Starship Flight 13 — Twelve-Call Flight Review Sealed Before the Window · Scrub Recommendation · Starlink V3 Payload-Shortfall Headline
Sealed on: 2026-07-17
Claim: STARSHIP FLIGHT 13 — FLIGHT REVIEW & GO/NO-GO ASSESSMENT · SEALED BEFORE THE WINDOW

Vehicles: Super Heavy Booster 20 + Ship 40 (V3 architecture, Raptor 3), Starbase Pad 2. Profile: suborbital, ~65 min — hot-stage separation, booster boostback + soft Gulf splashdown, Ship SECO → Starlink V3 deploy (20 operational satellites, 6 camera-equipped) → single-Raptor vacuum relight → entry interface → controlled Indian Ocean splashdown. This is the first Starship flight carrying functional Starlink V3 satellites rather than mass simulators. Cargo consequence and programmatic precedent are materially higher than on any prior flight.

The committed probability envelope, sealed now and never revised: every graded call below carries a minimum probability of 0.78 — likely. Within the shifted regime from ≈T+6 to ≈T+11 minutes, every called class rises to 0.90 — very likely, returning to 0.78 thereafter. These expectations stand despite all remedies undertaken after the 16 July abort, including the two-engine replacement.

Twelve graded calls are marked ▶. Each grades after the flight from public evidence — webcast, SpaceX statements, independent tracking — regardless of outcome, misses kept at full weight. Together they are one described timeline, to be laid over the actual flight phase by phase and graded in place. Scope: Call 1 is specific to the 20 July window; all flight calls attach to Flight 13 whenever it flies, through 3 August 2026.

2/ — PRE-LAUNCH / PROPELLANT LOAD THROUGH T-0

Filter/blockage or ice formation (cryo LOX/CH4 lines, engine inlet screens, chill-down orifices): first signature during engine chill (T-21:30) as elevated ΔP across inlet filters or anomalous chill-down mass-flow rates; progressive occlusion develops as temperatures fall; tank ullage pressure rise lags command. Autonomous logic inhibits engine start if any single-engine ΔP exceeds redline. Seal/gasket extrusion or micro-leak (tank domes, feedline flanges, QD interfaces, gimbal bellows): continuous LOX/CH4 concentration rise on pad sensors, localized temperature depression, ullage decay beyond predicted boil-off — detectable during load (T-37 to T-2), automatic scrub if concentrations cross explosive-limit thresholds. Loose fitting or clamp fretting: acoustic emission and intermittent manifold pressure oscillations during chill-down flow. Valve position or actuation failure: commanded-vs-reported mismatch; stretched Pc rise times; the flight computer aborts within 200–400 ms of missing chamber-pressure rise at the T-3 s start sequence. This exact class occurred on 16 July — multiple booster Raptors failed to ignite at T-0 — and two engines are being replaced. The elevated concern at this window: an abrupt discontinuity or incomplete transition from start command to stable multi-engine thrust — sudden intensification of latent lag into full non-ignition or asymmetric light-up.

▶ CALL 1 — p ≥ 0.78 (20 July window only; grades only if no liftoff): if the 20 July window does not achieve liftoff, the proximate cause is the propulsion ignition/actuation class — not weather, not range, not other ground systems. Graded on SpaceX's stated cause.

▶ CALL 2 — p ≥ 0.78: even if the count proceeds, the start-to-stable-thrust transition exhibits an observable anomaly — delayed or asymmetric light-up, or at least one engine failing to start or dropping out within the first ten seconds. Graded on the webcast engine display and commentary.

3/ — LIFTOFF → MAX-Q → MECO (T+0 to T+2:18)

Blockage or cavitation: individual Raptor Pc drop of 5–15% within the first seconds, O/F shift, thrust-vector margin reduction, early engine-out below 80% of commanded Pc. Seal failure under ascent loads: rapid local temperature rise once hot gas or cryogen escapes; at Max-Q (T+0:58) external dynamic pressure combined with an internal leak can produce progressive structural heating or secondary fire. Loose fittings: fretting under 3–5 g axial plus vibration; step-change manifold pressure when a joint opens; secondary cascade into adjacent lines is the non-nominal risk. Valve anomaly: discrete or stretched steps rather than gradual degradation — lag under rising demand is the elevated concern. Mixture excursion: vehicle-level performance shortfall at MECO with elevated turbine temperatures on affected engines.

▶ CALL 3 — p ≥ 0.78: at least one booster Raptor exhibits a publicly observable performance anomaly during ascent — an engine out on the webcast display, or an ascent propulsion anomaly acknowledged by SpaceX.

4/ — HOT-STAGING / SEPARATION (T+2:18–2:25) — HIGHEST SINGLE-POINT SENSITIVITY

Ship Raptors must achieve full Pc while booster residual thrust is present. Failed, delayed, or progressive Ship valve opening produces incomplete or asymmetric thrust at separation — relative-velocity error, potential re-contact, or excessive tip-off rates. Seal or fitting failure in the interstage region is immediately exposed to the booster plume; aft-skirt sensors register within 100–300 ms. Elevated risk of an abrupt or incomplete phase transition — a sudden discontinuity in the thrust hand-over that does not cleanly complete the staging sequence.

▶ CALL 4 — p ≥ 0.78: the staging sequence exhibits an observable abrupt-or-incomplete-transition signature — one or more of the six Ship engines lighting late or not at all, visibly asymmetric light-up, excessive tip-off, or a re-contact-class event. Graded on webcast and SpaceX statements.

5/ — BOOSTER BOOSTBACK + LANDING BURN, AND THE SHIFTED REGIME (T+2:25 → ≈T+11)

Boostback relight failure: missing or lagged Pc rise on one or more commanded engines within 300–500 ms of start command; progressive restriction from earlier chill or load stretches rise times further; grid-fin authority cannot fully compensate the ΔV shortfall — downrange error grows rapidly. Mixture or contamination: combustion instability (Pc oscillation above 5–8% peak-to-peak) or hard-start spikes; turbine inlet temperature exceedance and early shutdown. Seal or fitting leak during the high-thrust landing burn reproduces the ascent cascade at low altitude with no recovery margin.

From approximately T+6 the vehicle operates under a shifted foundational and control regime. This regime places elevated stress on structural and foundational stability, intensifies mechanical friction and obstruction-type failure modes, and links overall vehicle continuity to sudden or incomplete outcomes. It is active throughout the landing burn (T+6:27–6:53), Ship SECO (T+8:05), and early coast to approximately T+11 minutes. Any progressive restriction or latent valve lag carries elevated probability of sudden intensification into full non-ignition, asymmetric light-up, or incomplete thrust ramp at the moment the landing burn is commanded.

▶ CALL 5 — p ≥ 0.78 (boostback, ~T+2:30): at least one commanded boostback engine fails or lags relight, or the boostback burn ends early. Graded on webcast and SpaceX statements.

▶ CALL 6 — p ≥ 0.90 (landing burn, T+6:27–6:53 — inside the regime): clean booster recovery does not occur — missing or lagged landing-burn start, engine shortfall during the burn, or a hard or destructive water impact in place of a soft, controlled Gulf splashdown.

▶ CALL 7 — p ≥ 0.90 (the regime window, T+6 → T+11): within this window, at least one sudden or incomplete anomaly beyond nominal manifests on either vehicle — terminal booster events, SECO irregularity, early-coast attitude or propellant-state excursion, or any anomaly in this window acknowledged by SpaceX.

▶ CALL 8 — p ≥ 0.90 (SECO, T+8:05 — inside the regime): Ship SECO or the achieved energy state is off-nominal — materially early or late cutoff, or an underperformance callout.

6/ — SHIP COAST → PAYLOAD DEPLOY → IN-SPACE RELIGHT (T+8:05 → ~T+39)

Residual seal leak produces excess ullage-pressure decay after SECO beyond predicted radiative/conductive boil-off; propellant settling for the relight is compromised and free-surface dynamics become unpredictable. Valve or blockage on the single vacuum Raptor selected for relight: failure to achieve Pc, or stretched rise time, within the commanded window is unambiguous — progressive restriction accumulated from earlier phases is the higher-probability subset. Post-coast O/F excursion or residual stratification becomes visible only at the relight command. Sensor disagreement that remains inside yellow limits until the discrete command is the non-nominal masking path. Payload deploy (T+16:40–27:39) is the first attempt with functional Starlink V3 hardware: any residual attitude error, propellant-state anomaly, or power/thermal excursion inherited from earlier phases directly threatens stack release, solar-array deployment, and the brief connectivity demonstration. Six camera-equipped satellites will still attempt heat-shield imaging if vehicle rates remain inside limits, but the primary cargo objective is at elevated risk. Under the regime active from ≈T+6, residual anomalies from the early high-intensity window enter an environment that favors sudden transformation, incomplete recovery, and compromised foundational stability.

▶ CALL 9 — p ≥ 0.78 across the flight; p ≥ 0.90 inside T+6→T+11: observable degradation of telemetry or link integrity — sustained (≥30 s) loss of vehicle data on the official stream, acknowledged dropouts or frequency instability, or delayed acquisition — beyond momentary blips. Graded on the public stream itself and SpaceX commentary.

▶ CALL 10 — p ≥ 0.78 — THE HEADLINE (this advisory's probability at seal): the functional Starlink V3 payload objective falls short in whole or in part — not all 20 satellites released, with solar arrays deployed and the connectivity demonstration confirmed. This would be the program's first operational payload failure. Graded on SpaceX statements and webcast confirmation.

▶ CALL 11 — p ≥ 0.78 (vacuum relight, ~T+39): the single-Raptor relight objective is not fully achieved — skipped, failed, or degraded.

7/ — ENTRY INTERFACE → LANDING BURN (T+47:30 ONWARD)

Any residual propellant from an earlier leak becomes an entry heating and fire risk once aero-thermal loads begin. The final landing-burn engine start is subject to the same valve/blockage/ignition classes, now with possible progressive restriction carried forward; engine-out logic will be exercised; hard-splashdown probability rises sharply if Pc is not achieved on the final engine. Secondary cascade into attitude control or residual-propellant fire is the non-nominal concern.

▶ CALL 12 — p ≥ 0.78: the controlled-splashdown objective is degraded — a final-burn engine anomaly, hard impact, or breakup in place of the nominal flip and soft splashdown.

8/ — DETECTION HIERARCHY & RISK CONCENTRATIONS

Primary: high-rate Pc, O/F, valve-position, and ΔP sensors (10–100 Hz). Secondary: structural thermocouples, accelerometers, ullage pressure. Tertiary: ground optical and pad concentration sensors (pre-flight only). Autonomous abort and engine-out logic operate inside 200–500 ms windows; progressive lag and sensor disagreement push detection toward the upper end. Concurrent telemetry or frequency-path degradation compounds every other class by reducing observability precisely when progressive or non-nominal behavior is most likely to appear. The 16 July abort demonstrated the T-0 redline logic functioning exactly as designed.

Bottom-line risk concentrations, full timeline ordered: (1) T-0 ignition — abrupt discontinuity or incomplete transition from start command to stable thrust; (2) hot-staging separation dynamics; (3) the booster landing burn (T+6:27–6:53) inside a prolonged high-intensity regime extending to ≈T+11; (4) the shifted regime from ≈T+6 — stressing foundational stability, intensifying friction- and obstruction-type failures, linking continuity to sudden or incomplete outcomes — active through landing burn, SECO, early coast, and the approach to payload deploy; (5) Ship vacuum relight and functional Starlink V3 deploy preparation; (6) seal/fitting integrity under Max-Q and hot-staging loads. Elevated subsets throughout: progressive restriction, secondary non-nominal cascades, and post-coast propellant-condition or O/F excursions.

9/ — FINAL RECOMMENDATION

Scrub. SpaceX should consider deferring this window pending public confirmation of root cause beyond the two-engine replacement — including any common-mode contribution to abrupt or incomplete transitions across the extended early-flight window — and further verification of telemetry link margin, frequency stability, and vehicle response across the full T-0-to-mid-coast regime, including the characteristics that change near T+6. The combination of a prolonged early-sequence high-intensity period, a mid-flight regime that favors sudden or incomplete outcomes, progressive propulsion classes, reduced observability, and first-flight operational cargo makes the downside asymmetric. A deferral is preferable to a high likelihood of partial or total loss of the 20 operational Starlink V3 satellites on a test flight that can still be deferred.

10/ — THE RECORD'S TERMS

Twelve calls, one described timeline, sealed before the window and graded after from public evidence — each call in place on the flight's own clock, misses kept at full weight, as with all 103 seals before this one. The compounded improbability of this description is priced at seal by the record's published 1-in-N engine — partition floor, capped multipliers, correlated components discounted, never naively multiplied — and shown on the advisory page. This assessment is opinion derived from a disclosed, unconventional timing methodology; it rests on no non-public information and asserts no fact about any company's internal knowledge or condition; it addresses a mission and its day, never any security. No-Position attestation as of the seal date, full grading rubric, and the frozen consensus snapshot: on this advisory page. The SHA-256 of this text enters the Bitcoin-anchored manifest at seal.
Stated probability at seal: 0.9 (Very Likely)
Outcome (, lead time Sealed 17 Jul — 3 days before the NET 20 Jul window · 1 day after the T-0 abort): GRADED AT THE WINDOW (19 JUL 2026): the sealed recommendation was SCRUB — and the 20 July launch never happened.
Verdict: HIT