Document: 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008) Myrna GOMEZ-PEREZ, Petitioner, v. John E. POTTER, Postmaster General. No. 06-1321. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 19, 2008. Decided May 27, *1934 Joseph R. Guerra, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Gregory G. Garre, respondent. Edelmiro A. Salas Gonzalez, Jose L. Ramirez, San Juan, P.R., *1935 Counsel Record, Virginia Seitz, Ileana M. Ciobanu, Matthew Archer-Beck, Richard Kaplan, Sidley Austin LLP, Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney Deputy Anthony Yang, to the Marleigh Dover, August Flentje, Attorneys, Department Justice, Justice ALITO delivered opinion Court. The question before us is whether a federal employee who victim retaliation due filing complaint age discrimination may assert claim under federal-sector provision Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 (ADEA), as added, 88 Stat. 74, and amended, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V). We hold that such authorized. I Petitioner Gómez-Pérez was window distribution clerk States Postal Service. In October 2002, petitioner, then 45 years age, working full time at Post Office Dorado, Puerto Rico. She requested transfer Moca, Rico, order be closer her mother, ill. approved, November petitioner began Moca part-time position. Later month, back old job Dorado Office, but supervisor converted position part-time, filled it with another employee, denied petitioner's application. After first an unsuccessful union grievance seeking job, filed Service equal employment opportunity complaint. According she subjected various forms retaliation. Specifically, alleges called into meetings during which groundless complaints were leveled her, name written on antisexual harassment posters, falsely accused sexual harassment, co-workers told "`go back'" where "`belong[ed],'" work hours drastically reduced. 476 F.3d 54, 56 (C.A.1 2007). responded by this action District claiming, among other things, respondent had violated ADEA, V), retaliating against Respondent moved summary judgment, arguing has not waived sovereign immunity ADEA claims does reach granted judgment favor basis immunity. On appeal, Appeals First Circuit held Reorganization Act, 39 401(1), unequivocally Service's immunity, see F.3d, 57, affirmed decision alternative ground provision's prohibition "discrimination based age," *1936 cover retaliation, id., 60, creating split Courts Appeals. Compare Forman Small, 271 285, 296 (C.A.D.C.2001) (ADEA covers retaliation). certiorari. 552 U.S. ___, 29, 168 Ed. 2d 806 (2007). II provides "[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants are least 40 . shall made free from any age." key case statutory phrase age" includes does. reaching conclusion, we guided our prior decisions interpreting similar language antidiscrimination statutes. Sullivan Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 229, 90 400, 24 386 (1969), considered could brought Rev. 1978, 42 1982, citizens have same right enjoyed white citizens. inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, convey real personal property." While 1982 use race," its plain meaning. See Tennessee Lane, 541 509, 561, 124 158 820 (2004) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (describing "banning public private racial sale rental property"); Jones Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 409, 2186, 20 1189 (1968). Sullivan, man (Sullivan) membership shares nonstock corporation operated park playground residents area he owned home. Under bylaws corporation, member leased home assign share corporation. But when rented his house attempted African-American (Freeman), disallowed assignment because Freeman's race subsequently expelled protesting decision. sued been "for advocacy cause" cognizable 1982. U.S., 237, 400. A contrary holding, reasoned, would allowed "punished trying vindicate rights minorities" given "impetus perpetuation restrictions Ibid. More recently, Jackson Birmingham Bd. Ed., 544 167, 125 1497, 161 361 (2005), relied Title IX Education Amendments 1972, 86 373, 1681 et seq. ed. Jackson, school teacher, board IX, "alleging Board retaliated him complained about sex high school's athletic program." 171, 1497. relevant part "[n]o person shall, sex, education program activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 1681(a) ed.) (emphasis added). Holding prohibits wrote: "Retaliation form intentional Retaliation is, *1937 definition, act. It `discrimination' complainant being differential treatment. Moreover, `on sex' response nature complaint: allegation discrimination. conclude funding recipient retaliates complains discrimination, constitutes sex,' violation IX." Id., 173-174, 1497 (citations omitted). This interpretation, found, flowed naturally Sullivan: Jackson's girls' basketball team just behalf black lessee race." 176-177, Following reasoning interpret likewise proscribing issue here ("discrimination age") materially different ("`discrimination'" "`on sex'") functional equivalent supra, 177, involving race"). And context appears all three cases; cases involve remedial provisions aimed prohibiting dissent strenuously argued conceptually 184-185, (opinion THOMAS, J.), view did prevail.[1] ask overrule Jackson. Nor those decisions. Indeed, Government contended "[t]he text demonstrate[s] encompasses protection retaliation" since "retaliation discrimination." Brief Amicus Curiae 8, O.T.2004, 02-1672. Similarly, Term, urged follow 1977, 1981. case, argues 1981's "`discrimination' quite account having 10, CBOCS West, Inc. Humphries, O.T. 2007, 06-1431. *1938 III Appeals, defends, perceived "clear difference between cause sought distinguish grounds. 58-59. persuaded, however, these distinctions. fact expressly creates whereas statute not. 58. reasoned that, implied express, Cannon University Chicago, 441 677, 99 1946, 60 560 (1979), greater leeway adopt expansive interpretation IX's sex. improperly conflates confers statute's substantive reaches particular conduct. These questions analytically distinct, confusing them lead exceedingly strange results. For example, Appeals' reasoning, "discrimination" "on sex," 1681(a), might narrower scope if contained authorizing aggrieved party bring suit remedy 1681(a). do how conclusion defended. Section 1681(a)'s either presence absence cannot alter scope. addition, perverse enactment explicitly actiona anything, tend suggest Congress need strong remedywere taken justification narrowing underlying prohibition. also seems despite holding authorized impose upon entity engages administrative remedies, including termination funding, sanctioned 1682. extremely odd, broader enforced means than provides. reasons, reject proposition distinguished present implied. B next play more important role they ADEA. pointed statement "`teachers coaches often best their students better able identify attention administrators.'" 58 (quoting 181, 1497). suggested third parties needed "identify instances *1939 supervisors" consequently, there no extend V) argument ignores concluded policy matter important. Instead, "text 173, 178, statements address term addressed board's even permit some claims, only "victim discrimination" and partiesshould claim. 179-182, noted importance reports violations teachers coaches. C Finally, "Title adopted Court's Sullivan," "there evidence legislative history ADEA's sector context." reliance stem "evidence history" IX. merely observed "Congress enacted after decided." 176, Due chronology, concluded, "`not appropriate realistic presume thoroughly familiar [Sullivan] expected [of IX] interpreted conformity [it]." Cannon, 699, 1946). ("Title [Sullivan]"); 179-180, ("Sullivan formed backdrop IX"). What said relationship can well provision, 633a decided 1969 1974five two reason think forgot passed 1972 1974. if, presumed, mind "appropriate" "realistic" "`to with'" similarly worded sex" earlier. IV encompass relies principally specifically *1940 individuals complain sector, 623(d), employment. respondent, "the presumption [the] omission reflects acted intentionally purposely 623 excluding 633a." 17 (internal quotation marks "[N]egative implications raised disparate strongest" "considered simultaneously raising implication inserted." Lindh Murphy, 521 320, 330, 117 2059, 138 481 (1997). Here, together. 1967, 4(d), 81 603, 633a, added until 1974, 28(b)(2), 74.[2] Respondent's undermined prohibitory differs sharply corresponding relating private-sector set out specific list forbidden employer practices. 623(a).[3] suggesting want therefore include dispel inference. modeled 623(d) couched very terms. patterned "directly after" VII's ban. Lehman Nakshian, 453 156, n. 15, 101 2698, 69 548 (1981). Like contains broad "discrimination," rather prohibited 118 814, 2000e-16(a) (personnel "shall race, color, religion, national origin") *1941 age"). like incorporates certain incorporate sector. 2000e-16(d) (incorporating §§ 2000e-5(f) (k) 2000e-3(a), forbids retaliation).[4] When pattern 623(a) instead enact broad, general ban presumably expect "in conformity" precedent. complaining "just Thus, separately terms, provide sufficient depart Jackson.[5] less merit respondent's 633a(f), department, agency, covered subject to, affected by, chapter" 631(b), restricts coverage persons age. contends recognizing tantamount making applicable employers thus contravene 633a(f). unsound way 623(d). Our instead, squarely itself, "unaffected sections" Act. Lehman, 168, 2698. advances complicated concerning congressional executive branch responses problem employment." 27. VII *1942 Equal 11, 111, Civil Commission issued new regulations origin (but age), 5 CFR 713.211 (1973), "reprisal[s]" prompted 713.262(a). argues, anticipated prompt "extend existing reprisal regulations" intended civil service process exclusive avenue asserting claims. 33, 7. suggests took approach believed "reflect[ed] distinct concerns sector." cites direct actually approach;[6] rests nothing unsupported speculation. And, event, contradicts itself. If, maintains, "[s]ection confer anti-retaliation right," 9, assume respond issuing contrary, declined antiretaliation right, abide choice. D final principles "require read narrowly retaliation." 44. waiver beside point purposes because, many agencies, waives "must construed strictly sovereign." 44 Nordic Village, 503 30, 34, 112 1011, 181 (1992); internal course correct "[a] Government's must expressed text" "will construed, terms scope, Lane Peña, 518 187, 192, 116 2092, *1943 135 486 (1996). rule construction satisfied here. Subsection (c) "[a]ny aggrieved" 633a. Unlike 633a(c), immunity; outlawing "discrimination." That 633a(c) applies mean surmount hurdle 633a(c). White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 465, 472-473, 123 1126, 155 (2003) (where one enforce separate latter "`need manner waivers immunity'" Mitchell, 463 206, 218-219, 103 2961, 77 580 (1983))). reasons previously explained, requisite clarity. * reversed, remanded further proceedings consistent opinion. so ordered. Chief ROBERTS, whom SCALIA THOMAS join Part I, dissenting. today holds discriminationwhich providesbut Protection always case. treatment each makes clear. my view, structure, protected through established process, confirm intend judicial respectfully dissent. 602, applied employers, purpose "promot[ing] older ability age; [of] prohibit[ing] arbitrary employment; [and of] help[ing] workers find ways meeting problems arising impact 621(b). implemented principal ways. First, unlawful "discriminate individual individual's 623(a)(1). Second, "unlawful discriminate opposed practice section, charge, testified, assisted, participated investigation, *1944 proceeding, litigation under" Fair Labor Standards 1974 (FLSA Amendments), (among things) extended most Executive Branch adopting counterpart, specifies [in agencies] 633a(a). Despite express 633a(a), finds both To support proposition, (2005). majority reads worth. As correctly states, property, retaliation.[1] 373 excluded participation in, benefits of, assistance," 1681(a)encompasses extent takes precedents principle component, disagree. why am today's ante, S.Ct., 1960-1962, 2008 WL 2167860 *11-12 (holding 1981). becontrary majority's apparent viewthat proscribes X," proscribe well. clear "discriminat[ion] individual. 623(a)(1), (and superfluous) precise observation Rights 1964, *1945 discrete provisions. 2000e-2 (discrimination), 2000e-3 (retaliation). broadly discrimination," while spells detail conduct statute." 175, acknowledged every more, although asserts rejected "a 1937, explained indeed serve purposes. Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. White, 53, 126 2405, 165 345 (2006), 2000e-3(a)which indistinguishable ADEAapplies "only [to] resulting harms related workplace." 61, 2405. answering negative, explained: "The seeks workplace discriminated [protected] status. secure primary objective preventing interfering (through retaliation) employee's efforts advance enforcement Act's basic guarantees. prevent injury are, i.e., harm what do, conduct." 63, 2405 (citation omitted).[2] take bans standing alone, stand alone. itself clear, words place overall scheme." Davis Michigan Dept. Treasury, 489 803, 809, 109 1500, 891 (1989). Here structure statute, scheme part, distinctions federal- convince me "[w]here section omits generally presumed acts *1946 inclusion exclusion." Russello States, 464 16, 23, 104 296, 78 (1983) holds, difficult understand felt specify prohibitions "discriminat[ion]" "because [an] responds noting "`[n]egative strongest' `considered inserted.'" Ante, 1940 (1997)). notes 1940. enough, quarrel matter, thinks obviously prominently bill included amended provision. See, e.g., 28(a)(2), 74 (amending definition "employer" 630(b) political subdivisions). odd assume, does, 1939, 1941, aware Sullivanwhich wholly unrelated provisionbut attuned own reflected differences Even negative drawn "strongest" circumstances, certainly enough. point, (1981), faced bringing alleging entitled trial jury. jury-trial available Government, jury trial, analogous grant 626(c), "expressly trials." 162, accordingly demonstrated knew wished elsewhere `legislation cited.' [§ 633a(c)] failed so." Galloway 319 372, 389, 63 1077, 87 1458 (1943)). So too to" "when cited,'" "failed so" inference weakened practices," 1940, "broad, `discrimination age,'" 1941. cuts majority. drew distinction "employer practices" (discriminatory "[e]mployer practices"), *1947 phrased "personnel actions." Just regard within dealt counterpart 633adiscriminatory actions" should meaning ought attach Congress's supported several factors. begin with, should apply providing referred subsection (a) of" except sees "merit 633a(f)." again, Lehman. "clearly emphasize[s] 633a] self-contained unaffected used though short, significant private- portions specified former understood implicitly imported latter. Other underscore deliberately chose exclude suggests, 1938, extending protections employees. FLSA Amendments, 6(a)(2), doing so, FLSA's 215(a)(3). strongly conscious "inference. unfounded" good 1982." 1942, 6. Anything possible, far likely eye crafting one, statute. 1946. whatever merits argument, rebut import probative Amendments. particular, treat differently respect 74including 623(d)while stand-alone employment, without ibid. evinces deliberate choice *1948 Given this, safe say allow suits state Government? answer remedy, typically addressedthrough system, comprehensive workers. detailed systemone already existed employees, ones. approach, unlike Court's, recognized regulation complex issue, requiring "careful conflicting considerations" "balancing governmental efficiency employees," Bush Lucas, 462 367, 388, 2404, 76 648 (1983). system requires remedies found (or States). Before order. Exec. Order 11478, 34 Fed.Reg. 12985 (1969). allegedly discriminatory acts, action[s]," 713.211, 713.214(a)(1)(i) (1972). provided complainants, representatives, witnesses restraint, interference, coercion, reprisal" involvement process. 713.214(b) (complainants representatives), 713.218(e) (witnesses). (CSC) promulgated rights, protections. serious actions, known "adverse actions," challenged employing agency appealed CSC, 713.219(a) (b), 752.203, 771.202, 771.208, 771.222, "any [other] concern dissatisfaction" procedures appealable 713.217(b), 713.218, (c), 713.231(a), 771.302(a). proscribed events. 771 appeals CSC); 771.105(a)(1) (b)(1), 771.211(e) (antiretaliation CSC appeals). federal-sector, Opportunity (EEO Act), mandating origin." 2000e-16(a). empowered "to remedies," "issue rules, regulations, orders instructions deems necessary *1949 carry responsibilities section." 2000e-16(b). authority, authority order, revised implement [EEO Act] strengthen processing." 37 22717 (1972) (Part 713 Subpart B). enforcement, "complaints grounds origin," hand, charges "complainant, representative, witness connection presentation complaint," 713.262(a), other. imposed agencies obligation "timely investigation resolution coercion reprisal," 22717; 713.220, processing 713.261, 713.262. mandated [employing] appropriate" allegations "not completed inquiry," 713.262(b)(1). leading up CSC's regulatory forth otherwise participating EEO "enforce 633a(a)] orders, responsibilities" 75, assumption create VII, compelling. sure promptly enacted. Fed. Reg. 24351 (1974); 713.511 (1975). addressing means, combined (relative sector) practices, anomalous "primary objective" combating Burlington, left expert administrators dealing matters force "secure guarantees," discounts above "unsupported speculation." 1942. treated almost immediately passage provisions, plenty support. primarily procedures, instance, confirmed Reform 1978 (CSRA), 92 1111. *1950 CSRA, "take fail take, threaten applicant (A) exercise complaint, law, rule, [or] (B) testifying lawfully assisting subparagraph (A)." 2302(b)(9).[3] plainly exercising statutes, host remedies. If alleged results adverse removal, suspension 14 days, reduction pay, 7512, appeal directly Merit Systems (MSPB), 7513(d), 7701, review Circuit, 7703(b)(1). investigated Special Counsel. reasonable supporting report determination seek corrective from, MSPB. 1214(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(B), (C), 1214(c). Again, available. events, finding occurred, MSPB action, 1214(b)(4), 7701(b)(2), attorney's fees 7701(g), discipline responsible retaliatory 1215.[4] sure, CSRA Nevertheless, "classic task reconciling laws over time, getting `make sense' combination, necessarily assumes altered later Fausto, 484 439, 453, 108 668, 98 830 (1988). precisely situation particularly true "integrated review, designed balance legitimate interests categories needs sound efficient administration." 445, 668. Perhaps CSRA's "civil [are] effective damages remedy" obtained court, Bush, perhaps quicker practical matter. issue. Cf. 2404 *1951 (the Amendment "obviously answered simply complete relief plaintiff"). establishes "elaborate, forbidding supervisors proceduresadministrative judicialby improper redressed." 385, 2404. Congresswhich "developed considerable familiarity balancing 2404 one. on" status careful scrutiny question. analysis confirms sloppy distinction; reason: governed regulation, aware, affirm joins, THE CHIEF JUSTICE's write reiterate incorrectly conflated concepts clear: 185, (THOMAS, dissenting), 1944, *13 Because implying reaffirms meaning, 1945-1948 C.J.), below. NOTES [1] Suggesting retreated JUSTICE, citing 63-65, states "we purposes." Post, 1945 (dissenting opinion). explains 1951, 1960, "[i]n status/conduct help explain wanted explicit sweep (i.e., outside workplace) (status-based) events." [2] single piece legislationthe amendments ADEAadded conferring suits. 4(a)(2), 189. [3] provides: "(a) Employer practices "It employer "(1) refuse hire discharge compensation, conditions, privileges "(2) limit, segregate, classify deprive opportunities adversely affect "(3) reduce wage rate comply chapter." [4] 2000e-5(g)(2)(A), authorizes 2000-3(a). shows meant origin" banning awarded. 20. Tr. Oral Arg. 31, [5] theory gives rise logically forbid age-discriminatory notices advertisements 623(e) ed.), fails mention expressly. [6] asks infer Sup. private-employment amending 1938 (FLSA) retaliate attempting rights. arguments appreciate significance 633a(a)'s 657, 2279, 1346 (1968), draw unfounded. disagreement really third-party standing, put won day 1, 194, dissenting). Whatever disagreement, accept Court's) stare decisis. 1954-1956, *4. views discussion "[s]uggesting [the has] Jackson." 1. Not bit. points said: *11-12. choose two, portion Neither nor President Residence House. 633a(a); 2302(a)(2)(B). 2 1311(a)(2) (Congress); 3 411(a)(2) (White House), 1317; 417(a). ServiceGomez-Perez's employeroperates system. Employee Relations Manual (ELM) subjects activity." ELM 665.23, pp. 681-682 (June

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