Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments Abstract   We experimentally examine repeated prisoneru0027s dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follow generous titfortat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of titfortat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous titfortat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it.

The effects of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperation in spatial network Abstract   The emergence and maintenance of cooperation remains to be one of the overreaching problems and a number of scholars have devoted endless efforts to resolve such problems. To further explore this issue, we focus on the impact of heterogeneity of updating rules on cooperative behavior in voluntary prisoneru0027s dilemma; here, two types of strategy updating rules are considered to mimic social facts which are listed as strategy learning mechanism and strategy teaching mechanism. The stability of different mechanisms on promoting cooperation is thoroughly investigated in this manuscript. Numerical simulations are conducted while corresponding results are presented with sufficient clarifications. We find that the strategy learning mechanism can promote cooperation steadily. However, with the variance in the proportion of the two update rules in the investigated community, the strategy teaching mechanism seems to be more sensitive. Moreover, compared with strategy learning mechanism, strategy teaching mechanism plays a more important and apparent role in promoting cooperation. We also find that personal strategy is sensitive to the varying of Loneru0027s payoff xcfx83, especially when xcfx83 is close to 1. We hope our findings will shed some lights on resolving the social dilemmas.