An RFID Lightweight Authentication Technology Based on PUFRFID Structure Model With the rapid development of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, RFID devices are beginning to exist widely in our daily lives, and people are paying more and more attention to RFID security. Traditional RFIDbased encryption algorithms rely on expensive Hash function. Therefore, this paper proposes a lightweight RFID authentication protocol based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF), which uses the machine learning algorithm and stringmatching algorithm, and presents a new mechanism of PUF challenge generation, which does not require expensive error correction code and fuzzy extractor. The implementation cost is lower. Through our security analysis, our identity authentication protocol can provide reliable security for lowcost RFID systems.

PUFRLA: A PUFBased Reliable and Lightweight Authentication Protocol Employing Binary String Shuffling Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) can be employed for device identification, authentication, secret key storage, and other security tasks. However, PUFs are susceptible to modeling attacks if a number of PUFsu0027 challengeresponse pairs (CRPs) are exposed to the adversary. Furthermore, many of the embedded devices requiring authentication have stringent resource constraints and thus require a lightweight authentication mechanism. We propose PUFRLA, a PUFbased lightweight, highly reliable authentication scheme employing binary string shuffling. The proposed scheme enhances the reliability of PUF as well as alleviates the resource constraints by employing error correction in the server instead of the device without compromising the security. The proposed PUFRLA is robust against brute force, replay, and modeling attacks. In PUFRLA, we introduce an inexpensive yet secure stream authentication scheme inside the device which authenticates the server before the underlying PUF can be invoked. This prevents an adversary from brute forcing the deviceu0027s PUF to acquire CRPs essentially locking out the device from unauthorized model generation. Additionally, we also introduce a lightweight CRP obfuscation mechanism involving XOR and shuffle operations. Results and security analysis verify that the PUFRLA is secure against brute force, replay, and modeling attacks, and provides 99% reliable authentication. In addition, PUFRLA provides a reduction of 63% and 74% for lookup tables (LUTs) and register count, respectively, in FPGA compared to a recently proposed approach while providing additional authentication advantages.