Consumer complaint received 2022-01-20 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Mobile or digital wallet
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: IL

Complaint narrative:
On XX/XX/XXXX @ XXXX XXXX, I was contacted by an entity claiming to be the Wells Fargo XXXX prevention department XXXX The number calling me was the number I had recognized as Wells Fargo 's fraud prevention line ( they had called me a few weeks earlier to report a fraudulent charge on my account, so I was already familiar with the process ). After going through a process to confirm my identity ( e.g., asking me to confirm my address ) that was familiar to me because I had just gone through it with the real XXXX XXXX department just a few weeks prior, the person calling said that an individual had initiated a deduction of XXXX dollars via XXXX from my account to an account in Florida affiliated with XXXX XXXX and they had flagged the deduction as fraud and wanted to confirm. I said that I had not authorized this deduction. The man on the phone said that because the transaction had already initiated, the deduction was already pending, but he could reverse the transaction via XXXX by setting up a temporary account with an employee at XXXXXXXX XXXX. He led me through a series of steps which included me having to read a code texted to me, which I now recognize was me granting them access to my account via XXXX. They then directed me to make a series of XXXX XXXX payments to an account that had my name on XXXX, explaining that this was XXXXXXXX XXXX  crediting the money back to my account. I noticed that with each payment, my balance was getting lower, and just prior to the third deposit, I informed the man on the line that the third payment would overdraft my account, and I was confused. The man then hung up on me. 

Immediately after, I called Wells Fargo 's fraud department, where the woman on the line informed me that I had been in communication with fraudsters. I explained the above situation to her, and she opened up XXXX different cases ( XXXX for each transaction ). These case numbers were XXXX and XXXX. She informed me that if the case was not resolved within 7-10 business days, they would provide me with a temporary credit to my account. She confirmed that this date would be XX/XX/XXXX. 

Wells Fargo then sent me a letter in the mail ( dated XXXX ) informing me that they had closed the case and passed the matter onto XXXX, and said that XXXX would have to determine whether my lost funds could be returned to me. I followed up with them via phone ( today, XX/XX/XXXX ), where their fraud department repeated the above to me. They said they were no longer responsible for case, and that it was unlikely that I would see my money returned to me. I read them the following language from Regulation E word for word : " Regulation E defines an unauthorized EFT as an EFT from a consumers account initiated by a person other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and from which the consumer receives no benefit ... An unauthorized EFT includes a transfer initiated by a person who obtained the access device from the consumer through fraud or robbery. Similarly, when a consumer is fraudulently induced into sharing account access information with a third party, and a third party uses that information to make an EFT from the consumers account, the transfer is an unauthorized EFT under Regulation EXXXX For example, the Bureau is aware of the following situations where a third party has fraudulently obtained a consumers account access information, and thus, are considered unauthorized EFTs under Regulation E : ( 1 ) a third-party calling the consumer and pretending to be a representative from the consumers financial institution and then tricking the consumer into providing their account login information, texted account confirmation code, debit card number, or other information that could be used to initiate an EFT out of the consumers account, and ( 2 ) a third party using phishing or other methods to gain access to a consumers computer and observe the consumer entering account login information. EFTs stemming from these situations meet the Regulation E definition of unauthorized EFTs. '' I explained that the first example given was exactly what had happened to me per the notes that he had just read on my case, and he repeated again that Regulation E does not apply to my case. I informed the associate on the phone that I would be filing a complaint with the CFPB, because I was legally entitled to the funds being returned to my account, and ended the call. 

By my estimation, Wells Fargo has not only failed to properly correct what is plainly an unauthorized EFT by the definition set forth by the CFPB, but they also failed to follow the proper timeline for resolution, which according to 12 CFR 1005.11 ( c ) ( 1 ) should have been within one business day ( and therefore, XX/XX/XXXX at the latest ). In fact, when I initially reported the situation the evening of XX/XX/XXXX, the associate on the phone advised me that resolution might be a little slower " because it is a holiday weekend. '' XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX are not federal holidays, so I don't see how that should have impacted the timeline.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation