Arguing Security of Autonomous Robots Autonomous robots are already being used, for example, as tour guides, receptionists, or officeassistants. The proximity to humans and the possibility to physically interact with them highlights the importance of developing secure robot applications. It is crucial to consider security implications to be an important part of the robot applicationxe2x80x99s development process. Adding security later in the applicationxe2x80x99s lifecycle usually leads to high costs, or is not possible due to earlier design decisions. In this work, we present the Robot Application Security Process (RASP) as a lightweight process that enables the development of secure robot applications. Together with RASP we introduce the role of a Security Engineer (SecEng) as an important stakeholder in any robot application development process. RASP enables the SecEng to verify the completeness of his work and allows him to argue about the applicationxe2x80x99s security with other stakeholders. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the RASP supports the SecEng and also other developers in their daily work.

New Opportunities for Integrated Formal Methods Formal methods have provided approaches for investigating software engineering fundamentals and also have high potential to improve current practices in dependability assurance. In this article, we summarise known strengths and weaknesses of formal methods. From the perspective of the assurance of robots and autonomous systems(RAS), we highlight new opportunities for integrated formal methods and identify threats to their adoption to be mitigated. Based on these opportunities and threats, we develop an agenda for fundamental and empirical research on integrated formal methods and for successful transfer of validated research to RAS assurance. Furthermore, we outline our expectations on useful outcomes of such an agenda.