AECC: An Enhanced Public Key Cryptosystem for User Defined Messages Due to enormous growth of devices and its interconnected communication, there are lot of possibilities for attacks and vulnerabilities in the network. From recent studies, we come to know about various security related techniques and their usage. A lot of cryptographic algorithms are used efficiently and effectively in plenty of applications. Thus it is notable to classify the attacks as two types Active and Passive Attack. Unauthorized access to the information implies passive attack. For example, in the communication channel doing operations like intercepting and eavesdropping are considered as passive attack. If the attacker tries to access the information and modify the information in an unauthorized manner, then it is considered as active attack. Man in the Middle attack is the best example of active attack. Here the attacker sends its public key as the hosts public and tries to hack the message. To overcome the issues in tradional authentication model, we proposed an Advanced Elliptical Curve Cryptographic (AECC) Algorithm which uses a code bit with a random function in both the sender and receiver side for encoding and decoding functions. This code bit is used to identify whether the public key belongs to attacker or the sender. By identifying the sender, the receiver can communicate with it without any restrictions. The results analysis section shows that our proposed AECC algorithm enhances security for user defined input messages like text, image, video and also for binary data.

Extending NCP for protocols using public keys One of the greatest obstacles to widespread deployment of wireless mobile systems is security. Cryptographically strong protocols and algorithms are required to enable secure communication over links that are easy to monitor and control by an attacker. While good cryptographic algorithms exist, it is difficult to design protocols that are immune to malicious attack. Good analysis techniques are lacking. This paper presents extensions to a technique for specifying and analyzing nonmonotonic cryptographic protocols that use asymmetric keys. We introduce new actions and inference rules, as well as slight modifications to the Update function. An important observation is that reasoning about the origin of messages is quite different when dealing with asymmetric key protocols. We also introduce the notion that keys in certificates should be bound to the principals receiving them. We extend the technique to meet the binding requirements and show how the flaw in the Denning and Sacco public key protocol, which was discovered by Abadi and Needham, is revealed. We demonstrate the extended technique using one protocol of our own and the Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. We also introduce and analyze a fix to a known weakness in Needham and Schroederu0027s protocol using our extended technique. Finally, we present several applications of these techniques to protocols for mobile computing over wireless networks.