Legal Document

476 U.S. 19 106 S.Ct. 1678 90 L.Ed.2d EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitionerv.FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al. No. 84-1728. April 29, 1986. PER CURIAM. 1 We granted certiorari, 472 1026, 105 3497, 87 629 (1985), to consider the question whether a union proposal that would require federal agency comply with OMB Circular A-76 (1983) Performance of Commercial Activities, which prescribes guidelines for contracting out by agencies, is negotiable under Title VII Civil Service Reform Act 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 seq. 2 In course contract negotiations petitioner, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), respondent American Federation Government Employees (AFGE) submitted following proposal: "The EMPLOYER agrees and other applicable laws regulations concerning out." 3 The EEOC took position this was nonnegotiable (Act) declined bargain over it. AFGE then petitioned review Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), empowered "resolv[e] issues relating duty bargain" in sector. 7105(a)(2)(E). 4 Before FLRA, EEOC's principal contention because concerned it inconsistent Act's management rights clause, which, pertinent part, provides "nothing [Title VII] shall affect authority any official agency—. . accordance laws—. make determinations respect 7106(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). FLRA rejected view, ruling not invade management's reserved since merely "require exercise its right whatever exist at time such action." 10 F.L.R.A. (1982). rejecting additional argument itself forbade negotiation proposal, went on explain even absence AFGE's proposed provision "disputes conditions employment arising connection application be covered negotiated grievance procedure." Id., 5. A divided panel Court Appeals District Columbia Circuit affirmed FLRA's decision. 240 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 744 F.2d 842 (1984). found claim regarding barred clause "untenable light plain text clause." 224, F.2d, 848. Since conditioned upon compliance "applicable laws," language "essentially echoes statutory requirement contracting-out made decisions. Ibid. also agreed 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), defines "grievance" include "any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication law, rule, regulation affecting employment," an alleged violation grievable proposal. U.S.App.D.C., 227, 850. dissenting judge believed intended place constraints out. 228, 852 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 6 Court, raises three arguments support nonnegotiable. First, although did so argue Appeals, now contends la[w]" within meaning therefore requiring Circular, intrude rights. Second, again first asserts absent "law, regulation" 7103(a)(9)'s definition "grievance." Third, suggests "Government-wide rule purposes 7117(a)(1), argues 7117(a)(1) excludes rules from scope bargain. This argument, too, never presented FLRA. 7 Whatever their merit, we have concluded these contentions, are linchpins brief properly before us. expressly when aggrieved party seeks judicial final order "[n]o objection has been urged Authority, designee, considered court, unless failure neglect urge excused extraordinary circumstances." 7123(c). virtually identical 10(e) National Act, 29 160(e), [National Relations] Board interpreted mean "without jurisdiction consider" issue raised if do circumstances. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 645, 665-666, 102 2071, 2082-2083, 72 398 See Detroit Edison Co. 440 301, 311, n. 10, 99 1123, 1129, 59 333 (1979); May Department Stores 326 376, 386, 5, 66 203, 209, 9, L.Ed. 145 (1945). similarly held 7123(c) "issues placed Authority" Treasury 227 377, 382, 707 574, 579 (1983). Social Security Administration, 243 338, 342, 753 156, 160-161 (1985). agree interpretation 7123(c), think "waived" simply fails invoke Section speaks courts, parties, evinces intent pass thereby bringing expertise bear resolution those issues. need decide express waiver relevant determining there "extraordinary circumstances" excusing party's raise agency, no here. do, however, reject Justice STEVENS' theory implied waiver, should noted, offered as exception Congress had meant two exceptions bar instead one, said so. 8 failed excuse what appear objections decline them. Conceivably, apprise attributable appears sua sponte injection grievability into proceedings rendering But most might press FLRA; does point Appeals. latter "brought our attention respondent's opposition petition certiorari," Oklahoma City Tuttle, 471 808, 816, 2427, 2432, 85 791 la[w]." Brief Opposition 11, 8, 17, 17. Our normal practice, see reason depart occasion, refrain addressing See, e.g., FTC Grolier, 462 19, 23, 6, 103 2209, 2212, 76 387 (1983); Rogers Lodge, 458 613, 628, 3272, 3281, 73 1012 Under circumstances, several central may well turn cannot reached resolved. Accordingly, dismiss writ certiorari improvidently granted. 9 It ordered. WHITE, dissenting. Because I STEVENS merits case, join Court's opinion judgment. 11 STEVENS, 12 my case. Two agencies disagree about important statute; serve interests both disagreement resolved promptly possible. To end, neither suggested advanced Court. fully advised merits, efficient us resolve rather than postpone decision until another similar case works way up through Appeals.1 13 (FLRA) designated congress enforce must presume thorough understanding provisions including 7123(c).2 Chevron U.S.A. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 837, 844-845, 104 2778, 2782-2783, 81 694 provision, surely knew could interposed consideration Solicitor General behalf construction statute,3 but elected take approach Court.4 doing, waived protection given palpable interest having decided, believe acted wisely doing so.5 14 On am persuaded one laws" described reverse judgment "[R]espondent's prevailed economy served invoking [a contemporaneous-objection rule] point, after received plenary merits. grant represents commitment scarce resources view deciding more questions petition. Nonjurisdictional defects sort brought later certiorari; not, discretion deem defect waived." 815-816, "per curiam " implies reasons dismissing were certiorari." ante, 24. If true, can only wonder why decided certiorari. As matter fact, cite suggest contentions waived; rhetorical previously much merit. called supplementary briefing Authority's ability waive per functional equivalent summary disposition manner proceeding customarily reserve settled law. Wyrick Fields, 459 42, 51, 394, 398, 74 214 (1982) (MARSHALL, dissenting); Schweiker Hansen, 450 785, 791, 101 1468, 1472, 67 685 (1981) R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, Supreme Practice 5.12, p. 277 (6th ed. 1986). Until today, waivability addressed (Indeed, authoritative tribunal.) nonetheless proceeds confident assumption construed pari materia former "virtually identical" latter. Ante, 23. Even accepting propriety parallel interpretation—an adduces either legislative history—the cases relied (1982), defense his Opposition, O.T. 1981, 80-1798, 11; 311-312, 1129-1130, n.10, 353 (1979), he response petitioner's Respondent, 77-968, pp. 17-18; 387, 210 (1945), "the sufficient" "put notice presented." Thus, none honor affected agency. Moreover, all dispositions consistent practice announced U.S., S.Ct., "[n]onjurisdictional [barring review] deprive subject-matter (indeed, authorizes circumstances," 381-384, 578-581 (1983)), adhere Tuttle presented. Finally, nonwaivable still enough force convince court erroneous. adequately conclusion some leads further entire dismissed.

Classification Label: 8