Consumer complaint received 2025-08-27 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Mobile or digital wallet
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: NH

Complaint narrative:
Additional Information Fraud Dispute ( CFPB Cases # XXXX & # XXXX ) Summary : Wells Fargo has formally denied my fraud claim for a {$10000.00} XX/XX/XXXX cash advance, stating it was customer authorized/ no error in processing. This is inconsistent with their own actions, since they already reversed the {$500.00} cash advance fee and all interest charges adjustments that would not have been made if the transaction were valid. I never received a genuine Wells Fargo fraud alert before the transaction was completed. On XX/XX/XXXX and XXXX, I received new genuine Wells Fargo texts from short code XXXX that appeared directly behind spoofed messages in the same thread. Wells Fargo has this additional information, yet still denies liability and continues to call the transaction customer authorized. 

Details : On a call with Wells Fargo Executive Office ( XXXX ) on XX/XX/2025, I was informed that my fraud claim has been formally denied. Wells Fargo is taking the position that the transaction was customer authorized/ no error in processing. 

This denial is inconsistent with Wells Fargos own actions. The bank has already reversed the {$500.00} cash advance fee and all related interest charges. If the transaction were truly valid, none of those adjustments would have been made. 

In addition, new evidence shows that the XXXX  spoofing vulnerability is ongoing. On XX/XX/XXXX and XXXX, 2025, I received legitimate Wells Fargo texts from short code XXXX that appeared directly behind spoofed texts in the same thread. Wells Fargo has this additional information, yet is still denying liability and insisting that the transaction was customer authorized. This proves that Wells Fargos messaging system remains vulnerable to spoofing, and that customers can not reasonably distinguish real alerts from fake ones in real time. I never received a genuine Wells Fargo fraud alert for the {$10000.00} transaction before it was completed only spoofed alerts that looked identical to the real ones. 

Most recently, in a denial letter dated XX/XX/2025, Wells Fargo only referenced the {$9800.00} transfer to XXXX XXXX, claiming it was customer authorized/ no error in processing. This letter makes no mention of the {$10000.00} credit card cash advance that was first moved into my checking account, even though that was also the fraudulent transaction I disputed. The XXXX XXXX transfer was only possible because of that initial {$10000.00} advance. I never requested or consented to the cash advance for my own benefit. The only reason I double-clicked was because I believed, based on instructions from individuals I thought were Wells Fargos fraud department, that I was stopping a fraud in progress. My so-called authorization was obtained entirely under deception and duress, which is not valid consent under Regulation Z. 

Adding to the inconsistency, when I read back the fraud alert I received to XXXX from Wells Fargos fraud department, she told me that one was from us. In reality, that alert was spoofed. This proves that even Wells Fargos own employees can not reliably distinguish between genuine and fraudulent alerts in real time. If XXXX was correct, it means Wells Fargos system allowed a spoofed alert to appear as genuine. If XXXX was mistaken, it means their own staff are misinforming customers during active fraud investigations. Either way, the failure lies with Wells Fargo not with me. 

I did not authorize this transaction. My so-called consent was obtained entirely through deception by scammers impersonating Wells Fargo using the banks own short codes. Under the Truth in Lending Act ( Regulation Z ), consent obtained through fraud or false pretenses is not valid authorization. 

I am making minimum payments under protest solely to protect my credit, but this should not be taken as acceptance of liability for this debt. 

Thank you for your continued attention. 

XXXX XXXX

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation