The impact of carbon emissions tax on vertical centralized supply chain channel structure Abstract   This paper studies the supply chain channel structure which is considered choosing either centralization or decentralization in both a single chain system with a single product and a two chains system with competition in the two substitutable products under carbon emissions tax, respectively. In the two cases, each chain consists of a retailer, who acts as a follower and a manufacturer who acts as a leader. Our analytical results show that: (i) When decentralization is practicable, the government is willing to set a lower carbon tax. (ii) In a singlechain system, the monopolistic manufacturer is better off under decentralization than under centralization when its product emissions pollution is high enough. (iii) In the two chains system, two manufacturers can benefit from decentralization when their product is more emissions polluting. Under certain conditions, comparing with centralization, decentralization enhances two manufacturersxe2x80x99 profits through carbon emissions tax reduction and keeps consumer surplus and social welfare at the firstbest level. (iv) The manufacturerxe2x80x99s product quantity under decentralization is lower than that under centralization due to double marginalization effect, which also results in the lower environmental pollution. Our study also suggests that for the seriously emissions polluter, when it utilizes decentralization, the government have to introduce a lower carbon emissions tax in the consideration of abating environmental pollution and of maximizing its profits. The result can also benefit policymakers in instructing firms to choose decentralization for promoting social development and environmental protection.

Liability Cost Sharing, Product Quality Choice, and Coordination in TwoEchelon Supply Chains Abstract   We consider a twoechelon supply chain in which an upstream manufacturer (M) and a downstream retailer (R) share the product liability cost caused by quality defects. We assume that M and R share the expected liability cost per unit of the lowquality product (the ULQ liability cost). We use two respective Stackelberg games to model two different channel leadership structures: the manufacturerled Stackelberg (MS) and the retailerled Stackelberg (RS). We first obtain the analytical subgame perfect equilibria for the games. Subsequently, we investigate the impacts of the ULQ liability cost sharing on the product quality and the pricing decisions and on the profitability for supply chain members and the entire supply chain in equilibrium. We find that (1) in response to a shift of the share of the ULQ liability cost from R to M, the leader M under the MS structure is able to use a higher wholesale price to transfer its increased ULQ liability cost completely to R without the need to improve its product quality, while the leader R under the RS structure would decrease its retail margin to incentivize M to improve its product quality; (2) such a shift of the ULQ liability cost sharing does not have any impact on the supply chain efficiency under the MS structure, but it enhances the supply chain efficiency under the RS structure; (3) despite the different responses of the leaders under the MS and the RS structures, we are able to establish a same set of contracts combining quantity discounts with quality improvement cost sharing to coordinate the supply chain, regardless of the channel leadership structures.