Consumer complaint received 2025-06-16 00:00:00
Product: Credit card — General-purpose credit card or charge card
Issue: Getting a credit card — Card opened without my consent or knowledge
Company: CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
State: NV

Complaint narrative:
Capital One opened a credit card account in my name using legacy data from a long-closed Kohls Charge account, without my consent and without any application submitted by me. 

I have not had an active Kohls account for years. I never applied for a new Capital One credit card, was never contacted about any application, and did not receive or activate any card. Despite that, a Capital One credit card account appeared on my credit report. 

Capital One acknowledges that this is a new account, not a conversion. However, I did not submit an application or authorize a credit inquiry. The account uses personal data from my childhoodincluding an outdated address tied to my original Kohls Charge account, which I havent lived at in over a decade.

I believe Capital One internally generated this account using archived Kohls customer data and treated it as a new application without my knowledge. This resembles a non-consensual or fabricated application, functionally similar to a passive account conversion, but falsely reported as a customer-initiated request. 

My credit reports now show hard inquiries from Capital One on both XXXX and XXXX, with no inquiry on XXXX, confirming a dual-bureau pull. This is standard for credit applicationsbut I never submitted XXXX, making these inquiries unauthorized. 

Capital One also claims that someone accessed my existing Capital One account portal ( for a legitimate, unrelated card ) and changed the mailing address to my childhood addressthe same address now linked to the newly opened card. They state this happened on the same day the application was submitted. 

I filed a fraud claim with Capital One, but I do not accept their explanation. It is implausible that a third party would have accessed my Capital One portal, updated the address to a location I havent lived at in over 10 years, and simultaneously submitted an application using my legal name, date of birth, and XXXX for the account to remain unused. 

To further support this, the credit card was mailed to my childhood address, where the current homeowners gave it to a longtime trusted neighbor. That neighbor sent me a photo of the mailed letter, and I instructed them to destroy itassuming at the time it was junk marketing material. I had no idea a legitimate account had been opened in my name. 

Several aspects of this case strongly suggest this was not external fraud, but rather an internal process failure or misconduct : The address change and card creation occurred the same day. 
The address reverted to my childhood home, not a current or known fraud location. 
The card was mailed there and retrieved by a trusted third party. 
The account has never been activated or usedunusual behavior for third-party fraud. 
Capital One already possessed all identifying data used to generate this account. 

In fact, XXXX separate legacy addresses from my Kohls Charge account were added to my Capital One account on the same day. XXXX was set as my new residential address, and the other was added as a new mailing address. However, my actual existing mailing address remained unchanged, leaving XXXX addresses total on file. 

The credit card was then mailed to the newly added residential addressnot my legitimate mailing address, and not even the newly added mailing address. This shows a highly specific, legacy-linked address configuration inconsistent with random or opportunistic identity theft. 

For external fraud to have occurred, a bad actor would have had to : Gain access to my existing Capital One login credentials, Possess detailed legacy data from my closed Kohls account, including XXXX old addresses, XXXX, full name, and XXXX, Choose to update Capital Ones internal records with those XXXX historical addresses while leaving my valid mailing address untouched, Open a new credit card without activating or using it in any way. 

These are XXXX entirely separate data entities, with no connection to each other except through Capital Ones internal systems. The only plausible point of overlap is inside Capital One 's infrastructure, further discrediting the theory of third-party identity theft. 

Additionally, when I called Capital Ones service department and escalated to a supervisor to request application details, I was told they could not provide any information unless I disclosed multiple pieces of legacy personal informationincluding old phone numbers, email addresses, and outdated residential data. I verbally confirmed some of this information, but expressed concern since their system had already notified me that the call was being recorded. I stated that I was not comfortable disclosing further sensitive personal history on a recorded line. 

At that point, the supervisors demeanor changed abruptly. She began repeatedly asking whether I was recording the call, despite the fact that I had made no indication whatsoever of doing so. She then stated that Capital Ones policy prohibits customers from recording conversations. Her sudden concern came only after I mentioned discomfort with being recordednot before. This exchange raised further concern that something being discussed in that call could be damaging if documented. 

Once all investigations are complete, I want confirmation that all data associated with this incidentincluding customer service call logs, chat logs, and account notesare purged from Capital Ones systems. I also intend to close my remaining Capital One account, as I no longer trust their ability to protect my data.

If this incident was not internally initiated by Capital One, then it raises even greater concernsbecause it would mean that a third party somehow gained access to a highly specific combination of : My legacy Kohls Charge Card data ( including XXXX addresses from over a decade ago ), And my current Capital One login credentials. 
These are XXXX 100 % separate data sets, with nothing connecting them other than Capital Ones internal systems. That possibility would indicate a severe breach of both legacy and active account systems. 

Finally, this does not appear to be an isolated incident. Across consumer forums and complaint sites, numerous Capital One and former Kohls Charge Card users are reporting similar issuessudden issuance of Capital One credit cards without notice, often using long-closed Kohls account data. In many cases, customers state that their Kohls Charge accounts were closed years ago, and yet they were issued a Capital One credit card, triggering a fraud referral when they called for explanation. 

While Capital One may technically have the legal right under their agreements to convert open Kohls Charge accounts into Capital One credit cards, these mass conversions have been occurring without consumer awareness, consent, or advance warning. Many affected customers report they were given no opportunity to opt out or prevent the change, which would have protected them from unwanted accounts. This behaviorthough potentially legalis ethically indefensible and reflects a clear willingness to prioritize internal business goals over customer transparency and autonomy. 

These conversions have spiked in recent months, precisely during the same period when this fraudulent account was opened in my name. I believe this points to a larger systemic pattern inside Capital Ones post-acquisition systems, and I am deeply concerned that internal actions are being misrepresented to consumers as external fraud. This issue warrants regulatory investigation and may represent early class action exposure for Capital One.

Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation