waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <C5uprt.GMq@dcs.ed.ac.uk> pdc@dcs.ed.ac.uk (Paul Crowley) writes: > >>Perhaps these encryption-only types would defend the digitized porn if it >>was posted encrypted? > >>These issues are not as seperable as you maintain. > >In fact, since effective encryption makes censorship impossible, they >are almost the same issue and they certainly fall into the brief of the >EFF.   It also falls within the purview of the ACLU, but that doesn't mean the ACLU (or the EFF) would be the most effective instrument to  "win the hearts and minds" in favor of access to cryptography.   It's precisely slogans like "cryptography makes censorship impossible" which stand to torpedo any attempt to generate a broad consensus in favor of encryption.  It is not true, and in the context of a public debate it would be a dangerous red herring.  Advocates of strong crypto had better prepare themselves to answer such charges in pragmatic terms that laypeople and politicians can sympathize with. The usual mumblings about Constitutional amendments are not enough.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  In message <9304190956.AA10390@pizzabox.demon.co.uk> you write:  > : The cops/feds do *not* need to be able to get hold of your private key to > : listen in to cellular conversations.  Encryption is not end-to-end, but  > : cellphone to base-station [...]  > That was true for the UK Paul, but I'm fairly sure they're talking about > building end-to-end encryption phones out of this chip.  It's *not* for > cellular (though it certainly could be used there in the way you suggest)  I'd lost the White House's deathless prose when I posted (that's what happens when you read news at home when you're rat-arsed), but I did have a bunch of follow-ups going on about cellular/cordless comms.  The original article has reappeared, so:      The President today announced a new initiative that will bring     the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary     program to improve the security and privacy of telephone     communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law     enforcement.  Hmm, telephone communications could indeed include end-to-end encryption on ordinary landlines.      The initiative will involve the creation of new products to     accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure     telecommunications networks and wireless communications links.  But the next paragraph says telecoms networks and wireless communications links.  OK, it's far from clear exactly what Cripple (what an apposite anagram) will be applied to, but the reason Joe Public wants secure comms is to stop people listening in to his cellular or cordless phones (and he wouldn't even be bothered about that were it not for Wingnut and Squidqy's misfortunes).  Yes, Cripple *might* be for end-to-end encyption, dropping to clear when the other end doesn't have Cripple.  But then a cordless-to-ordinary conversation would be in clear leaving the cordless end just as vulnerable as at present.  Nope, I suspect that Cripple will only be used on radio links.  OK, it's possible `telecommunications networks' could mean `ordinary phone lines', but I'm betting it means the microwave links used by the telcos.  My apologies if I'm wrong, particularly if the turgid Press Release makes it clear that I'm wrong and I missed it, but as far as I can see it was full of obfuscation, and anyone expecting end-to-end encryption is in for a surprise (IMHO).   BTW, Graham, I've posted questions to alt.security.pgp and not seen any replies/followups from outside Europe - how about you?  Have I made it into everyone's kill file, or is there some problem?  - --Paul  -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2
> Somebody asked me what was wrong about overreacting in cases such as this.  >  > The reason is very simple:  How many people do you want to die in a riot?  >In a new Civil War?
In article <1993Apr13.225348.6511@colorado.edu> bear@tigger.cs.Colorado.EDU writes:  >since the price of 1.44 M 3.5" floppies were still high until the last >few years.  If you store "old" data, with old file times, in the public >filesystem the casual observer may miss the "HD"... especially if you  >"accidently" cover it with something). > >--  >Bear Giles >bear@cs.colorado.edu/fsl.noaa.gov >  It has been done already!  In the UK the Atari ST box was shipped with 360K disks in the first few years and then later 720K disks. In order to make life less complicated, many freebie disks on mags were double formatted like this. Side 0 of the disk had 360K on it and could be read  by any ST. It also had a flip-side program. This would swap the sides around so that side 1 became side 0.  --
How can the government tell which encryption method one is using without being able to decode the traffic? i.e., In order to accuse me of using an unauthorized strong encryption technique they would have to take both keys out of escrow, run them against my ciphertext and "draw a blank".
> In article <1993Apr21.192615.3465@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>, denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu writes: >  > > Each chip includes the following components: >  > >    the Skipjack encryption algorithm > >    F, an 80-bit family key that is common to all chips > >    N, a 30-bit serial number (this length is subject to change) > >    U, an 80-bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip > [ ... ] >  > > To see how the chip is used, imagine that it is embedded in the AT&T > > telephone security device (as it will be).  Suppose I call someone and > > we both have such a device.  After pushing a button to start a secure > > conversation, my security device will negotiate an 80-bit session key K > > with the device at the other end.  This key negotiation takes place > > without the Clipper Chip.  In general, any method of key exchange can > > be used such as the Diffie-Hellman public-key distribution method. >  > > Once the session key K is established, the Clipper Chip is used to > > encrypt the conversation or message stream M (digitized voice).  The > > telephone security device feeds K and M into the chip to produce two > > values: >  > >    E[M; K], the encrypted message stream, and  > >    E[E[K; U] + N; F], a law enforcement field ,  > [ ... ] >  > > which are transmitted over the telephone line.  The law enforcement > > field thus contains the session key K encrypted under the unit key U > > concatenated with the serial number N, all encrypted under the family > > key F.  The law enforcement field is decrypted by law enforcement after > > an authorized wiretap has been installed.  Is the U used in the law enforcement field from the phone which placed the call, from the unit whose 'start secure session' button was pressed first, or does each phone transmit its own law enforcement field?  Even assuming one of the first two choices, the FBI is going to get a fresh N,U for its own database about every other phone call, eventually accumulating keys for all the phones used to connect to the line they are monitoring, not just the 'suspects' key.  (Assuming the ever-thrifty FBI doesn't forget each key after its wiretap permission has expired.)  Not quite a pyramid, but not bad, either.
In article <C5oy0z.ILy@chinet.chi.il.us> schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier) writes: >In article <strnlghtC5M2Cv.8Hx@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >> >>Here's a simple way to convert the Clipper proposal to an unexceptionable >>one: Make it voluntary. >> >>That is--you get high quality secure NSA classified technology if you agree >>to escrow your key. Otherwise you are on your own. >> > >As long as "you are on your own" means that you can use your own encryption, >I'm sold. > >Bruce  As am I  If "high quality secure NSA classified technology" means handing my key over to whomever, I'll take PGP any day.  Right now they are billing it as voluntary, i.e. bend over, here it comes.  As soon as enough Wiretap chip based units are out there, how much easier do you think it will be to redefine "on your own" to mean write it yourself and don't even THINK about distributing it...?  Get honest, no one is going to buy this trash if they KNOW it's compromised already, and less will buy it if the algorithm is not disclosed.  The NSA knows that making this stuff available to the public means handing it to whatever foreign powers are interested in the process. Since when has export control stopped anyone (especially software wise)  Ask yourself carefully if " high quality secure NSA classified technology " is something they are going to hand out.  Not unless you can drive a NSA van through the holes.  uni (Dark)
In article <strnlghtC5wHo2.1FK@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >In article <a_rubin.735496128@dsg4.dse.beckman.com> >a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes: > >>I wouldn't think so.  Asking people to trust a secret algorithm seems >>unsound to me. > >Maybe so, but it's quite common.  Not when your talking about cryptography.  >There are millions of Macintosh users who >have no idea what's in Apple's patented ROMs. Many have modems connected. >How do you know all your business secrets aren't being stolen? Answer: >1. Because you trust Apple;  Think again.  You won't see me using apple's new signature from the finder feature.  >2. Because if any such attempt, however sophicsticated, came out, it would >destroy Apple's credibility forever.  This analogy fails in its assumption that the government gives two squirts about credibility.   In addition, Apple's proclaimed purpose in releasing the Macintosh wasn't survellience.  Quite the opposite: "On January 24, Apple will introduce.... Macintosh, and you'll see why 1984 won't be, like '1984'"  So don't give me any bullshit analogies about how we trust coke not to put mind control drugs in every can to get us to buy more.   >In the Clipper case, a representative body of experts is going to be allowed >to audit it, and we'll have assurances (maybe even from the President) that >other than the escrowed keys there are no back doors. While some may not >have confidence in that (I am not among them), it's a lot more assurance >than we get for many things we routinely trust in everyday life.  One of the reasons we should be all the more suspicious.  When was the last time the president wasted his time to comfort americans? Just another reason to look closely at exactally what's going on.  >David >--  >David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of >                         our information, errors and omissions excepted.    uni@acs.bu.edu
I have been looking over the postings about the Clipper Chip and noticed an interesting omission from the discussion.  You all mention that the algorithm is classified and have expressed  concerns and ideas of how to figure out the algorithm using software.  The question that I have is why cant someone take one of these chips and reverse engineer it? I mean, take the thing to a chip testing/ analysis facility, one with a decent electron microscope. Just pry off the top of the chip and start scanning it with the electron microcope and figure out the circuitry. I remembered a place that I use to work for had one of these facilities that they used to analyze chips that we accidently blew out while running tests. They could actually find the area that was fried and show us where in the circuit it was.   I am sure that many companies and universities must have these facilities and that the potential is there, especially at a university where the security at such a facility is looser, for someone to take a clipper apart and analyze it?  What can the government do to prevent this? Start taking away all  microchip analysis facilities and electron microscopes??
In article <1993Apr20.000359.20098@bernina.ethz.ch> caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni) writes: > >Just a question.  >As a provider of a public BBS service - aren't you bound by law to gurantee >intelligble access to the data of the users on the BBS, if police comes >with sufficent authorisation ? I guessed this would be  a basic condition >for such systems. (I did run a bbs some time ago, but that was in Switzerland)  That sounds like an old _Dragnet_ episode.    "Joe and I went to the apartment of Prime Suspect.  Nobody answered the   door, but his landlord gave us permission to search the apartment."  Perhaps that worked in California in the 60's, but as I understand the law landlords do _not_ have authority to grant permission to search space rented by a third party, provided the lease is not in default, etc. (I'm not even sure if they can provide the master key, when shown a search warrant, since the _subject_ of the search is supposed to be notified).  At this point the question becomes: did the user "rent" the disk space her encrypted file occupies?  If she did, it _should_ fall under the same body of case law that applies to apartments, storage lockers, etc.  (As to whether any court would recognize this fact....)  If she did not (i.e., no compensation exchanged), I don't know how it would be treated -- there doesn't seem to be a non-cyberspace equivalent.
prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu (Philip Zimmermann) writes:  Philip, I think your ideas are well taken and constructive.  Thanks for articulating them in this forum.  >2)  Work the Press.  Talk with your local newspaper's science and >technology reporter.  Write to your favorite trade rags.  Better yet, >write some articles yourself for your favorite magazines or >newspapers.  Explain why the Clipper chip initiative is a bad idea.  >Remember to tailor it to your audience.  The general public may be >slow to grasp why it's a bad idea, since it seems so technical and >arcane and innocent sounding.  Try not to come across as a flaming >libertarian paranoid extremist, even if you are one.   As a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist (:-), I'at a loss for specific objections that don't sound frighteningly technical.  Any suggestions?  Perhaps somebody could post a list of these?  >5)  Mobilize opposition in industry.  Companies that will presumably >develop products that will incorporate the Clipper chip should be >lobbied against it, from within and from without.  If you work for a >telecommunications equipment vendor, first enlist the aid of your >coworkers and fellow engineers against this initiative, and then >present your company's management with a united front of engineering >talent against this initiative.  Write persuasive memos to your >management, with your name and your colleagues' names on it.  Hold >meetings on it.   One way to do this might be to suggest that these companies should be implementing their own schemes, not being limited to the govt's scheme.  I find that most of my reasons for opposition to the CLipper scheme are algoritm insecurity and mistrust of the govt/NSA.  These are hard  to sell in letters to the editor and to nontechnical people.  Any hints or advice.  Maybe a small FAQ-type thing "Why should I Hate Clipper" would be a good idea.
In article <1993Apr23.051005.28404@Princeton.EDU> mg@cs.princeton.edu (Michael Golan) writes: >something that no one has discussed yet (or I missed it): > >The FBI sets up a wiretap AFTER the court order was handed.  >Only at this point they can access the line and detect  >the serial number N. > >What happens next, does the FBI simply asks for the keys >for N, and, since a warrant was issued for the line, the FBI  >simply gets it? What if multiple phones are used from the >same house, the FBI just asks for N1, N2, etc.? > >Exactly who is to prevent the FBI from claiming some >other serial number, X, was also used over the wirtapped  >line and get the keys for X?  > >Either a second court order (for the specific serial/key) >is required (and I have seen no indication of this), or >the FBI can effectively ask for any pair of keys at any >time, so the escrow key holders are a total fake. >  Two safeguards:  1. The FBI could be asked to produce the law enforcement block to the escrow agencies, and associate it with a particular court order;  2. If the thing comes to trial the defense attorneys can probe this issue closely. It is not too different from proving that the speaker on a legal wiretap is the person the court order covered.  Putting it another way, this question is not very different from the pre-clipper question "What's to prevent the FBI from getting a court order to tap Al Capone and then using it to tap Jonathan Livingstone Seagull instead?"  David
In article <1r466c$an3@news.intercon.com> amanda@intercon.com (Amanda Walker) writes: >Agreed.  Remember, I don't even think of Clipper as encryption in any real  >sense--if I did, I'd probably be a lot more annoyed about it.  I agree with this assessment.  Furthermore, its promotion as providing greater protection than bare voice is quite true, as far as it goes.  However, the only way for it to fulfill its stated goal of letting LE wiretap "terrorists and drug dealers" is to restrict stronger techniques.    Wiretap targets presently use strong encryption, weak encryption, or (the vast majority) no encryption.  The latter two classes can be tapped.  With weak encryption in every phone, the no-encryption class is merged into the weak-encryption class.  Will the introduction of Clipper cause targets presently enjoying strong privacy to give up on it?  that is, to rely for privacy on a system expressly designed to deny it to people like them?  I doubt it.  The mere introduction of this scheme will give the government *nothing*.  The stated goal of preventing the degradation of wiretapping capabilities can be fulfilled by restriction of domestic cryptography, and only by this restriction.  "Clipper" appears to be no more than a sop, given to the public to mute any complaints.  We would find this a grossly inadequate tradeoff, but I fear the public at large will not care.  I hate to even mention gun control, but most people seem to think that an `assault weapon' (as the NYT uses the word) is some sort of automatic weapon, .50 caliber maybe.  Who wants to have such a thing legal?  Well, people know even less about cryptology; I suspect that strong cryptography could easily be labeled "too much secrecy for law-abiding citizens to need".  >That's not for Clinton (or anyone under him) to say, though.  Only the  >federal and supreme courts can say anything about the constitutionality. >Anything the administration or any governmental agency says is opinion at  >best.  What they say is opinion, but what they do is what matters, and will continue unless overturned.  And the courts are reluctant to annul law or regulation, going to some length to decide cases on other grounds.  Furthermore, Congress can get away with quite a bit.  They could levy a burdensome tax; this would place enforcement in the hands of the BATF, who as we've seen you really don't want on your case.  They could invoke the Commerce Clause; this seems most likely.  This clause will get you anywhere these days.  The 18th was required because the Supreme Court ruled a prohibitory statute unconstitutional.  In 1970 Congress prohibited many drugs, with a textual nod to the Commerce Clause.  The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 still stands.  I think the government could get away with it.  >Amanda Walker
ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu (Eli Brandt) writes: > Instead we have a deliberately brain-dead version of a cryptosystem  > that has not even been peer reviewed.  Yes, the NSA owns some smart  > people.  But if they pulled a FEAL, well, AT&T is going to be left with  > a lot of dud phones on its hands.   Agreed.  Remember, I don't even think of Clipper as encryption in any real  sense--if I did, I'd probably be a lot more annoyed about it.  > Heh heh.  The government already gave it up for us.  Remember in the  > announcement they described this scheme as balancing the two  > extremes of having no privacy and claiming that citizens had a  > Constitutional right to encryption?    That's not for Clinton (or anyone under him) to say, though.  Only the  federal and supreme courts can say anything about the constitutionality. Anything the administration or any governmental agency says is opinion at  best.
If there is anyone attending the ISSA conference in Arlington, VA next week, I would appreciate them getting in touch with me.
I am most embarassed that my irrate, intemperate post is still circulating.  I have been chided by experts for my behavior.  I now agree with all of them, although some were no more restrained in their speech than I was 8)  I have apologized to Robin Hanson.  Lew
>>How can the government tell which encryption method one is using without >>being able to decode the traffic? i.e., In order to accuse me of using an >>unauthorized strong encryption technique they would have to take both >>keys out of escrow, run them against my ciphertext and "draw a blank". > >	I was thinking about this, also. It's quite possible the >system transmits, in clear, the serial number of the device being >used. That way they can start a tap, get the serial number, and use >the warrant for the first tap to get the key. > >	If they tap someone who's apparently using encryption, but >don't find that prefix, then they'll assume it's an "un-authorized" >encryption scheme.  	This doesn't handle superencrypted traffic. If the clipper doesn't impose any unfortunate performance side-effects there's no reason not to use it to superencrypt a stream of triple-DES encrypted traffic. That way your traffic looks "normal" and perhaps anyone desiring to listen in won't even bother, since they know nobody's going to really trust crypto that has classified internals for important stuff.
OK, I heard a lot of talk about the NSA's infamous control over encryption export through the ITAR.  Here's a question.  Say I develop this great new encryption system, and I want to sell my software worldwide.  The thought police then come in and say "This algorithm is a threat to national security. You will not be permitted to export it."  At this point, what kind of trouble could I get into if I ignored the ITAR and sold my program to international customers anyway?  Doug Holland