A Critical Look at the 2019 College Admissions Scandal Discusses the 2019 College admissions scandal. Let me begin with a disclaimer: I am making no legal excuses for the participants in the current scandal. I am only offering contextual background that places it in the broader academic, cultural, and political perspective required for understanding. It is only the most recent installment of a wellworn narrative: the controlling elite make their own rules and live by them, if they can get away with it. Unfortunately, some of the participants, who are either serving or facing jail time, didnxe2x80x99t know to not go into a gunfight with a sharp stick. Money alone is not enough to avoid prosecution for fraud: you need political clout. The best protection a defendant can have is a prosecutor who fears political reprisal. Compare how the Koch brothers escaped prosecution for stealing millions of oil dollars from Native American tribes1,2 with the fate of actresses Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman, who, at the time of this writing, face jail time for paying bribes to get their children into good universities.3,4 In the former case, the federal prosecutor who dared to empanel a grand jury to get at the truth was fired for cause, which put a quick end to the prosecution. In the latter case, the prosecutors pushed for jail terms and public admonishment with the zeal of Oliver Cromwell. There you have it: stealing oil from Native Americans versus trying to bribe your kids into a great university. Where is the greater crime? Admittedly, these actresses and their

Bribing the self Abstract   Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how selfdeception helps advisors be biased while preserving their selfimage as ethical and identify limits to advisorsu0027 ability to selfdeceive. In experiments where advisors recommend one of two investments to a client and receive a commission that depends on their recommendation, we vary the timing at which advisors learn about their own incentives. When advisors learn about their incentives before evaluating the available investments, they are more likely to be biased than when they learn about their incentives only after privately evaluating the investments. Consistent with selfdeception, learning about the incentive before evaluating the options affects advisorsu0027 beliefs and preferences over the investments. Biased advice persists with minimal justifications but is eliminated when all justifications are removed. These findings show how selfdeception can be constrained to improve advice provision.