Consumer complaint received 2026-04-11 00:00:00
Product: Checking or savings account — Savings account
Issue: Managing an account — Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed
Company: BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
State: TX

Complaint narrative:
CFPB Complaint Bank of America Wire Fraud Case Company : Bank of America Issue : Fraud / Unauthorized Transfers/ Scam ( XXXX XXXX ) Complaint : On XX/XX/year>, at approximately XXXXXXXX XXXX, I received a phone call from individuals impersonating Bank of Americas fraud department. The call lasted nearly three hours. During this time, I was manipulated through sophisticated social engineering tactics into initiating three wire transfers totaling {$40000.00}. This incident did not occur in isolation. In the three weeks leading up to this event, I had already been in direct contact with Bank of Americas legitimate fraud department on two separate occasions due to unauthorized debit card activity. A replacement card had been issued, yet fraudulent activity continued even before I received it. During one of those legitimate calls, a Bank of America representative advised that changing my account number might be necessary to secure my funds. The scammers used this exact context to gain my trust. They referenced fraudulent activity, asked security-style questions, and demonstrated knowledge of my account balances. I was then transferred to another individual who instructed me, step-by-step, within my Bank of America mobile app , to move my funds into what I was told were secure accounts while new account numbers were being generated. The caller explained that the account names appearing during the transfers were temporary internal designations and that the system would update within 48 hours. He also stated he would follow up with me to confirm completion. Before each transfer, he read disclosures that sounded consistent with legitimate bank procedures. Based on my recent legitimate interactions with Bank of Americas fraud department, the callers apparent knowledge of my accounts, the use of Bank of Americas own mobile platform, and the urgency tied to ongoing fraud on my account, I reasonably believed I was acting under the direction of Bank of America to protect my funds. Additionally, shortly after completing the transfers, I contacted Bank of America directly to confirm that the transactions had been completed, as I had been instructed that the process would take a couple of days and that I would receive a follow-up call that Friday. During this call, I asked the representative to verify the status of the transfers. The representative appeared alarmed and informed me that Bank of Americas fraud department does not schedule or conduct outbound follow-up calls of that nature. However, I had been told during the earlier interaction that a callback was scheduled, and my call records reflected a scheduled follow-up. That follow-up call did occur on the expected day, but when I answered, there was no response on the line. Later that same day, I contacted Bank of America directly and was informed that no such call had taken place and that the wire transfers were fraudulent. I immediately reported the incident and fully cooperated with the bank. However, Bank of America has since closed my claims after recovering only {$2200.00} total, leaving the vast majority of the {$40000.00} unrecovered. I am disputing this outcome. This was not a voluntary transaction in the traditional sense. I was deceived into acting under the belief that I was securing my funds through Bank of Americas fraud department during an active fraud situation on my account. Requested Resolution : A full reinvestigation of my claim A detailed explanation of how these transactions were determined to be authorized Documentation of any wire recall attempts and recovery efforts Consideration of reimbursement due to the fraudulent inducement and impersonation involved A review of whether adequate safeguards were in place given my recent fraud alerts and account activity I believe this situation warrants further review, as it involves impersonation of the bank, exploitation of an active fraud case, and manipulation through the banks own systems.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with monetary relief