Document: 546 U.S. 132 (2005) MARTIN ET UX. v. FRANKLIN CAPITAL CORP. AL. No. 04-1140. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 8, 2005. Decided December 7, *133 Sam Heldman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on briefs were Hilary E. Ball, Michael P. Malakoff, and James M. Pietz. Jan T. Chilton respondents. brief was Ronald J. Segel.[*] *134 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered opinion Court. A civil case commenced in state court may, as a general matter, be removed by defendant to federal district court, if could have been brought there originally. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000 ed. Supp. II). If it appears that lacks jurisdiction, however, "the shall remanded." 1447(c). An order remanding "may require payment just costs any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred result removal." Ibid. Although 1447(c) expressly permits an award attorney's provides little guidance when such fees are warranted. We granted certiorari determine proper standard awarding court. I Petitioners Gerald Juana Martin filed class-action lawsuit New Mexico against respondents Franklin Capital Corporation Century-National Insurance Company (collectively, Franklin). Federal District basis diversity citizenship. See §§ 1332, In its removal notice, acknowledged amount controversy not clear from face complaint no reason should be, since complaint had courtbut this requirement jurisdiction nonetheless satisfied. so arguing, relied part precedent suggesting punitive damages aggregated class action meet amount-in-controversy requirement. App. 35. Fifteen months later, Martins moved remand ground their claims failed satisfy The denied motion eventually dismissed *135 with prejudice. On appeal, Appeals Tenth Circuit agreed suit rejected Franklin's contention calculating controversy, decisions issued after Court's decision. reversed remanded instructions 251 F.3d 1284, 1294 (2001). Back before Court, under reviewed concluded that, although determined improper, "had legitimate grounds believing fell within th[e] jurisdiction." Pet. Cert. 20a. Because objectively reasonable believe legally proper," Martins' request fees. appealed again, arguing requires granting matter course. disagreed, noting is left "wide discretion" subject review only abuse discretion. 393 1143, 1146 (2004). Under precedent, "`key factor'" deciding whether "`the propriety defendant's removal.'" (quoting Excell, Inc. Sterling Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., 106 318, 322 (CA10 1997)). case, law subsequently held unsound, therefore reasonable. F.3d, at 1148. abused discretion denying affirmed. Id., 1151. *136 certiorari, 544 998 (2005), resolve conflict among Circuits concerning awarded Compare, e. g., Hornbuckle State Farm Lloyds, 385 538, 541 (CA5 2004) ("Fees removing lacked proper" (internal quotation marks omitted)), Sirotzky York Stock Exchange, 347 985, 987 (CA7 2003) ("[P]rovided plaintiff presumptively entitled fees"), Hofler Aetna Healthcare Cal., 296 764, 770 (CA9 2002) (affirming fee even position may fairly supportable" omitted)). hold absent unusual circumstances, party has removal. affirm judgment Circuit. II argue automatically remand, or least strong presumption favor Section 1447(c), "may" feesnot "shall" "should." As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained Fogerty Fantasy, 510 517, 533 (1994), "[t]he word `may' clearly connotes automatic prevailing would pretermit exercise discretion." Congress used often enough 1447(c)as specified cases apparently outside "shall remanded"to dissuade us conclusion meant authorizing somewhat stronger pressing they explain, *137 we interpreted statute discretionary plaintiffs rights give rise presumption. Newman Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). But all like Park. Park, serves "`private general,'" helping ensure compliance laws benefiting public "vindicating policy considered highest priority." also later appropriate because defendant, who required pay violated law. Flight Attendants Zipes, 491 754, 762 (1989) ("Our emphasized crucial connection between liability violation fee-shifting statutes"). do serve private attorneys secure nor view defendants violators To contrary, grants right forum. necessary improperly asserts right, but incorrectly invoking comparable violating substantive reasons adopting present accordingly here. absence reasons, sound similar Instead, intended course successfully obtains think "[s]uch bold departure traditional practice surely drawn more explicit statutory language legislative comment." Fogerty, supra, 534. For part, begins shifted *138 all. According Franklin, provision simply courts otherwise warranted, example Rule Civil Procedure 11 supports correct predecessor enacted, lack see Mansfield, C. L. R. Co. Swan, 111 379, 386-387 (1884), assume went further than conferring acted. most efficient way cure jurisdictional defect create ordering costs. text view. strictly jurisdictional, need limit awards "just" costs; authorized other provisions presumably "just." natural reading: authorizes just. question remains how define standard. Solicitor General narrowly, showing unsuccessful party's "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation"the adopted cases, Christiansburg Garment EEOC, 434 412, 421 (1978), intervenors 762. Brief States Amicus Curiae 14-16. supposing tilt too here bias awards, Zipes. context strike evenly balanced pro-award anti-award *139 either Zipes; nothing persuade usually denied. fact court's discretion, heavy congressional thumb side scales, does mean legal governs good authority "a [a court's] motion, inclination, judgment; guided principles." Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, J.). Discretion whim, limiting according standards helps promote basic principle justice decided alike. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory 747, 758 (1982). these limited courts' despite express restrictions. That is, course, what did (A "should ordinarily recover unless special circumstances render unjust"), Garment, 422 ("[A] assessed his opponent's finds claim frivolous, groundless"), U.S., 761 (Attorney's "only where intervenors' foundation"). reaffirmed which based: "Although specify limits upon allow disallow system rarely limits." 758. Zipes explains discern When applying statutes, "we found `the large objectives' *140 relevant Act, embrace certain `equitable considerations.'" 759 (citation omitted).[*] By enacting statute, forum state-court defendants. shifting automatic, might choose remove obvious. (awarding prevail "could discourage airtight claims, seldom can [party] sure ultimate success"). suppose confer remove, while same time discouraging obvious cases. Congress, enacted concern avoiding deterrence removals. thought some process then having back delays resolution imposes additional both parties, wastes judicial resources. Assessing reduces attractiveness method delaying litigation imposing plaintiff. test recognize desire deter removals sought purpose prolonging opposing party, undermining Congress' decision afford criteria *141 light "`large objectives,'" 759, turn reasonableness Absent seeking Conversely, exists, See, Hornbuckle, 541; Valdes Wal-Mart Stores, 199 290, 293 2000). rule, retain consider warrant rule given case. instance, plaintiff's delay failure disclose facts affect exercises manner, departing "faithful purposes" 534, n. 19; Milwaukee Cement Div., National Gypsum Co., 515 189, 196, 8 (1995) ("[A]s always issue committed judge's must supported circumstance relevance hand"). * "close question," 1148, dispute arguments, lower point. It ordered. NOTES [*] Briefs amici curiae urging affirmance Clement, Assistant Attorney Keisler, Deputy Hungar, A. Feldman, Jay Singer, Robinson; Product Liability Advisory Council, Robert N. Weiner D. Rosenbaum. 517 identify awarded. depart decide applied 521. Having first instance. 534-535.

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