Legal Document

546 U.S. 212 (2006) BROWN, WARDEN v. SANDERS No. 04-980. Supreme Court of United States. Argued October 11, 2005. Decided January 2006. *213 Jane N. Kirkland, Deputy Attorney General California, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on briefs were Bill Lockyer, General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Mary Jo Graves, Senior *214 and Ward A. Campbell, Supervising General. Nina Rivkind, by appointment Court, 544 1017, respondent. brief Cliff Gardner Eric E. Jorstad.[*] JUSTICE SCALIA delivered opinion Court. We consider circumstances in which an invalidated sentencing factor will render a death sentence unconstitutional reason its adding improper element to aggravation scale jury's weighing process. I Respondent Ronald Sanders companion invaded home Dale Boender, where they bound blindfolded him his girlfriend, Janice Allen. Both victims then struck head with heavy, blunt object; Allen died from blow. was convicted first-degree murder, attempt murder robbery, burglary, attempted robbery. Sanders' jury found four "special circumstances" under California law, each independently rendered eligible penalty. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West Supp. 1995). The trial moved penalty phase, at instructed list factors relating background nature crime, one "[t]he crime defendant present proceeding existence any special be true." 190.3(a) 1999). sentenced death. On direct appeal, declared invalid two *215 jury. It nonetheless affirmed sentence, relying our decision Zant Stephens, 462 862 (1983), which, it said, "upheld judgment despite invalidation several aggravating factors." People Sanders, 51 3d 471, 520, 797 P.2d 561, 589-590 (1990) (in bank). conviction all other respects. denied certiorari. 500 948 (1991). filed petition writ habeas corpus pursuant 28 U.S.C. 2254 States District Eastern arguing, as relevant here, that consideration unconstitutional.[1] After exhausted various state remedies, relief. Appeals Ninth Circuit reversed. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054 (2004). concluded "the court erroneously believed could apply rule (1983) is applicable only nonweighing statesand uphold verdict because upholding circumstances." Id., 1064 (citations omitted). Finding State, applying rules we have announced such States, see Stringer Black, 503 222, 232 (1992), courts finding use been harmless beyond reasonable doubt or reweighing 190.3. Since, continued, had done neither, unconstitutionally deprived "individualized *216 sentence." F.3d, 1064. granted 947 (2005). II Since Furman Georgia, 408 238 (1972) (per curiam), required limit class murderers may applied. This narrowing requirement usually met when trier fact finds least statutorily defined eligibility either guilt phase. Tuilaepa 512 967, 971-972 (1994).[2] Once has satisfied, sentencer called upon determine whether thus should receive it. Most channel this function specifying (sometimes identical factors) are weighed against mitigating considerations. issue line cases confront here what happens imposes after valid found, but scheme specified later held invalid. To answer question, jurisprudence distinguished between so-called non-weighing terminology somewhat misleading, since capital must allowed weigh facts arguably *217 justify defendant's evidence. See, e. g., Eddings Oklahoma, 455 104, 110 (1982). adopted, moreover, relatively early development death-penalty jurisprudence, perhaps unaware great variety forms capital-sentencing legislation would ultimately take. identified "weighing State[s]" those permitted considered factors. Parker Dugger, 498 308, 313, 318-319 (1991) (citing Fla. Stat. 921.141(3)(b) (1985)); Richmond Lewis, 506 40, 47 (1992) (quoting Ariz. Rev. 13-703(E) (1989)). definition distinct particular features, if them not some capacityfor example, omnibus "circumstances crime" case. In therefore, sentencer's necessarily skewed balancing aggravators mitigators, Stringer, U.S., 232, reversal (unless appellate determined error reweighed evidence factors), ibid. By contrast, Statea different from, addition to, factorsthis automatic skewing occur. never occur entirely Nor added category (such factor, quite common) allow very *218 rubric. therefore set forth governing consequences State.[3] *219 amounts constitutional situations. First, due process requires aside invalidity "authorizes draw adverse inferences conduct constitutionally protected," "attache[s] `aggravating' label impermissible totally irrelevant process, . actually militate favor lesser penalty." Zant, 885. Second, hear otherwise before id., 886; also Tuggle Netherland, 516 10, 13-14 (1995) curiam).[4] weighing/non-weighing accurate far goes, now seems us needlessly complex incapable providing full range possible variations. For same problem gave rise weighing-State arise just *220 clearly prima facie "skewed," basic reason: might given weight aggravator.[5] And appropriate shown illusory separates States: One factors, conceivably another one, made proper underlying factor. think clarify analysis, simplify sentence-invalidating hitherto applied supra, 218-219, henceforth guided following rule: An (whether not) process[6]unless enables give circumstances. test not, BREYER describes it, "an inquiry based solely admissibility evidence." Post, 241 (dissenting opinion). If presence *221 mandate without regard here. 219; n. 6, supra.[7] result considering properly admitted ("[W]hen body told decision, reviewing assume no difference thumb removed death's side scale"). As explained, occur, error, rubric other, III listed 2005) true. These designed satisfy Furman. Bacigalupo *222 6 4th 457, 467-468, 808, 813 (1993) circumstances, "take into account" separate describing aspects crime. 190.3 include, proceeding." "`the [is] restricted "weighing" mitigation' `the prevented than discrete, statutorily-defined factors.'" 1061 Williams Calderon, 52 1465, 1478 (CA9 1995); brackets original). last statement inaccurate. can hardly "discrete." effect rendering nonexclusive, causing prior terminology) State. Contrary contention, STEVENS' views dissent, mere included [eligibility factors] true," 190.3(a), did make That redundant purposes way narrowed universe entitled determining sentence.[8] But leaving *223 dichotomy more analysis earlier opinion: All open their erroneous "skewed" violation occurred. More specifically, true: committed while engaged Robbery," 190.2(a)(17)(A) 2005); "committed in... Burglary first second degree," 190.2(a)(17)(G); victim [Allen] witness who intentionally killed purpose preventing testimony criminal proceeding," 190.2(a)(10); especially heinous, atrocious, cruel," 190.2(a)(14). burglary-murder circumstance merger law instructions find burglary (and circumstance) intent commit assault, already homicide, Wilson, 1 431, 439-440, 22, 27-28 (1969) banc). 3d, 517, P. 2d, 587. "heinous, cruel" previously vague. P.2d, 589 Superior 31 797, 647 76 (1982) bank)). noted, however, (robbery-murder witness-killing)." *224 589-590. sufficient Furman's requirement, alone Moreover, produce admissible establish adduced bearing They bore 521, 590. argues asked consider, view, placed emphasis Virtually thing happened Zant. There Georgia "`conside[r] extenuation, mitigation punishment,'" 871-872 250 Ga. 97, 99-100, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1982)), specifically "`any [the] statutory you supported evidence,'" 866. instruction prominence. Yet, even though three (that "substantial history serious assaultive convictions," 867) invalidated, upheld sentence. acknowledged "might caused greater respondent's record given," 888; indeed, assumed effect, "merely consequence `aggravating circumstanc[e].'" *225 agreed impact "`inconsequential,'" 889, "cannot fairly regarded defect process," true * Because violation, erred ordering reversed, case remanded further proceedings consistent opinion. so ordered. STEVENS, whom SOUTER joins, dissenting. Our drawn simple categorical distinction former, sole 862, 874 (1983) ("[I]n does play role guiding exercise discretion [to impose penalty], apart persons penalty"). latter, performs functionit provides deciding defendant. Clemons Mississippi, 494 738, 745 ("In unlike part determination, circumstances"). Thus, legal significance *226 three, presumptively harmless. long infect formal making weighty three. jury, incorrectly informed killing imposing death, generally 190.2(a)(14) 2005), well affect deliberations. Having [aggravating] 1999) (emphasis added), conclusion heinous separately conclusion, improperly counting twice warranted. Or recognizing legislature decided more, worthy penalty, legislative imprimatur heinousness dictate. Under scenario scale, cannot presume ultimate conclusion. are, course, systems. specific *227 provide reasons obviously prejudicial juries these increases likelihood subsequently harmless, take out State" category. majority, convert weighing/nonweighing focused deliberations during Compare 229 (explaining Mississippi choosing "aggravating [that] decision"), ante, 220 ("An unless (footnote omitted)). plays nothing do "all `circumstances crime.'" case, question presented us, Brecht Abrahamson, 507 619, 638 (1993). merely decide Pet. Cert. i, correctly *228 text unambiguously answered question. Cf. (enumerating requiring [to] [it] concludes outweigh Instead heeding plain language, chosen modify settled ignoring dual played California's regime. likely complicate respectfully dissent. BREYER, GINSBURG approach makes "nonweighing" "harmless-error" review certain kind casenamely, rests circumstance. my matter ordinary apply. A aggravator doubt, regardless form State's takes. understand answer, fully including misleading phrased. Death place stages. At stage, there something wrongful, i. e., "aggravating," about conduct. statutes typically *229 "aggravating" become "By doing so, narrows according objective definition," Eighth Amendment. Lowenfield Phelps, 484 231, 244 (1988). consequently proceeds Stage Two. Two, (or sometimes judge) (usually, life imprisonment). divide approach. Weighing Some tell jury: "Consider One, predominate, death; otherwise, not." tells (typically One) States." misnomer everything instead limited classic example (1992). Nonweighing Other them, simply aggravating." balance includes list, "nonweighing Although clearer call "complete *230 weighing" (for admissible), shall continue traditional terminology. prototypical adopted complete Ibid. B arises (1) (2) "improper" forbids purpose) appeal. mistake, indeed mistake dimensions, One. Godfrey 446 420, 433 (1980) (plurality itself, forbid application all, (3) Two admitted. showed how committed, Given outline problem, questions follow. Question One: Is judge's Onetelling presentprejudiced decisionmaking Two? words, create harmful *231 finding? lower read Court's opinions say "no"; "yes." Two: courts' State? assume, going further, arising having gone holding misunderstood Despite occasional suggestion contrary, little need `acute need' reliable issue," Deck Missouri, 622, 632 (2005), harmful, distinguish harmless-error unrealistic, impractical, legally unnecessary. Use unrealistic unrelated plausible conception reaches decision. issue. admission infra, 239-241. importance attach Using metaphor "thumb scale," "possibility *232 randomness bias 236; Sochor Florida, 504 527, 532 ("Employing creates possibility placing creating risk treating deserving penalty" (internal quotation marks, citations, alterations why causes harm, shows) factor." judge prosecutor led believe attaches factor: Indeed, else "aggravator" and/or permit eligible? 888 (recognizing "arguably given"); 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting "a ."); 753, 755 "repeatedly emphasized `especially heinous' hearing" remanding review). factora that, turns out, instanceis significant explicitly prove well, *233 too kinds (which enumerated statute). 17-10-30(b) (2004) (judge "shall authorized evidence" added)). potential harm exists both namely, says there. illustrate point, statements. Statement OneThe State: "You X, Y, Z. do, mitigators." TwoThe permits evidence, Z, reaching your decision." What meaningful statements? differ significantly: offered mitigation. Brief Criminal Justice Legal Foundation Amicus Curiae 4 reality, sentencers `weigh'"). wrongfully amount similarly error? instances, *234 put previous Y. surprising commentators unsatisfactory efforts statements purposes. Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections Decades Constitutional Regulation Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. 355, 386-387 ("[T]he doctrinal approaches `weighing' `non-weighing' schemes difficult similar scheme"); Widder, Hanging Life Balance: Metaphor Penalty Phase Trial, 68 Tulane 1341, 1363-1365 (1994) (arguing largely "illusion" "appears derived fixation literal meaning weighing, [which] remains common means decisions rely status [death] sentences resting factors"). impractical administer paradigmsStates (i. nonstatutory aggravators). Many fall somewhere paradigms. additional (unrelated determination) discretion. account eligibility-related 11 factorsincluding *235 many collapse (eligibility) (sentence selection) single hears time, prosecution introduce argue related aggravators. characterized (Mississippi) (Virginia) intermediate Miss. 99-19-101 (1973-2000); Va. 19.2-264.4(B) (Lexis 2004). Efforts classify varied schemes, much heat casting light. C precedents, detail, require maintain distinction. discussed key cases. arose jurythat "`substantial convictions'" was 867, 5. present, remained court's erroneous, "had `an inconsequential regarding penalty.'" 889 100, (1982)). conceded label"aggravating circumstance"created aggravator. said "`aggravating circumstance[s]'" *236 given." 888. thing, Georgia's statute 886. "instructions (citation fact, "`consider ext[e]nuation..., aggravation.'" Finally, indication tried weight. real "any process." like Georgia. detailed discussion inconsistent "harmless error" laws Georgia's. 888-889, 25; 891 ("Under scheme, weight" dissent understood principal conducted analysis. 904-905 (opinion Marshall, joined Brennan, J.). repeated understanding weeks later. Barclay 463 939, 951, 8 opinion) (upholding *237 concluding "we type federal necessary Zant".) involved Mississippi. petitioner's "even pressed cruel,' invalid." 741. unclear review, vacated procedure remand jury) instance. 754. reveals, remandedthe thought harmlesshad 3. Rather, repeatedly hearing," stark contrast "little emphasis" 753. "[u]nder explanation possibly agree giving harmless." 753-754. third question: Teague Lane, 489 288 (1989), vague violates Amendment applies Georgia? doing, described Mississippi's system follows: *238 "In Assuming determination resulting introduction stage proceedings. scale. When itself skewed, level suffices guarantee received individualized added). submission term State," attached appear Stringer. less first. suggests "would determination" conclude "no violation." errant language "[n]ot surprisin[g]" operated assumption "that States," former. Ante, 218, My point unfounded *239 interpretation important own Stringer's characterization precedents. curiam) (characterizing multiple always invalid" stated Parts II-A II-B, ambiguous dicta derive unjustified deprive fair proceeding. upshot examine hold likely, excuse ensuring area result. IV It, too, abolish diminish of) then, surprisingly, diminishes all. considers announces, (holding "one underlie *240 Common sense suggests, held, court. strong enough, wrongly scale" (sentencing). implied Clemons. right depart implication wrong Clemons' unanimous holdinga Members recognized such. Pensinger 502 930, 931 (O'Connor, Kennedy, dissenting denial certiorari) "`especially change mix [Clemons]" support harmlessness"). reconcile clear emphasis, disavowed "reliance phases surrounding aired phase 754-755, entire potentially consisted *241 robbery pecuniary gain. 753-754; 773, 23 (Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., concurring part). assert "Clemons maintains envisioned Zant." 3 Clemons, 745). thing. observe differences certainly claims, suggest former latter. unremarkable "[i]n serve punishment, vacate jury." 744-745 Of qualifier "necessarily" cases, vacated, Georgia." sum, explained above, 231-234, tilting scales toward (like Virginia) V errors ask Circuit's contrary so. respect) *242 distinction, light issue, reconsider considerations described. NOTES [*] Kent S. Scheidegger amicus curiae urging reversal. [1] April 24, 1996, substantive standards Antiterrorism Effective Act 1214. Lindh Murphy, 521 320, 327 (1997). [2] frequently employed terms circumstance" factor" refer satisfaction requirement. 972. becomes confusing when, employs role, defendants avoid confusion, "eligibility describe function. [3] contends post, 235-239 strange discover late long-held sorts difference. Cf., (weighing/non-weighing "of critical importance"). Not Courts uniformly 1054, 1059-1060 2004); Flamer Delaware, 736, 746-749 (CA3 Cain, 125 269, 281 (CA5 1997). flatly types notes, 235, endorse attaching "inconsequential penalty," marks core next: "More importantly, added); 237-239. rejecting claim error. Neither 738 (1990), nor anything contrary. points rather relevant: (the passage cites, 753-754) addressed distinction). latter 890-891, (a State) State), 745. Likewise, distinguishes [the jury] "constitutional level" required, [4] explains Tuggle's invalid," cf. 239 (Breyer, dissenting), comment [non-weighing] jury," (BREYER, dissenting). [5] supra. There, although circumstancewhether "especially 99-19-101(5)(h) (1993 Cum. Supp.)that 97-3-19(2) (1994), treated provided 99-19-101(3)(b) Supp.), converted de facto [6] distortions element. "actually militate[d] 219. [7] footnote 754, 5, relies, 240. argument arbitrarily refused order resentencing, Johnson 511 So. 2d 1333 (1987), rev'd, 486 578 (1988), remand, 547 59 (1989) (en noting Johnson, inadmissible sentence," whereas "there reliance [invalid] 755, crux wit, calculus. [8] STEVENS affected ways, rejected theories (1983). "coun[t] twice," alsomuch herewas [i. evidence.'" "give[n] weight," 889. 224-225.

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