Document: Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DAVID BOBBY, WARDEN v. ARCHIE DIXON ON PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI TO APPEALS SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 10–1540. Decided November 7, 2011 PER CURIAM. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking writ of habeas corpus from federal court “must show that court’s ruling on claim being presented in was so lacking justification there an error well understood comprehended existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington Richter, 562 ___, ___ (slip op., at 13). The Court Appeals Sixth Circuit purported to identify three such grievous errors Ohio Supreme Court’s affirmance respondent Archie Dixon’s murder conviction. Because it is not clear erred all, much less transparently no jurist could agree with decision, Circuit’s judgment must be reversed. * Dixon Tim Hoffner murdered Chris Hammer order steal his car. beat Hammer, tied him up, buried alive, pushing struggling down into grave while they shoveled dirt top him. then used Hammer’s birth certificate social security card obtain identification name. After using establish ownership car, sold vehicle $2,800. mother reported her son missing day after murder. While investigating disap­ 2 BOBBY pearance, police had various encounters Dixon, which are relevant here. On 4, 1993, detective spoke local station. It undisputed this chance encounter—Dixon apparently visiting station retrieve own been impounded traffic violation. issued Miranda warnings asked talk about disappearance. See Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). declined answer questions without lawyer present left As their investigation continued, determined car forged signa­ ture when cashing check he received sale. Police arrested forgery morning No­ vember 9. Beginning 11:30 a.m. detectives intermit­ tently interrogated over several hours, speaking 45 minutes total. Prior interro­ gation, decided provide fear would again refuse speak them. readily admitted obtaining name signing check, but said given permis­ sion sell claimed know where was, although thought might have Tennessee. challenged plausibility tale told providing them more useful information. At one point “now time say” whether involvement pearance because “if starts cutting deal there, kinda like, bus leaving. first gets only that’s gonna get on.” App. Pet. Cert. 183a. responded that, if knew any­ thing disappearance, 3 insisted everything “[n]othing whatsoever” do Id., 186a. approxi­ mately 3:30 p.m. interrogation concluded, brought correctional facility booked charge. same afternoon, led grave. there. concluding inter­ view releasing him, transported back arrived 7:30 questioning, stated heard found body custody. not, said, “I talked my attorney, I want tell you what happened.” State 101 St. 3d 328, 331, 2004–Ohio–1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, 1050. read rights, obtained signed waiver those half hour. 8 police, now tape recorder, advised rights. In detailed confession, murdering attempted pin lion’s share blame Hoffner. trial, trial excluded both initial confession later confes­ took interlocutory appeal. did dispute properly suppressed, argued admissible prior confession. agreed allowed as evidence. convict­ ed murder, kidnaping, robbery, forgery, sen­ tenced death. 4 affirmed convictions sentence. To analyze admissibility applied Oregon Elstad, 470 298 (1985). receiving prior, unwarned were voluntary. supra, 332–334, N. E. 2d, 1050– 1052; see 318 (“We hold today suspect who has once yet uncoer­ cive questioning thereby disabled waiving rights confessing requisite warnings”). filed petition under 28 C. §2254 District Northern Ohio. claimed, inter alia, decisions allowing admission contravened clearly established law. denied relief, divided panel Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (2010). authority issue decision “was contrary to, or involved unreasonable application of, Federal law,” set forth holdings, “based de­ termination facts” light record. §2254(d); Harrington, S., 10). believed contained egregious errors. First, according Circuit, deci­ itself 9, refused lawyer. That plainly wrong. custody during encounter 5 4. And “never held person can invoke anticipatorily, context other than ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” McNeil Wisconsin, 501 171, 182, n. (1991); also Montejo Louisi- ana, 556 778, (2009) (slip. 16) (“If defendant [Miranda its proge­ ny] apply”). Second, violated Fifth Amendment by urging “cut deal” before accomplice so.1 cited precedent Court—or court—holding common tactic unconstitutional. Cf., e.g., 317 (“[T]he find confesses, falsely codefendant turned State’s evidence, does involun­ tarily”). holding suggests, establishes, may urge confess another so, ground.2 —————— view, con­ clusion voluntary based unrea­ sonable determination facts evidence proceeding.” §2254(d)(2). however, purport mistaken factual finding. differed ultimate characterization voluntary, cases make “the ‘voluntariness’ legal question.” Miller Fenton, 474 104, 110 (1985); Arizona Fulminante, 499 279, 287 (1991). This therefore addresses question should addressed: applica­ tion law, United States.” §2254(d)(1). case Mincey 437 385 (1978). “virtually continu­ ous seriously painfully wounded man edge consciousness” hospital’s intensive care unit 6 Third, unreasonably Elstad. case, confessed burglary Approximately hour later, warnings, fessed burglary. warned “there warrant presuming coercive effect sus­ pect’s inculpatory statement, though technically violation Miranda, inquiry whether, fact, second [warned] statement voluntarily made.” U.S., (footnote omitted). opinion explained, circumstances surrounding interrogations demon­ strate statements During interrogation, breaks, water offered food, abused threatened. He freely acknowledged name, even stating “welcome” information, difficulty denying anything 3d, 1049. made unsolic­ ited declaration spoken attorney wanted happened Hammer. Then, giving taped twice waiver-of-rights form acting free will. “clearly expressed wish interrogated” “debilitat­ helpless condition.” 399–401. There simply nothing reasoning suggesting state­ ments involuntary. 7 recognized in- terrogation “an intentional violation.” “as breach procedures here actual compulsion” thus reason suppress 334, 1052 (citing 318). disagreed, believing inadmissible Elstad product “deliberate question-first, warn-later strategy.” F.3d, 557. holding, relied heavily Missouri Seibert, 542 600 (2004).3 em­ ployed two-step strategy reduce warnings: A exhaustively questioned Seibert until she then, 15- 20­ minute break, gave repeat 604–606, 616 (plurality opinion). Seibert’s against preceded warning. plurali­ ty reasoned “[u]pon hearing aftermath just mak­ opin­ ion peti­ certiorari review decision. open law” purposes §2254(d). Smith Spisak¸ 558 (2010) 3). necessary decide ques­ entirely consistent Thus, “contrary to” of” Seibert. estab­ lished explication further demonstrates ing hardly think genuine right remain silent, let alone persist began lead ground again.” 613; id., 615 (de­ tailing “series bear delivered midstream effective enough accomplish object”). JUSTICE KENNEDY concurred judgment, noting “would apply narrower test applicable infrequent . technique calculated way undermine warning.” 622. type concerned undermined received. first, “little, anything, incriminating potential unsaid,” making “unnatu­ ral” “repeat stage before.” 616–617 But steadfastly maintained whatso­ ever” unlike concern earlier repeat. Indeed, contradicted Nor induce waive silence later: clared desire session began. reasonably “no nexus” between 333, 1051. 9 Moreover, “effectively advise real choice statement” interroga­ tions blended “continuum.” 612, 617. Given all Four hours passed rogation receipt traveled separate jail again; lawyer; learned talking body. Things changed. significant break dramatic change created “a new distinct expe­ rience,” ensuring effectiveness mur­ der. 615; 622 (KENNEDY, J., concurring judgment) (“For example, substantial prewarning warning suffice most circumstances, allows accused distinguish two contexts appreciate taken turn”).4 sistent precedents: Mi- concluded erroneously placed burden proof prove coerced.” 553, carries proving voluntariness.” 332, discusses absence coerciveness alongside affirma­ tive voluntariness indicates shifted onto Dixon. 10 randa murder; impaired sort “two-step technique” condemned Seibert; coercion. excuse detectives’ give interrogation. courts failure imposed ap­ propriate remedy: exclusion attendant benefit warnings. required more, overturn highest court. respondent’s motion proceed forma pauperis granted. reversed, remanded proceedings opinion. ordered.

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