Consumer complaint received 2022-11-24 00:00:00
Product: Checking or savings account — Checking account
Issue: Managing an account — Deposits and withdrawals
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: TX

Complaint narrative:
WIRE TRANSFER FRAUD of {$24000.00} On XX/XX/2022 ( Friday ) at XXXX I received a phone call from a lady at XXXX ( Wells Fargo XXXX calling to 'verify recent activity ' on my business checking account ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The lady is from the WF Fraud Department and proceeds to ask me whether I purchased a XXXX XXXX ticket for {$500.00} in very clear normal American English. I said no. She commented 'So you are not arranging for travels in XXXX XXXX Ohio area? ' I said no. Then she asked if I had XXXXmade an online purchase of {$9.00} from South Carolina XXXX? I said no, I am in Texas, and have not made any of these purchases. She proceeds to explain with confirmation that my bank account has indeed been compromised possibly through my debit card and starts rolling through a process of verification inquiries to get in front of the fraud and 'reverse the transactions '. 

She asked me if I had my main phone with me that is tied to the account so she could send me identification verifications, which will included the six-digit code verification. I said yes. She explained she was going to send me the text verification. I then receive two text messages from her back-to-back at XXXX inside a text string from a previous wire I legitimately sent out on XX/XX/2022 earlier in the week ( lending legitimacy to her being a WF employee ). This first text message says I added XXXX XXXX to my account as a wire transfer recipient. The second text comes right behind it saying XXXXYou sent a Wells Fargo wire transfer of {$24000.00} '. She asks me to 're-verify ' that I did not initiate this wire. I said no I did not. She explains that we need to begin the process for the fraud claim and verify which transactions are, or are not, mine for the claim. In authenticating the transactions ( which she makes sound like an oath of some sorts ), it requires my six-digit code from my XXXX security fob for verification, which I happen to have in my brief case, and provide to her. She proceeds going through legitimate transactions that are legitimately mine ( she is definitely in my account ) that only I would know the details, amounts, dates, etc. She starts reconfirming my basic address and account details ( lending more legitimacy ). At one point she asks me to reconfirm my password on the bank account, which I refuse, and it raises a caution flag in my mind. But she says 'No problem, we can continue with other forms of verification ' and she proceeds going through details about wire recipients entered into my account by me, saying peoples names I clearly recognize in my bank account roster of wires ( lending definite credibility further that she is in my bank account ). 

She goes through a one-hour process ( two phones calls that were exactly 30 minutes each, followed with a 4 minute third call afterward ) of 'escalating the fraud claim ', which she puts me on hold several times for short periods. I also receive an incoming call on my cellphone at XXXX from another WF phone number ( XXXX ) and ask the lady if I should answer it and she very professionally says No, we are already handling it, stay with me here, so I reject the call and it goes to voicemail ( 22 second voicemail from XXXX at WF ). Toward the end of the call, she comes on a few times once mentioning that we have the Federal Reserve on the other line preparing to stop the transfer and to hold tight. Then she comes back and explains we are almost finished and inquires if I am going to need access to the account over the weekend because they have also contacted the FBI and they want to shadow my account in conjunction with WF to do a sting on the perpetrator. I tell her that I should be in good shape through the middle of next week using my credit card on another account. She requests that I stay off my online account and WF cellphone app until she calls me back Monday morning with the outcome. She also mentions that they will also need me to sign an affidavit on Monday, as well. I confirm that I will be on standby and we end the series of calls. 

Monday I never receive the call. I am busy and think nothing of it because in my mind, I am in good hands. Tuesday, same thing, plus I am not sure who to contact inside WF. Wednesday ( XX/XX/2022 ), thinking nothing of it but needing to start accessing my bank account going into XXXX commitments, I contact WF and start a process for an hour of being passed around because the fraud department is not linked to the new online department, and one does not know what they other on handles, but one girl initially comments that she shows activity regarding my account on Friday, XX/XX/2022. Thinking all is well I begin what becomes a two ( 2 ) hour process of collectively finding out that US {$24000.00} has been stolen from my account. After being passed around multiple times at WF, the last representative still seems confused and thinks I authorized the wire and is wondering why we are on the call, which is obviously very frustrating for me. I DID NOT AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO MY ACCOUNT NOR THE WIRE TRANSFER. I finally re-explain what has happened and ask him if they/he has a claim number that I need to make note of, which he provides to me. He confirms that they should be able to reverse the transaction that apparently went to XXXX XXXX  XXXX. My bank account has been closed and will change to a new account once I visit a local WF branch in XXXX, Texas area. 

COMMENTS : 1. Seems to me the banks need to make an arrangement with the cellphone companies whereby valid bank phone numbers come up on our phones with a green shield verifying it is a legitimate bank phone number similar to the shield you see when you visit a legitimate banking website. 

2. It is my opinion that there needs to be better communication on whether the RSA fob is used ONLY for wire transfers, or is it used for wire transfers AND identification verification. I still do not know this answer and when I contacted my WF XXXX banker ( who issued me the fob/ great guyXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX following the fraud experience, he did not seem to know either. 

3. I am glad to assist if it is helpful to overcome these kind of frauds

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation