In article <C5sy1z.4tD@demon.co.uk>, Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: > In article <1993Apr20.192105.11751@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: > :Thousands?  Tens of thousands?  Do some arithmetic, please...  Skipjack > :has 2^80 possible keys. >  > We don't yet know if all 80 bits count.  That doesn't worry me at all; they're not going to cheat at something they can get caught at.  And key size is one of the things that can be verified externally.  Feed lots of random key/input pairs into the chip, then try flipping random key bits, and see what happens to the output.  We already know what *should* happen -- about half the output bits should vary, on average, from a 1-bit key change or input change.  If they were out to build a weak cryptosystem, it might be the case that some of the bits are much less powerful than others, in the sense that they only enter into the encryption very late in the game.  By contrast, DES was designed to use each key bit as early as possible; the 50% output change rate appears as early as round 5.  Again, though, I don't think NSA is going to cheat that crudely; they're likely to get caught.  Remember that they've promised to let a committee of outside experts see the cryptosystem design.  If you assume something DES-like, a biased subkey generation schedule will stick out like a sore thumb.  The committee can and should run lots of tests, and retain the output.  This can be verified later against the chip.  And yes, the civilian community has at least some secure storage facilities that I don't think even NSA can get into without it being noticed, until Fort Meade gets its transporter working again. (Oops -- I don't think I was supposed to talk about that...)  The committee members can even retain secure copies of the code -- in two halves, which you have to XOR together to recover the program...  Seriously, there are, I think, problems with this whole scheme.  But the people who invented it aren't stupid, and they've been in the crypto game and the smoke-and-mirrors game far longer than most of us.  They're not going to lie in ways that can be detected easily, since their credibility is the *only* thing they can use to sell this system.  If they've lied about the civilian committee, no one will believe them about the absence of other back doors.  If they've lied about the key size, no one will believe that they haven't copied the programming disk with the U keys. If they've lied about obvious aspects of the strength of the cryptosystem, no one will believe the escrow agencies aren't in cahoots with them.  That isn't to say that they aren't lying about all those other things anyway.  And I'm certainly not claiming that NSA can't build a cryptosystem with a back door that the committee can't find -- look how long it took for folks to believe that the S-boxes weren't sabotaged.  It's entirely possible that the committee will release an ambiguous report, for just such reasons.  But that's a subtle point (i.e., one you can't explain to a Senator...).  > Anyway, its looking like the > keys and escrow arrangements are smoke and mirrors to cover the way the NSA > can regenerate the key from the transmitted serial number.  I don't like the unit key generation process any better than you do. However -- S1 and S2 are supposed to be under control of the same escrow agents.  If they can't be trusted to keep the seed values secure, they can't be trusted to keep the half-keys secure.  I still don't know if or when S1 and S2 change.  I thought I had seen something about them being constant, but I just reread Denning's technical information post, and it doesn't say anything, one way or the other.