Consumer complaint received 2026-04-10 00:00:00
Product: Checking or savings account — Savings account
Issue: Managing an account — Deposits and withdrawals
Company: TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION
State: FL

Complaint narrative:
I am reporting a {$60000.00} fraudulent HELOC disbursement that Truist Bank failed to prevent despite direct and timely notice. This incident represents the third material fraud event affecting our accounts in XXXX, establishing a clear pattern of ongoing identity compromise and, more importantly, a failure by Truist to implement and enforce adequate safeguards after explicit notice of that compromise. XXXX. XX/XX/XXXX : Approximately {$18000.00} was fraudulently withdrawn from our money market account. In response, we closed all accounts, opened new accounts, changed all credentials, and implemented two-factor authentication and transaction alerts. XXXX. XX/XX/XXXX : A {$20000.00} fraudulent bill pay transaction was initiated. Truist subsequently determined that a fraudulent online banking profile had been established using stolen identity credentials in XX/XX/XXXX. We appeared in person at a Truist branch and expressly required that no new online access be permitted absent in-person identity verification with photo identification. XXXX. XX/XX/XXXX ( Current Incident ) : A fraudulent HELOC advance of {$60000.00} was initiated. On XX/XX/XXXX ( yesterday ), we identified this transaction while still pending and spent approximately three hours on the phone with Truist representatives, including a supervisor within the Escalation Department. During that call, we were explicitly advised that : o The fraudulent access had been identified and terminated ; and o The pending transaction would be stopped and would not be processed. These representations were false. The following morning ( today ), the transaction was processed in full and immediately transferred out of the account in XXXX installments : o {$1100.00} ( test transfer ) o {$58000.00} ( primary transfer ) The funds were transferred to an account at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX under the name XXXX XXXX XXXX. I have spent the entire day today from XXXX XXXX to now XXXX XXXX trying to prevent this pending transfer from occurring, including well over 4 hours on the phone with several representatives from Truist Bank. I explicitly requested many times that Truist initiate a same-day interbank fraud recall and contact the fraud department at XXXX ( the receiving bank ) directly to prevent the fraudulent transfer before it is completed. I was repeatedly informed that Truists policy is to wait until the transfer is completed ( and {$60000.00} is successfully removed from my savings account ), then initiate a fraud investigation. My wife spoke to a representative at XXXX who explained that this type of fraudulent activityspecifically involving Truist Bankhas been increasingly common recently. I have filed a police report, a report with IC3, and a report with IdentityTheft.gov. I have sought aggressively and unsuccessfully to escalate my request inside Truist. Finally, in defeat, settling for sending a secure message on their online portal to document the situation. This matter is not a routine fraud claim. It involves affirmative failure by Truist to act after direct notice of a known fraudulent transaction, failure to enforce previously established account restrictions, and refusal to prevent the fraudulent transfer from being completed by instituting an interbank fraud recall. This is incompetence and gross negligence.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation