Consumer complaint received 2025-12-03 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Domestic (US) money transfer
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: CA

Complaint narrative:
I am submitting this complaint because Wells Fargo denied reimbursement for a {$25000.00} fraudulent wire transfer that occurred on XXXX XXXX XXXX, even though the fraud was enabled in part by Wells Fargos own authentication failures and incorrect guidance from branch employees. 

This was not simply a customer-authorized scam. 
A fraudster was able to : impersonate me to Wells Fargos phone system prior to the wire obtain and recite non-public Wells Fargo transactional information guide me through steps that required access to my online banking profile initiate a wire draft inside my account trigger legitimate Wells Fargo alerts mislead me into believing they were a Wells Fargo fraud representative The fraud occurred in multiple stages, and Wells Fargos internal controls failed at several points. 

Key facts of the incident : On XX/XX/year>, I received legitimate Wells Fargo alerts stating a new wire recipient had been added. The alerts were real and reflected actual changes inside my online banking profile. 

I then received a call that my phones caller ID showed as Wells Fargos published fraud number. I later learned this was a fraudster impersonating the bank. 

The fraudster was able to recite my full SSN, address, employer, email, and my XXXX most recent transactions, as well as the current list of my wire and XXXX recipients. This is information not available through typical phishing or third-party breaches. 

The XXXX XXXX XXXX employee later informed me that my phone number had already called Wells Fargo earlier that day and had spoken to a Wells Fargo representative, even though I never made such a call. This indicates that a fraudster successfully passed Wells Fargos own phone-authentication process. 

While on the call with the impersonator, I was told a wire was being initiated and that I needed to log in to stop it. My XXXX  login had been unexpectedly disabled, so the impersonator walked me through a password reset. Under duress and believing I was speaking to the fraud department, I complied. 

Once logged in, I saw a screen with no recipient or routing informationonly a field where I was told to enter XXXX. I was told this step would block the fraudulent activity. I now understand this was the fraudster causing me to unknowingly authorize a wire. 

Immediately after realizing something was wrong, I went in person to the Wells Fargo XXXX XXXX XXXX. I put the impersonator on hold and explained to the teller ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ) what had happened. 

The teller told me the wire was pending but would not be processed, and that the fraud department was already handling it. I relied on this information. My account was closed and a new account opened. 

The next morning ( XX/XX/XXXX ), the wire nevertheless posted. I called Wells Fargo repeatedly and was told contradictory information, including that the funds could still be reversed during the claim period. 

Wells Fargos final determination stated no fraud occurred because my login credentials and one-time code were used. However, another Wells Fargo representative told me that a recall was requested with XXXX XXXX  but the funds had already been withdrawn. This directly conflicts with the position that the transaction was fully authorized and legitimate. 

Why I am requesting CFPB review : Wells Fargos denial does not address the central issues : A fraudster successfully authenticated themselves to Wells Fargo before the transaction, according to the branchs own records. 

The fraudster had internal Wells Fargo account information, including recent transaction history and recipient lists. 

I reported the fraud in person while the wire was still pending, and was told it would not post. 

Wells Fargo gave inconsistent statements regarding recall efforts and whether fraud occurred. 

The banks investigation did not evaluate its own authentication failure or the misinformation provided by branch staff. 

Wells Fargo relied solely on an outdated interpretation of UCC 4A without considering bank-assisted social engineering, misrepresentation by employees, or authentication breakdowns. 

I am requesting that the CFPB require Wells Fargo to reopen this claim and conduct a full investigation into : The unauthorized caller who was authenticated by Wells Fargo earlier that day How the fraudster obtained non-public transactional data Why the wire was not stopped after I reported the fraud in person Why Wells Fargo staff reassured me that the wire would not be processed Why recall efforts contradict the banks stance that no fraud occurred Whether Wells Fargos security procedures were commercially reasonable under UCC 4A-202 in light of the known impersonation and authentication failure

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation