Document: 514 U.S. 291115 S.Ct. 1489131 L.Ed.2d 395 George W. HEINTZ, et al., Petitioners,v.Darlene JENKINS. No. 94-367. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 21, 1995. Decided April 18, Syllabus * Petitioner Heintz is a lawyer representing bank that sued respondent Jenkins to recover balance due on her defaulted car loan. After letter from listed amount owed as including cost insurance bought by when she reneged promise insure car, brought this suit against and his law firm under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which forbids "debt collector[s]" make false or misleading representations engage in various abusive unfair practices. The District dismissed suit, holding Act does not apply lawyers engaging litigation. Appeals disagreed reversed. Held: must be read engaged consumer debt-collection litigation for two rather strong reasons. First, who regularly tries obtain payment debts through legal proceedings meets Act's definition collector": one "regularly collects attempts collect, directly indirectly, [consumer] . another," 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Second, although an earlier version expressly excluded "any attorney-at-law collecting debt attorney behalf name client," Congress repealed exemption 1986 without creating narrower, litigation-related, fill void. Heintz's arguments nonetheless inferring latter type exemption—(1) many requirements, if applied activities, will create harmfully anomalous results could have intended; (2) postenactment statement repeal's sponsors demonstrates that, despite removal blanket exemption, still lawyers' litigating activities; (3) nonbinding "Commentary" Federal Trade Commission's staff establishes attorneys sending dunning letters other traditional activities are covered while those whose practice limited not—are unconvincing. Pp. __. 25 F.3d 536, affirmed. BREYER, J., delivered opinion unanimous Court. Spellmire, Chicago, IL, petitioners. Daniel A. Edelman, respondent. Justice BREYER 1 issue before us whether term collector" 91 Stat. 874, §§ 1692-1692o (1988 ed. Supp. V), applies "regularly," litigation, collect debts. Seventh Circuit held it does. We agree with we affirm its judgment. 2 prohibits making says, example, may use violence, obscenity, repeated annoying phone calls, 1692d; falsely represent "the character, amount, status any debt," 1692e(2)(A); "unfair unconscionable means attempt collect" debt, 1692f. Among things, sets out rules collector follow "acquiring location information" about debtor, 1692b; communicating debtor (and debt) third parties, 1692c(b); bringing "[l]egal actions," 1692i. imposes upon violate provisions (specifically described) "[c]ivil liability" whom they, e.g., harass, mislead, treat unfairly. 1692k. also authorizes Commission enforce provisions. 1692l (a). includes person "who [to] another." And, limits "debt" i.e., "arising transaction[s]" "are primarily personal, family, household purposes." 1692a(5). 3 plaintiff case, Darlene Jenkins, borrowed money Gainer Bank order buy car. She bank's then state court due. As part effort settle firm, Heintz, wrote Jenkins. His letter, listing loan agreement, included $4,173 insurance, because had kept insured promised do. 4 firm. claimed violated prohibitions trying "authorized agreement 1692f(1), "false representation 1692e(2)(A). conceded, required keep "against loss damage" permitted such protect should fail do so. App. Pet. Cert. 17. But, said, $4,137 substitute policy was kind mind, only "loss but failure repay Hence, "representation" "amount" "false"; amounted "authorized" agreement; thus Act. 5 Pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) Rules Civil Procedure, Jenkins's lawsuit claim. However, reversed Court's judgment, interpreting lawyers. v. 536 (1994). Circuit's view respect conflicts Sixth Circuit. See Green Hocking, 9 18 (1993) (per curiam). granted certiorari resolve conflict. 513 ----, 115 416, 130 332 conclude correct. 6 There reasons believing defines collec[t] attemp[t] asserted In ordinary English, "attempts" "collect" See, Black's Law Dictionary 263 (6th 1990) ("To claim liquidation it, either personal solicitation proceedings"). 7 1977, enacted statute, contained express That said did include client." Pub.L. 95-109, 803(6)(F), 875. 1986, however, entirety, 99-361, 100 768, Without more, then, would think intended subject whenever they meet general definition. 8 argues statute containing implied debt-collecting consist (including, he assumes, settlement efforts). He relies three arguments. simply intended. address argument light fact first substantive provisions, most exempted coverage; later revisit wording these provisions; reasons, some awkwardness understandable. Particularly light, find 10 Many "anomalies" particularly anomalous. For pointed 1692e(5), "threat take action cannot legally taken." reasoned were provision automatically liable brought, lost, debtor. Green, supra, at 21. says explicitly "shows preponderance evidence violation intentional resulted bona fide error notwithstanding maintenance procedures reasonably adapted avoid error." 1692k(c). Thus, even assume suggested reading 1692e(5) correct, result so absurd warrant implying event, assumption seem unnecessary, see how turns ultimately unsuccessful could, itself, "action 11 remaining significant similarly depend their persuasive force readings courts unlikely endorse. strongest "anomaly" focuses governing "[c]ommunication connection collection." 1692c. One requires "communicate further" "notifies" "refuses pay" wishes "cease further communication." 1692c(c). provision, asks can file thereby communicate with) nonconsenting motion summary judgment consumer? 12 odd empowered debt-owing stop "communications" inherent cause grind halt. necessary 1692c(c) way—if has exceptions permit communications "to notify creditor invoke" "intends "specified remedy" (of "ordinarily invoked [the] creditor"). 1692c(c)(2), (3). Courts exceptions, plausibly, imply authorize actual invocation remedy invoke." language permits reading, court-related document does, fact, "notify" recipient "invoke" judicial remedy. Moreover, interpretation consistent statute's apparent objective preserving creditors' remedies. need authoritatively interpret conduct-regulating now, however. Rather, rest our conclusions easier additional, implicit, exception than believe intended, silently implicitly, far broader exception, all attorneys, itself. 13 points Congressman Frank Annunzio, amendment removed Representative Annunzio stated exemption's removal, activities. 14 "regulates collection, law. act, attorney[s'] conduct courtroom, backroom. Only collection act. act debts, performing tasks nature. regulates collectors, prevent creditors, pursuing remedies available them." 132 Cong.Rec. 30842 (1986). This statement, persuade us. 16 thing, plain itself nothing retaining line seeks draw between "legal" collection" necessarily debated legislation, litigating, blush, seems way debt. another considered Congressmen expressed fear repeal limit "ability contact parties facilitate settlements" "could very easily interfere client's right pursue remedies." H.R.Rep. 99-405, p. (1985) (dissenting views Rep. Hiler). They proposed alternative designed outside scope, enacted. Ibid. Further, made during legislative process, after became It therefore legislators might relied voting represents informed others (or not) thought differently. 17 Finally, staff. says: "Attorneys firms (sending letters, calls consumers) [Act], covered." Commission—Statements General Policy Interpretation Staff Commentary 53 Fed.Reg. 50097, 50100 (1988) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). 19 give conclusive weight statement. "is binding public." Id., 50101. More importantly, elsewhere indicating FTC coverage—an set forth above, falls range reasonable interpretations language. Brown Gardner, 552, 555, 462 (1994) (slip op., ---- - ----); Fox Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 1507, 1513 (CA9 1994) (FTC staff's entitled deference); Scott Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 (CA4 1992) (same). 20 "regularly" consumer-debt-collection activity, activity consists Its 21 Affirmed. syllabus constitutes no been prepared Reporter Decisions convenience reader. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 321, 337, 26 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

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