Consumer complaint received 2022-06-07 00:00:00
Product: Debt collection — Medical debt
Issue: False statements or representation — Attempted to collect wrong amount
Company: Tesla, Inc.
State: CA

Complaint narrative:
XXXX XXXX is owed, and been blocked from accessing, and receiving his medical paperwork from Tesla Clinic. 

In process of debt collection, seeking service and contract for worker 's compensation benefits ( from injury while working at Tesla and requiring augmented work schedule, receiving treatment at Tesla Clinic for that injury, and still unhealed from that injury happening on XXXX, overtime, XXXX. XXXX XXXX contacted a variety of personnel, including security personnel, to figure out what the issue is in accessing his own medical records, from injury from working at Tesla, and receiving treatment at Tesla clinic ( while requiring augmented work schedule ), and has yet to provide a solution. 

This behavior is especially problematic in context of both XXXX XXXX, and XXXX " engaging in repeated, and discriminatory refusal of service in context of debt collection, as well as service and a XXXX man, and injured workers right to contract regarding workers compensation ( from injury while working at Tesla. Because of their own 100+ Unruh violations they are incurring their own debt owed XXXX XXXX XXXX per CA Unruh statutory minimums alone of $ XXXX {>= $1,000,000}, not including 1981, per their discriminatory refusal of contract, and services. XXXX XXXX XXXX has an affirmative duty to serve all persons, and injured workers who contract with them ( as instructed by State of California, and joint employers ) when holding itself out as a public accommodation business, and in California all California residents per Unruh. They are violating that duty by unjustly, and without basis refusing service to XXXX XXXX ( an injured worker, and Citizen ). 
XXXX people have an affirmative right to contract protected under 1981, and Unruh, as well as elsewhere ( that had to affirmatively be put into Federal Statute due to the unjust practices in our Country like those exhibited by XXXX XXXX ). XXXX XXXX publicly pronounces that it provides workers compensation service to all interested customers and seeks the public 's business. Plaintiff, XXXX XXXX XXXX, a self disclosed, and acknowledged XXXX man sought, and used, XXXX XXXX services, an enterprise affected with the public interests service from this public accommodation business, and speaking directly with their representatives on multiple occasions. XXXX XXXX was treated in a differential, substandard, and intentionally discriminatory manner in comparison to nearly every other customer, and injured worker. See Stringer v. Combe , Inc., XXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees that [ A ] ll persons shall have the same rights to make and enforce contracts as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX citizens ). 
Unfortunately, defendant XXXX XXXX intentionally discriminated against XXXX XXXX, a XXXX man who is also recovering from injury due to being injured while working at Tesla, under Federal, and State law ( including violating Unruh Civil Rights Act ( Civ.Code, 51, 52 ) ). Denial of service ( private or public ) is a fundamental, textbook, example of discrimination, and cognizable harm. XXXX XXXX. XXXX? XXXX ( XXXX XXXX only pies ) ; https : XXXX? XXXX ( XXXX Movie CLIP - Application ( XXXX ) - XXXX XXXX ; Voter Registration ) XXXX XXXX XXXX See Brown v. FPI Mgmt., Inc., Case No XXXX : XXXX, at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  . XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( Plaintiff 's race discrimination claims are ones of targeted discrimination ). See also Lemmons v. Ace Hardware Corporation, XXXX XXXX. XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX, XXXX ) ( The purpose of the Unruh Act " is to compel a recognition of the equality of citizens in the right to the peculiar service offered '' by the entities covered by the Act. Marina Point , Ltd. v. Wolfson, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX ). ) XXXX XXXX intentionally discriminatory [ i.e. against public policy ] conduct ( refusal of service, blocked app usage, refusal to communicate nor answer even basic questions that they have duty to anser, to deprive Plaintiff, a XXXX man, of Constitutional right to contract ). See Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co. , Inc. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ( We conclude that [ Plaintiff ] presented sufficient direct evidence to support an inference that [ Companys ] decision to [ act intentionally discriminatorily ] was based on the fact [ of protected characteristics ] ) XXXX XXXX failed its affirmative duty to serve All customers by refusing to serve, or enter contract ( i.e. process his orders ). See Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ( outright denial of services is certainly a sufficient basis for finding a 1981 violation ) See e.g. Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ( See, e.g., Joseph v. New York Yankees P'shp, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX Dist Lexis XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX ) ( plaintiff denied entry to restaurant ) ; Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX XXXX ) ( plaintiff 's required to pre-pay for their food ) ; Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers , Ltd., XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX ( XXXX XXXXXXXX ) ( XXXX Americans required to show passport to enter store, while white customers allowed to enter without such restrictions ). ) Because intentional discrimination by XXXX XXXX is not normal expected business practices, violates public policy, and invokes a Federal Question, 1981, and Unruhs claims for relief are allowable. See U.S. Fidelity and Guar. v. Lee Invest. LSS, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( 9th Cir. 2011 )

See also Int'l Union of Elec , Radio Mach . Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB , XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX n. * ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ). XXXX XXXX specific Intentional Discriminatory conduct to refuse, deny, and block service to Plaintiff, a self disclosed XXXX man, for purpose of depriving his Constitutional rights ( i.e. right to contract under 42 USC section 1981, and Unruh ), which independently violates public policy, and is seperate conduct from normal business practice in receipt of workers compensation benefits from injuries at Tesla, creates liability. See also U.S. Fidelity and Guar.

v. Lee Invest. LSS, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX Cir. XXXX ) ( [ S ] tate law may not control or limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The district court 's jurisdiction is a creature of federal law under Article III and 28 U.S.C. 133 [ 1 ]. Pursuant to the supremacy clause, section 133 [ 1 ] preempts any contrary state law ... the California Supreme Court has confirmed that " [ c ] auses of action seeking to recover " [ e ] conomic or contract damages incurred independent of any " workplace injury are... exempt from workers ' compensation exclusivity. '' ) See also e.g. Ali v. Cooper, XXXX. XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not precluded by the workers ' compensation doctrine when it is based on discriminatory conduct that violates public policy. ( discriminatory conduct violating public policy " can not be considered a normal part of the employment relationship and the plaintiff 's remedy is not confined to workers ' compensation " ) ) Because the cause of action is beyond the scope of the XXXX XXXX XXXX, it is actually Improper for intentional discrimination ( or analogously bad faith, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, rescission, or claims for other monetary relief ) to be heard in XXXX XXXX, and should not be remanded, nor dismissed, and instead heard in Federal Court. See U.S. Fidelity and Guar. v. Lee Invest. LSS, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) ( That statutory restriction on the federal courts ' removal jurisdiction " does not prohibit plaintiffs from filing such actions directly in federal court. '' Id. Nor did the district court appear, deus ex machina, to wrest control over the litigation from the State Board. Rather, it addressed the issues put before it in an original federal proceeding... California law does not authorize the State Board to award the damages for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. " " [ T ] he [ State Board ] can not award damages for injuries. ' .... [ A ] civil suit for damages is no more a claim for workers ' compensation benefits than a criminal or disciplinary action is a civil suit for damages. " ) ; cf. United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R D Latex Corp., XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXXXXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ( " `when other claims are joined with an action for declaratory relief ( e.g., bad faith, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, rescission, or claims for other monetary relief ), the district court should not, as a general rule, remand or decline to entertain the claim for declaratory relief '' ( quoting Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) ). See Walton v. Mead, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( A public policy is fundamental if it has a basis in constitutional or statutory provisions. See Maynard v. City of San Jose, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX  XXXX ) ( citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) ). In XXXX, the court held that plaintiff 's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress were not preempted by workers ' compensation because the claims were based on conduct that implicated public policy, namely retaliating against employees who oppose or participate in the investigation of discriminatory practices under California Civil Code section 12940 ( f ). Id. at 1406-07. Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant denied benefits on the basis of plaintiff 's race and gender. 
Taken as true, defendant 's conduct constitutes a violation of California civil code section 51. 
Plaintiff 's other causes of action, with the exception of defamation, are all based on defendant 's alleged discriminatory conduct and thus arise out of conduct that implicates a fundamental public policy. Defendant 's motion to dismiss plaintiff 's claims under the exclusivity provisions of the XXXX is DENIED. ) XXXX XXXX Claim for Relief against XXXX XXXX, Intentional Discrimination under 42 Section 1981 ( right to contract including services like basic communication, account setup, terms of contract, trouble shootting, etc ), and simultaneous Unruh Violations are specific, factual, and supported by specific holdings, and statutes ( from Supreme Court down ) and thus surpassed the Plausibility Standards. See Stringer v. Combe , Inc., XXXX. XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( violation of XXXX XXXX. XXXX, which guarantees that [ A ] ll persons shall have the same rights to make and enforce contracts as [ XXXX ] hite citizens ). See also XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX New Hampshire XXXX XXXX, Case No. : XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( insurers have been held liable for after attempting to induce an insured to surrender his policy by sending false and threatening letters, XXXX v. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX, XXXX XXXX. App. XXXX XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX XXXX. XXXX ), frivolously delaying XXXX payments despite knowledge of the insured 's " fragile condition, '' Hernandez v. General Adjustment Bureau, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX XXXX. XXXX ), or by rescinding coverage without good cause after learning that an insured has suffered an accident. ). XXXX XXXX Claim for Relief against XXXX XXXX for Intentional Discrimination includes detailed information about Defendants conduct treating Plaintiff ( a self disclosed, and acknowledged by Defendant, XXXX man ) in an inferior manner as compared to similarly situated others, ( i.e. flat out refused, denied, and blocked service, access to app, or communication after multiple follow ups, and escalations ) to not only surpass Pluasibility standards, but to put Defendant on Notice ( although they failed to provide a defense ). See also Department of Justice Civil Rights Division publishes Title IX Legal Manual and Revised Title VI Legal Manual ( The provision of fewer or inferior services or benefits to a person or class of persons will satisfy the adversity requirement ). See also Serrano v. Francis, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) ; Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX  XXXX ) ; North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX  XXXX ). ( A plaintiff may establish an equal protection claim by showing that the plaintiff was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of his membership in a protected class. ) The harm need not be physical in nature, or even the type of harm that would permit an award of compensatory damages. For example, the Supreme Court has held that intentional XXXX segregation is a harm in and of itself. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ). Similarly, the stigma that intentional discrimination may cause is a cognizable harm. See generally Johnson v. California, XXXX XXXX. 
XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX ). See also Miller v. Fairchild Industries , Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) ( A plaintiff with a cause of action under section XXXX is entitled to equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and possibly punitive damages. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ). ordinary contract damages would not provide an incentive to XXXX to avoid breach and would not make the plaintiffs " whole '' ; ) See also Tibbs v. Great American Ins. Co., XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX Cir. XXXX ) ( consciously disregarded XXXX 's rights and was therefore guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. Thus, the district court properly instructed the jury on punitive damages and substantial evidence supports the jury 's punitive damage award. ) See also Ali v. Cooper, XXXX. XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( Cf. Marshall v. Am. 
Hosp. Ass'n, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) ( circumstantial evidence such as " sudden change in attitude upon disclosure that the plaintiff is [ a ] member of a protected class '' permits inference of discrimination when otherwise unexplained ) ; Hofmann v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Case No. XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( " suspicious timing '' supports inference of discrimination ). ) Defendants sudden change in attitude [ and subsequent refusal, denial, blocking service ] upon disclosure that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, as a XXXX man, via providing all required information ( including disclosure via work badge, and other background information that Plaintiff is a XXXX man who was still injured to the point of requiring an augmented work schedule ) supports the reasonable, and logical, inference that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff, under Federal, and State law ( including violating Unruh Civil Rights Act ( Civ.Code, 51, 52 ) ). See Brown v. FPI Mgmt., Inc. , Case No. : XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX. 
XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( Plaintiff 's race discrimination claims are ones of targeted discrimination ). Defendants engaged in unconstitutional, and intentionally discriminatory conduct to prevent access, availability and deprive of several enumerated constitutional rights. See General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( 1982 ) ( We have held that both 1981 and 1982 " prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein. '' Jones v. Alfred H.

Mayer Co., XXXX XXXX, at XXXX. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency , Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) ; Runyon v. McCrary , XXXX XXXX XXXX at XXXX. ) [ B ] ecause [ P ] laintiff [ a member of protected classes, suffered due to defendants intentional overt, and covert acts through refusal, runaround, silence, denial, stalling blocking ) .. [ is ] deprived of the right to contract ) and prevented, .. at different stages of the process. See Stringer v. Combe , Inc., XXXX. XXXX, XXXX XXXXXXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) Plaintiff followed up in writing, via phone, and other methods to independently attempt to get right enforced ( without litigation ), but Defendant continually refused to respond appropriately, and denied service, and ultimately the right to contract, that is provided to all similarly situated injured workers ( treating Plaintiff in an inferior manner ). Plaintiff was deprived right to contract with workers compensation insurers after being injured, provided instruction for Insurers by both employer and State of California, and subsequently filing for insurance benefits based on Plaintiffs wages from work at Tesla. See Stringer v. Combe , Inc., XXXX. XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees that all persons shall have the same rights to make and enforce contracts as white citizens.T ] he term 'make and enforce contracts ' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. '' Id. ; see also Flores v. City of Westminster, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX Cir. XXXX ). To state a claim under Section 1981 : ( 1 ) the plaintiff must be a member of a XXXX minority ; ( 2 ) the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race ; and ( 3 ) the discrimination concerns one of the activities enumerated in the statute which includes the right to make and enforce contracts. Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX 
XXXX ) ; see also Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXXth Cir. XXXX ) ( plaintiff must prove, in denial of services by a commercial establishment case under 1981, " ( 1 ) it is a member of a protected class, ( 2 ) it attempted to contract for certain services, and ( 3 ) it was denied the right to contract for those services. '' ). ) XXXX XXXX, not only subsequently deprived XXXX XXXX as a customer, XXXX man, and injured worker and intentionally discriminated, in making, performance, modification, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship, ... excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently ... denied the right to contract for those services ; deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not, but did so in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory to to deprive Plaintiff of Federal Rights. See Bill v. Berkeley United School District, XXXX XXXX XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( XXXX, however, Congress " overturned XXXX by defining the key make and enforce contracts ' language in 1981 to include the termination of contracts and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship ' ''. 
Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX ), citing, 42 USC 1981 ( b ). ) See also 42 U.S.C. 1981. ( A claim of intentional discrimination under 1981 [ where ] denied [ or ] deprived of services .., or received services in a markedly hostile manner ). See also Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. 
XXXX ) ( adapting the prima facie elements to claims of XXXX discrimination in nonemployment situations ) ... .excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently ) See also Gratz v. Bollinger XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) See XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX, XXXX See also e.g. Wayne Merritt Motor Co. , Inc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., Case No. : XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( Richardson v. Employers Liab.

Assur. Corp., XXXX XXXX. App. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ( finding bad faith [ similar to overlapping intentionally discriminatory conduct ] on the part of an insurer that withheld payment knowing that benefits were owed, forced an arbitration hearing despite having no defense and required plaintiffs to resort to litigation to have the award judicially confirmed ). ) XXXX XXXX discriminatory refusal, denial, and block of service which is separate, and a prerequisite, to any distribution of workers compensation benefits is analogous to a Doctors office who discriminatorily refuses to book an appointment, before any potential for a doctors wrongful conduct in the provision of service, or a school registrars office discriminatory refusal to register for classes, before any potential professors wrongful conduct in the provision of service of teaching, that form of discrimination alone can trigger liability separate and dictinct from the latter. See Walton v. Mead, NoXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( An employee may maintain a private cause of action against the insurer when the insurer commits wrongful acts that are independent of its role as insurer of workers ' compensation benefits ) See e.g. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. v. Lee Invest. 
XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX ) ( However, the federal action did not involve an adjudication of the Employee 's workers ' compensation benefits ; it addressed. 
misrepresentation. Thus, this action did not " arise under '' California 's workers ' compensation laws. Because XXXX XXXX actions toward XXXX XXXX resulted in the " actual loss of a contract interest, '' under section 1981, ( via blocking, refusal of service, and denial of service, etc. ) it not only qualifies under intentional XXXX deprivation of right to contract, but also differentiates from instructive, even if not controlling cases ( i.e. XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, etc. ) whereas those Plaintiffs had not been denied admittance, benefits, or service as Plaintiff experienced in these set of facts. 
See e.g. Pendleton v. City of Casey, NO : XXXX, XXXX XXXXXXXX ( XXXX. XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX denied the benefits of these contracts because of his race. ) ; Ramirez v. Kornegay, XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XX/XX/XXXX ) ( XXXX discrimination is prohibited in the making and enforcement of contracts. 42 U.S.C. 1981. XXXX XXXX XXXX ] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in fact ] presents evidence of [ both ] a contractual relationship or attempted contractual relationship ) ; Jeffrey v. Home Depot U.S.A. , Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( S.D. Cal. XXXX ) ( [ XXXX XXXX XXXX ] result [ ed ] in the " actual loss of a contract interest. '' See XXXX, XXXX XXXX at XXXX ( citing Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon , XXXX  XXXX XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ) [ Because ] plaintiff is.. deprived of the right to make and enforce a contract, there is.. violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1981. " ) ; XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXXXXXX ( [ XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX was not served, thus deprived. 
[ DISTINGUISHED from ] XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX ( granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant restaurant because the plaintiff was eventually served his food, albeit slower than non-minority customers [ whereas Plaintiff was not only not served, but blocked from obtaining service via denial, refusal, blocking in the app, account formation, etc. ] ) ; Berry v. Modesto Area Express Reg'l Transit, XXXX. XXXX, at XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX. 
XXXX. XXXX, XXXX ) ; XXXX, XXXX XXXX at XXXX [ XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX denied admittance or service [ DISTINGUISHED from ] ( upholding summary judgment for the defendant store because the plaintiffs " were denied neither admittance nor service, nor were they asked to leave '' ) ; Robertson v. Burger King , Inc. , XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX ) ( [ XXXX XXXX, denied admittance or service. Robertson v. Burger King , Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX ) ( granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant because, although the plaintiff received slow service, he was not denied admittance or service ) ; Cf. Hampton v.

Dillard Dep't Stores , Inc. , XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX ) ( upholding a jury award for violation of 1981 because a reasonable jury could conclude that a security guard 's search of the plaintiff 's bag interfered with the plaintiff 's redemption of a coupon, which constituted the benefit of a contract for the purchase of merchandise ). ) XXXX XXXX displayed discriminatory practices where they flat out refused, delayed or denied service, or communication on right to contract creating liability under Unruh and 1981. See Walton v.

Mead, No. XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ) ( Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act ( " UCRA '' ) by denying workers ' compensation benefits based on plaintiff 's race and gender. Defendant argues that the UCRA is inapplicable to workers ' compensation claims. The UCRA states that " All persons... are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, XXXX XXXX, religion, ancestry, national origin, XXXX, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. '' XXXX. XXXX. 
Code 51. The UCRA prevents discrimination in access to a business and its services. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX Cir. XXXX ) ;... The UCRA evidences concern not only with access to business establishments, but with equal treatment of patrons in all aspects of the business. See Koire v. Metro Car Wash, XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX ). " The primary purpose of the Unruh Act is to compel recognition of the equality of all persons in the right to the particular service offered by an organization. '' Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX ). On a plain reading of the statute, plaintiff 's allegation states a valid cause of action under the UCRA. See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX  XXXX. XXXX ) ( Plaintiff 's allegations that he was denied insurance based solely on his association with a person with a XXXX was sufficient to state a claim under the UCRA. ). ) Defendants deprivation of contract along with refusal of service, communication, and thus treatment and resources for effective treatment for that injury has perhaps prolonged, and compounded the initial injury for Plaintiff, a XXXX man who is also recovering from leg injuries at Tesla, not only triggers liability under 1981, and Unruh, ( denying Defendant 's motion ) but due to Defendants non-defense also leads to grant of Plaintiffs motion for Judgment in Plaintiffs favor. See Walton v. Mead, No. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 
XXXX, XXXX ) ( does not prohibit plaintiff from bringing a cause of action under the UCRA for defendant 's alleged discriminatory denial of workers ' compensation benefits because, as defendant previously asserts, plaintiff and XXXX did not have an employment relationship. Defendant 's motion to dismiss plaintiff 's cause of action under the UCRA is DENIED. ) Defendants willful, affirmative misconduct, included going out of their way to discriminatorily ( and willfully ) remove Plaintiff from account already establish, block Plaintiff from service, and affirmatively deprive Plaintiff from entering into contract without cause triggers intentional discrimination liability under Federal and State ( Unruh ) laws. See Cullen v. Netflix , Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) Greater L. A. Agency on Deafness , Inc. v. Cable News Network , Inc., XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ( XXXX, XXXX XXXX at XXXX ( Unruh Act claim [ requires ] alleging willful, affirmative misconduct ) ) See also Lemmons v. Ace Hardware Corporation , Case No. XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX. XXXX, XXXX ) ( The purpose of the Unruh Act " is to compel a recognition of the equality of citizens in the right to the peculiar service offered '' by the entities covered by the Act. Marina Point , Ltd. v. Wolfson, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX ( XXXX. XXXX ) ''

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation