In article <C5n4wH.Izv@dscomsa.desy.de> hallam@dscomsa.desy.de (Phill Hallam-Baker) writes: > >In article <1993Apr15.213436.1164@martha.utcc.utk.edu>, PA146008@utkvm1.utk.edu (David Veal) writes: > >|>In article <C5JpL7.5Cz@dscomsa.desy.de> hallam@dscomsa.desy.de (Phill Hallam-Baker) writes: >|>> >|>>In article <1993Apr12.002302.5262@martha.utcc.utk.edu>, PA146008@utkvm1.utk.edu (David Veal) writes: >|>> >|>>Well yes and no. The Federalist papers are propaganda and it is therefore >|>>difficult to determine precisely what Maddison etc were up to from them.  >|> >|>       There are a couple of ways to look at them.  One is, "We want >|>you to support this Constitution, so we'll say anything that we think >|>will appeal to you," or the more straightforward, "This is why we think >|>what we've suggested in this Constitution is a good idea." >|> >|>       You clearly consider the former to be the primary situation. > >The point is that they did not make pains to point out where the consitution >may have been aginst the new yorker's interests. Also they did not want >to raise opposition by basing their advocacy on unpopular principles.         Horrors, appealing to popular principles.  Can we perhaps as the question of whether the Constitution might have been written to appeal to the principles, rather than, as you appear to believe, it was written with something else in mind and "propoganda" put out by its supporters.         But let's be honest about something, here.  When was the last time you brought up all the valid points against your own arguments?         Or are they simply propogranda?  We can't know what Phill *really* means because he's obviously using arguments designed to convince.  >|>       Well, I know Hamilton was a dyed in the wool monarchist, and  >|>probably the authoritarian extreme to Jefferson's democratic impules. >|>But what would you suggest as a means of determining their opinions >|>on the government if we don't consider what they wrote about the >|>government? > >I don't propose that any means exists for determining their true opinions. >Thus their true opinions died with them and are of little help today. > >Their opinions have not the slightest bearing on the matter though, only their >arguments. These are true or false regardless of who said them or why.          If they're true or false, regardles of why they were said, why on earth did you make a point of calling them "propogranda?"  That would seem to be irrelevent.  >The >difficulty that most US posters seem to have is in considering that their >arguments may have been flawed or no longer apply to modern societies.          Oh, I have no argument with questioning them.  I don't believe they no longer apply, but that's because I think most of them were good arguments.  I'm not entirely happy about the situation, because they were obviously only applied to a minority of the time, but I don't think that alone is sufficient to invalidate them.  >If they were alive today the one opinion we could count upon these men to >express is that a careful study of the mechanisms of government is necessary >and that an ongoing improvement of the same is required. They gave their  >opinions in certain areas and have been proved right. In other areas they >got it wrong. They ensured that there was a mechanism to adapt and improve >the consititution. this can only happen if there is a willingness to accept that >the structural problems within the US political system may require >constitutional change as a solution.          Since the U.S. constitution is the basis for the U.S. political system, most changes in it would require Constitutional change.  In this particular case, however the fillibuster is a matter of procedure and tradition.  It only *should* have been made part of the Constitution. :-)  >|>       If the Senate was less powerful than the House of Lords, than >|>we'd almost have to state that the House of Representatives was also. >|>(In fact, they both were, because the British government had much >|>greater power than did the American system).        > >In principle no, in practice yes.           In principle no?  That they had less power of that they should have had less power?  >The British government today is theoreticaly >dependent on the will of the Monarch. By convention any monarch seeking to >exercise that power is deposed. The subtly is that the Prime Minister is >not able to identify their politics with the national interest in the same >manner that US Presidents regularly do.          Phill, we're discusing the power of legislative houses.  While the Prime Minister *is* member of Parliament, he is more analgous (although badly) to the U.S. President.          Now, please explain to me how the U.S. House of Representatives is "in principle" more powerful than the House of Lords (or the Senate) but in practice is less.  Are you suggesting that the writers of the Constitution *really* intended for them to be more powerful, but gosh darn the thing was ratified before they realized they'd forgotten to put those extra restrictions on the Senate in?  >|>       I disagree.  The system is not too slow, it was simply designed to >|>handle less than it has demanded that it handle.  As somebody in Washington >|>put it (whose name I forget), "Congress has become everybody's city >|>council." > >One reason for that is that at every level the government is rendered unable >to come to decisions. These decisions are pushed up to the next higher level >instead.         Not at all.  As any entry level political science course will tell you, people who want laws implemented will always choose the level of government to "attack" which presents them with the best chance of getting what they want.  With national "interest groups" it is simply a very rational thing to do to want the Federal government to enact a law rather than the states.  Less people to persuade, and less  "contributions" to make.          Why do those concerned about abortion primarily concentrate at the Federal level?  Simply because if they win that battle all the little state battlefields are won by extension.  The same extends to insurance, medicine, and most other questions.        Local government has not "failed" in that it hasn't done what it should, but that it is dominated by local interests.  Thus non-local interests who want localities to abide by their rules can't get their rules past the local government.  Thus, since they've got more clout, only in the wrong place, they appeal to the next higher level because it can impose its will on the lower.        I mean, let's get real here.  Do we *really* need the Congres of the United States deciding that x traffice light should be on thus- and such pattern?  Or that *carjacking* needs to be a federal as opposed to a local crime?        The more people want the more Congress will take power to "sell" it to them for their votes.  I don't think the rise of "special interests" is coincidence with the increased power of Congress.  >|>       Congress is more than capable of quick action, and has more than >|>enough power and time on its hands, if it confined itself to what its >|>original jurisidiction was and allowed more local autonomy. > >If they were to start from a social welfare model instead of the current  >"no state subsidy motto" they would be better placed. As it is there is >plenty of state money being handed out. The problem is that it is >distributed on the basis of power in congress and not on the basis of >actual need.          Bingo.  The higher up the governmental ladder the less actual need matters, because political power can be concentrated at higher levels, while people with less cloud only find themselves reduced to in effectiveness.  >In order to set up a school project in New York state you have to pay off the >other 49 states with pork - defense contracts, agricultural subsidies etc. >Or to be precise 30 of the states since you need 60 to beat the filibuster.         Then why not simply leave New York's education to New York?  I remain unconcinved that there is any state in the Union which is not capable of educating its own children if that's what they want to do.  And if you leave it to them, you only have to worry about the "pork" in that state.  And since industries can't concentrate their political power and wealth, rather they must divide it among the states to try and get what they want, individual voices have more relative impact.         The problem with the fillibuster is not that you must "buy off" states, but that the Congress has acquired too much power to sell pork.  >|>       It is not a case of the system of government they created failing, >|>but that it is operating under a set of conditions they specifically >|>wanted to avoid.  Namely, a concentration of power.  It would seem >|>then that the proper thing to do is not to reduce the power of either >|>House in some attempt to grease the wheels.  All you'll get then is >|>a system which moves quicker to do stupid things.  It would make more >|>sense to make more decisions at a local level. > >No, you have to break the machine free of seizure before you can redirect it.         But why on earth should we want to redirect it?  You said yourself  that you have to sell pork to get things through Congress.  If Congres has less authority to sell pork and retains its authority to enact national legislation within its granted jurisdiction, the pork problem is significantly reduced.  >The current blocks on power simply absolve congress of any responsibility >to come to a decision.          The current blocks essentially state that inaction is preferable to action, thus it the system is weighted against action.  Considering the government the usually the institution with the sole power to enforce its decisions by force, I consider bias against making those decisions a good thing.  >Pushing the decisions lower in the pyramid won't >work unless the lower levels are less corrupt. In most cases they are worse, >not better.         The difference with the lower pyramid is that a) they have more legal, legitimate authority in most matters under our Constitution than the federal government, and b) at those lower levels power is harder to concentrate.  And c) you get the benefit of not imposing new deicisons on everybody at once.  You get to see them tried out without a national decision.  Congressional action usually treats the entire country as a whole, yet even with similar problems in different areas, different solutions may be called for.         And while I often don't agree with the decisions my local and state reps make, at least I have a better option of going to the city council and shooting my mouth off.  I'd much rather the majority of laws be made by accessible people who hang around and end up having to put up with them rather than somebody far off in Washington with half a million or more constituents.         I'm curious what you base your assumption that lower levels are more corrupt.    >|>       I fail to see where any restrictions, implied or otherwise, were >|>placed on the veto.  It could just as easily have been read as a means >|>to put a check on democratically popular but unwise (in the executive's >|>opinion) policies.   > >Since we were arguing from the Federalist papers I would point to them.          Phill, *you* brought up the Federalist papers.  We were arguing the fillibuster and whether or not a minority of Senators should be allowed to hold up a bill.  You claimed the Senate was suppose to be a far less powerful House, and I contended there was nothing in the Constitution or other writings which indicated this. Which was when you brought up that we can't decide what the founders wanted based on the Federalist papers.  You argued against them, I never argued from them.  I have primarily referred to the Constitution, which places only very small restrictions on the Senate than for the House.  >The  >US constitution gives almost no reasoning as to how it should work. The >only part where a reason is given is the right to bear arms ammendment where  >the well regulated militia justification is ambiguous.         The U.S. Constitution is a nuts-and-bolts document.  The Delcaration of Independence was the high-brow reasoning.  (There are a couple of other examples, though, such as the reasoning for the power to tax, and the reasoning for the power to grant permits, both in Article I, Section 8.)  >That the veto was meant to be an exceptional measure follows from the  >fact of the senate. If the President was meant to revise legislation then >there would be three chambers of the legislature, not two. Furthermore >the separation of powers would have been much less distinct.          To a certain extend I do believe the veto has become something it wasn't intended.  However, I also believe it is inevitable considering the Congress' own abuse of their power to make bills say whatever they want them to say.  Unlike most people I think we shouldn't be worrying about the veto, which is fine, but of the problem in Congress which almost necessitates its abuse.  >|>       There is no limit in the Constitution to the President's veto power >|>regarding what a bill is for.  Previous Presidents have used the veto >|>for any number of reasons, most usually having something to do with their >|>agenda.  I am really curious how you single Bush out as *the* President >|>who abused vetos. > >He has the record for vetos.          *BUSH?*  Phill, that's absurd.  Bush had *37* vetos, one of which was over-ridden.  Go read up on FDR if you think that's anything resembling a record.  >|>       Why is it not a reasonable restriction?  Because 51 Senators >|>is the magic holy number upon which Laws must be based?  If 41 Senators >|>feel safe enough with their state constituencies to stand up and  >|>fillibuster isn't that *enough* to indicate there's a sufficient question >|>as to whether a law is a good idea or not to re-evaluate it? > >Up to a point, the fact is though that when the majority are opposed by >a minority the minority should not be allowed to win by default.         Why not?  What is inherently wrong with biasing the system against action?  Historically governemnt action in the U.S. when dealing with issues with a bare minority and a large minority have not been successful.  When you're in a position of imposing federal power on diverse people, why should the federal government not have to got through something more than a bare majority  >|>       Why one earth *should* 51% be sufficient to enact a law which >|>covers 250 million people in very, very diverse places and living >|>in radically different conditions?  Why *shouldn't* a super-majority >|>be required? > >Because the bill at issue is a money bill relating to a short term proposal.         Now we're switching from a general question of a fillibuster to a specific bill.  I don't see how it make a difference.  >It is not a change in the law where a presupposition in favour of the  >status quo is arguable.          Sure it's arguable.  Theyr'e *arguing* it.  However, requiring 60% to bring it to a vote ensures that they'll have to have a *good* argument.  Something that isn't based solely on party lines.  >|>       Any system in which the simple majority is given absolute power >|>to ignore the minority then the minority *will* be ignored.  I do not >|>see this as a positive thing.  And for all that I'm sure the Republicans >|>are looking for pork as much as the Democrats, they've got some legitimate >|>objections to the legislation in question. > >So instead you consider a system under which the minority automatically win >to be superior?         No, I am completely happy with a system which requires a minority for *action*.  Since U.S. history is a history of carving up population groups and implementing piece-meal on minorities, I feel minorities should have sufficent clout to prevent action they feel strongly enough about.  And 41% is hardly a tiny minority.  I don't advocate the minority being capable of initiating actionm but I see no problem with biasing the *federal* system against action.