waashk/20ng huggingface dataset:
In article <strnlghtC5puCL.6Kp@netcom.com> strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: > In article <Apr18.204843.50316@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> > holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland) writes:   >>	Let me ask you this.  Would you trust Richard Nixon with your >>crypto keys?  I wouldn't.  > I take it you mean President Nixon, not private citizen Nixon. Sure. > Nothing I'm doing would be of the slightest interest to President Nixon .  Mr. Sternlight, your naivete and historical ignorance is appalling.  [ History lesson detailing 1968-74 deleted. ]
The key question is whether non-Clipper encryption will be made illegal.  >     The Administration is not saying, "since encryption >     threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, >     we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have >     effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every >     American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an >     unbreakable commercial encryption product."  There is a >     false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is >     an "either-or" proposition.  Rather, both concerns can be, >     and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, >     balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper >     Chip" and similar encryption techniques.  The clear middle ground implied by these statements is to say that Americans have the right to Clipper encryption, but not to unbreakable encryption. This implies that, ultimately, non-Clipper strong encryption must become illegal.  (As an aside, isn't the language here jarring?  All this talk about "harmonious balance" when they're talking about taking away people's right to communications privacy?)  Although the article emphasizes voice communication, data and mail encryption is mentioned as well:  >Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to >protect electronic funds transfer.  It is now being used to >protect electronic mail and computer files.  >     --   the privacy of our citizens, including the need to >          employ voice or data encryption for business purposes;  It looks like the worst nightmares raised by Dorothy Denning's proposals are coming true.  If the government continues on this course, I imagine that we will see strong cryptography made illegal.  Encryption programs for disk files and email, as well as software to allow for encrypted voice communications, will be distributed only through the "underground".  People will have to learn how to hide the fact that they are protecting their privacy.  It's shocking and frightening to see that this is actually happening here.
In article <1993Apr22.022324.17172@news.clarkson.edu> tuinstra@signal.ece.clarkson.edu.soe writes:  > >From these figures, estimate the number of Clipper-tap requests the FBI >is expecting.  Publish this figure.  Compare it on a per-capita basis >with the amount of tapping now known or suspected.  The Attorney General publishes the number of court-ordered taps each year. It isn't enough (around a thousand) for the average non-crook, non-spy to worry about. In fact, considering any reasonable guess about the number of big-time crooks and spies around, it may not be enough even for most crooks and spies to worry about.  There's no reason to believe that it will go up with Clipper, since the number of taps now includes many targets too stupid to use encryption (based on the playbacks we've heard in court cases).  David
gtoal@gtoal.com (Graham Toal) writes: >Can someone tell me if hardware compression is or is not needed to run >digital speech down 14.4K?  I think it is; I've heard it's not.  Lets >say 8 bit samples.  Would *raw* data at the corresponding sampling rate >be usable?  If not, how fancy does the compression need to be?  A good vocoder like ours will give you 8000 bits per second locked at full rate (it's a variable rate voice activity vocoder).  If you want less quality, cut that to 4000 bps (half rate).  At full rate variable you could put two full-duplex conversations on a V.32bis modem.  This requires a DSP or ASICs, though.  An RS-6000 has a CPU that could probably do it in real-time, because it has the add-and-multiply instruction and a few other DSP things.  If you want to do speech in real-time you need about 4000 samples a second (for not very good voice) with your 8 bit samples (ISDN is 8000 8-bit samples a second), which is 32 kbps.  You could do a fast 2:1 compression on that to get it down to 16 kbps, which is just about V.32bis.  The quality at this point is very bleah, but it should work. Now add in the time for your encryption method.  You're going to need sampling hardware, which is no problem on a new Mac, an Amiga.  Or a PC with a SoundBlaster card (just because they're so popular and cheap - you could also build a simple ADC).  The problem with the SoundBlaster is that it doesn't seem to be full duplex - you can't sample and play backq at the same time, making a two-way conversation a bit tough.  The special hardware or a more capable sound card may be required.  The only thing that worries me is that 2:1 compression - the SoundBlaster can do it automatically in hardware, but other than that I don't have a good feel for how processor intensive it is, so I can't estimate how fast a PC you'd need.
In article <1993Apr26.063532.10120@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)   writes: > In article <C614BJ.BK6@agora.rain.com> jhart@agora.rain.com (Jim Hart)   writes: > >"The security of the system should depend only on the secrecy of > >the keys and not on the secrecy of the algorithms" -- Dorothy Denning >  > Cite source, please.  Dorothy Denning, _Cryptography and Data Security_, 1982, Addison Wesley. Page 8, under the heading "Cryptosystems must satisfy three general requirements.  The other two are efficiency and ease of use.
In article <1993Apr4.221640.8104@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes: >I guess we will have to wait for the time in the far future >when everyone uses such good crypto that the NSA has no job.  Then the >agency will be disbanded and its files opened after the approprate >historical delay.  ;)  You've overlooked a fundamental Truth:  	both headcount and budget of any government agency are 	monotonic increasing functions.  Given that Truth, you need to look for what the agency can do to occupy all those people and spend all that money when crypto is unbreakable.  Perhaps they could talk the world's telephone companies into making equipment they could break into and tap.  Maybe they could convince people that distributed computing was a good idea so that even the internal state of a process would be available for access by wiretapping.  Maybe....
In article <1993Apr22.194121.25386@nynexst.com>, rsilvers@nynexst.com (Robert Silvers) writes: ... > 	Send something to Rush Linbaugh about Clinton taking away our right > to privacy and how if the govt. standard takes off, only people with lots > of money (drug dealers) will be able to justify DES stuff.  He will slam > Clinton for this on the air.  Well, lets for a hypothetical put our selves in the place of the US end of the drug rings. What do we do about the Cripple chip? First off, we would express disaproval to our congress critters, and remind them of the large sums of money our legitimate co.s provide to their campain coffers. We would also let them know via the 'other' channels that a) their income is about to take a hit, and b) their health may not be too good either.  But just in case, the next obvious step to take is to BUY Mycotoxic and VLSI! Yeah, free enterprise at work. :-) Now they have the Cripple in their pockets, literaly as well as figurativly. Tough about the masses though.
brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:  [...] >And of course you have to identify yourself to the phone company, and >since the phone company complies with court orders, they will know the >magic number of your chip when they sign out a warrant on you, and >then can present the warrant to the key escrow house.    Who makes them forget and destroy all copies of the key once they've decided you're not a criminal today?  Just curious. >--  >Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Sunnyvale, CA 408/296-0366 ------- Any views expressed are those of myself and not my employer. -------- Steven C. Johnson, WB3IRU / VK2GDS      | TRW                                     | johnson@trwacs.fp.trw.com FP1 / 3133                              |         [129.193.172.90] 1 Federal Systems Park Drive            | Phone:        +1 (703) 968.1000 Fairfax, Virginia  22033-4412  U.S.A.   | Fax:          +1 (703) 803.5189
In article <tenneyC62HqH.6s1@netcom.com> Glenn S. Tenney, tenney@netcom.com writes: > of interest.  I understand that on 29 April, Mr. Markey will be holding a > hearing on the questions raised in this letter.  There may also be a follow-on > hearing dedicated to the clipper chip, but that's not definite.  Glenn,  Thanks for posting that.  I was surprised to notice, however, that one question I might have expected to be asked was not:  "Are all forms of strong encryption other than the Clipper to be made illegal?"  Speaking of which, is anyone aware of whether that question *has* been asked of any knowledgeable or official spokesperson for the government?  I have not yet seen it mentioned in any of a dozen places it might have been reported, but I could have easily missed it.
Stupid me. I believed the Democrats stood for principles of personal privacy while it was the Neanderthal Republicans that wanted into every aspect of our lives.   Clinton is just more clever than the other guy. Looks like gun control for privacy technology. One small step at a time.  Wait a minute....  Let me think about this.  Hmmm, I feel better now. I believe the White House when they tell us this first step is, in fact, the final step. All is OK. We've nothing to fear. They're here to help us.   God bless America. --  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Hesse           |          A man,      jhesse@netcom.com    |                 a plan,  Moss Beach, Calif    |                         a canal, Bob.
I am looking for some Public Domain (and exportable) code for encryption.  Nothing elaborate, just something that will satisfy a marketing need :-) Oh yes, UNIX platform.
>>I am postive someone will correct me if I am wrong, but doesn't the Fifth >>also cover not being forced to do actions that are self-incriminating? > >[From Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>, posted with permission - Carl] > >Sadly, it does not. Suspects can be compelled to give handwriting and >voice exemplars, and to take blood and DNA tests.  I am sure that Mike is correct on this point.  I am also pretty sure that administering "truth serum" would be ruled a violation of your right not to incriminate yourself.  But, what is the salient difference? Both drawing blood and injecting "truth serum" incapacitate you for a while, but do no permanent damage.  Is it simply that we have come to view one as acceptable, while the other is viewed as a fundamental violation of one's rights?  If this is the case, how do we expand the protections of the 5th amendment to incorporate new technologies without the results being a hodgepodge of different judges personal opinions?
In article <nagleC5w79E.7HL@netcom.com> nagle@netcom.com (John Nagle) writes: :       Since the law requires that wiretaps be requested by the Executive :Branch and approved by the Judicial Branch, it seems clear that one :of the key registering bodies should be under the control of the :Judicial Branch.  I suggest the Supreme Court, or, regionally, the :Courts of Appeal.  More specifically, the offices of their Clerks.  I've got a better idea.  We give one set to the KGB c/o Washington embassy, and the other set to the Red chinese.
I've seen PGP 2.2 mentioned for the Mac platform. I use 2.0 on MS/DOS. Is there a 2.2 for MS/DOS? If so, a site or two that has it available (I'd need executables, although source would be nice to review). What was "fixed" or changed from 2.0 > 2.2?
brad@optilink.COM (Brad Yearwood) writes:  > Criminals who very badly want inscrutable tactical communications (specificall > the terrorists and drug dealers who proponents of key escrow cite as threats) > will be highly motivated to steal the cipher phone of a legitimate user, and > to kill this person or hold them hostage so discovery of compromise of the > device will be delayed.  Why doing it in such a rough manner? It is much more professional to steal the chip from the phone and even to replace it with a pin-compatible do-nothing chip that does not encrypt at all. Chances are that the victim will not notice anything, especially if it is done professionally.  > Once a suitable collection of devices is stolen, criminals can communicate > with impunity (assuming the cipher system carries no trapdoors apart from > key escrow) until and unless the compromise is discovered by some other means.  No, because the Feds will still be able to decrypt the conversations. True, they'll blame the wrong guys, but nevertheless one cannot say something like "The drugs arrive tommorrow on the ship 'Terminus'" when the Feds are listening, even if they cannot identify who the speaker is.  No, the criminals will just use some secure encryption. The new proposal does not stop criminals; it ensures that the government will be able to wiretap the average citizen and stops the casual snooper. To me, it also clearly looks as a step towards outlawing any other strong encryption devices.  Regards, Vesselin
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >Two safeguards:  >1. The FBI could be asked to produce the law enforcement block to the escrow >agencies, and associate it with a particular court order;  Exactly what would that show, ?! the "law enforcement block" is easy to create, given the Government key and any serial number.   >2. If the thing comes to trial the defense attorneys can probe this issue >closely. It is not too different from proving that the speaker on a legal >wiretap is the person the court order covered.  *IF* it comes to trail about the wiretap.... ya, some safegaurd that is. What if they just harass people as a result, or learn things they shouldn't have learned, etc?   >Putting it another way, this question is not very different from the >pre-clipper question "What's to prevent the FBI from getting a court order >to tap Al Capone and then using it to tap Jonathan Livingstone Seagull >instead?"  The whole point of the Escrow system is to prevent the FBI from making  illegal wiretaps. Why not have the FBI holds the keys and that's it? Why do we need the escrow system at all?  Unless a 3rd party (a judge) verifies that the requested serial number is "right", and the FBI can get any key they like at anytime, the escrow system is useless.
random@presto.UUCP (Jeff W. Hyche) writes: >Yes, "Clipper" is a trademark of Intergraph.  Its the RISC chip used >in some of thier workstations.  I wonder what Intergraph is going to >do to this infringement on thier name sake?  Probably keep quiet and take it, lest they get their kneecaps busted.
In article <1993Apr20.203756.20667@kronos.arc.nasa.gov> hanson@kronos.arc.nasa.gov (Robin Hanson) writes: >I'm attempting to write a serious policy paper examining whether the >proposed wiretap (or "Clipper") chip is a cost-effective tool for >police investigation.  That is, ignoring concerns about government >intrusions into individual privacy, is the value of easy wiretaps to >investigators greater than the cost to the communications industry, >and their customers, to support this wiretap technology?   > >A rough estimate suggests that wiretaps are worth about five million >dollars per year to U.S. law enforcement agencies.  (In 1990, 872 U.S. >wiretaps led to 2057 arrests, while total police expenditures of $28 >billion led to 11.25 million arrests [ref US Statistical Abstracts].) >I'm working on estimating this wiretap benefit more accurately, but >I'd like to ask hardware experts out there to help me with estimating >the costs of the new proposed wiretap technology. > >Please send me quotable/citeable estimates for: > >- How many chips which would need to be made per year to keep all >  phones with wiretap chips? >- How much would it cost to make each chip? >- How much did it cost to develop this technology in the first place? >- How much more would supporting hardware, people, etc. cost, per chip? >- What percentage cheaper would encryption chips and support have been >  if private enterprise could compete to meet customer encryption needs? >- What percentage of phone traffic would be taken up by the proposed >  "law enforcement blocks"? >- What is the total cost of handling all phone traffic per year? > >Put another way, the question I'm asking is, what if each police >agency that wanted a particular wiretap had to pay for it, being >charged their share of the full social cost of forcing communication >to be wiretap compatible?  Would they choose to buy such wiretaps, or >would they find it more cost-effective to instead investigate crimes >in other ways? >--  >Robin Hanson  hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov  >415-604-3361  MS-269-2, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035 >510-651-7483  47164 Male Terrace, Fremont, CA  94539-7921   First, what the fuck is NASA doing wasting my tax dollars doing policy papers on stuff far outside of their purvew/mission?                                                                           Second, this isn't a problem of economics.  This is a problem of the incremental accumulation of police-state powers by our government.   How, exactly, do you put a price on the loss of freedom of a society? Maybe use the dollars/life lost calculations for the extra people killed by the gov.  The pain and suffering cases for those tortured. The dollars/life lost caused by the inevitable collapse of the economy, and all the secondary effects of diseases, diet, etc.  Plus, the inevitable collapse of the economy as the gov controls it, becomes  corrupt, etc.  Do us a favor.  Resign rather than right this paper for NASA.  Go do useful work for the society.  lew
In article <1993Apr21.132318.16981@ulysses.att.com> smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: >Remember that they've promised to let a committee of outside experts see >the cryptosystem design.  I hope there are some silicon jocks on the committee who can follow the algorithm through to hardware.  While I doubt the NSA would pull any monkey business on this point -- they have to expect that the chip will be reverse-engineered sooner or later -- it's an obvious opportunity to introduce additional holes.  >		--Steve Bellovin
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:  > Nothing I'm doing would be of the slightest interest to President Nixon .  A typical example of seep-minded thinking. We all know that David Sternlight is a jerk, but I'm afraid that in this case 90% of the population will think like him. Realize it guys - NSA, Dorothy Denning, and the US government have already won the battle...  Unless... unless you succeed to wake up the people... but nah, that's too unlikely... The events are happening too fast, cryptography is a too sophisticated issue, and almost nobody cares anyway... A few thousand of net.readers won't make the difference, if millions are caught asleep... Too sad... :-(((((  Regards, Vesselin
In article <1993Apr25.024032.26935@ringer.cs.utsa.edu> whughes@lonestar.utsa.edu writes:  >In article <1993Apr24.233742.26839@lehman.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com   > ...the basic idea behind any communications security system is not >to absolutely deny access, but to make access more expensive (in time, >money, manpower) than it is worth. > True of all security sytems, I think, and it is the fundamental measure to  be used in establishing a requisite security level.  --
In article <1993Apr19.093227.1093@jarvis.csri.toronto.edu> lewis@eecg.toronto.edu (david lewis) writes: >In article <16BB51156.C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu> C445585@mizzou1.missouri.edu (John Kelsey) writes: >>  >>strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >>> [..stuff deleted] >>But who would >>trust his/her confidential information to an encryption scheme that, for >>(say) $100,000 could by cracked one time in a hundred?  (DES, for all the >>complaints about a 56-bit key, would probably cost several million dollars >>to build a keysearch machine for.) >>  > >I can buy a DES keysearch machine off the shelf now for approx $500K, but >it is not sold by that name. Go buy a circuit emulation machine (eg. Quickturn) >containing a bunch of FPGAs, (say 500 to 1000 3090's), and program each >to be a DES search engine. Lets say 500 chips, running at 10Mhz = 5G tests/sec. >Time is 14e6 sec max = 23 weeks, 12 weeks average. Can't wait that long? >Buy a bigger machine. > Oh, but can Big Brother afford such things in these times of tight budgets?  I don't know how many folks noticed it, but Dorothy "Trust Me" Denning gave a real clue to the current state of the art at NSA on decrypto machines when she said the NSA told her they didn't even want to be the holder of any part of the key.    Now why is that?  I doubt there is a trapdoor in Skipjack.  (But we will never know).  And I doubt the NSA would promote a mass market chip they couldn't compromise.  Ergo, NSA is now capable of compromising (probably with brute force keysearch) engines of the complexity of Skipjack.  Look at the specs.  Why, I bet they have thousands of little chips chugging away in their crypto busters... Maybe even tens of thousands.  Complexity? Not much more than a 3090.  How many such machines will fit into Fort Meade?  I think PGP2.3 should have 256 bit IDEA keys...
In article <1993Apr21.222016.18990@leland.Stanford.EDU>, arc@leland.Stanford.EDU (Andrew Richard Conway) writes: > I must protest your "...in a Communist country". How do you know? > There haven't been any, and are unlikely to ever be any. In some Socialist > dictatorships, you can't, whilst in some socialist democracies > (such as France or Australia) > you can. Of course, some people may disagree about France & Australia being > socialist... >  > >it, (or rather, you're complaining about it) and nobody is shooting at us.   >  > Yet. >  > >GUESS WHAT PEOPLE?  You live in one of the few countries in the world > >where a person can complain without getting shot at.   >  > In some circumstances. I was at a public meeting last night (in the USA), where > a protester, who was very nice and calm, and just said before the > speaker started to beware of his opinions, was forced out of the meeting by > two armed policemen. >  > There are a lot of things that one cannot do in the USA. You may not > notice them, but as an Australian visitor, I notice them. >  >  > Of course don't over react --- but don't under react. >  Thank you Andrew.  Not only for the firm rebuttal, but for understanding the  difference between communism and socialism (even though this is off topic). Why do people just not understand that just because all those pretty songs about the land of the free and so on sound nice, that they may not be true? Take off those rose colored glasses and get a clue (to use two of the better  cliches around) thanks you again jamie
In article <a_rubin.735496128@dsg4.dse.beckman.com> a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) writes:  > >I wouldn't think so.  Asking people to trust a secret algorithm seems >unsound to me.  Maybe so, but it's quite common. There are millions of Macintosh users who have no idea what's in Apple's patented ROMs. Many have modems connected. How do you know all your business secrets aren't being stolen? Answer: 1. Because you trust Apple; 2. Because if any such attempt, however sophicsticated, came out, it would destroy Apple's credibility forever.  In the Clipper case, a representative body of experts is going to be allowed to audit it, and we'll have assurances (maybe even from the President) that other than the escrowed keys there are no back doors. While some may not have confidence in that (I am not among them), it's a lot more assurance than we get for many things we routinely trust in everyday life.  David