Dynamic Effects Arise Due to Consumersxe2x80x99 Preferences Depending on Past Choices We analyzed a dynamic duopoly game where players adopt specific preferences. These preferences are derived from Cobbxe2x80x93Douglas utility function with the assumption that they depend on past choices. For this paper, we investigated two possible cases for the suggested game. The first case considers only focusing on the action done by one player. This action reduces the gamexe2x80x99s map to a onedimensional map, which is the logistic map. Using analytical and numerical simulation, the stability of fixed points of this map is studied. In the second case, we focus on the actions applied by both players. The fixed points, in this case, are calculated, and their stability is discussed. The conditions of stability are provided in terms of the gamexe2x80x99s parameters. Numerical simulation is carried out to give local and global investigations of the chaotic behavior of the gamexe2x80x99s map. In addition, we use a statistical measure, such as entropy, to get more evidences on the regularity and predictability of time series associated with this case.

Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguity: A Reappraisal It is commonly argued that dynamic consistency, consequentialism and nonexpected utility are incompatible. The first aim of this paper is to rebut such arguments, by targeting the implicit assumption that the relevant contingencies correspond to objective resolutions of uncertainty (that is, events in a state space). These are not necessarily the same as the contingencies that the decision maker envisages, and we argue that any reasonable notion of dynamic consistency involves the latter, rather than the former, sort of contingency. We formulate such a version of dynamic consistency and show it to be compatible with consequentialism and nonexpected utility. We then analyze the economic consequences of this new perspective. On the one hand, it provides a principled justification for restrictions on nonexpected utility models (such as that proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003)) in applications to dynamic choice problems. On the other hand, it provides a new analysis of the issue of attitude to information; contra standard arguments, the value of information under nonexpected utility is nonnegative as long as the information offered does not compromise information that the decision maker had otherwise expected to receive. Finally, we give a representation theorem for the contingencies the decision maker envisages, in the case where he uses the maxmin expected utility rule.