CVE-2024-41057 (Moderate severity, published 2024-07-28)
CVSS score: 7 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
CWE: CWE-416
Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

cachefiles: fix slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_withdraw_cookie()

We got the following issue in our fault injection stress test:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_withdraw_cookie+0x4d9/0x600
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888118efc000 by task kworker/u78:0/109

CPU: 13 PID: 109 Comm: kworker/u78:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #566
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 kasan_report+0x93/0xc0
 cachefiles_withdraw_cookie+0x4d9/0x600
 fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x5c8/0x1230
 fscache_cookie_worker+0x91/0x1c0
 process_one_work+0x7fa/0x1800
 [...]

Allocated by task 117:
 kmalloc_trace+0x1b3/0x3c0
 cachefiles_acquire_volume+0xf3/0x9c0
 fscache_create_volume_work+0x97/0x150
 process_one_work+0x7fa/0x1800
 [...]

Freed by task 120301:
 kfree+0xf1/0x2c0
 cachefiles_withdraw_cache+0x3fa/0x920
 cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount+0x1f6/0x250
 cachefiles_daemon_release+0x13b/0x290
 __fput+0x204/0xa00
 task_work_run+0x139/0x230
 do_exit+0x87a/0x29b0
 [...]
==================================================================

Following is the process that triggers the issue:

           p1                |             p2
------------------------------------------------------------
                              fscache_begin_lookup
                               fscache_begin_volume_access
                                fscache_cache_is_live(fscache_cache)
cachefiles_daemon_release
 cachefiles_put_unbind_pincount
  cachefiles_daemon_unbind
   cachefiles_withdraw_cache
    fscache_withdraw_cache
     fscache_set_cache_state(cache, FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_WITHDRAWN);
    cachefiles_withdraw_objects(cache)
    fscache_wait_for_objects(fscache)
      atomic_read(&fscache_cache->object_count) == 0
                              fscache_perform_lookup
                               cachefiles_lookup_cookie
                                cachefiles_alloc_object
                                 refcount_set(&object->ref, 1);
                                 object->volume = volume
                                 fscache_count_object(vcookie->cache);
                                  atomic_inc(&fscache_cache->object_count)
    cachefiles_withdraw_volumes
     cachefiles_withdraw_volume
      fscache_withdraw_volume
      __cachefiles_free_volume
       kfree(cachefiles_volume)
                              fscache_cookie_state_machine
                               cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
                                cache = object->volume->cache;
                                // cachefiles_volume UAF !!!

After setting FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_WITHDRAWN, wait for all the cookie lookups
to complete first, and then wait for fscache_cache->object_count == 0 to
avoid the cookie exiting after the volume has been freed and triggering
the above issue. Therefore call fscache_withdraw_volume() before calling
cachefiles_withdraw_objects().

This way, after setting FSCACHE_CACHE_IS_WITHDRAWN, only the following two
cases will occur:
1) fscache_begin_lookup fails in fscache_begin_volume_access().
2) fscache_withdraw_volume() will ensure that fscache_count_object() has
   been executed before calling fscache_wait_for_objects().
Statement: Red Hat Product Security has rated the attack complexity as high for the following reasons:

1. To get this bug to work, precise ordering in concurrent operations on cache volumes/cookies need to be broken, thereby causing a race condition.
2. Reproducing a use-after-free from a race is not very deterministic
3. The state is super important as cachefiles_withdraw_cookies() are called only during specific lifecycle events.
4. It can not be easily triggered by unprivileged users.