Consumer complaint received 2026-07-06 00:00:00
Product: Checking or savings account — Checking account
Issue: Problem with a lender or other company charging your account — Can't stop withdrawals from your account
Company: UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION
State: CO

Complaint narrative:
On XX/XX/XXXX, I was the victim of a sophisticated social engineering scam originating on XXXX XXXX. A scammer impersonating XXXX customer support sent me a spoofed email from " XXXX '' and then placed me in a live screen-sharing session, actively controlling my device and directing me to send three XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX {$3800.00}, funded directly from my USAA bank account. The recipients were XXXX XXXX ( {$1000.00} ), XXXX XXXX ( {$1400.00} ), and XXXX XXXX ( {$1400.00} ). I realized I had been scammed during the scam and called XXXX to stop the funds from being transfered. XXXX said because I selected " friends and family '' at the behest of the scammer that they weren't able to stop the funds from being transfered. XXXX told me to immediately call my back to put in a stop payment. I called USAA and requested to put a stop payment for all funds transferred through XXXX. The USAA rep told me it would go into effect the next day- which was Sunday. XX/XX/XXXX - Monday morning the funds had left my account in the total amount of {$3800.00}. I called USAA again and they had me file a fraud dispute claim to get my money back and I'd receive a desicion in a few days. On XX/XX/XXXX I received the following message : " We appreciate your patience while we researched the following dispute. Weve completed our investigation and found that no error occurred because the transaction was authorized and processed as requested. '' I then filed a formal written appeal on XX/XX/XXXX, citing Regulation E and the coercive nature of the screen-sharing consent obtained through criminal impersonation is not valid authorization. Copy of the appeal letter : " I am writing to formally appeal the denial of my recent fraud claim regarding three unauthorized peer-to-peer transfers totaling {$3800.00}, executed via XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX, and funded directly from my USAA bank account. I am requesting a full, manual re-investigation under federal Regulation E. This incident was not a case of buyers remorse or a freely authorized transaction ; it was a highly coercive Advanced Fee Fraud and Social Engineering scheme in which my consent was obtained entirely through criminal impersonation and deception. Consent obtained through fraud and impersonation does not constitute valid authorization under Regulation E. Chronological Timeline of the Fraud XX/XX/XXXX : XXXX XXXX Received a spoofed email from XXXX designed to look like official XXXX communications, claiming my account was frozen and required an upgrade to accept a business payment. I called the fraudulent support number listed in the email. The scammer placed me in a live screen-sharing session, actively controlling my device and dictating every action. Under the scammers direct instruction and real-time screen control, I was forced to send three rapid XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX {$1000.00}, then {$1400.00}, then {$1400.00} while being falsely assured the funds were secure and would be returned. I discovered the fraud when I XXXX the sender email address, found it flagged as a scam, and immediately ended the call. I then contacted XXXX, my bank, and my credit card company, filed a local police report and filed a report with the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ). Details of the Fraudulent Incident : Impersonation & Social Engineering : The perpetrator, using the name XXXX, manipulated me through XXXX XXXX under the guise of purchasing a listed dresser. Spoofed Communications & Coercion : I received spoofed emails designed to look exactly like official XXXX customer support communications, falsely stating my account was frozen and required an immediate upgrade to accept a business payment. Active Device Compromise via Screen-Sharing : I was instructed to call a fraudulent support line. The scammer forced me into a live screen-sharing session, actively dictating my every action, bypassing fraud warnings, and directing me to select Friends & Family payment types while falsely assuring me the funds were secure and would be fully returned. The Specific Transactions Being Appealed : Transaction 1 : {$1000.00} sent to XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX Transaction 2 : {$1400.00} sent to XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX Transaction 3 : {$1400.00} sent to XXXX XXXX XX/XX/XXXX Because these funds were extracted through active misrepresentation, criminal deception, and real-time technical manipulation via screen-sharing, I did not truly authorize these charges. My account was weaponized against me by an active malicious actor, and the authorization was obtained entirely by fraud. This is precisely the type of harm Regulation E exists to address. I have officially reported this crime to federal authorities. Attached to this letter, please find a full copy of my FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center ( XXXX ) Report, filed on XX/XX/XXXX ( Submission ID : XXXX ). I have reported this crime to the local police department here in XXXX XXXX and the tracking number is XXXX. Per my rights under federal consumer protection laws, I formally request copies of all documentation, transaction logs, and internal evidence USAA relied upon to issue the initial denial of this claim. '' I also filed a police report on XX/XX/XXXX. On XX/XX/XXXX - USAA denied my appeal as well, offering no adequate explanation. I requested information they used to make their decision and their response " The outcome of this dispute was based on the following : the disputed transaction was completed using authenticated credentials, confirming that the funds were moved with authorization. As a result, the transaction is considered valid. '' I had to call USAA at the end of XXXX as they had yet to process my appeal. I have also filed an FBI XXXX report ( Submission ID : XXXX ). USAA has failed to adequately investigate this claim or account for the fact that my authorization was obtained entirely through fraud and active device manipulation.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation