Consumer complaint received 2023-05-25 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Virtual currency
Issue: Other transaction problem — 
Company: Coinbase, Inc.
State: CA

Complaint narrative:
Commencing on or about XX/XX/XXXX, I fell victim to two multi-layered scam operations run by an entity presenting themselves as an employee from Coinbase named XXXX, which resulted in money being stolen from me for a total amount of XXXX USD from my Coinbase account to fraudulent entities. 
I have made numerous attempts to resolve the issue with Coinbase ( most notably, # XXXX XX/XX/XXXX and # XXXX ). Unfortunately, they said too bad even though the money went to another Coinbase account, they can not go into it. Their only suggestion was to file an FBI complaint. I filed twice and did not hear back from them. I also have my Congressperson pursuing the FBI and the FBI answer her saying can take 3-6 months. Then I had a British asset recovery company work on it and they found where two of the cryptos went. That information should give you a good head start. Coinbase again refused to check out the thieves Coinbase account.

Transaction I.D . ( Hash ) [ XXXX ], occurred on XX/XX/XXXX @ XXXX where the following address : XXXX sent XXXX BTC to multiple ( XXXX ) beneficiary addresses. One of these beneficiary addresses is : XXXX which received XXXX BTC Clustering techniques show that this receiving address is clustered with a wallet that is controlled by or under the ownership of Coinbase.com, therefore Coinbase must have internal KYC, ( Know your customer ) data and can establish from their internal records who or what entity holds the Coinbase account that had use of that address at that time. The second address ( ADA address ) is not complete in this picture, so I can not search for it using XXXX block explorer. ADA is not currently supported by XXXX XXXX so I am unable to comment further on this at this time. 
The third address [ XXXX ], is an Ethereum address. LINK is an XXXX token which is an extension of the XXXX protocol. This means that although it is a decentralized oracle token, it sits on the Ethereum Network where the transactions can be viewed. 
The XXXX LINK was moved to the above address at XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX. 
The above transaction shows the interaction between the sending Coinbase address being, [ XXXX ] to the LINK Smart contract where ultimately it is sent to the following beneficiary address [ XXXX ] This address interacts with the Chainlink protocol. ( A smart contract interaction so is more than likely an automatic transaction when using LINK ), and then sends all the LINK tokens back to the exact same address of [ XXXX ]. 
This occurs 4 minutes after the initial movement of funds at XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX. 
This beneficiary address can be shown to belong to or is under the control of Coinbase.com, seen as Coinbase 4 on XXXX, therefore, once again Coinbase must have internal KYC, ( Know your customer ) data and can establish from their internal records who or what entity holds the Coinbase account that had use of that address at that time. It is therefore possible to determine who had control of the BTC and LINK wallet that effectively stole these funds. A legal request to Coinbase.com using the relevant legislation instructed by a Lawyer on the two transactions outlined above should enable Coinbase to provide such data once they have interrogated their internal systems. It is a robust assumption to make that the same entity/person is also responsible for the theft of the ADA as all three currencies were stolen at the same time.

Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation