Legal Document

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SCOTT KERNAN, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA DE- PARTMENT CORRECTIONS AND REHABIL- ITATION v. ANTONIO A. HINOJOSA ON PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI TO APPEALS NINTH CIRCUIT No. 15–833 Decided May 16, 2016 PER CURIAM. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief first to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in courts State.” 28 U.S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A). If adjudicate prisoner’s claim “on merits,” §2254(d), then AEDPA mandates deferential, rather than de novo, review, prohibiting from granting unless state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” §2254(d)(1), based on determination facts,” §2254(d)(2). Ninth Circuit this case decided that Supreme Court California’s summary denial petition was not therefore AEDPA’s deferential-review provisions did apply. We summarily reverse. Respondent Antonio Hinojosa serving 16-year sentence for armed robbery related crimes when, 2009, California prison officials “validated” him as prison-gang associate placed secured housing unit. At time Hinojosa’s offense conviction, law had permitted prisoners unit solely by virtue their affilia- tions continue accrue good-time credits. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §2933.6 (West 2000). In 2010, Cali- fornia Legislature amended so 2 KERNAN associates could no longer earn future credits, although they would retain any credits already earned. §2933.6(a) Supp. 2016). filed petition, arguing (as rele- vant here) applying new violated Constitution’s prohibition ex post facto laws. Art. I, §10, cl. 1; Weaver Graham, 450 24 (1981). Orange County Superior denied grounds petitioner has sought review his error proper judicial venue.” App. Pet. Cert. 44a. court explained: “ ‘Although superior jurisdiction en- tertain writ corpus, it does follow should do all in- stances.’ Challenges conditions inmate’s con- finement be entertained county wherein inmate is confined. (Griggs (1976) 16 3d 341, 347.) “The corpus DENIED.” Id., at 44a–45a.1 Rather file correct venue (Kings Court), turned appellate court, which petition. Instead appealing denial, see §1506 2016), original California, Const., 6, —————— InGriggs Ct. San Bernardino Cty., 347, 546 P.2d 727, 731 (1976), stated “[a]s general rule,” if files challeng- ing confinement other one he confined, deny fails prima facie case. case, however, there hint opinion followed approach, did. 3 without explanation. A followed. Adopting Magistrate Judge’s findings recommendation, District under deferential review. panel re- versed. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (2015). Citing our Ylst Nunnemaker, 501 797 (1991), “looked through” Califor- nia’s last reasoned adjudi- cating claim: Court’s dismissal improper venue. “is ‘on merits’ ” result “not bound AEDPA.” F.3d, 419. Having thus freed itself strictures, granted relief. Ylst, we said where “the rea- soned explicitly imposes procedural default, will presume later rejecting silently disregard bar consider merits.” U.S., 803. adopted presumption because “silence implies consent, opposite—and generally behave accordingly, affirming further discussion when agree, disa- gree, with reasons given below.” 804. But pointedly refused make irrebuttable; “strong evidence can refute it.” Ibid. It amply refuted here. Improper possibly have been ground high court’s claim. There only California—and court. Under these circumstances, cannot State “rest[ed] upon same ground” Court’s. quite obviously rested some different ground. Ylst’s 4 “look-through” approach inapplicable.2 resists conclusion, remarking “a reviewing discretion prejudice lower court.” re Steele, 32 4th 682, 692, 85 P.3d 444, 449 (2004) (emphasis added). indica- tion here prejudice, refuting speculation. Containing statement contrary, merits. Harrington Richter, 562 86, 99 (2011). Accordingly, reviewed through lens. And express view merits claim, note held denials claims identical are estab- lished law. Nevarez Barnes, 749 1124 (CA9 2014); also Efstathiou, 200 725, 730–732, 133 Rptr. 34, 37–40 (2011); Sampson, 197 1234, 1240–1244, 130 39, 43–46 below recognized much: “If applies here, deci- sion must affirm district petition.” 418. certiorari mo- leave proceed forma pauperis granted, judgment Appeals reversed. ordered. Alternatively, fact Griggs’ instruc- concluded relief, n. 1, supra, still merits, standard SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting JUSTICE whom GINSBURG joins, dissenting. When faced order denies ha- beas explanation, long pre- sumed agrees “last state- opinion” evidence” contrary. 797, 804– 805 (1991). parties agree nia wrong county. ex- plained reason. Applying commonsense presump- tion, “most improbable” unexplained disagreed order. Anto- nio Court, believes strong contrary—for two inexplicable reasons. reason—the “improper venue” ante, 3—is straw man, poorly constructed that. Obviously Court. easily agreed conclusion (2004). That possibility be- comes even more likely light atypical rules, treat commonplace method Carey Saffold, 536 214, 221–222 (2002).* By issuing silent after decision, presumably Cf. 800 (applying its posture out California). majority’s second reason flimsier. majority suggests include words “without prejudice” denial—which assumes preju- dice. Ante, 4. quotes, simply ‘DENIED’ petition; neither nor “DENIED” dice.” 2, mindboggling how necessarily disagrees another merely omits language lacks. I hold, did, reasoning very least, hold such verse Circuit’s interpretation * Contrary characterization, “[i]nstead appealing” 2—his appeal. Carey, 225 (calling alternative “petition hearing” “interchangeable” methods appeal, “with option bringing adverse consequences petitioner”). order—and, process, reverse separate incar- ceration unconstitutionally extended.

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