Legal Document

127 S. Ct. 815 (2007) 549 U.S. 183 Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Petitioner, v. Luis Alexander DUENAS-ALVAREZ. No. 05-1629. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 5, 2006. Decided January 17, 2007. *817 Dan Himmelfarb, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Christopher J. Meade, New York, NY, respondent. Paul D. Clement, Solicitor Counsel Record, Department Justice, Anne K. Small, Janet Carter, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, Peter Keisler, Assistant Edwin Kneedler, Deputy to the Donald E. Keener, Jennifer Paisner, Justice *818 BREYER delivered opinion Court. Immigration law provides removal from States an alien convicted "a theft offense (including receipt stolen property) . which term imprisonment [is] at least one year." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (emphasis added; footnote omitted); 1227(a)(2)(A). The question here is whether "theft offense" in this federal statute includes crime "aiding abetting" a offense. We hold that it does. And we vacate Ninth Circuit determination contrary. I Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 1101 et seq., (2000 ed. Supp.IV), lists set offenses, conviction any subjects certain aliens States, 1227(a). In determining (say, violating state criminal forbids taking property without permission) falls within scope listed (e.g., offense"), lower courts uniformly have applied approach forth Taylor 495 575, 110 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990). E.g., Soliman Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 284 (C.A.4 2005); Abimbola Ashcroft, 378 173, 176-177 (C.A.2 2004); Huerta-Guevara 321 883, 886-888 (C.A.9 2003); Hernandez-Mancilla INS, 246 1002, 1008-1009 (C.A.7 2001). concerned offenses Armed Career Criminal 18 924(e) Supp. IV). That Act mandates lengthy prison sentence offenders with previous convictions for, e.g., "violent felony"; sets specific crimes, "burglary," included category. Court, Taylor, considered criminalizing burglary-like behavior fell "burglary." U.S., 589, 598, 2143. held Congress meant its "burglary" refer crime, i.e., "`burglary'" "the generic sense now used codes most States." Id., 2143 added). also qualifies burglary conviction, "regardless "exact [state] definition or label" long has "basic elements" "generic" burglary, namely, "unlawful unprivileged entry into, remaining in, building structure, intent commit crime." 599, added that, when sentencing court seeks determine particular prior was offense, should normally look not facts case, but rather defining conviction. 599-600, further noted "few States' statutes" "define more broadly" include both (genetically defined) nonlisted crimes. For example, Massachusetts defines including only breaking into "`a building'" "vehicle" (which outside car "`building structure' "). See Shepard 544 13, 16, 125 1254, 161 205 (2005); see (discussing *819 Missouri statutes). such cases Court's "categorical approach" permits "to go beyond mere fact conviction" order earlier "jury actually required find all elements burglary." 602, 2143; Conteh 461 45, 54 (C.A.1 2006) (observing some step inquiry "modified categorical approach"). "For example," might examine indictment information jury instructions" case. Shepard, nonjury "charging document" terms plea agreement," "transcript colloquy between judge defendant," "some comparable judicial record" about "factual basis plea." 26, 1254. II case before us concerns application framework just Duenas-Alvarez, respondent here, permanent resident 2002, Duenas-Alvarez Cal. Veh.Code Ann. 10851(a) (West 2000). section states: "Any person who drives takes vehicle his her own, consent owner thereof, either permanently temporarily deprive thereof title possession vehicle, steal party accessory accomplice driving unauthorized stealing, guilty public offense." (Emphasis added.) After convicted, Federal Government, claiming began proceedings. A Judge, agreeing Government California year," found removable. (footnote Board Appeals (BIA) affirmed. sought review BIA's decision Circuit. While respondent's petition pending, Circuit, Penuliar 395 1037 (2005), relevant Vehicle Code provision, 10851(a), sweeps broadly than theft. id., 1044-1045. particular, said element control others' property. But, added, statutory phrase "`[who] accessory. accomplice'" would permit "for aiding abetting theft." 1044 deleted). believed "aid" "abet" controlling 1044-1045 (citing Martinez-Perez 393 1018 2004), withdrawn 417 1022 (2005)). Hence, Appeals' view, provision must cover generically defined "theft" crimes other (aiding crimes) because they are fall immigration statute. F.3d, subsequently heard Duenas-Alvarez's summarily remanded agency *820 proceedings light Penuliar. 176 Fed.Appx. 820 (2006). granted Government's certiorari consider legal validity Circuit's holding itself conclude erred. III like Circuits BIA, accepted theft, "taking exercise over rights benefits ownership, even if deprivation less total permanent." 435 961, 969 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Abimbola, (analyzing citing three Circuits, approving definition). aids abets falls, principal, definition. he common divided participants felony four basic categories: (1) first-degree principals, those committed question; (2) second-degree aiders abettors present scene crime; (3) accessories fact, helped principal event took place; (4) after persons place. Standefer 447 10, 15, 100 1999, 64 689 (1980). course 20th century, however, American jurisdictions eliminated distinction among first categories. 16-19, 1999; Nye & Nissen 336 613, 618, 69 766, 93 919 (1949). Indeed, every jurisdictionall Governmenthas "expressly abrogated distinction" principals second third 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Law 13.1(e), p. 333 (2d ed.2003) (LaFave). General presented comprehensive account well. verified these treat similarly common-law Appendix A, infra. Since treats categories alike, which" "is States," covers "aiders abettors" well principals. activities themselves does defend position. He agrees speaking during same way principals; then them Instead, argues ways reaches nongeneric points out aider abettor criminally responsible *821 intends, "naturally probably" results intended crime. People Durham, 70 171, 181, 74 Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198, 204 (1969) ("`aider liable natural reasonable probable consequences act knowingly aided encouraged'" (quoting Villa, 156 App. 128, 134, 318 828 (1957); emphasis deleted)). This alone show relatively few (only 10 own view) expressly rejected "natural consequences" doctrine. Brief Respondent 21-22; B, Moreover, many apply form variation doctrine, inferences circumstances similar explained below. C, To succeed, something special California's version doctrinefor applying criminalizes conduct "theft." attempts make showing. says unlike makes defendant did intend, known almost byproduct defendant's intentional acts. 1 La-Fave 5.2(a), 341 (person intends knows practically follow conduct"). At oral argument, counsel suggested individual wrongly bought liquor underage drinker young drinker's later (unforeseen) reckless driving. Tr. Oral Arg. 44. refers several prove point. 19. reviewed cases, cannot agree somehow special. Nguyen, 21 4th 518, 26 323 (1993), Third Appellate District upheld individuals had robberies houses prostitution, sexual assault by convince proprietor, frightening her, give up 528, 533-534, Cal.Rptr.2d, 329, 333. court, upholding verdict, wrote "knowledge another's purpose sufficient abetting; share intend commit, encourage, facilitate commission 530, 330 "[w]hile defendants participated endeavor foreseeability went possible likely certain, yet continued lend their aid assistance endeavor." 534, could defendants' "continuing participation perpetrators providing security needed tarry enough helping victim resistance be useless, dissuading victim's employee notion she may formed going assistance." concluded: "Under will do assert *822 were robbery bear no responsibility assault." Simpson, 319, 152 339 (1944), affirmed kidnaping on theory. 322, 339. Although argued appeals compatriots planned kidnap victim, record showed brought gun intimidate while tied placed car, corobbers rode another location robbed him. 322-323, As noting means committed, requisite "motive," kidnaping. App.2d, 326, Montes, 1050, 88 482 (1999), attempted murder where confederate shot armed assault, simple breach peace. 1055, 485. appellant charged peace "confrontation. punctuated threats weaponry" "in context ongoing rivalry two gangs [that] acted violently toward each other." Ibid. reasoned escalating violence, resulting someone being shot, foreseeable consequence participating gang confrontation. Montes expansive concept "motive" "intent" Nguyen say concepts extend significantly our creates requires imagination statute's language. It realistic probability, theoretical possibility, State offender, course, so But point (nongeneric) manner argues. Because showing statute, through courts' subspecies B additional claims. First, 10851 holds fact; require Second, applies, auto joyriding, involves limited use Van Vechten Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 303, 146 N.E. 432 (1925) (Cardozo, J.) proposition very temporary theft). *823 shall agreed decide "`theft offense'" "includes Petitioner I. Context clear referred Penuliar, (principal degree, fact), supra, 820, "accessory fact." Thus neither claim nor "joyriding" presented. Regardless, claims, decline reach instance. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Smith, 525 459, 469-470, 119 924, 142 929 (1999); Roberts Galen Va., Inc., 249, 253-254, 685, 648 (1999) (per curiam); Bestfoods, 524 51, 72-73, 118 1876, 141 43 (1998). reasons judgment remand consistent opinion. ordered. APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT Ala.Code §§ 13A-2-20, 13A-2-23 (2006); Alaska 11.16.100, 11.16.110 (2004); Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-301, 13-302, 13-303(A) 2001); Ark.Code 5-2-402, 5-2-03(a) Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-1-601, 18-1-603 Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a-8(a) Del.Code Ann., Tit. 11, 271 (1995); D.C.Code 22-1805 (2001); Fla. 777.011 Ga.Code 16-2-20 (2003); Haw.Rev.Stat. 702-221, 702-222 (1993); Idaho 19-1430 (Lexis Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, 5/5-1, 5/5-2 Ind.Code 35-41-2-4 Iowa 703.1 Kan. 21-3205(1) Ky.Rev.Stat. 502.020(1) 2006); La. 14:24 1997); Me.Rev.Stat. 17-A, 57(1) Md.Crim. Proc. 4-204(b) Supp.2006); Mass. Gen. Laws, 274, Mich. Laws 767.39 2000); Minn.Stat. 609.05, subd. Miss.Code 97-1-3 Mo.Rev. 562.036, 562.041(1) (2000); Mont. 45-2-301, 45-2-302 Neb.Rev.Stat. 28-206 Nev.Rev. 195.020 N.H.Rev.Stat. 626:8 (Supp.2006); N.J. 2C:2-6 N.M. 30-1-13 Penal 20.00 N.C. 14-5.2 N.D. Cent.Code 12.1-03-01(1) Ohio Rev.Code 2923.03(A), (F) Okla. 21, 172 Ore.Rev.Stat. 161.150, 161.155 Pa. Cons.Stat. 306 (2002); R.I. 11-1-3 S.C.Code 16-1-40 S.D. Codified 22-3-3, 22-3-3.1 (1998); Tenn. 39-11-401(a), 39-11-402 Tex. 7.01, 7.02(a) Utah 76-2-202 Vt. 3 Va.Code 18.2-18 Wash. 9A.08.020 61-11-6 Wis. 939.05 (2003-2004); Wyo. 6-1-201 (2005). 11.16.110; Riley State, 60 P.3d 204, 214, 219-221 (Alaska App.2002); *824 Tarnef 512 923, 928 1973); Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 435-437, 46 1048, 1056-1058 Wall, 212 1, 4-5, 126 148, 151-152 18-1-603; Bogdanov People, 941 247, 250-252, n. 8, amended 955 997 (Colo.1997), disapproved grounds Griego 19 7-8 (Colo.2001); Wilson-Bey 903 A.2d 818, 821-822 (D.C.2006); Kitt 904 348, 354-356 Commonwealth Richards, 363 299, 305-308, 293 N.E.2d 854, 859-860 (1973); Daughtry, 136, 137-140, 627 928, 930-931 (1994); Mont.Code 45-2-302; ex rel. Keyes Montana 13th Jud. Dist. Ct., 288 27, 32-35, 639, 642-643 Sharma Nev. 648, 653-657, 56 868, 871-873 (2002) cf. Bolden 121 908, 921-922, 124 191, 200 Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶¶ 5-13, 64, 946 1075, 1079-1080; Bacon, 163 279, 286-292, 658 54, 60-63 Pitts, 174 23-27, 800 481, 483-485 (2002). C See, LaFave 13.3(b), 361-362, nn. 27-29 ed.2003 Supp.2007) (identifying doctrine California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, viability unclear); Medeiros, 599 723, 726 (R.I.1991) (aider acts). Beasley 360 So. 1275, 1278 (Fla.App.1978); 16-2-20; Jackson 278 Ga. 235, 235-237, S.E.2d 129, 131-132 Jordan 272 395, 395-397, 530 192, 193-194 Crawford 210 Ga.App. 36, 36-37, 65 Ehrmantrout, 202, 595 1097 (1979) Meyers, 95-750, pp. 5-7 (La.App.11/26/96), 683 1378, 1382; Holmes, 388 722, 725-727 (La.1980); Robinson, 475 8-9, 715 N.W.2d 44, 49 Welch 566 680, 684-685 (Miss.1990); Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 857, 863, 6 (Mo.1986); Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485, 497 (Mo.2000); Logan, 645 60, 64-65 (Mo. App.1982); Leonor, 263 Neb. 86, 95-97, 638 798, 807 2C:2-6; Torres, 554, 566-567, 874 1084, 1092 Weeks, 107 396, 401-406, 526 1077, 1080-1082 (1987); 2923.03; Johnson, St. 3d 240, 242-246, 754 796, 799-801 Herring, 94 246, 248-251, 762 940, 947-948 161.155; Pine, Ore. 194, 203-205, 206-208, 6, 82 130, 135, 137, Anlauf 164 Ore.App. 672, 674-677, 995 547, 548-549, Hudgins Moore, 337 S.C. 333, 339, 105, 108, 5 22-3-3; Tofani, 2006 SD 63, 31-48, 719 391, 400-405; Richmond, 90 654-656 (Tenn.2002); 7.02; Ex parte Thompson, 179 549, 552 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Gordon 640 743, 758 (Tex.App.1982); 76-2-202; Alvarez, 872 450, (Utah 1994); Crick, 675 527, 534 1983); *825 Rodoussakis, W.Va. 58, 77, 511 469, 488 Jahnke 692 911, 921-922 (Wyo.1984); Fales 908 404, 408 (Wyo.1995); Edwards, 303 606, 637 (C.A.5 2002), cert. denied, 537 1192, 123 1272, 154 1025 Walker, 99 439, 443 (C.A.D.C.1996); Miller, 22 1078-1079 (C.A.11 936 F.2d 1508, 1527(CA7), 502 991, 112 607, 116 630 (1991); Graewe, 774 106, (C.A.6 1985), 474 1068 1069, 106 826, 798 (1986); Barnett, 667 835, 841 1982); DeLaMotte, 434 289, 1970), 401 921, 91 910, 27 825 (1971). STEVENS, concurring part dissenting part. join Parts I, II, III-B opinion, judgment, Part III-A. am prepared disagree anything III-A, believe advised withhold comment issues until been addressed Limiting answer, though rigid rule, generally prudent. Doing seems particularly wise whenever reaching analysis disputed law. circuit judges familiar respective are, often followed sound practice deferring matters necessarily views. Haring Prosise, 462 306, 314, 103 2368, 76 (1983); Bishop Wood, 426 341, 345-346, 96 2074, 48 684 (1976) (collecting cases); Elk Grove Unified School Newdow, 542 2301, 159 98 (2004). adhere settled

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