waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <Apr22.185314.14420@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> ns111310@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (Nathaniel Sammons) writes: >1) I think that most of us can afford a stamp and an envelope, and the >cost of printing out a letter. > >2) If some kind soul out there would write a letter, and upload it to  >the net, everyone could capture it, print it out, and snail-mail it >out to their local congressional critter. > >BTW>> I'm working on one.  Dear Senator/Congressman/President {fill in the blank}  I am writing you to voice my strong opposition to President Clinton's Clipper  Chip initiative. This proposal to establish a secret government designed cryptography chip with government key registration as the standard for voice encryption is very disturbing. The idea that citizens must register their  secrets with the government just in case they are trying to keep them secret  is patently unAmerican. Additionally, the press release for this program strongly implied that other forms of cryptography would be banned after the  Clipper Chip standard is in place. This latest attack on our civil rights is  deeply disturbing and is frankly a voting issue for me.   The presidents press release stated that the plan strikes a balance between the legitimate needs of law enforcement and a citizens right to privacy but this  is not the case. The fact is that since other strong cryptographic equipment  is avalible the criminals, drug dealers and terrorists mentioned in the press  release will simply use non clipper cryptography. Meanwhile the average citizen may gain no protection against warentless wiretaps by the government since the  government escrowed key is derived deterministicly from the unit serial number which is broadcast by the chip durring its opperation. This seems like an  obvious back door for the NSA and law enforcement. If you still do nott  understand my objection to key registration, consider the way J. Edgar Hoover  blackmailed government officials like yourself; would you now use a phone to  transmit personal details of your life that the NSA and FBI have the keys to?   ______________________________________________________________________________ Well heres a letter, I didnt spell check it since I dont know how in EMACS so you might want to do that.
In article hcs@transfer.stratus.com, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes: > >To paraphrase, I may not agree with what you're encrypting, but I defend >your right to encrypt it. >  Great slogan!  I'm ready to sign up with a crypto-lobbying effort (though I wouldn't want to do it through an NRA offshoot).  Shall we also push for the CRA  -- Cryptographic Rights Amendment ??
> If the crooks use an innocent person's clipper phone on the tapped line  >there's no problem. The Feds don't care whose phone instrument is used, just  >that the conversation is by the suspect on the tapped line. They get the  >serial number, get the keys, and they are in business.    So, you admit that Clipper opens the doors wide for the following scenario:    FEDS: We need the keys to Joe Blow's phone.    ESCROW AGENT: Joe Blow?  You have a warrant to tap his line?    FEDS: Well, no, but we have a warrant to tap Carlos "Slime-Devil" Gonzales'      line, and our tap shows that Mr. Gonzales is using Mr. Blow's phone.
I think it very unlikely there are back doors in clipper, for two reasons:  1. The government doesn't need them if it can get the key (and yes, I assume that the "official" government obeys court orders, etc.--and that the design of the chip and its approval were "official");  2. It would defeat the whole purpose of providing secure crypto for American business that couldn't be read by our economic adversaries. If this were not a legitimate and genuine purpose, and as many think, the NSA can read DES, why bother otherwise?  Rational responses preferred to conspiracy theories, thanks.  David
The points raised about checking what is actually -in- the chip, as opposed to what is allegedly programmed therein, raise yet another trust issue.  Even if we assume that these "trusted agents" are really entering a wide range of S1 and S2 seeds (rather than using the same one all the time to reduce the key search space to 30 bits), I assume they are not doing so by picking up an iron filing and poking it into the circuitry at carefully selected points to encode data.  They would presumably be punching numbers into a computer, which for all they know could program the chips in a manner completely independent of the S1 and S2 values they are feeding into the system.
I am a PhD student. Can I get the sci.crypt group posted directly to me??? Also I would like some feed-back on the encryption schemes that my research in finite fields can be applied to. Any takers Reply to gamv25@udcf.gla.ac.uk Thanks yours Gavin.
In article <strnlghtC5t3nH.Is1@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >In article <1993Apr20.032623.3046@eff.org> kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie) writes: > > >>So, don't just think of replacements for clipper, also think of front >>ends. > >This only makes sense if the government prohibits alternative non-escrowed >encryption schemes. Otherwise, why not just use the front end without >clipper? 	Because everyone but you expects that making alternative methods of  	encryption illegal is the next step.  Otherwise the Cripple chip is  	utterly worthless.  It should be obvious that  		a) the Cripple Chip is aimed at spying on ordinary citizens 				OR 		b) that other forms of encryption will soon be illegal.
:    I've been thinking about how difficult it would be to make PGP available : in some form on EBCDIC machines.  Don't encourage them.  Let EBCDIC machines die an honorable death :)
In article <1r3hgqINNdaa@uwm.edu> Rick Miller <rick@ee.uwm.edu> writes: >jbotz@mtholyoke.edu (Jurgen Botz) writes: >>Seems like sombody didn't like your snooping around, Marc. > >Or, the more *likely* explanation is that Marc is spoofing.  While I didn't try the expansion personally, I know of at least two other people who did and got the same results.  Your allegation is incorrect at best.
The protocol/key-management description published so far is either 	incomplete or incorrect. It leaves me with no idea of how the system 	would actually _work_. I hope the CPSR FOIA request succeeds so that 	we get full details.  Wouldn't it be easier just to ask denning@cs.georgetown.edu? ;-)
>>>>> On Wed, 28 Apr 1993 04:30:27 GMT, kckluge@eecs.umich.edu (Karl Kluge) said:  KK> (Shaun P. Hughes) writes:  KK>    Newsgroups: sci.crypt KK>    From: sphughes@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Shaun P. Hughes) KK>    Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 07:18:59 GMT   	[..]  KK>       Just a random passing thought, but can anyone cite a documented use KK>    of encryption technology by criminals and terrorists. KK>       (Excluding the Iran-Contra Gang)  KK> Sure, the rum-runners in Prohibition. See Kahn's _The Codebreakers_. KK> The irony was, they were using better codes and key security than KK> most governments were.
In article <C5L12t.GCI@dove.nist.gov> clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) writes:  >Q:   Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on >     a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation... [etc]         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\                             Great... nice choice of bad guys to                             convince everyone how "bad" unrestricted                             encryption is.  Why not use a child                             molester instead?  Of course, the word                             *suspect* is never used here, so I guess                             these people have already been convicted                             and are operating this drug ring from                             their jail cells.  How about *this* question instead?  Q:   Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on      a political opponent of a senior administration official and      intercepts a conversation...  Kinda changes your interpretation of the event, doesn't it?  And yes, the presence of the Clipper Chip DOES change things, because it will not only give the people talking on the phone a false sense of security, it will also give federal law enforcement agencies the justification to deny use of strong encryption methods that are inconvenient to them. Dang it all, it's SUPPOSED to be inconvenient (but not impossible). That's the ONLY sure way to make sure that abuses are minimized while still allowing legitimate law enforcement access.   >Q:   How strong is the security in the device?  How can I be sure >     how strong the security is?   > >A:   This system is more secure than many other voice encryption >     systems readily available today.  While the algorithm will >     remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow >     system, we are willing to invite an independent panel of >     cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all >     potential users that there are no unrecognized >     vulnerabilities.  Uh huh... sure.  I predict that within two months (weeks?) of the chip's debut, the full technical details will be posted to sci.crypt.  And if this has ANY impact on the security of the key escrow system, then we've been lied to.  Any cryptosystem worth its salt can withstand the light of public scrutiny, and there is NO WAY you can be sure that an algorithm has no "unrecognized vulnerabilities" unless you have half the world trying to break it for a decade or so.  Even then, you gotta be careful.
In article <1993Apr17.122651.1874@sugra.uucp> ken@sugra.uucp (Kenneth Ng) writes: >In article <1993Apr16.165423.27204@linus.mitre.org: ptrei@bistromath.mitre.org (Peter Trei) writes: >:Judge: "I grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key >:	itself" >:You:    "The keyphrase is: "I confess to deliberately evading copyright;  >:	the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of  >:        copyrighted Peanuts strips."" >:Judge and CP: "Oh." >:     How will they get you now? I'm not saying that they won't, or >:can't (or even that they shouldn't :-), but what legal mechanism will >:they use? Should we be crossposting this to misc.legal? > >Hm, could another court try you via a bypass of the double jeopardy amendment >like they are doing in the LAPD trial?  Ie your judge is a state judge, and >then a federal judge retries you under the justification that its not the >same trail.      No. The LAPD officers were tried first by the State of California on charges of police brutality, and secondly by the Federal Government on depriving RK of his civil rights - a different crime.      The scenario I outline is more similar to the Oliver North trial. Ollie confessed to treason (aiding an enemy of the US) during Senate hearings, under immunity. The team which was later to prosecute him on criminal charges had to sequester itself from all reports of ON's immunized testimony. ON's lawyer brought up the probability that at least someone on the team had heard about the Senate testimony, and it was a strong factor against the prosecution, which is one of the reasons this ON is still walking around free today.
In article <1993Apr2.050451.7866@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> cuffell@spot.Colorado.EDU (Tim Cuffel) writes: >How about this.  I create a bunch of sets of random data, and encrypt it.  I  >keep only one of the sets of random data around, to show that I encypt random >data for kicks.  The rest, I delete with their keys.  I tell all my friends. >I think this establishes reasonable doubt about the contents of any encrypted >files, and my ability to provides keys.  Since anyone could do this, any law >that forces a user to provide keys on demand is worthless.  The law is much worse than worthless.  It gives police the power to put innocent people in jail because they (the police) find something they don't understand.  Most police don't know what the return key does, never mind the difference between a core file and classified military secrets.  There are plenty of scenarios where the user would have no idea what something is either.  It could be uninitialized junk.  The burden of proof is on the user to show that it's something a normal upstanding citizen should have.  No one should ever be put in that situation, especially in America.  What's disgusting about this is how easily most people go along with it, to provide a bargaining chip against some hypothetical *alleged* child molester or drug dealer, or whatever bad thing is in style at the time.  Basically most people don't have a clear distinction between criminals and suspects.  As an analogy, it's like they find a loose screw in your house, and they insist that you're building a bomb or machine gun.  They ask you where it came from (like you'd know), and ask you to prove your claim.  When you explain it in such simple terms, people may start to get the idea.  As a matter of fact, i do keep random files on my disk.  The reason is, without special-purpose hardware, it takes a long time to generate good random bits.  I have programs that crank out a couple bits per minute, which is pretty conservative, but over time that's more than i need.  If you think about it, there's no point in actually encrypting random data, because it just gives you different random data.  If you want some data to look like an encrypted file, you just put an appropriate header on it.  If enough people do this, some of them will be put in jail.  When you get arrested and the police ask for your keys, you can tell them it's just random junk, although of course they won't believe you.  While you're sitting in jail, you can take consolation in the fact that the government will burn a few CPU-years trying to find something that's not there.
> > >As a flaming libertarian paranoid extremist (:-), I'at a loss for > > >specific objections that don't sound frighteningly technical. > > > >  The idea that foisting the Cripple Chip standard on US manufacturers would > >result in saying "Sayonara" to yet another high-tech market isn't technical, > >isn't in the least difficult to understand, and plays on a concern lots of > >people are worried about already....      > >  Could you expand on this...?     Simple -- if you have a choice between:   1. American manufacturers peddling Cripple Chips with a secret untested      algorithm whose keys are held by people with a history of untrustworthy      behavoir, or   2. Japanese (to pick the obvious example) manufacturers peddling encryption      chips with an algorithm that has faced public scrutiny and keys under      the control of the user,
angel@Foghorn_Leghorn.coe.northeastern.edu (Kirill Shklovsky) writes:  >In article <1993Apr26.104320.10398@infodev.cam.ac.uk> rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) writes: >I heard somewhere (can't name the source) that TEMPEST does not necessarily >pick-up just CRTs, but it can pick up emissions from almost any chip.  If >that is true, the kind monitor would not make any difference becuase everything >on the screen can be picked-up from the video controller.  Can anybody verify >or refute this?
There is an article in Communications Week (April 12's issue) which states definitively that not only is the justice department trying to revive the "wiretapping bill", but they are ALSO trying to find a way to force key registration.  CLIPPER is an obvious thrust in exactly this direction. Dorothy Dennings is quoted in this missive.  Communications Week, April 12th, page 8.  Read it and get peeved folks. Then ACT NOW or lose your fundamental right to privacy.  Clinton has shown us that his only interest in this has to do with abortion, and not the right of all citizens to be secure in their papers and effects.
David Reeve Sward <sward+@CMU.EDU> writes: > We don't know this, do we?  The algorithm is classified.   I speculate, from the MykoTronx data sheet on the MYK-78, that the algorithm  is a classified cryptosystem, similar in application to DES but cleared by  the NSA for classified traffic, that has been in use for a number of years.   Myktotronx refers to it as "Government Type II encryption", which matches the  designation of one of the types of encryption available on STU-III phones,  and may be the same as a cryptosystem I have heard called "CIPHER2".  This would make sense, since this is evidently a field-proven cryptosystem  which can act as a "pin-compatible" substitute for DES.  Combined with a  tappable key exchange protocol, this would offer exactly what is claimed for  Clipper: secure encryption with access via a key escrow.  If this is fact the  case, it would make me quite confident of the encipherment algorithm itself.  Now, I do not know if these are in fact the same cryptosystem; my knowledge  of classified cryptography isn't even fuzzy :), it's nonexistent.  However,  it would certainly have been the least-effort approach on the part of the  government: take an old military cipher that people can drop in place of DES  (and which is at least as secure), set up a key escrow scheme for law  enforcement, and promote it for public use.  This also fits with Mykotronx,  who's been around but almost invisible for years.  Has anyone else made this sort of connection, or am I just hallucinating pink  elephants here? :).  My curiousity has been piqued...
In article <1993Apr22.223906.25929@lehman.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:    >Qualcomm had spare cycles in the DSPs for their new CDMA digital    >cellular phones. They wanted to put strong crypto into them since they    >had the capacity. The government decided to "discourage" them.     You're blowing smoke.  Qualcomm wants to sell to nice, lucrative overseas    markets like Japan and the EC.  The government told them "don't do encryption    if you ever hope to export this technology".  The reason that CDMA doesn't    have encryption is NOT because the G-men came a'knocking at Qualcomm's door.    It's because Qualcomm doesn't think that the US market for digital cellular    is big enough for them.  This is just the International Traffic in Arms    Regulations all over again.  Perry has already stated on the net that Qualcomm wanted to sell overseas, and the government told them they wouldn't be allowed to export, so he's only blowing the same smoke you are :-) Sure, they probably could have made a US version, and a non-crypto export version, and contracted with a Bulgarian or Japanese software house to develop an overseas crypto ROM, but that's getting pretty expensive.     No, Cylink sells their phones because they're willing to make different    stuff for domestic use vs. export.  Qualcomm isn't.  So Cylink makes    money--that's capitalism, comrade.  Well, some people like capitalism, and others prefer free enterprise; they're different!  Using the government to stifle your competition is capitalist.     >Someone out there WILL build a unit to do all this. Better yet,    >prehaps someone will produce a package that turns any 486 box with a    >sound card into a secure phone.    "Someone" this and "someone" that.  If you think it's so easy, why are    you whining on the net instead of getting your butt in gear and writing it?  Writing good crypto code is something most good programmers can do; writing good new crypto algorithms is a very specialized skill. Developing new voice coding algorithms is also pretty specialized, but finding ways to implement the more complex ones when you don't have enough horsepower is still fairly hairy stuff. Once the 586/Pentium becomes widespread, or the next generation of sound boards has DSPs on it, I suspect we'll see it happen. Maybe the vanilla 486+Soundblaster is enough.
douglas craig holland (holland@CS.ColoState.EDU) wrote: : In article <C62D8r.C7p@demon.co.uk> Graham Toal <gtoal@gtoal.com> writes: : >In article <1rf04s$jqu@sol.TIS.COM> mjr@tis.com (Marcus J Ranum) writes: : >:	I'd really like to see such a thing developed so that interactive : >:internet talk radio could be done. Ideally, though, it should be a general : >:purpose device. It should be a general purpose enough device that nobody : >:should be able to balk at its widespread use. Obviously, to make it easy : >:for homebrewers, it should use pretty common hardware. :  :      Why don't we move down even further toward the masses by setting this : up on an IBM PC clone(probably needs to be a 386 or a 486) with a  : sound blaster and a V.32bis modem.  Those components are very widely  	I concur for a PC to PC version.  BUT for a interactive thing like internet talk radio?!?!  It makes me cringe at the amount of hogging such a thing would do to the bandwidth of the internet.  I mean 15 meg files getting floated around for internet talk radio is bad enough.  I have a solution; use the phone system; take your electronics and use them on point to point  conversations through the phone and thats it.  If you need to tell someone  something secret and very important wouldn't it make more sense to write it  out concisely? And if it's just a quick "YO" then use a code word and spend  your twenty cents. 	Those good ol analog systems like Shortwave, Telephones, and TV's have a use don't gunk up a nice digital packet network trying to emulate them!
In article <strnlghtC64Dx1.1zn@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >In article <1993Apr25.193300.1707@microsoft.com> gideony@microsoft.com >(Gideon Yuval) writes: > >>If these personal attacks are what stopped Prof. Denning from >>replying on issues of substance, they have cause real harm >>to the serious debate here. > >They are and they have.  Are you in contact with her, is that what she said, or what you THINK her reason is?  Also, could it be possible that she is not replying because she has no reply that wouldn't confirm the worst suspicions?  If the suspicions are way out of pocket, one would think the person would be in there saying so, and indicating WHY they are out of pocket.  Hiding behind a veil of secrecy is not reassuring.
gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes: > Whatever happens though, the effect of this new chip will be to make  > private crypto stand out like a sore thumb.   It already does.
:    Indeed, if NSA really designed the algorithm to be secure, it's very likely : as secure as IDEA or 2-key DES.  However, the system as a whole isn't resistant : to "practical cryptanalysis."  In _The Puzzle Palace_, Bamford describes how : several NSA employees were turned by foreign (presumably KGB) agents, despite : security measures that I doubt any Big 8 accounting firm could match.  And : NSA confidential data was *not* subject to being requested by thousands of : police organizations and courts across the land.  Ah yes, don't anyone mention Ronald William Pelton[*], heh heh heh.  How embarrassing.
In article <1993Apr28.104036.15896@ens.fr> 	h2o@dmi.ens.fr (Philippe Hoogvorst) writes:  >Forbidding crypted communication is impractical: how is it possible to spot >a crypted communication in the thousands of megabytes of data which circulate >on the various existing networks. What about private networks ?  I suspect the government feels it is enough to prevent companies from offering secure encryption services.  Big companies don't take that kind of risk.  They're too visible and have too much to lose.  The US government may not have to make encryption illegal to prevent its use.  If they could credibly say to IBM or MIT: you will receive no US government money next year unless you follow these voluntary guidelines on use of encryption, I doubt either organization would delay making use of encryption a violation of local policies.  The US government gets much of its power by making it impractical to operate without getting money from the government while putting restrictions on use of such money that would be illegal if they were enacted as laws.
> er, excuse me but since the escrow agencies aren't yet chosen, how can you  >say they have a "history of untrustworthy behavoir[sic]"?
In article <WCS.93Apr17024857@rainier.ATT.COM> wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes: >... This is the Democrats' version >"Defend Free Speech - Reject Republicans" followed by speech control.  This must have been in the works for some time.  The Bush administration must have been working on it for quite a while.  --Clinton simply took the credit (or blame, depending on how you look at it).