Document: 342 U.S. 197 72 S.Ct. 223 96 L.Ed. 225 PILLSBURY et al.v.UNITED ENGINEERING CO. al. No. 229. Argued Dec. 6, 1951. Decided Jan. 2, 1952. Mr. Samuel D. Slade, Wasington D.C., for petitioner. Edward R. Kay, San Francisco, Cal., respondents. Justice MINTON delivered the opinion of Court. 1 These four cases present same question, namely, construction and application statute limitations provision Longshoremen's Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, § 13(a), 33 U.S.C. 913(a), U.S.C.A. which provides in pertinent part as follows: 'The right to compensation disability under this Act shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after injury * *.' The claims here involved were from eighteen twenty-four months dates employees injured. Deputy Commissioner held that nevertheless timely, since they had been claimants become disabled because their injuries. District Court vacated awards, 92 F.Supp. 898, Appeals affirmed on ground not 'filed injury', 9 Cir., 187 F.2d 987, 990. We granted certiorari, 847, 78, conflict between circuits,1 identical holdings Appeals, given provision. This question was before us 1940 Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 667, by an equally divided Court, 309 619, 60 465, 84 983. 2 Petitioners contend word 'injury' used should construed mean 'disability.' contention premised petitioners' conclusion 6(a) 'No allowed first seven days disability,'2 ('disability' elsewhere defined 'incapacity earn wages employee receiving at time or any other employment')3 19(a), 'a may following injury,'4 operate prevent filing have occurred. Since, case each here, injured fail accrue days' 'disability' his injury, petitioners argue such will file it arises, if 'injury.' Thus, conclude limitation made run until becomes compensable, i.e., 3 But recover thing, another. It has long practice permit avoid running one-year period involved. A proper interpretation §§ 19(a) does prohibit accrual disability. Each immediately aware received medical treatment, suffered continuous pain. are dealing with latent occupational disease. 4 free, guise construction, amend inserting therein 'compensable' so make read Congress knew difference words advisedly. view especially compelling when noted two sentence provision; related compensation, while must filed. Furthermore, both Act,5 its awareness apparent throughout. we think sentence, making applicable different did intend carefully distinguished separately thing. meant what said limited recovery date 5 humanitarian act, liberally effectuate purposes; but give power rewrite will, intended no all. Petitioners' would effect extending indefinitely filed; then extension rather than limitation. While might desirable provide contend, change Congress, us. 6 judgments affirmed. 7 Affirmed. 8 BURTON, whom BLACK DOUGLAS concur, dissenting. Court's computation opposed beneficial purpose justified absence more express basis it. death certain maritime employments caused injuries arising out course employment. now restricts Act. computes employee's accident compensation. One thus claiming later resulting unless, year, he compensation—although during acquired 10 call justify frustrating interpretation. Section 13(a) say 'accident.' says 'within injury'. 1432, 913(a). deals only disabling loss earning them. If recognized means compensable natural result flows So interpreted, section requires arises. 11 That concerned solely appears face. payable merely employment, nor even physical damage accident. allows also power. 12 expressly limits 'injuries' those origin stating arise employment.1 death.2 defines required diminution power.3 13 reasonable injuries.4 On hand, interpret cutting off measure bearing relation causes him accident, entitled year. Yet, subsequently disabilities instant show how readily situations arise. 14 legislative history consistent interpretation.5 Their judicial support appellate courts Columbia Circuit Third Circuit. See Great American Indemnity Co. Britton, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 179 60; Potomac Electric Power Cardillo, 71 App.D.C. 163, 107 962; Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. Norton, 93 119. 15 Before enactment several states interpreted comparable provisions Acts 'compensable injury' Esposito Marlin-Rockwell Corp., Conn. 414, 114 A. 92; Guderian Sterling S. & Co., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546; Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428, 514. Cf. Hornbrook-Price Stewart, 66 Ind.App. 400, 118 N.E. 315; In re McCaskey, 65 349, 117 268. Contra: Cooke Holland Furnace 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013, L.R.A.1918E, 552. 16 To determine begins necessary resulted necessarily coincident reduction rate actually paid him. respective Commissioners found occurred, although none question. findings supported substantial evidence record taken whole. O'Leary Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 504, 470, 95 483. Accordingly, I hold timely reverse judgment directions remand dismissal complaints. decision Ninth 60. 1426, 906(a), 906(a). 1425, 902(10), 902(10). 1435, 919(a), 919(a). 'Sec. 2. When Act— '(2) term accidental disease infection arises naturally employment unavoidably results includes willful act third person directed against '(10) 'Disability' incapacity employment.' 1424—1425, 902(2, 10), 10). 902(2), 902(2). 3. (a) respect employee, occurring upon navigable waters United States (including dry dock) through workmen's proceedings validly provided State law. *' 903(a), 903(a). 13. death, except payment without award account last payment. bill became (S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; 67 Cong.Rec. 4119) amended reduce limit years substitute place 'accident' starting point period. like substitution places added. changes emphasize impropriety reading meaning disease, restrictive rights some early contact constituting 'accident,' due

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