waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <1993Apr21.204036.13723@rick.dgbt.doc.ca> jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Han) writes: >In article <bontchev.735404289@fbihh> > >As one of the happily sleeping people, I would just like to ask this-> >aren't people just slightly overreacting to this?  Or are we all of a >sudden going to draw parallels to Nazi Germany and Communist Russia?  Yes. Reasonable parallels. (though I don't think Russia ever claimed to be Communist)  >The point of the matter is that; yes this is a serious problem.  But it is >not the end of the world.  Guess what?  We're doing something now you >can't do in a Communist country or Nazi Germany.  We're complaining about  I must protest your "...in a Communist country". How do you know? There haven't been any, and are unlikely to ever be any. In some Socialist dictatorships, you can't, whilst in some socialist democracies (such as France or Australia) you can. Of course, some people may disagree about France & Australia being socialist...  >it, (or rather, you're complaining about it) and nobody is shooting at us.    Yet.  >(Or, rather, if they're shooting at me, they have real bad aim.  (:-) ) > >GUESS WHAT PEOPLE?  You live in one of the few countries in the world >where a person can complain without getting shot at.    In some circumstances. I was at a public meeting last night (in the USA), where a protester, who was very nice and calm, and just said before the speaker started to beware of his opinions, was forced out of the meeting by two armed policemen.  There are a lot of things that one cannot do in the USA. You may not notice them, but as an Australian visitor, I notice them.  >People are always complaining that somebody did this wrong, or somebody >did that wrong, or whatever.  Sit down and figure out two things: > >1)  What have they done right? >2)  How much worse can it get? > >And you'll find that you and I, are pretty damn lucky.  Yes, we are lucky at the moment. I hope that is still true in a few years time. Because it didn't just happen...it required concious effort.  >So let's talk about it, get some action going, decide what's going on.  >But let's not overreact!    Of course don't over react --- but don't under react.  Andrew. Disclaimer: All my opinions are my own, and do not represent the society for the conservation of momentum or any other group. I hope I don't lose my student Visa as a result of these opinions..   --
Dear netters:  I have been scanning this news group for a while but has not found a FAQ. Could someone enlight me where to find the FAQ if there is a one. Also, could someone recommend a few good books about encription and decription, about patent information, goverment regulation on this science/technology. I will appreciate any of your help very much.  Sincerely
I've been thinking about how difficult it would be to make PGP available in some form on EBCDIC machines.  The message authentication would be ugly, but I think at least the IDEA encryption could work, if PGP had a switch to tell it to use IDEA in OFB-mode or ECB-mode.  In OFB-mode, errors in translating EBCDIC-->ASCII-->EBCDIC would only affect their byte, not the 16 bytes that would be affected under CBC.    Is PGP set up to use different IDEA modes?  I don't recall notincing it in the executable, but I haven't gone through it as carefully as I probably should....
In article <16BB91429.C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu> C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu (John Kelsey) writes: >   I've recently been reading a paper of Merkle's (publixhed only on the >net, I think) discussing three potential replacements for DES.  Was >anyting ever done with these?  Are Khufu, Khafre, and/or Snefru still >being discussed anywhere?  (I know Snefru is referenced in the RSA >FAQ, and I think it may also be in the sci.crypt FAQ.) >   On a related topic, can anyone point me toward good sites to find >papers/articles/discussions of cryptology?  I think I've about exhausted >the Math/Sci library here, which doesn't seem to have anything more recent >than about '84. >  >   Thanks. >  >   --John Kelsey  Khufu and Khafre are both patented (#5003597).  Biham and Shamir showed that differential cryptanalysis can break 16-round Khafre with a chosen- plaintext attack using 1500 different encryptions.  Khafre with 24 rounds can be broken with the same attack using 2^53 different encryptions. (There are probably more efficient differential cryptanalytic attacks, if someone wants to take the time to look.)  Khufu has key-dependent S-boxes, and is immune to differential cryptanalysis. Source code for this algorithm (and Khafre) are in the patent.  Snefru is a public-domain one-way hash function.  The version of Snefru that produces a 128-bit hash is vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis (vulnerable means that the attack is more efficient that brute force) for four passes or less.  Given that, SHA and MD5 are much more efficient.  Oh yes, anyone interested in licensing the patent should contact Dave Petre, Director of Patent Licencing for Xerox, (203) 986-3231.
In article <1993Apr20.192105.11751@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: :Thousands?  Tens of thousands?  Do some arithmetic, please...  Skipjack :has 2^80 possible keys.  We don't yet know if all 80 bits count.  Anyway, its looking like the keys and escrow arrangements are smoke and mirrors to cover the way the NSA can regenerate the key from the transmitted serial number.
I have been scanning and trying to read the articles in the sci.crypt area, but what do I get?   SURPRISINGLY, the blurb comes upon the screen " file xxx has either been cancelled or expired.       Now I ask you, If it expired, wouldn't it be out of the available file cache? I am 32 and not a paranoid, but the older I get, the greater my cynicism of both federal and state governments becomes.     The censorship  of this Internet (and it is no less than censorship [stupid me, it's the GOVT.]) is ridiculous.  The Japanese have far outstripped our ciphertechnology,  and  our government is now, before your very observant eyes, trying to force the "crypto standard" onto a framefork where the "standard" is now an ancient relic in terms of modern Japanese security techniques.   Now, I pose the question: Why censor folks on the net and send the warning shown above ("cancelled or expired") when it would be wiser to not let people see the post at all??   Which Article of the Constitution gives me the right of revolution if things seem to be going cockeyed??   Hmmm...
Michael Levin wrote: >      I am looking for references to algorithms which can be used for > password encryption. I.e., someone has a clear-text word, runs it > through the algorithm, and it becomes some other sequence of symbols. > I want this algorithm to have the property that it is a) next to > impossible to reverse, and b) would take too long to try all possible > words to see which one works (even by use of a high-speed computer). > Please send references or ideas to mlevin@husc8.harvard.edu.  The original one-way encryption I put into Multics about 1968 (as suggested  by Joe Weizenbaum) was invertible.  An Air Force tiger team demonstrated  this to me in May 1973.  I then asked an expert (who requested anonymity)  what I should use instead; the expert's suggestion was to treat the  8-byte password as both key and data for the LUCIFER encryption algorithm,  which is similar or identical to DES.  This method or something stronger  should take care of (a).  Issue (b) is discussed in comp.security.misc:  longer passwords and quality control on what users can choose as passwords are the common tactics.
In article <1993Apr18.032405.23325@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes: >In article brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes: > >[...]> >>The greatest danger of the escrow database, if it were kept on disk, >>would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out.  You >[...]> >>Of course then it's hard to backup.  However, I think the consequences >>of no backup -- the data is not there when a warrant comes -- are worse >>than the consequences of a secret backup. > >If the data isn't there when the warrant comes, you effectively have >secure crypto.  If secret backups are kept...then you effectively have >no crypto.  Thus, this poster is essentialy arguing no crypto is better >than secure crypto.  No, the poster (me) has his brain in the wrong gear.  As you can infer from the first sentence, I meant the consequences of no backup are *better* than the consequences of an easy to copy database.
Being a browser of this group for some time,   and being very concerned about the clipper chip proposal,     I am hoping someone with more knowledge can help out.  Who would be the most influential people to write to, protesting  the obvious next step hinted at by this proposal ?  (Heads of what committees, etc.)  What are the major flaws in the plan ?  (From a cryptological standpoint)
In article <93113.11034134AEJ7D@CMUVM.BITNET>, <34AEJ7D@CMUVM.BITNET> writes: |> In article <ofppPcS00iUy0_k3Mr@andrew.cmu.edu>, "Stephen J. Ludwick" |> <sl3b+@andrew.cmu.edu> says: |> > |> >Hi everybody! |> > |> >Does anyone know of companies that are currently manufacturing |> >encryption chips for sale to the general public?  Get them while you |> >can!  Some pointers would be greatly appreciated.  Motorola certainly makes them, but I don't know how you would go about buying one.  You'd probably have to buy one of our secure radios.    You could also bring in encryption chips from outside the country.
In article <1r3jgbINN35i@eli.CS.YALE.EDU> jgfoot@minerva.cis.yale.edu writes: > >Perhaps these encryption-only types would defend the digitized porn if it >was posted encrypted? > >These issues are not as seperable as you maintain. >  To paraphrase, I may not agree with what you're encrypting, but I defend your right to encrypt it.
In article <1rae88$b5j@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: > > Nonsense! I wasn't asked if Larry O'Brien should trust Nixon with his keys, > >but whether I would. > >  Well, that explains it.  The government has no real need to spy on people >who already love Big Brother; it's the people who are inclined to talk >back who need to be watched.  Though I think this an overstatement, it does contain a grain of truth. It's drug dealers, spies, terrorists, and organized crime figures (assuming enough probable cause to convince a judge) who need to be watched, not law-abiding citizens.  David
In article <C5LGAz.250@dove.nist.gov>, clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) writes: > Distribution: na  No thanks.  This topic is of interest to a much wider audience.  > In making this decision, I do > not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the > government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that > are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key- > escrow system.  "In making this decision, I intend to prevent the private sector from developing, except with the government's approval, other microcircuits or algorithms that are more effective in assuring privacy."
ifarqhar@laurel.ocs.mq.edu.au (Ian Farquhar) writes: > Hmmm... I also wonder what Intergraph thinks about the use of the name > "Clipper" for this device. :)  Not to mention Computer Associates.  I'll have to be careful to stop telling people I'm a Clipper programmer, they might lynch me... :-)
In article <1993Apr20.203756.20667@kronos.arc.nasa.gov> hanson@kronos.arc.nasa.gov (Robin Hanson) writes: >A rough estimate suggests that wiretaps are worth about five million >dollars per year to U.S. law enforcement agencies.  (In 1990, 872 U.S. >wiretaps led to 2057 arrests, while total police expenditures of $28 >billion led to 11.25 million arrests [ref US Statistical Abstracts].) >I'm working on estimating this wiretap benefit more accurately, but  You seem to be assuming that all arrests are of equal value, and that the use of wiretaps is spread uniformly among them.
In article <1qn1ic$hp6@access.digex.net> pcw@access.digex.com (Peter Wayner) writes: >That leads me to conjecture that: ... >2) The system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks  I seriously doubt that any practical implementation of this proposal would place the onus on the individual to register keys.  Realistically, the Clipper-Chip will probably emit an ID code which will serve as the identifier when requesting the key fragments.  The chip manufacturer would register this identifier code vs. key combination when the chip is made and the (uninitiated) end-user can therefore remain completely outside the loop. The chip could be used in a cellular phone, a modem, or other device -- it really makes no difference:  When the authorities detect the use of this encryption standard during surveillance, they would then capture the ID and apply for the key in order to decrypt the data.
David Sternlight writes:  > I'd trust something from the NSA long before I'd trust something from > some Swiss or anbody Japanese.  What???  This is an incredible statement!  The NSA tried to suppress public key crypto and RSA, and yet they claim to encourage use of strong crypto for US citizens.  Would you trust a black-box from the NSA versus an "open system" from elsewhere?  /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus                    | | elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address | barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | \-----------------------------------/
In <1993Apr26.063532.10120@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin) writes:  >In article <C614BJ.BK6@agora.rain.com> jhart@agora.rain.com (Jim Hart) writes: >>"The security of the system should depend only on the secrecy of >>the keys and not on the secrecy of the algorithms" -- Dorothy Denning  >Cite source, please.
In article <42@shockwave.win.net> jhupp@shockwave.win.net (Jeff Hupp) writes:    >> conference calls?    >It's not Clipper, it's any encryption system.  I've seen a number of    >designs; they generally involve a multi-line cleartext bridge.  	   A 'multi-line cleartext bridge?" 			 ^^^^^^^^^ 	   And just were would you put that bridge?  If it isn't at one of    the receiptants location, forget encryption at all.  You have blown any    security you thought you might have had.   Most of the people using encrypted conference bridges these days are military (or equivalent, like CIA and other embassy personnel), so putting bridges on the recipient's location is normal - it's in a vault on a military base or Ft. Meade, and the secure phones are in sound-proof rooms with big locks on the doors because they're talking about Classified Stuff (or Golf with Other Generals.)  That paradigm will change as we start using encrypted phones in our offices or homes to carry on normal conversations about dinner plans and stock purchases and meeting schedules and technical info and the good batch of illegal frop that we got last weekend from Bob; most people don't use sound-proof vaults, and may use bridges in their PBX or from the local phone company (3-way calls) or Long Distance or value-added phone company (e.g. Alliance conference bridges).  If Clipjack is mainly used for the radio portion of cellular phones, the conferencing aspects don't change.  But there may be a market niche for trusted conference-bridge providers, though I suppose the inquisitors would try to get a blanket wiretap authorization for many bridges, just in case a Bad Guy might use the service.
Hi everybody!  Does anyone know of companies that are currently manufacturing encryption chips for sale to the general public?  Get them while you can!  Some pointers would be greatly appreciated.  Thanks
In <1993Apr22.132638.19448@ringer.cs.utsa.edu> whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu (William W. Hughes) writes:  >Hell, just set up a spark jammer, or some other _very_ electrically-noisy >device. Or build an active Farrady cage around the room, with a "noise" >signal piped into it. While these measures will not totally mask the >emissions of your equipment, they will provide sufficient interference to >make remote monitoring a chancy proposition, at best. There is, of course, >the consideration that these measures may (and almost cretainly will) >cause a certain amount of interference in your own systems. It's a matter >of balancing security versus convenience.  The problem is that this will also cause  "a certain amount of interference" in *all* systems within the range of the device.  A long time ago I built a small jammer to dissuade my brother from using his radio alarm clock at  something like 4am, which had just enough range to cover my room and his. However something powerful enough to mask all (or at least most) emissions from your computer equipment is also going to knock out half your neighbourhoods radio and TV reception.  This isn't going to make you many friends.  Incidentally, an older-model TRS80 makes a fine wideband jammer <grin>  Peter.
In article <1qn1ic$hp6@access.digex.net> pcw@access.digex.com (Peter Wayner) writes: >Okay, let's suppose that the NSA/NIST/Mykotronix Registered >Key system becomes standard and I'm able to buy such a system >from my local radio shack. Every phone comes with a built in >chip and the government has the key to every phone call.  >I go and buy a phone and dutifully register the key.  > >What's to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or  >buying a used phone at a garage sale? Whooa. The secret registered >keys just became unsynchronized. When the government comes
Though some may argue about the nose of the camel, it's worth noting that the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony. If it is only used for that purpose, and does not extend to electronic mail or file encryption, then it IS an improvement over the current mass-produced standard civilian technology which, with a few exceptions, is limited to easy-to-break inverters.  Note that the big issue for the feds is the continued ability to wiretap. Before we go off the deep end with long discusions about secure crypto for e-mail and files, let's focus on this.  One question that was not asked in the release is whether this proposal is limited to telephony, or if the government intends to expand it.  Though I share many of the concerns expressed by some, I find the proposal less threatening than many others, since right now most Americans have no secure telephony, and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a "goat" can eavesdrop. This would also plug up the security hole in cellular and cordless phones.  -------  Reading between the lines, I infer that the system is highly secure without access to the keys. This would meet the needs of U.S. businesses confronted by rich and powerful adversaries, including French and Japanese security services and rich Japanese companies. It allows the NSA to make available some of its better stuff while protecting law enforcement needs.  Most legitimate U.S. corporations trust the NSA, and would be delighted to have a high-security system certified by them, even at the price of depositing keys in escrow. I see no difficulty in creating a reliable escrow. Corporations entrust their secrets to attorneys every day of the week, and that system has worked pretty well.  From my point of view this is a fair starting point. There are concerns that need to be addressed, including the reliability of the escrows. But in return we get access to high-security crypto. Many have suggested that DES and other systems may be breakable by the NSA and hence others similarly skilled and endowed. There is at least a good possibility (which should be checked) that the proposed system is not so breakable. It doesn't have to be, nor does it have to have trapdoors, if the government can get the keys pursuant to a legitimate court order. Thus they can protect legitimate communications against economic adversaries, while still being able to eavesdrop on crooks pursuant to a court order.  ------  In discussing this, let's try to avoid the nastiness, personal attacks and noise of some previous threads. This is a substantive and technical issue, and personal remarks have no place in such a discussion.
In article <1993Apr20.213718.23129@husc3.harvard.edu>, kubo@zariski.harvard.edu (Tal Kubo) writes:   > Having mentioned the possible dangers of unwelcome political associations, > I would be remiss not to suggest something in the opposite direction: > gathering the support of the NRA by emphasizing the RKBA side of the > issue as well as the First-Amendment side. >  > Tal  kubo@math.harvard.edu >  >  Hmmm, this gave me an interesting idea.  How about this argument:  1)  Second Amendment gives us the right to keep and bear arms.  2)  Strong cryptography is "arms", according to the U.S. government (that's     why it's so hard to export).  Therefore, we have a constituitional right to strong cryptography!   Q.E.D.  However, it's likely to be as hard or harder to exercise this right as it is getting to exercise the other rights that the government is slowly restricting.  Maybe the NRA _would_ be the best existing organization? (Although I think a new one might be better, but perhaps would take too long to start up.  I would certainly join.)
In <1993Apr20.182038.12009@ee.eng.ohio-state.edu> butzerd@maumee.eng.ohio-state.edu (Dane C. Butzer) writes:  >What are the typical sizes for keys for commercial secret key algorithms? >I know DES is 56 bits ("tripple DES" is 112 bits) and IDEA is 128 bits.  Is >there anything made in the US that has 128 bit keys?  Anything anywhere >that has larger keys?  I've heard that RC2 can be scaled to arbitrarily >large keys, but is this actually implemented anywhere?  My MDC cipher (which uses any one-way hash function as a CFB-mode stream cipher, the current implementation uses MD5) uses a key of up to 2048 bits (that is, you can use a 1-bit key if you want and copy it over the entire 2048-bit range, or you can use the entire 2048 bits).  Runtime is independant of key size, the system runs slightly slower than MD5 itself. I presume RC2 and RC4 use a similar system (or possibly they just hash an arbitrary-length key down to n bits, maybe 128, using something like MD5).
erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:  >Anyone interested in adopting British Telecom's quantum encryption scheme? >They've demonstrated it over a 10 km link. It automatically detects >wiretapping.  Can you tell us more?
In article <C62D8r.C7p@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >In article <1rf04s$jqu@sol.TIS.COM> mjr@tis.com (Marcus J Ranum) writes: >:	I'd really like to see such a thing developed so that interactive >:internet talk radio could be done. Ideally, though, it should be a general >:purpose device. It should be a general purpose enough device that nobody >:should be able to balk at its widespread use. Obviously, to make it easy >:for homebrewers, it should use pretty common hardware. > >I suggest we start with the ubiquitous Sun, to get a lot of momentum >going.  Custom hardware isn't going to go anywhere until there's a >user base.       Why don't we move down even further toward the masses by setting this up on an IBM PC clone(probably needs to be a 386 or a 486) with a  sound blaster and a V.32bis modem.  Those components are very widely available.  I don't know if the PC has enough horsepower to encrypt the data at realtime, but the sound blaster has 4 to 1 hardware compression and will work at any sampling rate from 4KHz to 23 KHz.  Doug Holland