Modeling and Verification of Privacy Enhancing Protocols Privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) are a family of  :8,allow secure exchange and management of sensitive user  are :17,important in preserving usersxe2x80x99 privacy in todayxe2x80x99s  :26,Proof of the correctness of PEPs is necessary before  :36,be deployed. However, the traditional provable security  :44,well established for verifying cryptographic primitives, is not  :53,PEPs. We apply the formal method of Coloured Petri  :63,to construct an executable specification of a representative  the :72,Private Information Escrow Bound :63,to Multiple  :80,(PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification :8,allow  :89,reason about various security properties of PIEMCP using state  :99,techniques. This investigation provides us with preliminary  :107,modeling and verification of PEPs in general,  :115,benefit of applying the CPNbased formal approach :63,to proving  of :53,PEPs.

Analysis of ObjectSpecific Authorization Protocol (OSAP)using coloured Petri nets The use of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is  :8,increasingly popular in many security  :14,To access objects protected by TPM  :21,cryptographic keys), several :21,cryptographic  :26,such as the Object Specific Authorization  :33,(OSAP), can be used. Given the sensitivity  :41,importance of those objects protected by  security of :48,this protocol is vital. Formal  :56,allow a precise and complete analysis of  :64,protocols :26,such that their security  be :70,asserted with high assurance.  :76,verification of these :64,protocols are limited,  the :83,abundance of formal tools that one can  :48,this :92,paper, we demonstrate the use of  :100,Nets (CPN)  a type of formal technique,  :109,model the OSAP. Using :48,this model, we  the :117,authentication property of :48,this protocol  the :124,state space analysis technique. The results  :132,demonstrates that as reported by Chen  the :117,authentication property of :139,OSAP can