Document: 536 U.S. 214 CAREY, WARDENv.SAFFOLD. No. 01-301. Supreme Court of the United States. Argued February 27, 2002. Decided June 17, CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after conviction becomes final, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), but excludes from that period time during which an application for collateral review is "pending," 2244(d)(2). Respondent Saffold filed in California seven days before deadline. Five trial court denied petition, he further State Appeal. Four one-half months was denied, Court, on merits lack diligence. Federal District dismissed subsequent as untimely, finding statute limitations not tolled intervals between denial filing next because no "pending" time. In reversing, Ninth Circuit included period, found Saffold's timely based its decision only diligence also merits. Held: 1. As used 2244(d)(2), covers lower court's notice appeal higher court. Most States' systems require court; then specified entry unfavorable judgment; and, if still unsuccessful, (or request discretionary review) supreme Petitioner warden seeks uniform national rule interval judgment court, reasoning being considered Such reading consistent with ordinary meaning which, present context, means until completion process; i. e., has achieved final resolution through State's postconviction proceedings. Petitioner's would produce serious statutory anomaly. Because petitioner exhausted remedies long "the right under [state] law ... raise" State, "by any available procedure, question presented," 2254(c), petitioner's interpretation encourages prisoners their petitions completes full round review, courts have contend are sense unlawful (because claims been exhausted) another required by they otherwise be barred 1-year period). Pp. 219-221. 2. same applies California's unique system, even though system involves, appeal, (within "reasonable" time) original special practice terminology might suggest. A typically will seek later appellate Thus, functions very much like other States, indeterminate timeliness rule. That may make it more difficult determine when comes too late. But tolling provision protect interests, can explicate timing requirements precisely should prove necessary. applying interacts procedural rules, this looks how procedure functions, particular name. ways sufficiently bring scope "pending." 221-225. 3. words "on merits" themselves do indicate timely, possible conclude wrong ultimate conclusion. such opinion variety reasons. And Circuit's willingness take them absolute bellwether risks likely thus threatening purpose encouraging prompt filings order forced hear stale claims. reconsidering issue, left evaluate conditions justifying delay relevant considerations, decide whether certify clarification law. 225-227. 250 F. 3d 1262, vacated remanded. BREYER, J., delivered STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, dissenting opinion, REHNQUIST, SCALIA THOMAS, joined, post, p. 227. Stanley A. Cross, Supervising Deputy Attorney General California, argued cause petitioner. With him brief were Bill Lockyer, General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Jo Graves Arnold O. Overoye, Senior Attorneys General. David W. Ogden respondent. Mary Katherine McComb, appointment 534 1053, Seth P. Waxman.* JUSTICE BREYER Court. 1 (AEDPA) corpus remedy become "final." 2244(d)(1)(A). adds, however, does include courts. 2 This case raises three questions related word "pending": 3 (1) Does cover court? 4 (2) If so, apply similarly — involve rather reasonable 5 (3) at issue here (filed 4½ reached decision) pending or longer failed comply rules? 6 We answer first two affirmatively, while remanding Appeals consideration third. 7 * 1990 Tony Saffold, respondent, convicted sentenced murder, assault firearm, robbery. His became direct April 1992. AEDPA took effect, began running AEDPA's effective date, 24, 1996, giving date (in absence tolling) petition. 8 week deadline, stating single sentence did so diligence." App. G Pet. Cert. 9 Approximately later, early 1998, noted 1997. It recognized gave extra decided actively considering it, had those amounted five (between intermediate court) plus Court), made critical difference. Without counting part enough timely. Hence 10 reversed. hence what was, least assuming v. Newland, 1266 (2001). added despite elapsed since Appeal decision. "lack diligence" merits," circumstance showed "applied untimeliness bar some degree underlying constitutional raised." Id., 1267. 11 granted certiorari. now vacate remand case. II 12 most sets forth version following procedures. First, files instance, Second, must within, say, 30 45 judgment. See, e. g., Ala. Rule Proc. (2001); Colo. 4(b)(1) Ky. Crim. 12.04(3) (2002). Third, short time, 20 days, appeals Rev. Stat. 13-4-108 Conn. 80-1 (2002); Civ. 76.20(2)(b) argues "uniform rule" effect Brief 36. Its rationale that, consideration. 13 word's meaning. dictionary defines (when adjective) "in continuance" "not yet decided." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1669 (1993). term preposition) "through continuance of," "until of." Ibid. definition, applied process of" process. words, procedures, definition remains 14 exhaust obtain relief. makes clear maintains presented." 2254(c). interpreted latter "invok[e] complete established process." O'Sullivan Boerckel, 526 838, 845 (1999). exhaustion requirement serves goal promoting "comity, finality, federalism," Williams Taylor, 529 420, 436 (2000), opportunity [the] claim," "correct" "constitutional violation instance." supra, 844-845. accompanying ensures achievement "promotes respecting interest finality judgments." Duncan Walker, 533 167, 178 violates these principles review. lead great uncertainty courts, requiring limitations). 15 therefore surprising circuit manner proposed California. Every consider argument rejected it. Melancon Kaylo, 259 401, 406 (CA5 2001); Payton Brigano, 256 405, 408 (CA6 Hizbullahankhamon 255 65, 72 (CA2 Nyland Moore, 216 1264, 1267 (CA11 2000); Swartz Meyers, 204 417, 421-422 (CA3 Taylor Lee, 186 557, 560-561 (CA4 1999); Nino Galaza, 183 1003, 1005 (CA9 Barnett LeMaster, 167 1321, 1323 (CA10 1999). Like we affirmative. III 16 Having answered necessarily predicate ordinarily treats applications typical "appeal" turn differs States require, technically speaking, determination. Instead contemplates new "original" determines each according "reasonableness" standard. These differences, argued, treating differently determination Criminal Justice Legal Foundation Amicus Curiae 5-18. 17 "original writ" rules first. re Ramirez, 89 Cal. 4th 1312, 1316, 108 Rptr. 2d 229, 232 (2001) (appellate "has discretion refuse writ ground [first] court"); Harris Superior Cal., 500 1124, 1126 1974) (same); B. Witkin & N. Epstein, Law 20, 540 (3d ed. 2000) (describing general policy reviewing court). who similar (say, find successive. Clark, 750, 767-771, 855 729, 740-744 At higher, basic seeks, dubbed See Resendiz, 25 230, 250, 19 1171, 1184 (reviewing grants substantial deference factual findings). just occurred 18 upshot fact indeterminate. Other (with exception North Carolina, see Allen Mitchell, 276 183, 2001)), specify precise limits, taken, Still, feature could mentioned, designed Duncan, (internal quotation marks omitted). modifies (a prevents delaying filing) give free interference. Inclusion periods carries out way, degree, inclusion specific prevalent exclusion undermine goals Part II, supra. standard than (i. interests protect, decisions legislation, Ordinarily, purposes look name bears. Richfield Oil Corp. Bd. Equalization, 329 69, (1946) (looking function "designation" gives state-court determining jurisdiction); Department Banking Neb. Pink, 317 264, 268 (1942) (per curiam) (same). 21 dissent contends "will disrupt sound operation 36 States." Post, 227 (opinion J.). believes, given choices court: He "petition hearing" "new petition" Reed, 33 914, 918, n. 2, 663 216, 217, (1983). Why different, asks, power entertain petitions? Won't our rule, equally expired, might, petition? 22 "no." systems, plays different role. Idaho (one cited dissent) explains: 23 "The having jurisdiction district proceedings exercise grant corpus, except extraordinary cases." Barlow, 48 309, 282 380 (1929). 24 also, Commonwealth Salzinger, Pa. 268, 269, 177 619, 620 (1962) ("extraordinary circumstances" La Belle Hancock, 99 H. 254, 255, 545 (1954) ("original authority" exercised"); Ex parte Lambert, 37 Tex. 435, 436, 81, 82 (1896) ("[E]xcept cases, writs corpus"). contrast, engrained both level into normal explained, recognizes, avenue challenge superior denial, "[f]urther [of application] sought [the supreme] either or, preferably, hearing." 2d, (emphasis added). Unlike as, Idaho, "extraordinary" interchangeable hearing, neither option bringing adverse consequences Consequently, treat States), appeals). course, said, free, legislative judicial action, adjust accordingly. IV 26 ask delayed "unreasonably" period. issued held nonetheless conclusion primarily upon wrote suggested, late, for, why merits? 3d, 27 There many plausible answers question. sometimes address claim believes presented untimely way: where issue; wants alternative grounds decision; wishes show (who lawyer) merely technicality precluded obtaining Given reasons cannot apparent highly Welch 267 1013 2001) (finding 4-year gap). consequently threatens S., 179. clearly ruled 4½-month "unreasonable," end matter, regardless addressed claim, ruling "entangled" say case, circumstances here: notified Appeal's several months, receiving notification. phrase referred matter irrelevant interval. leave considerations instance. appropriate area 29 For foregoing reasons, issues affirmative, Appeals, opinion. 31 ordered. Notes: Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal Carolina et al. Roy Cooper III, Amy Kunstling, Dan Schweitzer, respective follows: Pryor Alabama, Janet Napolitano Arizona, Ken Salazar Colorado, M. Jane Brady Delaware, Earl I. Anzai Hawaii, James E. Ryan Illinois, Carla J. Stovall Kansas, Joseph Curran, Jr., Maryland, Thomas Reilly Massachusetts, Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon Missouri, Mike McGrath Montana, Don Stenberg Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa Nevada, John Farmer, Jersey, Betty D. Montgomery Ohio, Hardy Myers Oregon, Michael Fisher Pennsylvania, Charles Condon South Mark Dakota, Randolph Beales Virginia, Christine Gregoire Washington, Hoke MacMillan Wyoming; Kent Scheidegger. Porter Peter Goldberger National Association Defense Lawyers amici affirmance. 32 whom CHIEF JUSTICE, SCALIA, THOMAS join, dissenting. appeal. begins presented, hypothetical somewhere else. strong indication off direction. After holding appellant, finally gets filed. On Court's view, procedures "unique," ante, treatment affect State. quite about this. fact, today's happens departs text nationwide reach result 34 rests propositions: "application" "petition, anything else appeal." untenable text. second third, facts allows high reverse outright. differ They respect case: 4-month respondent's 35 (AEDPA), 2244(d)(1), provides tolls "properly application" holds day respondent filed" somewhere. nor identify nothing awaiting four previous application. identifying application, relies expansive term. defining offering adjective preposition. 219. uses (tolling "is pending"), misleading. When adjective, help says "`in continuance' `not decided.'" (quoting (1993)). real means, "application pending." asserts "an `in ...." Ante, 219-220. true, "ordinary process," proposition finds support Third. Indeed, inconsistent Artuz Bennett, 531 "document" distinct legal contained 8, 9. word, "application," appears numerous places laws governing corpus. 2242 ("application shall writing signed verified"); 2243 "judge entertaining place, refers document; none substitute discussing references, meaning, existence document evidencing embraces multiple petitions, appeals, constitute explains says, "does `original' petition." 221. incorrect statement While permit provide "appellate review" available; concedes, 224-225, said preferred practice. Section 1506 Penal Code Ann. (West provides: "[I]n all criminal cases heard determined defendant people hearing Court." Rules 28(b), 50(b) analysis premised misinterpretation 38 Had provided 2000), remained prepared application; rather, Congress way distinguishing "appeals," 2253, successive "applications," 2244. remain pursues point future. 39 An pending, once loses ever (2002) ("When thereafter subject modification rehearing ..."). 40 invoking Const., Art. VI, (Supp. 2001). Under law, proceeding proximate connection People Romero, 728, 737, 883 388, 391 (1994). E., 192-193, 15, 538 231, 237, (1975). writ, below. 41 Even equivalent there turns out, regard equivalents. recognizes preferred. 918-919, use available. Although need earlier. Black, 66 881, 428 293 (1967); 56(a)(1) (directing explain apply). Moss, 175 913, 922, 221 645, 649 (1985). constitutes form function, today refuses see. 42 "Where remanded custody instituted terminated therein, inaugurate limited making jurisdiction, court." Zany, 164 724, 727, 130 710 (1913). 43 law: Each relief," ibid., let alone denies "no pending," 44 contrary depend construction "pending application." depends entirely writ," "appeal," privilege over substance. taken here. impossible understand ignored every writs, consequence, error significance beyond case; quirk well Appendix, infra. Congress, understands distinction, own validity certiorari, 1257, 2241. distinction requests ourselves. Before thought 46 mistaken concerns distinguishes 224. correct 231-232. true cites, test dozens more. "appeal States" creation mention tie enacted. departed sensible well-understood define fall side ordinary, litigated. many, all, mentioned above, relying decision, able extend perhaps indefinitely, denied. 47 jurisdictions create strange Now taking Seventh described "Cheshire-cat quality, time." Fernandez Sternes, 977, 980 (2000). If, declined highest went barred. docket year, granted, anywhere. premature expired. without comment), earlier ruling, before, retroactively prisoner's provision. Whether moment susceptible yes answer. theory often "impossible tell," submission events occur 49 insistence confusion elsewhere reason. (retroactively) pending. problem, unlike everywhere strict limit. "timely" exercised "due aware Harris, 813, 828, 7, 391, 398, equitable concept flexible, miscarriages justice, happened ago. Stankewitz, 396, 1, 708 1260, (1985) (hearing 18-month delay); 921, Rptr., 648 9-month delay). Nothing suggests wanted inject unpredictability limitations, hard approach state-law inquiry. 50 one, expressly deny diligence, routinely lengthy delays findings undue delay. 40-41, 27. assess, guidance due inquiry uncertainty, resulting litigation, vex well, know prepare petitions. 51 disposition proves unanswerable. rare diligence," hold untimely. Instead, concludes ambiguous, refer, 5-year pursuing all. 226. ambiguity, benefit years overdue, 8. Our presupposes 52 takes delivering back resolving ambiguity. thoroughly briefed resolve not. ask. Presumably, suggesting summary factbound really meant say. 53 ends answering presented. Both points telling. By leaving behind calling something not, complicated thousands Dept. Justice, Bureau Statistics, Prisoner Petitions Filed Courts, 2000, Trends 1980-2000, (Jan. 2002) (California 4,017 2000). addition appeals. Applying easier. 54 I Appeals. 55 APPENDIX OPINION 56 12-2-7(3) (1995); Ariz. 5(1); Ark. VII, 4; 3; Fla. 9.030(a)(3) Haw. 660-3 (1993); 19-4202(1) Ill. 4(a); Iowa V, Kan. La. 2; Me. Ann., Tit. 14, 5301 (1980); Md. Cts. Jud. 3-701 (1974-1998); Mich. Comp. Laws 600.4304(1) Mo. 4(1); Mont. 2(1); 24-204 Nev. 490:4 (1997); Gen. 7A-32(a) (1999); Cent. 27-02-04 (1991); Ohio IV, Okla. Ore. Cons. 721(1) (1981); 8-1-2 14-3-310 (1977); (1978); 2002); Utah 78-2-2 (2001 Supp.); Vt. 4, 2(b) Va. 1; Wash. 2.04.010 (1994); 51-1-3 (2000); Wyo.

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