Consumer complaint received 2022-01-06 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Domestic (US) money transfer
Issue: Fraud or scam — 
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: MD

Complaint narrative:
On XX/XX/XXXX we accessed our account online at Wells Fargo Bank and discovered that fraudulent transactions were paid against our account using ACH debits on XX/XX/XXXX in the amounts of {$3500.00} & {$3700.00} ( ref # XXXX ). I telephoned Wells Fargos customer service to report the fraud and recover the funds. During that call I was asked to complete a verbal affidavit and was informed the bank would investigate and if the issues were not resolved within 10 days a provisional credit would be provided. No credit has been provided as of the date of this complaint. I also asked the bank to place an ACH block on the account to prevent any further fraudulent transactions. Instead, the representative, told me that they would put a stop-payment in place that would block any further loss from these vendors, I discovered they only placed the stop payment on the {$3500.00}. As I investigated further, I discovered that the ACH debit for {$3700.00}, had been paid twice, the first time on XX/XX/XXXX, of which I informed the bank. In the days that followed I began to receive contradictory notices from the bank. 
On XX/XX/XXXX we received a letter from the bank stating that the stop payment request failed because it was not reported in time enough for the bank to reverse the debit, ( it was reported the first business day after it was posted to the account ). This contradicted the notice which states fraudulent items need to be reported by the second business day, ( it posted on XX/XX/XXXX ). Furthermore, no action was taken on our request to place an ACH block on the account. On the same day we received a notice stating that the bank was not able to reimburse us because too much time had passed before we notified the bank of the fraudulent transactions ; the charges were posted on the night of XX/XX/XXXX and we notified the bank the morning of XX/XX/XXXX the next business day, and in fact the notice stated that we needed to report it the second business day, which suggest to us that no research was done and the bank dismissed our request outside of the guidelines of ACH regulations, reflected in the notice itself. 
On XX/XX/XXXX we reviewed our account and there were three additional fraudulent ACH debits charged against our account, in the amount of {$2400.00}, {$2700.00} & {$2200.00}, none of which would have been paid had the ACH block been enforce. We received additional notices on XX/XX/XXXX, that stated the bank had completed their research and determined that the 2 ACH debits of ( {$3700.00} ) totaling {$7500.00} were authorized and the case was considered closed. In the banks note, they stated that these ACH payment types, does not allow the bank to reverse authorization after the payment had been made. Once again representatives from the bank made statements that were not factual and denied us recovery of the funds that were stolen from our company. Even after having provided an affidavit that they were fraudulent & not authorized by our company or initiated by our clients the bank continued to imply we and our clients were complicit in the thief of funds from our account. When we asked how it was determined that these were authorized ; no documentary evidence was provided. By this time, our account was defrauded {$1800.00}. When we had no success with the normal fraud reporting process, we insisted that our case be escalated to the executive customer advocacy group. 
To our great disappointment the escalation to the executive advocacy group proved to be equally ineffective and served only to prolong our exposure to fraud at a bank that has no concept of customer advocacy. During this process we were bounced around to several representatives all of whom said the operating departments should have been able to resolve our issue. The representation that they would review the pattern & practice of our account and the recorded conversations throughout this process. The result of their review generated a letter on XX/XX/XXXX from XXXX XXXX, simply restating the erroneous conclusion of prior notice. A further illustration of the poor work quality of the advocacy groups is the letter on XX/XX/XXXX from XXXX XXXX, stating In your inquiry, you stated that your deposit account was closed with excessive overdrafts fees. We certainly understand your frustration regarding the concerns you referenced in your complaint. At Wells Fargo, we pride ourselves on developing and maintaining quality financial relationships. We apologize for any inconvenience you may have experienced. While we are aware this does not alleviate any frustration, your comments are truly appreciated, as they are critical to our continued growth and improvement. We are responding to your recent complaint dated XX/XX/XXXX. We have determined we previously addressed your concerns and did not find you enclosed any new information or provided significantly different details that would change our response. We addressed your previous inquiry and are enclosing our previous response dated XX/XX/XXXX. We have reviewed your account activity since our prior response and our decision remains the same. The problem with this response is that it has nothing to do with ACH fraud, our account was never closed, we had no O/D fees & reference # XXXX has no connection to our Claim. Other than the name and address all the information in this letter was incorrect. 
When we further escalated our concerns within the advocacy group and spoke with XXXX XXXX, the Complaints/EO Manager, she expressed concern about our prolonged dispute and asked us to allow her time to review tapes, notices and discuss the issues with her associates. She also represented that there was an alternative source that the bank could use to make us whole by reimbursing our {$18000.00}. A week later we followed up at which point she requested that we wait 10 days until after her vacation, at which point she would leverage this alternative source of reimbursement. After that time elapsed, she never called us back, so we pursued XXXX XXXX exchanging a series of emails and phone calls which comprised of our challenging their erroneous conclusions & failure to operate within the uniform commercial code governing commercial ACH transactions. Her contention surmounted in her implying we were complicit in the fraud, based on her communications with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX the company that received the funds from our account with whom we had no relationship. XXXX XXXX told us that XXXX provided a letter saying that we authorized them to create these transactions, which we assured her that we did not. She then forwarded a letter she received from XXXX. Which was ironic because we were receiving emails from XXXX inquiring about possible fraudulent ACH payments against our account and a fraudulent XXXX card in our company name that their fraud department were investigating. Therefore, the company XXXX XXXX was relaying on to dismiss our claims was simultaneously creating and investigating the fraudulent transactions in question. I have attached the email exchanges that illustrate the events. 
After we expressed our objection to the implication, we were complicit in the fraud to our account, another Wells Fargo associate sent a secure email informing us he would be our new point of contact however, he has never returned a phone call or email. 
We also know that no one reviewed the patterns and practices of our account, because if they had, they would know that we employ their secured direct payment service to make ongoing payments. Furthermore, two of the vendors names used in the fraud are registered on that system and have an audit trail of the dollar value & depository banks the funds would be directed. And the only other form of payments we use is our debit cards. It is an industry standard when conducting fraud investigations that the investigator reviews the patterns and practices of the account owner to discover abnormalities of transactions. The abnormal nature of these were apparent and the adherence to UCC ACH guidance was not correctly followed or applied. We have also submitted a police report on XX/XX/XXXX # XXXX. 
As a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX the way our claim was handled is one of the worst cases of customer service I have experienced. I retired from XXXX as a XXXX XXXX XXXX, during that time I spend 15 years as a XXXX in operations and cash management which affords me a depth of knowledge of how this fraud claim investigation should have been managed.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation