Consumer complaint received 2026-04-08 00:00:00
Product: Checking or savings account — Checking account
Issue: Managing an account — Problem accessing account
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: MT

Complaint narrative:
Institution : Wells Fargo Bank , N.A . ( Account Takeover Department ) Nature of Complaint : I have held my Wells Fargo checking account for over 25 years. In that time, there have been no account lockouts, no significant fraud incidents, and the account has always been in good standing. Wells Fargo locked me out of both my personal and business checking accounts on XX/XX/year> without notification, despite my having authenticated every flagged transaction over the preceding week through multiple verification methods, including biometric facial recognition ( Face ID ), uploading my drivers license ( multiple times ), SMS text verification and providing my Social Security number, address, phone number, debit card number, and login credentials. Each flagged transaction was authenticated and released with the assurance that the card was reset and that these transactions would no longer be flagged. Subsequent attempts to resolve the lockout were met with unexplained procedural requirements, and a Wells Fargo representative terminated the call while I was mid-sentence. Chronology of Events Approximately XX/XX/XXXX XX/XX/year> : Wells Fargos fraud detection system repeatedly blocked legitimate transactions on my accounts because they deviated from my typical transaction pattern. Each time, I contacted Wells Fargo and satisfied their verification requirements, as described above. After each verification, the flagged transaction was released. April 6, 2026 : Wells Fargos Account Takeover Department disabled access to both accounts. I discovered this approximately 15 minutes before the department closed and was told I would have to call back the next business day. No escalation path or emergency accommodation was offered. XX/XX/year> : I called the Account Takeover Department and completed another full verification. The representative ( XXXX XXXX stated that the system would not allow him to restore access and offered two options : ( 1 ) call back after 24 to 48 hours, or ( 2 ) visit a branch in person with two forms of identification. He could not explain why waiting 24 to 48 hours would produce a different outcome than the current call. The nearest branch is approximately a two-hour round trip from my location, and I was unable to travel that day due to medical appointments, making the earliest possible resolution XX/XX/year> a lockout of at least two full days. The representative also confirmed that during the lockout, all customer-initiated transactions including deposits, bill payments, and wire transfers would be blocked. Only previously established automatic transactions would continue to process. As a direct result, a {$35000.00} wire transfer I had initiated from XXXX XXXX was blocked by Wells Fargo upon arrival. Premature call termination : While I was mid-sentence asking a clarifying question about the callback option, the representative interrupted with a scripted closing and disconnected the call. I had been polite and cooperative throughout the interaction, which is verifiable on Wells Fargos recorded call log. Concerns 1. Disregard for extensive prior authentication. Over the preceding week, I authenticated my identity through every method available to me, including biometric facial recognition a verification method that can not be circumvented without the account holders physical presence. Despite this and all other verification requests that I satisfied, Wells Fargo account takeover department imposed a full account lockout and then required yet another round of verification that its own representative was unable to use to restore access. 2. Blocking of incoming funds. Wells Fargo confirmed that customer-initiated deposits and wire transfers would be blocked during the lockout. A {$35000.00} wire transfer from XXXX XXXX was blocked as a result. Blocking incoming funds that the account holder has independently initiated from a verified external institution goes beyond any reasonable fraud prevention measure. 3. No viable remote resolution. The Account Takeover Department could not restore access by phone, could not explain why a 24-to-48-hour delay would change that outcome, and offered in-person branch verification as the recommended alternative. For customers in rural areas, this imposes a significant time and travel/costs burden that extends the lockout period. 4. Unprofessional con duct. The representative disconnected the call while I was mid-sentence asking a legitimate question, which is essentially hanging up on me. This interaction is documented on Wells Fargos call recording system. 5. Overly sensitive fraud detection. The fraud detection system flags transactions solely because they deviate from an established pattern and does not appear to incorporate prior authentication events into subsequent risk assessments. This creates a cycle of repeated blocks and verifications with no resolution, ultimately culminating in a full account lockout despite the customer having satisfied every verification request. Regulatory Basis This complaint is filed pursuant to the OCCs supervisory authority over national banks under 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq. and the CFPBs authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act ( 12 U.S.C. 5536 ) to address unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices ( UDAAP ). Wells Fargos conduct as described above causes substantial risk and potential for injury to consumers that is not reasonably avoidable and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation