Document: 487 U.S. 552 108 S.Ct. 2541 101 L.Ed.2d 490 Samuel R. PIERCE, Jr., Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Petitioner,v.Myrna UNDERWOOD et al. No. 86-1512. Argued Dec. 1, 1987. Decided June 27, 1988. Syllabus One petitioner's predecessors as Development decided not to implement an "operating subsidy" program authorized by federal statute, which was intended provide payments owners Government-subsidized apartment buildings offset rising utility expenses property taxes. Various plaintiffs, including respondent members a nationwide class housing tenants, successfully challenged the decision in lawsuits nine Federal District Courts. After two decisions were affirmed Courts Appeals, newly appointed settled with most respondents. While Court administering settlement, Congress passed Equal Access Justice Act (EAJA), authorizes award reasonable attorney's fees against Government "unless court finds that position United States substantially justified." Under EAJA, amount awarded must "be based upon prevailing market rates for kind quality services furnished, except . shall be excess $75 per hour unless determines increase cost living or special factor, such limited availability qualified attorneys proceedings involved, justifies higher fee." The respondents under concluding operating-subsidy had been "substantially justified," basing award, exceeded $1 million, on "special factors" justifying hourly cap. Appeals held abused its discretion Secretary's justified, factors relied justified exceeding Held: 1. In reviewing Court's determination correctly applied abuse-of-discretion standard, rather than de novo standard review. Neither clear statutory prescription nor historical tradition requires this choice standards. However, deferential, review is suggested EAJA's language, that" (rather simply "unless") States' statute's structure, expressly provides agency fee determinations. As matter sound judicial administration, district courts are better appeals decide substantial justification question. Moreover, question multifarious, novel, little susceptible useful generalization at time, therefore likely profit from experience will permit develop. Pp. 557-563. 2. phrase justified" means substance main—that is, degree could satisfy person. This interpretation accords related uses term "substantial," equivalent "reasonable basis both law fact" formulation adopted vast majority Appeals. Respondents' reliance House Committee Report pertaining 1985 reenactment EAJA proposition "substantial justification" "more mere reasonableness" misplaced, since authoritative what 1980 statute meant language drafted Committee, merely accepted existing phrase. 563-568. 3. ruled did abuse finding Government's Although "objective indicia" can relevant establishing justification," they inconclusive case. willingness settle litigation stage merits reliable objective indicia here. views expressed other merits, some support sides. arguments underlying issue do command conclusion justified. 568-571. 4. fixing respondents' fees, none reasons reimbursement rate above maximum factor" within meaning. Since suggests thought generally sufficient regardless rate, "limited availability" factor refer "qualified proceedings" specialized sense, patent lawyers proceedings, just their general legal competence. Similarly, order preserve cap's effectiveness, broad application. Thus, court—the "novelty difficulty issues," "the undesirability case," work ability counsel," results obtained," contingent nature fee"—do qualify applicable spectrum more routine why are. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council Clean Air, 483 711, 107 3078, 97 585, distinguished. 571-574. 761 F.2d 1342 802 1107, part, vacated remanded. SCALIA, J., delivered opinion Court, Part I all participating Members joined, Parts II IV REHNQUIST, C.J., BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, JJ., III WHITE, O'CONNOR, V WHITE joined last three lines. filed concurring part judgment, MARSHALL post, p. ---. dissenting KENNEDY, took no consideration Thomas W. Merrill, Washington, D.C., petitioner. Mary S. Burdick, Los Angeles, Cal., SCALIA Court. 1 Respondents lawsuit one after found taken meaning 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). also determined calculating $75-per-hour cap imposed statute. We granted certiorari, 481 1047, 2177, 95 834 (1987), resolve conflict over important questions concerning EAJA. Compare Dubose Pierce, 913 (CA2 1985), cert. pending, 85-516, (CA9 1985) (per curiam ), amended, 1107 (1986)(case below). 2 * dispute arose out 236 amended 212 Community 1974, Pub.L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633, formerly codified 12 §§ 1715z-1(f)(3) (g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). provided plaintiffs See Underwood 547 F.Supp. 256, 257, n. (CD Cal. 1982) (citing cases). appealing these adverse decisions, respondents, tenants residing housing, brought present action challenging Columbia. That Secretary, summary judgment favor entered permanent injunction writ mandamus requiring disburse accumulated fund. Hills, 414 526, 532 (1976). stayed pending appeal. Sub nom. Hills Cooperative Services, Inc., 429 892, 250, 50 175 Second Circuit similarly stayed, appeal, eight judgments Secretary. Harris, 82 F.R.D. 582, 584 (Conn. 1979). Two those see Ross 544 514 (CA4 1976), Abrams 1062 sub Pierce Ross, 455 1010, 102 1700, 72 127 (1982), we consolidated cases petitions writs certiorari Harris 431 928, 2630, 53 243 (1977). Before any reached issue, before cases. agreed pay into settlement fund $60 million distribution subsidized whose rents increased because subsidies paid. case then transferred Central California administration settlement. 3 1980, while being administered, 2412(d), provides: 4 "(1)(A) Except otherwise specifically party ., incurred civil circumstances make unjust. 5 6 "(2) For purposes subsection— 7 "(A) 'fees expense' includes attorney (The subsection (ii) fee.)." 8 motion 3,304 hours service applying ranging $80 performed 1976 $120 1982. produced base "lodestar" figure $322,700 multiplied three-and-one-half (again factors"), resulting total $1,129,450. 9 On Ninth F.2d, 1346. increasing attorneys, but justify multiplier lodestar amount. It reduced $322,700. Id., 1347-1348; 1107. 10 petition whether below properly identified fees. 11 first consider correct when review, judges traditionally divided categories, denominated (reviewable fact error), matters "abuse discretion"). treated involving these; have it first. Battles Farm Co. 257 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 11-12, 806 1098, 1103-1104 (1986), denied, 1046, 2176, 832; 917. few trial determinations, appellate answered relatively explicit command. See, e.g., 42 1988 ("[T]he court, discretion, may allow fee"). others, answer long history practice. But when, here, neither exists, uncommonly difficult derive pattern analytical framework yield answer.1 Rosenberg,,JudicialDiscretionoftheTrialCourt, Viewed Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 638 (1971) (hereinafter Rosenberg). No today past attempt discern create comprehensive test; persuaded significant call discretion" 13 turn structure governing 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). formulation, opposed emphasizes make, thus deference inference compelled, certainly available. provision administrative litigant adjudication if 504(a)(1), specifies agency's reversed only "finds failure unsupported evidence." 504(c)(2). doubt intent interlocking scheme would accord own court. Again, however, assuredly compelled. 14 recently observed, regard problem determining mixed sometimes "has turned that, justice, actor positioned another question." Miller Fenton, 474 104, 114, 106 445, 451, 405 (1985). think context well, argues To begin with, elements bear "was known Not infrequently, law, evidence regarding facts. By reason conferences pretrial activities, insights conveyed record, particular worthy upon, critical facts easily verified Government. even where judge's full knowledge factual setting acquired acquisition often come unusual expense, undertake unaccustomed task entire determine there existed usual minimum made factfinder below, urging opposite 15 cases, one, involve ultimately evaluation purely litigation. cannot assumed, require invest additional grapple same merits. contrary, expect so feeble grounds (as here) appeal judgment. occurs simultaneously (or goes panel entertains) latter precisely merits: now believing been. separate-from-the-merits appeals, investment energy either fail produce normal law-clarifying benefits else strangely distort process. former result obtain (because intervening circuit itself) time quite clear, entirely interest. Where, hand, remains unsettled ruling thus-and-so (unless has changed since) effectively establish peculiar, secondhanded fashion. possibility occurrence encourage needless Government, know does victorious plaintiff denial district-court loss converted circuit-court without opportunity victory All untoward consequences avoided adopting 16 Another find described follows Professor Rosenberg: 17 "One 'good' conferring judge sheer impracticability formulating rule issue. Many arise amenable regulation fleeting, special, narrow utterly resist least, being. 18 19 "The non-amenability rule, diffuseness circumstances, novelty, vagueness, similar argue allowing develop, appears magistrate. A analogue course development Rule 39(b) Rules Civil Procedure, providing spite litigant's tardiness (under 38 ten-day-from-last-pleading deadline) 'in discretion' jury issues. Over years, consistently upheld refusing late-demanded trials, doing laid down guidelines exercise discretionary power. products cumulative experience, relate justifiability tardy delay absence prejudice his adversary. Time allowed formless take shape, contours guiding principle emerge." Rosenberg 662-663. 20 litigating multifarious novel question, susceptible, generalization, There applies here said connection our 54(b) certification courts: "because number possible situations large, reluctant fix sanction follow." Curtiss-Wright Corp. General Electric Co., 446 10-11, 100 1460, 1466, 64 (1980). Application needed flexibility. 21 acknowledged militating use liability Judge's decision. If sort ordinarily consequences, might reviewed intensively. regard, characteristic median less $3,000. Annual Director Administrative Office Courts, Fees Expenses Awarded Act, pp. 99-100, Table 29 (1987) (351 387 awards fiscal year 1986-1987 Department Health Human Services averaged $2,379). generality exception form rule. sum, although outset resolution rigorously scientific, satisfied text permits, counsels, deferential court's addition furthering goals described, view "request should second major litigation." Hensley Eckerhart, 461 424, 437, 103 1933, 1941, 76 40 (1983). 23 proceeding case, abstract resolve: 2412(d)(1)(A). following precedent, "had fact." source prepared original enactment commented "[t]he test essentially reasonableness H.R.Conf.Rep. 96-1434, petition, urges us hold "some fair success." Brief Petitioner 16. Respondents, contend imports something "a simple standard," 24—though somewhat vague more, high strong showing," id., 28. 24 addressing appropriate substitute formula judicially crafted revision it—whether anything else. "Substantially prescribes, framed terms. said, nevertheless obvious need elaborate range interpretations attributable word "substantial" different—indeed, almost contrary—connotations. mean "[c]onsiderable amount, value, like; large," Webster's New International Dictionary 2514 (2d ed. 1945) as, example, statement, "He won election majority." "[t]hat main," ibid.—as, "What he true." Depending connotation selects, respondents'. 25 not, dealing field guidance matter. Judicial action, regularly proceeds rubric evidence" set forth Procedure 706(2)(E). large considerable evidence, "such mind accept adequate conclusion." Consolidated Edison NLRB, 305 197, 229, 59 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). area way, avoiding imposition resisting discovery resistance Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 37(a)(4) (b)(2)(E). knowledge, never "justified degree," "genuine dispute," Advisory Committee's Notes 1970 Amendments Fed.Rule 37(a)(4), U.S.C.App., 601; see, Quaker Chair Litton Business Systems, 71 527, 535 (SDNY "if people differ [the appropriateness contested action]," Reygo Pacific Johnston Pump 680 647, 649 1982); C. Wright & A. Miller, Practice 2288, 790 (1970); SEC Musella, [1984] CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. ¶ 91,647, 99,282 1984) [available WESTLAW, 1984 WL 832]; Smith Montgomery County, 573 604, 614 (Md.1983). 26 view, therefore, between commonly used connotations "substantially," naturally main"—that different addressed Yoffe, 775 447, 449-450 (CA1 1985); 917-918; Citizens County Brinegar, 741 584, 593 (CA3 1984); Anderson Heckler, 756 1011, 1013 Hanover Building Materials, Inc. Guiffrida, 748 1015 (CA5 Trident Marine Construction, Dis- trict Engineer, 766 974, 980 (CA6 Ramos Haig, 716 471, 473 (CA7 1983); Foster Tourtellotte, 704 1109, 1112 1983) curiam); 2,116 Boxes Boned Beef, 726 1481, 1486-1487 (CA10), denied Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, States, 469 825, 105 105, 49 (1984); Ashburn 740 843, 850 (CA11 1984). means, course, undeserving sanctions frivolousness; person approve.2 27 press excerpt read follows: "Several 'substantial justification' reasonable. Because rejected 'reasonably justified' 'substantially justified,' reasonableness." H.R.Rep. 99-120, (1985), U.S.Code Cong. Admin.News 1985, 132, 138 (footnote omitted). controlling us, (1) meant, (2) expression intended. cannot, former, function Legislature, much say enacted means. Nor reasonably explanation drafted, face accepts terms subsisting, indication whatever legislative insofar concerned reenacting making legislation. (Quite obviously, strange way change.) noted, situation reenacted given consistent along lines quoted suggested. Such reenactment, interpretation. Lorillard Pons, 434 575, 580-581, 98 866, 870, 55 (1978). Here, uniform (12 Circuits 13) contradicted endorsed Report. supra, 565—566 cases); Foley Construction Army Corps Engineers, 1202, 1204 (CA8 1983), 466 936, 104 1908, 80 457 Broad Avenue Laundry Tailoring 693 1387, 1391 (CA Fed.1982). Only Columbia show "slightly more" reasonableness. Spencer 229 225, 244, 712 539, 558 (1983), (1984). add body contradicted, explanation, ("reasonableness fact") which, drew 30 Even ordinary situation, suffice reporting draft. Much willing force clearest congressional persuade adopt prior usage, unadministerable, Between reasonableness, "clearly convincingly justified"—which applicable—there stopping-place, ledge anchor steady behavior. 31 reach, last, Both parties inquiry rely agreement, decided, This, suggest, avoid time-consuming possibly inexact process assessing strength position. disagree relevant, conclusive answer, direction, 32 lack demonstrated unfavorable Other factors, explain equally well change substantive policy instituted new administration. conclusively weakness truth penalize thereby discourage settlements. 33 further established pleadings stage. disagree. At least where, centers fact, disposition proves efficient. 34 consisting Obviously, disagreed Conceivably, yet win; likely, lose. Nevertheless, string losses indicative; successes. Once again, category enough emphasize every hear (nine Appeals) responds stays issued reflect objectively justification; "unlikely [this] government's [for issue] argument" substantial. 25. reply grants indications merit. parse further. side state, alone, justification. 35 turn, then, actual argued permissive mandatory language: "authorized contract make" payments. IV) contrasts creating subsidy program: "shall make." 1715z-1(f)(2) supported Lynn, 163 288, 501 848 (1974), through suspended concluded implementation interfere goals. Finally, contended funds conduct programs, suspend program. 36 rebuttal mandatory: "[T]here initial operating expense level [which] later 180 days August 22, 1974." 1715z-1(f)(3), 17152z-1(g)(1970 "project owner rental charges collected basic [and] credited reserve assistance payments." 1715z-1(g). Furthermore, Lynn there, inconsistent national policy. They pointed direct precedents decisions. authorization tens millions dollars 37 description commands Accordingly, affirm Circuit's holding Judge not. final proper. Here applies. U.S., S.Ct., 1941 (42 1988); 478 546, 560-561, 3088, 3095-3096, 92 439 (1986) 7604(d)); 568 3099-3100 (BLACKMUN, part). 39 furnished," 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). (adjusted inflation), arguably single example involved." provision. involved" skilled experienced try short supply, eliminate cap—since "prevailing furnished" obviously relative supply services.3 "Limited interpreted factor," virtually always provided. city—or country—come exceed market-minimum govern instead public lawyers' local be. so, refers having distinctive skill needful question—as extraordinary lawyerly Examples identifiable practice specialty foreign language. Where qualifications necessary obtained cap, limit allowed. 41 effectiveness envisioned specify be, include nothing "work App. Pet. Cert. 16a-17a, litigation; "customary cases," 17a, worse; rates, rates. factors. considered fee," too regarded "special" contingent-fee enhancement faced Term, 585 (Delaware II). differs contains requirement, fundamentally designed reimburse limit. exceeded, client paying fully compensated. Moroever, impossible use, fostering nonmonetary claims small-dollar claims) certain favored Unlike statutes discussed II, directed advance attorney. economically viable acceptance civil-rights 1988) Air 7604(d)) prospect victory, lawyer assess discussions prospective client, rarely able certainty likelihood deemed unreasonable award. sure, contingency cause foster besides effect diluted insignificant, Congress' purpose, very small subsidize States. 43 conclude, factor." 44 45 vacate remand opinion. 46 ordered. 47 KENNEDY 48 whom BLACKMUN join, agree (EAJA) adhere Therefore, concur affirming remanding disagree, reasoning. my prove showing "reasonable." join I, opinion, III.1 Further, believe predicate cap—that involved"—is stingier intended, Concerned resources, citizens acquiescing vindicating rights, threatening them costly litigation, waiving sovereign immunity "American Rule" awarding parties. S.Rep. 96-253, 1-6 (1979) (S.Rep.). Consequently, defined Act) prevails adversarial sounding tort, prescribes unjust." this, called 51 begins, proper, plain points "substantially" precise singular definition. Indeed, bears definitions: " 'considerable large' "; main.' Ante, 564. Third 2280 (1976) ("considerable worth"; "having solid firm foundation specified main"). concludes, agree, extent different, 52 Unfortunately, feels duty bound go beyond words fashion using perceives legally term. alights initially 'reasonable fact' below. 565. mentioned explication alternative phraseology inherently equates reasonableness," ante, 568, significantly forgiving actually adopted. Senate Judiciary amendment substituting "reasonably S.Rep., 8. Clearly, equate "reasonable" "substantial"; understood embrace burdens. "Reasonable" variety connotations, "not absurd" ridiculous." 1892 strongest, implies some, necessarily much, seen, definition: "in main." connotes position, foundation. true overlap (substantial weakest strongest) identity. weaker believe, disbelieve discuss below), sense. 54 methodology similar, identical, meanings aid choosing among assertedly relying tools help ambiguity jettison Congress. point illustrated content asks substitution, asked "it 13. each successive definitions stray far before, end product removed substance, slight success; hope engages fitting definition, surely warrant $100 expected spend 5-year life. My reasonable, aside conforming chose, bolstered history. "middle ground" earlier, unsuccessful proposal prevail, Justice's "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, groundless." 2-3. Far occupying middle ground, firmly encamped near espoused Department. states "mere dispositive, unequivocal rejection pure "reasonableness" considering bill deserving weight. 56 however lopsided weight authority lower once been, opinions longer nearly unanimous. Columbia, Third, Eighth, Sixth en banc. Riddle 817 1238 (CA6) (adopting standard), rehearing banc, 823 164 (1987); Lee Johnson, 799 1986); 1,378.65 Acres Land, 794 1313 Gavette OPM, 785 1568 Fed.1986) (en banc); 539 57 journey crystallize intent. Instead, allows creep towards success," intentionally avoided. makes marginal basis) fact. "anchored" debatable proposition, excuse abandon enacted.2 58 discussion supporting inflation) Congress, courts' stand. warranting increase. deciding, Appeals' analyses erroneously mirrored analysis 1988, fee-shifting limitation. clearly contain potential costs limiting awarded. like counsel's customary perfectly render advisory despite rare job term: attorneys." begins holds required, articulable specialization, handle involved. nugatory, rate. tidy simplistic. 60 striking aspect ignore exception. all, highly truly neophyte nonpatent nonetheless rendered meaningless, First, keep award: observation takes reasoning, exceptional weak 61 Second, attorneys," conjunction reflects price exceeds trend alone required write 62 economic assumes known, assumption share, shared. exactitude according preset accounting complexity type assume or, interest counsel, charged "skill, reputation." Blum Stenson, 465 886, 895, 11, 1541, 1547, 79 891 Certainly adjustments up line rendered. rate" reference involved minimally hypothetical lawyer, ibid., become "second extent, fewer billed due greater efficiency. Absent extensively analysis. retained normally will, itself, avail applicant may, dispositive 63 wrong asserts (in required) enhanced meaningless. it. logic "patent lawyer" exception—that fraction bar charge premium supports experience. Equally troubling requirement "of application." 573. limitation, declaration efficacy factor—everything below—we subject-matter specialization already falling example. Having list entirety, seems leaves remaining. 65 strained interpretation, apparently reading as" unnecessary. Vibra-Tech 787 1416 (CA10 Action Smoking CAB, 233 79, 724 211 Cf. Kungys 485 759, 778, 1537, 1550, 99 839 (1988) ("[N]o [of statute] construed redundant"). readily analogized enhance Blum, (the billed) "presumably" fee. upward adjustment offers specific superior light success exceptional." 899, 1549 (internal quotations omitted).3 Analogizing context, calculated multiplying capped) billed. presumably proper exists appropriate. approach, predicted case." 66 enhancers constitute considered. miserly refusal accede unjustified unwarranted. calculation. 67 O'CONNOR joins, part. 68 majority's assessment sustained dissent 69 acknowledges "compel[s]" 559. wholly silent determinations reviewed.1 silence issues purpose encouraging meritorious suits majority. 70 aware error. 52(a); Pullman-Standard Swint, 456 273, 287, 1781, 1789, (1982). established, resolved decisional authorities perform. expertise competing applications norms justified] stronger paradigmatic conclusions law." 249, 563 apply De consistency predictability about substantiality rests defensible construction application defer though different. predict vary circuit. uncertainty would, undermine challenges governmental action. Spencer, 249-250, 563-564.2 unanimity "close scrutiny," assessments Brinker 798 661, 664 Estridge, 797 1454, 1457 Haitian Refugee Center Meese, 791 1489, 1496 451 Russell National Mediation Bd., 1284, 1289 Essex Electro 757 247, 252-253 Fed.1985); Hicks 1022, 1024-1025 Sigmon Fuel TVA, 754 162, 167 Boudin Thomas, 732 1117 1486 251, reinforces 73 withstand scrutiny 74 programs: "deep-subsidy" program, "interest-reduction" "operating-subsidy" programs 75 interest-reduction 1715z-1(a)(1970 contrast, stated deep-subsidy 1715z-1(f)(2)(emphasis her commit operate devote available (and pre-existing commitments program) spread programs. Whether scope decline 569, provisions instructing payments, "authorizing" vesting give matter, 77 then-recent offered suspending program—under likewise payments—after serving fours one. couched exercised program.3 78 conclude reverse EAJA.4 suggests, 583-585, establishment "historical facts," novo. From confidently expected, clearly-erroneous applied, abuse-of-discretion. Piper Aircraft Reyno, 454 235, 252, 266, 419 (1981) (abuse dismissal forum non conveniens grounds); Gulf Oil Bernard, 452 89, 103, 2193, 2201, (order 23(d)); 1466-1467, (1980) (certification 54(b)). especially common broadly labeled "supervision litigation," presented (1983) (attorney's fees); Hockey League Metropolitan Club, 427 639, 642, 96 2778, 2780, 747 (discovery sanctions); Childress M. Davis, Standards Review 4.1-4.20, 228-286 (1986). Contrary BRENNAN's suggestion, 576 577, convert criterion correct" correct, (i.e., part) perhaps dichotomy furnished 2412(d)(2)(A), "—meaning (which luxe ) really run-of-the-mine). argument run) reimbursed define fees" 2412(d)(2)(A). 556—557. primary embraces notion needed. reading, distorting text, produces peculiar needlessly reimbursable hour, beyond. imposing burden reasoning perforce served contexts left open enhancement. pertinent thing compensate uncertain, uncertain. remained appropriate, explicitly agencies, 504(c)(2), seem militate drawn difference court-awarded agency-awarded knew how chose choose courts. desirable "appellate energy" expended unlikely "law-clarifying benefits." 561. allocation resources concentrate efforts clarifying correcting errors affect ought choice. event, indeed "quite clear" expend ascertaining earlier date. Of individuals claims. concern "needless appeals," appear shared throughout standard. heavily existed, mandate HUD's surrender early litigation" "bec[o]me one-sided unjustifiable" several 918. concludes reconsidered. respect hence

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