Document: 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007) UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION. No. 06-562. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 23, 2007. Decided June 11, *2333 Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D.C., for the petitioner. Owen T. Armstrong, Jr., Milwaukee, WI, respondent. Jay D. Geck, et al., as amici curiae, by special leave Court, supporting Paul Clement, Solicitor General, Counsel Record, Department Justice, Frank L. Steeves, von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Respondent Atlantic Research Corporation. Matthew J. McKeown, Acting Assistant Attorney Deputy Kannon K. Shanmugam, to Ronald M. Spritzer, Ellen Durkee, Attorneys, Justice THOMAS delivered opinion Court. Two provisions Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 1980 (CERCLA) §§ 107(a) 113(f)allow private parties recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), 9613(f). In this case, we must *2334 decide a question left open in Cooper Industries, Inc. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161, 125 577, 160 Ed. 2d 548 (2004): whether § provides so-called potentially responsible (PRPs), 9607(a)(1)-(4), cause action costs from other PRPs. We hold that it does. I A Courts have frequently grappled how PRPs may recoup CERCLA-related The questions lie at intersection two statutory provisionsCERCLA 113(f). Section defines four categories PRPs, 94 Stat. 2781, makes them liable for, among things: "(A) all removal or remedial incurred States Government State an Indian tribe not inconsistent national contingency plan; [and] "(B) any necessary response person consistent plan." 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). Enacted part Superfund Amendments Reauthorization 1986 (SARA), 100 1613, 113(f) authorizes one PRP sue another contribution certain circumstances. 9613(f).[1] Prior advent 113(f)'s express right, some courts held 107(a)(4)(B) provided party voluntarily seek after having been sued. See supra, 161-162, 577 (collecting cases); Key Tronic Corp. States, 511 809, 816, n. 7, 114 1960, 128 797 (1994) same. After SARA's enactment, however, Appeals believed "direc[t] traffic between" 459 F.3d 827, 832 (C.A.8 2006) (case below). As result, many was exclusive remedy 169, cases). But prevented suing under 107(a), they expanded allow "contribution" even absence suit 106 107(a). Servs., 312 677, 681 (C.A.5 2002) (en banc). could only sued U.S., 577. This narrower interpretation caused several reconsider rights 107(a)(4)(B), issue declined address Industries. Id., 168, revisiting issue, permitted actions Consolidated Edison Co. N.Y. UGI Utilities, 423 90 (C.A.2 2005); Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. Greater Chicago North American Galvanizing Coatings, 473 824 (C.A.7 2007). However, least court continues available E.I. DuPont de Nemours 460 515 (C.A.3 2006). Today, resolve issue. *2335 B respondent leased property Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot, facility operated Defense. At site, retrofitted rocket motors petitioner Using high-pressure water spray, removed pieces propellant motors. It then burned pieces. Some resultant wastewater fuel soil groundwater site. cleaned site its own expense sought both our decision Industries foreclosed relief 113(f), amended complaint federal common law. moved dismiss, arguing does (such Research) costs. District granted motion relying on case decided prior Dico, Amoco Oil Co., 340 525 2003). Eighth Circuit reversed. Recognizing undermined reasoning precedent, F.3d, 830, 4, joined Second Seventh Circuits holding provide "the route which [PRPs] cleanup costs." 834 (citing supra). reasoned authorized than persons 107(a)(4)(A). 835. Accordingly, Research. To prevent perceived conflict between 113(f)(1), "have subject 107 enforcement are still required use 113, thereby ensuring continued vitality." 836-837. certiorari, 549 ___, 1144, 166 910 (2007), now affirm. II parties' dispute centers what "other person[s]" 107(a)(4)(B). argues "any person" refers identified 107(a)(1)-(4).[2] words, subparagraph (B) permits non-PRPs thus bars Research's claim. counters takes cue *2336 (A), earlier paragraph (1)-(4). accord Appeals, believes anyone except State, tribethe listed (A). agree Statutes "be read whole." King St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 215, 221, 112 570, 116 578 (1991). Applying maxim, language can be understood reference adjacent remarkably similar structures. Each concerns entities bear specified relationship plan.[3] Bolstering structural link, text also denotes provisions. By using phrase costs," differentiates relevant those light subparagraph, is natural referring immediately preceding tribe. therefore means three. 9601(21) (defining "person" include various States). Consequently, plain cost-recovery party, including Tronic, 818, 1960 (stating dictum "impliedly PRP[s]" (emphasis added)). Government's little textual sense. (B), costs" refer antecedents"costs" "person[s]"located previous provision. Although clearly references would inexplicably interpret (A) but paragraphs Nothing suggests intent antecedents located different Reading statute manner suggested destroy symmetry 107(a)(4)(A) render internally confusing. Moreover, so broadly sweep virtually likely incur Hence, if do qualify purposes unclear would. posits "innocent" partiesfor instance, landowner whose land has another. contamination fall within broad definitions 107(a)(1)-(4). 9607(a)(1) (listing owner operator ... facility" PRP); see Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 179, 184 2003) ("CERCLA 9607 strict liability statute"). reading logically precludes innocent not, *2337 recovering accepting reduce number potential plaintiffs almost zero, rendering dead letter.[4] Louisville Nashville R. Mottley, 219 467, 475, 31 265, 55 297 (1911) ("We regard words used Congress, far possible give effect them"). According Government, suffers same infirmity because causes duplicate work done text. view, "already governmental under" Brief 20. Even assuming correct, alter conclusion. performs significant function simply clarifying excludes enumerated event, hesitancy construe statutes superfluous require us avoid surplusage appropriate tolerate degree rather adopt textually dubious construction threatens entire provision nullity. will create friction very harm appeals previously tried avoid. particular, maintains interpretation, offering choice effectively allows circumvent shorter limitations. 9613(g)(2)-(3). Furthermore, argues, eschew equitable apportionment favor joint Finally, contends eviscerates settlement bar set forth 113(f)(2). recognized "clearly distinct" remedies. 163, 3, "CERCLA provide[s] right cost recovery circumstances, separate 113(f)(3)(B)." (emphases added). uses word were synonymous 33, 14 ("Contribution merely form recovery, wholly independent type relief"); also, e.g., Pinal Creek Group Newmont Mining 118 1298, 1301 (C.A.9 1997) ("Because statute, claim against necessarily contribution"). imprecise usage confuses complementary yet distinct nature established explicitly grants contribution. Contribution *2338 defined "tortfeasor's collect others tort tortfeasor paid more his her proportionate share, shares being determined percentage fault." Black's Law Dictionary 353 (8th ed.1999). Congress term anything traditional "during following" 9613(f)(1).[5] Thus, 113(f)(1) before establishment liability. either PRP's contingent upon inequitable distribution parties. contrast, without third party. "incurred" 9607(a)(4)(B). When pays satisfy agreement judgment, response. Rather, reimburses incurred. remedies complement each providing "to procedural circumstances." Edison, 99; Nemours, (Sloviter, J., dissenting). stemming instituted And (as contribution) itself money judgment pursue reimbursing parties, cannot though eligible simultaneously reimbursement, choose 6-year limitations over period claims.[6] For reasons, reimbursement instead *2339 choosing impose 107(a).[7] exist. defendant such blunt filing counterclaim. 835; 100, 9 Resolution counter-claim necessitate filed action. 9613(f)(a) ("In resolving claims, allocate factors determines appropriate"). permitting eviscerate That prohibits claims "[a] who resolved administrative judicially approved ." 9613(f)(2). terms protect doubt supposed loophole discourage settlement. First, stated above, trigger district applying rules equity undoubtedly consider calculus. Cf. Restatement (Second) Torts 886A(2), p. 337 (1977) ("No make beyond share liability"). Second, protection suits inequitably reimbursed Third, carries inherent benefit finally State.[8] III Because affirm Appeals. ordered. NOTES [1] during following civil 9613(f)(1). 113(f)(3)(B) settled their Government. 9613(f)(3)(B). [2] CERCLA lists definition costs: "(1) vessel facility, "(2) time disposal hazardous substance owned substances disposed of, "(3) contract, agreement, otherwise arranged treatment, transporter transport possessed person, entity, incineration entity containing substances, "(4) accepts accepted treatment facilities, vessels sites selected there release, threatened release incurrence costs, substance, shall [various costs]." 9607(a)(1)-(4). [3] "The plan specifies procedures preparing responding contaminations promulgated Protection Agency 2, (2004) 40 CFR pt. 300 (2004)). [4] 2002 exempt bona fide prospective purchasers (BFPPs) 9607(r)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). these 2002, made small BFPPs life implausible best conclude lay dormant until enactment 107(r)(1) 2002. [5] Similarly, "has settlement...." [6] suggest no overlap all. "similar somewhat overlapping remed[ies]"). recognize sustain pursuant consent decree See, Technologies Browning-Ferris 33 96, 97 (C.A.1 1994). reimburse compelled recoverable both. purposes, suffices demonstrate way legal minimum, neither swallows other, contrary argument. [7] assume deciding [8] expressly need alternative contains additional implied 171, Texas Radcliff Materials, 451 630, 101 2061, 68 500 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Transport Workers, 77, 1571, 67 750 (1981)).

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