Document: 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) Gary LAWRENCE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA. No. 05-8820. Supreme Court of United States. Argued October 31, 2006. Decided February 20, 2007. *1081 Mary Bonner, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, appointed by this Court, for petitioner. Christopher Kise, Tallahassee, respondent. William M. Norris, Miami, Prof. Diane E. Courselle, Univ. Wyoming College Law, Laramie, WY, Catherine Counsel Record, Wanda Raiford, Petitioner. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General Florida, James A. McKee, Deputy Solicitor General, Office the Attorney, Record Foley & Lardner, LLP, Special to General. Jeffrey T. Green, Courtney Smith, Sidley Austin Washington, D.C., PA, Justice THOMAS delivered opinion Court. Congress established a 1-year statute limitations seeking federal habeas corpus relief from state-court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and further provided that period is tolled while an "application State post-conviction or other collateral review" "is pending," 2244(d)(2). We must decide whether state application still "pending" when courts have entered final judgment on matter but petition certiorari has been filed in hold it not. I Petitioner Lawrence his wife used pipe baseball bat kill Michael Finken. A Florida jury convicted first-degree murder, conspiracy commit auto theft, petty theft. The trial court sentenced death. affirmed Lawrence's conviction sentence appeal, denied January 1998. 522 U.S. 1080, 118 863, 139 L. Ed. 2d 761. On 19, 1999, 364 days later, postconviction *1082 court.[1] relief, affirmed, issuing its mandate November 18, 2002. See State, 831 So. 121 (per curiam). sought review denial March 24, 2003. 538 926, 123 1575, 155 319. While was pending, he present application. Federal District dismissed as untimely under 2244(d)'s period. All one day had lapsed during between time became relief. then entertained After issued mandate, waited another 113 dayswell beyond remained periodto file As consequence, could be considered timely only if continued Court's consideration certiorari. Then-applicable Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed any argument 2244's pendency proceeding. Coates Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227 (2000) Accordingly, concluded after mandate. affirmed. 421 1221 (2005). granted certiorari, 547 ___, 126 1625, 164 332 (2006), now affirm. II Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, sets one-year judgment. 2244(d)(1). This prisoner seeks court: "The which properly with respect pertinent claim pending shall not counted toward limitation subsection." Based provision, parties agree AEDPA's filing until affirming petition. At issue here also If tolled, timely. So we whether, according 2244(d)(2), *1083 pending" considers petition.[2] Read naturally, text mean stated Carey Saffold, 536 214, 220, 122 2134, 153 260 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), "remains "until achieved resolution through State's procedures." part "State's ends finally resolved highest review, no avenues remain open. And longer exists. remains separate before court. therefore court's complete, 2244(d)(2) does toll were difficult understand how exhaust remedies without Indeed, exhaustion provision tolling work together: balances interests served requirement . Section 2244(d)(1)'s 2244(d)(2)'s together 2254(b)'s requirement, encourage litigants first all their petitions soon possible." Duncan Walker, 533 167, 179, 181, 2120, 150 251 (2001) (final emphasis added). Yet said prisoners need remedies. Fay Noia, 372 391, 435-438, 83 822, 9 837 (1963); County Ulster Cty. Allen, 442 140, 149-150, n. 7, 99 2213, 60 777 (1979). are exhausted at end review. Fay, supra, 822; 2213. argues should construed same meaning 2244(d)(1)(A), trigger determines begins run. But 2244(d)(1)(A) uses much different language referring "the date conclusion direct expiration such review." (emphasis When interpreting similar 2255, explained "direct long included Clay States, 537 522, 527-528, 1072, 88 (2003). noted "[t]he Courts Appeals uniformly interpreted `direct review' encompass Court." Id., 528, 3, 1072 (collecting *1084 cases). By contrast, refers exclusively "State review," easily include participation Furthermore, "time seeking" includes Clay. parity reasoning, arguably would However, makes reference Instead, know pending. linguistic difference insignificant: application, even additional more analogous statutory 2263(b)(2), "opt-in" provisions States comply specific requirements relating counsel. Under 2263, "from disposition petition." 2263(b)(2). concedes there applications. although correctly notes 2263 differs clear both sections provides hinges 2263(b)(2) ("until petition"); ("a pending"). Given Congress' intent provide following surprising make distinction 2244. our interpretation result awkward situations applications they proceedings these will arise express terms admits intended preclude petitions. Brief 22. Because concerned potential awkwardness reason us construe avoid Contrary suggestion, results few practical problems. STEVENS noted, "this rarely grants stage litigation supported meritorious constitutional claims," choosing instead wait "federal proceedings." Kyles Whitley, 498 931, 932, 111 333, 112 298 (1990) (opinion concurring stay execution). Thus, likelihood duplicate analysis might done proceeding quite small. event, district about duplicative can resolves case or, likely, denies greater anomalies *1085 In hypothetical, maintains lack standing immediately (because him relief) later barred prevailed. Again, particular procedural posture extremely rare. Even so, equitable may available, light extraordinary circumstances prisoner's diligence. Pace DiGuglielmo, 544 408, 418, 8, 125 1807, 161 669 (2005).[3] cannot base exceedingly rare inequity almost certainly contemplating well cured tolling. contrast hypothetical problems identified Lawrence, allowing incentives delay tactic. push back 2254's deadline rule incentive petitionsregardless merit claims assertedso receive III applies otherwise claims. decided 2244(d) allows ibid. assume deciding is. To entitled tolling, show "(1) pursuing rights diligently, (2) some circumstance stood way" prevented filing. 1807. several arguments support contention case. First, legal confusion justifies expired case, every address agreed See, e.g., Coates, F.3d, 1227. settled law relevant belies confusion. Second, counsel's mistake miscalculating entitles credited, essentially equitably periods person whose attorney missed deadline. miscalculation simply sufficient warrant particularly context where right E.g., Coleman Thompson, 501 722, 756-757, 2546, 115 640 (1991). Third, presents special because supervised effort assist accountable delay. alleged hiring own representing *1086 himself. It perverse indeed providing counsel deprived benefit AEDPA limitations. Duncan, U.S., 2120 ("The 2244(d)(1) plainly serves well-recognized interest finality judgments"). Fourth, mental incapacity reliance upon assuming legally made factual showing incapacity. sum, fallen far short "extraordinary circumstances" necessary IV determined declined For reasons, so ordered. GINSBURG whom STEVENS, SOUTER, BREYER join, dissenting. today concludes "no exists"and "pending"once Ante, 1083. What remains, majority "separate" Ibid. do exist vacuum; actions instituted lower courts. asked consider reliefnot Until disposed live relief; transformed into applicant review.[1] certiorari.[2] instructed appropriate pending." That read continue either addressed 219-220, *1087 ("pending" means "in continuance" "not yet decided" omitted)). majority's contrary reading cuts opportunity reading, conclude, neither nor proper statute. Two 1217, 1223, §§ 2263(b)(2)bear these, tells run; states [of conviction] thus explicitly ordered clock starts, conviction, expires filed, denied. 527-529, According majority, similarly "refers `State review.'" 1084 original). fact, (Emphasis added.) tolls "pending," "pending court." Just "final" merits, see Clay, 527-530, (interpreting 2255), sensibly understood fundamental characteristic system appellate jurisdiction over decisions implicating Constitution. exercised decided. 1086, 1.[3] opposing view, emphasizes words seeking. 2244(d)(1)(A). phrasing, indicates cut off renders Court.[4] wording *1088 am persuaded, appropriately contrasted prescribes parallel capital cases. unlike here, leaves doubt exclude demonstrates wanted decisioni.e., periodit so. One why chosen uncommon cases covered 2261-2263, chapter terminating disposition, rather than extending petition, eliminated source implementing death penalty. shortened apply brought mechanism proceedings. 2261. An attorney, course, better equipped pro se petitioner hurdles, including timelines.[5] exceptional character opt-in category, aligned preceding it, 1083-1084. serve discrete functions synchronized. former prerequisite Exhaustion promotes principles comity federalism giving adjudicate prisoners; doctrine, however, necessitate determination. O'Sullivan Boerckel, 526 838, 844, 119 1728, 144 1 (1999) ("Comity dictates alleges confinement violates law, relief."). Tolling, concerns within move made, issues raised tribunal. purpose allow adequate exhaustion, sole objective. Tolling involved protects litigant's ability pursue her forum avoids simultaneous courtobjectives undercut today's decision. infra, 1089-1090. (2001), *1089 suggest result. Cf. ante, held "an 2244(d)(2)." omitted). But, undoubtedly subject Not unwarranted, spark two pleadings file, contemporaneously, Only expeditiously ensure run Protective essential, too, grant ruling many months elapse hear opinion.[6] Consequently, once, duplication occasion administrative problems; example, decision, record lodged. Rule 12, ¶ 7 clerk having possession keep notified Clerk certify transmit it."). There indication burden premature filings.[7] anticipatory anomalous prevails appears, obliged *1090 protective though gained questions bizarre 1084-1085. incline view position standing, least plausible raise specter prevailing court, losing altogether: ruled likely Though recognizing problem, suggests solution. next breath, hastens clarify available AEDPA. 1084-1085, 3.[8] problems, jurisdictional, determination decision Nor create untoward abuse writ. suggestion tactic basis reality mine Most want released custody possible, prolong incarceration. They interested expeditious claims.[9] earlier indicated, 1089-1090, rule, achieve equivalent 1084-1085; cf. Rhines Weber, 269, 278-279, 1528, 440 (2005) (a ask abey exhausted). nothing promote determinations Rather, imposes unnecessary judges who determine requested stay, trap those unaware compelled practically sound. cutting holding unnecessarily encumber filings deprive unwitting claimsall furthering purposes * reasons stated, qualifies reverse Circuit's NOTES [1] contends delays Florida's program appointing outside control caused pass took active role These facts little relevance analysis. did seek question entitle able spite delays. mistakenly deadline, lacked [2] previously word "State" modifies "post-conviction" "other 172-174, (2001). question, therefore, [State] [3] discussed below, assume, do, availability unclear just what thinks considering 2254 (authorizing persons review). entertain original petitions, Felker Turpin, 518 651, 660, 116 2333, 135 827 (1996), fall category. reach judgmenti.e., presenting presented inappropriately relies (2002), proposition procedures complete. continues throughout procedures, (or whether) excluded [4] Notably, (2003), rejected absence phrase changed "final." 6(1), becomes final" Nevertheless, 525, 1072. [5] Matching 2263(b)(2)'s abbreviated period, 2263(a) shorter Compare ("A writ corpus. .") (establishing 180-day limitation). [6] Sanchez-Llamas Oregon, 548 2669, 165 557 (2006) (certiorari June 2005, 386 28, 2006); Deck Missouri, 622, 2007, 953 July 15, 2004, 312 May 23, 2005). [7] regards inconsequential proposition, cites pre-AEDPA generally avenue Since AEDPA, become pressing. standard suffered violation nonetheless fail unless "was to, unreasonable of, clearly [this] Court," 2254(d)(1), based facts," 2254(d)(2). rare, importance evident. Deck, 624, 2007 (granting Constitution forbids use visible shackles guilt penalty phase justified essential interest); Roper Simmons, 543 551, 578, 1183, execution individuals age 18 prohibited Eighth Fourteenth Amendments). [8] Satisfied covers petitioner's alternative [9] petitioners aided delay, small minority petitioners. moreover, intentionally dilatory. 1082, 1.

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