DroPPPP: A P4 Approach to Mitigating DoS Attacks in SDN. SoftwareDefined Networking (SDN) has proven itself a useful technology for establishing and managing configurable, dynamic networks with the rapid deployment of services in the past decade. Despite these advantages, the fact that the functionality of SDN relies heavily on the controller with a much less capable data plane creates a single point of failure, which leaves the network susceptible to denial of service (DoS) attacks mainly targeting the controller to affect the operation of the whole network. An effective approach for mitigating DoS attacks in SDN requires identifying and stopping attacks as close to their source as possible, which will require involvement of the data plane in the mitigation strategy. In this work we propose DroPPPP, a DoS prevention approach for SDN that operates in the data plane using the P4 programming language. We demonstrate through experiments in the Mininet that lightweight processing of the packets in the data plane with DroPPPP negates significant overheads through reducing the traffic between switches while keeping the controllerxe2x80x99s CPU usage at 0% and below 50% during spoofing and volumetric attacks.

A Framework for Distributed Denial of Service Attack Detection and Reactive Countermeasure in Software Defined Network Software Defined Network is an evolving and promising architecture which allows greater control over network entities by centralising the control plane. Although on the surface SDN provides a simple framework for network programmability and monitoring, few has been said about security measures to make it more robust to hitherto security flaws. Among the identified security flaws, DDoS flooding attack continue to be one of the major security concerns as attack volumes are increasing year on year. In this paper, we developed and implement the feasibility of spoofing and flooding DDoS attack on data plane devices using Mininet emulator, floodlight and network performance testing tools. We further developed a mitigation mechanism to counter these attacks by pushing reactive flow through the controller to the attacking switch port. Our result shows that pushing flows through the controller mitigates the flooding attack with low performance overheads, and requires no change to the controllers mode of operation for deployment, which indicates a good performance of our model.