Document: 412 U.S. 434 93 S.Ct. 2260 37 L.Ed.2d 56 Clarence Eugene STRUNK, Petitioner,v.UNITED STATES. No. 72—5521. Argued April 24, 1973. Decided June 11, Syllabus Petitioner was convicted of a federal offense and sentenced to term five years, run concurrently with sentence one three years that he serving pursuant state-court conviction. Before trial, the District Court denied his motion dismiss charge on ground had been speedy trial. The Appeals reversed, holding but 'extreme' remedy dismissal charges not warranted. case remanded reduce by 259 days, compensate for unnecessary delay occurred between return indictment petitioner's arraignment. government did file cross-petition certiorari challenging finding denial Held: In this case, only question review is propriety fashioned Appeals. light policies underlying right must remain, as noted in Barker v. Wingo, 407 514, 522, 92 2182, 2188, 33 101, 'the possible remedy' deprivation constitutional right. Pp. 2261—2264. 467 F.2d 969, reversed remanded. John R. Wideikis, Chicago, Ill., petitioner, pro hac vice, special leave Court. William Bradford Reynolds, Washington, D.C., respondent. Opinion Mr. Chief Justice BURGER, announced DOUGLAS. 1 found guilty United States transporting stolen automobile from Wisconsin Illinois violation 18 U.S.C. § 2312 years. five-year petitioner then Nebraska State Penitentiary conviction courts State. 2 Prior charge, which argued At trial called no witnesses take stand; jury returned verdict guilty. Court, fact However, court went hold warranted; extent days order 3 * Certiorari granted claim that, once judicial determination has made an accused available 'to reverse conviction, vacate sentence, indictment.' No filed Government defendant acknowledges its present posture, presents novel unresolved issue, controlled any prior decisions 4 stated 10-month 'unusual call(ed) explanation well justification,' 972. responded had, after receiving proper warnings, freely admitted guilt FBI agent while incarcerated Penitentiary, intended demand under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 20. claimed it postponed prosecution because reference Rule 20, consequently, large portion ensued attributable petitioner. regarded tenuous; also rejected lack staff personnel Attorney's Office justification delay. entire course events time arrest through plainly placed notice issue being preserved would be pressed, indeed been. 5 On record, seems clear responsible part neither showed nor preparation defense prejudiced reason It may correct Attorney understaffed due insufficient appropriations and, unable provide organization capable dealing rising caseload office, especially respect criminal cases. Unintentional delays caused overcrowded dockets or prosecutors are among factors weighed less heavily than intentional delay, calculated hamper defense, determining whether Sixth Amendment violated but, we 531, 2192, 101 (1972), they 6 'nevertheless . considered since ultimate responsibility such circumstances rest rather defendant.' This served reaffirm what held earlier Dickey Florida, 398 30, 37—38, 90 1564, 1569, 26 (1970): 7 'Although great many persons seek put off confrontation long possible, prompt inquiry into fundamental duty charging authority trial.'1 (Footnote omitted.) 8 absence certiorari, questioning properly before us Whether some circumstances, questions, might deal involving claims, absent raised cross-petition, need resolve. Suffice presented here pressed forward resolved favor, disposed examine assume deliberately elected allow petition certiorari. II 9 Turning remaining power fashion appeared consider 'practical' remedy, note clearly perceived interest tried promptly, even though confined penitentiary unrelated charge. Under these 10 possibility already prison receive at least partially concurrent forever lost if pending postponed.' Smith Hooey, 11 393 374, 378, 89 575, 577, 21 607 (1969) (footnote omitted). state: 12 'The traditionally vacation sentence. Perhaps severity extremely hesitant failure afford Be may, know why drastic relief appropriate Here about sufficiency evidence showing defendant's guilt, have said, makes having presenting defense. seem inappropriate. Rather, think remand district direction enter instruction General credit period elapsing date arraignment Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 provides illegal time. We choose treat imposed characterized unreasonable.' F.2d, 973. 13 correct, noted, prescribes 'flexible' standards based practical considerations. aspect directed process occurred; By definition, unlike other guarantees Amendment. For example, public impartial jury, charges, compulsory service can ordinarily cured providing those guaranteed rights new guarantee recognizes prolonged subject emotional stress presumed result ordinary person uncertainties prospect facing longer than, consecutive to, presently removes. U.S., 379, S.Ct., 578; Ewell, 383 116, 120, 86 773, 776, 15 627 (1966). recognizes, delayed prisoner confined, whose family ties employment interrupted,2 rehabilitation affected adversely. chosen does difficulties. 14 Government's reliance support further undermined when Court's opinion whole. true described 'unsatisfactorily severe remedy.' Indeed, practice, 'it means who serious crime will go free, without tried.' 101. But remedies unique application standards. underlie Ibid. Given unchallenged trial,3 judgment set aside; therefore direct aside judgment, indictment. 16 Reversed American Bar Association Project Standards Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial 27—28 (Approved Draft 1968) (hereafter ABA, Trial). said released often little quickly; this, standing alone, alter prosecutor's obligation see brought desires convenience individuals cannot controlling. broad sense, guarantee, commands disposition charges. 40—41.

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