A39-IP/297
International Civil Aviation Organization

TE/xx126
../../16

INFORMATION PAPER

ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION
TECHNICAL COMMISSION
Agenda Item 33: Aviation safety and air navigation monitoring and analysis
ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT THE RISKS TO CIVIL AVIATION
ARISING FROM FLYING OVER OR NEARBY CONFLICT ZONES
(Presented by Slovakia on behalf of the European Union and its Member States1 and the other Member
States of the European Civil Aviation Conference2; and by EUROCONTROL), and by Australia and
Malaysia
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper presents information on actions taken to manage the risks to civil aviation
arising from conflict zones. It provides references to the actions taken by ICAO on conflict zones, the
safety recommendations from the Final Accident Investigation Report on MH17; and information about
a regional approach, with Europe as example, for efforts of sharing and dissemination of information at
regional level.
This paper complements A39-WP/108 on Conflict Zones.
Strategic Objectives:

This paper relates to the Safety, Air Navigation Capacity, Efficiency, Security
and Facilitation Strategic Objectives.

Financial implications: N/A

1

2

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom.
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Moldova, Monaco,
Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine.

1

References:

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1.
1.1

A39-WP/108 on Conflict Zones
ICAO Convention; Annexes 2, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19
the United Nations Security Council resolution 2166 (2014)
ICAO State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59; 24 July 2014
Council WP/14220 report from the senior-level task force on risks to civil
aviation arising from conflict zones; 14 September 2014
Council WP/14223 Resolution of the Council on Malaysia airlines flight
MH17, destroyed over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014
2015 High-level Safety Conference (HLSC); 2 to 5 February 2015 (ICAO
SecGen HLSC/15-WP/33)
C-WP/14378 Progress report on the coordinated work programme
recommended by the task force on risks to civil aviation arising from
conflict zones (TF RCZ); 10 February 2016
Final Accident Investigation Report Dutch Safety Board on MH17 of 13
October 2015 (www.safetyboard.nl)

INTRODUCTION
This paper provides:

•
references to the actions taken by ICAO on conflict zones
•
the safety recommendations from the Final Accident Investigation Report on MH17;
and
•
information about a regional approach, with Europe as example, for efforts of sharing
and dissemination of information at regional level.
1.2
ICAO has taken several initiatives related to conflict zones after the accident with
MH17 on 17 July 2014 (see also paragraph 2.1). The ICAO Secretary General established the Task
Force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF-RCZ) that developed a work
programme with 12 actions, which was approved in principle by the Council during its 203rd Session
(C-DEC 203/1) on 27 October 2014 (see attachment 1). This work already undertaken and planned by
ICAO is acknowledged and appreciated.
1.3
The actions of ICAO had already been initiated when the Final Accident Investigation
Report on MH17 (including its safety recommendations) on conflict zones was published by the Dutch
Safety Board (DSB) on 13 October 2015 (see attachment 2). The safety recommendations on conflict
zones from the Final Accident Investigation Report are addressing respectively all States, ICAO and
operators.
1.4
This paper also provides background information on a regional approach for sharing
and disseminating relevant information on conflict zones, complementary to a global approach.
2.

ACTIONS TAKEN ON CONFLICT ZONES
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, NOTABLY BY ICAO

AT

2.1
Several actions to address safety of flight over or near conflict zones have been taken
by ICAO:
• ICAO established a Task force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TFRCZ). This TF developed a work programme;
• On 24 July 2014, ICAO issued State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59;
• In response to the accident, ICAO hosted a special high-level meeting with the directors
general of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International
(ACI) and the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO) on 29 July 2014;

2

•

Council Working Paper C-WP/14223, submitted by Malaysia and co-sponsored by all 36
Council Members, called for a resolution;
• The 2015 High-Level Safety Conference (HLSC), held from 2 to 5 February, adopted
conclusions and recommendations related to conflict zones;
• During its 204th Session in March 2015, the ICAO Council approved an interim procedure to
disseminate information on risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones. This resulted in
ICAO establishing in April 2015 the Conflict Zone Information Repository (CZIR); a
centralized web-based repository of risks over or near conflict zones, as recommended by the
HLSC. This was also reflected in State letter SMM 1/4-15/16; and
• The President of the ICAO Council established in April 2015 the Repository Review Group
(RRG) to periodically review the implementation and progress of the CZIR. The Council
reviewed the repository on 17 June 2016, deciding to explore alternative options for
dissemination of information on conflict zones.
2.2
The work of ICAO and the accident investigation was also supported by the United
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2166 (2014) during its 7221st meeting held on 21 July
2014.
3.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FINAL
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT ON MH17
AND ADDITIONAL ACTIONS PROPOSED TO ICAO
3.1.
For the accident investigation, cooperation was established between the Netherlands
and Australia, Malaysia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Unites States and the Russian Federation.
Attachment 2 of this paper contains all the recommendations of the accident investigation report on
MH17 released by the independent Dutch Safety Board. It is noted that, while Australia, Malaysia,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and the Russian Federation cooperated with the Annex 13
safety investigation, although the report and the recommendations can be attributed to the Dutch
Safety Board alone. It is important however, that all States give further consideration to the MH17
report. The recommendations refer to conflict zones in general and propose to implement
improvements at three levels:
a) Airspace management in conflict zones, in particular on the followings topics:
•
The timely closure or restriction of the use of the airspace;
•
Providing information to third parties as quickly as possible in the event of an armed
conflict with possible risks for civil aviation;
•
Coordination between civil and military air navigation service providers during an
armed conflict allowing the State to fulfil its responsibility for the safety of civil aviation in
the airspace.
b) Risk assessment
•
Provision of information
•
Risk assessment
c) Operator accountability
3.2.
This information paper refers to the safety recommendations of the Final Accident
Investigation Report in respect of the ICAO work programme. Those recommendations pertain to the
revision of SARPs, where necessary (see Attachment 3). The table below juxtaposes the
recommendations with the existing ICAO work programme on conflict zones (established before the
Report was published) and displays the potential link with ICAO Annexes.

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Table: Relation between the recommendations of the accident investigation report on MH17, the
actions of the ICAO work programme related to conflict zones and the ICAO annexes.
Recommendations of the accident
investigation report
airspace management in
1
conflict zones
2
3

Risk assessment

operator
accountability

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Link with the actions of the ICAO
work programme on conflict zones
1
12
2
1, 8, 12
1, 2, 4
3, 4, 10
9
4, 9
7; 12
7
7

Potential link with ICAO
Annexes
2, 15
(11), 15
Convention and Annexes
2, 11, 15, 17, 19
Convention and 2
11, 15
17, 19
19
6, (8), 19
15
15
19

3.3.
States must ensure the safety of their airspace. Airspace management in conflict zones
and civil-military cooperation within States regarding the availability of the airspace are principal
responsibilities of States.
3.4.
Moreover, the availability of threat information is vital for the State and operators’
risk assessment. This subject is addressed for operators in Annex 6, for State safety in Annex 19 as
well as in Annex 17 for operators and States from an aviation security perspective. Similar to other
risks in flight operations, conflict zones should be part of the risk assessment during flight preparation.
Operators are accountable vis-à-vis the public and their passengers and must take their responsibilities
for the safe planning of flights. In addition, dissemination of information is another State and service
provider responsibility, not only related to States’ responsibilities for airspace, but also for provisions
related to Aeronautical Information (Annex 15).
3.5.
Risk assessments are an essential part of airlines flight planning. IATA and ICAO are
cooperating, notably on the issue of including the work on risk assessment for conflict zones in the
IOSA Standards. IATA has an important role in specifying the formulation of the needs of airlines for
adequate information and discussing with States and ICAO.
3.6.
The Council (session 207/6; C-WP/14378) discussed on 26 February 2016 the
progress of the work programme recommended by the TF-RCZ and encouraged continuation of this
work with a holistic and coordinated approach. It also emphasized the importance of coordinating all
elements of the work programme and ensuring that interested parties be kept informed on progress.
The Council requested the Secretary General to consider means by which to advance some of the
completion timelines and to report periodically on the further implementation of outstanding items on
the TF-RCZ work programme.
4.

A REGIONAL APPROACH FOR EFFORTS ON
REGIONAL SHARING AND DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION, WITH EUROPE AS EXAMPLE

4.1
States can also inform other States directly when they have relevant information about
threats within foreign airspace, which is being advocated by ICAO is advocating.
4.2
In Europe, an initiative has been started by the European Union (EU) to implement a
system of collecting and sharing of information at regional level, based on a High Level Task Force
Report on Conflict Zones (see attachment 4 for the recommendations of the report)3. One of the
3

https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/208599_EASA_CONFLICT_ZONE_CHAIRMAN_RE
PORT_no_B_update.pdf

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considerations is that operators have expressed a need for a consolidated picture of the safety/security
situation. A level playing field for all operators is required to protect all passengers. Despite the fact
that operators have different resources available to them, all operators and passengers should have
access to the best available information. One of the main identified areas for improvement at European
level is the need for availability, in a timely manner, of all the information required to define a
common risk picture, to support National Authorities and operators in their own decision making
processes. Sharing information between States may help to validate information and also helps States,
with limited capacity to collect information about all conflict zones, to get a better understanding of
specific threats.
4.3
The High Level Task Force Report on Conflict Zones contains the following
recommendations:
a) State actions: EU Member States are recommended to set up national systems for addressing Risks
to Civil Aviation from Conflict Zones in which relevant information is shared with operators. In
addition, EU Member States should cooperate in sharing conflict zone information with the view
to enable the development of common EU risk assessments and to enable the timely sharing of
information on rapidly emerging new threats.
b) EASA actions: EASA should put in place a process allowing the publication of information and
recommendations related to conflict zone risks, based on common EU risk assessments, or based
on threat information. This should be done in close coordination with Member States, taking into
account the needs for both consultation and for timely dissemination including for emergency
cases.
c) Intelligence Agencies actions: Within the boundaries of a States’ legal structure, the intelligence
agencies should support national systems for addressing risks arising from conflict zones and
should support the State’s contribution to the sharing of information at EU level on rapidly
emerging new threats.
d) European Commission actions: The European Commission (the executive body of the EU) should
facilitate the exchange of risk analysis and the development of common EU risk assessments, with
the support from Member States, European Commission services, EASA and other EU institutions
such as the European External Action Service (EEAS).
e) Operator actions: Operators should make use of available information and recommendations on
conflict zones, and incorporate this information into their risk assessment or decision making
processes. They should furthermore share their own risk assessment information with their
national authorities, and they are encouraged to share this information with the RCZ Network, and
EASA.
4.4
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is setting up an alerting system on
risks to civil aviation flights over conflict zones4. Based on a coordinated risk assessment of the EU
Member States and their approval, and considering the position of airlines and of the European
Network Manager, EASA published a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB). The final
information bulletin is available on the EASA website and specifies the affected area and contains
further information from the States regarding a particular conflict zone.
4.5
The European Network Manager, whose functions are currently carried out by
EUROCONTROL, also publishes information on its online portal, showing for a specific region all
EASA CZIBs, together with NOTAMs and other information issued by the EU Member States and
third countries. The role of the Network Manager is also to provide a platform at regional level to find
alternative routes and airspace capacity. This is a best practice, referring to action 11 of the ICAO
work programme on conflict zones.

4

https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/air-operations/information-on-conflict-zones

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4.6
Aviation is a global business and passengers fly all over the world. Other States and
regions are invited to initiate similar activities for cooperation and to share their information with
ICAO.

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ATTACHMENT 1
Work Programme recommended by the Task Force on the Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from
Conflict Zones (C-WP/14378 - 10 February 2016)

1

2

3

4

5

6
7

8

9

10

11

12

Expected outcome
Development of processes, including types of reliable, timely and relevant
information that States require to effectively discharge their responsibilities in
sovereign or delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators
outside of that airspace.
Consolidation of available information as it relates to conflict zones in a
centralized system accessible to all relevant stakeholders, including States and
industry.

Scope
States
responsibilities

Dissemination
of information:
centralized
system
Development of best guidance for conducting risk assessments for civil aircraft Risk
operations conducted over or near conflict zones, including consideration of how assessment
efforts can be assisted trough cooperation on a regional basis, as appropriate; and
the sharing of the results of these assessments with industry players in their States
and regions.
Development of modalities for the timely exchange of these risk assessments and Dissemination
supporting information with other States or with industry players from other of information
regions; and recommendations as to whether this is best done bilaterally,
regionally, through industry groupings, or via ICAO.
Identification of specific types of information, required from States by airspace Specifying
users, ANSPs and airports relevant to civil aircraft operations over or near conflict information
zones.
Improvement of processes to share operationally derived risk information taking risk
into consideration ways in which safety occurrences are currently shared.
assessment
In order to enhance transparency, develop best practices on the provision of Information to
information to passengers and flight crew regarding the use of airspace over or passengers and
near conflict zones.
flight crew
Reinforcing and clarifying the responsibilities of States under the framework of States
the Chicago Convention system for safe operations in their sovereign and responsibilities
delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators outside of that
airspace.
Consistent with the agreed outcomes, modifications to aviation safety and security Safety
and
auditing and assessment programmes so as to ensure that accountabilities, security
including those related to contingency planning, are properly discharged.
oversight
Development of a set of possible changes to ICAO Annexes, guidance and/or Risk
other materials so as to give effect to the recommendations made on enhancements assessment
of risk assessments for civil aircraft operations near or over conflict zones.
Building on the current provisions and guidance on contingency planning, expand Contingency
so as to enable States to meet air traffic services needs of changes in traffic flows. planning
related
to
traffic flows
Recommendations for ICAO, States and industry action to support the agreed States
outcomes, including recommendations to ensure effective implementation of any responsibilities
new SARP, supported by the provision of assistance when necessary.
; SARPS and
other
provisions

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ATTACHMENT 2
Dutch Safety Board - Safety Recommendations from the Final Accident Investigation Report on
MH17
The accident investigation report was published on 13 October 2015 by the Dutch Safety Board
(DSB). The report contains recommendations at three levels. The first level concerns the management
of the airspace in States dealing with an armed conflict within their territory. The second level
concerns the manner in which States and operators assess the risks of flying over conflict zones. The
third level concerns the accountability of operators regarding their choice of whether or not to fly over
conflict zones.
The recommendations of the accident investigation report propose to look at amendments to the
Chicago Convention and in Standards and Recommended Practices (DSB report page 272). To this
end, the report makes the following recommendations:
Level 1
1

ICAO

2

ICAO

3

ICAO

4

ICAO
Member
States

Level 2
5

ICAO
and
IATA

6

ICAO

7

IATA

8

States
(State of
operator
)

Airspace management in conflict areas
Incorporate in Standards that states dealing with an armed conflict in their territory
shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding
the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil
aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and
armed conflict.
Ask states dealing with an armed conflict for additional information if published
aeronautical or other publications give cause to do so; offer assistance and consider
issuing a State Letter if, in the opinion of ICAO, states do not sufficiently fulfil
their responsibility for the safety of the airspace for civil aviation.
Update Standards and Recommended Practices related to the consequences of
armed conflicts for civil aviation, and convert the relevant Recommended Practices
into Standards as much as possible so that States will be able to take unambiguous
measures if the safety of civil aviation may be at issue.
Ensure that States’ responsibilities related to the safety of their airspace are stricter
defined in the Chicago Convention and the underlying Standards and
Recommended Practices, so that it is clear in which cases the airspace should be
closed.
The States most closely involved in the investigation into the crash of flight MH17
could initiate this.
Risk assessment
Encourage states and operators who have relevant information about threats within
a foreign airspace to make this available in a timely manner to others who have an
interest in it in connection with aviation safety. Ensure that the relevant paragraphs
in the ICAO Annexes concerned are extended and made stricter.
Amend relevant Standards so that risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil
aviation in the airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict zones.
Risk increasing and uncertain factors need to be included in these risk assessments
in accordance with the proposals made by the ICAO Working Group on Threat and
Risk.
Ensure that the Standards regarding risk assessment are also reflected in the IATA
Operational Safety Audits (IOSA).
Ensure that operators are required through national regulations to make risk
assessments of overflying conflict zones. Risk increasing and uncertain factors need
to be included in these assessments in accordance with the proposals made by the
ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk.

8

9

Level 3
10

11

ICAO
and
IATA

IATA

Operato
rs

In addition to actions already taken, such as the website (ICAO Conflict Zone
Information Repository) with notifications about conflict zones, a platform for
exchanging experiences and good practices regarding assessing the risks related to
the overflying of conflict zones is to be initiated.
Operator accountability
Ensure that IATA member airlines agree on how to publish clear information to
potential passengers about flight routes over conflict zones and on making
operators accountable for that information.
Provide public accountability for flight routes chosen, at least once a year.

In addition, the report also recommended to the Dutch aviation authorities to take initiatives at
international level to incorporate the registration of the nationality of airline passengers in the
international regulations. In the meantime, airlines are encouraged to register the nationality of each
passenger travelling from a Dutch airport before departure, in the system that provides passenger
information in case of an accident.

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ATTACHMENT 3

MH17Relation between the Safety Recommendations on conflict zones of the Final Accident
Investigation Report of the Dutch Safety Board and ICAO Annexes
Below is an overview of the possible links between the accident investigation report’s
recommendations on airspace management in conflict areas, on availability of threat information and
on operator accountability, and the ICAO Annexes.
•

States’ responsibilities regarding their airspace related to the Convention and Annexes 2, 11
and 13:

Annex 2: Rules of the Air:
This annex is addressing the principle responsibilities of states regarding safety of airspace and
regularity of air traffic. ICAO is addressing States in general. This Annex and related guidance
material also deals with coordination between civil and military air navigation service providers
during an armed conflict that the state can fulfil its responsibility for the safety of civil aviation in the
airspace. Recommendation 4 of the report asks for enhancing the responsibilities for closure of
airspace and recommendation 1 ask for dissemination of information in the case of conflict, while
recommendation 3 asks for standards for measures if the safety of civil aviation is at issue. It should be
considered to reflect this it in Annex 2.
The investigation report and the ICAO State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59 (24 July 2014) also emphasized
the importance of coordination between civil and military authorities within States. The ICAO Manual
concerning safety measures relating to military activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft
operations (Doc 9985 AN/49) and other relevant guidance material should be updated. This action is
included in the ICAO Work Programme. This subject is also linked with civil-military coordination of
service providers, relevant for Annex 11.
ICAO refers to better coordination between civil and military air navigation service providers that the
state can fulfil its responsibility for the safety of civil aviation in the airspace. ICAO is addressing
States in general. This was also reflected in the State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59 issued 24 July 2014. The
action in the ICAO work programme to update, as necessary, Doc 9554, the Manual Concerning
Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations is
supported. This is also linked with Annex 11. In the guidance material ICAO does not take into
account so far the modern challenges and new forms of armed conflict.
Recommendation 1 of the Final Accident Investigation report is also asking for providing clear
definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zones and armed conflict. This relates to the Annexes 2,
11 and 15.
Annex 11: Air Traffic Services:
The investigation report shows that there are different opinions on how to implement the obligations
for States. The meaning of the Standard should be clarified, as States should preserve all possible
information, that was obtained in relation to tasks for air navigation services, that might be relevant for
an accident investigation, as long as the accident investigation report has not been finalised and
concluded.
The comments made by Annex 2 on civil-military coordination of service providers are also relevant
for Annex 11.
Annex 13: Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation:
Taking into account the experience of Ukraine and the Netherlands regarding the delegation of the
MH17 accident investigation it is proposed to better specify the responsibilities of a State of
occurrence of an accident and the State to which the conduct of the investigation is delegated.

10

Under the Chicago Convention, States maintain sovereign authority over their airspace. By ratifying
the Convention, States have also taken responsibilities towards ICAO and towards other member
States for enhancing safety in situations of the closure of airspace. Following recommendation 4,
States’ responsibilities for the safety of their airspace could be stricter defined and could get a more
prominent place within the ICAO legal framework. The accident investigation report also provides a
consideration to give clarity in which cases airspace should be closed, in the main text of the
Convention. In relation to the issue of the application of ICAO treaties relating to conflict zones, the
Council noted (C-DEC 207/7) that this had been considered by the Legal Committee but was not at
this stage incorporated in its General Work Programme. In this connection, it was understood that
should there be developments arising from the current work being undertaken by the Secretariat in this
area, then this issue would be reconsidered (see recommendation 3 and 4 of the Final Accident
Investigation Report)
•

On the subject of availability of threat information in relation to risk assessment, related to
Annexes 6, 17 and 19:

Risk assessment is essential for planning safe flights. Special attention should be paid to risks related
to conflict zones, as these will be from another nature than other risks. Airlines should be aware and
guided how to make these assessment. States have a responsibility to oversee the activities of an
airline to make a proper assessment. This type of responsibilities is addressed in Annexes 6, 17 and 19.
Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft:
Recommendation 8 of the report deals with risk assessments by operators; especially when overflying
conflict zones. In addition to Annex 19 - States’ responsibilities – it is also needed to address the
responsibilities of operators for an adequate risk assessment when dealing with conflict zones in
Annex 6, as this Annex addresses inter alia the responsibilities of airlines for a safe operation.
Annex 17: Security:
The recommendations on risk assessment, in particular recommendation 3, 6 and item 10 of the ICAO
work programme, should also be addressed in the context of this Annex. The risk assessment and
sharing of information about conflict zones is already under discussion in the Security Panel.
Annex 19: Safety Management:
a) With a view on recommendations 6, 7 and 11 it is very important to address risk assessment in
State Safety Programs, to execute this in Safety Management Systems (SMS) and to investigate
criteria to certify the SMS. Action 10 of the ICAO work programme also acknowledges that.
b) In addition, activities regarding risk assessment for conflict zones should also be included in the
ICAO oversight and continuous monitoring approach as an issue with special attention. This is also
subject of action 9 of the ICAO work programme.
Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services:
The recommendations 2 and 5, related to dissemination of information, lead to addressing in more
detail the responsibilities of States for their airspace and the related air navigation services when
dealing with information dissemination related to the safety of their or foreign airspace in the case of
armed conflict. This is also related to Annexes 2, 11 and 17.
In light of recommendations 1, 2, 5, 9 and 10, Annex 15 should be updated regarding the type of
information and type of documents to be used to distribute information about conflict zones to
airspace users and to ICAO.
Information about conflict zones, including the mechanism of dissemination of information, should be
disseminated to airspace users and States and relevant principles should be embedded in ICAO
SARP’s.
•

Passenger information

Annex 9: Facilitation:

11

The recommendation to register the nationality of airline passengers was made, as more information
on passengers helps to identify a passenger and to find the family who needs to be informed before a
publication of the casualties. Annex 9 is the right place to formulate the obligation to add more
information on the passenger manifest, i.e. nationality.
•

ICAO Panels work in progress

In parallel to the issues addressed above, papers have been submitted by the Netherlands to the
relevant panel meetings. This includes the:
Aviation Security Panel (AVSEC) (14 to 18 March 2016) (scope: Annex 17):
AVSECP/27-WP/38 addressed the risk assessment and sharing of information about conflict
zones. This is now on the work programme of the Security Panel.
Facilitation Panel (FALP) (4-7 April 2016) (scope Annex 9):
FALP/9-WP/5 addressed the issue of nationality of passengers, while WP/6 and WP/11 dealt
with exchange of information of passengers. The Panel has recommended making a standard
for Advanced Passenger information.
Accident Investigation Panel (AIGP) (14-17 June 2016) (scope Annex 13):
WPs have been developed to address the issues of availability of information relevant for
accident investigation and about the responsibilities of States when the accident investigation
is delegated to another State.
Safety Management Panel (SMP) (2nd Working Group Meeting February 2016, preparing
panel meeting 11-15 July 2016) (Scope Annex 19):
A WP has been submitted addressing risk assessment.

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