Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pollutant Abatement with CollectiveRisk This paper examines strategies of asymmetric enterprises in joint pollutant abatement with collectiverisk. Asymmetric enterprises are divided into two types: one type with high initial resource endowments, the other with low initial resource endowments. Evolutionary dynamics in two distinct scenarios namely fair contribution and altruistic preference are analyzed. The paper proves that enterprises with high initial endowments have greater incentives to cooperate, and are more likely to be altruistic agents. Moreover, effects of increment of risk rate on cooperation are two sided. A large group size of enterprises hinders the prevalence of cooperation and weakens punitive tax rateu0027s role in promoting cooperation. Whereas broadening the gap of resource endowments between enterprises can effectively reduce the occurrence of defection. Whether those with low initial resource endowments will participate in joint pollutant abatement depends on if there are cooperators in enterprises with high initial endowments.

The impact of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game with exclusion Abstract   Public goods game as a multiplayer social dilemma game plays an important role in studying the emergence of cooperation, which remains an open question. This paper studies the impact of heterogeneous investments on cooperative behavior in public goods game, where players adopting exclusion strategy can exclude defectors from the group. Our research shows that the heterogeneous investment mechanism can significantly promote cooperation. When the cost of exclusion is low, the excluders can obtain higher payoff than other players, which leads that cooperators and excluders coexist and dominate the population. As the cost of exclusion increases, the advantage of excluders weakens and population keeps high cooperation level in some regions of contribution rate xcfx89. For low or middle values of r, the too small or relatively large values of xcfx89 will be not beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. For high values of r, a small increase in xcfx89 will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. This paper provides a new understanding of cooperation under heterogeneous investment mechanism.