Document: 500 U.S. 344 111 S.Ct. 1854 114 L.Ed.2d 385 Thomas BRAXTON, Petitionerv.UNITED STATES. No. 90-5358. Argued March 18, 1991. Decided May 28, Syllabus At a hearing at which petitioner Braxton pleaded guilty to assault and firearm counts, but not the more serious charge of attempting kill United States marshal, Government presented facts—to agreed—showing, inter alia, that, after each two instances in marshals kicked open his door, fired gunshot "through door opening," shots lodged door's front. Over Braxton's objections, District Court later sentenced him as though he had been convicted attempt count, relying on proviso § 1B1.2(a) Sentencing Comm'n Guidelines Manual. Although ordinarily requires court apply Guideline most applicable offense conviction, allows court, case conviction by plea "containing stipulation" that "specifically establishes" offense, stipulated offense. The Appeals upheld sentence. Held: below misapplied proviso. Pp. 346-351. (a) This will resolve question whether "contain[ed] within proviso's meaning. Commission—which was specifically charged Congress with duty review revise given unusual explicit power decide what extent its amendments reducing sentences would be retroactive effect—has already undertaken proceeding eliminate conflict among Federal Circuits over precise issue here. Moreover, specific controversy before can decided other grounds. 347-349. (b) Assuming agreement Government's facts constituted "stipulation," stipulation does establis[h]" an kill, is required best, supports reasonable readings—one shot across room when they entered, one entered frighten them off. There nothing latter reading from intent kill—a necessary element count—could even inferred. 349-351. 903 F.2d 292 (4th Cir.1990), reversed remanded. SCALIA, J., delivered opinion for unanimous Court. Stephen J. Cribari, Baltimore, Md., petitioner. Marzen, Washington, D.C., respondent. Justice SCALIA 1 about 7 a.m. June 10, 1988, four arrived warrant arrest. One marshals, Deputy Jenkins, knocked. no answer, could hear someone inside. Thirty minutes officers returned key apartment. Jenkins knocked again; again received answer. He unlocked only find it secured chain-lock well—which broke kicking open. "[C]ontemporaneous opening, through opening. front just above doorknob. That's outside door." App. 17. slammed shut withdrew. A moment later, Another fired, this too lodging five feet floor. withdrew, area barricaded. Braxton, who shots, eventually gave himself up, three-count indictment (1) deputy marshal (18 U.S.C. 1114), (2) 111), (3) use during crime violence 924(c)). 2 These were course hearing, pursuant Rule 11(f) Rules Criminal Procedure, counts indictment, count. pleas made any agreement, did dismiss count hearing. purpose simply provide factual basis accepting pleas. 3 agreed characterized them, small caveats, neither significant purposes case. Subject those "modifications," "what say[s] prove [happened] happened." 19. With it, accepted pleas, noting "there agreement." Ibid. 4 Two months sentenced. Relying upon Comm'n, Manual (1990), essence attempted killing, confessed guilt. sentence, (CA4 1990), we granted certiorari. 498 ----, 426, 112 410 (1990). 5 * Ordinarily, pronouncing sentence under applies "offense guideline section . conviction." 1B1.2(a). is, however, "limited" exception general rule, 1B1.2, Commentary, n. 1, consisting following 1B1.2(a): 6 "Provided, or nolo contendere containing establishes than [the shall such chapter] offense." doubt "plea guilty." presents questions also sent arrest him. Courts have divided meaning first phrase, stipulation," argues however phrase read, second, We consider contention turn. A. 8 As noted, there "contai[n]" because mean part formal agreement. Some interpretation, believing "stipulation" must "quid pro quo" higher See, e.g., v. McCall, 915 811, 816, (CA2 1990); Warters, 885 1266, 1273, (CA5 1989). But points out, 1B1.2 terms limit application stipulations contained agreements; language speaks "plea[s] stipulation." Since, argues, assent set constitutes stipulation, rely setting base-offense level. That approach below. 9 principal our certiorari jurisdiction, reason present case, conflicts Circuit state courts concerning provisions federal law. See Court's 10.1. respect law apart Constitution, are sole body conflicts, least far their continuation into future concerned. Obviously, itself statutory provision making clarifying amendment statute, agencies do same regulations. regard task initially primarily ours. Events transpired since grant focused attention fact may Congress' Guidelines. 10 After petition certiorari, Commission requested public comment should "amended expressly agreement," 56 Fed.Reg. 1891 (1991), raised took action "periodically [to] revise" 28 994(o ). implemented courts, so charging Guidelines, necessarily contemplated periodically work make whatever revisions conflicting judicial decisions might suggest. congressional expectation alone induce us restrained circumspect using primary means resolving conflicts; further indication ought adopt course. In addition guidelines, has effect, 994(u). 1B1.10, sets forth justify reduction. 11 choose current circuit grounds, B 12 Unlike discussed above, circuits fallen disagreement, second closely tied For apply, Thus, assuming 1B1.2(a), unless established" 18 1114, based cannot stand. 13 killing taken substantial step towards crime, requisite mens rea. E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, & M. Wolff, Jury Practice Instructions 14.21 (1990 Supp.). "at marshal," without qualification intent, suffice establish perhaps intent. here, marshal." appears concede, Brief 19, citing Guerrero, 863 245, 248 1988), relevant inquiry (at most) occurred refers isolation, "a (Emphasis added.) All opening [and that] [t]he [is] 14 affirmed judgment violation believed "clearly erroneous" concluding. course, standard applied, reviewing findings fact. 3742(e). Determination effect finding: determination contract, consent decree, proffer summary judgment. Washington Hospital White, 889 1294, 1299 (CA3 1989); Frost Davis, 346 82, 83 1965). question, therefore, determination, right. 15 think not. say marshals; conclusion inference ambiguous facts. To give example ambiguity: proffered (and agreed) bullet "front [of the] It difficult understand how both these possibly true, ordinary understanding "door opening" consists of. shoot hit walks bumps door. if accepts (inward-opening) unreasonable conclude shooting room. stipulated, appear properly marshals," established them.** Not inferred, statements attorney flatly deny it. 16 "Of lurking background allegation murder. You gather Mr. position, probably government's] statement facts, admits assaulted used handgun, but, obviously, admitting murder anyone." Id., 22. 17 claims intended claim certainly consistent us. know actually happened morning June, resolution best off—is marshals. 19 reversed, cases remanded proceedings opinion. 20 ordered. ** Since statute specify elements "attempt kill," "attempt" common law, see Morissette States, 342 246, 263, 72 240, 249, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), include commit unlawful act. "Although committed kill." Torcia, Wharton's Law 743, p. 572 (14th ed. 1981). R. Perkins Boyce, 637 (3d 1982); W. LaFave Scott, 428-429 (1972).

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