Document: 128 S. Ct. 1783 (2008) UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Gino RODRIQUEZ. No. 06-1646. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 15, 2008. Decided May 19, *1786 Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Charles A. Rothfeld, Respondent. Paul D. Clement, Dan M. Kahan, Sarah F. Russell, New Haven, CT, L. Cece Glenn, Spokane, WA, Andrew J. Pincus, Mayer Brown LLP, DC, Solicitor General, Alice Fisher, Assistant Attorney Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy E. to the Daniel Goodman, Justice ALITO delivered opinion Court. Under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), a state drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as "a serious drug offense" if maximum term imprisonment ten years or more is prescribed by law" "offense." The Appeals Ninth Circuit held that "the imprisonment. . must be determined without taking recidivist enhancements into account. 464 F.3d 1072, 1082 (2006). We reverse. I At issue in this case respondent's sentence on his 2004 States District Eastern Washington possession firearm convicted felon, violation 922(g)(1). Respondent had two prior convictions California residential burglary and three delivery controlled substance, Wash. Rev.Code §§ 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii)-(iv) (1994).[1] Respondent's occurred same day but were based deliveries took place separate dates. Sentencing Order CR-03-142-RHW (ED Wash., Sept. 3, 2004), p. 5, App. 245, 250 (hereinafter Order). time offenses, statute respondent was violating stated that, upon conviction, defendant could "imprisoned not than five years," 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii)-(iv), another provision specified "[a]ny person second subsequent "be imprisoned up twice otherwise authorized," 69.50.408(a). Thus, virtue latter, recidivist, faced penalty *1787 10 years. judgment each drug-delivery charges listed offense "ten 16, 42, 93, court sentenced concurrent sentences 48 months' count. Id., at 21, 47, 98. In federal felon-in-possession case, Government asked under ACCA, which sets 15-year minimum "[i]n who violates section 922(g) [Title 18] has previous violent felony offense, both, committed occasions different from one ." 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). argued "`violent felonies.'" Pet. Cert. 4. See 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) ed.) (listing "burglary" "violent felony"). agreed, ruling here. also least "serious offense[s]." includes: "an State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, possessing with intent distribute, substance (as defined 102 Controlled Substances (21 802)), law." 924(e)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because years, contended these counted ACCA. disagreed, holding offense[s]" ACCA because "maximum imprisonment" purposes 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) reference enhancements. Order, 9, 254. Circuit, applying its precedent Corona-Sanchez, 291 1201 (2002) (en banc), affirmed. 1072. recognized decision conflicted Seventh Circuit's Henton, 374 467, 469-470, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 967, 125 431, 160 Ed. 2d 336 (2004), "in tension" decisions Fourth Fifth Circuits. F.3d, 1082, n. 6; see Mutascu Gonzales, 444 710, 712 (C.A.5 2006) (per curiam); Williams, 326 535, 539 (C.A.4 2003). granted Government's petition writ certiorari, 551 ___, 33, 168 808 (2007). II question we decide whether is, maintains held, 5-year ceiling first offenses or, contends, 10-year offenses. 69.50.401(a)(ii)-(iv), reading compelled language For present purposes, there are key statutory terms: "offense," "law," term." "offense" cases 69.50.401(a)(ii)-(iv). relevant "law" set out both provision, prescribes term" 69.50.408(a), *1788 law contorts ACCA's plain terms. Although imprisonment, no dispute 69.50.408(a) permitted On even been to, say, six years' still would have It hard accept proposition may lawfully exceeds law," where leads. interpretation inconsistent way concept customarily understood participants criminal justice process. Suppose indisputably felon[ies]" of-fense[s]" charged statute. face "not less 15 years." her attorney, "What's new offense?" An attorney aware surely respond, "10 though enhancement. 924(a)(2) ed.). then pleaded guilty charge. Federal Rule Procedure 11(b)(1)(H), trial judge required advise possible penalty." If told imposed sorely misled ground moving withdraw plea. Gonzalez, 420 111, 132 (C.A.2 2005); Harrington, 354 178, 185-186 (C.A2 2004). sum, straightforward application leads conclusion III A an effort defend decision, offers textual argument related "manifest purpose" Brief 8. follows. "generally describe elements constituting crime." 10. typically elements, they should considered part simply committing therefore 10-11. faithful text. reads referring *1789 trigger enhancement, what says. instead refers offense," and, previously explained, rejected. argues uses short-hand means identifying conduct deemed sufficiently `serious' [the] mandatory 9. According respondent, "[t]he nature [a defendant's] conduct, impact crime characteristics used gauge `seriousness' defendant's "status connection one." 11. This rests erroneous record bearing seriousness offense. contrary, however, repeat offender often thought reflect greater culpability thus merit punishment. Similarly, regarded it portends future danger warrants increased deterrence incapacitation. Witte States, 515 389, 403, 115 2199, 351 (1995); Spencer Texas, 385 554, 570, 87 648, 17 606 (1967) (Warren, C. J., dissenting judgments concurring one). correct follow any punishment something else presumably crimes recidivist," But squarely rejected understanding recidivism statutes. Nichols 511 738, 114 1921, 745 (1994), explained "`[t]his consistently sustained repeat-offender laws penalizing only last defendant.'" 747, 1921 (quoting Baldasar Illinois, 446 222, 232, 100 1585, 64 169 (1980) (Powell, dissenting)). When given higher statuteor matter, when sentencing judge, guidelines regime discretionary system, increases history100% conviction. None recidivist." "is stiffened latest crime, aggravated [it is] repetitive Gryger Burke, 334 728, 732, 68 1256, 92 1683 (1948). B our produces sort perverse bootstrapping" "punished being treated 20 deleted), fact itself bolsters reading. Since statute, Congress such provisions mind *1790 [state] some provisions. Contrary suggestion, LaBonte, 520 751, 117 1673, 137 1001 (1997), supports Reform 1984, amended, 28 994(h), directed Commission "assure" Guidelines specify prison "at near authorized categories of" adult offenders commit their third crime. phrase authorized" "refers all applicable statutes," including U.S., 758, 4, 1673. claims LaBonte position unlike does refer "categories offenders. suggests Congress' failure include intended depend falls first-time-offender "category." explain how easily reworded mirror 994(h). event, reasons above, clear enough. supported so-called "categorical" approach Taylor 495 575, 110 2143, 109 607 (1990), determining qualify 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Section provides four enumerated crimes burglary, arson, extortion, use explosivesare purposes. Taylor, "uniform definition" "independent labels employed various States' codes." 592, 2143. categorical congressional intentreflected languageto focus inquiry rather collateral matters unrelated definition 12. connection, between (the meaning 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)) here 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)). label attached particular State, 600-601, necessarily depends law. similar reason, reject interpretation, really will included chose rely prescribed" measure manufacture, distribution, illegal drugs. thoughtnot reasonthat lawmakers provide punishable regard "serious," defer lawmakers' judgment. Therefore, poses risk *1791 "serious" satisfying standard prescribed.[2] C difficult determine possibility enhancement past require courts "engage inquiries regarding novel questions complex factual determinations about long-past proceedings courts." 21. greatly exaggerates problems he refers. First, cases, received evident length imposed. Second, illustrates, sometimes list did exceed top allowed Third, himself notes, jurisdictions prosecution submit formal charging document order obtain 33. Such documents fall within limited generally available already consult purpose predicate. Shepard 544 13, 20, 1254, 161 205 (2005). Fourth, those charges, plea colloquy very statement penalty. mandated many requirements.[3] Finally, records properly consulted do show well precluded establishing qualifying mere might difficulties cannot justify disregards language. *1792 D can increase systems cap decrease 38. situation, argues, actually defendant. concedes waived respect own specific state-court convictions. Opposition 7. He wanted make dependent complexities guidelines. conclude, meant apply range. range allow impose appropriate circumstances. Guidelines, example, permit "upward departures," Commission, Manual 5K2.0 (Nov.2007), essentially characteristic shared system existence enactment case.[4] (Following pattern, likewise provided "impose outside range" finding "that [were] substantial compelling justifying exceptional sentence." 9.94A.120(2) (1994).[5]) "maximum" statutes predated Pub.L. 98-473, 211, 98 Stat. 1987, referred guideline See, e.g., 3 (1982 ("[A]n accessory after shall one-half principal"); 3575(b) (allowing dangerous special disproportionate severity *1793 for" underlying felony); 371 conspiracy misdemeanor "shall misdemeanor"); 3651 confinement suspension death life "if months"); 3653 (referring probation period"). instructive Act, sense. 212, 1991-1992 (new 3559 classifying describing offense"); 235(b)(1)(F), 2032 ("The effect effective date [of Act]" remains "for before date"); 1003(a), id., 2138 (solicitation violence "one-half solicited"). light established pattern relative newness added, conclude Our R.L.C., 503 291, 112 1329, 559 (1992), contrary. there, 5037(c) ed.), official detention juvenile found delinquent. amended 214, 2013, again later, 21(a)(2)-(4), 3596. As Rather, focused sentenced. "`in eighteen old,'" extend beyond earlier dates: juvenile's 21st birthday "`the tried adult.'" supra, 295-296, 1 5037(c)). clearly focuses circumstances 299, analogous us case. * reasons, hold provision. Accordingly, reverse remand further consistent opinion. so ordered. SOUTER, whom STEVENS GINSBURG join, dissenting. chooses 924(e) ed. V), over much sense statute's ambiguous text counsel tradition *1794 lenity construing perplexing laws. Court's choice, moreover, promises times calculations demands. respectfully dissent. mandates anyone "has [for] among crimes. defines laws, limitation leaves open acts making basic regardless commits it, account taken facts (such offender's qualified him enhanced conviction). alternative intended, needs look first-time offender. one, consider variations (for using gun, repeating offense) other turns word tied. One naturally read general level synonymous crime," tend rule maximums adjusted facts; usually speak "burglary while having bail." Those details come speaking instance, described "committed someone bail," "enhance" burglary. trouble occurrence, too; looking jarring suggest around event authorize ranges gun) history (like conviction) ought count day, place, offender, way. Either seems offer plausible take identify calculate penalties, get help imagining ask adopt. choice answer easy arose lawyer whose client thinking asks faces. ante, 1787-1788. His knows wants know, understands add-on baseline comparison break potential agreement. And faces carrying gun during bail, tell guns bail restrictions. By token, Rodriquez did) lower says, grace guidelines, know enough *1795 capped comes client's prospects, judge's wondering context gives ready answer. Nor tie does, mean add-ons above "maximum," 1787 ("even `the imprisonment' years"). That description, all, just verbal quirk showing design proper working order: viewed generically apart characteristics, gap heavier, actual accounting expected.[1] point likelier interpretive choices, alternatives, ambiguous.[2] believe ambiguity fairly resolved favor, affirm. principal points ripostes solves puzzle. To begin with, arbitrary trying resolve rejecting maximum-for-basic-offense option declining entire class offender-based adjustments. going penalty, seem "prescribed determine. original am of, authority invests legal status *1796 customary Cf. R.L. C., 297, (1992) suggestion character primacy administrative mandate statutory"). tries deflect implication denying since depart them, down, conditions met. 1792. true, objection stands. However scheme works, somewhere; includes affecting maximum, affected Indeed, involved them offense-defining freestanding (whether setting, authorizing departure from, limit). There practical difference statutorily guideline, guideline-specified departure; wherever "prescri[ption] resides, honored court. lights, then, think complication schemes present, difficulty calculating jurisdictions.[3] What imaginary meets altering sentence, artificially stripped triggers fundamental objection, though, goes makes better resting treatment recidivists schemes, considered. says natural terms criminals national level, quite possibly right this; turn classification shows chances equally good wrong; odd piggybacked extraordinary irreconcilable policies subject. thing, vary methods augmenting sentences. Iowa's subjects triple Iowa Code 124.411(1) (2005); Wisconsin distributor fixed number whatever starting point, see, Wis. 961.48(1)(b) (2003-2004) (4-year Class H selling kilogram marijuana). More striking differing structures, vast disparities State: Massachusetts *1797 small amount marijuana carries 2.5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 94C, 32C(b) (West 2006). Delaware, parole. Del.Code Tit. 11, 4214(b) (2007) (third-felony parole violations non-narcotic substances 4752 (2004)). chosen state-law "seriousness" widely doubt. doubt gets worse notice penalties base-level lead sanction other: view, selling, pounds predicate Arizona (maximum 13 years), (15 Utah Columbia (10 example;[4] short mark (8 Michigan York years).[5] Yet falling narrower (between 3.5 5.5 years).[6] With backdrop hardly heard say "incongruous" targeting flagged assigned bare facts. 17. saying retroactive crimes, double-jeopardy right-to-counsel enquiries. 1789 (citing (1948)). quotations identified draw "[w]hen statute," nonetheless "100% conviction," leaving nothing attributed "prior `status recidivist,'" 1789. Still, bear *1798 relation gravity triggering "three-strikes" (not mention Delaware above) show. Ill. Comp. Stat., 720, 5/33B-1 (2004) (mandatory "Class X" felony, dealing heroin, gradation X similarity offenses); W. Va.Code Ann. 61-11-18(c) (2005) (if "twice penitentiary," incurs sentence). Ewing California, 538 30, 2, 123 1179, 155 108 (2003) (plurality opinion) "California Legislature made deliberate policy determinative factor Three Strikes Law" (internal quotation marks omitted)). (or status) necessary "`stiffened penalty'" crime,'" 1789, "enhancement." upshot been. anything strange ignoring piles magnifying severe with. Whatever plausibility describes description avoids source glossing portends. unmoved probably expect master countless complications schemes; another, thinks threatening subject, simplify offering few pointers. notes "evident imposed" court; sometimes, court's "judgment sentence"; prosecutor "submit[ted] enhancement." Ante, 1791. pleas, Ibid. Even pointers help, Court, consulted" yield answer, worst happen inability qualifies. easy, comfort. start mentioned records, supposed written down today holds means? State's below reduced guidelines; product weapons commission). Having enquire *1799 leave plenty sorting least, prosecutors, end job). Another example: coordinate drug-offender provisions, together habitual-offender statutes, resulting "maximum." figure avoid conflict cut courts, Goldberg 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (general trumps one; overruling Mikell 270 510 523 (1999)); Keith, N.M. 462, 697 P.2d 145 (App.1985) (specific general). Clines 912 So. 550 (Fla.2005) (relying multiple single more: reminds us, deciding counts "prior" always thing. People Wiley, 9 Cal. 4th 580, 583, 38 Rptr. 347, 889 541, 542 (1995) (noting requirement "brought separately," trials occurring session; end, drawing needed inference docket numbers revealed requested municipal court); 595, P.2d, (Werdegar, dissenting) (protesting solicitation extra-record documents). enquiry easier, likely benefit well-settled takes Timothy 90 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2004) (holding Oklahoma Alaska, Alaska's enhancements, 2-year-old Butts 53 609 (2002)); (raising today). N.J. 2C:44-4(c) 2005) ("A jurisdiction constitute excess 6 months jurisdiction"); 31-18-17(D)(2)(b) (2007 Supp.) (defining conviction" as, inter alia, "punishable [by] year"). thornier problem treat procedural safeguards sentencing. Saying deference extends raises, far themselves go raising penalties. (The disregard no.) seek failed give timely notice? *1800 Commonwealth Fernandes, 430 517, 522, 722 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1999) longstanding indictment subject punishment"). on, highly complicated enquiries every Territory's collection ancillary unconvincing ambiguity. plainly superior elusive; favoring certainly is. defy common English sense, former "offense"; neither foolish however computed. said basic-crime view concede competing positions pretty close evenly matched. assumption, tie-breaker. adopted counseled lenity, applies here) "`seiz[ed] thing aid derived,'" "left Bass, 404 336, 515, 30 488 (1971) 2 Cranch 358, 386, 304 (1805) (opinion Marshall, J.)). grounded instinctive distaste against men languishing unless lawmaker should,'" 348, H. Friendly, Benchmarks 209 (1967)), metes bounds Bifulco 447 381, 387, 2247, 65 (collecting cases). "This interpret places individual guess intended." Ladner 358 169, 79 209, 199 (1958). why control recognizing best side, debatable guesswork send man 180 months, view. Courts imposing doubling well. "fair warning" motivates rule, McBoyle 283 25, 27, 51 340, 75 816 (1931) Holmes, J.), benign fiction, 309, 1329 (SCALIA, concurring), realistic chance giving fair apply, chose. Their ours, too. NOTES [1] "Except chapter, unlawful deliver, possess manufacture deliver substance." Rev. 69.50.401(a)(1994). [2] "minor crime" identifies potentially distribution 21 812, Schedule narcotic Mich. 333.7401(2)(b)(ii) Supp.2007). Given anabolic steroids painkillers amounts certain narcotics like opium, debate assertion generic word. However, Legislature's warrant seven 333.7401(2)(b)(ii), 333.769.12(1). [3] Kan. 22-3210(a)(2) (2007); N.C. Gen.Stat. 15A-1022(a)(6) (Lexis 2007); Tex.Crim. Proc.Code 26.13(a)(1), (d) Supp.2007); Ala. Crim. Proc. 14.4(a)(1)(ii) Fla. 3.172(b), (c)(1) Uniform Super. 33.8(C)(3) 2008); Sup.Ct. 402(a)(2) Pa. 590, comment Ohio 11(C)(2)(a) 6.302(B)(2) Alexander 605 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992); Bunnell Superior 3d 604-605, 119 302, 531 1086, 1094 (1975). [4] 1986, added language, 99-570, 1402, 3207-39, eight effect. Frase, Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L.Rev. 1190, 1196, Table Two (Utah Maryland) voluntary 1198, recommended circumstances, Miles, 156 Mich.App. 437, 402 N.W.2d 34, 37 (1986) (remanding upward departure); Staats 717 413, 422 App.1986) (affirming Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547, 549-550, 723 1111, 1113-1114 banc) (same); Mortland, 395 469, 474 (Minn.App.1986) Walker 496 220 (Fla.App.1986) curiam) Mills, 344 Pa.Super. 200, 204, A.2d 752, 754 (1985) (same). [5] While "illustrative factors [could] exercise discretion sentence," exclusive" departing. 9.94A.390. today's need counted, too permits offense's purposes: outstrip nonrecidivism raise ceiling. possibility, noting matter structured create broad tiers offenders" recidivism, "then imprisonment." Tr. Oral Arg. address prospect, despite seen kind result dealbreaker Rodriquez's adopting "alternative" ambiguity, rubric comprises possibilities umbrella. Most simply, applied extreme, purely hypothetical "worst" add-ons. Or perhaps fictional version rules it); maybe departures eligible, menagerie options multiplied, directly confronted so, which. doing affirmance, admits, shy 28. Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-604(B) Supp.2007) years); 124.401(1)(d), 902.9(5), 124.411 (basic-offense tripled 58-37-8(1)(b)(ii) 2007 Pamphlet), 76-3-203(2) 2003) D.C.Code 48-904.01(a)(2)(B) 48-904.08(a) (2001) (basic doubled years). Health & Safety 11360 Cal.Penal 1170.12(c)(1) 8 333.7401(2)(d)(iii) Supp.2008), 333.7413(2) N.Y. Penal Law 221.55 2001), 70.70(3)(b)(ii) Supp.2008) [6] 13-3405(B)(5), 13-701(C) 2001) (4 (5 902.9(5) 221.55, 70.70(2)(a)(ii) (5.5 58-37-8(1)(b)(ii), 76-3-203(3)

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