Document: 336 U.S. 210 69 S.Ct. 530 93 L.Ed. 621 UNITED STATES ex rel. HIRSHBERGv.COOKE. No. 231. Argued Jan. 13, 1949. Decided Feb. 28, Mr. John J. O'Neil, of Boston, Mass., for petitioner. Peyton Ford, Washington, D.C., respondent. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion Court. 1 This case raises important questions concerning statutory jurisdiction general courts-martial Navy. 2 In 1942 petitioner was serving a second enlistment in Upon surrender United States forces on Corregidor became war prisoner Japan. After liberation September, 1945, brought back to and hospitalized. He restored duty January, 1946. March 26, 1946, he granted an honorable discharge because expiration his prior enlistment. The next day re-enlisted, obligating himself serve four years 'subject such laws, regulations articles government Navy as are or shall be established by Congress * other competent authority *.' 3 About year later, served with charges directing trial court-martial specifications included that during had maltreated two naval enlisted men who were also Japanese prisoners members groups working under petitioner's charge. Petitioner filed plea bar trial, one ground being without try him alleged offenses committed at end which received discharge. His overruled. acquitted some but convicted others charged maltreatment. sentence ten months confinement, reduction from chief signalman apprentice seaman, dishonorable 4 then this habeas corpus proceeding federal district court charging judgment void want power convict offense if all enlistment.1 That sustained contention ordered release custody. 73 F.Supp. 990. Court Appeals reversed, judge dissenting. 168 F.2d 503. importance construction, appeared affect powers Army well Navy, caused us grant certiorari. 5 Aside reference will later made, punish conduct primarily depends language Article 8 (Second) Articles Government 34 U.S.C. § 1200, art. 8, U.S.C.A. subd. 2, particularly provides 'such punishment may adjudge inflicted any person is guilty maltreatment of, subject orders contends given its literal meaning authorized It pointed out 'in Navy' when tried; it argued brings Article. aid interpretation emphasizes whole period time involved, continuously except interval few hours between re-enlistment. latter circumstance we think cannot justify urged. For correct, would satisfied sailor merely before court-martial, regardless duration interim service, provided prosecution not barred two-year limitation 61, 61. 6 concessions made urging construction expose whimsical uncertain nature distinctions mark boundaries powers. conceded re-enlisted after 1946 discharge, no could have tried service. Thus, here urged, wholly depend whether offender either voluntarily re-enters drafted into And gravest might imposed volunteer draftee voluntary forced entry same re-entered country's service way rather than choice accident draft assignment, Army, punished him. Jurisdiction rarely, ever, rests upon illogical fortuitous contingencies. We therefore must look beyond Article, ambiguous best, order determine acted within power. See Runkle v. States, 122 543, 555, 556, 7 1141, 1145, 1146, 30 1167; Ex parte Reed, 100 23, 25 538. While n t itself determinative question here, 14 (Eleventh), 14, 11, has greatly influenced determining their personnel enlistments. where previously discharged dismissed 'while service' been certain types fraud against Government, 'shall continue liable arrested held manner extent nor dismissed.' (Eleventh) stems Act passed 1863, designed frauds military branches connection procurement supplies activities. 12 Stat. 696. attention 1863 directly focused should vested clear debates fact deleted bill proposed specific provisions civilian contractors courts-martial. Cong.Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952—958 (1863), Part II, Appendix 199 (1863). Henderson, C.C.D.Ky. 1878, 11 Fed.Cas. 1067, 6,349. see Marcus Hess, 317 U.S 537, 539-545, 63 379, 382-385, 87 443. But elimination further expanded jurisdiction, left 3, now Naval makes frauds, dismissal. provision applicable War 94, 10 1566, 1566. 9 plainly recognized there significant difference former correctly argues precise namely, court's man presently discharged. remains did act implicit assumption congressional courts soldiers while Acting assumption, only very limited category defined—frauds Government.2 Since Act, measure over servicemen, they not. Obviously [Second], subjects persons Navy,' supports argument court-martial. equally obvious view suppor Under these circumstances long exercised entitled great weight interpreting Articles. submitted Secretary Attorney General 1919. re-enlistment revive considered, reached conclusion proceedings instituted 'for violations Governing excepting 14' 'thereafter violations, though service.' 31 Op.Atty.Gen. 521, 529. relied statements Judge Advocate Generals offices 'from beginning uniformly separated ceases amenable' jurisdiction. Previous General's 1919 neither ever claimed Winthrop, Military Law Precedents (2d ed. 1920). concedes always so construed whenever arose. followed until 1932.3 Many holdings opinions authorities cited support concessions. Government's brief quotes following Department cases considered issue raised here. appears CMO 12-1921, p. 11. 'Except violation law giving subsequently reenlisted reenlistment asserted.' 13 Accepting do longstanding referred to, necessarily deny recent congressionally regulation acquired 591, authorizes approval President, adopt alter control claims adopted pursuant promulgated,4 necessary regulation, contended, force law, 22, 538, consequently supplants statutes which, interpreted, denied asserted. There considerable sufficiently endow law. Passing argument, however, able agree ac uire claimed. construe permitting extend courtmartial limits fixed. Symonds, 120 46, 49, 50, 411, 412, 413, 557. stands better evidence revised 1932. Before time, both more half century men, not, longer proceeded assumption. Kelly, 15 Wall. 34, 36, 21 106. circumstances, little can 1932 separate effort change long-accepted understanding belated accepted outstanding opposed substantially foundations, opposing interpretations right, unless assumed each free own boundaries. assume intended delegation broad area vitally affects rights liberties those now, been, associated Nation's armed forces. Reversed. Court-martial part (Second), reaches 'maltreatment orders.' District contended orders' virtue obligations, whatever came duties assigned war. Both rejected suggested urged discussion showed grudgingly comparatively slight expansion apparently prompted reports abhorrent contractors, supply shells 'filled proper explosive materials use, sawdust.' Cong. Globe, 955 action does quick response appeals Duncan Kahanamoku, 327 304, 66 606, 90 688; Milligan, 281. consistently adhered Art. (Second). 1934 incorporated official publication, Courts Boards, 344(a) Boards (1937 ed.). appearing 1937 334 contained language: '* Except article A.G.N., martial individual formally Similarly, legal previous enlistment, although A.G.N.'

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