waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
langford@gems.vcu.edu writes:  >In article <1993Apr20.213718.23129@husc3.harvard.edu>, kubo@zariski.harvard.edu (Tal Kubo) writes: >> Having mentioned the possible dangers of unwelcome political associations, >> I would be remiss not to suggest something in the opposite direction: >> gathering the support of the NRA by emphasizing the RKBA side of the >> issue as well as the First-Amendment side.  >Hmmm, this gave me an interesting idea.  How about this argument: >1)  Second Amendment gives us the right to keep and bear arms. >2)  Strong cryptography is "arms", according to the U.S. government (that's >    why it's so hard to export). >Therefore, we have a constituitional right to strong cryptography!   >Q.E.D.  >[. . .]  Maybe the NRA _would_ be the best existing organization?  I think a new organization would be a much better idea, as the NRA carries as much undesireable baggage for me as the EFF and CPSR do for others.  Are any hot-shot, reputable organizers reading this message?  If an effective group comes into existence, it can count on me signing up.
In <C5LJ0t.K52@blaze.cs.jhu.edu> eifrig@beanworld.cs.jhu.edu (Jonathan Eifrig) writes:  >FACT:  It is unlawful to distribute code implementing RSA without a license >to do so from PKP, whether or not one is charging for it.  Furthermore, >any use of RSA, other than for research purposes allowed under US patent >law, is similarly unlawful.  Therefore, the "average citizen" cannot use >RSA to encrypt message traffic in the US without a license from PKP.  WRONG:  I don't think even PKP claims this one.  It is not unlawful to distribute code implementing RSA.  It appears to be unlawful to use it, so I agree with your last sentence.  >FACT:  There are no restrictions (yet!) on the use of cryptography under >US law, although this is beginning to look like it will change.  The only >impediments to widespread use of RSA cryptography in the US are PKP's >patents.  Yes, that's correct.
In article <1qnmnp$db8@sol.TIS.COM> mjr@tis.com (Marcus J Ranum) writes: >traffic. That way your traffic looks "normal" and perhaps anyone >desiring to listen in won't even bother, since they know nobody's >going to really trust crypto that has classified internals for >important stuff.   Nice to think, but naive.  The fact is that millions of people today are sending highly confidential information over unencoded, easy to receive cellular phones.  They figure the chances of being heard are small, so they risk it.  And 99.9% of people don't understand crypto the way the least of the sci.crypt newbies does.   If Clinton tells them it's good crypto, they'll believe him, and send important stuff over it, and be thankful that they're no longer using clear-voice FM cellular phones.  Only a tiny fraction of people will want more crypto.  Worse, in the eyes of the government, which swears up and down the algorithim is spook-level secure (and it may indeed be) the only reason you could possibly want this extra level is to avoid police.  By using it, you'll attract attention as a likely lawbreaker.  "Your honour, the suspect suddenly started using another level of cryptography and we can't tap his phone calls any more.  He must have something to hide.  Please sign the warrant to search his house..."
In article <1993Apr20.000359.20098@bernina.ethz.ch> caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni) writes:       Just a question.        As a provider of a public BBS service - aren't you bound by law to gurantee       intelligble access to the data of the users on the BBS, if police comes       with sufficent authorisation ? I guessed this would be  a basic condition       for such systems. (I did run a bbs some time ago, but that was in Switzerland)  The US doesn't yet have many laws covering BBSs - they're not common carriers, they're not phone companies, they're just private machines or services operated by businesses.  There's no obligation to keep records. As Perry Metzger points out, if the police come with a search warrant, you have to let them see what the warrant demands, if it exists, and they generally can confiscate the equipment as "evidence" (which is not Constitutionally valid, but we're only beginning to develop court cases supporting us).  A court MAY be able to compel you to tell them information you know, such as the encryption password for the disk - there aren't any definitive cases yet, since it's a new situation, and there probably aren't laws specifically covering it. But the court can't force you to *know* the keys, and there are no laws preventing you from allowing your users to have their own keys for their own files without giving them to you.  Even in areas that do have established law, there is uncertainty. There was a guy in Idaho a few years ago who had his business records subpoenaed as evidence for taxes or some other business-restriction law, so he gave the court the records.  Which were in Hebrew. The US doesn't have laws forcing you to keep your records in English, and these were the originals of the records.  HE didn't speak Hebrew, and neither did anybody in the court organization.  Don't think they were able to do much about it.  It might be illegal for your BBS to deny access to potential customers based on race, religion, national origin, gender, or sexual preference; it probably hasn't been tested in court, but it seems like a plausible extension of anti-discrimination laws affecting other businesses.
From: "dan mckinnon" <dan.mckinnon@canrem.com>  	   I have lurked here a bit lately, and though some of the math is 	unknown to me, found it interesting. I thought I would post an article I 	found in the Saturday, April 17, 1993 Toronto Star:  	                  'CLIPPER CHIP' to protect privacy  Politics is of course Dirty Pool, old man, and here we have a classic example: the NSA and the administration have been working on this for a *long* time, and in parallel with the announcement to us techies, we see they're hitting the press with propoganda.  It's my bet the big magazines - Byte, Scientific American, et all - will be ready to run with a pre-written government-slanted story on this in the next issue.  ('Just keep us some pages spare boys, we'll give you the copy in time for the presses')  We *must* get big names in the industry to write well argued pieces against this proposal (can you call it that when it's a de facto announcement?) and get them into the big magazines before too much damage is done.  It would be well worth folks archiving all the discussions from here since the day of the announcement to keep all the arguments at our fingertips.  I think between us we could write quite a good piece.  Now, who among us carries enough clout to guarantee publication?  Phil? Don Parker?  Mitch Kapor?
In article <1993Apr23.195051.16862@news.clarkson.edu>  (Dwight Tuinstra) writes:  > Great slogan!  I'm ready to sign up with a crypto-lobbying effort (though > I wouldn't want to do it through an NRA offshoot).  Shall we also push > for the CRA  -- Cryptographic Rights Amendment ??          Looking at it from up here in the Frozen North, it looks like         you could do worse than get the NRA involved. They have a         kindred problem, a large number of voters, the right attitude,         and lots of funds.          From an ethical _or_ constitutional viewpoint, I haven't seen         a good argument for cryptographic rights that doesn't also         support the NRA position on guns (and vice-versa).          Cheers,                 Marc  ---  Marc Thibault                             | marc@tanda.isis.org  Automation Architect                      | CIS:71441,2226  R.R.1, Oxford Mills, Ontario, Canada      | NC FreeNet: aa185
In article <strnlghtC5toC6.KIu@netcom.com>, strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > ... >                                  The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee > has successfully kept decisions from leaking for the statutory period until > publication.  How are you sure of that?  Weren't there some recent studies that found corelations between not-yet announced decisions and market changes?  Aren't there continuing early rumors of their deliberations?   >              Even the Department of Agriculture has successfully kept crop > forecasts from leaking prematurely.  Sheesh!  Remember the big scandal a year or two (or 3?) ago about exactly such leaks?
In article <tcmayC5rs6n.Lz8@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:  > >After the Waco Massacre and the Big Brother Wiretap Chip, any tactic >is fair.  This is pernicious nonsense!  David
jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Han) writes: >In article <RENS.93Apr22153654@stimpys.imsi.com> rens@imsi.com (Rens >Troost) writes:  > >>>   In this giant bally-ho over this Clipper chip I noticed a rather >>>   disturbing trend in some of the E-mail and posts I've tossing back and >>>   forth.   >> >>Me too. A tendency on the part of some people to hide their head in >>the sand. > >I never advocated "hiding in the sand."  I'm advocating a peaceful >solution while a peaceful solution is possible.  Unless you want blood on >your hands.  No one has mentioned violence other than you, Mr. Han. I believe you are imagining things.  -- Perry Metzger		pmetzger@shearson.com
Besides being an infringement on our civil liberties (not the subject in this post), the name "Clipper Chip" seems very confusable with the "Clipper" chip of Intergraph.  Originally designed by a team at Fairchild Semiconductor, Clipper was a 32-bit RISC microprocessor. It is still used in some workstations, notably those from Intergraph, the supplier of CAD tools. Intergraph acquired the Clipper product line when Fairchild was sold to National Semiconductor several years back.  When I first saw "Clipper Chip" in the announcement, I immediately thought the article was referring to the Clipper chip I know.  This seems to be grounds for Intergraph to sue, but then I'm not a lawyer. I'd say I'm a cryptologist, but I don't want to incriminate myself under the laws of the new regime.  -Tim May
res@colnet.cmhnet.org (Rob Stampfli) writes:  > Wouldn't a a second monitor of similar type scrolling gibberish and adjacent > to the one being used provide reasonable resistance to tempest attacks?  We've got a tempest receiver in the lab here, and there's no difficulty in picking up individual monitors. Their engineering tolerances are slack enough that they tend to radiate on different frequencies. Even where they overlap, you can discriminate because they have different line synch frequencies - you can lock in on one and average the others out.  The signals are weird in any case, with varying polarisations and all sorts of interactions with the building. Just moving a folded dipole around is also highly effective as a (randomised) means of switching from one monitor to another,
In article <bontchev.735404289@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes: >andersom@spot.Colorado.EDU (Marc Anderson) writes: > >> methods.  ``This year's crime bill will have teeth, not bare gums,'' >> Clinton said.  In particular, his administration will place strict >> controls on data formats and protocols, and require the registration >> of so-called ``cryptographic keys,'' in the hope of denying drug >> dealers the ability to communicate in secret.  Clinton said the >> approach could be used for crackdowns on other forms of underground >> economic activity, such as ``the deficit-causing tax evaders who >> live in luxury at the expense of our grandchildren.'' > >And some people thought that I am exaggerating when claiming that the >Cripple Chip is just a first step in a totalitarian plot against the >civil liberties in the USA... It seems that I've even been an optimist >- the things are happening even faster than I expected.... That's >another of the dirty tricks they used to apply on us under the >communist regime - do something secret, THEN tell the people about is >(after the fact, when nothing can be done any more), and of course, >explaining them how much better the situation is now... > >In my previous messages I wrote that the Americans should wake up and >fight against the new proposal. Now it seems to me that it is already >too late - it has already happened, the civil liberties have been >violated, no, stollen from the American people, while the most part of >this people has been sleeping happily... :-((( Too sad... >  	I'm definitely going to write my Congressman, and nobody's ever going to make me respect a law that violates my freedom of speech, and if the feds try to enforce this law on me, I will protect my freedoms, with force if it ever comes to that. (Hopefully, it won't)  Doug Holland  --
n9045178@henson.cc.wwu.edu (Sean Dean) writes...  [other 2 posts deleted]  |I've heard he doesn't read alt.fan.rush..... |But I have no idea of a Compuserve e-mail address...  Does anyone have Rush Limbaugh's e-mail address?  Is there anyone out there on Compuserve who might be able to look it up or otherwise find it? Maybe it would be impossible, but I thought I should at least ask...
rlward1@afterlife.ncsc.mil (Robert Ward) writes:  > >and since the US constitutions guarantees the right to every American > >to bear arms, why is not every American entitled, as a matter of  > Have you read the applicable part of the Constitution and interpreted it IN  > CONTEXT?   Yes. BTW, the appropriate Amendments were posted here some time ago.  > If not, please do so before posting this misinterpretation again. > It refers to the right of the people to organize a militia, not for individual > to carry handguns, grenades, and assault rifles.    It's OK, it's OK... Just a month ago I expressed my belief that the right to have a means to shoot your neighbor is not that much necessary to ensure a people's right to be free and got flamed by lots of American gun supporters. So I thought that...  Never mind. The new Cripple Chip is a purely American problem, so deal with the mess yourselves. I just wanted to share with you a bit of my experience of living 30 years under a totalitarian regime (I'm Bulgarian) - because I thought that it might be useful to you. Oh well.  Regards, Vesselin
In article <1993Apr26.145937.3570@wdl.loral.com> koontzd@phobos.lrmsc.loral.com (David Koontz ) writes:    >Clipper also allows an extraordinary opportunity for the criminal to    >conceal use of super-encryption.  An automated full-system surveillance    >mechanism (quite feasible across radio bandwidth) which knows family key F,    >can validate Clipper wrappers and N:ESN associations, but it cannot reveal    >in realtime the use of super-encryption, unless it knows all unit keys,    >which we are being assured are only to be made available in two separate    >pieces, upon specific wiretap-like order.     The serial number will be in a 64 bit block, with a 34 bit filler.  Doesn't    take a lot to check to see if that is correct.  Depends on whether the filler is a constant (makes checking easy, but susceptible to replay), or variable (e.g. timer, counter, random), which makes replay harder and can also make it easier for the inquisitors to know if they've missed messages, or gotten them out of sequence, or other interesting things that sort of person might care about.  It is still easy to conceal super-encryption, at least until the inquisitors get ahold of the K key, which can take a while, presumably not in near-real-time.  (Worst-case, in which the escrow agencies provide the U key to the local cops, still only gets one side of the conversation per warrant, unless the same key is used for both directions, which I suppose the CAPSTONE version of the chip will probably insist on.)
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  >What follows is my opinion. It is not asserted to be "the truth" so no >flames, please.  It comes out of a background of 20 years as a senior >corporate staff executive in two Fortune 50 companies.  >I'd be happy to use a crypto system supplied by the NSA for business, if >they told me it was more secure than DES, and in particular resistant to >attempts by Japanese, French, and other competitive companies and >governments to break.  >I'd be happy to do so even with escrowed keys, provided I was happy about >the bona fides of the escrow agencies (the Federal Reserve would certainly >satisfy me, as would something set up by one of the big 8 accounting firms).  >I'd trust the NSA or the President if they stated there were no trap >doors--I'd be even happier if a committee of independent experts examined >the thing under seal of secrecy and reported back that it was secure.  >I'd trust something from the NSA long before I'd trust something from some >Swiss or anybody Japanese.  A lot of us out here in the hinderland will trust the Japanese before we'll trust the NSA, the President, or those stupid Fortune 50 companies you're so proud of.  >This may seem surprising to some here, but I suggest most corporations would >feel the same way. Most/many/some (pick one) corporations have an attitude >that the NSA is part of our government and "we support our government", as >one very famous CEO put it to me one day.  >Just some perspective from another point of view.  And since the Japanese corps aren't part of our "government/governors" they may be more trusted out htere than you are.   People are getting tired of this "be patriotic, do whatever we say without question, and pay more taxes" attitude that comes from America's political party... or should that be caste?  >--  >David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of >                         our information, errors and omissions excepted.
In article <1993Apr23.110149.29470@cs.aukuni.ac.nz> pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:  > >Something similar has happened to me - ages ago when we were working on PGP >we used to send short messages about development issues or simply to test  >new features around.  Now at this time PGP (and certainly the newer version) >was unknown over here.  Suddenly the admin at the site I was using received >a request that I stop sending encrypted email.  Now there is almost no way >that some automatic scanner could have found this, since they wouldn't have >known about PGP - they *must* have checked for unknown data types in the >message, tried to unscramble it, found they couldn't get past the PEM >armour part, and then contacted the sysadmin and asked me to stop.  Luckily >the current email carriers are less picky about what goes over their >networks :-).  Is the sending of encrypted traffic without government permission legal in New Zealand?  David
At the risk of getting lost in the clipper chip discussion I give a   summary on my recent question:  In article <PQSCBCNH@minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de> I wrote: > The recent discussion in this news group suggests that a key search > attack   > against DES is quite feasible now. But normally DES is applied in CBC or  > CFB   > mode where one chooses a random init vector of 8 bytes. Questions: >  >  - Makes it sense to handle the init vector as an additional key? Then > we have   > a 56 + 64 = 120 bit key. >   >  - If yes: Is anything known about the security of this key scheme? Can  > we   > break it faster than by exhaustive search through the 120 bit key space?  Unfortunately the answer is no - concealing the initialisation vector   essentially doesn't give any additional security. I got 3 answers (from   grady@netcom.com, Mark.Lomas@cl.cam.ac.uk, smb@research.att.com) that   opened my eyes. It's pretty simple:  Say E is encryption (and D decryption) with key K on 64-bit blocks.  Let c[0] be the initialisation vector, m[1], m[2], ... the message blocks, c[1], c[2], ... the cipher text blocks.  Then encryption in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode works by the formula     c[i] = E(m[i] XOR c[i-1]),  and decryption by     m[i] = c[i-1] XOR D(c[i]).  So if the attacker doesn't have c[0] this only affects the first message   block m[1]. But she can do her key search attack on m[2], m[3], ...  The situation in cipher feedback (CFB) mode is a bit more complicated but   similar and left as an exercise for the reader :-)  Finally there is the modified output feedback mode (OFB) where DES (or   whatever block cipher you use) simply acts as random generator by     s[i] = E(s[i-1]) with initialisation vector (= seed) s[0],  and encryption is given by     c[i] = m[i] XOR s[i].  Here the usual `known plaintext' attack against XOR-bitstream ciphers   reduces the cracking to key search for K.
For those of you looking for information on MS-DOS 6.0's file system compression API:  Today I called Microsoft's DOS 6.0 hotline at (800)228-7007. They told me that the DOS 6.0 Resource Kit had the specifications for the compression interface.  The Resource Kit costs $19.95, plus tax and $5 shipping.  I ordered a copy and will post further when I get it and know more about it.  I am posting now because the order turnaround is 15  working days.    If anyone knows for sure where's there's a good source of info on this API, please speak up.  I am  slightly skeptical about the Resource Kit's likelihood of having detailed programming info.  Mark R.  mrr@ripem.msu.edu
jhesse@netcom.com (John Hesse) writes: > Oh great. Wonderful news. Nobody can listen in--except the feds.   Hey, it's better than the status quo.  I am far less worried about "the feds" tapping my phone than high school  scanner surfers who get their kicks out of eavesdropping on cellular and  cordless phone calls.  It would be stupid to rely on even a "Clipperized" channel for truly  sensitive material, but it *does* seem to finally offer a reasonable way to  guard against casual eavesdropping.  For example, even with my strong "right  to bear arms" view of the private right to possess and use strong  cryptosystems, the system as described provides enough security that I would  actually buy a cordless phone, and would be much less wary of using cellular  phones, walkie-talkies, and so on.  As long as it's only used for mass-market  voice scrambling, I actually don't see a problem with it.  If you want more security than it offers, use something different.  Use PKCS  for electronic mail, CELP over DES or triple DES with Diffie-Hellman key  exchange for your voice traffic, or whatever.  And yes, I'd rather just see all crypto restrictions lifted, but this is at  least an incrememental improvement for certain applications...
In article <1993Apr20.014135.24134@fsl.noaa.gov> bear@kestrel.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles) writes:    In article <C5pstr.Lu2@panix.com> dfl@panix.com (Danny O'Bedlam) writes:    >	The algorithm is classified because a military contract (or similar    >government equivalent to military) has been let for this "proprietary"    >design that the Feds say that NSA developed.  Is there a patent?  Is that    >patent publicly available?  My betting is that that too is classified.     Unless there has been a _major_ change in the law, there's no such beast    as a "classified patent."  Patents exist to encourage communications and    develop the state of the art.   While there aren't classified patents, there are "patent secrecy orders".  Suppose you invent a voice scrambler for CB radio, and apply for a patent. The Patent Office decides the NSA might be interested, gives them a copy of your application, and you get a nice note back saying your patent application has now been classified for national security reasons and you're no longer allowed to make and sell it.   I'm picking this example because it happened in the late 1970s. It was probably some analog scrambler, and would have probably violated FCC rules anyway, but it did get classified.  Or suppose you publish a paper on your Really Spiffy Algorithm and then file a patent application.  Since it's been published, they can't gain anything by classifying it, though you can't get patents in most countries other than the US, where patent laws are different.  Obviously a system of classified patents would be highly bogus "You can't sell that widget, because there's a classified patent on it. You're not allowed to see the patent, or know who owns the design, so just give us all your money and work in progress and maybe we won't throw you in jail for espionage."  Some countries might have that kind of system :-(, but we don't have that here.  Quite.  Yet.