Advancing European Mineral Security
Insights from the Dutch industry
Irina Patrahau, Michel Rademaker, Lucia van Geuns and Jeff Amrish Ritoe
October 2023

Advancing European Mineral Security
Insights from the Dutch industry
Authors:
Irina Patrahau, Michel Rademaker, Lucia van Geuns
and Jeff Amrish Ritoe
Contributors:
Joris Teer, Inês Lains, Tom Connolly, Tom Draaijer,
Giovanni Cisco and Nathan Lokhorst
October 2023
This HCSS report was commissioned by the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conclusions and recommendations presented in this study are the result of independent
research. Responsibility for the content rests with the authors
and the authors alone.
© The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved.
No part of this report may be reproduced and/or published in
any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means
without prior written permission from HCSS. All images are
subject to the licenses of their respective owners.

III

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Table of Contents
Executive Summary

IV

Management Samenvatting

VIII

1.

Introduction

1

2.

Methodology

3

3.
3.1

4

3.2

Critical raw materials are essential for vital sectors
Vital sectors: energy, defence, medical equipment, digital
technologies
Vital partners: regional distribution of EU mineral supply

4.
4.1
4.2
4.3

Critical raw materials in an age of strategic rivalry
Strategic dependencies at risk of weaponization
Significant acceleration of global CRM policies
Chinese dominance in the foreseeable future

22
22
25
27

5.

Dutch companies in metals and minerals supply
chains: capabilities, challenges and opportunities
30
Types of companies active in the Netherlands and their
capabilities
30
Obstacles to successful operations
33
Opportunities to strengthen mineral security in the
Netherlands and abroad
40
Global presence of companies active in the Netherlands
minerals and metals sector
42

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
6.
6.1
6.2

Policy recommendations
Address the challenges: creating an enabling
environment
Bolster opportunities: leveraging Dutch capabilities to
strengthen mineral security

4
9

46
48
49

References

52

Appendix 1. Companies active in the metals and minerals
sector in the Netherlands

59

Appendix 2. International quick scan of policy interventions 64

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

IV

Executive Summary
This report, commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explores the challenges and opportunities for Dutch companies to expand their presence in the CRM sector
and contribute to diversified and resilient supply chains. The study aims to inform the implementation of the Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie and European Critical Raw Materials
Act by offering recommendations on how the Dutch government can support companies in
diversifying CRM supply chains.
Access to critical raw materials (CRM) is vital for the most essential sectors of the European
Union’s (EU) society and economy including energy, transport, digital technologies, health,
defence, and space. The EU and its member states face a major challenge. Demand for CRM
is on the rise, and it is unsure whether sufficient supplies at affordable prices will be available
to match the needs of a green, competitive and secure EU. The risk extends beyond CRM to
encompass entire supply chains of strategic technologies located outside European borders.
The recent decoupling from Russia due to the war in Ukraine underscores the undesirable nature of strategic dependencies. Russia’s manipulation of energy resources inflicted
substantial economic damage on European households and industries, leading EU governments to spend hundreds of billions of euros since September 2021 to mitigate the consequences of this weaponized dependency. As a result, the EU and its member states are now
taking proactive measures to safeguard against similar situations taking place in the CRM
supply chain.
Yet great power competition and increasing protectionist tendencies are already severely
impacting CRM supply security. Geopolitical clout is increasingly intertwined with the control
of CRM and strategic technologies, enabling supplier states to coerce others to align with
their geopolitical interests. The Chinese government's decision to request licenses for the
export of gallium and germanium as of August 2023, for instance, points to significant risk in
the years to come.
The EU is moving fast in response to the changing geopolitical setting. In March 2023, the
European Commission introduced the proposal for the European Critical Raw Materials
Act (CRMA). By September 2023 European Parliament had already voted on its position to
boost CRM supply security with a sweeping majority.1 In parallel, the Netherlands is busy with
the implementation of the Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie, adopted in December 2022.2
The two acts have a similar goal – to bolster domestic CRM production while simultaneously
enhancing supply chain resilience through international collaboration.

1

European Parliament, ‘Critical Raw Materials: Securing the EU’s Supply and Sovereignty’, 14 September 2023,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230911IPR04927/critical-raw-materials-securing-the-eu-s-supply-and-sovereignty.

2

‘Grondstoffen voor de grote transities’, Rijksoverheid.nl, 9 December 2022, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2022/12/09/bijlage-nationale-grondstoffenstrategie.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

V

The report builds on insights from over 30 interviews with industry representatives from
the Netherlands. It contributes to the existing debate on CRM in two ways; (1) by providing
up-to-date information about the capabilities of companies active in the CRM sector in the
Netherlands; (2) by offering first-hand insights from the industry about the challenges and
opportunities to strengthen their position within global supply chains.
The Dutch mineral industrial base consists of two types of companies: those with global
operations and those primarily active in the Dutch and European markets. Larger companies operate worldwide, relying on international conditions as much as domestic legislation
for their daily activity and strategic decisions. In contrast, smaller companies catering to the
Netherlands and the EU market are fully dependent on national and European legislation to
maintain competitiveness.
Companies active in mineral extraction, processing and recycling in the Netherlands are
primarily serving the Dutch and European markets, though exceptions exist. Mining salts
and sands is the main extraction operation in the Netherlands, while the processing sector is
dominated by steel facilities and, to a lesser extent, minerals like manganese, silica, baryte and
zinc. Dutch companies are globally active in the field of deep-sea mining, which could significantly change the industry should the International Seabed Authority allow for exploitation
permits. Finally, there is a significant push for recycling in the Netherlands and the sector is
expected to grow rapidly.
The Netherlands has a strong representation in global service provision for maritime infrastructure, water management services, environmental assessments, geotechnical and survey
services. Dutch companies are assisting operators at mineral extraction and processing sites
in South America and Africa.
Table 1 and Table 2 showcase the types of challenges that companies active in the
Netherlands face. The data was collected based on more than 30 interviews with industry
professionals.

VI

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Table 1. Key obstacles to successful operations in the Netherlands and the EU
ranked according to the urgency of the issue.

An ‘X’ means that the company faces an issue. The more companies indicated they face this problem,
the more urgent the problem is considered to be. The table shows whether a specific challenge applies to
companies primarily active in the Netherlands and the EU, to companies primarily active abroad, or to both.
Companies active worldwide

Companies active in the
Netherlands and EU

Negative public opinion

X

X

Insufficient dialogue with government and lack of trust

X

X

Delayed action and fragmented mandates

X

Ranked in order of urgency

Uneven playing field

X

Cumbersome permitting process

X

Insufficient financial support

X

X

Inconsistent or inexistent legislation

X

X

Inadequate green energy infrastructure

X

Energy costs

X

Inefficient use of space

X

Unskilled labour

X

X

Table 2. Key obstacles to successful operations in the Netherlands ranked according
to the urgency of the issue.

Service providers

Finance

Trade

Knowledge

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Insufficient financial support

X

X

X

Inconsistent or inexistent legislation

X

X
X

Processing

X

Ranked in order of urgency

Extraction

Recycling

An ‘X’ means that the company faces an issue. The more companies indicated they face this problem,
the more urgent the problem is considered to be. The table shows whether a specific challenge applies
to companies in one or more parts of the mineral supply chain.

Negative public opinion

X

X

Insufficient dialogue with government and lack of trust

X

X

Delayed action and fragmented mandates

X

X

Uneven playing field

X

Cumbersome permitting process

X

Inadequate green energy infrastructure

X

X

Energy costs

X

X

X
X

Lack of space

X

X

Unskilled labour

X

X

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

VII

Achieving the goals of the EU CRMA and the Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie requires a
comprehensive approach to revitalize domestic industry, empowering it to diversify supply
sources and strengthen supply security. Creating the necessary conditions for companies to
stay competitive – i.e., an enabling socio-political, economic and legislative environment – is
an essential step in creating opportunities for further expansion. Issues must be addressed
in relation to public opinion, limited dialogue with the government, lack of a clear vision for
industry, slow action and fragmentation of mandates, permitting and red tape. At the same
time, the Netherlands can play an important role in strengthening European mineral supply
security by encouraging knowledge exchange and industrial partnerships, clarifying financial
instruments and investing in knowledge development. Table 3 summarises the challenges
and opportunities that companies active in the Netherlands face in continuing operations and
looking to expand.

Table 3. Summary of challenges and opportunities for companies active in the
Netherlands minerals sector and policy recommendations.
Issue

Recommendation

Challenge: Public opinion

Facilitate a more balanced public debate by offering fact-based information about global mineral supply
chains, the EU’s footprint, and benefits and risks of reshoring (parts of) supply chains.

Challenge: Dialogue with government

Engage in dialogue with companies to discuss upcoming policy proposals and gain a better understanding of possible unintended consequences of policies as well as find ways to mitigate these.
Create a vision for the minerals industry and integrate it in the National Plan for the Energy System.

Challenge: Speed of action and allocation of mandates

Concentrate mandates and responsibilities by creating a ‘one stop shop’ in one government department
for minerals in order to improve the availability of information and accelerate action.

Challenge: Permitting processes and
legislation

Reduce red tape for permitting to speed up action.

Challenge: Energy costs and
infrastructure

Support the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as the electricity grid to allow companies in the
minerals sector to develop.

Opportunity: Increase the competitiveness of companies active in the Dutch
and European markets

Establish incentives structures that support the expansion of the Dutch footprint in mineral supply
chains.

Opportunity: Industrial partnerships

Improve information about the market and facilitate connections.

Identify outdated or inconsistent regulation and update it according to new ambitions.

Support a more even playing field by establishing standards that can allow Dutch companies to
compete with non-EU actors on criteria other than price.

Encourage collaboration with globally active companies that have headquarters and/or operate industrial facilities in the Netherlands.
Opportunity: Financial support

Clarify the availability funding instruments and, when possible, combine efforts with other EU countries.

Opportunity: Knowledge development

Invest in education around minerals and metals to expand skills and strengthen the workforce.
Invest in research and development for European-based innovative solutions for CRM value chains.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

VIII

Management
Samenvatting
Dit rapport, uitgevoerd in opdracht van het Nederlandse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken,
onderzoekt de uitdagingen en kansen voor Nederlandse bedrijven om hun activiteiten in de
kritieke grondstoffensector uit te breiden en daarmee bij te dragen aan gediversifieerde en
veerkrachtige toeleveringsketens. De studie beoogt de implementatie van de Nederlandse
Grondstoffenstrategie en de Europese Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) te ondersteunen
door aanbevelingen te doen specifiek over hoe de Nederlandse overheid bedrijven kan
helpen bij het diversifiëren van CRM-toeleveringsketens.
Toegang tot kritieke grondstoffen is cruciaal voor de meest essentiële sectoren van de
Europese Unie (EU), waaronder energie, transport, digitale technologieën, gezondheid,
defensie en ruimtevaart. Daarmee staan de EU en haar lidstaten voor een aanzienlijke
uitdaging. De vraag naar CRM neemt toe en het is onzeker of er voldoende voorraden
tegen betaalbare prijzen beschikbaar zullen blijven om aan de behoeften van een
groen, concurrerend en veilig Europa te voldoen. Grondstoffenrisico’s zijn er in de hele
toeleveringsketen van strategische technologieën. Deze keten bevindt zich grotendeels
buiten de grenzen van Europa.
De recente ontkoppeling van Rusland als gevolg van de oorlog in Oekraïne onderstreept
de aard van de risicovolle ongewenste strategische afhankelijkheden. De Russische
manipulatie van energiebronnen heeft Europese huishoudens en industrieën aanzienlijke
economische schade berokkend. Regeringen van EU-lidstaten werden sinds september
2021 gedwongen om honderden miljarden euro’s uit te geven om de klappen van deze
energiecrisis op te vangen. Mede als gevolg van die gebeurtenis nemen de EU en haar
lidstaten nu proactieve maatregelen om zich te beschermen tegen vergelijkbare situaties in
de CRM-toeleveringsketen.
Desalniettemin hebben geopolitieke rivaliteit en een toename in protectionistische maatregelen
nu al ernstige gevolgen voor de toeleveringszekerheid van kritieke grondstoffen. In toenemende
mate oefenen staten invloed uit door het beheersen van CRM en strategische technologieën,
waardoor grondstoffen exporterende staten anderen kunnen dwingen zich te conformeren
aan hun geopolitieke belangen. Illustratief voor de recente escalatie en aanzienlijke risico’s de
komende jaren is Pekings beslissing om vanaf 1 augustus 2023 een vergunning te vereisen voor
de uitvoer van gallium en germanium.
De EU reageert snel op de veranderende geopolitieke situatie. In maart 2023 introduceerde
de Europese Commissie de voorstellen voor de Europese Wet inzake Kritieke Grondstoffen
(CRMA). Al in september 2023 had het Europees Parlement de ontwerpverordening
aangenomen met een ruime meerderheid. Tegelijkertijd zet Nederland stappen om zijn eigen
Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie gepresenteerd in december 2022, uit te voeren. De
twee initiatieven hebben een vergelijkbaar doel: het versterken van de Europese binnenlandse
productie van CRM en het versterken van toeleveringsketens door internationale samenwerking.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

IX

Dit rapport bouwt voort op inzichten uit meer dan 30 interviews met vertegenwoordigers uit
de industrie in Nederland. Het draagt op twee manieren bij aan het grondstoffendebat: (1) door
actuele informatie te verstrekken over de mogelijkheden van bedrijven die actief zijn in de
CRM-sector in Nederland om de leveringszekerheid van CRM te vergroten; (2) door eerste
inzichten vanuit de industrie te bieden over de uitdagingen en kansen om hun positie binnen
mondiale toeleveringsketens te versterken.
De Nederlandse mijnbouw- en mineralensector bestaat uit twee soorten bedrijven: ze zijn
ofwel wereldwijd actief, ofwel voornamelijk op de Nederlandse en Europese markt. Grotere
bedrijven opereren wereldwijd en zijn afhankelijk van zowel internationale omstandigheden
als nationale wetgeving voor hun dagelijkse activiteiten en strategische beslissingen. Kleinere
bedrijven, die de Nederlandse en Europese markt bedienen, zijn juist volledig afhankelijk van
nationale en Europese wetgeving om hun concurrentiepositie te behouden.
Bedrijven actief in de delving, verwerking en recycling van mineralen in Nederland bedienen
voornamelijk de Nederlandse en Europese markt, hoewel er uitzonderingen zijn. Het winnen
van zouten en zanden is de belangrijkste winning in Nederland, terwijl de verwerkingssector
wordt gedomineerd door staalfabrieken en in mindere mate mineralen zoals mangaan, silica,
bariet en zink. Nederlandse bedrijven zijn wereldwijd actief op het gebied van diepzeemijnbouw. De grondstoffenproductiesector zou ingrijpend kunnen veranderen als de International
Seabed Authority besluit exploitatievergunningen te verlenen. Tot slot is er een aanzienlijke
inzet voor recycling in Nederland en wordt verwacht dat ook dit deel van de sector snel
zal groeien.
Nederland is sterk vertegenwoordigd in de wereldwijde dienstverlening op het gebied van
maritieme infrastructuur, waterbeheer, milieubeoordelingen, geotechnische en landmeetkundige diensten. Nederlandse bedrijven assisteren operators op mijnbouw- en verwerkingslocaties in Zuid-Amerika en Afrika.
Tabel 1 en Tabel 2 laten de soorten uitdagingen zien waar bedrijven die actief zijn in Nederland
mee worden geconfronteerd. De gegevens zijn verzameld op basis van meer dan 30 interviews met professionals werkzaam in de industrie.

X

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Tabel 1. Belangrijkste obstakels voor het succesvol uitvoeren van activiteiten in
Nederland, gerangschikt op basis van de urgentie van het probleem.

Een ‘X’ betekent dat het bedrijf met een probleem wordt geconfronteerd. Hoe meer bedrijven aangaven
met dit probleem te maken hebben, hoe urgenter het wordt beschouwd. Bij elk obstakel wordt aangegeven
of dit van toepassing is op bedrijven die voornamelijk actief zijn in Nederland of de EU, of op bedrijven die
voornamelijk wereldwijd actief zijn, of op allebei.
Wereldwijd actieve bedrijven

Bedrijven die actief zijn in
de EU en Nederland

Negatieve publieke opinie

X

X

Onvoldoende dialoog met de overheid en gebrek aan vertrouwen

X

X

Vertraagde actie en versnipperde bevoegdheden

X

Gerangschikt naar urgentie

Oneerlijke concurrentie

X

Vermoeiend vergunningenproces

X

Onvoldoende financiële ondersteuning

X

X

Onsamenhangende of ontbrekende wetgeving

X

X

Onvoldoende groene energie-infrastructuur

X

Energiekosten

X

Inefficiënt gebruik van ruimte

X

Ongeschoolde arbeidskrachten

X

X

Tabel 2. Belangrijkste obstakels voor het succesvol uitvoeren van activiteiten in
Nederland, gerangschikt op basis van de urgentie van het probleem.

Dienstverlening

Financiën

Handel

Kennis

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Onvoldoende financiële ondersteuning

X

X

X

Onsamenhangende of ontbrekende wetgeving

X

X
X

Verwerken

X

Gerangschikt naar urgentie

Winning

Recycling

Een ‘X’ betekent dat het bedrijf met een probleem wordt geconfronteerd. Hoe meer bedrijven aangaven
met dit probleem te maken hebben, hoe urgenter het wordt beschouwd. Bij elk obstakel wordt aangegeven
of dit van toepassing is op bedrijven die actief zijn in een of meer schakelen in de toeleveringsketen.

Negatieve publieke opinie

X

X

Onvoldoende dialoog met de overheid en gebrek aan vertrouwen

X

X

Vertraagde actie en versnipperde bevoegdheden

X

X

Oneerlijke concurrentie

X

Vermoeiend vergunningenproces

X

Onvoldoende groene energie-infrastructuur

X

X

Energiekosten

X

X

X
X

Inefficiënt gebruik van ruimte

X

X

Ongeschoolde arbeidskrachten

X

X

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

XI

Het behalen van de doelen van de EU CRMA en de Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie vereist
een allesomvattende aanpak om de binnenlandse industrie nieuw leven in te blazen, zodat
deze zich kan diversifiëren wat betreft toeleveringsbronnen en de voorzieningszekerheid
kan versterken. Het creëren van de nodige voorwaarden voor bedrijven om concurrerend te
blijven - oftewel, een gunstige sociaal-politieke, economische en wettelijke omgeving - is een
essentiële stap om kansen te bieden voor verdere uitbreiding. Problemen moeten worden
aangepakt omtrent publieke opinie, beperkte dialoog met de overheid, gebrek aan een
duidelijke visie voor de industrie, trage actie en versnippering van bevoegdheden, vergunningen en bureaucratie. Tegelijkertijd kan Nederland een belangrijke rol spelen in het versterken van de Europese voorzieningszekerheid van mineralen door het stimuleren van kennisuitwisseling en industriële partnerschappen, het verduidelijken van financiële instrumenten
en investeren in kennisontwikkeling.
Tabel 3 geeft een overzicht van de uitdagingen en kansen waarmee bedrijven die actief zijn
in Nederland worden geconfronteerd bij het voortzetten van hun activiteiten en het zoeken
naar uitbreiding.

Tabel 3. Een samenvatting van de uitdagingen en kansen voor bedrijven die actief zijn
in de Nederlandse mineralensector en beleidsaanbevelingen.
Probleem

Aanbeveling

Uitdaging: Publieke opinie

Faciliteer een evenwichtigere publieke discussie door feitelijke informatie te verstrekken over mondiale
minerale toeleveringsketens, de footprint van de EU en de voordelen en risico’s van het (gedeeltelijk)
terughalen van toeleveringsketens.

Uitdaging: Dialoog met de overheid

Ga in dialoog met bedrijven om aankomende beleidsvoorstellen te bespreken en om potentiële onbedoelde gevolgen hiervan in kaart te brengen en deze te beperken.
Ontwikkel een visie voor de mineralenindustrie en integreer deze in het Nationaal Plan voor het
Energiesysteem.

Uitdaging: Snelheid van handelen en
toewijzing van bevoegdheden

Concentreer bevoegdheden en verantwoordelijkheden door een ‘one-stop shop’ voor mineralen te
creëren, dat wil zeggen een centraal aanspreekpunt bij één ministerie, om zo de beschikbaarheid van
informatie te verbeteren en handelingssnelheid te vergroten.

Uitdaging: Vergunningsprocedures en
wetgeving

Verminder bureaucratie bij vergunningverlening om actie te versnellen.

Uitdaging: Energiekosten en
infrastructuur

Ondersteun de uitbreiding van noodzakelijke infrastructuur, zoals het elektriciteitsnet, om bedrijven in
de mineralensector de mogelijkheid te bieden zich te ontwikkelen.

Kans: Verhoog de concurrentiekracht
van bedrijven actief op de Nederlandse
en Europese markt

Stel structuren op die de uitbreiding van de Nederlandse aanwezigheid in minerale toeleveringsketens
stimuleren.

Kans: Industriële partnerschappen

Verbeter informatie over de markt en faciliteer connecties tussen partijen actief in de sector.

Identificeer verouderde of inconsistente regelgeving en werk deze bij in overeenstemming met nieuwe
ambities.

Ondersteun een gelijk speelveld door normen vast te stellen op basis waarvan Nederlandse bedrijven
kunnen concurreren met niet-EU-actoren.

Stimuleer samenwerking met internationaal actieve bedrijven die hun hoofdkantoor en/of industriële
faciliteiten in Nederland hebben.
Kans: Financiële ondersteuning

Verduidelijk de beschikbaarheid van financieringsinstrumenten en bundel waar mogelijk de inspanningen met andere EU-landen.

Kans: Kennisontwikkeling

Investeer in onderwijs op het gebied van mineralen en metalen om kennis en vaardigheden uit te breiden
en de beroepsbevolking te versterken.
Investeer in onderzoek en ontwikkeling van innovatieve oplossingen voor CRM-waardeketens in Europa.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

1

1. Introduction
Critical raw materials (CRM) are essential for vital sectors of the European economy and
society – energy, transport, digital technologies, health, defence, and space. The demand for
CRM is expected to skyrocket in the coming decades, primarily driven by the green energy
transition. Globally, the total demand for minerals used in clean energy technologies will
double by 2040 under current policy commitments and could quadruple if governments
increase their ambitions and pursue net zero policies.3
The supply of CRM is concentrated in the hands of a few global players, making consumers
like the EU vulnerable to supply shocks. The risk extends further than the raw material – it
involves entire supply chains that are outside of European borders. Most nickel is mined and
refined in Indonesia and then shipped to China for final processing. Two thirds of global lithium
supply comes from South America and goes to China for final processing. More than 70% of
cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo and transported to China, which refines
70% of all cobalt globally, and is dominant in processing the material into battery packs for
electric cars.4
The sudden and extreme decoupling from Russia as a consequence of the war in Ukraine
made it clear that strategic dependencies are undesirable and brought urgency to the EU
and other consumers to act. Russia’s weaponization of energy caused significant economic
damage for European households and industries. EU governments spent EUR 646 billion
since September 2021 to mitigate the consequences of a weaponised dependency in a
strategic sector.5 Learning from this experience, the EU and its member states are trying to
prevent a similar situation in the CRM supply chain.
Yet the competition for CRM is already under way for more than two decades. As trade in raw
materials is skyrocketing, so are export restrictions. Since 2009,export barriers in raw materials trade have seen a significant increase, led by China and Indonesia having implemented
20% and 15% of export restrictions worldwide, respectively.6 Controlling a large share of the
production of a particular CRM gives states geopolitical clout – they can (threaten to) coerce
others to act according to their own geopolitical goals and punish them when they do not.7
As mineral supply scarcity increases and geopolitical fragmentation intensifies, geopolitically
motivated export restrictions are likely to become more commonplace.

3

‘The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy: Mineral Requirements for Clean Energy Transitions’, IEA,
accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/mineral-requirements-for-clean-energy-transitions.

4

‘Cobalt Market Report 2022’, Cobalt Institute, 10 May 2023, https://www.cobaltinstitute.org/resource/
cobalt-market-report-2022/.

5

Giovanni Sgaravatti et al., ‘National Fiscal Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis’, Bruegel, 20 September
2023, https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/national-policies-shield-consumers-rising-energy-prices.

6

Przemyslaw Kowalski and Clarisse Legendre, ‘Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition: Production,
International Trade and Export Restrictions’, OECD Trade Policy Paper (Paris: OECD, April 2023), https://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/raw-materials-critical-for-the-green-transition_c6bb598b-en.

7

Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks
Shape State Coercion’, International Security 44, no. 1 (1 July 2019): 42–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/
isec_a_00351.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

2

As of 2022, the EU and member states are taking active measures to mitigate strategic
dependencies. The European Green Deal and European Economic Security Strategy
underpin these efforts. In the minerals sector, these measures are primarily codified in the
European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). On the one
hand, the EU aims to strengthen domestic capabilities to produce CRM and advanced technologies. On the other hand, acknowledging the importance of continued international collaboration, the EU has embarked on a journey to strengthen supply chain resilience. European
efforts have been mirrored by member states – Germany is currently revisiting its raw materials strategy,8 Spain introduced a roadmap for the sustainable management of its minerals,9
and the Netherlands has introduced its Nationale Grondstoffenstrategie,10 and is moving
towards the implementation phase.
At the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report investigates the challenges that Dutch companies face to expand their reach in the CRM sector and contribute
to diversified, resilient supply chains. This study aims to inform the implementation of the
Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie and European Critical Raw Materials Act by proposing
ways in which the Dutch government can support companies in the diversification of Dutch
and European CRM supply chains. This study answers the following question:
What is the potential of internationally active Dutch companies to take on a larger role in global
supply chains of critical raw materials?
Based on more than 30 interviews with the industry and supported by desk research, this
report provides a state-of-play description of the CRM sector in the Netherlands and an analysis of the challenges faced by Dutch companies to strengthen their position.
The report proceeds as follows. First, it provides a short explanation of the report’s methodology. Second, it gives an overview of the vital sectors in which CRMare used, accompanied
by the current EU supply base divided per geographical region. Third, it discusses the impact
of global strategic competition on supply chain resilience. It shows how governments have
already been weaponizing strategic dependencies to further geopolitical goals. Fourth, it
offers a description of the main characteristics of the Dutch companies active in the minerals
sector and synthesizes the main challenges faced by these companies in sustaining and/
or expanding their footprints in global supply chains. Finally, the report provides policy
recommendations that could mitigate these challenges and turn them into opportunities for
the Netherlands.

8

‘Raw Materials – Indispensable for Germany’s Industrial Future’, BMWK-Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
and Climate, 2023, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/raw-materials-and-resources.html.

9

‘Roadmap for the Sustainable Management of Mineral Raw Materials – Policies’, IEA, 12 December 2023,
https://www.iea.org/policies/16806-roadmap-for-the-sustainable-management-of-mineral-raw-materials.

10 ‘Grondstoffen voor de grote transities’.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

3

2. Methodology
The research combines primary data collection – 30 interviews with industry representatives
– desk research, and literature review.
First, an overview of companies active in the metals and minerals sector of the Netherlands
was compiled. The companies are either headquartered in the Netherlands or present (with
an office and/or operations) in the Netherlands. This includes companies active in mining,
processing, end-users and recycling, as well as service providers (equipment, engineering,
technology and logistics providers) and knowledge institutions. See Appendix 1.
Second, a selection was made of companies in the various sectors to pursue in-depth interviews. The selection was based on the type of activity of the company to ensure a diversity
of perspectives. The focus was placed particularly on companies that supply material flows
rather than manufacturers of end products given that the unit of analysis in this research is the
material itself rather than the end product. A total of 30 companies were interviewed between
May and August of 2023.
Third, the results of the interviews were synthesized with information gathered through desk
research with respect to global CRM supply chains, strategic dependencies, and types of
governmental interventions implemented by other countries.
Finally, conclusions were drawn regarding the challenges and opportunities of expanding the
Dutch footprint in CRM supply chains and ways to add value through possible governmental
support for these efforts.
The interviews were conducted based on the following question list:
1. What is your company’s main field of activity in the Netherlands & abroad?
2. Which raw materials and minerals do you use?
3. Where do you source the minerals from?
4. What does a typical customer look like? Which industry or end application sector do they
come from?
5. Considering Dutch and European ambitions for the energy transition and strategic
autonomy, what are your future plans in the field of CRM?
6. Which main obstacles to secure the (raw) materials you require for your business are you
currently facing?
7. How are you addressing these obstacles?
8. How could the Dutch government help you overcome these obstacles?

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

4

3. Critical raw
materials are
essential for vital
sectors
3.1. Vital sectors: energy, defence, medical
equipment, digital technologies
CRM are used throughout sectors of climate change and national security interest for Europe
and the Netherlands, including clean energy technology, medical equipment, defence applications and digital technologies (Figure 1).
The energy sector is the main demand driver over the next 20 years. Renewable forms of
energy generation such as wind turbines and solar PV panels as well as electric vehicles
require significantly more CRM than their fossil fuel-based counterparts. Moreover, extensive
energy storage in the form of large-scale batteries is necessary for renewables given their
intermittent nature. For instance, to limit the increase in global temperatures to 1.5 degrees, the
world will require 42 times more lithium, 21 times more cobalt and 19 times more nickel in 2040
compared to 2020.11 Even under the stated policies scenario – which involves a less ambitious
plan in 2050 – demand for these minerals will grow significantly.
Depending on the application, the EU is vulnerable at different stages of the mineral supply chain.
The 34 minerals on the EU’s list are considered at either the extraction or processing stage.
Figure 2 illustrates the various stages of a supply chain, actors involved and average time to set
up operations. The long time and massive investments required to expand the upstream and
midstream capabilities are significant bottlenecks to ramping up CRM supply in the short term.
Facilities like specialized storage and transport are essential to the resilience of a supply
chain. Even if the EU built conversion or processing facilities, specialised storage is necessary
to warehouse chemical compounds. Without this, companies are forced to react to market
dynamics and thus conduct business ‘just in time’ rather than with a ‘just in case’ approach.
Through a ‘just in time’ inventory approach, companies aim to fulfil demand based on expected
sales and minimize waste.12 A ‘just in case’ approach implies larger stock levels than necessary
in the short term, thus allowing for rapid rebound in case of a shock in global supply chains.13
11

‘Growth in Demand for Selected Battery-Related Minerals from Clean Energy Technologies in 2040 Relative to
2020 Levels by Scenario’, IEA, 5 May 2021, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/growth-in-demand-forselected-battery-related-minerals-from-clean-energy-technologies-in-2040-relative-to-2020-levels-by-scenario.

12 Abby Jenkins, ‘Just-in-Time vs Just-in-Case: Choosing the Right Strategy’, Oracle NetSuite, 3 May 2021, https://
www.netsuite.com/portal/resource/articles/inventory-management/just-in-time-vs-just-in-case.shtml.
13 Jenkins.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

5

Figure 1. Critical raw materials use in vital sectors. Figure adapted from Teer,
Bertolini and Girardi, ‘Great power competition and social stability in the
Netherlands, 2023.14

14 Joris Teer, Mattia Bertolini, and Benedetta Girardi, ‘Great Power Competition and Social Stability in the Netherlands: The Risks of Russian Gas, Chinese Materials and Taiwanese Chips to Vital Sectors’ (The Hague Centre
for Strategic Studies, August 2023), https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Great-power-competition-and-social-stability-in-the-Netherlands-HCSS-2023-V1-1.pdf.

6

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 2. Mineral supply chains.
Mineral supply chains involve thousands of
actors spread across continents
Upstream

Corporate social responsibility

Average time to set up operations: 17 years

Exploration and
prospecting
Involves geological
surface mapping and
sampling, geophysical
measurements,
geochemical analysis,
water, air and soil testing,
drilling and sampling.

Midstream

Downstream

Average time to set up operations:
3-5 years

Average time to set up operations:
1-3 years

Discovery
Involves metallurgical
testing, environmental
assessments, economic
feasibility.

Mine development
Involves mine site design
and development, building
processing facilities,
transport modalities
(roads, railways, port etc.),
water, sewage and power
services, employee
facilities.

Extraction
Materials are
extracted from the
mine site. It can take
up to 2 years to rampup operations. Most
facilities reach about
80% of name plate
capacity.

Specialized storage facilities
Service providers (equipment,
engineering technology, expertise)

Conversion and/or Processing

Components
manufacturing

Assembly

Recycling

Consumption

Materials are refined into the desired form in
terms of purity, concentration etc. The materials
tend to go through a range of different chemical
processes to reach different forms.

Trade

Transport

Average time to set up
operations: 3-5 years

Countries all over the world have defined various lists of minerals that are essential for their
economies and designed strategies to increase resilience. The EU Critical Raw Materials
list identifies 34 minerals at the extraction or processing phase to be critical. A material is
added to the CRM list once it fulfils criteria of high economic importance and supply risk.15
The EU also identified strategic raw materials in a specific grade that is necessary for
green and digital technologies and for which a high increase in demand is expected, but
may not necessarily be considered critical materials (e.g., battery grade lithium, copper).16
The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) sets clear targets to strengthen the resilience
of CRM supply chains.17 The European Parliament is already trying to further increase
these targets:18
15 ‘Critical Raw Materials’, European Commission, accessed 22 September 2023, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en.
16 ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for
Ensuring a Secure and Sustainable Supply of Critical Raw Materials and Amending Regulations (EU)
168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020’, Pub. L. No. COM/2023/160 final (2023), https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023PC0160&qid=1695373338533.
17

‘European Critical Raw Materials Act’.

18 European Parliament, ‘Critical Raw Materials: Securing the EU’s Supply and Sovereignty’, 14 September 2023,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230911IPR04927/critical-raw-materials-secur¬ing-the-eu-s-supply-and-sovereignty.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

•
•
•
•

7

10% of the minerals demanded in 2030 should be extracted within EU borders,
40% of this demand should be processed domestically,
15% should be recycled,19
Not more than 65% of the EU’s supply should come from one single country.

The US Geological Survey (USGS) has released a list of 50 minerals that are critical for
national security.20 The US government is investing in reshoring mineral supply chains of
national interest for energy, defence, transport and digital technologies under the Inflation
Reduction Act, the Defence Production Act, and the CHIPS and Science Act.. Canada’s
list contains a set of 31 minerals.21 The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy aims to position
Canada as a key supplier of sustainably sourced raw materials.22
European countries have some capabilities in the extraction and processing of critical
minerals, but this will have to significantly expand in the coming years in order to fulfil the
growing demand and the ambitions of the CRMA. Between 2016 and 2020, the EU was able
to extract and process some of the minerals it consumed (Figure 3). For instance, silica sand
and tungsten, as well as strategic materials like nickel and copper were extracted in EU countries. Moreover, a large part of the consumed cobalt, scandium, hafnium and silicon metal
between 2016-2020 was processed by EU countries (Figure 3). As the energy transition will
lead to an exponential increase in the EU’s demand, capabilities for extraction, processing and
recycling will have to grow proportionately to ensure a secure supply.

19 ‘European Critical Raw Materials Act’, European Commission, 16 March 2023, https://single-market-economy.
ec.europa.eu/publications/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en.
20 Jason Burton, ‘U.S. Geological Survey Releases 2022 List of Critical Minerals’, usgs.gov, 22 February 2022,
https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-minerals.
21 ‘Critical Minerals List 2021’, IEA, 27 October 2022, https://www.iea.org/policies/15698-critical-minerals-list-2021.
22 Government of Canada, ‘The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy’, 9 December 2022, https://www.canada.ca/
en/campaign/critical-minerals-in-canada/canadian-critical-minerals-strategy.html.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 3. The ratio of EU CRM supply extracted and processed domestically
between 2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023.
More than 85% of the EU's supply of silicon metal, cobalt and scandium between 2016 and 2020
was processed domestically. Yet demand will grow exponentially in the coming decade, requiring
an upscale of capabilities.

8

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

9

3.2. Vital partners: regional distribution
of EU mineral supply
The European Union is import dependent on various countries for sourcing its minerals, both
at extraction and processing stage. This section outlines the regional diversity of EU mineral
supply between 2016-2020. The focus is placed on EU critical and strategic raw materials.
Such an outline on the one hand provides an overview of the concentration of supply in
various geographies. On the other hand, it offers an overview of opportunities to expand the
relationships with those countries that have the potential to play a large(r) role in the EU’s
supply chains.
It is important to interpret these numbers correctly. First, the data shows EU supply between
2016-2020, meaning that ratios between regions can change with an increase in demand
in minerals. Second, a lot of minerals flow into the EU in the form of half fabricates and end
products, so looking at mineral supply offers an important perspective but not the full picture.
Finally, geographic distribution does not equate a diversity of suppliers. As explained in
section 4.3, China is a major investor in global mineral supply chains, meaning that mines in
African countries and processing plants in the Indo-Pacific are often partly or fully owned by
Chinese companies.
China is the main supplier of both CRM (Figure 4) and clean energy technologies to the EU.
China has developed a domestic ecosystem in which the manufacturing of end applications
like batteries and solar PV panels generates sufficient demand for processed CRM, creating
economies of scale which allow for the production of these material at an affordable price.
Chinese investments in renewables and electric vehicles have been monumental in driving
down global costs, but they also consolidated its position as a quasi-monopolist in most
minerals and clean tech markets. China supplies 98% of EU imports of rare earths and 98% of
rare earth permanent magnets.23 Six of the ten largest EV battery manufacturers are Chinese.
The largest one, CATL, controls 35% of the global market.24
In the Indo-Pacific (excl. China), Japan is a major EU supplier of light and heavy rare earth
elements at the extraction level, while Malaysia is a key exporter of processed rare earths
(Figure 5). Rare earth elements are used across vital sectors (see section 3.1).

23 Roland Gauß et al., ‘Rare Earth Magnets and Motors: A European Call for Action’ (Berlin: Rare Earth Magnets
and Motors Cluster of the European Raw Materials Alliance, 2021).
24 Bruno Venditti, ‘The Top 10 EV Battery Manufacturers in 2022’, Visual Capitalist, 5 October 2022, https://www.
visualcapitalist.com/the-top-10-ev-battery-manufacturers-in-2022/.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 4. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by China between 2016-2020.
Source: European Commission, 2023.
China is not only the EU's main supplier of raw and processed critical raw materials. A significant amount
of Chinese minerals are used by its considerable domestic manufacturing sector for energy, transport
and digital technologies and bought as end products by EU companies.

10

11

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 5. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by Indo-Pacific countries
(excl. China) between 2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023.

Japan accounts for 55% of the EU's supply of heavy r

Between 2016-2020 Japan supplied 55% of the
EU's raw rare earths, while Malaysia was a key
supplier of processed light rare earth elements
Japan

Light rare earths (Lanthanum,
Neodymium, Praseodymium,
Samarium), Heavy rare earths,
Natural Graphite

South Korea

Japan

Natural Graphite

Beryllium, Bismuth,
Germanium, Titanium Metal

South Korea

India

Light rare earths
(Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium)
Titanium ores

Natural Graphite
Antimony, Bismuth, Heavy
rare earths (Yttrium, Taiwan
Ytterbium), Manganese,Germanium
Laos
Tungsten,
Vanadium
Bismuth

Light rare earths (Cerium,
Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium),
Manganese, Phosphorous

India

Light rare earths (Lanthanum,
Neodymium, Praseodymium,
Samarium), Heavy rare earths,
Natural Graphite

Antimony, Bismuth, Heavy
rare earths (Yttrium,
Ytterbium), Manganese,
Tungsten, Vanadium

Light rare earths
(Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium)
Myanmar
Antimony
Titanium ores

Beryllium, Bismuth,
Germanium, Titanium Metal

Vietnam
Fluorspar

Thailand

Light rare earths (Cerium,
Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium),
Sri Lanka
Manganese, Phosphorous

Bismuth

Antimony, Bismuth, Light rare
earths (Cerium, Lanthanum,
Neodymium, Praseodymium,
Samarium), Phosphorous,
Tungsten

Laos

Natural Graphite

Malaysia

Germanium
Bismuth

Light rare earths
(Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium)
Light rare earths (Cerium,
Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium),
Manganese

Myanmar
Antimony

Taiwan

Indonesia

VietnamCopper

Thailand
Bismuth

Fluorspar
Antimony, Bismuth, Light rare
earths (Cerium, Lanthanum,
Neodymium, Praseodymium,
Samarium), Phosphorous,
Tungsten

Sri Lanka
Natural Graphite

Malaysia
Light rare earths
(Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium)
Light rare earths (Cerium,
Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium),
Manganese

Indonesia
Copper

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 5. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by Indo-Pacific countries
(excl. China) between 2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023. (continued)

12

13

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 6. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by Central Asian countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023.
Note: Platinum group metals were not included in the original dataset, but Russia is a major EU supplier of
these minerals.

Russia supplies 24% of EU's phosphate rock, while
and manganese

Russia and Kazakhstan supply
processed phosphorous, titanium metal
and vanadium to the EU. Ukraine is an EU
supplier for small amounts of raw and
processed materials

Russia
Coking Coal, Natural Graphite, Phosphate Rock, Tantalum
Borate, Coking coal, Copper, Gallium, Germanium,
Hafnium, Helium, Nickel, Silicon Metal, Titanium Metal,
Tungsten, Vanadium

Ukraine
Kazakhstan

Manganese,
NaturalRussia
graphite

Beryllium, Copper, Phosphorous,
Silicon Metal, Titanium Metal
Gallium,
Hafnium,
CokingGeorgia,
Coal, Natural
ArmeniaGraphite, Phosphate Rock, Tantalum
Manganese,
Nickel, Titanium
Copper
Metal
Borate, Coking coal, Copper, Gallium, Germanium,
Tajikistan

Hafnium, Helium, Nickel, Silicon Metal, Titanium Metal,
Antimony
Tungsten, Vanadium

Ukraine
Kazakhstan

Manganese,
Natural graphite
Gallium,
Hafnium,
Manganese,
Nickel, Titanium
Metal

Beryllium, Copper, Phosphorous,
Silicon Metal, Titanium Metal

Georgia, Armenia
Copper

Tajikistan
Antimony

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 6. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by Central Asian countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023. (continued)
Note: Platinum group metals were not included in the original dataset, but Russia is a major EU supplier of
these minerals.

Russia and Ukraine are both suppliers to the EU of raw materials, while Russia and
Kazakhstan are the largest processing hubs in the region (Figure 6). Between 2016-2020,
62% of the EU’s phosphorous supply, used for fertilizers and the chemical industry, was
sourced from Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, in the same time period 72% of titanium metal used
in Europe’s aerospace sector and for medical equipment came from Kazakhstan, Russia
and Ukraine.

14

15

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 7. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by African countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023.
Africa plays a vital role in EU supply of
critical raw materials at the extraction level
but processing capabilities are limited
Morocco
Baryte, Copper, Fluorspar,
Phosphate Rock

Morocco

Arsenic, Titanium Metal,

Baryte, Copper,Vanadium
Fluorspar,
Phosphate Rock

Egypt
Phosphate Rock

Arsenic, Titanium Metal,
Vanadium

Algeria
Phosphate Rock

Senegal

Helium

Phosphate Rock

Phosphate Rock

Algeria
Sierra Leone

Senegal

Egypt

Nigeria
Cote d'Ivoire
Phosphate Rock

Titanium ore

Ethiopia
Tantalum

Tantalum

Manganese

Helium

Phosphate Rock

DRC, Rwanda, Burundi
Gabon

Sierra Leone
Titanium ore

Tantalum

Nigeria

Ethiopia

Manganese

Cote d'Ivoire

Manganese

Tantalum

Manganese
Zambia

Copper, Manganese

Mozambique
Coking Coal, Natural
Graphite, Tantalum,
Titanium Ores

Tantalum

Zimbabwe
Natural graphite

DRC, Rwanda, Burundi

Gabon

South Africa
Fluorspar, Manganese,
Nickel, Phosphate Rock,

Madagascar

Tantalum

Natural graphite

ManganeseTitanium Ores
Copper, Manganese, Nickel,
Silicon Metal, Vanadium

Manganese

Zambia
Copper, Manganese

Nickel

Mozambique
Coking Coal, Natural
Graphite, Tantalum,
Titanium Ores

Zimbabwe
Natural graphite

South Africa
Fluorspar, Manganese,
Nickel, Phosphate Rock,
Titanium Ores
Copper, Manganese, Nickel,
Silicon Metal, Vanadium

Madagascar
Natural graphite
Nickel

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 7. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by African countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023. (continued)

16

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

17

African countries are important suppliers of raw materials to the EU, but play a marginal role
in exporting processed materials (Figure 7). The Netherlands’ Africa Strategy 2023-2032
aims to support countries to develop more processing capabilities so that African states
gain a more equitable share of value chains and are empowered to contribute to the diversification of global capabilities.25 Between 2016-2020, almost 80% of EU manganese came
from Gabon and South Africa, respectively. In the EU, manganese is used in construction and
transport industries, and it is a key component of lithium-ion batteries.26 Rwanda, Nigeria,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the largest African suppliers of tantalum, used in
electronics. Morocco is the largest EU supplier of sedimentary phosphoric rock, an important
feedstock to produce (animal) food but which would require processing into a different purity
of phosphoric acid in order to be used in the energy transition.27
The largest US export of minerals to the EU was beryllium between 2016-2020, which is
used in manufacturing industrial components, aerospace and defence, automotives and
electronics (Figure 8).28 Moreover, the US has extraction capabilities for light and heavy
rare earths and processing for the latter. Nickel – a strategic raw material for the EU due
to its importance in lithium-ion batteries – is supplied by Canada at both extraction and
processing levels.
Finally, a third of copper used in the EU between 2016-2020 was sourced from South
America (Figure 9). Copper is a key mineral for electric transmission and therefore essential
in the renewable electricity system. Chile alone provided almost 80% of the EU’s processed
lithium and Brazil 82% of the EU’s niobium, which is used for high-strength steel alloys in pipelines and transport infrastructure and the construction of structural application.29

25 ‘Africa Strategy: Government Presents Integrated Approach to Cooperation with Africa’, Government of the
Netherlands (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 31 May 2023), https://www.government.nl/latest/
news/2023/05/31/dutch-strategy-on-africa-2023-2032.
26 Milan Grohol and Constanze Veeh, ‘Study on the Critical Raw Materials for the EU 2023’ (European
Commission, 6 May 2023), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/725585.
27 Marjolein de Ridder et al., ‘Risks and Opportunities in the Global Phosphate Rock Market: Robust Strategies in
Times of Uncertainty’ (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 17 December 2012), https://hcss.
nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Risks_and_Opportunities_in_the_Global_Phosphate_Rock_Market.pdf.
28 Grohol and Veeh, ‘Study on the Critical Raw Materials for the EU 2023’.
29 ‘Niobium Deposits in the United States’, usgs.gov, 4 February 2021, https://www.usgs.gov/data/niobium-deposits-united-states#:~:text=Niobium%20is%20necessary%20for%20strategic,Schulz%20and%20
others%2C%202017.

18

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 8. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by North American countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023.
The United States supplies 60% of processed
beryllium to the EU and 4% of yttrium and
ytterbium (heavy rare earths).
Canada provides raw and processed nickel.
Canada

Canada

Baryte, Coking Coal, Copper, Fluorspar,
Natural Graphite, Nickel, Titanium Ores
Nickel, Niobium, Titanium Metal,

Baryte, Coking Tungsten
Coal, Copper, Fluorspar,
Natural Graphite, Nickel, Titanium Ores
United States of America

Nickel, Niobium, Titanium Metal,
Tungsten

Coking Coal, Copper, Heavy rare earths,
Light rare earths (Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium), Natural
Graphite, Nickel
Beryllium, Gallium, Germanium, Heavy
rare earths (Yttrium, Ytterbium,
Scandium), Helium, Lithium, Tungsten

Mexico

United States of America

Copper, Fluorspar,
Manganese

Coking Coal, Copper, Heavy rare earths,
Light rare earths (Lanthanum, Neodymium,
Praseodymium, Samarium), Natural
Graphite, Nickel Dominican Republic
Guatemala

Mexico

Antimony, Nickel

Copper, Fluorspar,
Manganese

Nickel

Nickel
Beryllium, Gallium, Germanium,
Heavy
rare earths (Yttrium, Ytterbium,
Scandium), Helium, Lithium, Tungsten

Panama
Copper

Dominican Republic

Nickel

Guatemala
Antimony, Nickel
Nickel

Panama
Copper

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 8. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by North American countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023. (continued)

19

20

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 9. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by South American countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023.

South America is a significant EU
supplier of copper and battery
materials
Colombia

Colombia

Coking Coal

Coking Coal

Brazil
Copper, Manganese,
Brazil

Nickel

Natural Graphite,
Copper,
Manganese,
Tantalum,
Titanium
Ores

Nickel

NaturalNickel,
Graphite,
Manganese,
Tantalum,
Titanium Ores
Niobium,
Silicon Metal,
Tungsten, Vanadium
Manganese, Nickel,
Niobium, Silicon Metal,
Tungsten, Vanadium

Peru
Copper

Peru

Borate, Copper

Bolivia

Copper

Antimony

Borate, Copper

Chile

Antimony

Bolivia

Chile
Copper

Antimony

Borate, Copper,
Lithium

Antimony

Copper
Borate, Copper,
Lithium

Argentina
Copper
Lithium

Argentina
Copper
Lithium

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 9. The ratio of EU CRM supply provided by South American countries between
2016-2020. Source: European Commission, 2023. (continued)
South America accounts for one third of EU raw copper imports, used across renewable energy technologies

Chile and Argentina provide 85% of the EU's imports of processed lithium, used for batteries

21

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

22

4. Critical raw
materials in an age
of strategic rivalry
Countries facing insecurity of supply in the CRM sector are particularly vulnerable as strategic competition has come to dominate international trade and inter-state relations. The era
of geostrategic rivalry between the US and China, the fragmentation into geopolitical blocs
along the lines of this rivalry, and the push for decoupling from unreliable suppliers since the
onset of the war in Ukraine have turned CRM into instruments of geopolitical power play.
This section offers a snapshot into the geopolitical context surrounding critical minerals as
of 2023.

4.1. Strategic dependencies at risk
of weaponization
The rapidly growing demand for minerals coincides with an era of growing geopolitical
tensions and strategic rivalry, making Europe more vulnerable to the weaponization of mineral
supply. As seen in the previous sections, the EU supplier base is relatively concentrated in just
a few countries.
The US-China rivalry permeates through geopolitical, military, economic, socio-political and
technological sectors. Ever since President Donald Trump imposed the first large-scale set
of tariffs on Chinese imports in 2018, tensions between the US and China grew exponentially.30 Control over clean energy technology is one of the proxies of this rivalry. This was an
explicit part of the Made in China 2025 strategy, which set the target for Chinese companies
to expand their market share in high tech sectors, including clean tech.31 During a speech
for China’s Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission in 2020, Xi Jinping explicitly
communicated ambitions to increase China’s footprint in global value chains of transport, new
energy, and communication, “forming a powerful countermeasure and deterrent capability
against foreigners who would artificially cut off supply [to China]”.32
30 Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, ‘Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide’, PIIE, 1 June 2023, https://
www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-trade-war-timeline-date-guide.
31 Jost Wübbeke et al., ‘Made in China 2025: The Making of a High-Tech Superpower and Consequences for
Industrial Countries’ (Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2016), https://merics.org/sites/default/
files/2020-04/Made%20in%20China%202025.pdf.
32 “We must sustain and enhance our superiority across the entire production chain in sectors such as
high-speed rail, electric power equipment, new energy, and communications equipment, and improve
industrial quality; and we must tighten international production chains’ dependence on China, forming a
powerful countermeasure and deterrent capability against foreigners who would artificially cut off supply [to
China]” Xi Jinping, ‘Major Issues Concerning China’s Strategies for Mid-to-Long-Term Economic and Social
Development’, CSIS, 31 October 2020, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/major-issues-concerning-chinas-strategies-for-mid-to-long-term-economic-and-social-development/.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

23

By 2022 it had become clear that strategic dependencies are not only problematic in times
of large-scale logistics crises like a pandemic or extreme weather events but can be weaponized to further geopolitical interests. International trade and industrial production plummeted during the first part of the Covid-19 lockdowns in 2020.33 Despite a rapid recovery
one year later, the pressure put on global supply chains showed the importance of achieving
greater resilience in the supply of strategic goods. The world has been affected by record
high food prices, inflation, and a global chip shortage. Notwithstanding, it was Russia’s weaponization of oil and natural gas supplies to Europe that demonstrated the negative impacts of
strategic dependencies on rivals for vital resources. The financial consequences of decoupling from Russian oil and gas have been substantial. European governments were forced
to pay over EUR 600 billion in support for consumers and industries and to rapidly diversify
supplies of oil and natural gas.34 Certain energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, base
metals, and non-ferrous minerals suffered drops in output across Europe.35 In order to maintain production, some chemical industries resorted to the import intermediate goods from
areas less affected by the energy price crisis.36 Yet, by August 2022, 70% of Europe’s fertiliser
production capacity was curtailed as facilities in more than ten EU countries either shut down
or decreased production.37 Some of the impacts are long-lasting, with companies like BASF
announcing permanent downsizing in operations.38 The moderate winter and the reduced
demand in China due to Covid-19 lockdowns enabled the EU to successfully replace Russian
gas, but relying on such circumstantial factors is not a sustainable policy choice.
The dependence on foreign imports of CRM and clean tech could similarly be weaponized
in this era of strategic competition to further geopolitical objectives. Trade sanctions in the
minerals sector have been growing over the last decade (Figure 10). Between 2009 and
2020, export restrictions for CRM grew more than five-fold, from 2,518 in January 2009 to
13,102 in December 2020.39 Export taxes are the most commonly employed restriction,
followed by export licensing requirements. Five countries imposed the most restrictions over
this period: China, India, Russia, Argentina and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These
countries are some of the world’s largest suppliers of minerals. Most restrictions were applied
to waste and scrap product categories, specifically for precious metals – gold, silver and platinum group metals (PGM).40 Tin, titanium, gold, platinum, cobalt, cadmium and copper were
the other minerals with top restrictions since 2009. Critical minerals with high growth rates
were rare earth elements, phosphates, molybdenum, titanium, and natural graphite.41

33 ‘International Trade during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Big Shifts and Uncertainty’, OECD, 10 March 2022,
https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/international-trade-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-big-shifts-and-uncertainty-d1131663/.
34 Sgaravatti et al., ‘National Fiscal Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis’.
35 Other industries, particularly manufacturing, were not so severely affected. See Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone
Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann, ‘Adjusting to the Energy Shock: The Right Policies for European Industry’,
Bruegel, 17 May 2023, https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/adjusting-energy-shock-right-policies-european-industry; ‘Economic Bulletin’, 2 (Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2023), https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/pub/pdf/ecbu/eb202302.en.pdf.
36 ‘Economic Bulletin’.
37 Paul Hodges, ‘Food Costs and Interest Rates Rise as Energy and Fertilizer Supplies Are Hit by the Invasion’,
ICIS, 4 September 2022, https://www.icis.com/chemicals-and-the-economy/2022/09/food-costs-and-interest-rates-rise-as-energy-and-fertilizer-supplies-are-hit-by-the-invasion/; Fertilizers Europe, ‘Europe’s
Fertilizer Industry Victim of EU’s Energy Chaos’, 26 August 2022.
38 ‘BASF to Cut 2,600 Jobs on High Costs in Europe’, CNBC, 24 February 2023, https://www.cnbc.
com/2023/02/24/basf-to-cut-2600-jobs-on-high-costs-in-europe.html.
39 Przemyslaw Kowalski and Clarisse Legendre, ‘Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition: Production,
International Trade and Export Restrictions’, OECD Trade Policy Paper (Paris: OECD, April 2023), https://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/raw-materials-critical-for-the-green-transition_c6bb598b-en.
40 Kowalski and Legendre.
41 Kowalski and Legendre.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

24

Figure 10. Export restrictions for critical raw materials 2009-2020 –
data and original figure by OECD42

The US is increasingly aggressive in its trade policy towards China, and European countries and
their allies are at risk of being pulled into this rivalry. As of 2023, a new trade conflict between the
US and its allies on the one hand, and China on the other, has emerged. The US embarked on a
path to strengthen its domestic chip-making industry and weaken China’s. The United States’
CHIPS and Science Act set aside significant subsidies for domestic manufacturing and was
followed by a set of export controls for chip-making technology to China in October 2022. After
a few months of negotiations, the Netherlands and Japan announced they would impose export
controls themselves. Soon after, the Chinese government has introduced restrictions on the
exports of gallium and germanium. According to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,
technology export controls “can be a new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit to impose
costs on adversaries, and even over time degrade their battlefield capabilities.“43
The EU is pursing open strategic autonomy – i.e., the ability to act autonomously in global politics and be resilient to shocks but continue investing in international trade relations whenever
42 Kowalski and Legendre.
43 Jake Sullivan, ‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project
Global Emerging Technologies Summit’, The White House, 16 September 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-global-emerging-technologies-summit/.

25

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

possible.44 However, it is likely to get caught in the great power rivalry more often and suffer
from its consequences.
The impact of restricting supplies can be significant, leading to high mineral prices and possible
interruptions in manufacturing advanced (energy) technologies. The global chip shortage
during the pandemic caused massive interruptions in the production of medical equipment, computers, smartphones and cars, among others. This led to a shortage of millions of
components for medical ventilators, increase in consumer prices for TVs and companies like
Samsung to shut down production of entire product lines (Galaxy Note in this case).45

4.2. Significant acceleration of global
CRM policies
Supply security for CRM has been at the forefront of governments, who have passed a
number of interrelated policies to strengthen supply chain resilience (see Table 5). The list is
not comprehensive but aims to illustrate the type of instruments EU and non-EU countries
have been implementing. Appendix 3 includes a more detailed list.

Table 5. Types of policy instruments implemented by selected countries.

Note: An ‘X’ refers to the existence of policies for the minerals sector in the specific category (domestic
coordination, innovation & scale-up, human capital, financial support, stockpiling, international collaboration).
Domestic
coordination

Innovation &
scale-up

Human
capital

Financial
support

European Union

X

X

Germany

X

X

X

France

X

X

X

Netherlands

X

X

X

Sweden

X

X

Finland

X

Spain

X

United Kingdom

X

X

United States

X

X

X

X

Canada

X

X

X

X

X

Australia

X

X

X

X

Indonesia

x

Japan

X

X

X

X

South Korea

X

X

X

X

Stockpiling

International
collaboration
X

X

X

X

X

44 ‘EU Strategic Autonomy 2013-2023: From Concept to Capacity’, Think Tank European Parliament, 8 July
2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733589.
45 Wassen Mohammad, Adel Elomri, and Laoucine Kerbache, ‘The Global Semiconductor Chip Shortage:
Causes, Implications, and Potential Remedies’, IFAC-PapersOnLine, 10th IFAC Conference on Manufacturing
Modelling, Management and Control MIM 2022, 55, no. 10 (1 January 2022): 476–83, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ifacol.2022.09.439; Frans van Houten, ‘Global Chip Shortages: Why Supplies Must Be Prioritized for
Healthcare Capabilities’, World Economic Forum, 24 May 2022, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/
global-chip-shortages-put-life-saving-medical-devices-at-risk/.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

26

Domestic coordination measures are aimed to reduce bureaucracy, streamline internal
processes, establish monitoring tools and common standards. In 2023, the EU proposed
a net-zero industrial policy to (re)establish EU-based manufacturing of clean tech through
the Net-Zero Industry Act46 and the Critical Raw Materials Act.47 Ensuring fast permitting
for industrial processes, identifying and promoting European strategic projects and aligning
standards across member states to accelerate the scale-up of technologies are some of the
main measures included in these acts. The Netherlands has introduced its Raw Materials
Strategy (Nationale Grondstoffenstrategie) in December 2022 and is looking to expand the
competitive advantages of its industries in order to secure supply of minerals.48 The Strategy
is focused on five pillars: (1) circular economy; (2) European mining and processing; (3) diversification; (4) sustainable supply chains; and (5) knowledge building and monitoring.49 Finland
created a national body that can foster efficient cooperation across various stakeholders in
the national battery and electrification sector to strengthen cooperation, interaction and information flow across different members of the battery value chain.50
Innovation and scale-up policies support research and development (R&D) and the rapid
scale-up of technologies. The UK allocated £15 million within the Circular Critical Materials
Supply Chains (CLIMATES) fund to R&D in rare earth elements and introduced an Accelerateto-Demonstrate Facility with a dedicated funding pillar on technology innovations for critical
minerals in developing countries.51
Human capital policies aim to expand and develop the labor force in the minerals sector. The
Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy aims to facilitate the training of people transitioning from other
energy sectors to the CRM industry, focusing on assisting youth in developing relevant skills and
involving the business sector in developing university curricula for mining. 52 The US Department of
Energy has announced the development of a comprehensive workforce infrastructure dedicated
to Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) disciplines in the CRM sector.53
Financial instruments promote and incentivize private investments and include tax benefits,
subsidies and export control agencies. The German government has announced plans
to allocate up to €2 billion to support CRM mining activities. This complements the earlier
announcements of offering untied loan guarantees for German companies investing in raw
materials projects abroad and of partnering with commodity trader Trafigura to ensure
security of supply of minerals from the global market. Japan, South Korea, Sweden and
Finland also offer untied loan guarantees in the minerals sector.54 France has announced the
46 Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, ‘Net Zero Industry Act’, European
Commission, 16 March 2023, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/net-zero-industry-act_en.
47 ‘European Critical Raw Materials Act’.
48 ‘Grondstoffen voor de grote transities’.
49 ‘Grondstoffen voor de grote transities’.
50 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, ‘National Battery Strategy 2025 - Executive
Summary’, julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, 26 January
2021), https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/162685.
51

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Critical Minerals Refresh: Delivering Resilience in a Changing
Global Environment’, GOV.UK, 13 March 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-critical-mineral-strategy/critical-minerals-refresh-delivering-resilience-in-a-changing-global-environment-published-13-march-2023.

52 Government of Canada, ‘The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy’, campaigns, 9 December 2022, 31–32,
https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/critical-minerals-in-canada/canadian-critical-minerals-strategy.html.
53 Critical Minerals and Materials: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support Domestic Critical Mineral and
Material Supply Chains” (U.S. Department of Energy, 2018).
54 ‘Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-Sure)’, IISD, accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.iisd.org/credit-enhancement-instruments/institution/korea-trade-insurance-corporation-k-sure; ‘Raw Material Guarantee’, Finnvera,
accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.finnvera.fi/eng/financing/export-credit-guarantees/raw-material-guarantee; ‘JOGMEC & JBIC Financial Support for Overseas Minerals Projects’, IEA, 27 October 2022, https://www.iea.
org/policies/16642-jogmec-jbic-financial-support-for-overseas-minerals-projects; ‘Export Credits’, Svensk
Exportkredit (blog), accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.sek.se/en/product/export-credits/.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

27

launch of an investment fund for critical minerals of €2 billion, €500 million of which would be
provided by the Government.55 The US government had already moved towards investments
in green energy in 2021 with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) that allocated $70 billion
to energy funding. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 was a significant elevation of this
law, adding almost $370 billion in funding to energy infrastructure, innovative clean energy
and advanced technology for vehicle manufacturing.56 Canada and Australia have received
special status under the IRA so that they qualify for funding as well.
Stockpiling of CRM is growing in importance. Stockpiling refers to the accumulation of stocks
of a mineral or specific refined product to mitigate short-term risks. The Japanese and South
Korean governments are building stockpiles of minerals whilst planning to expand the size of
their stocks to 180 and 100 days, respectively, for materials considered high-risk. Similarly, the
United States National Defence Stockpile was created in 1939. In 2022, the US government
has announced its expansion to include critical minerals.57
International coordination entails bilateral and multilateral initiatives which facilitate CRM trade and/
or promote cross-border cooperation between states. Through the Global Gateway Partnership,
the EU will facilitate investments abroad in clean energy infrastructure, including CRM.58 At the
same time, EU trade agreements with Canada, Australia, Chile and Indonesia are under development, seeing that these are large global suppliers of CRM.59 The US integrated Australia and
Canada to qualify for funding under the IRA. Multilateral agreements like the Minerals Security
Partnership and the Sustainable Critical Materials Alliance also aim to enhance cooperation.

4.3. Chinese dominance in the
foreseeable future
The Chinese government has been able to consolidate its dominant position over the last
25-30 years by ensuring that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are actively pursuing this longterm goal.60 China’s state capitalist system allows it to direct its SOEs into actions that may
not be the most economically advantageous but have a political gain. Over time, strategies
of resource nationalism have been targeted to the same goal of achieving strong domestic
capabilities in CRM supply chains at the expense of China’s rivals (Table 6).61 Trade restrictions, heavy subsidies for domestic industries, vertical integration of SOEs across supply
chains and targeted investments into strategic goods abroad ensured that the goals of the
Chinese government would be fulfilled. The Belt and Road Initiative spans across several
strategies and it has led to the integration of logistics services across the largest trade routes.
55 Paul Messad, ‘Métaux critiques : la France devrait aller au-delà des 2 milliards de fonds’, EURACTIV France, 11
May 2023, https://www.euractiv.fr/section/economie/news/metaux-critiques-la-france-devrait-aller-au-delades-2-milliards-de-fonds/.
56 Justin Badlam et al., ‘The Inflation Reduction Act: Here’s What’s in It’, McKinsey & Company, 24 October 2022,
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it.
57 ‘Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act’, IEA, 31 October 2022, https://www.iea.org/policies/15534-strategic-and-critical-materials-stock-piling-act.
58 ‘Global Gateway’, European Commission, accessed 22 September 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/
strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.
59 ‘Negotiations and Agreements’, European Commission, 13 September 2023, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/
eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/negotiations-and-agreements_en.
60 Irina Patrahau et al., ‘Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sectors: Policy Options for the Netherlands and the
European Union’ (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2020), https://hcss.nl/
wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Securing-Critical-Materials-for-Critical-Sectors.pdf.
61 Patrahau et al.

28

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Table 6. China’s strategies to secure mineral supply chains. Based on HCSS, 2020.62
Strategies​

Definition​

Example

Vertical
integration​

Acquire a monopoly position and create
entry barriers for junior companies.
States can nationalize companies or subsidize sectors to strengthen domestic
companies’ international position.

In 2021, three of China’s six rare earth companies were merged into a
state-owned giant, leaving only four key players in China’s rare earths
market. The companies that merged are Minmetals Rare Earth,
Chinalco Rare Earth & Metals Co and China Southern Rare Earth
Group Co.63

Stockpiling​

Accumulate a strategic stock of a certain
asset in order to become less vulnerable to
short-term disruptions in the market.

The Chinese government has had a strategic stockpile of rare earth
elements since 2011, which has been expanded over time.64 In 2016,
the first commercial stocks of rare earths were approved.65

Export
restrictions​

Export quotas, export taxes, obligatory
minimum export prices lead to an increase
in global prices and decrease in global
availability. It becomes more challenging to
meet domestic demand.

The Chinese government has imposed the most export restrictions
in the mineral sector between 2009-2020, particularly in the form of
export taxes.66 As of August 2023, the government has imposed
restrictions on the exports of gallium and germanium.67

Foreign investments for
supply security

Ensure secure supplies by investing in a
diversified supply base and foreign assets.

Chinese companies have financial stakes in 15 out of the 19 existing
cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo.68 Chinese
companies are a key investor in Indonesia’s Morowali Industrial Park,
where they process nickel sourced from Indonesian and (partly)
Chinese-owned mines.69

Resource diplomacy

Build alliances with strategic partners
– supplying.
Countries as well as countries which share
similar import dependence vulnerabilities

The relations built with companies within Belt and Road Initiative are
a part of China’s strategy of resource diplomacy.

Standard Setting/
Certification frameworks​

Create differentiation between very similar
products, allowing competition based
on characteristics other than solely the
price. This has the potential to lead to firstmover advantage and market dominance.

Chinese state-owned companies are leading technical committees
for minerals within the International Standardization Organisation.
The government has passed several laws, the most important being
‘China Standards 2035’, empowering companies to contribute to
global standard setting.70

R&D

Expand knowledge and encourage innovation in order to secure patents for relevant future technologies.​

Between 1950 and 2019, China filed 25.911 patents for rare earth
elements compared to 9.810 by the US, 13.920 by Japan and 7.280
by EU countries combined.71

Circular Economy Strategies

Recycle (the Urban Mine), Reuse, Reduce,
Substitution ​

Circularity in China has grown exponentially over the last two decades.
Copper recycling has increased from 300.000 tonnes in 2000 to
3 million in 2019. Moreover, 49 demonstration facilities for ‘Urban Mining’
have been approved by the central government to accelerate recycling.

Resource
Nationalism​

62 Patrahau et al., ‘Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sectors: Policy Options for the Netherlands and the
European Union’.
63 Tom Daly, ‘Minmetals Confirms China Rare Earths Merger, Creating New Giant’, Reuters, 22 December 2021, sec.
China, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/minmetals-unit-confirms-china-rare-earths-merger-2021-12-22/.
64 Jost Wübbeke, ‘Rare Earth Elements in China: Policies and Narratives of Reinventing an Industry’, Resources
Policy 38, no. 3 (1 September 2013): 384–94, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.05.005.
65 Nabeel A. Mancheri et al., ‘Effect of Chinese Policies on Rare Earth Supply Chain Resilience’, Resources,
Conservation and Recycling 142 (1 March 2019): 101–12, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.11.017.
66 Kowalski and Legendre, ‘Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition: Production, International Trade and
Export Restrictions’.
67 Annabelle Liang and Nick Marsh, ‘Gallium and Germanium: What China’s New Move in Microchip War Means
for World’, BBC News, 2 August 2023, sec. Business, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66118831.
68 Eric Lipton and Dionne Searcey, ‘Chinese Company Removed as Operator of Cobalt Mine in Congo’, The New
York Times, 28 February 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/world/congo-cobalt-mining-china.html.
69 Ellen Moore, ‘Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP)’, The People’s Map of Global China (blog), 22
November 2021, https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/indonesia-morowali-industrial-park-imip/.
70 Irina Patrahau et al., ‘Standards for Critical Raw Materials: Strategic Standard Setting in China, the EU and the
Netherlands’ (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, n.d.), https://hcss.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/Standards-for-Critical-Raw-Materials.pdf; Yi Wu, ‘The China Standards 2035 Strategy:
Analyzing Recent Developments’, China Briefing, 26 July 2022, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/
china-standards-2035-strategy-recent-developments-and-their-implications-foreign-companies/.
71 Eric Ng, ‘China’s War Chest of Rare Earth Patents Give an Insight into Total Domination of the Industry | South
China Morning Post’, South China Morning Post, 20 July 2019, https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/
article/3019290/chinas-war-chest-rare-earth-patents-give-insight-total.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

29

Even though investments increased significantly in 2022, looking at the geographical distribution of investments may hide the ownership of these future projects. Global investment in
CRM primary supply has increased in 2022 compared to 2019, from about USD 30 billion to
slightly over USD 40 billion.72 Yet most of the exploration and production of minerals remains
concentrated in few countries, with China being present in most of these mineral markets.
Even though most planned refining projects for nickel are located in Indonesia, this is only
half of the story. Chinese companies are heavily involved in Indonesia’s nickel sector. In
2022, Chinese companies invested USD 3.2 billion in Indonesia, a large part of it in smelting
facilities for nickel.73 Moreover, the Chinese government invested the record amount of
$10 billion in mineral industries in the first half of 2023 across African, South American and
Asian countries.74

72 ‘Critical Minerals Market Review 2023’, IEA, accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/
critical-minerals-market-review-2023/key-market-trends.
73 Yudith Ho and Eko Listiyorini, ‘Chinese Companies Are Flocking to Indonesia for Its Nickel’, Bloomberg, 15
December 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-15/chinese-companies-are-flocking-to-indonesia-for-its-nickel.
74 Edward White, ‘China’s Overseas Investment in Metals and Mining Set to Hit Record’, Financial Times, 31 July
2023, https://www.ft.com/content/dff6b029-43af-46e7-947d-06981cd988ec.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

30

5. Dutch companies
in metals and
minerals supply
chains: capabilities,
challenges and
opportunities
5.1. Types of companies active in the
Netherlands and their capabilities
The metals and minerals sector in the Netherlands consists of companies active across the
supply chain in the extraction, processing, manufacturing and recycling of minerals, both as
operators and as service providers – including equipment and technology, software, storage
and logistics (Figure 11). To this group are added financial and trade companies and knowledge institutes.
Broadly speaking, two types of companies are active in the Dutch metals and minerals sector:
multinational companies with global operations, and smaller companies that have most of
their operations in Europe, though are sometimes active in non-European countries in addition to the Netherlands. Larger companies may be headquartered or have an office in the
Netherlands but have most of their operations in mineral industries across the world. They are
not dependent solely on domestic legislation to stay in business, but on international conditions as well. Contrastingly, Dutch companies that have most operations in the Netherlands
and Europe tend to be smaller (start-ups, and small –and –medium-sized enterprises) and are
highly dependent on national and EU legislation.
The industry is closely interconnected and mutually dependent. As the country is relatively
small and very dense, the various functions of industry are closely integrated for efficiency
gains. For instance, the extraction and processing of magnesium salts produces base chemicals for industry. In turn, chemical re-agents like ammonia and hydrochloric acid are necessary for the processing of fertilizers and certain minerals. Many industrial processes result in
byproducts that may not be directly relevant for the company itself but that can be reused by
someone else. As such, a temporary or permanent closure of a company is likely to impact the
entire industrial ecosystem as well.

31

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 11. The activity of companies in metals and minerals supply chains in
the Netherlands.
The activity of companies in metals and minerals supply chains in the Netherlands
Companies headquartered in the Netherlands | Companies active in the Netherlands

Extraction
Allseas
Nedmag
Nobian
Sibelco

Aurubis
Climax Molybdenum
E-magy
E-Max
Geraeds Ijzergieterij
Gieterij Doesburg
KME Netherlands
Nijmeegsche Ijzergieterij

Nouryon
Nyrstar
Sanders Gears Casting Machining
Sibelco
Tata Steel
Uzimet
VDL Castings Heerlen
Wupperman Staal
Zalco

Service
providers

Accessworld
Albemarle
Alia Instruments
Allseas
Antea
Arcadis
Arenal Dredging and Mining

Finance
and trade

BHP
Metinvest
Natec
WMC Energy
Stratton

Knowledge
institutes

Brightlands Chemelot
CML Leiden University
IHE Delft
In2Waste Solutions

Cohere Consultants
Crux Engineering B.V.
Eurocell
Fastned
Fugro
Ginaf Truck B.V.

Recycling

Manufacturing

Conversion / Processing

ASML
CIREX
ENERCON GmbH
Fairphone
General Electric
Leyden Jar
MHI Vestas Offshore Wind
NX Filtration
NXP

Hiber
MTD Pure Water
Netics B.V.
Optecs B.V.
Paques
ROHR-IRDECO

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
M2i
Metalot
TNO

Philips
Signify
Sunrock
Nefit Industrial
HYCC
Nobian
BASF
Elsun
SABIC

Royal Eijkelkamp
Royal HaskoningDHV
Royal IHC
SGS
Skygeo
Siemens Gamesa

Smart-M
Soluforce B.V.
Steeltrace
Steinweg
Trisoplast
Van Essen Instruments

Aurubis
A&M Recycling
Circular Industries
Galloo
Krommenhoek Metals
Raak Metals
TES
Van Peperzeel

Weir Minerals
Witteveen en Bos

TU Delft
Wageningen University

Note: The list is not comprehensive. The companies are categorised according to their
field of activity in the Netherlands, but they may be active in other sectors abroad.

Below, some of the key capabilities of Dutch companies or global companies active in the
Netherlands are outlined.
Extraction
When it comes to the extraction of minerals, salt mining in the form of both sodium chloride
and magnesium chloride is a large-scale operation in the Netherlands.75 Reserves in the North
and East of the country continue to be exploited by companies active primarily in the Dutch
and European markets. Depending on their characteristics and purity, salt-based products
can be used in chlor-alkali industries, the food and agriculture sector, in pharmaceuticals, and
lastly, in road safety (e.g., the provision of grit). 76
Another notable industry in the Netherlands is sand extraction. In the North Sea, suppletion and fill sand are extracted as a means to protect the Dutch coastline as well as being
employed in the construction industry.77 Additionally, the Netherlands has reserves of silica
75 E L J Scherpbier and H C Eerens, ‘Decarbonisation Options for the Dutch Salt Industry’ (TNO, PBL, 2021),
https://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/pbl-2021-decarbonisation-options-for-the-dutch-salt-industry-3477.pdf.
76

Scherpbier and Eerens.

77 ‘Surface Mineral Extraction’, Noordzeeloket, accessed 21 September 2023, https://www.noordzeeloket.nl/
en/functions-and-use/artikel-baseline/.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

32

sand that is converted into silica.78 This is used in the glass, metallurgy and construction
industries. At the right purity, silica sand is one of the raw materials used for the production of
silicon metal, a key part of the EU’s CRM list.79
Moreover, the Netherlands has a strong basis of companies that have developed deep-sea
mining equipment and technology. While most of these remain service providers of equipment
to global mining companies, there are also companies that would operate the equipment
themselves and thus engage in extraction in international waters, granted that the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) gives them the green light. As of 2023, no official decision has been
made by the ISA on permits for the exploitation of minerals in international waters given uncertainty about environmental impacts. The decision has been postponed to July 2024.
Conversion and/or processing
Steel processing makes up a dominant part of the Netherlands metals and minerals processing.
This is undertaken primarily by smelters, steel production plants and foundries that feed the
Dutch and European markets, with a few exceptions of internationally active companies.
Moreover, there are companies engaged in the Netherlands in the processing of manganese,
silica and baryte, which are either part of the EU’s CRM list (manganese, baryte) or can be
used in the production of a CRM (silica). The processing of zinc, molybdenum and aluminium
also takes place in the Netherlands. Most of these companies are also active abroad, both in
processing and extraction of various minerals.
Recycling
Most recycling companies in the Netherlands serve the domestic and/or European markets.
While the recycling of CRM is a complex process given that technology is often still under
development or the process is very inefficient and thus expensive, there is an increasing move
towards such activities, such as start-up developing facilities for recycling digital technologies
(e.g., print circuit boards) and large-scale multinationals investing in battery recycling.
Service providers
The Netherlands has particularly strong capabilities in service provision in minerals and metals
value chains, especially at the global level. Dutch companies have a good reputation in water
management, environmental assessment and sustainable design, engineering and infrastructure. These services are essential for the mining and processing of minerals. Several large
Dutch companies are active in these industries in North and South America as well as Africa.
At the same time, as part of the well-developed Dutch maritime industry, large scale Dutchbased multinational companies have emerged. They are involved in dredging, offshore fossil
and renewable energy infrastructure and, increasingly, deep sea mining, across the world.
The Netherlands is also known for its innovative business environment. As such, there are
Dutch startups developing software to optimize processes and increase efficiency in minerals
extraction and processing.

78 P Ike, ‘Mineral Planning Policies and Supply Practices in The Netherlands’ (University of Groningen, 2005),
https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/36009669/The_Netherlands.pdf.
79 Grohol and Veeh, ‘Study on the Critical Raw Materials for the EU 2023’.

33

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Finally, the Netherlands is a global trade hub, making it an attractive location for traders and
specialized storage providers. The Port of Rotterdam is the hub for metals trade in Europe and
even serves as a key location for the delivery of metals to North America. Customs and other
related services are highly efficient and digitized, facilitating these processes. Traders often
opt to maintain stock-level presence in Rotterdam or in the vicinity in order to be flexible and
be able to react rapidly to changes in global demand and supply.

5.2. Obstacles to successful operations
This section outlines the key challenges that the interviewed companies active in the
Netherlands face in maintaining operations and/or expanding. Table 7 maps the challenges
according to the part of the supply chain that the company referred to, while Table 8 divides the
issues depending on whether the company has operations primarily within the Netherlands
and the EU market or worldwide. Each of the challenges is, in turn, described below.

Table 7. Key obstacles to successful operations in the Netherlands and the EU ranked
according to the urgency of the issue.

Service providers

Finance

Trade

Knowledge

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Insufficient financial support

X

X

X

Inconsistent or inexistent legislation

X

X
X

Processing

X

Ranked in order of urgency

Extraction

Recycling

An ‘X’ means that the company faces an issue. The more companies indicated they face this problem,
the more urgent the problem is considered to be. The table shows whether a specific challenge applies to
companies primarily active in the Netherlands and the EU, to companies primarily active abroad, or to both.
The data was collected based on 30 interviews with industry representatives.

Negative public opinion

X

X

Insufficient dialogue with government and lack of trust

X

X

Delayed action and fragmented mandates

X

X

Uneven playing field

X

Cumbersome permitting process

X

Inadequate green energy infrastructure

X

X

Energy costs

X

X

X
X

Lack of space

X

X

Unskilled labour

X

X

34

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Table 8. Key obstacles to successful operations in the Netherlands ranked according
to the urgency of the issue.

An ‘X’ means that the company faces an issue. The more companies indicated they face this problem,
the more urgent the problem is considered to be. The table shows whether a specific challenge applies to
companies in one or more parts of the mineral supply chain. The data was collected based on 30 interviews
with industry representatives.
Companies active
worldwide

Companies active in
the Netherlands and EU

Negative public opinion

X

X

Insufficient dialogue with government and lack of trust

X

X

Delayed action and fragmented mandates

X

Ranked in order of urgency

Uneven playing field

X

Cumbersome permitting process

X

Insufficient financial support

X

X

Inconsistent or inexistent legislation

X

X

Inadequate green energy infrastructure

X

Energy costs

X

Inefficient use of space

X

Unskilled labour

X

X

A. Negative public opinion
Mining and industrial processes have an unfavourable reputation in European society. Coal
mines have embedded mining in European culture as a highly polluting industry that should
be. This goes hand in hand with the ‘not in my back yard’ mentality whereby local communities
oppose the idea of expanding industrial facilities close to their homes.
Several projects have been cancelled or postponed due to public opposition in Europe. In
Serbia, nation-wide protests against a lithium exploration site by Rio Tinto led to the government opposing the project’s further development.80 In Spain, the Extremadura lithium mine
has been a contested topic for more than 5 years. Due to local opposition, the plans were
updated from an open-cast mine to an underground operation to minimise environmental
impact.81 The new plans are still opposed by the local population.
However, reshoring some of the mining and processing of minerals in Europe cannot be seen
in isolation of the global minerals industry. A balanced view would acknowledge the negative
impacts of mining and processing in Europe in relative terms to current global mining operations that take place in countries with limited standards for the environment, human rights and
labour conditions. Opposing mineral industries in Europe only externalises the issue to other

80 ‘Serbia: Thousands Protest against Rio Tinto Lithium Mine Project and New Draft Laws Allegedly Designed to
Benefit Business’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 17 January 2022, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/serbians-are-protesting-against-lithium-mine-and-new-draft-laws-which-allegedly-benefit-business/.
81 Joyner Caceres, ‘EU Green-Tech Homeshoring Plans Face Resistance in Spain’, DW, 16 March 2023, https://
www.dw.com/en/
spanish-lithium-eus-green-tech-homeshoring-plans-face-resistance-on-the-ground/a-64996771.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

35

countries.82 Moreover, long-term monitoring of restoration efforts in mining sites shows positive results within 10-15 years.83
Companies in the Netherlands share this struggle, especially those in the extraction and
processing sectors. The conversation is currently taking place of whether mining magnesium
salts in the Netherlands is of national interest. Deep sea mining tends to be highly divisive in
public debate too. There is a lack of balanced discussions about industrial processes in the
Netherlands and Europe.
B. Insufficient dialogue with the government and lack of trust in government policy
The industry is under significant pressure because of climate regulation, geopolitical developments and geo-economic competition. Throughout the interviews, companies expressed the
feeling of being unwelcome in the Netherlands due to the increasingly stringent regulations,
the structural difficulties of adapting to these new conditions such as lack of (affordable)
green electricity, grid connections and space, and negative public opinion. Companies feel like
there is insufficient support and understanding given by the government despite having some
of the most sustainable processes in the world. The relationship between the mineral industry
and the government is characterised by a general lack of trust.
C. Delayed action and fragmented mandates
The EU made significant progress in one year to start reducing dependence on foreign
suppliers. However, further than a shift in political narrative, companies interviewed in this
study have not yet experienced concrete changes. Initiatives in the Netherlands and EU are
constrained by slow decision-making compared to the US, Canada or South-Korea, where
governments have been much more proactive in their support for industry. Due to the use
of CRM throughout a wide variety of sectors, the responsibility for various parts of minerals
supply chain was spread across departments within the Government. If a company needed
information, they would have to reach out to various departments responsible for a small part
of the answer, making it very difficult to get a comprehensive picture. The fragmentation in
mandates brings uncertainty and discourages companies from expanding, whether domestically or abroad. For instance, a start-up that developed software to increase the efficiency of
mineral processing wants to expand abroad. It would be more productive to support creating
insights into the different countries’ mineral sectors, for (large) Dutch companies to assess
partnerships. Having an ‘agency or diplomatic point of contact’ hat has a good overview of the
latest developments in the sector as a whole that could support partnering with local partners,
financing opportunities etc. Now, in absence of support, the company must invest a significant
amount of time and capital to find this information.
D. Uneven playing field with non-EU countries
Most companies operating in the Netherlands and the EU are experiencing an uneven
playing field compared to non-EU countries due to weaker regulations abroad and the heavy
governmental support that these non-EU companies receive. The high energy costs, lack
of space and high labour costs in the Netherlands are contributing to the uneven playing
82 Guillaume Ragonnaud, ‘Securing Europe’s Supply of Critical Raw Materials’ (European Parliamentary
Research Service, March 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739394/
EPRS_BRI(2023)739394_EN.pdf.
83 Tim Stephens, ‘Long-Term Monitoring Shows Successful Restoration of Mining-Polluted Streams’, UC Santa
Cruz News, 4 March 2021, https://news.ucsc.edu/2021/05/mine-remediation.html.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

36

field – higher operating costs are forcing companies to increase their prices. However, they
operate in international markets and must offer competitive prices with China, India or Turkey
to stay profitable.
Several interviewed companies reinforced that customers value quality and sustainability,
but price is always the deciding factor of whether a product is purchased. According to a
company that surveyed its customer base, no customer agreed to a 2-3% increase in price in
order to guarantee a sustainable production process.
E. Permitting processes and inconsistent legislation
The duration and complexity of the permitting process was mentioned throughout interviews with the extraction, processing, recycling and service providing sectors active in the
Netherlands. Including permits, it takes an average of 17 years to open a mine according to
the International Energy Agency and 3-5 years to set up processing and recycling facilities.84
As such, companies must start developing projects as soon as possible to make the 2030
target. The permitting process has not yet been updated to match the fast pace of EU and
Dutch ambitions.
In the extraction and processing sectors, permitting is difficult due to the complex and largescale industrial processes they perform. This means that companies have to be in contact
with several different agencies and levels of government, often due to insufficient capacity
or knowledge within permitting agencies. Compared to companies outside of the EU, Dutch
companies are operating in a relatively sustainable manner and have minimized possible environmental damage. Still, the regulatory difficulties they face make it difficult to stay in business
or to expand to reach 2030 goals. Companies are considering expanding operations in other
jurisdictions in South America, the Middle East and the United States due to the difficulties of
staying in business in the Netherlands.
The recycling sector is energy intensive as well and permitting can take a long time. Moreover,
issues arise with the type of feedstock that they can use given that legislation has not
been fully adapted to support circularity. Often waste streams require a different type of
handling than raw materials, making it difficult and expensive for recycling companies in the
Netherlands to source. Changing definitions of waste streams and categories could benefit
the Dutch recycling industry.
For service providers such as storage and logistics companies, permitting is difficult due
to the outdated legislation regarding non-ferrous materials. Many minerals like lithium are
considered hazardous materials and require very extensive permitting process to transport
large amounts, comparable to the processes required for large-scale chemical plants with
which they claim they are incomparable with. This puts a significant burden on (smaller)
storage and logistics companies even though their operations are less risky than those of
a chemical plant. As such, an in-between layer of legislation would be useful to distinguish
between the scale and risk of operations, facilitating faster permitting.

84 ‘Global Average Lead Times from Discovery to Production, 2010-2019 – Charts – Data & Statistics’, IEA, 3 May
2021, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-average-lead-times-from-discovery-to-production-2010-2019.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

37

F. Unclear financial instruments
The goals to expand the Dutch footprint in mineral supply chains are not paired with clearly
defined financial instruments, especially when contrasted with the US, Germany, Sweden or
France. Dutch companies either lack knowledge of financial support possibilities through the
Dutch government and are thus discouraged from expanding or consider expanding operations abroad given attractive conditions offered by other governments. Especially start-ups
and small and medium enterprises (SME) are struggling to find initial investments to scale
activity domestically and abroad. For instance, the US Defence Production Act and Inflation
Reduction Act offer significant subsidies for European companies to open up extraction,
processing and manufacturing on US soil. Germany’s untied loan guarantees are de-risking
investments for German companies abroad. The Dutch government can play a key role in
de-risking investments across the sector and creating accelerators for smaller companies
to scale.
G. Energy costs and inadequate green energy infrastructure
Companies that operate in the Netherlands in the extraction, processing, recycling and logistics sectors face challenges to maintain operations and expand due to high costs and infrastructural constraints. Many companies are part of globally integrated mineral value chains.
Financial difficulties in the Netherlands constrain their ability to maintain current facilities and
expand both domestically and abroad.
As climate regulations are becoming increasingly stringent, companies in extraction,
processing and recycling sectors are caught between high costs on the one hand, and infrastructural limitations that slow down their decarbonization on the other hand. Many companies are taking active steps to reduce emissions by investing in advanced and energy efficient
furnaces, electrifying (parts of) operations and looking into investments in green hydrogen or
biomass. Yet high costs and severe infrastructural constraints limit the speed at which they
can transition and expand operations.
Energy prices and the taxation on fossil fuel energy in the EU is significant, and in the
Netherlands it is more stringent than in other EU countries. Energy prices in Europe have
historically been much higher than China or India given their use of coal rather than natural
gas. The industry retail price for natural gas in the US has been less than half the price of gas
in the Netherlands since the early 2010s (Figure 12).85 Especially since the energy price crisis
in 2022, industrial energy costs have skyrocketed. Added to natural gas and electricity prices
is the taxation on emissions in the Netherlands. The Netherlands does not provide support
schemes like the Indirect Cost Compensation and Volume Correction Scheme that are available in various other EU countries and approved at the EU level.

85 ‘Dashboard for Energy Prices in the EU and Main Trading Partners’, European Commission, accessed 22
September 2023, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/energy-prices-and-costs-europe/
dashboard-energy-prices-eu-and-main-trading-partners_en.

38

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 12. Natural Gas Industry Retail Prices excluding recoverable taxes and levies,
2009-2019.86
EU Average

Netherlands

2012

2014

United States

40

EUR2018/MWh

30

20

10

0

2010

2016

2018

Moreover, green energy is insufficiently available in the Netherlands and the transmission
grid is not strong enough to support (extra) connections for industrial facilities, whether for
smelting or recycling. The market for green hydrogen and biofuels is still under development
and prices remain high, so a transition will require some more time. The current electricity grid
is not suited to connect processing or recycling facilities for CRM and supply the necessary
(green) power to support these energy-intensive processes.
These domestic issues are constraining the companies’ willingness and ability to expand
operations. Companies have expressed uncertainty about staying in business in the
Netherlands over the next 5 years. Some have plans to expand abroad, in the US, Middle East
and South America. The expansion into extraction and processing abroad would bring benefits to facilities in the Netherlands as supply chains would become more integrated, resilient
to shocks and therefore secure. However, companies tend to be reluctant to invest before
knowing whether their main operations in the Netherlands will remain profitable.
H.

Limited knowledge and intellectual property development

The focus of technical research and university education for upstream mineral industries has
declined over the last two decades, reducing the speed of knowledge development and the
size of a skilled labour force to support strategic autonomy in the mineral sector. In contrast,
academic research on circular economy and the contribution of secondary material flows to
resilient mineral supply chains is a strong component in Dutch universities.
86

‘Dashboard for Energy Prices in the EU and Main Trading Partners’.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

39

In the 1980s mining engineering emerged as a strong sector in the Netherlands, but the last
20 years have seen a significant decline. The academic focus on earth sciences grew significantly in the 1980s-1990s due to the focus on coal, natural gas and petroleum engineering.
The number of students in the Applied Earth Sciences department of the TU Delft grew
threefold – from 15-20 students in the early 1900s to 60 in 1980-1990.87 Membership in the
KNGMG (Royal Geological and Mining Society of the Netherlands) peaked in the mid-1980s
at 1550 members, compared to 500 in 1925.88 As of 2023, the KNGMG has 700 members,
which they explain it is due to “the closing of the coal mines in the nineteen sixties and the
disappearance of mining engineers in Dutch industry”.89 The lack of knowledge development
is directly impacting the labour force in the long run.
At the same time, EU intellectual property (IP) in the mineral processing industry tends to be
weak compared to competitors like China. Significant investments of Chinese companies
over time gave them IP rights over a number of processes, including the refining of rare earths
and magnesium metal. Between 1950 and 2019, China filed 25.911 patents for rare earth
elements compared to 9.810 by the US, 13.920 by Japan and 7.280 by EU countries combined
(Figure 13).90 As such, European companies that want to enter new mineral markets often
must source their technology from China or spend time and capital developing alternative
technologies even before starting to plan a facility, for instance.

Figure 13. Global patent filings by Chinese firms covering rare earth elements
compared to firms in the rest of the world91

87 ‘De Mijnbouwstraat 120. Van 1912-2021 een markant gebouw’, TU Delft, 10 June 2021, https://www.tudelft.
nl/2021/citg/de-mijnbouwstraat-120-van-1912-2021-een-markant-gebouw.
88 ‘Geschiedenis van het KNGMG’, KNGMG, accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.kngmg.nl/
geschiedenis/.
89

‘Geschiedenis van het KNGMG’.

90 Ng, ‘China’s War Chest of Rare Earth Patents Give an Insight into Total Domination of the Industry | South
China Morning Post’.
91

Ng.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

40

While up- and midstream research and innovation has declines in the last years, research on
circularity has been relatively stable. Departments of Industrial Ecology, Industrial Design and
Circular Built Environment departments of Leiden University and the Technical University of
Delft have been researching circular approaches to mineral supply chains over the last years.
I. Inefficient use of space
Serious limitations to the existence of mineral industries stem from the competition for space
in the Netherlands. On the one hand, space is required to transition the Dutch and European
economies given the coexistence of fossil and green energy in the short and mid-term. While
demand for oil and gas remains high and green fuels are on the rise, the industries will function
in parallel. On the other hand, there are many competing ambitions for the Netherlands (and
the EU) to become central actors in mineral supply chains, circularity and recycling, green
hydrogen supply chains, green electricity etc. This comes in addition to pressures around
population density and the housing crisis.
All these various societal functions are competing for space. As of 2023, facilities of companies involved in the storage, logistics and stockpiling of critical minerals are being overtaken
by housing plans around big cities. A centralised vision over the type of facilities wanted in the
Netherlands and good spatial planning are required to ensure that important assets for Dutch
and European strategic autonomy are not accidentally chased out of the country. The Port
of Rotterdam is the central hub for minerals in North-Western Europe, but re-purposing infrastructure from other ports in the Netherlands could allow the country to better participate in
CRM supply chains for the European hinterland.

5.3. Opportunities to strengthen mineral
security in the Netherlands and abroad
This section outlines opportunities to strengthen mineral security for companies active
in the Netherlands. The data was collected through interviews with the industry and
research institutes.
Extraction
In the Netherlands the mining sector is limited to a few minerals including salts and sands.
These can be leveraged in the production of certain CRM (making silicon metal from silica
sands) or substances that are essential for the functioning of Dutch and European industries.
Supporting these companies would be beneficial for the Dutch position in industrial supply
chains. At the same time, showing that existing industries are supported gives a positive
indication to other companies looking to invest in CRM supply chains. It would signal that the
Netherlands is a good candidate for new investments.
Another strength of Dutch companies lies in deep sea mining technology and operations. If
approved by the International Seabed Authority, deep sea mining could support the establishment of new supply chains and diversify mineral imports. For this to happen, a balanced
debate is necessary around deep sea mining based on comprehensive information about
global supply chains, their challenges and opportunities. Governments can choose to be
sponsor states for companies at the ISA. For instance, Belgium is a sponsor state while

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

41

Germany has refrained from doing so.92 Assuming that deep sea mining would take effect, it
is important to think along supply chains. Once a mineral is extracted from the seabed, it will
go through conversion and processing. This is a key opportunity to establish a reliable supply
chain with trustworthy players.
Processing
The current social, political and economic environment is making it difficult for companies engaged
in conversion and processing of minerals and metals to stay in business in the Netherlands. This
also inhibits their ability and willingness to expand activities. As such, when trying to strengthen the
mineral processing sector in the Netherlands, attention should be paid to existing companies and
their challenges. As mentioned above, this not only supports industrial competitiveness, but it
also points to a more certain and stable environment for (new) businesses to operate in.
Recycling
Recycling and circular approaches are key pillars of the Netherlands minerals strategy.
However, companies that try to expand in this sector in the Netherlands face difficulties in
terms of energy costs and availability, grid connections, permitting requirements and space
limitations in industrial clusters. Moreover, revising permitting regulations for waste can support
a bigger role for Dutch companies in recycling processes and providing secondary materials.
Service providers
Dutch service providers have a significant international footprint in engineering and consultancy for water management, maritime technology, sustainability and environmental assessments, geotechnical and survey services. Supporting their efforts abroad could strengthen
the position of the Netherlands in mineral supply chains. Moreover, enhanced collaboration
between Dutch companies can create a comprehensive and diverse proposition of Dutch
service providers for potential clients within mineral supply chains.
Stockpiling and trade
The Netherlands is known for being an international trade hub and this function expands to
the minerals sector too. The Rotterdam area is rich in opportunities for strengthening mineral
security through international trade, as companies may choose to establish their base operations there as well as hold stockpiles. Given the scarcity of land around the already busy
Port of Rotterdam and considering the nation-wide good infrastructure, other parts of the
Netherlands could be leveraged into a role in trade and stockpiling of CRM.
Knowledge development
To enhance the knowledge position of the Dutch industry and policy makers, expertise could
be formally consolidated into an institution that on the one hand could expand knowledge
on issues of national importance, and, on the other hand act, could act as a bridge between
academia, policymakers and industry.
92 Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, ‘Belgium Helps Decide on the
Seabed’s Fate’, FPS Foreign Affairs - Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 30 March 2023, http://diplomatie.
belgium.be/en/policy/policy-areas/highlighted/belgium-helps-decide-seabeds-fate-11-questions; BMWK-Federal
Ministry for Economics Affairs and Climate Action, ‘Marine Conservation: Germany Will Not Sponsor Deep-Sea
Mining until Further Notice’, 2022, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2022/11/20221101-marine-conservation-germany-will-not-sponsor-deep-sea-mining-until-further-notice.html.

42

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Global presence of companies active in the Netherlands
minerals and metals sector
Many companies active in the Netherlands with an office or an industrial plant (e.g., chemical industry, mineral processing, manufacturing half fabricates) are engaged in various mineral supply chains abroad. Creating synergies between these companies’ Dutch
branches and country offices and their foreign operations offers significant opportunities to strengthen European and Dutch mineral
security through international collaboration. For instance, actors in the Netherlands could expand collaboration on the import of
raw materials to increase supply security. Partnerships could be made between processing facilities in the Netherlands and foreign
extraction activities, or between Dutch recycling companies and end users abroad. In addition to diplomatic measures, financial
instruments like untied loan guarantees or import guarantees can support these processes.

Figure 14. Presence of companies active in the Netherlands minerals and metals
sector in Africa

Qatar

Jordan

Exploration and
prospecting

Extraction

Service provider

Processing

United Arab Emirates

Service provider

Libya

Exploration and
prospecting

Service provider

Service provider

Egypt
Exploration and
prospecting

Nigeria

Extraction

Exploration and
prospecting

Ghana
Exploration and
prospecting

Oman
Service provider

Saudi Arabia

Service provider

Exploration and
prospecting

Service provider

Service provider

DRC
Exploration and
prospecting

Cameroon
Exploration and
prospecting

Sao Tome and Principe
Exploration and
prospecting

Gabon
Exploration and
prospecting

Angola
Exploration and
prospecting

Mozambique
Exploration and
prospecting
Service provider

South Africa
Exploration and
prospecting
Service provider

Mauritius
Exploration and
prospecting

43

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 15. Presence of companies active in the Netherlands minerals and metals
sector in the Indo-Pacific

Russia
Extraction
Processing

South Korea

Kazakhstan

Extraction

Exploration and
prospecting

Processing

Service provider

Components
manufacturing

China
Exploration and
prospecting

Japan

Processing

Exploration and
prospecting

Components
manufacturing

Components
manufacturing

Azarbaijan

Service provider

Taiwan

Exploration and
prospecting

Exploration and
prospecting
Extraction

Bangladesh
Exploration and
prospecting

Pakistan

Vietnam

Processing

Service provider

Exploration and
prospecting

Hong Kong
Exploration and
prospecting

India
Exploration and
prospecting
Extraction

Thailand
Extraction

The Philippines

Processing
Components
manufacturing

Processing

Exploration and
prospecting

Components
manufacturing

Service provider

Macau
Exploration and
prospecting

Service provider
Service provider

Indonesia
Exploration and
prospecting

Malaysia

Extraction

Exploration and
prospecting

Brunei

Extraction

Exploration and
prospecting

Processing

Processing
Service provider

Australia
Service provider

Exploration and
prospecting

Singapore
Exploration and
prospecting

Extraction
Processing

Service provider
Service provider

New Zealand
Exploration and
prospecting

44

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 16. Presence of companies active in the Netherlands minerals and metals
sector in North America

Canada
Exploration and
prospecting

Extraction
Components
manufacturing

USA
Exploration and
prospecting

Extraction

Mexico
Components
manufacturing

Processing
Components
manufacturing
Service provider

45

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Figure 17. Presence of companies active in the Netherlands minerals and metals
sector in South America

Trinidad and Tobago

Curacao

Exploration and
prospecting

Exploration and
prospecting

Guyana
Exploration and
prospecting

Panama
Service provider

Suriname
Colombia

Exploration and
prospecting

Exploration and
prospecting

Peru
Exploration and
prospecting
Service provider

Brazil

Bolivia

Extraction

Extraction

Processing

Chile
Mine development
Exploration and
prospecting
Extraction
Conversion

Argentina
Extraction
Components
manufacturing

46

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

6. Policy
recommendations
Achieving the goals of the EU CRMA and the Nederlandse Grondstoffenstrategie requires
a comprehensive approach to revitalize domestic industry, empowering it to diversify
supply sources and strengthen supply security. This report offers a set of recommendations for the Netherlands government to support companies active in the mineral industry
in the Netherlands, the EU and globally (Table 9). The level of action indicates whether the
Netherlands government should act through national or European-level policy instruments in
other to maximize the efficiency of a specific action.

Table 9. Summary of challenges and opportunities for companies active in the
Netherlands minerals sector and policy recommendations.
Issue

Recommendation

Level of action

Best practices from other countries

Challenge: Public
opinion

Facilitate a more balanced public debate by
offering fact-based information about global
mineral supply chains, the EU’s footprint, and
benefits and risks of reshoring (parts of)
supply chains.

European level

Under its Critical Minerals Refresh, the
British government is championing
London as the world’s capital of responsible finance for critical minerals.93

Challenge: Dialogue
with government

Engage in dialogue with companies to discuss
upcoming policy proposals and gain a better
understanding of possible unintended consequences of policies as well as find ways to mitigate these.

National level

Finland’s National Battery Strategy
created a national body to foster efficient
cooperation across various stakeholders
in the sector, facilitate interaction and
information flow across different members
of the battery value chain.94

Create a vision for the minerals industry and
integrate it in the National Plan for the Energy
System.

National level

The Netherlands National Plan for the
Energy System offers a clear vision about
what the green energy system should
look like.95

Concentrate mandates and responsibilities by
creating a ‘one stop shop’ in one government
department for minerals in order to improve the
availability of information and accelerate action.

National level

The Norwegian Government has designated its Directorate of Mining as the
“national competent authority for coordinating critical and strategic metal and
mineral projects (one-stop shop).”96

Challenge: Speed of
action and allocation of
mandates

93 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Critical Minerals Refresh’.
94 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, ‘National Battery Strategy 2025 - Executive Summary’.
95 Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, ‘Concept Nationaal Plan Energiesysteem’, Open Overheid,
2023, https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/5a6e1180-844e-4f42-ab06-d63a559cd795/file.
96 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, ‘– Norway Will Develop the World’s Most Sustainable Mineral
Industry’, Government.no (regjeringen.no, 6 July 2023), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/-norway-will-develop-the-worlds-most-sustainable-mineral-industry/id2986277/.

47

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Issue

Recommendation

Level of action

Best practices from other countries

Challenge: Permitting
processes and
legislation

Reduce red tape for permitting to speed up
action.

National level

Identify outdated or inconsistent regulation and
update it according to new ambitions.

National level

The EU CRMA sets out to streamline
permitting processes and accelerate
project development, but it is up to the
individual member states to implement this
change and streamline cross-European
projects.97

Challenge: Energy
costs and infrastructure

Support the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as the electricity grid to allow companies in the minerals sector to develop.

National level

Public investments through wholly or
partly state-owned companies.

Opportunity: Increase
the competitiveness of
companies active in the
Dutch and European
markets

Establish incentives structures that support the
expansion of the Dutch footprint in mineral
supply chains.

National level

The US IRA provides financial incentives
for companies starting mining and
processing activities under the condition
that part of the produced materials is for
industries in the US.98

Support a more even playing field by establishing
standards that can allow Dutch companies to
compete with non-EU actors on criteria other
than price.

European level

N/A

Improve information about the market and facilitate connections.

National and
European level

The International Energy Agency’s Critical
Minerals and Clean Energy Summit is a
platform for stakeholders across supply
chains to create relations and exchange
information.99

Encourage collaboration with globally active
companies that have headquarters and/or
operate industrial facilities in the Netherlands.

National level

N/A

Opportunity: Financial
support

Clarify the availability funding instruments and,
when possible, combine efforts with other EU
countries.

National level

The German, Swedish, Finnish governments are offering loan guarantees to
companies investing in mineral facilities
abroad.100

Opportunity:
Knowledge
development

Invest in education around minerals and metals
to expand skills and strengthen the workforce.

National level

The Canadian government supports
efforts to retain and grow female participation in the mining sector and facilitate the
immigration of talented workers to
communities with CRM projects.101

Invest in research and development for
European-based innovative solutions for CRM
value chains.

National level

The UK allocated £15 million to R&D in rare
earth elements.

Opportunity: Industrial
partnerships

97 ‘European Critical Raw Materials Act’.
98 ‘Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy
and Climate Action’ (Department of Energy, January 2023).
99 International Energy Agency, ‘IEA Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Summit’, accessed 25 September
2023, https://www.iea.org/events/iea-critical-minerals-and-clean-energy-summit.
100 ‘Untied Loan Guarantees’, UFK-Guarantees, accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.ufk-garantien.de/
en/products/guarantees/for-untied-loan-guarantees/untied-loan-guarantees.html; ‘Raw Material
Guarantee’; ‘Export Credits’.
101 Government of Canada, ‘The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy’.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

48

6.1. Address the challenges: creating an
enabling environment
Creating the necessary conditions for companies to stay competitive – i.e., an enabling
socio-political, economic and legislative environment – is an essential step in creating opportunities for further expansion. The sequence in which the recommendations are tackled
reflects their respective urgency.
• Public opinion:
- Facilitate a more balanced public debate by offering fact-based information about
global mineral supply chains, the EU’s footprint, and benefits and risks of reshoring
(parts of) supply chains. The public debate around mineral supply chains in the EU is
highly polarised and focused on absolute rather than relative perspectives. The opposition of the general public to upstream and midstream operations is based on the negative environmental and social consequences that these may bring to Europe. However,
rejecting these processes in the EU has substantial greenhouse gas and social footprints when considering weak corporate social responsibility abroad, child labour, the
financial cost and emissions required to transport the materials all the way to Europe.
The government can play a role in ensuring transparency and availability of information
to the public about global supply chains and the consequences of outsourcing the EU’s
mineral industry compared to reshoring.
• Dialogue with government:
- Engage in dialogue with companies to discuss upcoming policy proposals and gain
a better understanding of possible unintended consequences of policies as well
as find ways to mitigate these. The industry in the Netherlands and the EU is under
pressure to change to achieve climate goals but often does not have the necessary
instruments to perform this change. Limited space, energy costs, weak grid connections, insufficient green energy are structural challenges that are too large for individual
companies to resolve. Climate regulation is getting progressively more stringent, and
companies will continue to be pressured. Structural engagement is necessary in order
to better understand challenges, find common solutions and support domestic industry
to operate, change and/or expand.
- Create a vision for the minerals industry and integrate it in the National Plan for the
Energy System.102 The energy transition is bringing significant challenges to transform
and replace industrial processes. The Netherlands aims to be a rapid mover in several
sectors like critical minerals and green hydrogen, but it is often difficult to determine
priorities. This inhibits the willingness and ability of companies active in the Netherlands
to expand operations domestically and abroad. The cabinet should make a priority list
for ambitions in the mineral sector that aligns with other national plans for the energy
transition to deconflict choices and create a more certain business environment.
• Speed of action and allocation of mandates:
- Concentrate mandates and responsibilities by creating a ‘one stop shop’ in one
government department for minerals in order to improve the availability of information and accelerate action. As of now, many different departments and institutions
are responsible for a part of mineral supply chains, but there is a lack of overview of the
entire process, significantly affecting the speed of action. Companies find it difficult to
102 Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, ‘Concept Nationaal Plan Energiesysteem’.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

49

identify the right department to reach out to with questions. The various institutions are
often unaware of what their colleagues are precisely doing or who they are engaging
with. The Netherlands representations abroad are not familiar with the domestic
industry and their needs, nor are minerals on their priority lists. Dialogue between Dutch
companies involved in mineral supply chains and the Dutch foreign representations
is not always streamlined. For that reason, creating a ‘one stop shop’ that centralises
efforts and information, and is in regular contact with industry can reduce the burden of
individual companies by providing a collective service.
• Permitting and legislation:
- Reduce red tape for permitting to speed up action. The time to 2030 is limited and
ambitions for strategic autonomy in the energy and mineral sector are high. The significant expansion of energy and manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (including
minerals, green hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, etc.) puts significant pressure
on permitting departments in terms of capacity and knowledge development. Moreover,
processes can be inherently slow due to outdated regulation. The expansion of mineral
industry requires faster and more streamlined permitting processes.
- Identify outdated or inconsistent regulation and update it according to new ambitions. Certain regulations do not progress as fast as political ambitions. For that reason,
companies often find it difficult to advance at the same fast pace. For instance, the legal
criteria for labelling certain material flows as waste have negative implications for the
recycling industry, which is not allowed to reprocess it. At the same time, storage and
logistics companies that wish to handle minerals must obey the same permitting legislation as large chemical companies, even though there is a large difference in the types
of operations. Identifying such instances and ensuring that regulations are streamlined creates the necessary conditions for companies to take a bigger role in mineral
supply chains.
• Energy costs and infrastructure:
- Support the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as the electricity grid to
allow companies in the minerals sector to develop. Insufficient (green) energy and
lack of grid connection are major concerns of companies, especially those engaged
in energy-intensive processes like recycling or processing. To reach 2030 ambitions,
immediate and decisive solutions must be found to this issue.

6.2. Bolster opportunities: leveraging
Dutch capabilities to strengthen
mineral security
The Netherlands can play an important role in strengthening European mineral supply security. The recommendations below aim to capitalise on opportunities.
• Increase the competitiveness of companies active in the Dutch and European markets:
- Establish incentives structures that support the expansion of the mineral industry.
Companies that are active in mineral industries can take active steps in building resilient supply chains if incentives are introduced. Tax benefits or loans for companies
taking steps in reaching the Nationale Grondstoffenstrategie goals can encourage

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

50

industry-wide participation. Upon receiving support from the government, the companies could agree on a set of criteria according to which their activity will contribute to the
Dutch and European mineral supply security.
- Support a more even playing field by establishing standards that can allow Dutch
companies to compete with non-EU actors on criteria other than price. Most of the
interviewed companies in this study mentioned price competition to be highly problematic for their profitability. Even though clients may support sustainable processes,
the cheaper product will always win. As such, the government in collaboration with the
EU could develop mandatory regulations and standards that can support a more equal
playing field with non-EU companies. Leveraging standards codified in the Carbon
Border Adjustment Mechanism or Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive
could be a first step in this direction.103
• Industrial partnerships:
- Improve information about the market and facilitate connections. The Dutch industry
is strong in various parts of the supply chain, but companies are not always aware of
each another’s activity. The government can take on a facilitating role for companies to
make contact and create synergies. For instance, collaboration through Partners for
International Business (PIB) are known to work quite effectively across sectors, and
increasingly in mineral supply chains too.104 The Dutch government can bring together
industry representatives that may have complementing capabilities in terms of expertise or regional experiences, so alliances can be formed to combine volumes and create
a better value proposition for global partners to cooperate. This can then be supported
by the Netherlands foreign missions abroad.
- Encourage collaboration with globally active companies that have headquarters
and/or operate industrial facilities in the Netherlands. As the Netherlands is an
important trade hub and is placed in the centre of the North-Western industrial cluster
between Germany and Belgium, many companies have country offices or industrial plants in this area. While they are often not active in mineral supply chains in the
Netherlands, many of them have global operations of this kind. As such, partnerships
between Dutch industry and foreign suppliers could be encouraged by leveraging the
presence of the various companies in the region.
• Financial support:
- Clarify the availability funding instruments and, when possible, combine efforts with
other EU countries. Funding projects in mineral supply chains abroad entails significant
risks that can be too high for private investors. Governmentally led financial instruments
can mitigate these risks. Through untied loan guarantees foreign entities can take a loan
with Dutch sovereign risk in exchange for delivering a certain percentage of their supply
to the Netherlands. Import guarantees ensure mineral imports from a specific country to
be used in Dutch processing plants. Germany and Sweden have already been activating
such financial instruments to support their companies. The Netherlands government
could consider various financing schemes to support companies that want to expand
as well. Moreover, certain Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) in the EU have the ability to
front for other ECAs. For instance, the Dutch government could provide a share of the
103 European Commission, ‘Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’, accessed 25 September 2023, https://
taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en; European Commission, ‘Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and
Amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937’, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0071.
104 ‘Partners for International Business - PIB’, accessed 25 September 2023, https://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes/partners-international-business-pib.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

51

loan guarantee of another European country in exchange for some Dutch companies
becoming involved in a different country’s partnership. This could also support smaller
companies like innovative start-ups that are looking to expand in the market.
• Knowledge development:
- Invest in education around minerals and metals to expand skills and strengthen the
workforce. Getting a competitive edge in the mineral sector requires a segment of the
workforce to be educated in mineral upstream, midstream and downstream processes.
Moreover, the government can facilitate exchanges with countries with more developed
mineral sectors for industry and representatives of NL embassies to expand knowledge.
- Invest in research and development for European-based innovative solutions
for CRM value chains. Universities in the Netherlands should offer more doctoral
programmes (PhD) and academic research grants in the minerals to expand knowledge and foster innovation. Talent from likeminded countries that have more extensive
mineral industries could be attracted to conduct research projects in the Netherlands,
facilitating knowledge exchange and development.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

52

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policies/15698-critical-minerals-list-2021.

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

55

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57

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Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Appendix 1.
Companies active
in the metals and
minerals sector in
the Netherlands
The table below offers an overview of companies and organizations active in the metals and
minerals sector in the Netherlands. They were divided into supply chain sectors based on
their activity in the Netherlands. They may have other facilities in other parts of the supply
chain, abroad. This is not a comprehensive list of all companies and institutions working in the
metals and minerals sector in the Netherlands. All the information has been collected from
open sources.
Name

Sector

Description

Allseas

Extraction, Service
provider (equipment)

Deepwater infrastructure for offshore energy,
deepsea mining

BHP

Extraction

Mining copper, iron ore, potash, nickel, metallurgical coal. Over 90 locations worldwide

Nedmag

Extraction

Magnesium salt extraction in NL

Nyrstar Budel B.V.

Extraction, Processing

Zinc and zinc alloys

Sibelco

Extraction, Processing,
recycling

Mining and processing silica, clays, feldspathics, olivine; Recycling glass

Albemarle

Processing

Industry leader in lithium. In the Netherlands, it
produces catalysts

Century Aluminium

Processing

Carbon anode production facility in Vlissingen

Climax Molybdenum B.V.

Processing

Produce metallurgical molybdenum. Facility in
Port of Rotterdam

E-magy

Processing

Developer of new battery anode material

Geraeds Ijzergieterij B.V.

Processing

Iron casting and alloys

Gieterij Doesburg B.V.

Processing

Iron casting and alloys

KME Netherlands B.V.

Processing

Fully integrated copper- and copper alloy mill

Nijmeegsche Ijzergieterij
B.V.

Processing

Iron casting and alloys

Sanders Gears Casting
Machining BV

Processing

Castings

Uzimet B.V.

Processing

The only lead sheet producer in Benelux

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Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Name

Sector

Description

VDL Castings Heerlen
B.V.

Processing

Iron castings

Wupperman Staal
Nederland

Processing

Producer of galvanized flat steel

Zalco B.V.

Processing

Aluminium foundry

Tata Steel

Processing

Steel producers

E-Max

Processing

Sustainable aluminium

Nouryon

Processing

Specialty chemicals

Aurubis

Processing, Recycling

Supplier of non-ferrous metals and copper
recycling

Akzonobel

End user

Paints and performance coatings

ASML

End user

Lithography technology

BASF

End user

Chemicals

CIREX B.V.

End user

Manufacturing complex steel components for
cars, trucks, aviation etc.

Elsun

End user

Solar panels

Eneco Group

End user

Renewable energy generation services

ENERCON GmbH

End user

Development, construction, maintenance of
wind turbines

Eurocell

End user

Battery manufacturer

Fairphone

End user

Electronics with sustainable supply chains

Fastned

End user

Owns and operates electric vehicle charging
stations

FNsteel B.V.

End user

Steel wire products

General Electric

End user

Wind and gasturbines

HYCC

End user

Electrolysers for green H2

Leyden Jar

End user

Pure silicon anode technology for batteries

MHI Vestas Offshore
Wind A/S

End user

Design, manufacture, install and service wind
turbines for the offshore wind industry

Nefit Industrial B.V.

End user

Casting and assemblies

Nobian

End user

Essential chemicals

NX Filtration

End user

Fiber membrane producer

NXP

End user

Semiconductors

Orsted A/S

End user

Develops, builds and operates offshore and
onshore wind farms, solar farms, energy
storage facilities, renewable hydrogen and
green fuel installations and bio-energy plants.

Philips

End user

Electronics

RWE AG

End user

Electricity generation, building storage systems
and energy trading

SABIC

End user

Chemicals

SHELL

End user

Electrolysers for green H2

Signify

End user

Lighting company (former branch of Philips)

Sunrock

End user

Building and operating large-scale solar parks

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Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Name

Sector

Description

Vattenfall AB

End user

Producer and retailer of electricity and heat

A&M Recycling

Recycling

Recycling industrial waste, battery and catalyst
injectors, metal waste, e-waste etc

Circular Industries

Recycling

Currently developing the Urban Mining Factory
- Printed Circuit Boards (Q2 2025)

Galloo

Recycling

Recycling and recovery of old metals

Krommenhoek Metals

Recycling

Metal and electronics recycling

Raak Metals

Recycling

Metals recycling

TES

Recycling

Solutions provider for electrical installation
technology

Van Peperzeel

Recycling, Trade

Collector of old batteries, national sorting
centre of waste consumer batteries, trade of
non-ferrous metals

Steeltrace

Service provider
(Certification)

Certification of raw materials

Blast Mining Enterprises

Sevice provider
(Consultancy)

Mining consultancy services

Cohere Consultants

Service provider
(Consultancy)

Expert consultancy subsurface and dynamics

Crux Engineering B.V.

Service provider
(Consultancy)

Geotechnical consulting agency in the field of
geotechnical engineering, geohydrology,
ground and settlement risk assessment.

Netics B.V.

Service provider
(Consultancy)

innovative research and consultancy firm in the
field of sediment reuse

Deltares

Service provider
(Engineering)

Knowledge in the field of water and subsurface

Fugro

Service provider
(Engineering)

Geotechnical, survey and geoscience services

MTD Pure Water

Service provider
(Engineering)

Provide technology, project management and
implementation of projects for water reuse,
disposal of wastewater etc.

Royal HaskoningDHV

Service provider
(Engineering)

Engineering consultancy

SGS

Service provider
(Engineering)

Testing, inspection and certification

Antea

Service provider
(Engineering,
consultancy)

Engineering for sustainability, energy transition,
climate adaptation etc.

Arcadis

Service provider
(Engineering,
Consultancy)

Sustainable design, engineering, and consultancy solutions for natural and built assets

Boskalis

Service provider
(Engineering,
consultancy)

Dredging and marine experts

Witteveen en Bos

Service provider
(Engineering,
Consultancy)

Consultancy on engineering projects for
energy and infrastructure

Alia Instruments

Service provider
(Equipment)

Equipment for mining, dredging, tunelling, well
servicing industry

Arenal Dredging and
Mining

Service provider
(Equipment)

Equipment for mining, dredging, metal refining,
drilling, tunneling

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Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Name

Sector

Description

Ginaf Truck

Service provider
(Equipment)

Mining equipment, producer of electric trucks

ROHR - IDRECO

Service provider
(Equipment)

Designs and manufacture deep digging electric
dredging vessels and equipment for the mining
and dredging industries

Royal Eijkelkamp

Service provider
(Equipment)

Advanced equipment for various activities
within all phases of mining

Royal IHC

Service provider
(Equipment)

Maritime technology for dredging, offshore,
mining, and defence industry

Siemens Gamesa

Service provider
(Equipment)

Energy generation equipment

Smart-M

Service provider
(Equipment)

Manufacture advanced machinery to produce
ferrous and non-ferrous semi-finished
products

Soluforce B.V.

Service provider
(Equipment)

High pressure Flexible Composite Pipe (FCP or
RTP) systems

Trisoplast

Service provider
(Equipment)

Isolation solution consisting of a special
clay-polymer component mixed with sand and
water

Van Essen Instruments

Service provider
(Equipment)

Water level data loggers and monitoring tools
for groundwater, aquifer, remediation, and
mining applications

Weir Minerals

Service provider
(Equipment)

Engineering solutions for minerals and mining
technology markets

Accessworld

Service provider
(Storage & logistics)

Storage and logistics

Steinweg

Service provider
(Storage & logistics)

Storage and logistics

Hiber

Service provider
(Technology)

IoT solutions for the energy industry

Optecs

Service provider
(Technology)

Artificial intelligence for mining

Skygeo

Service provider
(Technology)

Earth observation platform and tools for mining,
industries etc.

Metinvest

Trade

International steel and mining group with vast
iron ore reserves, coal mines and steelmaking
assets in Europe and North America.

Natec

Trade

Wholesaler of solar energy

Stratton

Trade

Metals trade

WMC Energy

Trade

Uranium, battery materials

Mining Governance
Europe

Finance, Consultancy

Consultancy

Brightlands Chemelot

Knowledge

Chemical industry

Institute of Environmental
Sciences (CML) Leiden
University

Knowledge

Research

In2Waste Solutions

Knowledge

Circular and social economy

M2i

Knowledge

Materials innovation institute

Metalot

Knowledge

Sustainable, circular developments in the field
of metals and renewable energy

63

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

Name

Sector

Description

The Hague Centre for
Strategic Studies (HCSS)

Knowledge

Geopolitical and geo-economic analysis, risk
assessments and anticipatory action

The Netherlands
Organisation for Applied
Scientific Research
(TNO)

Knowledge

Research

Faculty of Industrial
Design Engineering;
Faculty of Architecture
and Built Environment at
the Technical University
of Delft (TU Delft)

Knowledge

Research

Wageningen University
and Research (WUR)

Knowledge

Research

Convenant Hernieuwbare
energie

Association

Solar and wind energy supply chain
sustainability

European Partnership for
Responsible Minerals

Association

EPRM is an accompanying measure to the EU
Conflict Minerals Regulation

Eurometaux

Association

European non-ferrous metals association

Holland Solar

Association

Association of Dutch solar energy companies

Metaal Nederland

Association

Association for Dutch metal industry

Metaalconvenant

Association

Internationaal MVO-convenant voor de
Metaalsector

Nederlandse Vereniging
Duurzame Energie

Association

Sustainable energy

Nederlandse
Windenergie Associatie

Association

Wind energy

Vereniging ION

Association

Association for Industrial Surface Treatment

VNCI

Association

Chemicals

WindEurope

Association

Wind energy

Advancing European Mineral Security | Insights from the Dutch Industry

64

Appendix 2.
International quick
scan of policy
interventions
Recent years have seen a significant increase in policy interventions in CRM sectors. HCSS
compiled a non-comprehensive list of policy interventions below. They are ordered alphabetically.

Domestic coordination
• Australia: 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy105
- Regional hubs will promote innovation, attract talent, boost efficiency, create jobs, incentivise investment. AUD 4 million are allocated to scope possible hubs.
- Significant investments in ESG standards aim to promote strong standards to gain
credentials with international partners. AUD 25 million from the Government and AUD
130 million from the Future Battery Industries Cooperative Research Centre aim to
develop certification programs to boost standards.
• Canada: FDI screening106
- Strict FDI screening rules in CRM sector grant the Canadian government the power to
determine whether an investment poses a risk to national security to increase control
over the strategic sector.
• EU: Critical Raw Materials Act107
- Streamlined and predictable permitting procedures by giving Strategic Projects priority
status.
• Rapid administrative treatment.
- Permit granting procedures should not take a maximum of 1 year for processing
and recycling, and a maximum of 2 years for extraction-related SPs.
• Urgent treatment in all judicial and dispute resolution procedures.
• Member States have to designate a single national competent authority which is
responsible for coordinating the entire permit granting process.
- Supply chain monitoring tools to inform companies about the risks of supply chain
disruptions.

105 Australian Government, ‘Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030’, https://www.industry.gov.au/node/92581, 7
July 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/critical-minerals-strategy-2023-2030.
106 ‘Canada: Government Announces FDI Screening Measures’, Global Trade Alert, 24 March 2021, https://www.
globaltradealert.org/intervention/101926/fdi-entry-and-ownership-rule/canada-government-announces-fdi-screening-measures.
107 ‘European Critical Raw Materials Act’.

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65

• Finland: National Battery Strategy108
- Creating a national body that can foster efficient cooperation across various stakeholders in the national battery and electrification sector to strengthen cooperation,
interaction and information flow across different members of the battery value chain.
• France: Varin Report 2022109
- Strengthening local dynamics for setting-up industrial sites in the processing, battery
components, and recycling sectors.
• Japan: International Resource Strategy 2020110
- In 2020, Japan updated its national resource strategy to also focus on securing its
supply of rare earths due their role in the lithium-ion battery industry by:
• Diversifying supply sources.
• Establishing emergency reserves.
• Strengthening international cooperation in supply chains.
• Norway: Minerals Strategy111
- The Directorate for Mining is the principal institution responsible for critical raw materials in Norway, functioning as a ‘one-stop-shop’.
• Spain: Decree 5/2022 Establishing Urgent Measures Necessary to Regulate the
Exploitation of Lithium Mineral Resources in Extremadura112
- The Spanish Government issued a decree to expedite administrative processes and
public funding to exploit lithium reserves in Extremadura, the largest deposit in Spain.
- The Decree allows projects to be exempt of a license, speeding up processes and
enabling access to subsidies.
• South Africa: Exploration Strategy for the Mining Industry of South Africa113
- To take advantage of South Africa’s mineral wealth, the government has established
some policies to boost its sectors.
- Increasing the number of exploration drilling projects in the country.
- Promote investments, attracting 5% share of global exploration expenditure by 2025.
- Streamline regulatory requirements, reduce bureaucracy to facilitate exploration
projects.
• US: Inflation Reduction Act114
- US government aims to accelerate the move toward clean energy and climate action
and ensure US leadership in clean energy innovation and technology.

108 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, ‘National Battery Strategy 2025 - Executive
Summary’.
109 BRGM, ‘Strategic Metals: BRGM in the Forefront of the Actions Announced by the State’, 17 January 2022,
https://www.brgm.fr/en/news/news/strategic-metals-brgm-forefront-actions-announced-state.
110 ‘Japan’s New International Resource Strategy to Secure Rare Metals’, METI: Agency for Natural Resources
and Energy, 31 July 2020, https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/special/article/detail_158.html.
111 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, ‘– Norway Will Develop the World’s Most Sustainable Mineral
Industry’.
112 Comunidad Autónoma de Extremadura, ‘Decreto-Ley 5/2022, de 31 de Agosto, Por El Que Se Establecen
Medidas Urgentes Necesarias En La Regulación Del Aprovechamiento de Recursos Minerales de Litio En
Extremadura’, Pub. L. No. Decreto-ley 5/2022, § 1, BOE-A-2022-16900 140774 (2022), https://www.boe.es/
eli/es-ex/dl/2022/08/31/5.
113 ‘The Exploration Strategy for the Mining Industry of South Africa’ (Department of Mineral Resources and
Energy, Republic of South Africa, 14 April 2022), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202204/46246gon2026.pdf.
114 ‘Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy
and Climate Action’, 182.

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66

Innovation and scale-up
• Australia: Critical Minerals Strategy
- Creating an enabling environment through R&D115
• AUD 50 million in the next 3 years to identify how to take advantage of Australia’s
resources and connect the mining to other CRM sectors.
• The AUD 50 million will be used towards building the National Critical Minerals R&D
Centre which will build Australian intellectual property, target bottlenecks, and drive
collaborative research.
- Major Projects Facilitation Agency116
• If you are developing a project with a capital investment of over $50 million, you are
eligible for Major Project Status. To qualify for this, the project must showcase its
contribution to Australia’s strategic priorities, growth, employment.
• Canada: The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy117
- R&D funding to de-risk technological innovation for upstream and midstream segments
of the value chain.
• EU: Strategic projects under CRMA118
• Climate, Digital, Defence and Space related projects will get priority if considered
strategic projects.
• UK: Critical Minerals Refresh: Delivering Resilience in a Changing Global Environment119
- Champion London as the world’s capital of responsible finance for critical minerals.
- Accelerating collaboration on critical minerals with international partners, specifically
Canada and South Africa.
- Circular Critical Materials Supply Chains (CLIMATES) fund (£15 million) to make the
UK’s Rare Earth Element supply chains more resilient and boost the circular economy.
- Accelerate-to-Demonstrate Facility includes a dedicated funding pillar on technology
innovations for critical minerals in developing countries.
• US: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support Domestic Critical Mineral and
Material Supply Chains 2021-2031120
- Coordinating R&D strategy across CRM supply chains

Human capital
• Canada: Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy121
- Federal skills and training to help institutions and employers train and re-skill people:
• The initiatives include a range of programs that help forecast future skill requirements, green-skills training, and growing the indigenous workforce.
• The existing programs will see new federal investments and the establishment of the
Sustainable Jobs Training Centre and the Sustainable Jobs Secretariat.
115 Australian Government, ‘Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030’.
116 ‘Major Projects Facilitation Agency’, business.gov.au, 7 March 2023, https://business.gov.au/expertise-and-advice/major-projects-facilitation-agency.
117 Government of Canada, ‘The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy’.
118 ‘European Critical Raw Materials Act’.
119 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Critical Minerals Refresh’.
120 ‘Critical Minerals and Materials: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support Domestic Critical Mineral
and Material Supply Chains’ (US Department of Energy, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/eere/ammto/2021-doe-critical-materials-strategy.
121 Government of Canada, ‘The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy’.

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- Assisting youth in developing skills and entering the labour market
• The Youth Employment and Skills Strategy (YESS) will help 15-30 year olds to
develop skills and transition into the labour market.
• The YESS has an existing initiative, the Canada Summer Jobs Program which could
include the critical minerals sector.
- Mobilise a more diverse and inclusive CRM sector
• The Government will support efforts to retain and grow female participation in the
mining sector and facilitate the immigration of talented workers to communities with
CRM projects through the Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot Program.
- Partnerships between business sectors and universities will incentivise enrolment
in mining curriculum, trade, and increase awareness of the roles CRM will play in the
energy transition.
- Continued collaboration with indigenous business leaders and organizations
• Finland: National Battery Strategy122
- Developing skills in the battery sector by creating:
• Virtual campuses integrating battery and electrification education available to
students and companies.
• National doctoral school on topics related to the national battery sector.
• Education program for battery engineers.
• US: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support Domestic Critical Mineral and
Material Supply Chains 2021-2031123
- The US government promotes interdisciplinary collaboration among material and
chemical science, computer science, and related disciplines to modernize the minerals
supply sector industry.
- DOE can establish a coordinated national plan with academic institutions, including
community colleges, technical professional societies, the National Laboratories,
research centres and industrial mining sites to create a comprehensive workforce
development infrastructure dedicated to the engineering and STEM disciplines relevant
to the identification of deposits, extraction, processing, separation, processing, reprocessing, and recycling of critical materials.

Financial instruments
• Australia: 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy124
- AUD 2 billion to help projects get off the ground, supporting local jobs and communities.
- Critical minerals accelerator initiative aims to bring new sources of supply online
supporting early and mid-stage projects that contribute to creating robust supply
chains.
- Modern manufacturing initiative: Mid-stage CRM projects have access to AUD 1.3
billion to pilot, demonstrate, or scale up techniques or processes to achieve commercial
competitiveness.
- Attracting investments through Austrade, the trade facilitation agency of Australia,
which aims to deliver specialised services to companies including trade missions to
facilitate global commercial partnerships.
122 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, ‘National Battery Strategy 2025 - Executive
Summary’.
123 ‘Critical Minerals and Materials: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support Domestic Critical Mineral
and Material Supply Chains’.
124 Australian Government, ‘Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030’.

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68

• Canada: The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy.125
- $1.5 billion to support CRM projects prioritising advanced manufacturing, processing,
and recycling applications.
- $40 million to support regulatory processes in reviewing and permitting CRM projects.
- $21.5 million supporting the CRM Centre of Excellence (CMCE) dedicated to developing federal policies and programs on CRM and assisting project developers.
- $1.5 billion for infrastructure development of CRM supply chains, seeing as deposits are
located in remote areas with challenging terrain.
• France: National investment fund126
- National investment fund worth €2 billion combining public and private funding for
mining projects. The state will initially contribute €500 million.
• Finland: Raw material guarantee
- The Finnish government offers import credit guarantees as “security for a loan granted
to a foreign borrower in connection with a long-term contract with a Finnish buyer
concerning import of raw materials”.127
• Germany: Untied Loan Guarantees128
- The German Federal Government provides lenders to raw material projects abroad
covering against commercial and political credit default risks. The projects have to be
in the national and macroeconomic interest of Germany and to sign a long-term supply
contract for the raw materials to a German off-taker.
• Japan: JOGMEC Funding for Exploration and Technology Development129
- Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) allocated a budget of 25
million in the form of subsidies, that will be implemented in:
• Geological structure survey projects, collection, analysis and provision of information
of surveys overseas conducted by Japanese companies.
• Technological development projects promoting resource exploration which ensure a
stable supply of metal.
• Mining pollution prevention support for projects preventing mining pollution.
• U.S.: California Lithium Valley Development130
- California Energy Commission is requesting $5 million to support planning of
geothermal development and lithium extraction and processing facility with the
proposal to
• Streamline permission of geothermal facilities.
• Funding for mitigation for communities affected by the development of geothermal.
• Create a lithium extraction tax.
• Reporting and fee requirements for geothermal mining.
• Incentives for projects manufacturing, processing, or recovering lithium.
• Funding for restoration and community grants supporting the region.
• US: Inflation Reduction Act
- Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit

125 Government of Canada, ‘The Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy’, 22.
126 EURACTIV.com, ‘The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act’, www.euractiv.com, 15 November 2022, https://www.
euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/special_report/the-eus-critical-raw-materials-act/.
127 ‘Raw Material Guarantee’.
128 ‘Untied Loan Guarantees’.
129 ‘Financial Support for Japanese Companies’, JOGMEC: Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security,
accessed 22 September 2023, https://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/stockpiling/metal_10_000003.html.
130 ‘Clean Energy Investments’, DF-46 (REV 10/20) § (2022), https://esd.dof.ca.gov/Documents/bcp/2223/
FY2223_ORG3900_BCP5438.pdf.

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• Tax credit for domestic manufacturing of components in the solar modules, wind
turbines, battery cells, and critical raw materials processing supply chain.131
• Tax credit is equal to 10% and is applicable for a range of CRM.
• Sweden: Export credits
- “Swedish exporters can strengthen their competitiveness by offering their foreign
customers financing in connection with the sale of their products or services.” 132
• South Korea: Overseas investment insurance
- “The Overseas Investment Insurance offers coverage to banks that provide loans to
Korean overseas developers that require large-scale and long-term financing.”133

International collaboration
• Australia-India Strategic Research Fund134
- Grants for Australian and Indian organizations researching downstream processing,
recycling, and reclamation of CRM.
• Canada-EU Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials135
- Canada and the EU established a strategic partnership on CRM, advancing security and
sustainability of trade and investment of CRM and downstream value chains, supporting
the green and digital transition.
• Canada-US Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Collaboration136
- The Canada-US Joint Action Plan on CRM aims to advance interest of the two countries
to secure the supply chains of materials in strategic sectors including communication
technology, aerospace and defence, clean technology.
• Critical Minerals Mapping Initiative (CNMI) 137
- The CNMI is an initiative between the Australian, Canada, and the US’ Geological/
Geoscience survey organizations aiming to boost their understanding of known CRM. It
has three concrete objectives:
• Develop a database for CRM geochemistry, mineral deposit/system classifications.
• Analyse CRM trends.
• Develop modelling approaches to increase accuracy and analysis.
• Energy-Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI)138
- Initiative of Australia, Botswana, Canada, Peru, and US aiming to use best practices in
the sourcing of CRM and the international mining sector, share information about mining
development, mapping of CRM, and closing/reopening mines.

131 ‘Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy
and Climate Action’, 26.
132 ‘Export Credits’.
133 ‘Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-Sure)’.
134 ‘Australia-India Strategic Research Fund – Collaborative Research Projects – Round 14’, business.gov.au, 7
March 2023, https://business.gov.au/grants-and-programs/australia-india-strategic-research-fund-aisrf.
135 ‘EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement’, European Union External Action, 1 April 2017, https://www.
eeas.europa.eu/node/13529_en.
136 Government of Canada, ‘Canada and U.S. Finalize Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Collaboration’, 9
January 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2020/01/canada-and-us-finalize-joint-action-plan-on-critical-minerals-collaboration.html.
137 ‘Critical Minerals Mapping Initiative – Policies’, IEA, accessed 10 May 2023, https://www.iea.org/policies/16092-critical-minerals-mapping-initiative.
138 ‘Energy Resource Governance Initiative Toolkit’, ERGI, accessed 25 September 2023, https://ergi.tools/.

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• Finland National Battery Strategy139
- Ensure Finnish experts and companies gain European-level visibility.
- Raise Horizon Europe financing instruments.
- Strengthen national research with Nordic, European, and global communities.
- Promoting Finnish clusters requires the following actions.
• Increasing communication of the battery sector, organizing conferences and events
in line with Slush, the largest start-up event in Europe.
• Participate in international battery forums promoting Finnish participation as a whole
and not as separate companies.
• Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) 140
- Partnership between Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea,
Sweden, the UK, the US, and the EU with objectives:
• Strengthening information sharing.
• Increasing investments in CRM supply chains.
• Developing recycling technologies.
• Sustainable Critical Materials Alliance (SCMA)141
- SCMA is an initiative of Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US
that focuses on ESG standards in the CRM supply chain.
- The SCMA will allow members to develop sustainable and inclusive mining practices
which:
• Have a nature-positive approach encouraging practices that reduce environmental
harm.
• Support local communities by promoting safe working conditions.
• Reduce GHG emissions by promoting sustainable practices compliant to ESG.
• Restore ecosystems through requirements to close mine sites.
• Build a circular economy by improving recovery from waste.
• Foster ethical corporate practices by implementing due diligence in supply chains.
• South Korea and Canada MOUs on CRM142
- The RoK and Canada have held talks discussing the importance of expanding cooperation on CRM.
- Four MOUs have been signed between LG and Canadian companies (Avalon, Electra
Snow Lake) on supply chain cooperation and information sharing. LG will be able to tap
into Canada’s supply stream of CRM for its industry and the RoK will support the private
sector in Canada through data on mining investments.

139 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, ‘National Battery Strategy 2025 - Executive
Summary’.
140 ‘Minerals Security Partnership – Policies’, IEA, 27 October 2022, https://www.iea.org/policies/16066-minerals-security-partnership.
141 Natural Resources Canada, “Countries Commit to the Sustainable Development and Sourcing of Critical
Minerals,” news releases, December 12, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/
news/2022/12/countries-commit-to-the-sustainable-development-and-sourcing-of-critical-minerals.html .
142 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, ‘Korea and Canada Sign Critical Minerals Supply Chain Cooperation
MOUs’, Korea.net, 26 September 2022, https://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-Releases/
view?articleId=6602&type=O.

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Strategic stockpiling
• Japan: International Resource Strategy143
- In 2020, the Japanese Government announced plans to review the volume of its stockpiles, setting targets for national stockpiles not including industry stockpiles. The duration of supplies is set at 60 days but for ‘high risk’ materials, the Japanese government
wants to increase the number up to 180 days.
• South Korea: Increase of stockpiles144
- South Korea announced in 2021 that it planned to increase its stockpiles of CRM like
cobalt, nickel, REEs, which are used in important sectors like EV batteries and renewable energy. Currently, stockpiles cover 56.8 days but the Ministry of Trade, Industry,
and Energy is planning to increase stockpiles to cover 100 days.
• US: Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act145
- This act was passed in 1939 but became dormant until 2021 when the US Government
announced plans to restore the National Defense Stockpile for certain minerals.

143 ‘International Resource Strategy - National Stockpiling System – Policies’, IEA, 27 October 2022, https://www.
iea.org/policies/16639-international-resource-strategy-national-stockpiling-system.
144 ‘South Korea to Increase Stockpiles of Rare Metals’, Argus Media, 5 August 2021, https://www.argusmedia.
com/en//news/2241424-south-korea-to-increase-stockpiles-of-rare-metals.
145 ‘Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act’.

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