waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <strnlghtC5yBKA.Dp5@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)  brings up the issue of how the escrow agent will be paid, and the fact that the government had financial leverage if they don't cooperate. It's an important issue, especially if one of the escrow agents decides they'd rather stop offering the service.  I assume that if the escrow agent isn't the government, then the contract for providing escrow service would include some termination clause like returning the keys.  >   The easiest way is a user fee for each clipper chip manufactured.  >   This makes the funding separate from government.  But who's the user paying the fees here, and what's the service?   If the user is the government, then the funding's not separate from the government.  If the user is the buyer, what's the service?   Keeping the key for me?  No thanks - I don't need, and won't buy their service! Not telling everybody my key?  Sounds like blackmail!  If the user is the manufacturer, does the user have a choice about buying? The alternative is to just generate the key and not escrow it, which is fine - I'd certainly pay more for this kind of key than an escrowed key!  Face it, the escrow provider is providing a service the users don't want. The only people who want it are the government, not the users. What you're really talking about is either the government paying for the service, up front or per-year, either from general taxes, or from a special direct tax on wiretap chips, or on an indirect tax (forcing the manufacturer to pay the fee to the escrow agent.)  I hope the escrow people have no way of finding out your name from your serial number, especially if the escrow is a government agency.  Here in New Jersey, we have lots of people willing to provide that sort of services for user fees.  There are people willing to keep your store from burning down for a small monthly fee, though sometimes people refuse to pay and discover that the service really was effective. If you go to a baseball game at Yankee Stadium, there are people who will watch your car in the parking lot for a small user fee. Something could scratch the paint, after all. And what a shame if your Clipper key got out!
In article <strnlghtC5wCMo.Fx5@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > In article <C5uvn4.MF7@austin.ibm.com> arussell@austin.ibm.com (AG Russell) > writes: >  > > > >At the company I worked for previously, I received a file that was des encryped > >and the person that had sent it, went on vaction.  Rather than wait two weeks > >I set up a straight frontal attack with one key at a time.  It only took two(2) > >days to crack the file.  No, I don't have any faith in DES. > > >  > Taking this at face value (though it seems quite dissonant with much else > that has been published here about brute force DES cracking, unless Russell > was lucky with respect to the key), I'd be very interested in whether the > program Russell used is available? In whether he used a cleartext > recognition algorithm in the program or whether he had to examine each > decryption by hand? In whether he used a known plaintext attack?  Given that certain archival methods have certain key(cleartext) in a file I used a programatic dictionary attack.  I used the DES library provided with the system that I was using.  What is to keep anyone from being lucky with a key?   > He probably should also tell us, given his address, what machine he used--a > desktop, workstation, or super-computer.  My previous employment has nothing to do with my current address, other than the fact that the fastest machine in the office was an IBM RISC System/6000  model 530, with 16 meg of memory.(not a super-computer)   > Depending on his answer, this could be an appalling development calling into > question both DES and RSA/DES. Dunno about RSA/IDEA.  I really think this more of a statement of the limitations placed on the key by the interface(ascii char/no padding), and most programs don't bother to clear off the archival front and backend ID's.  > If any bright programmer with a little idle machine time can crack a single > DES message in a couple of days (assuming no tricks that are > message-specific), then here's my Clipper key, NSA; give me the chip at > once.  :-)  Yes any moderatly bright programmer with a little idle machine time, can crack most of todays real world encryption.  I sure that you or I could select a key, and prepare the data inorder that the decryption will become a  worst case.  but that is not the real world, and I'm sure that is how any  agency would start an attack on a message, as you pointed out, there are some  very good recognition algorithms availible, I'm just not familiar with them.  A.G.
In article <tcmayC5M2xv.JEx@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:  >But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much >worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper" >to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main >concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)  Excuse me?  This has *already* happened.  There's a couple of humps in the tent already.  Ask the folks at Qualcomm what became of the non-trivial encryption scheme they proposed for use in their CDMA digitial cellular phone standard?  There *already* are restrictions in place.
yuan1@scws7.harvard.edu (Nina Yuan) writes:  >I'm not a lawyer and I don't even play one on TV, but intuitively there's >something wrong with having one's words archived for possible future >use against you.  This possibility frightens me more than any of the >talk about the Clipper Chip, right to cryptography, etc.  :-)  I can just imagine it.  The mother is wheeled into the labour ward.  After delivery a government agent steps up to read the baby its rights... 	"You have the right to remain silent.  If you give up this right anything 	you say may be taken down and used in evidence against you."  	"Waaaaaaaaah"   -- Anthony Shipman                 "You've got to be taught before it's too late, CP Software Export Pty Ltd,      Before you are six or seven or eight, 19 Cato St., East Hawthorn,      To hate all the people your relatives hate, Melbourne, Australia, 3121       You've got to be carefully taught."  R&H
In article <1993Apr16.181040.9381@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes: >It looks like Dorothy Denning's wrong-headed ideas have gotten to the >Administration even sooner than we feared.  If the Administration is this far along, is it possible that the government been working on it for a while and has been using the Dennings to prime the pump, so to speak, or as the Judas goat? Whether paid off, just gullible, or what, doesn't really matter.  It might also be possible that the NSA / whoever has had the idea for this for quite a while, has been promoting it (Denning, et al) and siezed the new opportunity - a new administration who wants to spend more money on espionage than Bush did.  Whatever, i'm not so sure that the cause/effect order is totally obvious.
Has anyone ported RIPEM to the Amiga yet or is anyone working on it?  Emailed responses are fine.
:    Does Dorothy Denning read this group?  If not, is someone on the group : forwarding questions like these to her, or Martin Hellman, or anyone else : who's seen more details about the chip?  Of course she does; it's just she's been toasted so often for being an NSA patsy that she's keeping her head down.  You can always mail her directly as denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu, denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu or denning@cs.georgetown.edu
In article <C5Jzsz.Jzo@cs.uiuc.edu> kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie) writes: >ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Andrew S Hall) writes: > >>I am postive someone will correct me if I am wrong, but doesn't the Fifth >>also cover not being forced to do actions that are self-incriminating? >[From Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>, posted with permission - Carl]  >No, but they could compell you to produce the key to a safe where, as it >happens, evidence that will convict you is stored.  > >The crypto-key disclosure issue hasn't come up yet, but current law >suggests that it's a loser for the defendant--he'll be compelled to turn >over the key. > >The test for compelled self-incrimination is whether the material to  >be disclosed *in itself* tends to inculpate the discloser. In the example >I gave above, the safe key itself has no testimonial value--ergo, it can >be disclosed under compulsion (e.g., subpoena duces tecum).  >Moreover, the government can always immunize the disclosure of a crypto >key--compelling you to disclose the key at the price of not using the fact >of your disclosure as evidence in the case against you. Of course, they >can use whatever they discover as a result of this disclosure against >you. >--Mike      Lets carry this one step further. Suppose the text of the key is in itself conclusive evidence of the SAME CRIME for which the encrypted material is further evidence. I find myself envisaging a scenario like this:  You have made some scans of Peanuts strips. You encrypt them. The key is a phrase.  The Comic Police haul you in. They seize your system. They find the encrypted file.  CP:    "Whats that file?"  You:   "I take the fifth."  CP:    "What's the keyphrase to that file?"   You:   "I take the fifth."  Judge: "You have to reveal the keyphrase" [I disagree, but I'm not a judge.]  You:   "Your Honor, revealing the keyphrase, in it's own right, would  	tend to incriminate me of breaking laws, independent of what  	may or may not be in the encrypted file."    Judge: "I grant you immunity from whatever may be learned from the key 	itself"  You:    "The keyphrase is: "I confess to deliberately evading copyright;  	the file encoded with this keyphrase contains illegal scans of          copyrighted Peanuts strips.""  Judge and CP: "Oh."       How will they get you now? I'm not saying that they won't, or can't (or even that they shouldn't :-), but what legal mechanism will they use? Should we be crossposting this to misc.legal?
jgfoot@minerva.cis.yale.edu (Josh A. Goldfoot) writes:  >Tarl Neustaedter (tarl@coyoacan.sw.stratus.com) wrote:  >: It means that the EFF's public stance is complicated with issues irrelevant >: to the encryption issue per se. There may well be people who care about >: the encryption issue who don't care to associate themselves with the >: network erotica issue (or may even disagree with the EFF's position).  >Perhaps these encryption-only types would defend the digitized porn if it >was posted encrypted?  >These issues are not as seperable as you maintain.  Well, regardless of what policy liabilities anyone in Washington may think EFF has, it is going ahead aggressively attacking the assumptions that are behind the Administrations Clipper Chip initiative.  For all the reasons stated here.  In Washington, you have to work under the assumption that  everyone has some liabilities.  Government and non-governmental  organizations alike all share the same glass house.  EFF is variously identified as the Hacker Defense Fund, the First Amendment Absolutists, the New Communists, etc, but it is also an acknowledged leader in the civil liberties arena and is respected as a serious player in the  policy circles.  So unless there is another organization with the credibility and clout and right policy stance that you know of in Washington, please don't count EFF out as a valid representative of your views in the Clipper Chip matter.
Interestingly enough, in designing the escrow, we may want to use some rather unusual technology, such as sealed boxes of paper, or destructive read memory, rather than typical computer databases, which is fun for a database of hundreds of millions of keys.  The greatest danger of the escrow database, if it were kept on disk, would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out.  You can design lots of protection, but with enough corruption a complete copy is always possible.   Storing it on paper or something very hard to copy at once may actually make sense.  Or a medium that can't be copied -- for example, something with very slow access times or which leaves a destructive trail if it is even read.  Of course then it's hard to backup.  However, I think the consequences of no backup -- the data is not there when a warrant comes -- are worse than the consequences of a secret backup.  An audit trail that reveals when data has been access, that *can't* be erased by the humans involved, is also necessary.
There is a description of something called a "fair crypto system" in the May 1993 issue of BYTE, p. 134, attributed to MIT professor Silvio Micali.    The way it works is as follows:    You generate your private key S, and break it up into pieces s1, s2, s3, s4, and s5, such that (s1 + s2 + ... + s5) mod p = S.   You give each piece s1, s2, etc. to a different escrow agency.   The agencies each compute g^sn mod p, and forward the result to the public key telephone book keeper.   The public key telephone book keeper multiplies all the g^sn mod p, reduces the result to mod p, and this will be the user's public key.    Now, if there were several hundered recognized escrow agencies, and the user could give a piece of the key to each of the ones he trusted, the result would be something of an improvement over the proposed Clipper system.
djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein) writes:  >[Summary elided] >The system as described here can't possibly work. What happens when >someone plugs the above ciphertext into a receiving chip? To get M >the receiving chip needs K_P; to get K_P the receiving chip needs U_C. >The only information it can work with is C. If U_C can be computed >from C then the system is cryptographically useless and the ``key >escrow'' is bullshit. Otherwise how is a message decrypted?  The description of the chip's operation evidently leaves out some of the key management aspects.  Either the K_P is the secret key corresponding to a public key which is broadcast at message initiation, or it is the result of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or something similar.  Either way there must be some protocols beyond those described here.  It isn't clear whether they are implemented in the Clipper wiretap chip or must be provided by other system components.
In article <strnlghtC5wKrt.6JA@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:     > I believe it is illegal to send any cryptographic code out of the    > country without an export license. (Others will correct me if    > this is inaccurate.)     Glad to!  You are correct, it is illegal to send cryptographic code (and lots of other things) out of the country without a license. HOWEVER, every US citizen has a general export license, allowing export of lots of things, including constitutionally protected speech. This has the effect that it is legal for US citizens to export some things which it is illegal for a US corporation to export without first obtaining a license.     > Dunno if you'd get one for the particular code you have; the only    > way to find out is to apply for a license.     Nope, talk to a good lawyer in the area of export law.  But, in general, the government has to have a very good national security case to try prevent the export of anything you personally might wish to publish.  (Yes, I worded that the way I did intentionally.  It is a lot easier for the government to TRY to prevent the export of information than to charge someone with a crime after the fact. Espionage is probably the only exception.)     > Note that you need to distinguish between what is legal to send    > to Canada if YOU have such a license, and what is legal to send    > if you don't.      If you are a US citizen, you have a general license.  (I am not a lawyer, so take some of this with a grain of salt.  However, I have also had to swim through both ITAR and export regs in a few cases.)  --  					Robert I. Eachus
In article <rdippold.735595213@qualcom>, rdippold@qualcomm.com (Ron "Asbestos" Dippold) writes: |> There's been some discussion very recently as to whether the |> government once again might exempt themselves from something they use |> to screw us over...  Well, from comp.dcom.telecom: |>  |> From: lesreeves@attmail.com |> Subject: Odds 'n Ends in the News |>  |> * The Clipper Chip device introduced yesterday by AT&T may not be |> suitable for government use, says House Telecom Subcommittee Chairman |> Markey.  In a letter to Commerce Secretary Brown, Markey asked whether |> the use of the technology could lead to "inadvertently increased costs |> to those U.S. companies hoping to serve both" the government and |> private markets.  Markey has ordered Brown to answer several questions |> about security and cost concerns by April 28.  (Communications Daily, |> 4/20/93)  This is stupid.  Won't it cost more to those companies hoping to  serve the gov't and private markets if they DON'T use the same technology?
Here's a simple way to convert the Clipper proposal to an unexceptionable one: Make it voluntary.  That is--you get high quality secure NSA classified technology if you agree to escrow your key. Otherwise you are on your own.  David
In article <1r9av2$bg6@transfer.stratus.com>, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes: > I don't know about you, but I have nearly forgotten how to generate paper > mail. >  > If I had e-mail to Congress, I would have written many letters by now. > I haven't written one yet, as it turns out.  Writing on paper is such > a complicated job, for those of us hooked on our way-cool Internet.  Just ask postmaster for the e-mail address of the printer. :-)
In article <gradyC5unp0.D21@netcom.com>,  grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221) writes: > Andrew Molitor (amolitor@nmsu.edu) wrote: > :  > : 	1) Monitor my phonecalls. > : 	2) Monitor usenet. > : 	3) Provide only cryptosystems they can easily crack. > : 	4) etc etc. > :  > : 	This is not to say that they *don't*, they might. But you don't > : know that they do, and you have no evidence that they do, for almost > : all values of you. It follows, therefore, that for most values of 'you', > : your claims about the NSA border on paranoia. > :  > : 	Andrew  ..... ..... .....  >  > Or maybe the Germans should have been a little more 'paranoid' about > their Engima with respect to Turing and the British. >  > How about the cracking of the Zimmerman telegram?  Would a little > more paranoia have helped the Germans here? >  > Maybe the NSA should have been a little more 'paranoid' about > Emma Woikin, or Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., or  ... >  > Maybe you want to talk about Macmillan publishers cooperation > with the CIA and NSA to suppress Yardley's Japanese Diplomatic > Secrets or even Kahn's The Codebreakers.. paranoia, right? >  > The most popular cipher systems in captured soviet spies was > the one-time pad, even with the necessity of keeping incriminating > evidence about, is known to be the only proven unbreakable system. > Soviet paranoia, right? >  > And what do you think the NSA does with its Wullenwebers?  And  > huge Rhombics pointed embassy row?  And their sites near > satellite uplink and downlink sites?  Duh. >  .....   > --  > grady@netcom.com  2EF221 / 15 E2 AD D3 D1 C6 F3 FC  58 AC F7 3D 4F 01 1E 2F >  One case of Slovenian paranoia.  Once upon a time a tried to walk over the (famous) Marathon field, not far away  from Athens. I could not do that mostly becouse the field is now a huge  antenna farm. Probably a Greek COMINT installation, would you agree?  --  Borut B. Lavrencic, D.Sc.     | X.400   :C=si;A=mail;P=ac;O=ijs;S=lavrencic J. Stefan Institute           | Internet:Borut.B.Lavrencic@ijs.si University of Ljubljana,      | Phone   :+ 386 1 159 199 SI-61111 Ljubljana, Slovenia  |	    PGP Public Key available on request
Agreed.  This is like the Bay of Pigs fiasco (planned by the Eisenhower Administration but given the final green light by Kennedy).   To be sure, hen it all went down, Kennedy was at least man enough to take full responsibility, which is not what I expect from Slick Willie Clinton....
With regard to your speculations on NSA involvement in the creation of PKP, I find that it fails the test of Occam's butcher knife.  Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by forthright greed.
In article <1993Apr22.014646.28445@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>, andersom@spot.Colorado.EDU (Marc Anderson) writes: |> In article <1993Apr21.001707.9999@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> andersom@spot.Colorado.EDU (Marc Anderson) writes: |> [...] |> > |> >(the date I have for this is 1-26-93) |> > |> >note Clinton's statements about encryption in the 3rd paragraph..  I guess |> >this statement doesen't contradict what you said, though. |> > |> >--- cut here --- |> > |> >        WASHINGTON (UPI) -- The War on Drugs is about to get a fresh |> >start, President Clinton told delegates to the National Federation |> >of Police Commisioners convention in Washington. |> >        In the first speech on the drug issue since his innaugural, |> >Clinton said that his planned escalation of the Drug War ``would make |> >everything so far seem so half-hearted that for all practical |> [...] |>  |> I just found out from my source that this article was a joke.  Heh heh..   |> It seemed pretty damn convincing to me from the start -- I just didn't |> notice the smiley at the end of the article, and there were a few other |> hints which I should of caught.  Well, isn't this just a hoot! :)  All I read on this group is a bunch of ppl fearing the misuses of information by the big bad evil govt. This just happens to be a case of an ordinary-joe-netter, who decided that he would create and/or distribute some misinformation.  Ppl buy into BS posts like this (I know, because I forwarded a copy of the post to my office mate, who turned around and was (although he won't admit it...sorry Joe!) ready to get in a fight about F-O-R-F-E-I-T-U-R-E!!!) Please, if we're going to hold our govt (which admittedly has had and still has its problems) to high standards, then mustn't we follow these too?  Electronic Freedoms only go so far.    |> Anyway -- I guess this 'joke' did turn out to resemble Clinton's true  |> feelings at least to some extent.   |>  |> Sorry about that... |>  |> -marc |> andersom@spot.colorado.edu  Hey, I'm willing to forgive...after of course my office mate takes his extra anti-paranoia pills! :)
In article <ofppPcS00iUy0_k3Mr@andrew.cmu.edu>, "Stephen J. Ludwick" <sl3b+@andrew.cmu.edu> says: > >Hi everybody! > >Does anyone know of companies that are currently manufacturing >encryption chips for sale to the general public?  Get them while you >can!  Some pointers would be greatly appreciated. > >Thanks > >Steve
In article <16BB51156.C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu> C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu (John Kelsey) writes: >  >strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >> [..stuff deleted] >existence of the key-registry system seems to make possible all kinds of >possible attacks at a small fraction of the expense of trying to build (say) >a DES keysearch machine. >  >   As originally described, it sounded like any police / court combination >could acquire the key for a given chip.  I hope that's not the case, since >it would imply a glaring hole.  (How much does it cost to find *one* crooked >jodge and *one* crooked cop?  Especially for a foreign intelligence agency >or organized crime boss?)  However, even if more intelligent schemes are used >to allow access to the unencrypted phone conversations, there will be weak- >nesses.  They may be very expensive, and very difficult.  But who would >trust his/her confidential information to an encryption scheme that, for >(say) $100,000 could by cracked one time in a hundred?  (DES, for all the >complaints about a 56-bit key, would probably cost several million dollars >to build a keysearch machine for.) >   I can buy a DES keysearch machine off the shelf now for approx $500K, but it is not sold by that name. Go buy a circuit emulation machine (eg. Quickturn) containing a bunch of FPGAs, (say 500 to 1000 3090's), and program each to be a DES search engine. Lets say 500 chips, running at 10Mhz = 5G tests/sec. Time is 14e6 sec max = 23 weeks, 12 weeks average. Can't wait that long? Buy a bigger machine.