Document: 520 U.S. 670117 S.Ct. 1630137 L.Ed.2d 935 UNITED STATES, Petitioner,v.Robert E. HYDE. No. 96-667. Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 15, 1997. Decided May 27, Syllabus * Respondent pleaded guilty to several federal fraud counts, pursuant a plea agreement in which Government agreed move for dismissal other charges. The District accepted but deferred decision on whether accept agreement, pending completion presentence report. Before sentencing and court's respondent sought withdraw his plea. Finding that he had not provided "fair just reason'' withdrawing before sentencing, as required by Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 32(e), court denied respondent's request. then entered judgment, sentenced respondent. Appeals reversed, holding if defers acceptance or defendant may any no reason, until accepts both agreement. Held: In circumstances presented here, unless shows under 32(e). Nothing text 11, sets out prerequisites accepting supports Appeals' holding. That pleas can be while agreements are two separated time. requirement district shall without is absent from list set 11(c) (d). If decides reject such one given "the opportunity plea,'' 11(e)(4), does have comply with 32(e)'s requirement. This provision implements commonsense notion longer bound an has refused sanction, its necessary implication neither rejected nor granted "opportunity'' automatically contradicts this thus strips 11(e)(4) meaning. It also debases judicial proceeding at pleads allowing him simply lark. addition, would allow little, any, time standard apply, often made hearing. Respondent's arguments-that was meant apply conditioned Advisory Committee Notes 32(b)(3) support holding-are rejected. Pp. ____-____. 92 F.3d 779, reversed. REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered opinion unanimous Court. James A. Feldman, petitioner. Jonathan D. Soglin, appointed Court, Oakland, CA, Chief Justice REHNQUIST 1 32(e) Rules states "if fair reason.'' After case guilty, We hold 2 A grand jury indicted Robert Hyde eight counts mail fraud, wire fraud-related crimes. On morning trial, indicated desire enter negotiations Government. Those produced plead four counts. exchange, dismiss remaining bring further charges against allegedly fraudulent conduct. 3 afternoon, parties appeared again submitted court, along "application permission [a] guilty.'' placing oath, questioned extensively ensure knowing voluntary, understood consequences pleading including possibility maximum sentence 30 years. asked what done, admitted committing crimes it prepared prove, did so. because fact said was. Finally, how each count, stated "guilty.'' 4 concluded knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, there factual basis therefore deferring 5 One month later, Court's about filed motion His alleged duress admissions been false. evidentiary hearing, evidence claim duress, plea, let judgment first dismissed indictment's Government's motion, prison term 2%p1/2%p 6 Ninth Circuit absolute right 781 (1996). reasoned follows: First, defendant's Id., 780 (citing v. Washman, 66 210, 212-213 (C.A.9 1995)). Second, ""inextricably up together,''' deferral constitutes automatic even explicitly Ibid. (quoting Cordova-Perez, 65 1552, 1556 Combining these propositions, held " [i]f reason agreement.'' 781. 7 Courts Fourth Seventh Circuits reached opposite conclusion issue. Ewing, 957 F.2d 115, 118-119 (C.A.4 1992); Ellison, 798 1102, 1106 (C.A.7 1986). certiorari resolve conflict, 519 ----, 117 759, 136 695 (1997), now reverse. 8 To understand why we governs must go back principal dealing subject agreements. equated 11 conclusions. fact, true: deferred, 9 sections (c) (d) 11. Section says: "Before . , address personally open inform of, determine understands,'' numerous guilty. For example, understands possible penalty face 11(c)(1), important constitutional rights waiving, 11(c)(3), (4). "The first, addressing determining voluntary.''1 opening words important: together, they speak steps take [b]efore guilty,'' "shall Based language, conclude once taken steps, may, discretion, read additional prerequisite into list: But "prerequisite'' (d), strongly suggesting addition warranted. 10 (e), covers agreements, section divides three types, based agrees do: type charges; B, recommend (or oppose request for) particular sentence; C, should receive specific sentence. As C defer rejection consider report.''2 11(e)(2). agreement: agree sentence, appropriate disposition. decided turned subsection (e)(4) subsection, critical our purposes, provides: 12 "If rejects advise afford persists disposition less favorable than contemplated (emphasis added). 13 Thus, "then'' sanction. 14 Under holding, however, "for merely it. Appeals, significance: rejection, free plea; after same true. gives great deal significance. Only opportunity'' withdraw'' implication, 15 Not only contradicted very language Rules, sworn actually committed crimes, found announced Committee, adding 1983, explained cannot so: 16 "Given care [the] revised view so "tentative,' withdrawal whenever government establish prejudice. "Were every where alter tactics present theory jury, become mere gesture, temporary meaningless formality reversible whim. trifle, "grave solemn act,'' "accepted discernment.''''' Fed. Crim. Proc. 32, 18 U.S.C.App., p. 794 Barker, 514 208, 221 (C.A.D.C.1975) Brady States, 397 742, 748, 90 1463, 1468, 25 747 (1970))). 17 think degrade otherwise serious act something akin game chess. prior statement Cordova-Perez [t]he [guilty] inextricably together.'' F.3d, (internal quotation marks omitted). statement, own, necessarily incorrect. "bound together'' sense simultaneously frees commitment See 11(e)(4). And since side obviously wholly independent 19 nowhere state treated identically. Instead, envision situation performs bargain (the plea) perform (here, counts). promised performance, complete gets benefit bargain. terminated performance plea), binding contractual duty extinguished nonoccurrence condition subsequent. J. Calamari & Perillo, Law Contracts §11-7, 441 (3d ed.1987); 3A Corbin, Corbin §628, (1960).3 20 were correct, difficult see purpose serve. Since provided: imposed, permit withdrawn applicable between imposed. will 11(e)(2); USSG §6B1.1(c), report parties, objected to, revised, 32(b)(6), sentenced. leaves apply. indication suggest eviscerated manner, point one. 21 defends cramped understanding arguing "fully accepted'' pleas, opposed "conditionally pleas-i.e., later He points derived dictum pre-Rules Kercheval 274 220, 224, 47 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927), 794, spoke final, conditional, act, U.S., 223, S.Ct., 583 ("A differs effect admission extra-judicial confession; itself conviction. Like verdict conclusive. More required; nothing do give sentence''). argues Kercheval, incorporated unconditional act. 22 somewhat tortuous argument. When added already could able Guilty sort Yet new notes accompanying attempted draw distinction pleas. says applies motions "made imposed.'' speculation Congress mind when amended 1983 themselves. 23 substantial argument defense relies interpretation 32(b)(3). Rule, concerning reports, contents disclosed anyone consented writing, nolo contendere, all comments meaning construed them. 24 Reversed. syllabus part Reporter Decisions convenience reader. Detroit Timber Lumber Co., 200 321, 337, 26 282, 287, 50 499. 11(f) (court confirming basis). Sentencing Guidelines, reviewed report, believes required. Commission, Guidelines Manual §6B1.1(c) (Nov.1995) (USSG). unfair bind terms bound. that, policy matter, results differential treatment Even correct (a decide), remains task here policymaker, deciding make possible, rather provide. Cf. Carlisle 517 116 1460, 1466, 134 613 (1996) (district use "inherent supervisory power'' perceived unfairness application 29(a)'s 7-day limit filing acquittal, power "circumvent conflict Procedure'').

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