Consumer complaint received 2021-07-26 00:00:00
Product: Checking or savings account — Checking account
Issue: Closing an account — Can't close your account
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: WA

Complaint narrative:
In mid-XX/XX/2021, I received in the mail a routine monthly bank statement from Wells Fargo Bank showing that both a checking account and a savings account had been opened in my name, with XXXX  balances. 

I had NOT opened a checking and/or savings account with Wells Fargo Bank. 

I realized that someone had stolen my name and my personal information, my identity, and opened these accounts using my name. 

On a XX/XX/XXXX phone inquiry about this problem to a Wells Fargo central phone number, with my spouse on the line, I was passed from department to department to four different people over about 1-1/2 hours. None offered their names, but each had to be asked directly, and then they refused to provide more than their first names. Each one addressed me in an accusatory manner and demanded my Social Security number and my cell number, which I refused to provide. If they, in fact, have my SS number associated with the accounts in question, they should have proved to me that they had my number, not demanded that I reveal it to them. Also, they would not have my cell number as I rarely provide it to anyone, and certainly would never have provided it to Wells Fargo. 

Each one of these four individuals accused me of not cooperating! Then, they would escalate my call to the next individual. The first contact in this telephone ordeal was XXXX, who offered no help except to escalate the call to XXXX, who said the accounts were opened online. He, in turn, escalated the call to XXXX who identified herself as part of the identity theft team. She said she was opening an identity theft case, and then escalated the call to XXXX. 

Destiny was the culmination of this chain. She identified herself only as being in their " fraud '' department. She behaved throughout in a very nasty and rude manner. She demanded numerous times that I reveal my Social Security number and my cell number, which I again refused. 

At XXXX request, to further prove who I am to this fraud department clerk, we provided our Wells Fargo mortgage account number but she then refused to accept it as identifying us. She continued to belligerently refuse to address the fraudulent accounts problem except for acknowledging that these accounts are fraudulent and insisting repeatedly and abusively that I was a victim of identity theft and that my SS number was compromised. She refused to close the fraudulent accounts, however. 

The fact that XXXX was demanding sensitive personal information raises a question about her honesty and whether she is herself involved with fraud. The fact that she works in the fraud department does not prove that she is not involved in the very crimes she is supposed to remediate ; to the contrary, this position gives her unlimited access to personal information. 

On XX/XX/XXXX, the following day, we went in person to the local Wells Fargo branch in XXXX, WA, and spoke with a number of people, mainly XXXX XXXX, Service Manager, phone XXXX. She explained that there had been many such fraudulent accounts opened online at Wells Fargo in the area, most in XXXX XXXX, WA, but one or more all the way to XXXX, WA, about 60 miles and several counties distant. 

Ms. XXXX said there had been no activity on the accounts in my name. She placed a temporary block on the two accounts and referred further action to their fraud department. She promised that we would hear from them within 10 days. It is evident from our conversation with Ms. XXXX that none of the four fraud department employees had blocked the accounts during our telephone exchange the previous day, nor had they initiated an investigation. 

On XX/XX/XXXX, I received both a new monthly accounts statement indicating that the accounts were still open as of XX/XX/XXXX, and a vague letter from " Online Fraud Claims '' ( attached ). This letter, dated XX/XX/XXXX, states that " We have removed any information relating to the account ( s ) ... '' It does not state that the accounts had been closed and deleted from their system. 

Indeed, when we called the Wells Fargo automated phone system number on XX/XX/XXXX, the accounts continued to be reported current with zero balances. They were not closed and not deleted. A current follow-up by the regional manager confirmed that the accounts had not been closed as of XX/XX/XXXX. 

I have queried people at another local financial institution to see if they have experienced any such fraud. They told me that they have heard of it being prevalent at Wells Fargo, and perhaps one instance at another bank. 

We strongly believe that this fraud is coming from one or more Wells Fargo employees -- again. Wells Fargo has the servicing of our mortgage, so any of thousands of their employees with a password, whether assigned, borrowed, hacked or stolen, could get into the mortgage system and have access to SS numbers and a great deal of other personal information. They may use this information themselves, give it to someone they know, or sell it. 

How do I ensure that Wells Fargo closes and deletes all information related to these two accounts in its entirety? 

Dealing with Wells Fargo directly has proved to be virtually impossible. The local branch manager has attempted to be helpful by notifying the regional manager who, in turn, has undertaken the Herculean task of finding out what is going on. He has spoken with various people, including managers over the fraud department ( s ), but he has been stalled by statements that Wells Fargo is trying to have the credit inquiries made by Wells Fargo removed from my credit reports, that they are trying to catch the perpetrators, and that it takes 17-45 business days to close an account. 

From my direct experience, Wells Fargo has created a corporate shell game of departments and teams, all of which appear to be the same group of people. The obvious objective of this game is to evade responsibility or accountability for anything.

To reiterate, there is a very high probability that the perpetrator ( s ) who steal SS numbers and other personal identity information are Wells Fargo employees. They then use the information themselves to open these fraudulent accounts or provide the information to others who open the accounts.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with non-monetary relief