Document: 547 U.S. ___ (2006) UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. CUAUHTEMOC GONZALEZ-LOPEZ No. 05-352. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 18, 2006. Decided June 26, JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion Court. We must decide whether a trial court's erroneous depri- vation criminal defendant's choice counsel entitles him to reversal his conviction. I Respondent Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez was charged in Eastern District Missouri with conspiracy distribute more than 100 kilograms marijuana. His family hired attorney John Fahle represent him. After arraignment, respondent called California attorney, Joseph Low, discuss Low would him, either addition or instead Fahle. flew from meet respondent, who Some time later, and represented at an evidentiary hearing before Magistrate Judge. The Judge accepted Low's provisional entry appearance permitted participate hear- ing on condition that he immediately file motion for admission pro hac vice. During hearing, however, revoked acceptance ground that, by passing notes Fahle, had vio- lated court rule restricting cross-examination witness one counsel. following week, informed wanted be only attorney. then filed application denied without comment. A month second application, which again explanation. appeal, form writ mandamus, dis- missed States Appeals Eighth Circuit. withdraw as show-cause consider sanctions against Low. asserted contacting while re- spondent violated Mo. Rule Professional Conduct 4-4.2 (1993), prohibits lawyer "[i]n representing client" "communi- cat[ing] about subject representation party . another lawyer" lawyer's consent. strike Fahle's motion. granted continuance so could find new representation. retained local Karl Dickhaus, trial. and, first time, explained it motions ad- mission vice primarily because, separate case it, communicating party. proceeded trial, Dickhaus respondent. moved denied. also Dickhaus's request have table ordered sit audience no contact during proceedings. To enforce Court's order, Marshal sat between unable through- out except once last night. jury found guilty. It read forbid permission. reiterated admis- sion same matter. appealed, Circuit vacated 399 F.3d 924 (2005). held erred interpreting prohibit conduct both this sepa- rate matter based its denials motions. these were therefore respondent's Sixth Amendment right paid choosing. See id., 928-932. concluded violation not harmless-error review. 932-935. certiorari. 546 U. S. (2006). II provides all prosecutions, accused shall enjoy Assistance Counsel defence." previ- ously element is defendant does require appointed choose will Wheat States, 486 153, 159 (1988). Cf. Powell Alabama, 287 45, 53 (1932) ("It hardly necessary say being conceded, should afforded fair opportunity secure own choice"). Government here agrees, has previously, "the guarantees otherwise qualified whom can afford hire, willing even though funds." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered 491 617, 624-625 (1989). sure, "is circumscribed several important respects." Wheat, supra, 159. But dispute Circuit's conclusion erroneously deprived choice. contends, "complete" unless defen- dant show substitute ineffective within meaning Strickland Washington, 466 668, 691-696 (1984)i.e., counsel's per- formance deficient prejudiced it. In alternative, contends least demonstrate pursued different strategy created "reasonable probability result proceedings been different," 694in other words, denial if performance constitutionally deficient.[1] support propositions, points our prior cases, note "has accorded sake, but effect ability receive trial." Mickens Taylor, 535 162, 166 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). unfair thus violated, reasons, prejudiced. Stated broadly this, Government's argument reads detailed version Due Process Clauseand proceeds give details. true enough purpose rights set forth ensure trial; follow disregarded long is, whole, fair. What urges upon us what urged (successfully, see Ohio Roberts, 448 56 (1980)) regard Amendment's confrontationa line reasoning "abstracts purposes, eliminates right." Maryland Craig, 497 836, 862 (1990) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Since, argued, Confrontation Clause reliability evidence, testimonial hearsay bore "indicia reliability," violated. 65-66. rejected (and cases it) Crawford 541 36 (2004), saying "commands, evidence reliable, assessed particular manner: testing crucible cross-examination." Id., 61. So commands, fair, guarantee fairness providedto wit, defended believes best. "The Constitution through Clauses, defines basic elements largely provisions Amendment, including Clause." Strick- land, 684-685. sum, stake choice, because deprivation erroneous. No additional showing preju- dice required make "complete."[2] relies involve effective assistance counsel, generally requires establish prejudice. See, e.g., Strickland, 694; Mickens, 166; Cronic, 648 (1984). earliest cited proposition counsel," McMann Richardson, 397 759, 771, n. 14 (1970), rather Powell, S., 57 (cited McMann, 14). And recogni- tion consequence perception critical adversarial system produce just results." 685. Having derived repre- sentation ensuring we have, logically enough, limits purpose. 166. requirement prejudice arises very nature specific issue there (not mistake-free) cannot "ineffective" mistakes harmed defense (or, least, reasonably likely they have). Thus, until select one's contrast, never trial.[3] regarded root constitutional guarantee. 159; Andersen Treat, 172 24 (1898). W. Beaney, Right American Courts 18-24, 27-33 (1955). 53. Where assisted wrongly denied, therefore, unnecessary ineffectiveness inquiry violation. Deprivation when prevented wants, regardless quality received. argue confuse choice comparative effectivenesswith counselwhich imposes baseline compe- tence whatever chosen appointed. III concluded, light conces- deprivation, error review harmlessness. Arizona Fulminante, 499 279 (1991), divided errors into two classes. "trial error," "oc- curred presentation jury" their may "be quantitatively context presented order determine [they were] harmless beyond reasonable doubt." 307-308 These in- clude "most errors." 306. class "structural defects." "defy analysis 'harmless-error' standards" be- cause "affec[t] framework proceeds," are "simply process itself." 309-310.[4] Neder 527 1, 7-9 (1999). Such include Gideon Wainwright, 372 335 (1963), self-representation, McKaskle Wiggins, 465 168, 177-178, 8 (1984), public Waller Georgia, 467 39, 49, 9 giving defective reasonable-doubt instruction, Sullivan Louisiana, 508 275 (1993). little trouble concluding "with consequences necessarily unquantifiable indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies 'structural error.'" 282. Different attorneys pursue strategies investigation discovery, development theory defense, selection jury, witnesses, style examination argument. affect terms cooperates prosecution, plea bargains, decides go myriad aspects representation, bears directly "frame- work 310or indeed all. impossible know choices made, quantify impact those outcome proceed- ings. Many counseled decisions, involving bargains cooperation government, do concern Harmless- such speculative might occurred alternate universe. acknowledges pervades entire yet allow conviction reason claims stems definition issue; show- harmless, occurred. choice-of-counsel occurs whenever dant's wrongfully Moreover, "pervades" (to extent detect identifiable mistakes. assess how affected outcome. wrongful looking committed actual differences made coun- selin matters ranging questions asked voir dire intangibles relationship prosecutors. speculate handled differentlyor indeed, benefit jury- pleasing courtroom longstanding trust dif- ferent had. difficulties conducting assessments motely comparable.[5] IV Nothing said today casts any doubt places qualification previous holdings limit recognize authority courts criteria admitting lawyers them. As dissent too discusses, post, 3, extend defendants 624, 626. Nor insist person member bar, demand honor waiver conflict-free 159-160. recognized wide latitude balancing needs fairness, 163-164, demands calendar, Morris Slappy, 461 11-12 (1983). has, moreover, "inde- pendent interest trials con- ducted ethical standards profession legal appear observe them." 160. None limitations relevant here. This power rules adhere practices scheduling decisions effectively exclude However broad discretion be, Govern- ment conceded Accept- premise, hold respon- dent's analysis. * judgment affirmed, remanded further consistent opinion. ordered. ALITO, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, KENNEDY, THOMAS join, dissenting. disagree automatically reversed errs applying regarding admissions prevents first-choice Instead, some ruling adversely my view, majority's contrary holding incorrect interpretation misapplication prin- ciples. respectfully dissent. majority makes subtle mistake outset characterization guarantees. states protects him." Ante, 3. actually protects, assis- tance able provide. follows disqualification impair receives there viola- Amendment.[1] language supports interpretation. focuses entitled ("Assistance"), identity provider. back- adoption direction. evil aimed English common-law severely limiting felony Ash, 413 300, 306 (1973). "[T]he core assure 'Assistance' trial," 309, thereby "to adversary process," Morrison, 449 361, 364 (1981). essential aim Amendment. inexorably sented prefers." (1988); cf. (1983) ("[W]e reject claim 'meaningful relationship' tween counsel"). There doubt, course, Counsel" carries limited At adop- Bill Rights, availability ap- pointed limited,[2] inevitably played out: meant secure. beginning, circumscribed. For thing, al- ways restricted governing practice question. Judiciary Act 1789 clear, providing parties "in States" law respectively manage therein." Ch. 20, §35, 1 Stat. 92. Therefore, eligible under court, Indeed, top 10 25 question, Today, continue conflict- of-interest rules. Even aware her conflict, eager waive objection, Similarly, mundane case-management considerations. If judge schedules begin date already thereaf- ter, appropriate cir- cumstances refuse postpone thereby, effect, force forgo supra; Hughey, 147 423, 428-431 (CA5 1998). tolerable focus receives, iden- tity Limiting willing, available, still leaves pool fromand, most jurisdictions today, large diverse pool. restrictions adverse best circumstances permit. Because provided, violate diminishes second-choice land 668 Rather, "an difference disqualified represents Rodri- guez Chandler, 382 670, 675 (CA7 2004), cert. 543 1156 approach fully deci- sions. disqualifica- violates prejudice, stated (1989); (1932), occasion shown where opinions refer unreasonable general statements addressing prejudice.[3] accepting, holds, always cases. Constitution, terms, mandate remedy violations provisions. bound Federal Criminal Procedure 52(a), instructs federal "disregar[d]" "[a]ny error. substantial rights." 28 C. §2111; Chapman California, 386 22 (1967). exceptions "a fundamental consti- tutional 'defy "harmless error" standards.'" 7 (1999) (quoting 279, 309 (1991)); Chapman, 23. "Such 'necessarily render fundamentally unfair' [and] deprive 'basic protections' 'a reliably serve function vehi- cle determination guilt innocence punishment fair.'" Neder, 8-9 Rose Clark, 478 570, 577-578 (1986) (second omission original)); ante, (listing errors). omis- crime instruction "neces- sarily render[s] unreliable vehicle determining innocence." U.S., 9. fact, case, "quite opposite [was] true: tried impartial judge, correct standard proof counsel; fairly selected, instructed respect Neder's ." Ibid. situationwith proof, juryis much like respondent's. Fundamental unfairness "decision retain "often unin- formed," Cuyler Sullivan, 446 335, 344 (1980); turn better lawyer. More often, first- simply indistinguishable. possibilities justify violating me hard put characterize "always render[ing] unfair," Fairness right, 5, inform remedy. nearly deter- mine provided un- doubtedly prosecution difficulty initial evident possibly Requiring fall back comparable denying Refusing permit epitome unfairness, far concerned, difficult complete merely preventing gauge, burden doubt. eliminating possibility error"/"structural defect" dichotomy misleading. used denote poles appeared cases; lead review, structural defects automatic reversal. 306-310. did suggest sorts amenable "affecting 310, structural. touchstone unreliability. Auto- matic strong medicine reserved "always" "necessarily," (emphasis original), unfairness. Either courses outlined aboverequiring engaging harmless- reviewwould avoid anomalous unjustifi- two-part followed Under holding, erro- neously attor- ney performed brilliantly. By whose sense (i.e., "made serious func- tioning 'counsel' guaranteed Amendment," 687) obtain relief adopt admissions, Leis Flynt, 439 438, 443 (1979) (per curiam), adopts generous conviction, defendant. awarded clear errone- ous them least. Suppose, example, initially previously civil experience. Suppose services nationally acclaimed highly experienced secures surprisingly favorable trial instance, acquittal counts. means violatedeven attempt done job. counts publicly proclaimed after verdict at- torney country done. Cases stark above hypothetical unlikely, certainly neither seriously upsets preferences nor impairs noted above, sometimes Defendants frequently forced among information, preference candidates. addition, considered charge roughly fees, experience ability. circumstances, mean chose provide represen- tation good furnished realities, mandating minimal part unwarranted. particu- larly severe sys- tems take interlocu- tory appeal disqualified. Flanagan 259, 260 systems, appellate typically convicted. point, concludes marginally rules, alternative trialeven results. believe vacate remand let However, assum- sake required, violation, violations, Our statutes precedents bar case. NOTES [1] proposes third standardviz., " 'an trial.'" Post, 4 (opinion J.). That proposal suffers infirmities (outlined later text) beset positions. greatly clarity law. How lower-court "identi- fiable difference" consists of? Whereas appeals way precedential "consistent with" discussed Id. [2] resists cases' recognition, concession, argues Amend- "assistance impair[s] 1-2 ment's concession) anything, "impair[s] [from chose]." [3] 153 (1988), formu- limita- tions took overarching disallow create risk conflict interest. thing conclude need quite exist renders unfair. [4] criticizes error/structural defect dichot- omy, asserting Fulminante affecting structural," J.) citation Although doing anything dividing comprehen- sive categories, ensuing fact comprehensiveness here, past, rest assessing (1984) (violation public-trial harmlessness benefits fre- quently intangible, prove, chance"); Vasquez Hillery, 474 254, 263 ("[W]hen petit selected improper exposed prejudicial publicity, ascertained"). use "fundamental unfairness" sole criterion error, cites factor, (quoted dissent, 6). used. using assessment test, relied irrelevance harmlessness, 177, ("Since self-representation exercised usually increases likelihood unfavor- defendant, 'harmless error' analysis"). creates single, inflexible criterion, inconsistent precedents, asserts structural, 8. [5] discussion "better." 7-8 making look achievable, principle (which purports accept argument) harm McKaskle, framing expressing indignation thought wanted, betrays misunderstanding confusion view concession "[t]he encompasses non-indigent prosecution," Brief 11, "circumscribed respects," 12 (citation internal Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §29, 118 (providing pointment capital cases); Betts Brady, 316 455, 467, 20 (1942) (surveying state statutes). noting involved infamous obtaining constrained proceed court-appointed dubious effectiveness. due [one's] choice" concomitant 53; 71 ("[T]he failure [petitioners] proc- ess"). facts referring nothing established declining quired absence preferred comprehended l59, went stress circum- scribed ibid., require- membership conflicts "purpose" "essential aim"providing advocacy ibid.suggest opposite. Finally, challenged action judgeentering forfeiting funds earmarked paying attorneyshad proper, accordingly, address funds," 624-625, added "[w]hatever full protection choosing, protec- 'the individual's spend money advice counsel,'" 626 (omission original).

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