Document: Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MIKE STANTON, PETITIONER v. DRENDOLYN SIMS ON PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI TO APPEALS NINTH CIRCUIT No. 12–1217. Decided November 4, 2013 PER CURIAM. Around one o’clock in the morning on May 27, 2008, Officer Mike Stanton and his partner responded to a call about an “unknown disturbance” involving person with baseball bat La Mesa, California. App. Pet. for Cert. 6. was familiar neighborhood, known “violence associated area gangs.” Ibid. The officers—wearing uniforms driving marked police vehicle—approached place where disturbance had been reported noticed three men walking street. Upon seeing car, two of turned into nearby apartment complex. third, Nicholas Patrick, crossed street 25 yards front Stanton’s car ran or quickly walked toward residence. Id., at 7, 17. Nothing record shows that knew time whether residence belonged Patrick some- else; fact, it Drendolyn Sims. did not see bat, but he considered Patrick’s behavior suspicious decided detain him order investigate. Ibid.; Terry Ohio, 392 U.S. (1968). exited patrol called out “police,” ordered stop voice loud enough all hear. 7. But stop. Instead, “looked directly Stanton, ignored lawful orders[,] went through [the] gate” fence enclosing Sims’ yard. 17 (alterations omitted). When gate closed behind fence—which more than six feet tall made wood—blocked view 2 STANTON believed committed jailable misdemeanor under California Penal Code §148 by disobeying stop;* also “fear[ed] [his] safety.” He accordingly “split-second decision” kick open pursuit Patrick. Unfortunately, unbeknownst Sims herself standing when flew open. swinging struck Sims, cutting her forehead injuring shoulder. filed suit against Federal District Court Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 C. §1983, alleging unreasonably searched home without war- rant violation Fourth Amendment. granted summary judgment finding that: (1) entry justified potentially dangerous situation, need pursue as fled, lesser expectation privacy curtilage home; (2) even if constitutional occurred, entitled qualified immunity because no clearly established law put notice conduct unconstitutional. appealed, panel Appeals Ninth Circuit reversed. 706 F.3d 954 (2013). court held warrantless yard unconstitutional same itself, there immediate danger, only minor offense officer. 959–963. found be —————— * “Every who willfully resists, delays, obstructs any . peace officer discharge attempt duty office employment shall punished fine exceeding thousand dollars ($1,000), imprisonment county jail exceed year, both imprison- ment.” Cal. Ann. §148(a)(1) (2013 West Cum. Supp.). 3 justify entry, given suspected misdemeanor. 963–964. immunity. 964–965. We address latter holding here, now reverse. “The doctrine protects govern- ment officials ‘from liability civil damages insofar their does violate statutory rights which reasonable would have known.’ ” Pearson Callahan, 555 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow Fitzgerald, 457 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified gives government offi- cials breathing room make mistaken judgments,” “protects ‘all plainly incompetent those knowingly law.’ Ashcroft al- Kidd, 563 ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., 12) Malley Briggs, 475 335, 341 (1986)). “We do require case point” before concluding is established, “but existing precedent must placed question be- yond debate.” al-Kidd, S., 9). There suggestion this violated Constitution; whether, light time, “plainly incompetent” entering fleeing 12). concluded was. It so despite fact federal state courts nationwide are sharply di- vided probable cause arrest suspect may enter warrant while hot sus- pect. Compare, e.g., Middletown Flinchum, 95 Ohio St. 3d 43, 45, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002) (“We hold today officers, having identified themselves, flees house avoid arrest, warrant, 4 regardless being arrested misdemeanor”), State Ricci, 144 N. H. 241, 244, 739 A.2d 404, 407 (1999) (“the facts demonstrate defendant dis- obeying officer” fled officers pursuit), Mas- corro Billings, 656 1198, 1207 (CA10 2011) (“The based justified” “[t]he intended traffic minor, whom well acquainted, family from exit” (footnote omitted)), Butler State, 309 Ark. 211, 217, 829 S.W.2d 412, 415 (1992) (“even though Sudduth might impression continuous what crime disorderly conduct, since offense, these circum- stances exigent circumstance allow Sudduth’s Butler’s concededly, most, petty disturbance”). Other least circumstances estab- lished. E.g., Grenier Champlin, 27 1346, 1354 (CA8 1994) (“Putting firmly side merits arrests were constitutional, we cannot say policeman could thought them permissible time,” entered mis- demeanor suspects defied officers’ remain outside (internal quotation marks citation omitted)). Notwithstanding basic disagreement, below denied In its one-paragraph analysis point, 5 relied cases, Court, Welsh Wiscon- sin, 466 740, 750 (1984), own, United States Johnson, 256 895, 908 (2001) (en banc) (per curiam). Neither establishes Stan- ton Amendment rights. Welsh, learned witness Edward driven off road then left scene, presumably drunk. Acting tip, Welsh’s consent, intoxicated—a nonjailable law. U.S., 742–743. Our opinion first noted our felon justifies officer’s entry. (citing Santana, 427 38, 42–43 (1976)). rejected pur- exception applied: “there contin- uous [Welsh] scene crime.” 753. conclude Amendment, “im- portant” [was] believe ha[d] committed.” circumstances, said, “application exigent- context should rarely sanctioned.” lay down categorical rule cases of- fenses, saying “usually” required. 750. broke Michael Johnson’s fenced search another (Steven Smith) they attempting apprehend five misde- meanor warrants. F.3d, 898–900. clear case, like involve pursuit: “the simply covered ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine” Smith escaped 30 minutes prior where- 6 abouts unknown. 908. required part wanted offenses. Then, footnote, said: “In situations truly underlying felony, usually yields [to enforcement’s interest apprehending suspect]. See [Santana, supra, 42–43]. However, misdemeanor, enforcement yield ‘rarest’ cases. [supra, 753].” 908, n. concluding—as have—that incompetent,” 12), read foot- note Johnson far too broadly. First, cited Santana approval, approved pursuit. And involved felony suspect, expressly limit fact. remaining [the suspect’s] act retreating thwart otherwise proper arrest. not”). Second, repeat, neither nor 753; Thus, emphasis issue minor—indeed, mere offense—nothing seri- ousness equally important Third, portion below, equivocal: misdemeanant never justified, such rare. That how Welsh. People Lloyd, 216 1425, 7 1430, 265 Rptr. 422, 425 (1989), re Lavoyne M., 221 154, 159, 270 394, 396 (1990), Appeal refused suspects. stated Lloyd: “Where set motion public place, offenses justifying initial detention misdemeanors significance determining validity warrant.” 3d, Rptr., 425. especially troubling incompetent—and subject personal damages—based actions according jurisdiction acted. Cf. (KENNEDY, J., concurring) 2–4). Finally, determination insufficient overcome bolstered that, after differ- ent Courts precisely regarding misdemean- ant established. Kolesnikov Sacra- mento County, S–06–2155, 2008 WL 1806193, *7 (ED Cal., Apr. 22, 2008) (“since has can commission offenses”); Garcia Imperial, 08–2357, 2010 3834020, *6, (SD Sept. 28, 2010). Garcia, similar distinguished seen neighbor’s property, real reason think there.” 4. Precisely distinguish Johnson: 8 every just beyond gate. 6–7, To summarize split-second decision yard: Two opinions equivocal lawfulness entry; affirmatively authorized most relevant readily distinguishable; wake opinion; last resort around Nation divided. express ton’s con- stitutional. applied correct, “beyond believing incompetent.” Malley, 341. petition certiorari respondent’s leave proceed forma pauperis granted, judg- reversed, remanded further proceedings consistent opinion. ordered.

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