waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes: > They have a much better reason to classify the algorithm than to  > protect its security.  They want to protect its market share.   That's one way to put it.  Keeping the algorithm classified means that  disclosure of it falls under the rubric of "national security."  Nothing like  federal marshalls to guard a monopoly...  > The result is tappable  > cryptography without laws forbidding other kinds, for 99% of the  > populace.   Agreed, although this is still somewhat better than the status quo :).  > To get untappable crypto, you would have to build a special phone that  > runs on top of this system, and everybody you talk to would have to  > have an indentical one.   Sounds like a job for the Free Software Foundation :)/2...
In article <C5qy3M.DE3@agora.rain.com>, jhart@agora.rain.com (Jim Hart) writes: > Since the wiretap chip is being distributed internationally, > allowing the U.S. government to spy on foreign governments, > companies and people as as well as to wiretap domestic citizens, > this is a world-wide issue.  Please put DISTRIBUTION: WORLD on the  > Distrubution: line.  Thank you.  No!  Distribution keywords are case sensitive.  What you want is  	Distribution: world  or no Distribution line at all.  "WORLD" in capital letters is wrong.
In <1rmrm4$jvb@sol.TIS.COM> mjr@tis.com (Marcus J Ranum) writes:  >[about scanning clipper and reverse-engineering the algorithm] >>Am I missing something obvious here? What could have the government done >>to address this possibility? Do they really care if it stays classified?  >	Yeah, you're missing the obvious fact that since the algorithm >is classified, if you reverse engineer it from the chip, and later >publish it, or build a compatible chip, you're divulging classified >information and are in a big load of trouble.  I don't think they can do that without changing the law.  The chip itself isn't classified, and reverse engineering is allowed by law (possibly) unless prohibited by a valid contract.  The algorithm may be classified, but there are many court cases ruling that information identical to classfied information, but obtained from unclassified sources, is freely publishable (with the possible exception of nuclear weapon information.)
In article <1qv83m$5i2@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu> mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy) writes: >	I set up a bbs that uses public-key encryption and encryption of >	files on disk.  The general setup is designed so that when users  >	connect they send a private key encrypted using the system public >	key and the user's public-private keypair is used to wrap the >	one-time session keys used for encrypting the files on disk.  The >	result of this is that even if I reveal the system private key it >	is impossible for anyone to gain access to the files stored on the >	machine.  What is possible is for someone to use the revealed >	system private key to entice users into revealing thier personal >	private keys during the authentication sequence. > >Any answers or general musings on the subject would be appreciated... >  Just a question.  As a provider of a public BBS service - aren't you bound by law to gurantee intelligble access to the data of the users on the BBS, if police comes with sufficent authorisation ? I guessed this would be  a basic condition for such systems. (I did run a bbs some time ago, but that was in Switzerland)  Friendly greetings, 	Germano Caronni
In article <01050810.vuumdq@mbeckman.mbeckman.com>,  mbeckman@mbeckman.mbeckman.com (Mel Beckman) writes: >  > Unfortunately, Hoover thought himself above the constitution, whatever he > considered the limits others should obey. He ruthlessly invaded the privacy > of many private and public citizens.  >  >   -mel  In 1967, when I was a grad student at UW in Seattle I had a chance to  read Hoover's book "Masters of Deceit", and I quote a sentence (from  memory):  "and beware my fellow Americans, a communist may look just as an  ordinary person..."  I went to the mirror and it was true.  --  Borut B. Lavrencic, D.Sc.     | X.400   :C=si;A=mail;P=ac;O=ijs;S=lavrencic J. Stefan Institute           | Internet:Borut.B.Lavrencic@ijs.si University of Ljubljana,      | Phone   :+ 386 1 159 199 SI-61111 Ljubljana, Slovenia  |	    PGP Public Key available on request
>I don't like the unit key generation process any better than you do. >However -- S1 and S2 are supposed to be under control of the same >escrow agents.  If they can't be trusted to keep the seed values secure, >they can't be trusted to keep the half-keys secure.  I hope there is something I don't understand about this system, but can someone tell me how these chips are going to be manufactured while maintaining each half key under total control of the separate escrow agencies? Don't both halfs of the key have to come together (in some form) at the time the chip is constructed?  Or is it built like a fusable prom, with the chip being sent to the 1st escrow agency to program its 1/2 key, then the 2nd agency to program its 1/2 key (but who invents the safeguards that prevent the 2nd agency from reading the information already programmed by the 1st)?  This isn't intended to be a flame or anything, I am just really curious how to manufacture these things while still maintaining the key escrow security without simply saying "trust the manufacturer, they won't look".
geoff@ficus.cs.ucla.edu (Geoffrey Kuenning) writes:  >It always amazes me how quick people are to blame whatever >administration is current for things they couldn't possibly have >initiated.  This chip had to take *years* to develop, yet already >we're claiming that the Clinton administration sneaked it in on us.      No kidding.  The most recent post I saw in alt.privacy.clipper (and I hope anyone interested in this topic ends up there) states that Clipper has been in development for over four years.      I am, however, more than a little PO'd that Clinton put his name on this monstrosity, or even allowed it to get out the door, for that matter. He's already heard from me, and I hope you'll all take the time to voice your extreme displeasure as well.
In article <116530@bu.edu> uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt) writes: > >The point remains.  More and more I see the government slowly washing >away privacy.  Even unwittingly.  Do you think I will ever live in a >soceity that issues smart cards to citizens at birth?  Do you think I >will live in a soceity that insists I register my crypto keys so they >can keep track of what I'm saying?  Even if there is no evidence of my >guilt?  Do you think I will ever live in a soceity that seeks to meddle >in the affairs of its' citizenry without recourse of any kind?  I'm tired >of it.  There is (IMHO) no compromise with an administration that seeks >to implement these proposals under the guise of enhancing privacy. > >More than the proposals themselves, I read the language of the press >releases, the obvious deception involved in presenting these pieces to >the public, and I am sickened.  I am revolted.  I am repulsed. > >90%, perhaps even 95% of this country could care less about the >clipper chip, the wiretap bill, the smart card, because they are so >entrapped in the rhetoric of the Clinton Administration. > >This saddens and frightens me. > >I am a conserveative believe it or not.  A law and order conserveative. >But the move to a centralized authoratarian regime really scares me, >mostly because I know you cant go far wrong underestimating the >intelligence of the American people.  Tell them it's going to keep >them safe from drug dealers and terrorists, and they will let you >put cameras in their home. > >Even in the wake of Waco, you find those who support the increasingly >totalatarian moves. > >To be quite honest, the way things are going, I'd call it self defense. > >And I dont want mine growning up in the eyes of a security camera >24 hours a day.  I never advocated not saying what you believe in.  I'm advocating second thought, and calm.    "A smart warrior defeats the enemy in ambush on the battlefield" "A smarter warrior defeats the enemy in open warfare on the battlefield" "The smartest warrior defeats the enemy without using the battlefield"  Think about it.     >--  >uni@acs.bu.edu  ->  Public Keys by finger and/or request >Public Key Archives: <pgp-public-keys@pgp.iastate.edu>  >Sovereignty is the sign of a brutal past.<>Fight Clinton's Wiretap Chip! >DF610670F2467B99 97DE2B5C3749148C <> Crypto is not a Crime! Ask me how!
Perry E. Metzger (pmetzger@snark.shearson.com) wrote: ... : We would like to keep it that way. Thats the point. By reacting : strongly and forcefully now, we will assure that we continue to remain : free. You cannot overreact to a threat like this. The worst that : happens if we overreact is that we waste time and effort. The worst that : happens if we underreact is tyranny. I prefer overreaction myself. .... : Only through centuries of overreaction have we managed to maintain : ourselves in this state of even moderate freedom. I suggest that : overreacting now and in the future is a good thing.  Perry is right on target here. Careful analysis of the Clipper Chip announcement reveals that is *not* likely to remain "voluntary" for very long...the cost of the system, the cost of generating and _then storing_ the escrow keys, and the admitted security holes pretty much make the ClipperPhone a loser.  Strong crypto will outcompete it, if strong crypto is allowed. This is the battle we face.  We had rumblings of this totalitarian key registration thing a while back, and now the other shoe has dropped. The firestorm of commentary and criticism this time around reveals the almost immediate revulsion this Wiretap Chip (and automatic Caller ID and Callee ID, don't forget!) generates in everyone, or almost everyone, who hears about it.  This is a battle we can't afford to lose.   -Tim May
In article <1993Apr17.090731.18680@clarinet.com> (sci.crypt), brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes: > Interestingly enough, in designing the escrow, we may want to use some > rather unusual technology, such as sealed boxes of paper, or > destructive read memory, rather than typical computer databases, which > is fun for a database of hundreds of millions of keys. >   To me, a larger problem is that once disclosed, your keys could be used to decrypt any previously recorded conversations. I gather that from this proposal a warrant would be required to get the keys, but not to collect conversations! Consider the scenario where an agency collects preemptively all encrypted conversations for certain people likely to be targets (and not necessarily "legitimate" targets), then arranges for some unrelated incident that can trigger a warrant:     "Your honor, we know that the suspect has received calls from noted  crime figure Bugsy Butthead [said calls arranged by the agency] and we must  therefore have this warrant to determine whether this suspect, in a sensitive govt post, is corrupt."    I suppose that it is conceivable that there are session keys involved somewhere, but that doesn't seem likely; if there are, why wouldn't the technical overview mention them when it goes to such details as the number of bits held by each escrow authority?    This scheme is full of holes, and stinks to high heaven.    -mel
In article <1r1r3nINNebn@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >In article <C5so84.Hxv@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: >>Actually, I am *completely* baffled by why Dorothy Denning has chosen >>to throw away her academic respectability like this.  >	Actually, I've been following her remarks for some time, with >interest. I'm also a member of academia, and her remarks have nothing >but elevate her respectability in my eyes. It remains to be seen whether >you are the radical fringe, or I.  >	It is generally an error to assume that your beliefs are held by >the majority, or even a sizable minority. Especially when you're seeing >tens, nay dozens, of people on usenet agreeing with you.  The people on usenet are clearly a special bunch.  We live the net, which is the future of our culture.  Usenetters have rapid electronic access to information.  Society in general must depend on CNN.    I can only hope we can make this information accessable by the public before the radical fringe, which _is_ the majority, destroys the fabric of this country.  Freedom is never easily won.
In article <ELEE9SF.93Apr21095141@menudo.menudo.UH.EDU> elee9sf@menudo.menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus) writes:  > >Would you trust a black-box from the NSA versus an "open system" from >elsewhere?  Absolutely, if I were assured by someone I trusted that the black box was more secure. I have nothing to conceal from the government, but I would like to be sure that any Russian, Japanese, French, or other competitors for my services can't read my traffic. I'd like to be sure that competitive bid information was safe from commercial competitors and foreign governments which would aid them.  I believe the NSA has identical motivations with respect to my activities. The President and many other senior government officials have made it very clear that they share these motivations. Thus I'd trust them on the "coincidence of interests" argument as well as on a basic trust in their professionalism and a high confidence in their skills.  David
rsilvers@nynexst.com (Robert Silvers) writes: |>>	Send something to Rush Linbaugh about Clinton taking away our right |>>to privacy and how if the govt. standard takes off, only people with lots |>>of money (drug dealers) will be able to justify DES stuff.  He will slam |>>Clinton for this on the air.  He'll slam Clinton for anything at all on the air.  I just do not understand why he remains so popular.  He'll take a piece of video of Clinton walking along; find a frame in which Clinton wrinkles his nose, say; freeze on it and blow it up full screen; and then rant for five minutes on how no one could possibly trust someone with such a face and such beady greedy little eyes.  I've seen this on his TV show (it was around the time of the inauguration).  Can anyone call this stuff legitimate (I hate to say "informed") commentary?  How can anyone with half a brain in his or her head[1] continue to watch it[2]?  The American TV-watching (and I guess radio-listening) public never ceases to amaze me.  	/J  [1] Oops, have I just inadvertently answered my own question?  [2] I myself only see it when I run across it every couple months when     channel-surfing late at night; the longest I've been able to stand     him was about 10 minutes.  (Apologies for stripping the alt.fan.rush groups from the Newsgroups line; the software here apparently rejects anything with groups we don't carry, and we don't carry those.  Also I removed sci.crypt from followups.)
In article <C5LGAz.250@dove.nist.gov> clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) writes:  >PROCUREMENT AND USE OF ENCRYPTION DEVICES  [ ... ]  >The Attorney General will procure and utilize encryption devices to >the extent needed to preserve the government's ability to conduct >lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure >law enforcement communications.  Further, the Attorney General >shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture >Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase.   Talk about adding insult to injury ...   I, for one, believe that the use of civil forfeiture should be abolished by a decent administration, not continued.  Instead, it looks like that ill-gotten gain will be used to help pay for wiretap equipment.
I am aware of the restrictions imposed by the munitions act on the export of cryptographic technology, however, is it illegal to transmit encrypted data from the U.S. to another country?  If so, then which laws apply to this situation?
In article <1qovj8$74m@ni.umd.edu> louie@sayshell.umd.edu (Louis A. Mamakos) writes:     In article <tcmayC5M2xv.JEx@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:     >But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much    >worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper"    >to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main    >concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)     Excuse me?  This has *already* happened.  There's a couple of humps in    the tent already.  Ask the folks at Qualcomm what became of the    non-trivial encryption scheme they proposed for use in their CDMA    digitial cellular phone standard?  There *already* are restrictions in    place.  You have it slightly wrong. They dumped the encryption system because they could not export it -- not because they could not produce it for U.S. use. There are no legal restraints on citizen use of strong cryptography -- yet. -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
I don't think mr. Clinton can even understand the technical details of 	the clipper encryption scheme. So, his "assurances" are of no value at 	al, if he gives them he just says what a panel of experts(?) told him. 	If I lived in the USA, I would hope those experts were not paid by the 	<fill here you favorite 3-letter combination>.  "The doctrine of plausible deniability".  No-one is going to tell him it has a back door.  The NSA will assume he has the sense to work it out for himself or they wouldn't be pushing it.  Clinton might even *believe* the NSA when they tell him, for the record, it doesn't have a back door.  And no FOIA request in the world will ever find it.  These guys don't play by that set of rules.  They have their own rule book, and no, you're not allowed to see that either.
Victor Iseli (victori@xetron.com) wrote: :  :  : "Numerical Recipes in C"..Fortran..Pascal  has a nice section on : encryption and decryption based on the DES algorithm.  There is : also source code provided (I think some versions of this book are  : distributed with the source code on disk; the source code can : also be ordered from the publisher). :  : --Victor Iseli : victori@xetron.com  Yes I benchmarked the DES implementation in the Recipes in C book.. it is about 1 1/2 orders of magnitude SLOWER than the Outerbridge/Karn/Gillogly/et al implementation.  It may be instructional, but it isn't very fast.
In article <7020.Apr2207.05.3993@silverton.berkeley.edu>, djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein) writes: > In article <1993Apr21.132318.16981@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: > > And key size is one of the things that can be > > verified externally. >  > Gee. Say they feed the 80-bit key through Snefru-8 and take the first 60 > bits of the result, then use those 60 bits as the real key. How do you > figure out that each key is one of 2^20 ``equal'' keys? You can try a > birthday attack, but if the key can be changed only once a second then > you will need several lifetimes to get reliable statistics.
Danny Weitzner <djw@eff.org> writes:      >April 16, 1993  >INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROPOSAL  >DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:  >ESCROW  >The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of whom >hold 40-bits of each key.  The manufacturer of the communications device >would be required to register all keys with the two independent escrow >agents.  A key is tied to the device, however, not the person using it.  So if we subvert one of the two escrow agents, we only have a 40-bit space to search through...  2^40 doesn't sound that big - is digital telephony subject to a known plaintext attack?  In which case half the key seems to be all that is needed, and the two agent escrow arrangement is pointless.   Of course, the unknown algorithm might turn gaps in speech into  pseudo-random sequences, or there might be some magic involved, or...
In article <1r24us$oeh@agate.berkeley.edu>, shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff) writes: > Imagine archiving all pay-phone conversations, so if someone turns out > to be a drug dealer, you can listen to all their past drug deals.  And > archive calls to/from suspected Mafia members, potential terrorists, > radicals, etc.  Imagine the convenience for the police of being able to > get a warrant now and listening to all the calls the World Trade Center > bombers made in the past year. >  > Since archiving would be such a powerful tool and so easy to do, why > wouldn't it happen?
Does anyone know of a non-word password generator program for PC's?? i.e. it will produce a nonsense word but still be pronouncible. e.g. lisgollan  Wanted to "force" users to adopt more secure passwords, but still be memorable!  Thanks - George Bolt
In article <1raeir$be1@access.digex.net> steve-b@access.digex.com (Steve Brinich) writes: > >  Well, actually, this one's easy. It's their job. The NSA is > >supposed to develop cryptosystems. If the government chooses to go > >ahead and sell those cryptosystems to the masses, so be it. > >  Ah, but developing cryptosystems which are specificially designed to >protect the government's domestic spying capabilities takes them beyond >that mandate, into the forbidden field of domestic wiretapping. >  But the NSA will not be doing any wiretapping.  The actual wiretapping will, presumably, be conducted by the FBI.  Of course, the capability for this was provided by the NSA, but I think that they are still within the limitations of their charter.  I realize this is a fine point, and some may differ, but this is my opinion. Although I don't care for Clipper and won't support or use it, I don't see the NSA as having overstepped their bounds.  David R. Conrad		"No his mind is not for rent/To any god or government"
In article <1993Apr21.163929.21149@eff.org> A. Charles Gross <acg@eff.org> writes: >The NRA is successful because (among a number of things), on the drop of >a hat, they can get a congresspersons office flooded with postcards, >faxes and phone calls.  Certainly, with our way-cool Internet powers of >organization, we can act in the same way, if such action is appropriate.  I don't know about you, but I have nearly forgotten how to generate paper mail.  If I had e-mail to Congress, I would have written many letters by now. I haven't written one yet, as it turns out.  Writing on paper is such a complicated job, for those of us hooked on our way-cool Internet.
nobody seems to have noticed that the clipper chip *must* have been under development for considerably longer than the 3 months that clinton has been president.  this is not something that choosing choosing bush over clinton would have changed in the slightest; it has been in the works for some time.