waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <C5t759.DsC@well.sf.ca.us> rwert@well.sf.ca.us (Bob Wert) writes: 	<...>	<...> >This person is <100 lbs. and fairly small, so I don't see weight as too much >of a problem, but what sort of of advice should I give her before we go? >I want her to hold onto me  :-)   rather than the grab rail out back, and >I've heard that she should look over my shoulder in the direction we're >turning so she leans *with* me, but what else?  Are there traditional >signals for SLOW DOWN!! or GO FASTER!! or I HAFTA GO PEE!! etc.???  	I've never liked my passengers to try and shift their weight with the 	turns at all... I find the weight shift can be very sudden and 	unnerving. It's one thing if they're just getting comfortable or 	decide to look over your other shoulder, but I don't recommend having 	him/her shift her weight with each turn... too violent. 	 	Also (I think someone already said this) make sure your passenger 	wears good gear. I sometimes choose to ride without a helmet or 	lacking other safety gear (depends on how squidly I feel) but I 	won't let passengers do it. What I do to myself I can handle, but 	I wouldn't want to hurt anyone else, so I don't let them on without 	gloves, jacket, (at least) jeans, heavy boots, and a helmet that *fits*  >I really want this to be a positive experience for us both, mainly so that >she'll want to go with me again, so any help will be appreciated...  	Go *real* easy. It's amazing how solid a grip you have on the 	handle bars that your passenger does not. Don't make her feel like 	she's going to slide off the back, and "snappy" turns for you are 	sickening lurches for her. In general, it feels much less controlled 	and smooth as a passenger. I can't stand being on the back of my 	brother's bike, and I ride aggressively when i ride and I know he's 	a good pilot... still, everything feels very unsteady when you're 	a passenger.    >Thanks, >        -Bob-  	Show off by not showing off the first time out...
In article 734954875@zen.sys.uea.ac.uk, mjs@sys.uea.ac.uk (Mike Sixsmith) writes: > >Secondly, it is the adhesion of the >tyre on the road, the suspension geometry  and the ground clearance of the > motorcycle which dictate how quickly you can swerve to avoid obstacles, and >not the knowledge of physics between the rider's ears. Are you seriously >suggesting that countersteering knowledge enables you to corner faster >or more competentlY than you could manage otherwise??  If he's not, I will.  Put two riders on identical machines.  It's the one who knows what he's doing, and why, that will be faster.  It *may* be possible to improve your technique if you have no idea what it is, through trial and error, but it is not very effective methodology. Only by understanding the technique of steering a motorcycle can one improve on that technique (I hold that this applies to any human endeavor).  >that's all it is - an interesting bit of knowledge, and to claim that >it is essential for all bikers to know it, or that you can corner faster >or better as a result, is absurd.  Do you consider an understanding of the physics of traction absurd? Are you seriously suggesting that one can form a traction management policy without understanding what it is or what factors increase or decrease available traction?  Braking?  It is highly unlikely that any biker is going to develop his maximum swerving ability without any knowledge of turning techniques.  For most of his riding life this may not be a problem, but in an emergency situation it is very definately placing him at a disadvantage.  >But by including countersteering >theory in newbie courses we are confusing people unnecessarily, right at >the time when there are *far* more important matters for them to learn.  I disagree.  The existance and immense success of riding courses which teach the technique indicate that the concept can be taught in a manner that is neither confusing, nor detracts from any other aspects of the course.  >And that was my original point.  Perhaps, but in the ensuing discussion, you strayed far from that point, to claim that knowledge of steering technique is irrelevant to a rider's ability.  I find this assertion ludicrous.
Bred wrote: 	And this means that the FBI will want to track the customer lists of 	better encryption phones, because "the only reason a person would want 	one is to evade the police."  They don't have to track customer lists - they merely have to digitally listen to any phone line and eliminate any that don't have the clipper header/signature.  (No-one has said how it will be modulated - want a bet it's a non-standard and hence easily recognisable baudrate?)  Devices to scan exchanges and detect modems etc already exist.  I've seen them advertised in the trade press.  Once you eliminate crippled crypto devices and ordinary data modems, what's left is crypto worth looking more closely at.  I guess any substitute scheme will have to be v32bis or v.fast to disguise it, though then they just start looking at the data too...  Whatever happens though, the effect of this new chip will be to make private crypto stand out like a sore thumb.
>This thread brings up the more general question.  Can any crypto >implementation for which highly publicly scrutinized source code is not >available EVER be trusted?  After IBM had invented the DES and the NBS had advertised for proposals, but before IBM had decided to respond, I argued strenuously that they  should not; they should keep it proprietary.   The biggest proponent of proposing was Dr. Lewis Branscomb.  Dr. Branscomb was the IBM Chief Scientist and had come to IBM from NBS.  Fortunately for all of us, Dr. Branscomb understood the answer to the above question much better than I.  He realized how difficult it would be to gain acceptance for any cryptographic mechanism.  Because of the necessary complexity, publicity would not be sufficient and neither would  authority.  In fact, it has taken both of those plus more than 15  years.  We have also had independence.  The DES was solicited by NBS, invented and proposed by IBM, and vetted by NBS.  It has also been examined and vetted by experts like Adi Shamir, who are not subject to influence by any of these.  Even now, there are still people posting on this list who do not trust the DES in spite of all the time, all of the analysis, and all of the public scrutiny.  (Of course, it is just this point that NIST misses when it attempts to  gain acceptance for a novel mechanism, developed in secret, on the basis of authority alone.)  We had a long thread here about whether or not the NSA can "break" the DES.  That is a silly question.  At some cost and in some time they can "break" anything.  The important question is at what cost and in what time.  The fundamental strength of the DES and RSA are not nearly so important as what we know about their strength.  As long as we understand the cost and duration for an attacker, then we can use them in a safe way. At this point, we may never replace either because of the inability of any successor to overcome this knowledge gap.  DES and RSA are among the most significant inventions of the century and the most important inventions in the history of cryptography. We are damned lucky to have them.
In article <bontchev.735404289@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes:   >And some people thought that I am exaggerating when claiming that the >Cripple Chip is just a first step in a totalitarian plot against the >civil liberties in the USA... It seems that I've even been an optimist >- the things are happening even faster than I expected.... That's >another of the dirty tricks they used to apply on us under the >communist regime - do something secret, THEN tell the people about is >(after the fact, when nothing can be done any more), and of course, >explaining them how much better the situation is now... > >In my previous messages I wrote that the Americans should wake up and >fight against the new proposal. Now it seems to me that it is already >too late - it has already happened, the civil liberties have been >violated, no, stollen from the American people, while the most part of >this people has been sleeping happily... :-((( Too sad...  As one of the happily sleeping people, I would just like to ask this-> aren't people just slightly overreacting to this?  Or are we all of a sudden going to draw parallels to Nazi Germany and Communist Russia?  The point of the matter is that; yes this is a serious problem.  But it is not the end of the world.  Guess what?  We're doing something now you can't do in a Communist country or Nazi Germany.  We're complaining about it, (or rather, you're complaining about it) and nobody is shooting at us.    (Or, rather, if they're shooting at me, they have real bad aim.  (:-) )  GUESS WHAT PEOPLE?  You live in one of the few countries in the world where a person can complain without getting shot at.    People are always complaining that somebody did this wrong, or somebody did that wrong, or whatever.  Sit down and figure out two things:  1)  What have they done right? 2)  How much worse can it get?  And you'll find that you and I, are pretty damn lucky.  So let's talk about it, get some action going, decide what's going on.  But let's not overreact!    > >Regards, >Vesselin >--  >Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg >Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN >< PGP 2.2 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C >e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
In article <C5pGFu.IA4@dscomsa.desy.de> hallam@zeus02.desy.de writes: >views would be to recruit them as spooks. They can be guaranteed to give >the government line when it counts. In US history it has been the  >socialists such as myself who have been persecuted.     And in Russia, capitalists were persecuted for trading goods on the black market. And in the US, capitalist minded types are imprisoned and killed for things such as selling drugs, guns, pornography, and other victimless activities.  It doesn't matter whether you are socialist or capitalist, power and control are central to government. Since citizens can't be trusted to run their own affairs, the government must watch them.  (for their own good of course. I mean, with strong cryptography, citizens might <gasp!> start to hide things from the IRS, sell drugs/guns/pornography, and that cannot be allowed!)  >trials. Ever seen Ed Meese pissed? I have, it was when he said that socialism >and communism were the same thing and brought the house down with laughter. >It took several minutes before we realised that he was serious.
I would think that you could reduce the defense of using non-clipper based encryption technologies to defending freedom of expression  (IE, free speech).  That you have to right to express whatever you want in whatever form your little heart desires so long as you do not impinge on the rights of others.  Encrypted text/sound/video is just another form of expression of that particular text/sound/video.  Just like digitized sound is another  means of expression of sound -- streams of 100100101111 instead of continuous waveforms.  Also, it shouldn't be up to the government at all.  Encryption  _Standards_ can be decided upon by Independent Standards Orgainizations (apologies for the acronym).  One can note how well this has worked with ISO and the Metric System, SAE, etc.  Independent entities  or consortia of people/industries in that particular area are far more qualified to set standards than any One government agency. Consider for example what the Ascii character set would have looked like if it was decided by the government.  I hope this helps folks to formulate their defenses.  I'm still working on mine and hope to be faxing my congressmen soon...
In article <strnlghtC5LGFI.JqA@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > >Though some may argue about the nose of the camel, it's worth noting that >the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony. If it is only >used for that purpose, and does not extend to electronic mail or file >encryption, then it IS an improvement over the current mass-produced >standard civilian technology which, with a few exceptions, is limited to >easy-to-break inverters.  Try reading between the lines David - there are *strong* hints in there that they're angling for NREN next, and the only conceivable meaning of applying this particular technology to a computer network is that they intend it to be used in exclusion to any other means of encryption.  Don't be lulled by the wedge because its end looks so thin.
shirriff@sprite.berkeley.edu (Ken Shirriff) writes: > Since archiving would be such a powerful tool and so easy to do, why  > wouldn't it happen?   Not enough magtape.  Seriously, do you have any idea how much traffic flows through the US phone  system in a single day?
>>	With E-Mail, if they can't break your PGP encryption, they'll just >>call up one of their TEMPEST trucks and read the electromagnetic emmisions >>from your computer or terminal.  Note that measures to protect yourself from > >2. I could independently invent about half a dozen right off >the top of my head. If I had studied Advanced E & M a little better, >I could probably come up with a _very_ good system.  Wouldn't a a second monitor of similar type scrolling gibberish and adjacent to the one being used provide reasonable resistance to tempest attacks?
: From: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni)  : In article <9304201003.AA05465@pizzabox.demon.co.uk> gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes: : >Can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run : >digital speech down 14.4K?  I think it is; I've heard it's not.  Lets : >say 8 bit samples.  Would *raw* data at the corresponding sampling rate : >be usable?  If not, how fancy does the compression need to be?  : As far as I know ISDN (call it Swissnet here, and it's being plugged in) it's : 8 bit 8000Hz (gives you one channel of 64kBit/sec) I guess you should not go : below a sampling rate of 6000 Hz if you want to have same quality as on an : analog-line. Anybody knows compression-algorithms & -factors for voice ?  I've posted some info on CELP coding on sci.crypt.  Looks like you can squeeze speech into 4000bps if you have a fast enough computer like a sparcstation (or a Newton with the Acorn Risc Machine in it :-) )  This drops the bandwidth to so low a figure that it's feasible to run speech over tcp/ip running on top of slip down a v32bis modem.  Not only will this let us run point to point encrypted speech, it'll let us run speech internationally over the internet if no-one stops us by getting *very* heavy about regulations.  The thought of this, if the administration realised, would probably scare them shitless.  Now of course the trick is to develop and define a standard protocol for internet speech *damn fast*, allowing anyone who feels brave to inplement custom handheld hardware as well as us hacking it on our workstations.  Shouldn't be too difficult.  The CELP stuff is standardised, we use tcp/ip streams, and a protocol allowing silences to be used to catch up on any net lag, and also to avoid sending any data during silences (ie it's not wise to be synchronised real-time on each end because any net delays would add up to big voice-lags)  As for me, I'm going to press ahead on trying this stuff as soon as I get my sparc back from being loaned out and buy the necessary microphone. It'll save me a fortune in calling my friend in texas every night :) (whether encrypted or not)  You know, surely *someone* is working on this.  Who?  It's so obvious, why doesn't it exist already?  I've only seen netphone for Suns and it didn't do the CELP compression so was restricted to ether connections.
Yesterday I read an article from someone who was requesting references for introductory texts on cryptography.  Although I marked the article to return, it appears to have expired on this site.  Anyway, on one of the previous occasions when this subject arose I saved a couple articles which made suggestions.  One of the articles contained a quite impressive bibliography.  If the poster of the request (or anyone else) would like to email me, I would be glad to send out copies of these recommendations, including the bibliography.  David R. Conrad		"No his mind is not for rent/To any god or government"
In article <1r3vjhINN5iq@dns1.NMSU.Edu> amolitor@nmsu.edu (Andrew Molitor) writes: >In article <gradyC5uAMw.BnG@netcom.com> grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221) writes: >If you can get it for a buck, 2nd hand, it must be true, eh? I'm pretty >sure the NSA is supposed to, among many other things, provide high-quality >cryptosystems to a variety of places. I don't recall reading anywhere >reliable that they're supposed to: > >	1) Monitor my phonecalls. >	2) Monitor usenet. >	3) Provide only cryptosystems they can easily crack. >	4) etc etc. > >	This is not to say that they *don't*, they might. But you don't >know that they do, and you have no evidence that they do, for almost >all values of you. It follows, therefore, that for most values of 'you', >your claims about the NSA border on paranoia. > >	Andrew >  OK, Andrew, I'll provide some evidence. A friend of mine worked for an electronics manufacturer on with a west-coast office. They routinely sold equipment to the Japanese. One day, the Japanese started showing up with discount demands that were amazingly close to the cost to manufacture the products.  This company routinely sent most of the manufacturing data to the field  offices. The Japanese had simply intercepted it. So my friend, the computer systems admin, came up with a solution. He started sending the data out double-block-encrypted with DES.   Two days after this new distribution plan was implemented, the president of the company got a visit from a pair of government agents. They told him to "knock it off". The president gave in, since his company did a considerable business with the federal government.  Now, if the government wasn't monitoring the communications, how would they even know that the encryption system was installed? Further, since encryp- tion isn't illegal, and DES certainly isn't, what is the basis of the government's cease-and-desist demand?  The spooks do whatever they think is necessary, with or without the blessings of the law. I'll say "no thanks" to Clipper, or anything else the government produces. For the moment, double or triple DES is probably adequate. And when the line is idle, send random garbage, just to keep 'em busy.
Quoting dougb@ecs.comm.mot.com in article <1993Apr26.150434.227@lmpsbbs.comm.mot.com>: >You would have to use something other than the AT&T black box - in other >words, I don't think public key would work.  The session key would have  >to be agreed upon prior to the conversation and distributed to all  >sites beforehand.
In article <1r9vouINN2tv@shelley.u.washington.edu> niteowl@stein2.u.washington.edu (Jamie Jamison) writes:   >	Again we have the trust in government problem here. Members of  >Mr. Sternlight's generation trust the government to a degree which >members of my generation find ridiculous. I would suggest that Mr. Sternlight >read about the COINTELPRO program, or about J. Edgar Hoover, or about  You should read the history. It was Hoover who stopped Nixon's COINTELPRO dead in its tracks because he said it was unconstitutional. They tried to get around him every way they could.  Despite other things he may have done, for this alone, Hoover saved the Constitution.  David
In article <strnlghtC5LGFI.JqA@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > >Though some may argue about the nose of the camel, it's worth noting that >the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony. If it is only >used for that purpose, and does not extend to electronic mail or file >encryption, then it IS an improvement over the current mass-produced >standard civilian technology which, with a few exceptions, is limited to >easy-to-break inverters. > >Note that the big issue for the feds is the continued ability to wiretap. >Before we go off the deep end with long discusions about secure crypto for >e-mail and files, let's focus on this. > >One question that was not asked in the release is whether this proposal is >limited to telephony, or if the government intends to expand it. > >Though I share many of the concerns expressed by some, I find the proposal >less threatening than many others, since right now most Americans have no >secure telephony, and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a "goat" can >eavesdrop. This would also plug up the security hole in cellular and >cordless phones. > >------- > >Reading between the lines, I infer that the system is highly secure >without access to the keys. This would meet the needs of U.S. businesses >confronted by rich and powerful adversaries, including French and Japanese >security services and rich Japanese companies. It allows the NSA to make >available some of its better stuff while protecting law enforcement needs. > >Most legitimate U.S. corporations trust the NSA, and would be delighted to >have a high-security system certified by them, even at the price of >depositing keys in escrow. I see no difficulty in creating a reliable >escrow. Corporations entrust their secrets to attorneys every day of the >week, and that system has worked pretty well. > >From my point of view this is a fair starting point. There are concerns that >need to be addressed, including the reliability of the escrows. But in >return we get access to high-security crypto. Many have suggested that DES >and other systems may be breakable by the NSA and hence others similarly >skilled and endowed. There is at least a good possibility (which should be >checked) that the proposed system is not so breakable. It doesn't have to >be, nor does it have to have trapdoors, if the government can get the keys >pursuant to a legitimate court order. Thus they can protect legitimate >communications against economic adversaries, while still being able to >eavesdrop on crooks pursuant to a court order. > 	Let me ask you this.  Would you trust Richard Nixon with your crypto keys?  I wouldn't.
Doug Holland claims Tom Clancy has provided the recipe for nuclear bombs. Clancy himself says he has omitted certain crucial steps. Further, how do we know Clancy knows, rather than repeating what he's read or been told in the unclassified domain?
From: brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton)  	Let's assume, for the moment, that the system really is secure unless 	you get both halves of the encryption key from the two independent 	escrow houses.  Let's say you even trust the escrow houses -- one is 	the ACLU and the other is the EFF.  (And I'm not entirely joking about 	those two names)  I'm really not entirely sure I trust EFF any more to be honest.  Anyway, any organisation can be deeply infiltrated.  Look at CND in Britain a dozen years ago - one of their top members was an SIS spy who stole their complete address list.  How hard would it be to get one person to sneak in and copy the escrow data to disk?
There's been some discussion very recently as to whether the government once again might exempt themselves from something they use to screw us over...  Well, from comp.dcom.telecom:  From: lesreeves@attmail.com Subject: Odds 'n Ends in the News  * The Clipper Chip device introduced yesterday by AT&T may not be suitable for government use, says House Telecom Subcommittee Chairman Markey.  In a letter to Commerce Secretary Brown, Markey asked whether the use of the technology could lead to "inadvertently increased costs to those U.S. companies hoping to serve both" the government and private markets.  Markey has ordered Brown to answer several questions about security and cost concerns by April 28.  (Communications Daily, 4/20/93)