The effects of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperation in spatial network Abstract   The emergence and maintenance of cooperation remains to be one of the overreaching problems and a number of scholars have devoted endless efforts to resolve such problems. To further explore this issue, we focus on the impact of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperative behavior in voluntary prisoneru0027s dilemma; here, two types of strategy updating rules are considered to mimic social facts which are listed as strategy learning mechanism and strategy teaching mechanism. The stability of different mechanisms on promoting cooperation is thoroughly investigated in this manuscript. Numerical simulations are conducted while corresponding results are presented with sufficient clarifications. We find that the strategy learning mechanism can promote cooperation steadily. However, with the variance in the proportion of the two update rules in the investigated community, the strategy teaching mechanism seems to be more sensitive. Moreover, compared with strategy learning mechanism, strategy teaching mechanism plays a more important and apparent role in promoting cooperation. We also find that personal strategy is sensitive to the varying of Loneru0027s payoff xcfx83, especially when xcfx83 is close to 1. We hope our findings will shed some lights on resolving the social dilemmas.

The impact of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game with exclusion Abstract   Public goods game as a multiplayer social dilemma game plays an important role in studying the emergence of cooperation, which remains an open question. This paper studies the impact of heterogeneous investments on cooperative behavior in public goods game, where players adopting exclusion strategy can exclude defectors from the group. Our research shows that the heterogeneous investment mechanism can significantly promote cooperation. When the cost of exclusion is low, the excluders can obtain higher payoff than other players, which leads that cooperators and excluders coexist and dominate the population. As the cost of exclusion increases, the advantage of excluders weakens and population keeps high cooperation level in some regions of contribution rate xcfx89. For low or middle values of r, the too small or relatively large values of xcfx89 will be not beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. For high values of r, a small increase in xcfx89 will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. This paper provides a new understanding of cooperation under heterogeneous investment mechanism.