Document: 500 U.S. 1 111 S.Ct. 1562 114 L.Ed.2d Charles Z. STEVENS, III, Petitionerv.DEPARTMENT OF the TREASURY et al. No. 89-1821. Argued March 19, 1991. Decided April 24, Syllabus On 27, 1987, petitioner Stevens, who was in his 60's, subjected to an adverse personnel action by employer, Internal Revenue Service. Believing that he had been victim of age discrimination, attempted invoke agency's administrative procedure for resolving such claims September long after expiration applicable time period set forth Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations. October filed a formal complaint discrimination with Department Treasury, concluding notice intention sue if matter not satisfactorily resolved. The rejected because untimeliness initial attempt obtain relief, and EEOC's Office Review Appeals affirmed. May 3, 1988, Stevens against its Secretary District Court, which dismissed case prejudice, concludingthat it "without jurisdiction" apply Age Discrimination Act 1967 (ADEA) circumstances. Noting federal employee has two alternative avenues relief under ADEA, court reasoned (1) satisfied requirements proceeding directly 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d), which, declared, mandated "initiate no later than 180 days from unlawful notify EEOC within 30 prior commencing suit," (2) properly invoked untimeliness, whereas, having chosen route 633a(b), required exhaust remedies before bringing suit. Court declared that, file intent allegedly discriminatory but did have initiate suit period. Nevertheless, affirmed dismissal on ground since initiated until effective. Held: 1. Stevens' civil timely 633a. Pp. 5-8. (a) clearly met calls "not less than" (not notification days), provides "notice shall be filed" alleged practice notice). Here, EEOC—which accepts given employing agency as sufficient compliance statutory requirement—was notified 176th day 1987. And date more given. 5-7. (b) There is discernible basis limitations Since statute does expressly impose any additional complaint, must assumed Congress intended appropriate borrowed either state or analogous one. It need decided here 633a(c) actions, only one year six event. As respondents acknowledge, well whatever might apply. 7-8. (c) timeliness issue this heard merits, turn specifically referred answered question incorrectly. P. 8. 2. This will address whether filing action, Government, direct contradiction position Appeals, now fully agrees exhaustion required. 8-11. 897 F.2d 526 (CA5 1990), reversed remanded. BLACKMUN, J., delivered opinion REHNQUIST, C.J., WHITE, MARSHALL, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, andSOUTER, JJ., joined, all Part IV joined. concurring part dissenting part, post, p. ----. Alison Steiner, petitioner. Amy L. Wax, respondent, pro hac vice, special leave Court. Justice BLACKMUN concerns claim said violation 15 (the employees' component) (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, added Fair Labor Standards Amendments 1974, 88 74, amended, 2 * Petitioner United States Service (Service). In August 1986, when 63 years age, accepted into Service's Officer Training Program at Austin, Tex., probationary status service employee. 26, advised performance program satisfactory. He then requested transfer out demotion, rather face separation 21 wrote Congressman assistance. See App. That inquiry proved nonproductive. 3 complaints through meeting Counselor. This, however, 30-day prescribed application CFR §§ 1613.511, 1613.512, 1613.214(a)(1)(i) (1990). Treasury. 11. At end following statement: "This also my Civil resolved." Id., 15. rejected, said, delay seeking counselor there showing good cause complying requirement. 16. described Director Regional Complaints Center "a final decision." 19. petitioner's appeal rejection 30, 1988. 20. 4 se Treasury Western Texas. ensuing hearing, represented counsel. defense moved dismiss failed establish tolling 22. granted motion prejudice. Pet. Cert. A-1. noted: "[A]n believes discriminated ADEA": "may proceed id., A-3, citing finding the" EEOC, bring exhausting remedies," 633a(b). procedure, attempted, absence satisfactory explanation delay. therefore concluded ADEA "to circumstances demotion April, 1987." A-3 A-4. 5 appealed Fifth Circuit. unpublished per curiam opinion, disagreed Court's statement could go "no action." A-7. went say: "However, present [3], 1988[;] 1987 effective." Ibid. concluded: "Although district law correctly, ultimately correct result reached meet 633a(d)." A-8. Judgt. order reported 6 We certiorari over respondents' opposition what appeared us clear misreading lower courts important statute. 498 957, 383, 112 394 II 7 noted routes pursuing discrimination. An individual may process remedies. 633a(b) (c). A complaining seek all. can decide merits first instance. 633a(d). Both are implicated case. first. 8 Section 15(d) Act, reads: 9 "When concerning Commission, commenced section thirty days' action. Such hundred eighty occurred." (Emphasis added.) 10 obviously misread suit." (emphasis added). thus imposed requirement instituted 180-day commencement But reads otherwise both requirements. Clearly, action—petitioner's 1987—had occurred.1 11 corrected errors: 12 "Contrary stated, merely give 13 sentence already 4, enigmatic surely implies, even say so directly, disagreement second error—that litigation notice, instead notice. note, point, Appeals' error their reading replicated other courts. Castro v. States, 775 399, 403 (CA1 1985); McKinney Dole, 246 U.S.App.D.C. 376, 387, 765 1129, 1140 (1985). regulations positive "within days" marked contrast situation assertion Title VII claim. 1613.514 Respondents concede this, they "the clear." Brief 29. 14 foundation we discern conclusion limitations. assume, before, Agency Holding Corp. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 143, 146-148, 107 2759, 2762-63, 97 121 (1987). case, 633a(c). event That, "is action."2 III Solicitor General, submits petition should improvidently granted. 31. rests submission argument time. 8-9, 11-15. made same certiorari. Opposition granting certiorari, reject again like it, substantive presented. 16 merits. Tr. 83-176. suit, A-7, and, explained, us. 17 Answering favor, have, brings involving court. Once court? stated circuit rule just eight issued below. White Frank, 895 243, 244 (CA5), cert. denied, 890, 232, 192 (1990), said: plaintiff chooses employer's determination . await court." divided Circuits. Compare, e.g., Langford Army Corps Engineers, 839 1192, 1194-1195 (CA6 1988), Purtill Harris, 658 134, 138 (CA3 1981), 462 1131, 103 3110, 77 1365 (1983). 18 Although one, encounter procedural difficulty. agree issue. According elects review abandoned took when, brief there, 19 "If files agency, employees alleging types 20 "It established available him Therefore, Judge Bunton Mr. requirements." Appellees 89-1432 pp. 6-7. 22 Respondents, course, acknowledge Oral Arg. 17, indeed "took different position," They candidly "we reconsidered our position." 33. 23 rethink position. Their choice, meant stands Neither anyone defends results those cases where Courts found sought instituted. See, McGinty Army, 900 1114 (CA7 1990); 399 supra. Those stand conflict Sixth Circuit's decision 24 each these cited cases, put forward view General's concession here, Government longer defend earlier 25 Under disinclined feel proper course reverse judgment remand further proceedings. remand, presumably (and strong presumption) submit altered positions—that institute made—and, court, withdrawn stance event, finally gain completely blocked. 26 Meanwhile, sure, rulings McGinty, Castro, Purtill, ruling effect remain outstanding Langford. little nothing, way agreement do litigation. respectively challenged supported some future litigant lead definitive resolution existing authority. If come about, then, Government's change mind new position, legal significance simply fade away passage 27 Reversed 28 part. While I join remainder disagree IV. view, quite right contains instituting moot, former employer adversary posture finds lacking equally decide. Compare ante, 9-10, Moreover, 633a, provision issue, applies employees, awaits never arise unless once reverses acknowledges divided. 9. straightforward capable swift resolution. based contention solely analogy VII. Unlike VII, express complainant relief. infer voluntarily charged interpretation read require employees. 1613.513 31 language relied omission 633a allowing abandon days.* provision, unnecessary because, equivalent VII's command 32 would resolve question. To extent, respectfully dissent disposition. Management Directive EEO-MD 107, ch. 12, 12-2 12-3 Indeed, formally sue, told: "[Y]ou MAY up accrued reference general limitations, 2401(a), Government. n. (1983); 404 Rivera Postal Service, 830 1037, 1039 (CA9 1987), 486 1009, 108 1737, 100 200 (1988); Bornholdt Brady, 869 57, (CA2 1989); (1990); 1114, 1117 1990).

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