Consumer complaint received 2025-01-14 00:00:00
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service — Domestic (US) money transfer
Issue: Other transaction problem — 
Company: BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
State: CT

Complaint narrative:
I am writing to bring to your direct attention an ongoing SCAM/Fraud report and issue that has been pending since XX/XX/XXXX, without satisfactory resolution. 

While I will articulate the particular facts of this claim below, in essence the scam/fraud that was perpetrated on our XXXX year-old daughter, XXXX, on XX/XX/XXXX, mirrors ( almost to the very words the scammers utilized ) the fraudulent schemes utilizing the XXXX payment application that became prevelent approximately three years ago. 

While the instant scam/fraud utilized a wire transfer, completely emptying XXXX 's account of every dollar she had earned over the years or received as a gift from grandparents or family since her XXXX XXXX, the functional scam was exactly as occurred with the prior, nationally-publicized XXXX scams. Our daughter was so distraught being a victim of this scam that her mother was required to travel from Connecticut to XXXX, where XXXX currently attends college, to lend her emotional support. What is even more traumatizing is that Bank of America ( " BOA '' ) has been refusing to refund the account of the {$5000.00} stolen despite clear requirements under the EFTA, Regulation E, and despite the past news media focus on Bank of America 's response to the XXXX scandal where BOA, after being confronted by the news media, refunded various consumer accounts stating, in part, that BOA " considers each case individually '' and " compl [ ies ] with Regulation E ''.

Likewise, Connecticut 's U.S. XXXX XXXX XXXX, Chair of the Senate 's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, has repeated questioned Bank of America 's responses to these fraudulent transactions, and failure to consistently and timely reimburse victim accounts. While I have been hopeful that our particular claim would resolve without necessitating outreach to our local Connecticut news affiliates and XXXX XXXX 's office, as over one month has passed, I am becoming less optimistic that such will occur. 

For reference, the following is a summary of our underlying claim which is supported by the documentation within the attachment to this correspondence : On XX/XX/XXXX, XXXX XXXX received what would be discovered to be a fraudulent BOA Security alert notifying XXXX of both a XXXX debit transaction for {$430.00} and a wire payment for {$9400.00}, asking XXXX to reply whether she recognized this activity. XXXX replied no by text. 

The fraudulent party then immediately contacted XXXX by phone, coming from BOAs XXXX line and showing as Bank of America. Importantly, Account XXXX. XXXX did show a fraudulent XXXX {$430.00} charge that was debited to the account and declined. This indicates some access by the fraudulent party to Account XXXX. XXXX through debit card that further perpetuated this overall electronic fraud. 

When XXXX was on the telephone with the fraudulent party purporting to be from BOA, they walked XXXX through, online, what they represented to be a protection of XXXX account and restoration of the {$5000.00} ( representing all the funds in this account ) from the wire transfer. In fact, these instructions to restore the account funds was actually engaging in a fraudulent online wire transfer. Notably, as co-owner of this account, I, XXXX XXXX, never received any notification of these significant withdrawals. 

XXXX independently contacted me within an hour of this occurring and, at XXXX XXXX on XX/XX/XXXX, less than 90 minutes after the fraud occurred, I reported this to BOA to stop the wire transfer and restore the funds in the account. I was informed by the BOA agent at the time that this should occur and the funds should be in the account within 72 hours. BOA cancelled the account 's debit card and issued a new one. 

However, the next day, XX/XX/XXXX, I reviewed the account and saw that the wire transfer had completed. I called BOA again and was informed that no fraud claim had, in fact, been flagged to the wire transfer on XX/XX/XXXX, despite my immediate call. As a result, the wire transfer went through and a fraud claim was entered by BOA on XX/XX/XXXX. Had the claim been entered on XX/XX/XXXX when I contacted BOA, perhaps the transfer to XXXX Bank could have been prevented. 

On XX/XX/XXXX, BOA informed me that the initial claim had been " miscoded '' as a " fraud claim '' when, from BOA 's perspective, it should have been coded as a " scam claim ''. At that point, our claim was issued a new Claim Number - XXXX. 

It was only at that time ( 10 days after first being contacted by me, the account holder ) that BOA contacted XXXX XXXX about the fraudulent transaction. 

This claim clearly falls under the protections of the EFTA and its implementing regulation, Regulation E, as well as associated commentary as issued by the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau.

BOA was promptly notified of this fraud/scam within 90 minutes of its occurrence. BOA recklessly allowed the wire transfer to occur and did not timely notify the recipient bank, XXXXXXXX XXXX, of this fraudulent transaction until over ten days later. BOA staff has, much like in the XXXX cases, alternatively informed me when calling the BOA Fraud line that " you should be successful in recovering your funds '', " there is nothing BOA can do '', " BOA is dependent on XXXX XXXX '', and " BOA is only investigating 'as a courtesy to you ' ''. 


It is clear that this was a fraudulent online transaction addressed under the EFTA, involving deception in the perpetuation of an electronic fraud supported in part by a fraudulent debit card transaction in the amount of {$430.00} that was immediately refunded by BOA, where BOA was notified of the fraudulent transaction less than 90 minutes after it occurred but took absolutely no action to reverse. We are simply looking for restoration of these funds- {$5000.00} - to our account as required and expected. 

BOA has also taken the position that, when I first contacted BOA on XX/XX/XXXX ( again, less than 90 minutes after the fraud occurred ), the wire transfer was still " in process '' so they could not yet reverse the transfer. However, now, they claim that once the transfer is finalized, there is nothing they can do to recover funds if not in the recipient account... even though they could have ( and should have ) stopped the transfer from finalizing. This is our money in the account, for which BOA holds a fiduciary responsibility.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation