Document: Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGINIA, ET AL. v. DENNIS LEBLANC ON PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI TO APPEALS FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16–1177. Decided June 12, 2017 PER CURIAM. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state prisoner is eligible for fed- eral habeas relief if underlying court merits ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as determined by this Court. 28 U.S. C. §2254(d)(1). In case, Court Appeals Fourth Circuit held that demanding standard met Virginia court’s Graham Florida, 560 48 (2010). The question presented whether erred in con- cluding unreason- able Court’s holding. I On July 6, 1999, respondent Dennis LeBlanc raped 62- year-old woman. He 16 at time. 2003, trial sentenced him to life prison his crimes. 1990’s, had, felony offenders, abolished parole followed traditional framework. See Va. Code Ann. §53.1–165.1 (2013). As form replacement, enacted its so-called “geriatric release” program, which allows older inmates receive conditional release under some circumstances. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256, 261 (CA4 2016) (citing §53.1–40.01). Seven years after sentenced, decided Florida. Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders convicted nonhomicide offenses from being with- 2 VIRGINIA out parole. While “State not required guarantee eventual freedom offender crime,” held, it must “give defend- ants like meaningful opportunity obtain based on demonstrated maturity rehabilita- tion.” 540 U.S., 75. left States, “in first instance, explore means mechanisms compliance” with rule. Ibid. Respondent later filed motion court—the Beach Court—seeking vacate sen- tence light Graham. denied mo- tion. so doing, relied Supreme Virgin- ia’s decision Angel Commonwealth, 281 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011). Virginia’s geriatric program satisfies Graham’s requirement offenders. statute establishing provides: “Any person serving sentence imposed upon viction offense . (i) who has reached age sixty-five served least five (ii) sixty ten may peti- tion Parole Board release.” §53.1– 40.01. explained “[t]he regulations provide meets qualifications consideration tained statute, factors used normal process apply deci- sions statute.” Va., 275, E. 2d, 402. thus complied Graham, because provided “the demon- strated rehabilitation 3 Amendment.” S.E.2d, 402 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). Court, reviewing instant summarily re- spondent’s requests appeal rehearing. 2012, federal petition Eastern District pursuant §2254. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing petition, but disagreed granted writ. “there no possi- bility fairminded jurists could disagree conflicts wit[h] dictates Graham.” 2015 WL 4042175, *18 (July 1, 2015). divided panel affirmed, holding F.3d, 259–260. majority’s view, did rehabilitation. Niemeyer dissented. criticized majority “fail[ing] respect, any way, defer- ence Congress requires courts give decisions postconviction review.” Id., 275. Commonwealth petitioned certiorari. now granted, judgment reversed: unreasonably II order be case law, “objectively unreasonable, merely wrong; even clear error will suffice.” Woods Donald, 575 ___, ___ (2015) (per curiam) (slip op., 4) (internal other words, litigant “show 4 lacking justifica- there well understood compre- hended existing law beyond possibility fair- minded disagreement.” This “meant be” difficult meet. Harrington Richter, 562 86, 102 failing accord deference owed AEDPA. decide geriat- ric failed satisfy pre- sented. And objectively conclude that, employed factors, satisfied juveniles non- homicide crime have instructs consider “individual’s history individual’s conduct during incar- ceration,” prisoner’s “inter-personal rela- tionships staff inmates” “[c]hanges atti- tude toward self others.” 280–281 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) Policy Manual 2–4 (Oct. 2006)). Consideration these allow former offender’s her “demonstrated rehabilitation.” diverge far make “so obvious ‘fairminded disagreement’ ” about law. White Woodall, 572 (2014) 11). “Perhaps logical next step from” would hold does Amendment, “perhaps not.” S., 5 “[T]here are reasonable arguments both sides.” ___–___ 11–12). With respect petitioners, include dis- cussed above. Supra, 4. regards respondent, contentions Board’s substantial discretion deny deprives seek cannot until they spent four decades prison. These resolved review. Because arises “only th[at] narrow context,” “express[es] view underlying” claim. Woods, supra, 7) Nor “suggest imply issue, direct review, insubstan- tial.” Marshall Rodgers, 569 (2013) 7); accord, 5). today holds only ruling, resting earlier Angel, unrea- sonable current III proper AEDPA’s high bar avoids unnecessarily “disturb[ing] State’s significant interest repose concluded litigation, den[ying] soci- ety right punish admitted in- trud[ing] sovereignty degree matched few exercises judicial authority.” Harrington, 103 federalism implicated AEDPA cases central relevance Cir- cuit’s created potential discord sentencing process. Before today, 6 were permitted impose—and affirm— respondent’s, while same fact pattern grant ha- beas relief. Reversing Appeals’ case—rather than waiting more split authority develops—spares having confront legal quagmire. For reasons, certiorari leave proceed forma pauperis reversed. It ordered. GINSBURG, concurring JUSTICE judgment. (2010), today’s per curiam recognizes, “some mean- ingful [from prison] ante, 2. join under- standing (2011), interpreted require board such program. id., (“the statute”). contrary Circuit’s interpre- tation “for reason whatso- ever,” 269 (2016) (emphasis original); instead, board, when evaluating release, including maturity.

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