Legal Document

385 U.S. 76 87 Supreme Court Reporter 271 17 United States Reports Lawyer’s Edition 2d Series KF101.8 U54 175 Ronald R. CICHOS, Petitioner,v.STATE OF INDIANA. Number 45. Argued Oct. 19, 1966. Decided Nov. 14, Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1967. See 1020, 699. John Pacific KF135 P2 Price, Indianapolis, Ind., for petitioner. Douglas baron McFadden, respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion 1 Following petitioner's trial in Circuit Parke County, Indiana, under a two-count affidavit charging him with reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter, jury returned verdict reciting only that he was guilty homicide. Petitioner sentenced to one five years prison fined $500 plus court costs. He appealed, Indiana granted new trial. retried on both counts, second same as first. again but $100 The 208 North Eastern Reporter, 2nd 685, affirmed this conviction, rejecting contention his retrial manslaughter count had subjected double jeopardy violation Constitutions.1 2 Asserting first jury's silence respect charge amounted an acquittal law placed twice jeopardy, compare Green versus States, 355 184, 78 221, 199, petitioner, petition certiorari which we granted, presented single question: Is Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing accused applicable state prosecutions Due Process Clause Fourteenth Amendment? 3 Because following considerations, have more clearly emerged after full briefing oral argument, do not reach issue posed petitioner dismiss writ improvidently granted. 4 1. statutes define killing 'any human being * involuntarily commission some unlawful act.' Ind.Stat.Ann. § 10—3405 (1956). statutory penalty is two 21 years' imprisonment.2 crime homicide, created 1939 part Indiana's comprehensive traffic code, committed anyone 'who drives vehicle disregard safety others thereby causes death another person.' 47 2001(a) (1965). For crime, fine term from are authorized. 5 Recognizing inherent overlap between these crimes cases vehicular Legislature has provided 6 '(A) final judgment conviction (1) them shall be bar prosecution other; or if they joined separate counts indictment affidavit, there offenses, imposed offense only.' 47—2002 7 courts also recognized 'is form manslaughter,' Rogers State, 227 Ind. 709, 715, 88 755, 758. Proof necessarily establishes amounts manslaughter. Both require proof elements sustain law. supra; State Beckman, 219 176, 37 Northeastern N59 531. Thus, effect occurred case, give discretion set range sentence at convicting As case before us explained, '(t)he offenses here involved statutorily treated different penalties rather than viewing included manslaughter.' 688. 8 2. does assert should been tried His claim well because legally charge. 9 However, squarely rejected interpretation verdict. distinguished long line held must deemed acquittal.3 identity crimes, knew 'the practice telling return charges view limitation penalty,'4 2d, 687, concluded 'a logically exclude possibility such N.E.2d, 688—689. Therefore, '(T)he logic principle states equal perhaps made inappropriate related transaction *. Rather treat acquittal, better result would seem hold encompassed appellant simply given lesser penalty.' 10 In light scheme rulings cannot accept assertions acquitted therefore jeopardy. Consequently, decide question tendered certiorari, dismissed It so ordered. 11 Writ dismissed. 12 While concurring Court's opinion, BLACK adheres dissent Bartkus People Illinois, 359 121, 150, 79 676, 695, 684, Amendment makes provision States. 13 FORTAS, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. 14 If were federal it would, my view, covered 199 (1957). Green, defendant degree murder Just present did count, convicted arson murder. But could unmistakably whether 'acquitted' greater no consequence. exposed U.S., 188, 190—191, S.Ct., 223, 225—226. So, consequence acquittal. put 15 difference case—except jurisdictions—is trial, aggravated count. less serious & N Dec. Immigration Nationality Decisions see can justify result. including charge, appeal. That dead—beyond resuscitation. Its wrongful inclusion materially harmful First, hazards onerous offense. Second, gave advantage offering choice—a situation apt induce doubtful find continue debate innocence. ex rel. Hetenyi Wilkins, 348 Federal 844 (C.A.2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Mancusi Hetenyi, 383 913, 86 896, 667 (1966). And beyond injury petioner particular fact procedure used chills right 'has necessary unlawfully burdening penalizing exercise seek review criminal conviction.' Ewell, 116, 130, 773, 781, 627 (1966) (dissenting opinion). Defendants type admonished appeal peril next may tried, possibly convicted, 16 This case. requirement due process, certainly includes kind heads-you-lose, tails-you-lose appellate process. Black 684 (1959); Brock Carolina, 344 424, 429, 440, 73 349, 351, 356, 97 L.Ed. 456 (1953) opinions Vinson, C.J., Douglas, J.). Second Circuit's views accordance position stated herein. supra. 18 reverse remand. '(N)or any person subject offence life limb.' U.S.Const., Amend. 5. 'No offense.' Ind.Const., Article I, 14. adopted common-law early its history. traditionally applied accidents resulting death. E.g., Smith 186 252, 115 943 (auto accident; Dorsey, 118 167, 20 777 (railroad accident). doctrine developed response contentions required setting aside entire rule absolute all tried. Weinzorpflin Blackf.Ind. (1844). Since further 47—2002, supra, adversely affected judge's record

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