Consumer complaint received 2025-12-24 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Domestic (US) money transfer
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION
State: TX

Complaint narrative:
On XX/XX/XXXX, I was the victim of a highly sophisticated bank-impersonation scam in which individuals spoofed USAAs official customer-service phone number ( XXXX ), imitated USAAs fraud-alert text messaging format, and impersonated USAA fraud-department employees with highly detailed knowledge of USAA procedures. 
The scammers caused me to initiate a {$9500.00} wire transfer under the false belief that I was complying with USAAs fraud-prevention protocol to stop an attempted fraudulent wire. Although I physically entered the transfer details, the transaction was not truly authorized, because my consent was obtained through deception by people I believedreasonablyto be USAA representatives. 
Detailed Sequence of Events XXXX. At XXXXXXXX XXXX, I received a text message from ( XXXX ) XXXX that matched legitimate USAA fraud alerts I have received in the past. It stated I would receive a call from USAA. 
XXXX. At XXXXXXXX XXXX, I called USAA using their real number and was placed on hold. 
XXXX. At XXXXXXXX XXXX I received an incoming call from USAAs actual published number, XXXX, while I was still on hold. Caller ID displayed USAA. 
XXXX. Believing this to be USAA calling me back regarding the fraud alert ( as the text had indicated ), I answered. 
XXXX. Over the next XXXX minutes, XXXX individuals impersonated USAA fraud employees ( XXXX XXXX and another manager ). They had extremely detailed knowledge of the USAA mobile app and internal terminology, including guidance on account locking, device authorization, and XXXX XXXX XXXX. 
XXXX. They convinced me that : o a fraudulent {$9500.00} wire transfer had been attempted by someone named XXXX XXXX, o my accounts were locked and safe, and o I needed to cancel the fraudulent transfer through a controlled process that would generate a report for the FDIC and law enforcement. 
XXXX. They directed me to enter a wire transfer with routing number XXXX ( which they described as a cancellation code ), account number XXXX, and recipient name XXXX XXXX, claiming this was necessary to stop the fraud. 
XXXX. After the call ended abruptly, I contacted USAA and learned the transaction was fraudulent. 
USAA initiated a recall, but the receiving bank indicated the funds can only be returned if the scammer authorizes release, which is not realistic. USAA has refused reimbursement so far. 

The recall period has ended with no resolution. 

I received another fraud alert on XX/XX/XXXX and contacted USAA. This alert was real and triggered by an unauthorized log in attempt from another state on XX/XX/XXXX. The representative could not give an answer for why their system took 3 months to notify me of this occurrence. 

From the real interactions I have had with USAA representatives I have XXXX take-aways : XXXX. I am even more convinced that the XXXX men that scammed me were current or recently employed USAA employees due to their knowledge of USAA 's procedures and platforms. 
XXXX. I think they have been working my account for several months. Had the USAA fraud alert about the North Carolina log-in attempt happened in a timely manner, I would have been much more aware and sensitive to interactions concerning my accounts. My log in would have already been changed and I might have treated the spoofed call differently. 
XXXX. USAAs security protocols and protections are horribly lacking to protect members from modern day fraud.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation