Even if they're published in the NY Times, if SkipJack is resistant to known-plaintext attacks, when using triple- encryption, then there's no break in security.  But why allow that kind of weird format?  If those three 34-bit values are truly-random bits, then maybe it's used to ensure that a known-plaintext attack on SkipJack, if it exists, can't be easily used to derive S1 and S2 for a whole production run of these chips....)      Does Dorothy Denning read this group?  If not, is someone on the group forwarding questions like these to her, or Martin Hellman, or anyone else who's seen more details about the chip?
I just posted this reply to comp.risks (answering RISKS DIGEST 14.53). Summary: Re: [14.53 Mark Seecof] "key escrow"  >From: Mark Seecof <marks@wimsey.latimes.com> >Subject: "key escrow" (Clipper Chip; RISKS 14.51)  >Advances in digital computing have made it possible for ordinary people to >use powerful machine cipher techniques.  It is tempting (albeit chauvinistic) to believe that we have a new situation here, thanks to our pet computers.  This is not true.  David Kahn's "The Codebreakers", a history of cryptography, makes two things obvious:  1.	Cryptography is a spontaneous invention of private human individuals 	and has been going on for thousands of years.  [Teen-age slang and 	cipher inventions provide a modern example of this spontaneous 	creation.]  2.	The systems people created on their own were roughly as secure as (and 	sometimes more secure than) those used by military and diplomatic 	users *of that time* (although they seem very simple and insecure 	today). [e.g., In places, the Bible used a more complex simple 	substitution than Caesar did for his military dispatches, but before 	Caesar.]  I commend Kahn's book to all who might be interested.
In article <1993Apr22.065357.9667@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes: [article deleted] > >Just doing a quick reality check here - is this for real or did someone >invent it to provoke a reaction from people?  It sounds more like the >sort of thing you'd have heard, suitably rephrased, from the leader of a  >certain German political party in the 1930's....  It sounds like a joke (but then the war on drugs has always been a joke...).
From: andersom@spot.Colorado.EDU (Marc Anderson)  	>Also.. how about a box that you plug your phone into, which would allow 	>encrypted voice communications with someone who has a similar box?   	>(digitizing input speech, transmitting, and decrypting on the other end).  I  	>don't know how a public-key system could work in this regard, but it might  	[...]  	heh heh... I posted this just before reading all the Clinton Chip messages.. 	I guess they beat me to it..  Anyway, I think it would be a great idea to 	develop such a product, perhaps in the underground, as it would otherwise 	probably become illegal pretty quickly here...  It's really very feasible and shouldn't be too expensive - all that's needed is a box with a phone jack on one side, a DSP in the middle to do codec functions of speech->compressed bytestream, and an RS232 on the other side.  You'd plug your phone into it, plug the RS232 into your computer, and have a good old fashioned normal modem on your other RS232 port.  The CPU in the middle would do the encryption with a version of pgp modified to work on a byte stream.  With v32bis or better modems to carry the bytestream, it should work.  Quality would only be marginally lower than a normal telephone.  At the very highest price, you could use one of those voice-mail compatible modems to do the digitisation - that puts an upper bound of about $500 on the cost of such a box.  In practice, you really ought to be able to get the price well below $100 - I could do it now in software on my cheap&nasty home RISC box (Acorn Archimedes) with the digitising microphone I bought for 25 pounds, if I knew how to write good speech compression software (which I don't).  The reason it won't work of course is that hardly anyone will have one - the only consumer equipment to have encryption will use the wiretap chip. Economics, I'm afraid.  However... we can get about 2Kcps throughput on the internet even with the bottleneck of a v32bis modem.  When we get ISDN for all (ha ha ha) and the new NREN, it might then be trivial to run compressed speech over a tcp/ip connection on the Internet.  Perhaps we should start thinking now of a standard to keep voice on the internet compatible for everyone, and side-step the clipper stuff and use internet for all our phone calls in future :-)  [1/2 joking]
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >The proposal could be modified so that if they get a court order to tap you >and don't charge you with a crime within, say, 90 days, they have to buy you >a new phone. >If they do charge you, and you are found innocent, they have to buy you a >new phone. >:-)  Yeah, right, and if the ATF trashes your place on a bad tip they have to pay to repair it, sure.  And if your computer equipment is confisticated in a raid they have to charge you with a crime within, say, 90 days.  You're stretching the naivete bit on this one.
I have lurked here a bit lately, and though some of the math is unknown to me, found it interesting. I thought I would post an article I found in the Saturday, April 17, 1993 Toronto Star:                    'CLIPPER CHIP' to protect privacy     Washington (REUTER) - President Bill CLinton announced yesterday a plan to plant a new "Clipper Chip" in every government telephone and computer line to prevent eavesdropping.     Eventually the chips, developed by the government's National Institute for Standards and Technology, would be used by commercial and private electronics communication users.     The White House said that to assure privacy, each device containing the encryption devices would be assigned two unique "keys" - numbers that will be needed by government agencies to decode messages.     The attorney-general has been assigned the task of arranging that the keys are deposited in two "key-escrow" data bases. Access to them would be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap, the White House said in a statement.                                -30-    Dan McKinnon
In article <1993Apr25.025459.12837@random.ccs.northeastern.edu> rogue@ccs.northeastern.edu (Free Radical) writes: > >No no no no no no no. > >It will go like this: > >FEDS: We need the key to phone 334RE67D99. > >ESCROW: You have a warrant to tap the line phone 334RE67D99 is on? > >FEDS: Yes. > >ESCROW: Fine, here is our key. > >rogue@cs.neu.edu (Rogue Agent/SoD!)  It also goes like this:  FED1: We need to listen into <mafia head/druglord/terrorist/BBS sysop>'s       conversations but don't have probable cause for a tap.  FED2: Who do we have a tap on?  FED1: <some other enemy of the state>.  FED2: So get the keys - we can always claim that phone's being used on the       tapped line.  There's got to be some way to associate an instrument with an individual or the state effectively has a tap, possibly not admissible (given the War on Drugs exceptions to the 4/5 ammendments, who knows) but none the less listenable tap on any phone.
brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:  >Their strategy is a business one rather than legal one.  They are >pushing to get a standard in place, a secret standard, and if they >get it as a standard then they will drive competitors out of the market. >It will be legal to sell better, untapable encryption that doesn't have >registered keys, but it will be difficult, and thus not a plan for >most phone companies.  If Brad's analysis is correct, it may offer an explanation for why the encryption algorithm is being kept secret.  This will prevent competitors from coming out with Clipper-compatible phones which lack the government- installed "back door."  The strategy Brad describes will only work as long as the only way to get compatible phones is to have ones with the government chips.  (It would be nice, from the point of view of personal privacy, if Brad turns out to be right.  As long as people still have the power to provide their own encryption in place of or in addition to the Clipper, privacy is still possible.  But the wording of several passages in the announcement makes me doubt whether this will turn out to be true.)
In article <C5upHy.GH7@dcs.ed.ac.uk> pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes:    How fast do the fastest modems go?  V.FAST is targeted for about 28kbps; 14.4kbps is ~$500, and 19.2 may be here soon too.  (Remember to ignore compression figures which make your modem go faster on compressible data, because voice gets compressed better than that, and encryption makes further compression impossible.)     How far can voice be compressed?  The STU-III phones on the market from AT&T, Motorola, and (I forget who else), give you a choice of 9600, 4800, and 2400 baud.  The 9600 and 4800 are CELP, and I think the 2400 is some earlier military vocoder stuff. 9600 is decent, 2400 is pretty artificial, anything less is Speak&Spell. 16000 can produce quite adequate sound.  There's also some 8 kbps CELP around. DSPs have made it possible to do all this in real time for cheap.  Old-hand government crypto have trouble adjusting to systems faster than 9600 baud, because if the voice on the other end sounds good, you assume the crypto hasn't been turned on yet :-)
In article <bontchev.734981805@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes: >and since the US constitutions guarantees the right to every American >to bear arms, why is not every American entitled, as a matter of  Have you read the applicable part of the Constitution and interpreted it IN  CONTEXT?  If not, please do so before posting this misinterpretation again. It refers to the right of the people to organize a militia, not for individuals  to carry handguns, grenades, and assault rifles.
In article <1r47l1INN8gq@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> jfc@athena.mit.edu (John F Carr) writes: > >In most cases information you come by properly is yours to use as you wish, >but there are certainly exceptions.  If you write a paper which includes >sufficiently detailed information on how to build a nuclear weapon, it is >classified.  As I understand the law, nuclear weapons design is >_automatically_ classified even if you do the work yourself.  I believe you >are then not allowed to read your own paper. > 	Hate to mess up your point, but it is incredibly easy to learn how to make a nuclear weapon.  The hard part is getting the radioactives to put in it.  Have you ever read Tom Clancy's _The Sum of All Fears_?  It describes in great detail how a Palestinian terrorist group constructed a nuclear bomb using stolen (actually found) plutonium, with some help from an East German nuclear physicist.  For some non fiction, read Tom Clancy's article _Five Minutes Till Midnight_.  It shows how a terrorist group could construct a nuke using Neptunium, a low grade radioactive waste product dumped in toxic waste sites and forgotten about.  He also claims information on constructing a nuke is easily found in any large library.  Sounds kind of scary, doesn't it? :-(  >A less serious example: if you tell drivers about a speed trap they are >about to run into, you can be fined, even though you might argue that you >broke no law when you discovered the location of the policeman.  The charge >is interfering with a police officer, which is quite similar what you would >be doing by reverse engineering the Clipper chip. > >Don't tell me that you think this violates the Constitution -- find some >court cases which have struck down such laws.  Many people would not be >comforted by the fact that the government violated their rights when it >imprisoned them. >  	Don't know whether you could get busted for warning of a speedtrap.  Doug Holland  --
In <15314.735453769@moose.cs.indiana.edu> Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@cs.indiana.edu> writes:  >PGP is not available on the archive site rsa.com.  If it were, it >would be highly amusing, since rsa.com (actually Public Key Partners, >but it's the same entity) is the organization holding the patents >which they claim are violated if you actually "make, use or sell" PGP. >I believe those patents also apply in Canada, but I'm not a patent >lawyer or anything.  The patents don't apply in Canada.  I think the free trade agreement may provide for recognition of new patents, but not old ones.
Perry E. Metzger (pmetzger@snark.shearson.com) wrote: : Here is a disturbing thought. ....good stuff elided.... : Don't pretend that no one unauthorized will ever get their hands on : the escrow databases. :  ....... : secret. The escrow databases aren't the sorts of secrets that our : teachers told us about, but they are the sort of big secrets they : would lump into this category. Imagine trying to replace 100 million : Clipper chips.  Sounds to me like a *great* gimmick for a replacement market...every so often issue a "Clipper Alert" announcing that some key backup tapes are missing, that some Drug Lords got 'em, whatever. Then the owners of these $1200 Clipperphones have to trot down to their local Key Escrow Agency and buy new chips and have them programmed.  Microtoxin, the Clipper supplier, will make a killing...maybe this was the real idea. (Anybody know if Janet Reno has stock in Microtoxin, VLSI Technology, or AT&T?)  Could be a good opportunity to undermine this with some disinformation: float rumors that the key database has been stolen. All the chips need replacing. It angers people, undermines confidence even more, and kills sales.  After the Waco Massacre and the Big Brother Wiretap Chip, any tactic is fair.  -Tim May
In article <ZEEV.93Apr18014822@sepia.ccc.amdahl.com> zeev@ccc.amdahl.com (Ze'ev Wurman) writes: >It seems to me that all discussions about Clipper security are almost  >irrelevant - if I cannot choose the key, but have to use a key chosen for >me by the foundry, the security of the WHOLE UNIVERSE OF USERS is as good >(or as bad) as the security of VLSI Technologies Inc.  - or their handlers.  >It is a trivial effort to run any ciphertext agains ALL THE KEYS EVER  >MANUFACTURED - after all we are talking about 1 to 100 million keys that >will ever be manufactured. The key depositories can be as secure and >incorruptible as they wish to be, nobody cares anyway...:-(  They key depositories are IRRELEVANT. In order for the applicable law enformcement agencies to be able to know what keys to request from escrow, the system will have to squawk its serial number in clear text as part of the link establishment protocol. Whoever owns the program  that assigns keys to each serial number won't need access to the key depository.  In other words, the FBI may need a court-ordered release of escrowed keys, but the NSA has the keys before the chip is ever manufactured. There is no need to go through the escrow or to try all keys. While relations between law enforment agencies have sometimes been strained, there is also a long history of trading favors. This will re-establish the NSA as a very important agency for everyone to get along with, because they can give you untraceable encryption leaks without court orders.  The more I think about this affair, the fouler it smells. I'd rather have a DES with an engineered-in backdoor ...
In article brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:  [...]> >The greatest danger of the escrow database, if it were kept on disk, >would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out.  You [...]> >Of course then it's hard to backup.  However, I think the consequences >of no backup -- the data is not there when a warrant comes -- are worse >than the consequences of a secret backup.  If the data isn't there when the warrant comes, you effectively have secure crypto.  If secret backups are kept...then you effectively have no crypto.  Thus, this poster is essentialy arguing no crypto is better than secure crypto.  If the data isn't there when the warrant comes, then the government will just have to use normal law enforcement techniques to catch crooks.  Is this so bad?   BTW, bugging isn't YET a normal law enforcement technique. With the privacy clipper, it WILL become a normal technique. /Jim
In article <rlglendeC5t133.En3@netcom.com> rlglende@netcom.com (Robert Lewis Glendenning) writes: >First, what the fuck is NASA doing wasting my tax dollars doing >policy papers on stuff far outside of their purvew/mission?  I don't think they're paying for it.  >Do us a favor.  Resign rather than right this paper for NASA.  Go >do useful work for the society.  Useful?  I find his estimate of the annual value to law enforcement of $5 million quite useful, if rough (e.g. wiretaps may be preferentially used on otherwise-hard-to-catch criminals, resulting in an underestimate).  This comes to twenty cents a head over the U.S. population.  I would find some rigorous numbers on this quite useful -- it would make for nice slogans: "Your privacy is worth $0.37", or whatever it turns out to be.  >Lew Glendenning		rlglende@netcom.com
In article <1ppg02$i2k@bigboote.WPI.EDU>  ear@bigwpi.WPI.EDU (Mr. Neat-O [tm]) writes: >> >>It is apparently quite easy to get hold of a person's calling records >>through the phone company.  Police (and some lawyers) are able to acquire >>such information without any warrant or judicial supervision, whether or >>not the target is suspected of specific crimes. > >Pardon me, but isn't this very illegal?  I was under the impression that a >warrent *is* needed to get this information out of the phone company in >order to protect people's privacy.   Legal or not, I've seen it done.  Phone records were obtained in order to *establish* probable cause, rather than as a result of it. In other words, for a fishing expedition.    >                                   A local (Worcester, MA) police officer I >spoke with only a couple of nights ago told me that they usually only >subpeona the phone companies records in *extreme* conditions because it's so >much of a hassle.  And does the phone company require written, subpoena-able evidence of probable cause in order to process the request?  I suggest that the officer was disinterested in pursuing your case -- even if you could prove the offender had called you at a certain time, your  chances of winning a harassment suit on the strength of this evidence are nil.  My contact with several people who have dealt with cases of extreme phone harassment (several thousand calls in one case) teaches  me that police in this area are quite lethargic about pursuing such matters.
% telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov 25        Trying...        Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov.        Escape character is '^]'.        220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:42:56 EDT        expn clipper        250-<csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov>        250-<denning@cs.georgetown.edu>        250-<hoffman@seas.gwu.edu>        250-<mkapor@eff.org>        250-<rotenberg@cpsr.org>        250-<rivest@mit.edu>        250-<mhellman@stanford.edu>        250-<alanrp@aol.com>        250-<dparker@sri.com>        250-<jim@rsa.com>        250-<branstad@tis.com>        250 <mgrsplus@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov>        quit        221 first.org closing connection        Connection closed.  Note also:  % telnet csmes.ncsl.nist.gov 25 Trying 129.6.54.2... Connected to csmes.ncsl.nist.gov. Escape character is '^]'. 220 csmes.ncsl.nist.gov sendmail 4.1/NIST(rbj/dougm) ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:08:58 EDT expn mgrsplus 250-<mcnulty@ecf.ncsl.nist.gov> 250-Irene Gilbert <igilbert> 250-Dennis Branstad <branstad> 250-Robert Rosenthal <rmr> 250-Gene Troy <troy> 250-<smid@st1.ncsl.nist.gov> 250-Dennis Steinauer <dds> 250 <katzke@st1.ncsl.nist.gov>  telnet mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov 25 Trying 129.6.48.199... Connected to mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov. Escape character is '^]'. 220 mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov sendmail 4.1/rbj/jck-3 ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:06:50 EDT expn csspab 250-<burrows@ecf> 250-<mcnulty@ecf> 250-Bill Colvin <colvin> 250-<Gangemi@dockmaster.ncsc.mil> 250-John Kuyers <kuyers> 250-<slambert@cgin.cto.citicorp.com> 250-<lipner@mitre.org> 250-<gallagher@dockmaster.ncsc.mil> 250-<cindy_rand@postmaster.dot.gov> 250-<walker@tis.com> 250-<willis@rand.org> 250-Eddie Zeitler <zeitler> 250-Cris Castro <castro> 250 <whitehurst@vnet.ibm.com>  % telnet st1.ncsl.nist.gov 25 Trying 129.6.54.91... Connected to st1.ncsl.nist.gov. Escape character is '^]'. 220 st1.ncsl.nist.gov SEndMaIl 4.1/NBS-rbj.11 rEadY At Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:13:43 EDT expn smid 250 Miles Smid <smid> expn katzke 250 Stuart Katzke <katzke> quit 221 st1.ncsl.nist.gov closing connection Connection closed by foreign host.  % telnet ecf.ncsl.nist.gov 25 Trying 129.6.48.2... Connected to ecf.ncsl.nist.gov. Escape character is '^]'. 220 ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV TGV/MultiNet SMTP service ready. expn burrows 250 Burrows, James <burrows> expn mcnulty 250 McNulty, Lynn <mcnulty> quit 221 ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV TGV/MultiNet SMTP service complete.  % whois -h rs.internic.net first.org National Institute of Standards and Technology (FIRST-DOM)    225/A216    	 NIST    	 GAITHERSBURG, MD 20899     Domain Name: FIRST.ORG     Administrative Contact:       Wack, John P.  (JPW18)  WACK@ENH.NIST.GOV       (301) 975-3411 (FTS) 879-3411    Technical Contact, Zone Contact:       Hunt, Craig W.  (CWH3)  Hunt@ENH.NIST.GOV       (301) 975-3827 (FTS) 879-3827     Record last updated on 17-Dec-91.     Domain servers in listed order:     DOVE.NIST.GOV		129.6.16.2    AMES.ARC.NASA.GOV		128.102.18.3   The InterNIC Registration Services Host ONLY contains Internet Information (Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's). Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information.
Another objection occurred to me.  There was a comment about how supposedly there would only be one decode box, operated by the FBI. This is flat ridiculous, and I don't believe it for a millisecond. Even *if* they in fact only build one (or two or some other small number) of these, that won't stop others from building one.  Make it work like two Clipper-chip phones, one listening to each side of the recorded conversation.  I'll have to have another look at the specs posted so far, but offhand I didn't see anything that would preclude this sort of thing.....