Towards a Right not to Be Deceived? An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Media Personalization in the Light of the GDPR Privacy is a pillar of European law and of the new GDPR. Social and technological developments question its protection and raise the need for more comprehensive legal analysis. Informational and decisional privacy, in particular, prove to be fundamental rights to tackle the pervasiveness of surveillance practices and persuasive technologies. Yet, their protection is uncertain. The paper is a theoretical and interdisciplinary contribution structured as follows. In the first part, it is reviewed the literature on profiling and online personalization in order to provide an overview of the sociotechnical landscape, with a special focus on media content and news personalization. In the second part, the consequences of the GDPR on media personalization is analyzed. In the third part, the interplay between data protection, consumer and media law is discussed. In particular, the right to receive information and the value of serendipity are introduced to eventually discuss the idea of a xe2x80x98right not to be deceivedxe2x80x99 as a precondition to properly protect privacy and other human rights as well as to preserve trust between users and platforms.

Reconciliation of Privacy with Preventive Cybersecurity: The Bright Internet Approach The emergence of a preventive cybersecurity paradigm that aims to eliminate the sources of cybercrime threats is becoming an increasingly necessary complement to the current selfdefensive cybersecurity systems. One concern associated with adopting such preventive measures is the risk of privacy infringement. Therefore, it is necessary to design the future Internet infrastructure so that it can appropriately balance preventive cybersecurity measures with privacy protections. This research proposes to design the Internet infrastructure using the preventive cybersecurity measures of the Bright Internet, namely preventive cybersecurity protocol and identifiable anonymity protocol, and ten privacy rights derived from Europexe2x80x99s General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). We then analyze the legitimacy of the five steps of the preventive cybersecurity protocol and the four features of the identifiable anonymity protocol from the perspectives of ten privacy rights. We address the legitimacy from the perspective of potential victimsxe2x80x99 selfdefense rights. Finally, we discuss four potential risks that may occur to the innocent senders and proposed resilient recovery procedures.