Document: 452 U.S. 458 101 S.Ct. 2460 69 L.Ed.2d 158 CONNECTICUT BOARD OF PARDONS et al., Petitioners,v.David DUMSCHAT al. No. 79-1997. Argued Feb. 24, 1981. Decided June 17, Syllabus After several applications by respondent Dumschat, a life inmate in Connecticut state prison, for commutation of his sentence had been rejected the Board Pardons without explanation, he sued Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory judgment that Board's failure to provide him with written statement reasons denying violated rights Due Process Clause Fourteenth Amendment. Relying chiefly on fact granted approximately three-fourths all sentences, Court, after allowing other inmates (also respondents) intervene and certifying suit as class action, held prisoners serving sentences prisons have constitutionally protected "entitlement" why is not granted. The Appeals affirmed, then, its vacated this case remanded reconsideration light Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 1, 99 2100, 60 668, overwhelming likelihood will be pardoned released before they complete their minimum terms gave them liberty interest pardon proceedings, was necessary Clause. Held: power vested commute conferred no respondents beyond right seek commutation. Pp. 463-467. (a) Far from supporting an "entitlement," Greenholtz, which claim constitutional entitlement release valid prison exists independently explicitly State, compels conclusion has "no or inherent right" sentence. In Clause, felon's expectation lawfully imposed commuted more substantial than inmate's expectation, example, transferred another prison; it simply unilateral hope. A cannot "be created if estoppel—merely because wholly expressly discretionary privilege generally past." Leis Flynt, 439 438, 444, n.5, 698, 701, 702, 58 717. No matter how frequently particular form clemency granted, statistical probabilities generate protections. 463-465. (b) contrast unique parole statute applied unless certain findings were made, mere existence statute—which imposes limit what procedure followed, evidence may considered, criteria are Pardons—and granting many inmates, create "entitlement." P.p. 466-467. 2 Cir., 618 F.2d 216, reversed. Stephen J. O'Neill, Hartford, Conn., petitioners. Wizner, New Haven, respondents. Chief Justice BURGER delivered opinion Court. 1 question presented whether creates "liberty interest" life-term so require explain denial application * 1964, Dumschat sentenced imprisonment murder. Under law, eligible until December 1983.1 empowered reducing term,2 such accelerates eligibility parole.3 authority derives Conn.Gen.Stat. 18-26 (1981), provides pertinent part: 3 "(a) Jurisdiction over of, grant, commutations punishment releases, conditioned absolute, any person convicted offense against penalty death shall board pardons. 4 "(b) Said grant pardons, at time imposition service sentence." On occasions prior filing February 1976, each explanation. then guaranteed 5 hearing testimony officials Parole, concluded process, due process when failed give "a facts relied on" 432 F.Supp. 1310, 1315 (1977). court showing "at least 75 percent lifers received some favorable action completing sentences" virtually promptly paroled.4 Id., 1314. response postjudgment motions, allowed intervene, certified heard additional evidence.5 expectancy therefore affirmed. 593 165 (CA2 1979). petition writ certiorari filed, we 668 (1979). 926, 2854, 61 294 6 remand, reaffirmed original decision, 216 1980), stating: 7 "In marked [to considered Greenholtz], Connecticut's pardons contains neither presumption favor nor list factors Pardons. Instead, grants unfettered discretion exercise power. offers only 'mere hope' pardon; does legitimate freedom implicate process." 219 (citation omitted). 8 also noted Court's holding possibility cognizable longer tenable" Greenholtz. F.2d, 221; see U.S., 8-11, 2104-2105. However, proceeded conclude "[t]he gives proceedings." 220. understood our hold brief "not sufficient but necessary."6 222. reading determination "how years must serve probability becomes significant rise interest."7 II A. 9 state-created can, circumstances, beget yet procedures essential realization parent right. See Meachum Fano, 427 215, 226, 96 2532, 2539, 49 451 (1976); Wolff McDonnell, 418 539, 557, 94 2963, 2975, 41 935 (1974). Plainly, however, underlying come into can trigger protection. See, e. g., 442-443, 701-702, 717 10 far spelling out judicially divined did apply statute. We State. Our language leaves room doubt: 11 "There conditionally expiration natural desire individual indistinguishable initial resistance being confined. But conviction, procedural safeguards, extinguished right: '[G]iven criminal defendant deprived liberty.' " 7, S.Ct., 2103, (emphasis supplied; citation 12 pointedly distinguished revocation probation cases,8 noting there "critical" difference between prisoner's request parolee's conditional liberty. 9-11, 2104-2106, quoting, inter alia, Friendly, "Some Kind Hearing," 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975). Unlike probation, decisions traditionally business courts; such, rarely, ever, appropriate subjects judicial review.9 Cf. supra, 225, 2538. 13 decision long-term depends objective factfinding, purely subjective evaluations predictions future behavior those entrusted decision. shares characteristics parole. 9-10, 14 Respondents nevertheless contend consistent practice most protectible interest. They argue: 15 "[T]he State unwritten common law acceleration inmates. . effect, unspoken understanding simple: If cooperates behalf. Both recognize terms. Each expects abide them." Brief 17-18. 16 This involve parole, respondents' argument misconceives nature felon. nothing appeal clemency. Schick Reed, 419 256, 260-266, 95 379, 382, 385, 430 prison;10 11, 2106, seeLeis 443-444, 701-702. created—as andexpressly generously n. 5, 5. standing alone protections; contrary would trivialize Constitution. ground claim, any, found statutes rules defining obligations charged exercising B 17 correctly recognized "unfettered discretion" Pardons, paradoxically—then fetter halter Board. challenge precisely "the absence apparent standards." 28. agree explicit standards way statute, regulation, otherwise. 18 contrasts dramatically statutory mandated Parole "shall" order "unless" decided one four specified applicable. 2106. having definitions, criteria, "shalls," analogous duty entitlement. 19 It clear requirement articulating derived mandates statutes. Thus, although inmates' "is entitled measure protection," emphasized 20 "this structure thus case-by-case basis." 12, 21 Moreover, standpoint requirement, vast parole—particularly Greenholtz—and state's refusal lawful When directed who finding By contrast, sentence, petitioners, required act prescribed grounds. 22 23 Reversed. 24 BRENNAN, concurring. 25 I join opinion. Although demonstrated obtaining relief request, enough Rather, show—by reference administrative practice, contractual arrangement mutual understanding—that particularized guide State's decisionmakers. 442, (1979); Perry Sindermann, 408 593, 601, 92 2694, 2699, 33 570 (1972); Regents Roth, 564, 577, 2701, 2709, 548 (1972). Thestructure decisionmaking likely result process. shown base defined criteria. As inMeachum 228, 2540, (1976), decisionmaker deny requested permissible reason all. Accordingly, pardon. 26 WHITE, 27 write separately observe (1974), suggested source worthy federal McDonnell pointed "rights diminished needs exigencies institutional environment, [he] stripped protections imprisoned crime. [He] life, property law." 555-556, 2974. issue deprivation good-time credits, Constitution creation law. even rooted 28 Fano felon forfeit conviction confinement prison. He retains variety important courts alert protect." went prisoner protecting transfers Neither purport protection Of course, STEVENS dissent case; first addressed asserted interests retained felons. not; thought was. fairly characterized suggesting 29 STEVENS, whom MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 30 "Liberty bodily restraint always core arbitrary governmental action." 18, 2109, (opinion POWELL, J.). merely State," 558, 935. Surely stumbles states "must clemency," ante, 2464, implies "its roots law," 451. 31 To us, "self-evident" deeper roots.1 follows total; possesses residuum while legal custody State.2 presents these slaves, divested liberty; rather, refusing constitutes entitling 32 facile answer distinction hand forms basis implicated. Only obviously POWELL explained, less satisfactory appears.3 my judgment, insufficient evaluate character occurs effective terminate defendant's liberty, thereafter retain safeguards action. sentencing, release, revocation, ultimate discharge could totally arbitrary. asserts total control offender, unequivocally affords different stages postconviction process.4 basic applies itself survives extent continuous rather isolated event. 34 involves determining relatively small group serious offenders custody. Routinely includes three determinations: judge sentence; course commutes finally discharges regular critical component employed determine magnitude liberty.5 step denies arbitrarily.6 35 Whether shortcoming is, admittedly, debatable. Judges often decide difficult cases explaining reasons, suggest thereby commit error. ordinary litigant courtroom. few Indeed, case, afforded govern powers His somewhat earliest days common-law history. judges guided laws, developed meaningful set adjudication. Their explanations provided guideposts assurance litigants like similar way. Many us believe statements better guarantee justice possibly described code detail fit Napoleon. 36 out, obligation justify publicly assurance, appearance fairness, capricious," 40, 2121 (dissenting opinion). context element 37 respectfully dissent. 1971, term maximum years' 54-125 (1981). Effective sentencing specify term, low high years. 53a-35(c)(1) immediate absolute pardon, according recent 1313 (D.C. Conn. 1977). virtue "stands outside traditional scheme through chief executive." Governor temporary reprieves. 1312. determinations made separate body. procedure; denials commutations. whose paroled 90% during year eligibility, within App. 33, 39. Chairman testified per cent" 20-year 31. day entered Dumschat's served release. moved dismiss moot. denied motion permitted intervene. Those murder reasons. Two still sentences. According respondents, persons class, consists "inmates currently [without court-imposed terms] been, be, current incarceration" Pet. Cert. 21a; Petitioners ii; Tr. Oral Arg. 36; supra. cited passage said: "The [statutory] opportunity heard, informs respects falls short qualifying parole; circumstances. more." 16, 2108. remarked "[o]nly period elapsed 221. Because believed every make now us. 220-221; 25a. Gagnon Scarpelli, 411 778, 93 1756, 656 (1973); Morrissey Brewer, 471, 2593, 484 raised equal claim. (1976). "It self-evident individuals possess free physical restraint." 23, 2112, (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). "If man creature analysis correct. Bill Rights laws sovereign States protects. relevant provisions limitations infringe citizen. either rights, curtail citizen live ordered society. enjoyment complex surely exclusive source. "I men endowed Creator cardinal unalienable rights. protects, privileges specific regulations." 230, 2541, (STEVENS, 231-233, 2541-2542. today, concludes 'are quite different,' 'there losing getting wants,' 9, [99 2105]. am unpersuaded difference, indeed all, implies. Release marks severe restrictions regimen lifted, molded hope securing parole-release later, unanticipated, parole-revocation whatever reactions parolees dispositive. From system, justifiably meets applicable system. true disappointment once granted." 19-20, 2109-2110 Thus protects stage. Mempa Rhay, 389 128, 88 254, 336, 656, 484. issues affecting prisoners. Bounds Smith, 817, 97 1491, 52 72 (right assistance papers); Pell Procunier, 417 822, 2800, 2804, 495 (First Amendment rights); Cruz Beto, 405 319, 1079, 263 religious faith); Wilwording Swenson, 404 249, 407, file habeas corpus); Cooper Pate, 378 546, 84 1733, 1030 purchase materials); Ex parte Hull, 312 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 corpus). Cf.Weems United States, 217 349, 544, 54 793 (sentence violate Eighth Amendment). recognizes, 461, 75% receive paroles Ante, n.4. petitioner agency given title "Board Pardons" not, work equivalent executive occasional cases. record makes clear, roughly same frequency boards determinations.

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