Consumer complaint received 2025-10-15 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Mobile or digital wallet
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: NH

Complaint narrative:
This is my fifth and final complaint regarding Wells Fargos handling of claim # XXXX. I am not restating every prior detail I am documenting the specific contradictions and regulatory failures in the banks investigation. On XX/XX/XXXX, a {$10000.00} credit-card-to-checking transfer was initiated without my authorization. I received a real-time alert at XXXX XXXX., but my screenshots show the transaction was actually initiated at XXXXXXXX XXXX. I immediately replied N / No to the alert, yet the transfer was processed anyway. This means the fraudster was inside my online banking performing actions unbeknownst to me, exactly as Wells Fargo later admitted in writing. Wells Fargos denial letter states : They were in your account doing things unbeknownst to you. That is a direct admission of unauthorized access. Yet, in the same document, the bank declares the transaction customer authorized. These two statements can not both be true. Additionally, Wells Fargos correspondence incorrectly states that the XXXX XXXX transfer occurred on XX/XX/XXXX when in fact it occurred on XX/XX/XXXX the same day as the initial fraud. This false date further demonstrates that the banks investigation was careless and inaccurate. Their own letter also states : We informed you that another fraud department had disabled your online banking, but they were closed that day. We also did not know how you were able to speak with someone, as they are closed on weekends. That statement makes no sense if the fraud department was closed, how could it disable my account, and who did they think I was talking to? This internal confusion further proves that Wells Fargos own staff could not distinguish legitimate system actions from fraudulent ones during the incident. The bank has consistently focused only on the later {$9800.00} XXXX XXXX debit, ignoring the unauthorized {$10000.00} transfer that enabled it. The fraudsters transaction should have been stopped when I replied No. I am seeking independent regulatory review of Wells Fargos handling of this claim under 12 CFR 1005.11 ( Regulation E ), as their investigation appears to have ignored both real-time denial and evidence of system failure. Wells Fargos responses have been inconsistent and misleading. Their written communication admits that a fraudster accessed my account and initiated transactions unbeknownst to me, yet they concluded the case as customer authorized. The bank also misrepresented key dates, stating that the XXXX XXXX debit occurred on XX/XX/XXXX when it actually occurred on XX/XX/XXXX. They have also refused to explain why the alert was delayed by six minutes or why my No response was ignored. These procedural gaps directly undermine their determination and compliance with Regulation Es requirement for a good-faith, reasonable investigation. I am requesting that the CFPB review Wells Fargos handling of this claim for potential non-compliance with Regulation E ( 12 CFR 1005.11 ) and the CFPBs 2023 advisory opinion on consumer-information rights. Specifically, I request : a full explanation of why Wells Fargos system processed a transfer after a No response ; confirmation of whether the {$10000.00} credit-card transfer was properly classified as an unauthorized electronic fund transfer ; clarification on why the banks investigation listed the wrong transaction date and ignored evidence of real-time denial ; and independent verification that the investigation met regulatory standards. I am in the process of seeking legal representation, but I want this matter formally documented as a potential regulatory violation and mishandling of a consumer fraud claim. I have filed four prior CFPB complaints and contacted several media outlets due to Wells Fargos pattern of victim-blaming and refusal to honor consumer protections even while admitting in writing that fraudsters were in my account unbeknownst to me. Wells Fargos current stance sends the dangerous message that even when a customer declines a fraudulent transfer in real time, the bank can process it anyway and still call it authorized.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation