Document: 546 U.S. 189 (2006) EVANS, ACTING WARDEN v. CHAVIS No. 04-721. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 9, 2005. Decided January 10, 2006. *191 Catherine Baker Chatman, Deputy Attorney General California, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on briefs were Bill Lockyer, General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Mary Jo Graves, Senior and Janet E. Neeley, Stan Cross, Julie A. Hokans, Supervising Attorneys General. Peter K. Stris, by appointment Court, 545 1126, respondent. him brief Jason H. Wilson, Paul J. Loh, Shaun P. Martin.[*] JUSTICE BREYER delivered opinion Court. The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 (AEDPA or Act) requires a state prisoner whose conviction has become final to seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). tolls this 1-year limitations period "time during which properly filed application post-conviction other collateral review . is pending." 2244(d)(2). time that an postconviction "pending" includes between (1) lower court's adverse determination, (2) prisoner's filing notice appeal, provided appeal timely under law. Carey Saffold, 536 214 (2002). In most States statute sets out number days typically matter few *192 days. See id., at 219. however, special system governing appeals when prisoners review. Under system, equivalent if "reasonable time." re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 828, n. 7, 855 P.2d 391, 398, 7 (1993); see also supra, 221. case, Ninth Circuit found California request appellate made three years after court ruled against him. Chavis LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921 (2004). We conclude departed from our interpretation as applied California's we therefore reverse its judgment. I begin with holding in Saffold. case addressed questions. A initially considered question just mentioned: For purposes tolling AEDPA's period, interval reaches decision, day files appeal? answered "yes." U.S., 219-221. If timely, decision (typically days) not counted AEDPA limit. B then pointed who seeks must file higher court, timeliness measured terms determinate such 30 60 Id., As explained, different rule. may *193 original petition (rather than appeal) asked whether distinction difference purposes. "no." 222-223. sufficiently analogous systems treat it similarly. 222 ("The upshot process functions very much like States, but fact rule indeterminate"). long time," he could count (and add limit) reached court. added, "The standard general rather precise make more difficult courts determine (i. e., court) comes too late." 223. Nonetheless, undertake task. C finally issue had itself been filed. Saffold (a Court) even (the Appeal) but, rather, 4½ months later. was obviously late, because delay might have due excusable neglectSaffold said taken received decision. 226. sent back decide his thus making set forth several legal *194 propositions boundaries answer question. First, "the clearly Saffold's 4½-month `unreasonable,' would be end matter." Ibid. Second, noted order denying stated denial "`on merits lack diligence.'" 225. But, these words alone did 225-226. Third, "lack diligence" prove thought untimely. That those referred totally different, earlier "irrelevant" petition. Fourth, "on merits" timely. decided address "court," said, "will sometimes claim believes presented untimely way: instance, where present no issue; wants give reviewing alternative grounds decision; wishes show (who lawyer) merely procedural technicality precluded obtaining relief." ultimately concluded take "such words" merits") "an absolute bellwether" 226 (emphasis added). Circuit's contrary approach presumed *195 meant timely) lead circumstances law does permit tolling. And gave example incorrect four (citing Welch Newland, 267 1013 (CA9 2001)). II turn now case. Respondent Reginald Chavis, prisoner, May 14, 1993. trial denied He sought Appeal, held Appeal released September 29, 1994. waited years, until 5, 1997, before On April 1998, stating simply, "Petition writ [i. Court] DENIED." App. G Pet. Cert. 1. Subsequently, August 30, 2000 (after bringing second round petitions), dismiss ground After all, gives only year their petitions, became effective. Still, provides tolling, adding "pending." consequently calculate how many Chavis' applications period. Ultimately, Circuit, *196 turned upon included 3-year issued (September 1994), (on 1997). time; hence, should addition along various additions, rendered reasoning why consists following: "Under Chavis's 1997 merits, pending entitled [Saffold Carey, 312 1031, 1034-1036 (2002)]. When denies without comment citation, treated merits. Hunter Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, Court's summary dismissed id.; Delhomme Ramirez, 340 817, 819, 820 2 2003) (noting there indication citation). result, [the relevant period]." F.3d, 926 certiorari inconsistent granted writ. *197 III argues Like do possible reconcile two cases. court; "unreasonable" delays are timely; (3) (most pertinently) automatically indicate addition, 4-year reasonable what forbids do. effect mean reasonable). More that, silent appeared. 926. appearance warrant absence include makes less likely, believed reasonable. Thus, presumption ("that entirely indicates find *198 untimely," post, 205 (Stevens, J., concurring judgment)) consistent 194. Neither cases cited provide necessary support. (written remand nothing about significance merits." 1031 344 1992), predated AEDPA, mention any event concerned 817 2003), sentence footnote, 820, 2, discuss length control result here. clear direction explanation meaning term time" context, particular untimely, examine each respect timeliness. say, using determination "absolute (as timeliness), state-court (in proceedings) consider 193. This believe done. discrepancy view ours reflect administrative problem. hear hundred petitions seeking relief. *199 Some will involve delays, some require related proceeding Given uncertain scope standard, easy surprising tried create rules thumb look label order, refer reasons shortcuts remain true, either Congress' intent toll 220-221, themselves alleviate problem clarifying context indicating, petition, guidance certifying appropriate 226-227. Alternatively, Legislature impose limits, conforming Indeed, body adopt state-law kind concurrence here suggests. 209. guidance, way applying simply ask time. doing so, keep mind filings elsewhere) fell provision assumption *200 differ significantly laws i. substantially longer rules. course, remains free tell us if, respect, wrong. IV out, 195, date effective (April 24, 1996) actually district 2000, 128 date. Hence "a [was] pending" least proceedings 130 days, (when added period) conflict holding. And, examining record, convinced approximately month tries explain arguing use prison library work job's hours coincided library, lockdowns confined cell. adds, inability excuses delayto point where, despite delay, *201 concedes, March 1996, 38, half given new job. nowhere assertion, 68, working permitted library. concedes "remained relatively lockdown free" February 39, 6-month viewing every disputed favorably unexplained, hence unjustified, six months. Six far "short period[s] supreme It 10-day losing party Ct. Rule 28(e)(1) authority suggesting, nor convincing reason believe, unjustified unexplained "reasonable." Nor magnitude fall statutory word interpreted since needs all lengthy (three month) survive 927, cannot succeed. same ultimate conclusion way. Unlike favor certain pursuing efforts. 210. Because, parties argue below, 925, 3, reasons, judgment reversed, remanded further opinion. so ordered. *202 STEVENS, Today holds statement "must case" "was `reasonable time.'" Ante, 198. Contrary admonition next sentence, "asked Saffold," "it done." (2002)). both faithful prior jurisprudence. Instead endorsing ad hoc ambiguous judgments entered future, direct apply straightforward presumptions describe below. Rather de novo record law, ante, 200-201, presumptions, buttressed independent error convinces me reversed. today, procedures unlike employed 221-222; 191-193. limit noncapital forgiving flexible 222. Generally, petitioner counsel knew, diligence known, facts underlying well basis claim." (1993). apparently exercise jurisdiction whatsoever. *203 Const., Art. VI, 10 (giving over petitions); Clark, 750, 764-765, 729, 738 (1993) judicially created). existence flexible, discretionary cases[1] rise addresses today. tolled (AEDPA)) 217. concluding virtually unique limitations, faced 221, 223, answering ourselves, Appeals instructions so. explained clear. diligence." 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). preclude possibility decision"lack diligence"expressed *204 unreasonable hand, recognized respondent's failure first promptly, irrelevant `pending' interval." Our requested resolve ambiguity, noting "appropriate certify purpose clarification area law." 226-227.[2] fairly contemporaneous orders involved months, 18 15 mentioning diligence," came quite notation 5-year preceded recent filing. 1035 2002). "that bright-line determining constitutes `unreasonable' indeterminate standard. While certainly welcomed, appropriately Legislature." 1036, Judge O'Scannlainwho wrote Appealsand understood animated remand, predicated depended *205 reach concerning reasonableness 1034. assumption, here, unequivocal assertion "clearly ruled" unreasonable, matter," Similarly, inconsistency ruling "does filed," 197, particularly allows advance variety excuse late filing, see, e. g., Robbins, 770, 780-782, 959 311, 318 (1998). rejection merits'" indicated foreclose Appeals' dismissing solely necessarily completely statute, rests 2244(d)(2) (tolling while "properly filed" pending). To extent possibly *206 decisive requirement issue, rested adequate ground. Faced question, practice try actual ourselves. mere failed abide prevent resolving unless relied bar "as disposition case." Harris Reed, 489 255, 261-262 (1989) Michigan Long, 463 1032, 1042 (1983), "clear itself" ground, resolution constitutional resorted role intended it. Ylst Nunnemaker, 501 797, 803-804 (1991). Until directed issues instead focusing ruling. past practice, adhere confronting advancing claims Cf. Brooks Walls, 279 518, 522 (CA7 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (applying requirement). inquiry, then, focus *207 could, should, Determining "actually" difficult. Its rulings generally into broad categories: expressly deciding timeliness, disclose decision.[3] simplify can type order. easiest cases, states untimeliness clear, Conversely, respected judge differently.[4] need explicitly stated; citation suffice.[5] Brief Petitioner 27; 4th, 814, 34, P.2d, 340, 34 (explaining citing propositions). *208 deals situation simpliciter, means today seemingly assumesincorrectly rejected Even sub silentio, am endorse eminently sensible judicial administration sound applies, cite imposing bar, barred asserted ground). interest efficient processing dockets overworked judges powerful support relying engaging questions excessive, petitioner's acceptable nonetheless excused raises unusually serious 779-782, 317-318. There are, accurate. example, deficiencies easier deny sufficient. But whereas continue follow route, today's simple rule, applicable unambiguous surely wiser novel appears *209 situation, arises evidence passed issue. following decisions grounds. presumptive capital litigationthe specific mentioned jurisprudenceprovides principled doublebarreled presumption. Rules Policy Statement std. 1-1.1 (Deering 2005) ("A [in case] substantial 180 appellant's reply ."). Moreover, fully unreasonable.[6] above standards independently sufficient decidednot once, twicethat *210 respondent finding explicit; other, control. notes 2000more 16-month initiated 25, 1999, entry 28, 2000. 11-12. erroneous. 1998 silent. Instead, stand proposition 5; 34. Although 8, arguable disputing erred (although claimed Court). 195. explanation. described abovethat based *211 untimelyprovides interval. Consequently, denied. Accordingly, my profound disagreement opinion, concur NOTES [*] Jeffrey L. Fisher Russell D. Covey National Association Criminal Defense Lawyers amicus curiae urging affirmance. [1] oral argument, arise adopted separate Tr. Oral Arg. 63. significant because, death row often incentive delaying tactics, serving imprisonment presumably want obtain promptly possible. [2] fruitless. 31. [3] Orders resting grounds, (2002), consideration. [4] At agreed satisfactory preceding tolled. 19-20. [5] infra, 210, [6] probably somewhat periods attributable peculiar features procedures. place responsibility consequence State, readily modify procedures, unnecessarily complicate judges.

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