Document: 386 U.S. 731 87 S.Ct. 1419 18 L.Ed.2d 488 Helen JACKSON, Petitioner,v.LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., Inc. No. 575. Argued April 12, 1967. Decided May 8, Charles R. Maloney, New Orleans, La., for petitioner. Benjamin W. Yancey, respondent. Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of Court. 1 Luther Jackson, employed by Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, inhaled noxious gases and died while working as a longshoreman on vessel navigable waters. His widow, filed this action against in Louisiana state trial court claiming that her husband's death was proximately caused either Lykes' negligence operating ship or ship's unseaworthiness. moved to dismiss ground § 5 federal Longshoremen's Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation benefits required be given an employer his representative 'injury death' 'shall exclusive place all other liability such employee.'1 The court, sustaining motion assigned it, dismissed petitioner's suit th tate Court Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed. 185 So.2d 342. Supreme finding 'no error law,' denied writ certiorari. 249 La. 460, 187 441. We granted certiorari because it appeared that, deciding they did, courts had failed follow our holding Reed v. Yaka, 373 410, 83 1349, 10 448.2 2 crucial facts Yaka are strikingly similar those present case. Reed, covered Act, injured loading ship. owned Waterman Corporation but being operated bareboat charterer owner pro hac vice which directly work longshoreman. When damages rem ship, defended could not bring personal employer-owner Act's recovery features consequently he sue rejected contention express personally despite fact employer. 3 held shipowner In doing so we pointed out Seas Shipping Co. Sieracki, 328 85, 66 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099,3 cases following group maritime workers, including stevedores, carpenters, longshoremen, although independent contractor were allowed unseaworthiness its ship.4 also Ryan Stevedoring Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 124, 76 232, 100 733, permitted shipowner, sued who been hired stevedore under these circumstances, over recover from liability.' stressed traditional humanitarian remedy destroyed kind employment contract made with people worked 4 case instead company makes no difference owner. final analysis here is can vessel, same do exactly unseaworthy cannot recover. reject did before.5 accept construction Act—an designed provide equal justice every similarly situated. hold Congress intended any incongruous, absurd, unjust result passing Act. adhere committed dismissing claim. have broad jurisdiction admiralty frequently exercised it. situation duty adjudicate judgment reversed remanded further proceedings inconsistent opinion. Testa Katt, 330 386, 67 810, 91 967; Mondou York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 1, 32 169, 56 327; Claflin Houseman, 93 130, 23 833. See Garrett Moore-McCormack 317 239, 63 246, 239. 6 It ordered. 7 Reversed remanded. 8 STEWART, whom HARLAN joins, dissenting. 9 Jackson He injuries received course employment. A law clearly imposes absolute obligation upon pay widow.1 law's purpose ensure shall compensated, regardless employer's fault. That just statutory * at admiralty.'2 Nonetheless, Jackson's widow brought Louisiana. action, means what says. today holds mean says, would lead 'incongruous, result.' says reaches dictated prior decision 448. thought case, involved intervention third party, distinguishable, I. But event I decide own written Congress. 11 Congress, setting up system workmen's imposing without fault employers, provided should himself. agree passed 'incongruous,' 'absurd,' 'unjust.' If is, then laws 49 States, contain basic provisions.3 12 even if Court's characterization has written, never judgment. apply law, repeal 13 respectfully dissent. 44 Stat. 1426, set forth 33 U.S.C. 905, provides: 'The prescribed section 904 title employee, legal representative, husband wife, parents, dependents, next kin, anyone otherwise entitled account injury *.' Section 33(a) 1440, amended, 933, where persons liable: '(a) disability payable chapter person determines some than employ liable damages, need elect whether receive person.' affirmed lower court's dismissal. construing recent 448, permitting only employer, concluded provisions precluded petitioner bringing stated: 'An reveals language suggests personam may available; likewise there exists reason believing referred hereinabove taken judicial anvil hammered into unexpected shape. 'In event, exemplifies more integrity conclude rationale emanating merely permits court.' So.2d, 345. Sieracki extended doctrine seaworthiness longshoreman, though member crew, spite 1953 Pope Talbot, Hawn, 346 406, 74 202, 98 143, kinds employees, besides performed jobs formerly done seamen protection Sieracki. There said: 'It 'stevedore.' Hawn not. And vessel. On grounds asked deny gave These slight differences fairly justify distinction urged between two cases. Sieracki's based name 'stevedore' type relationship historic seaworthiness. hurt loaded when grain equipment developed defect. put go once. hurt. neither nor less stevedores him about voyage. All subjected danger. like treatment law.' U.S., 412—413, S.Ct., 206—207. Subsequent decisions line general concepts read expansively, wide range employees doctrine. Carpenters (Pope 143); electricians (Feinman A. H. Bull S.S. Cir., 216 F.2d 393); shipcleaners (Torres Kastor, 227 664, Crawford Inc., 206 784); repairmen (Read United 201 758); riggers (Amerocean Copp, 245 291), seamen, recovered shipowners Note, 75 Yale L.J. 1174, 1183. 415, 1353: 'We think produce harsh incongruous result, one keeping dominant intent help distinguish longshoremen precisely circumstances draw their others stevedoring service. Petitioner's company.' §§ 4, 9, 1429, 904, 909. Id., 5, 905. Schneider, Workmen's 89—154 (3d ed.).

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