Policy Review of Article 8 of the
Budget for Kingdom Relations
Part I: emergency assistance on Saba, Sint Eustatius and
Sint Maarten (including early recovery in Sint
Maarten)
Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius
Client: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)
Rotterdam, 1 November 2022

Policy Review of Article 8 of the
Budget for Kingdom Relations
Part I: emergency assistance on Saba, Sint Eustatius and
Sint Maarten (including early recovery in Sint
Maarten)
Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius

Client: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)

Michel Briene
Elvira Meurs
Simone Snoeijenbos

Rotterdam, 1 November 2022

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluation team. They do not engage the
Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) nor other parts of the
Government of the Netherlands in any way. While an attempt has been made to take into
consideration the views and perspectives of stakeholders consulted in the Netherlands, Saba, Sint
Eustatius and Sint Maarten, the interpretation of this type of information, and all findings,
conclusions and recommendations in this report are the exclusive responsibility of the authors.

Table of contents

List of acronyms and abbreviations

9

Summary

11

1

2

3

Introduction

19

1.1

Goal policy review

19

1.2

Context and background

19

1.3

Policy review of Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations

21

1.4

Reading guide

23

Methodology

24

2.1

Intervention logic

24

2.2

Evaluation questions

25

2.3

Methods and limitation

26

5

Documentation

26

2.3.2

Interviews

28

2.3.3

Visit to Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius

29

2.3.4

Triangulation of information

29

2.3.5

Limitations and causality

29

Design of the emergency response, early recovery and reconstruction activities

31

3.1

Timeline

31

Design of the emergency response

31

3.2

4

2.3.1

3.2.1

Emergency response on Sint Maarten

31

3.2.2

Emergency response on Saba and Sint Eustatius

33

3.2.3

Constitutional differences

33

3.2.4

Coordination between the islands after the hurricanes

34

3.3

Design of the early recovery

36

3.4

Design of the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius

37

3.5

Financial overview Article 8

38

3.6

Conclusions on the design

40

Emergency response

43

4.1

Introduction

43

4.2

Damage assessment

43

4.3

Requests for assistance

44

4.4

Results achieved

48

4.5

Effectiveness

56

4.6

Efficiency

57

4.7

Improvements to the emergency response after Irma

58

4.8

Conclusions on emergency response

59

Support for Early Recovery of Sint Maarten

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

62

5

6

7

6

5.1

Introduction

62

5.2

Effectiveness and efficiency

63

5.3

Conclusions on early recovery

72

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba

75

6.1

Introduction

75

6.2

Effectiveness and efficiency of the reconstruction of Sint Eustatius

76

6.3

Effectiveness and efficiency of the reconstruction of Saba

79

6.4

Other activities

81

6.5

Conclusions on the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius

82

Recommendations

84

7.1

Governance and design

84

7.2

Emergency response

85

7.3

Early recovery

86

7.4

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba

87

Annex I: References

89

Annex II: Evaluation matrix

97

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

7

List of acronyms and abbreviations

ABB

Algemene Bestedings Belasting

AMFO

Stichting Antilliaanse Medefinancieringsorganisatie

BBB

Building Back Better

BES

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba

COOC

Crisis Support Consultation Curaçao

CoPI

Commando Plaats Incident

COT

Crisis Onderzoeksteam (Institute for Security and Crisis Management)

CRFF

Children’s Rights Film Festival

CZMCARIB

Commandant der Zeemacht in het Caribisch Gebied

DJI

Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen

EBT

Eilandelijk Beleids Team

EOC

Emergency Operation Centre

ESF

Emergency Support Function

GEBE

St. Maarten Water and Energy Service Company

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

HUREX

Hurricane Exercise

IAO

Interdepartmental Coordination Council

ICCB

Interdepartmental Committee on Crisis Management

IFV

Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (Institute for Physical Safety)

ISSN

International Standard Serial Number

JUS

Ministery of Justice

KDM

Karel Doorman (a multi-function support ship of the Royal Netherlands Navy)

KMAR

Koninklijke Marechaussee

KNVB

Royal Dutch Football Association

KPSM

Korps Politie Sint Maarten

MCCB

Ministerial Committee on Crisis Management

MP CUR

Prime Minister of Curaçao

NCTV

National Coordinator for the Fight Against Terrorism and for Security (Nationaal
Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid)

NDMP

St. Maarten’s National Disaster Management Plan

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisations

NIVRE

Nederlands Instituut Van Register Experts

NL

Netherlands

NRPB

National Recovery Program Bureau

NLRC

Netherlands Red Cross

NRRP

National Recovery and Resilience Plan

OCJS

Ministery of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport

PM

Prime Minister

R4CR

Resources for Community Resilience

RCN

Rijksdienst Caribisch Nederland

RPE

Regeling periodiek evaluatieonderzoek

RWS

Rijkswaterstaat

SMDF

Sint Maarten Development Foundation

SSCS

Saba, Statia Cable System

STENAPA

Sint Eustatius National Parks Foundation

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

9

SXMFF

Sint Maarten Football Federation

SXM

Sint Maarten

TEATT

Ministry of Tourism, Economic Affairs, Transportation & Telecommunication

UNDP

United Nations Development Program

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

USAR

Dutch Urban Search and Rescue Team

VNG

Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)

VNW

Representation of the Netherlands in Willemstad

VROMI

Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment and Infrastructure

VSA

Ministry of Public Health, Social Development and Labour

WB

World Bank

WYCCF

White Yellow Cross Care Foundation

Ministries

10

BuZa

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

BZK

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

Defence

Ministery of Defence

IenW

Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management

JenV

Ministry of Justice and Security

OCW

Ministry of Education, Culture and Science

VWS

Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

Summary

1

Policy review of Article 8 of the Kingdom Budget

This policy review evaluates the activities for emergency assistance and reconstruction support
provided by the Ministry of the Interior to the Windward Islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint
Eustatius after Hurricanes Irma, José and Maria1. It specifically focuses on the activities funded
under Article 8 of the budget for Kingdom Relations. As policy review, it follows the structure and
methodology of the Regulation of Periodical Evaluation Research (RPE) of the Government of the
Netherlands.
For analytical purposes, the full evaluation has been sub-divided into three parts: a) Part I:
emergency assistance on all three islands (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) – Article 8.2.;
b) Part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten (both World Bank Trust Fund projects and direct support
activities) – Article 8.1.; c) Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius – Article 8.1. This
report covers parts I and III. Part II (reconstruction in Sint Maarten) has been conducted by an
independent evaluator. This evaluator will eventually also be responsible for a synthesis report
covering the evaluation results of parts I/III and part II.

2

Context and motivation of Dutch support

The islands of Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius have different constitutional statuses within
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, adopted on 10
October 2010 and usually referred to as 10-10-10, granted Sint Maarten the status of an
autonomous country within the Kingdom, along with Aruba, Curaçao and the Netherlands. Sint
Maarten therefore has full autonomy in most areas, unless explicitly included in the provisions of
the Charter of the Kingdom. Saba and Sint Eustatius, along with Bonaire, are public entities of the
Netherlands and so the Government of the Netherlands exercises direct authority over these
islands. These differences in the status of the three islands (and the resulting different relations with
the Government of the Netherlands) resulted in different contexts for the provision of support to the
islands under Article 8.
Particularly relevant to a post-disaster scenario is Art. 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom, which
stipulates that the countries of the Kingdom provide mutual support and assistance to each other.
However, due to the autonomy of the parties within the Kingdom since 10-10-10, the understanding
is that this type of support is typically provided upon an explicit request for assistance from the
country.

3

Hurricane Irma and the direct aftermath

Hurricane Irma started out as a central Atlantic tropical storm which quickly gained strength as it
moved westward. By the time it reached Sint Maarten on 6 September 2017, it had developed into
a Category 5 Hurricane. The hurricane devasted the island and overwhelmed a population and
1

This report regularly refers only to Hurricane Irma, but in some cases this also refers to Hurricanes José and Maria.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

11

local government that, despite being accustomed to an annual hurricane season, could not have
foreseen the strength of Irma. Saba and Sint Eustatius were also hit by the hurricane’s winds, and
the situation worsened when Hurricane Maria followed two weeks later.
The islands all have existing structures for emergency preparedness and disaster relief. However,
the strength or the hurricane – and the speed with which it gained strength – went beyond the
capabilities of local emergency preparedness and relief capabilities and caused far more damage
than expected. Despite the existence of national crisis structures, these were in many cases not
‘actionable’, without clear responsibility, roles and tasks assigned. Members of the public sector
were furthermore affected themselves, having to simultaneously attend to private matters and to the
emergency structure. The Netherlands at the time did not have existing ‘actionable’ procedures or
governance structures in place to provide support under the 10-10-10 constitutional arrangements.
The reaction to Hurricane Irma’s aftermath was therefore marked by a great degree of
improvisation across the board.

4

Emergency assistance for the three islands

Several assessments were carried out in the days after Hurricane Irma to understand the severity
of damage and losses – by governments, NGOs and the Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Together,
those damage assessments formed a picture of the situation on the islands. One calculation
estimated the damage on Sint Maarten at US$2.5 billion. The damage on Saba and Sint Eustatius,
while smaller in scale, was also significant, with an initial estimated loss of US$50 million.
The extent of the damage cause by Irma was described in a Letter to the Parliament of the
Netherlands on 8 September 2017, with the aim of providing an initial idea of the scale and scope
of resources needed. It made clear that the damage required immediate humanitarian emergency
response, in the form of public security, health care, drinking water, etc. The Council of Ministers of
the Netherlands made available €55 million for emergency assistance.
In the initial phase of emergency assistance, the Ministry of Defence was particularly active in
providing relief to Sint Maarten. Saba and Sint Eustatius had also requested aid early, via an official
request for assistance. The Ministry of Defence was well equipped in this regard, owing to its
presence in the region with a base of operations in both Curacao and Aruba.
The government of the Netherlands began looking into structures to finance the support. The
Ministerial Committee on Crisis Management decided on 7 September that the costs for the
provision of emergency aid to Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba would be financed centrally
through the budget of Ministry of BZK. A modified waiver procedure was developed by the Ministry
of BZK for emergency aid requests, allowing relevant ministries to diverge from the usual
procurement procedures. Instead, they would meet a need when identified, and use a record of the
purchase order and simple justification to invoice this amount to the budget made available under
the Ministry of BZK. This approach worked well in practice, and was appropriately fast and flexible
in the face of urgency.
The Netherlands acts on the premise that support within the Kingdom is provided upon the
reception of official requests for assistance. In the case of Sint Maarten, the official request to the
Netherlands for needs and relief supplies only arrived on the 12th of September, nearly a week
after the Hurricane had hit, and without much detail as to the type of support required. As a result of

12

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

the lack of needs assessments, the list of goods and services to be provided was at first developed
on the basis of mutual consultation and by proactively matching products to the flagged needs.
There was also a need to begin the loading process quickly, as the ship (the Karel Doorman) would
take two weeks to arrive in the Caribbean. This exercise resulted in a list containing an inventory to
be provided via shipment from the Netherlands, that had been drawn up in response to statements
by the various departments on Sint Maarten, and fed into by multiple stakeholders. This
improvisation, unfortunately, led to cases of mismatch between what was needed and what was
provided.
In the case of Saba and Sint Eustatius, official requests for assistance had arrived earlier, before
Hurricane Irma hit. These first requests for assistance related to the provision of military assistance.
After Irma made landfall, the focus shifted to requests for assistance for aid aimed at providing
acute emergency assistance (including requests for assistance of food and water and the
evacuation of patients). The clear and timely requests for assistance ensured that support could be
provided in a much more targeted way, particularly just after the hurricanes.
The help and support provided during the emergency response phase was effective in the sense
that almost all requests for assistance from the three islands were met. However, persons working
on the side of The Hague did not always have the required expertise to gauge whether a request
was borne out of the emergency situation or out of a structural problem. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of the provided support would have greatly benefited from a more streamlined
process, linking clear damage assessments to requests for assistance and ensuring better
communication between those witnessing the situation on the island and those doing the
processing of requests for assistance, particularly in the case of Sint Maarten. Several of these
issues have now been addressed through improved communication. While Sint Maarten and The
Hague did not used to have communication on requests for assistance, this is now done prior to
each hurricane season.

5

Longer-term needs and diverging approaches

Longer-term reconstruction needs were also already being considered at an early stage, i.e. while
emergency assistance was still under way. In the case of Saba and Sint Eustatius, their closer
relation to the Ministries (due to their constitutional status) meant that support could be provided in
a more direct manner. The case of Sint Maarten, however, followed a different approach – one
upon which certain conditions were set.
On 13 October 2017, a letter was addressed from the Ministry of BZK to the Government of Sint
Maarten, announcing that a significant financial envelope could be made available for the
reconstruction of the island, provided Sint Maarten gave its consent to two conditions, namely, (i)
the establishment of an Integrity Chamber; and (ii) the strengthening of border control. Both
conditions were stated by the Dutch government as essential for the support provided to benefit the
population of Sint Maarten in a sustainable manner.
The then Government of Sint Maarten did not approve these conditions at first, resulting in a
collapse of the cabinet. In November 2017 a newly set-up caretaker Government consented to the
conditions. The Government of the Netherlands then moved forward with the design of the Article 8funded reconstruction in Sint Maarten, the bulk of which was to be channelled through a World
Bank executed Trust Fund, and a smaller part through direct support, which also included liquidity

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

13

support and early recovery projects. The Government of the Netherlands maintained close
involvement in decision-making under both procedures, having a role in the Steering Committee
and making use of existing procedures to provide funding.

6

Early recovery in Sint Maarten

The emergency assistance period came to an end in December 2017. Knowing that setting up the
Trust Fund for Sint Maarten would take time, the Ministry of BZK proceeded to set up additional
funding for the early recovery phase to act as a bridging phase between the initial emergency
assistance and the longer-term reconstruction activities planned for the coming years. The early
recovery phase was designed to be a 6-month period during which the Ministry of BZK funded
projects that were meant to be implemented quickly and have a cost-effective, direct positive impact
on the situation of vulnerable people on the island, particularly the young and the elderly.
The Ministry of BZK chose to assign established international and local NGOs as implementing
parties, particularly those already active on the ground and with ongoing activities that could be built
upon. These organisations were thought to be best suited to identify needs and asked to develop
targeted project proposals to address these needs. The 11 rolled-out projects covered elements of
food provision in school, rebuilding housing and community infrastructure, providing psychosocial
support for childing and introducing schemes for labour market (re)integration, with organisations
often tackling several of these issues under one programme.
This approach largely paid off and allowed for the funds to be rapidly allocated and implemented.
The early recovery projects were implemented relatively effectively; with more than half of the
projects meeting their initial or adjusted target output. Projects that were particularly successful
often built on existing experience or ongoing initiatives, as in the case of the White Yellow Care
Cross Foundation, the Sint Maarten Development Fund and Qredits. The UNDP’s Recovering Back
Better, the programme with the largest financial contribution from the Ministry of BZK (nearly a third
of the total early recovery budget), encountered severe implementation issues as a result of wrong
assumptions regarding pricing, availability of information on damages, progress made by
individuals on their own houses, and availability of technical skills and materials on the island .
While projects were largely successful, the six month time period for early recovery proved to be
too short, leading to a significant standstill of social activities funded by Article 8 over the course of
2018/2019. In this period the Trust Fund was not yet operational, while the early recovery phase
was already closed. The relatively small budget assigned to early recovery projects could have
been significantly higher and quick wins could have been achieved by granting time extensions to
the more successful projects.

7

Reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius

The islands proposed their own reconstruction projects, in consultation with the Ministries of the
Netherlands. The projects for the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius were implemented and
funded by several ministries, depending on the thematic area and responsibilities. The Ministry of
BZK therefore only funded a limited portion (focused mainly on house repairs and repairs of public
spaces – in line with the focus of BZK) of the reconstruction efforts on these islands, but did remain

14

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

in a coordinating role for the activities of other ministries. The division of tasks between the
ministries was not always clear during the reconstruction phase.
The projects implemented on Saba and Sint Eustatius targeted damaged beyond those identified in
the damage assessments reports post-Irma. Reconstruction was approached from the perspective
of building back better and going beyond the repair of hurricane-induced damage by also making
the islands more resilient for the future through maintenance and fortification. The erosion of the
cliff in Sint Eustatius, for example, had already been discussed with the Ministry of BZK in 2016 –
prior to the hurricane – and was taken on board as one of the projects under the reconstruction
period.
Sint Eustatius
Sint Eustatius requested assistance for reconstruction efforts on 14 September 2017. The most
affected areas were private homes (with over 100 personal homes damaged), businesses (with
damaged infrastructure), utility companies (with power lines having been destroyed), island
vegetation (with an estimated 80% damaged) and the agricultural sector. The reconstruction budget
of BZK Article 8 for Sint Eustatius was €15 million. Just over €2.5 million was reserved for house
repairs and rehabilitation of the public space, and nature and environment.
The majority of the budget was spent on the stabilisation of the cliff supporting Fort Oranje (€11.6
million). The project aimed to improve its stability and stop erosion for the next five decades –
addressing both hurricane damage and deferred maintenance. The funds from the cliff, under the
reconstruction, are part of the total reconstruction funds of the Ministry of BZK, but as a project it
was independent and was not placed under the local reconstruction program. The cliff project was
completed in May 2020. An inspection was carried out one year post-completion by
RoyalHaskoning, which showed that the work carried out at the cliff was functioning as intended but
would require upkeep, particularly of the vegetation covering it.
A subsidy of just over €2.5 million was allocated to repair damaged buildings and public space, with
a Dutch project manager assigned by the Ministry of BZK to coordinate and execute repairs. The
project was successful and all 137 houses in the project were repaired before the end of 2019 and
compliant with building procedures. The project manager worked together with a well-informed,
equipped team in order to ensure timely implementation with the use of local constructors.
A sum totalling €800,000 was allocated to projects in nature and environment, including agricultural
recovery and water supply, coral restoration, recovery buoys and mooring system, restoration of the
botanical garden, reforestation and recovery of breeding sea turtles. All projects met the
expectations and finished according to the progress reports, which state that the latest projects
were expected to be finished by the end of 2021.
Saba
Saba sent an estimation for needs for the reconstruction work and supporting measures to BZK on
17 September. The overview included the airport, roads, buildings and steps for economic
development. In total, the estimated funds required amounted to approximately US$10.8 million.
Hurricane Maria caused additional damage on Saba, adding to the damage already caused by
hurricane Irma. On 2 October, an additional cost estimation with regard to the damage from Maria
was submitted. Project plans were submitted, and the Public Entity Saba received the
reconstruction budget from the Ministry of BZK for a total of €3.8 million. The Public Entity
delegated the construction works for the houses and public space to the Planning Bureau, which is

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

15

responsible for the implementation of civil works projects initiated by the government. The Planning
Bureau was in charge of planning the projects, tendering for proposals and evaluating the bids.
All damaged buildings were repaired by local construction companies, and the works were
monitored by the Planning Bureau. The process started with the search for a contractor, materials
and labour. All of them were difficult to find due to the greatly increased demand throughout the
entire Caribbean region, and owing to the limited capacity of local construction workers.
A smaller amount of €200,000 was allocated to rectify the damage caused to nature and the
surrounding environment. Most of it went to compensation for fishermen and farmers, and a very
small portion to repairing equipment and signs on nature trails.

8

Recommendations

Governance and design
•

Recommendation 1 The aftermath of Hurricane Irma highlighted the importance of swift
action. Work has been done to further optimize the way these structures are implemented in
practice and the way they coordinate between each other and with the other actors in the
Kingdom. A Handbook on crisis management for the Caribbean parts of the Netherlands has
been drawn up as a result of the experiences with Hurricane Irma. Such agreements need to
be constantly revisited before each hurricane season to ensure they continue to work as
expected.

•

Recommendation 2 Requests for assistance are an important instrument in providing mutual
assistance between the countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and between the BES
islands and the European part of the Netherlands. This instrument could be improved through
a more careful discussion of the interpretation of Article 36 of the Statute and clear agreements
between the various countries within the Kingdom regarding the preparation and submission of
requests for assistance.

•

Recommendation 3 This evaluation found shortcomings in the data and document storage
systems of the Ministry of BZK. The Ministry’s financial management and its document storage
system, Digidoc, can be improved, with a view to enhancing accountability for disbursements.
Specific guidelines and procedures should be developed in this regard and staff may have to
be trained for this purpose.

Emergency response
•

Recommendation 4 The aftermath of Hurricane Irma highlighted the importance of
coordination in the event of an emergency is crucial. Coordination should be improved through
better agreements in advance about the delineation of tasks and responsibilities between the
various ministries in the event of a disaster in the Caribbean part of the Netherlands. In
preparation of hurricanes or other disasters that may occur in the future, the Ministry of BZK
should further strengthen its capacities in assisting the islands in strengthening emergency
preparedness, drawing up post disaster needs assessments and developing relief and
reconstruction plans.

•

Recommendation 5 Implementing parties were satisfied with the workability of the adjusted
and flexible purchasing policy. Maintaining such adapted procedures in subsequent calamities
is advisable/recommended.

16

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

Early recovery
•

Recommendation 6 There was a significant period of standstill between the article 8-funded
social activities in the early recovery phase in Sint Maarten and the longer-term reconstruction
activities to be financed from the World Bank Trust Fund. Action in future crises should ensure
the continuity of social activities to support the most vulnerable of a population in the transition
from emergence assistance to reconstruction activities.

•

Recommendation 7 Some of the more successful projects in the early recovery phase were
those implemented by local NGOs or organisations with running activities that could be
expanded with early recovery funds. Betting on local know-how proved successful, and should
be kept in mind in future similar scenarios.

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba
•

Recommendation 8 The reconstruction projects were managed per ministry, which means
that a clear overview is lacking and coordination between the various projects was made more
difficult. It may be better to opt for a reconstruction programme for Saba and Sint Eustatius, like
in Sint Maarten, with centralised management during the implementation phase. The
coordinating role of the Ministry of BZK should be clarified and moved forward.

•

Recommendation 9 As the frequency and strength of hurricanes increases, it becomes
increasingly important to prevent potential damage in the future by building back better.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

17

1

Introduction

1.1

Goal policy review
Policy Review of Article 8

1.

This policy review is governed by provisions of the Regulation of Periodical Evaluation Research of
the Government of the Netherlands of 15 March 2018. The overall review focuses on Article 8 of
the budget for Kingdom Relations, describing funds reserved for emergency assistance and
reconstruction of the Windward Islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius.

2.

Policy reviews of this type follow standard evaluation questions. This particular review takes into
account further development of the standard questions in the Letter by the Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations (henceforth referred to as Ministry of BZK) to the House of Representatives
of 21 September 2020 concerning the policy review of Article 8.

3.

For analytical purposes, the evaluation has been sub-divided into three parts: a) Part I: emergency
assistance on all three islands (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) - Article 8.2.; b) Part II:
reconstruction in Sint Maarten (both World Bank Trust Fund projects and direct support activities) –
Article 8.1.; c) Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius – Article 8.1.

4.

The present report only concerns the financial contributions under Article 8 for emergency
assistance in 2017 on the three islands and early recovery activities in 2018 in Sint Maarten, as well
as funds provided for reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius in the wake of hurricane Irma,
which struck the islands on 6 September 2017 (Part I and III). Reservations made for the
reconstruction in Sint Maarten are reviewed in a separate report (Part II). Both reports will
eventually feed into a synthesis report (composed by the evaluator of Part II) to be presented to
Parliament in the Netherlands (for further details, see section 1.3).

1.2

Context and background
Hurricane Irma hit the islands Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba

5.

The islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius (part of the Windward Islands of the Lesser
Antilles2) were hit by devastating hurricanes Irma, Jose and Maria in 2017. Sint Maarten was hit
particularly hard by hurricane Irma, which struck on 6 September 2017.

6.

Around 90% of the physical infrastructure of the Dutch part of the island was destroyed, including
50% of the housing stock and the majority of vital infrastructure such as the airport and port
facilities. Drinking water supply and waste disposal procedures were disrupted, endangering public
health. Emergency assistance was initially hampered by a breakdown of communication lines and
information gathering and sharing, and also by a collapse of public order. The Government of the
Netherlands provided immediate emergency assistance to Sint Maarten, as well as to the islands of
Saba and Sint Eustatius, the latter two having been relatively spared by Hurricane Irma.

2

The report follows the tradition in Dutch to describe the islands of the Lesser Antilles north of Dominica as Windward
Islands. This is the literal translation of the corresponding term in Dutch “Bovenwindse Eilanden”. In English, the islands
north of Dominica, including Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius, are usually described as “Leeward Islands”, whereas
for the Lesser Antilles south of Dominica, the term “Windward Islands” is used. The Dutch linguistic preference is followed
as the main audience of the report is in the Netherlands.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

19

The position of the islands in the constitutional structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
7. The three islands differ in their position within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Charter of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, adopted on 10 October 2010 (usually referred to as 10-10-10),
established Sint Maarten as one of the autonomous countries within the kingdom, along with Aruba,
Curaçao and the Netherlands. Sint Maarten enjoys autonomy in all areas unless limited by
provisions of the Charter of the Kingdom.3 By contrast, Saba and Sint Eustatius, along with
Bonaire, are public entities of the Netherlands and, as such, the Government of the Netherlands
exercises direct authority over these islands. These differences in the status of the three islands
affected procedures concerning emergency assistance and support to early recovery, and
reconstruction provided by the Government of the Netherlands to the three islands. The early
recovery phase, for example, only applied to Sint Maarten. Particularly relevant to a post-disaster
scenario is Art. 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom, which stipulates that the countries of the Kingdom
are to provide each other with support and assistance.
Role of the Netherlands Ministry of BZK within the Kingdom of the Netherlands
8. The Ministry of BZK maintains the relations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which consists
of the Netherlands and the other countries within the Kingdom (Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten).
In addition, the Ministry of BZK coordinates between the national government and the public entities
(Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba). With due observance of the Charter of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the values and procedures contained therein, the countries themselves are
autonomous. As part of the Kingdom, the Netherlands attaches great importance to the field of
good governance, sound public finances and economic development, and a safe society. All
ministries have their own responsibilities on these two islands. For the public entities (Saba and
Sint Eustatius), the role of the Ministry of BZK is of a directing, initiating and binding nature in the
diversity of activities by the Dutch central government on these islands.
Specific features of the islands
9. The islands share similar levels of development (falling under the World Bank Group’s classification
of upper income countries4) and similar challenges. As small island states, they are similarly
dependent on imports for the provision of basic goods, and they struggle to diversify their economy.
Before the hurricane, tourism accounted for approximately half of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in Sint Maarten and three quarters of foreign exchange earnings.5 There are, however, some
key differences. Sint Maarten is significantly larger, with an official population of 40,812 in 2020,
whereas the public entities of Saba and Sint Eustatius had populations of 1,933 and 3,138
respectively in 2020. GDP per capita is also slightly higher in Sint Maarten, with US$29,200 in
2020, versus US$27,800 in Saba and Sint Eustatius.6 Sint Maarten also shares the island with
another country - the Collectivity of Saint Martin in the North, which is part of the French Republic
and therefore, the European Union.
Emergency response, early recovery and reconstruction
10. The Government of the Netherlands provided immediate emergency assistance to the islands after
the disaster. The emergency assistance for the three islands, was initially foreseen to amount to
€55 million from Article 8, and funds for early recovery in Sint Maarten €7 million, which included
3

4

5
6

20

1) the maintenance of the independence and defence of the Kingdom, 2) foreign relations; 3) Dutch citizenship; 4) the
arrangement of the orders of chivalry as well as the flag and coat of arms of the Kingdom; 5) the regulation of the
nationality of ships and the imposition of requirements with regard to the safety and navigation of sea-going vessels flying
the flag of the Kingdom, with the exception of sailing ships; 6) the supervision of the general rules concerning the
admission and expulsion of Dutch citizens; 7) setting general conditions for the admission and expulsion of foreign
nationals; 8) the extradition.
The World Bank Group uses an income classification system to group countries based on Gross National Income per
capita (Atlas Method).
Source: World Bank Trust Fund semi-annual report 30 June 2021
Source: CBS, 2020. Trends in the Caribbean Netherlands

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

essential projects to be initiated within a short time span and that could be expected to produce
quick results in 2018. Towards the end of 2017, plans were made for funds designated for the
reconstruction of the islands. Support provided to Saba and Sint Eustatius moved directly from
emergency assistance to the financing of reconstruction activities – and did not include the early
recovery phase used in Sint Maarten, because there was no need for a Trust Fund on these
islands. For Saba and Sint Eustatius, a maximum of €67 million was reserved for reconstruction
from the budgets of several departments, €18 million of which came from the budget of Article 8
from the Ministry of BZK and €49 million from the budgets of other ministries. The budget and
related activities from other ministries fall outside the scope of this policy review. For Sint Maarten,
€550 million was reserved for the reconstruction, the majority of which was channelled through the
Trust Fund of the World Bank.7

1.3

Policy review of Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations
Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations

11. Budgetary provisions under Art. 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations comprised a provision of €55
million for emergency assistance in Sint Maarten, Saba, and Sint Eustatius (Art. 8.2.) and a
provision of €550 million for reconstruction (including early recovery) in Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint
Eustatius (Art. 8.1). A small portion of this budget (€7 million) was reserved for the early recovery in
Sint Maarten. In total, €18 million was allocated from this budget for the reconstruction of Saba and
Sint Eustatius. The remaining, and largest part of the budget, was allocated to the reconstruction of
Sint Maarten.8
The actual disbursements of Article 8 were: €40.4 million for emergency assistance, €18 million for
reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius and €6.7 million for early recovery on Sint Maarten. All
expenditures of the other Dutch ministries on emergency assistance went through Article 8 of the
Budget of Kingdom Relations. For the reconstruction of Saba and St. Eustatius, other ministries
also contributed through their own budget (i.e. outside Article 8).
Objectives of the policy review
12. According to the letter from the Minister of BZK to the House of Representatives, this policy review
has two objectives: a) to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Dutch spending under Article 8;
and b) to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of institutional arrangements. Guidelines for such
policy reviews of the Government of the Netherlands9 stipulate that effectiveness relates to the
achievement of policy goals with given means (inputs), including human and financial resources, as
well as activities and other instruments. The achievement of goals usually distinguishes between
outputs (direct results and products), outcomes (higher level effects produced) and impact (ultimate
societal effects). The same guidelines define efficiency as the relation between the effects of the
policy (benefit) and financial and other resources mobilised for this policy (cost). The review of
efficiency considers the question of how the optimum effect is achieved at the lowest possible cost,
with the least possible undesirable side effects.
Organisation of the overall review and activities to be evaluated
13. For analytical purposes, the evaluation has been sub-divided into three parts:
•

Part I: emergency assistance on all three islands (including early recovery in Sint Maarten) Article 8.2.

7
8
9

See for more detailed information: Policy Review Art. 8 Part II.
See for more detailed information: Policy Review Art. 8 Part II.
Handreiking beleidsdoorlichting, https://www.rijksbegroting.nl/beleidsevaluaties/evaluaties-enbeleidsdoorlichtingen/handreiking, website consulted on 1 February 2022.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

21

•

Part II: reconstruction in Sint Maarten (both World Bank Trust Fund projects and direct support
activities) – Article 8.1.

•

Part III: reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius – Article 8.1.

14. Part II was reviewed by a separate independent evaluator (Lucien Bäck) and is addressed in a
separate report. The present report deals with Part I (the emergency assistance provided to all
three islands) and Part III (the reconstruction support to Saba and Sint Eustatius) of the overall
policy review. Since reconstruction activities in Saba and Sint Eustatius were to be completed by 31
December 2021, this report will be a final evaluation of respective activities. On the other hand,
reconstruction activities financed out of the Trust Fund in Sint Maarten are currently scheduled to
be completed by 31 December 2025. For Sint Maarten, this is designed to be a mid-term
evaluation. Table 1.1 outlines what is covered under these evaluations, what is not within their
scope, as well as the various details handled by the respective teams.
Table 1.1 Delimitation of activities related to emergency assistance /early recovery and reconstruction
and scope of reports on parts I/III and II
Activities falling under Article 8 – Within

Activities related to emergency assistance

scope

/early recovery and reconstruction – Out of
scope

Part I:

•

Coordination by the Ministry of BZK.

Emergency

•

Funding provided on the budget for

assistance to

Kingdom Relations to NL line Ministry,

all three

e.g. the Ministries of OCW, Economic

islands

Affairs and Climate (EZK), as well as

(including

the Ministry of Infrastructure and

early recovery

Water Management (IenW).

•

Emergency assistance provided by
budgets of other NL line Ministries.

•

Emergency assistance provided by other
external sources (e.g. the Netherlands
Red Cross and other NGOs).

•

Emergency assistance mobilised by local
governments and the private sector.

Sint Maarten)

Ecorys

Part II:

•

Coordination by the Ministry of BZK.

Reconstruction

•

Direct support – funding provided to

in Sint

Government of Sint Maarten, to UNDP

Maarten

and UNICEF, as well as to nongovernmental organisations and

Lucien Bäck

•

other NL line Ministries.
•

Functioning of the Trust Fund with the

Reconstruction funded from other external
sources.

•

private sector in Sint Maarten.
•

Reconstruction aid provided by budgets of

Reconstruction funded and implemented
by the Government of Sint Maarten.

•

World Bank.

Reconstruction funded and implemented
by private sector.

•

Liquidity and other support to the
Government of Sint Maarten (liquidity
support under Article 8 and liquidity
support outside Art. 8, e.g. related to the
COVID-19 pandemic).

•

The Integrity Chamber set as precondition for the funds.

Part III:

•

Coordination by the Ministry of BZK.

Reconstruction

•

Funding provided by BZK

in Saba and
Sint Eustatius

22

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

•

Reconstruction aid provided by budgets of
other NL line Ministries.

•

Reconstruction aid provided by other
external sources.

Activities falling under Article 8 – Within

Activities related to emergency assistance

scope

/early recovery and reconstruction – Out of
scope

Ecorys

•

Reconstruction aid provided by local
government and private sector.

The exclusive focus of the evaluation on effectiveness and efficiency of funding provided under
Article 8 of the Budget of Kingdom Relations excludes consideration of other sources of funding for
emergency assistance and reconstruction activities on the three islands. These include resources
mobilized locally by local and national authorities, by the population, by the private sector, including
proceeds from insurance coverage, as well as funding provided under other governmental and nongovernmental sources in the Kingdom. In methodological terms, this raises the question to what
extent results achieved can be attributed to Article 8 funding, and also sheds a different light on the
efficiency of inputs and activities. This policy review is therefore at best a contribution analysis, i.e.,
it can establish a reasonable attribution of results to or credible association with Article 8 funding.

1.4

Reading guide

15. Section 2 provides details on the methodology, the evaluation questions guiding the policy review,
and the limitations. Section 3 explains the process of the design of the emergency response, early
recovery and reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius. A more detailed presentation of findings
and conclusions follows in sections 4 to 6, both in terms of effectiveness (results achieved) and
efficiency (costs and benefits). Section 4 focuses on the emergency response phase, Section 5 on
the early recovery phase and Section 6 on the reconstruction phase on Sint Eustatius and Saba.
Section 7 presents recommendations.
16. An overview of consulted sources and a list of discussion partners is included in Annex I. The
terms of reference for this review are to be found in Annex II, and the Letter to Parliament guiding
the terms of reference in Annex III. The complete Evaluation Matrix with the Evaluation Questions
(including references to specific sections in the report) is presented in Annex IV.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

23

2

Methodology

2.1

Intervention logic

17. The intervention logic represents the thinking of how an intervention will solve the challenge
addressed and how it will deliver the expected outcomes. The starting point for the policy review is
therefore to reconstruct the intervention logic and to understand the approach that was given to the
Article 8-funded activities. This intervention logic conceives the policy as a stream of inputs
(manpower and budget), activities, outputs and outcomes, which pave the path towards impact and
the overall policy objective of Article 8. It is necessary to mention that the interventions of the
Ministry of BZK were not the only interventions on the islands in the aftermath of the hurricanes.
The local population, NGOs and other departments also carried out projects that contributed to the
outcomes and impacts (context). The intervention logic is presented in Figure 2.1.
18. While no official logic model or theory of change has been explicitly developed for this kind of
emergency situation in Sint Maarten, Saba or Sint Eustatius, the interviews showed us that there
was a broad understanding that immediate humanitarian emergency response was needed, and
that assistance in the reconstruction was necessary on the islands on request.
19. The intervention logic in Figure 2.1 differentiates between three phases: Emergency Response,
Early Recovery and longer-term Reconstruction. It is important to note that the activities were
implemented in rapidly evolving contexts, often overlapping and requiring improvisation, particularly
during the emergency response in the weeks following the disaster.
•

Emergency response: Immediate humanitarian emergency response for the three islands on
request, in the period after the disaster, consisting of security, health care, drinking water, etc.
The goal of this first phase was to meet the immediate needs of the islands' population.

•

Early recovery of Sint Maarten: Essential activities in Sint Maarten that could start quickly and
could bridge the gap until the Trust Fund of the World Bank was fully operational.

•

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba: Directly after the Emergency Phase, Sint
Eustatius and Saba requested assistance for the reconstruction of their islands, and support
was provided by several departments. The Ministry of BZK coordinated the reconstruction
phase and was responsible in this phase for the expenses on housing, public space and nature
and environment. With the projects selected, the Ministry of BZK not only focused on the
recovery of housing, public space and nature (situation as was), but also on ‘building back
better’. This strategy aims at reducing the risk preparatory of future hurricanes.

24

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

Figure 2.1

2.2

Intervention logic Budget Article 8

Evaluation questions
Policy review under the Regulation of Periodical Evaluation (RPE) Research

20. The evaluation questions for this review closely follow the standard questions defined under the
Regulation of Periodical Evaluation Research of the Government of the Netherlands of 15 March
2018 and their further development in the Letter to the House of Representatives of 21 September
2020. Annex IV contains all evaluation questions and references to specific sections in this report
where they are answered. In some cases, complex questions covering multiple elements were
disaggregated into sub-questions.
General and specific evaluation questions RPE
21. The general questions cover the structure of the funding; the motivation of the Government of the
Netherlands to provide support; the respective responsibilities of the Governments of the
Netherlands and Sint Maarten in the context of the Charter of the Kingdom; the scope of the
evaluation; the funding provided and the expenditures that were made; the funding from other
sources; and documentary and other evidence (including previous evaluations).
22. More specific questions address the effectiveness of policy support in terms of results achieved, as
well as possible positive or negative side-effects. Under effectiveness, the dimension of building
back better is explored, namely the rebuilding of physical infrastructure; being better prepared for a
crisis or better prepared through crisis management. Another set of questions addresses efficiency,
particularly how expenses were justified; if they were reasonable in light of results achieved; and
finally what policy options would exist if more or fewer resources (20% approx.) were available.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

25

2.3

Methods and limitation

23. Already before the start of the policy review, it had become clear that the evaluation material,
usually underlying a policy review (evaluation reports), was limited. In the inception phase it was
therefore expressly stated that the use of other documentation and interviews would be necessary
in order to formulate answers on the evaluation questions. Consequently, this policy review does
not merely synthesize findings from evaluation reports, but also carries out an evaluation
(appreciation) of the policy implementation and its results on the basis of other types of
documentation and in-depth interviews. This paragraph provides insight into the methods and
limitations of the information used for this policy review.

2.3.1 Documentation
24. The policy review sought to draw on documentation concerning the original design of the Dutch
contribution to the emergency assistance, the early recovery and the reconstruction of Saba and
Sint Eustatius. At an earlier stage, it had already been highlighted that document describing the
overall goal and specific objectives of the contribution from the Netherlands provided little guidance
as to which outputs, outcomes and impact were to be achieved within a given timeframe (see
section 2.1 and the section above).
25. Documentation in the form of letters, reports, invoices, tables and emails was provided by the
Ministry of BZK. The initial set of shared documents continued to be fed into by the Ministry of BZK
over the course of the policy review. This information was then supplemented with available reports
from other ministries, NGOs and local authorities. The quality of documentation varied per phase.
Due to the ad-hoc nature of decision-making during the emergency response, documents
concerning its funding and activities were scattered and not readily available. The early recovery
phase, on the other hand, is well-documented, due to subsidy obligations. For the reconstruction
phase on Saba and Sint Eustatius, official documents were in some cases limited or not readily
available at the project level within the Ministry of BZK. There is a lack of available information on
the project selection (e.g. the relation between the damage assessment and project selections) and
the monitoring of the projects on content. The financial project management (e.g. subsidie
beschikkingen, verzoeken tot uitstel, etc.) was available to the evaluation team.
26. The evaluation team also relied on financial source documents of the Ministry of BZK concerning
expenditure under Article 8, i.e. and payments to parties implementing emergency response and
early recovery activities. The objective of the policy review is not to reconstruct financial reporting,
but rely to the greatest possible extent on respective overall synthetic financial reporting of the
Ministry of BZK. This created some difficulties because the financial data is not always conclusive.
Expenditure is included in the administration, but often no link is made to the specific content.
Information on the content was scattered among emails, “subsidie beschikkingen”, project
proposals, etc.
27. The following types of documents were used for this policy review:
•

Overall policy and legal documents of the Governments of the Netherlands and Sint Maarten,
e.g. the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands10; Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom
Relations; documents prepared by the Ministry of BZK for Parliament (‘kamerstukken’ and
internal documents); annual reports of the Ministry of BZK; letters and other publications
addressed by the Government of Sint Maarten and the public entities of Saba and Sint
Eustatius to the Netherlands.

10

26

https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002154/2010-10-10 website consulted on 1 February 2022

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

•

Documentation related to emergency response, early recovery and reconstruction projects and
programmes, e.g. if available, project documents; progress and final reports; minutes of
meetings, as appropriate.

•

Other sources, e.g. scientific publications; archives of news media, as appropriate.11

Available documentation Emergency Response
28. For the assessment of the emergency response phase, we used the (internal) evaluations carried
out by the departments involved in the emergency response. Most of the departments involved in
the emergency response conducted an (process) evaluation of their own input afterwards. The
available (process) evaluations cover an important part of the resources used for emergency
response. In addition, more general reviews have also been drawn up by a number of other
organisations.
29. The available reviews focused on the learning experiences and on what could be improved in the
future; they focus much less on the effectiveness and efficiency of the emergency response
provided. During the interviews, an attempt was made to obtain more information on the
effectiveness and efficiency of the emergency assistance provided.
Table 2.1 Main documents emergency response

General

•

Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (2018), Lessen uit crises en mini-crises 2017,
Arnhem/ Zoetermeer.

•

COT: Instituut voor Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie
Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma, Rotterdam.

Ministry of BZK

•

Ministerie van BZK (mei 2018), Sint Maarten, Irma en BZK: evaluatie
crisisbeheer ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Den Haag.

•

Ministerie van BZK, Vertegenwoordiging van Nederland Willemstad (juli
2018), Verslag “Lessons learned” van het Crisis Ondersteuningsoverleg Curaçao.

Ministry of I&W

•

Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (april 2018), Orkaan Irma treft Sint Maarten en
Caribisch Nederland: een evaluatie van het door het ministerie van IenW
geleverde Crisismanagement. Arnhem/ Zoetermeer.

Ministry of

•

Defence

Ministerie van Defensie (mei 2020), Evaluatie militaire inzet orkaan Irma 2017,
Den Haag.

Ministry of VWS

•

No evaluation carried out specifically for VWS’ response.

Ministry of JenV

•

Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid/ Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (mei
2018), Onderzoek naar het Systeem van rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden.
Incidentenonderzoek naar aanleiding van de passage van de orkanen Irma, Jose
en Maria. Den Haag.

Ministry of OCW

•

No evaluation carried out specifically for OCW’s response.

Ministry of BZ

•

No evaluation carried out specifically for BZ’s response.

Available documentation Early Recovery phase
30. Due to the project-based nature of this phase, the activities are relatively well-documented. In
addition to internal documents from the Ministry of BZK showing the discussions held in early
December 2017, the evaluation team also received access to project proposals, progress reports
and final reports for most projects.

11

For example, https://dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl/ , https://stmaartennews.com/, https://www.thedailyherald.sx/ website
consulted 30 June 2021, website consulted on 1 February 2022

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

27

Table 2.2 Main documents Early Recovery

White Yellow

•

Cross Care

White Yellow Cross Care Foundation (30 September 2018), Final Report
Reconstruction Projects, Sint Maarten.

Foundation
•

UNICEF

UNICEF Nederland (November 2017), Sint Maarten Post-Hurricane Irma
Assessment, Den Haag.

•

UNICEF Nederland (13 December 2018), Early Recovery Final Report, Den
Haag.

Red Cross

•

Red Cross, Final narrative Report NLRC School Meal Project.

•

Red Cross (October 2018), From Waste to Work Final Report.

UNDP

•

UNDP (2019), Sint Maarten Recovering Back Better Project Final Report

Qredits

•

Qredits. (20 December 2017), Proposal ‘Ondersteuning MKB op Bovenwindse
Eilanden bij Wederopbouw’

•

Qredits (July 2021), Eindverslag subsidiebeschikking onder nummer 20170000662632”

SMDF

•

SMDF (February 2019), Progress Report

Available documentation reconstruction Saba and Sint Eustatius
31. The projects of the reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba have not been previously evaluated.
The documentation provided by the Ministry of BZK on the reconstruction of Saba and Sint
Eustatius is limited and consists mainly of the ‘dispositions’ – information about the cliff
reinforcement and documentation about projects in Sint Eustatius. In addition, the evaluation team
received documentation from the Public Entity of Saba and documents from the Planning Bureau.
Regional media has been used in order to provide useful insights. Lastly, field visits and the
interviews conducted on the island are used as an important source of information. For most
projects, the information is of sufficient quality to judge the effectiveness of the effort. However, as
mentioned earlier, the information provided does not address project selection – a well-considered
judgement on project selection is therefore impossible. The information on the content of projects in
nature and environment is scattered; therefore, the review could only provide minor insights into the
effectiveness on this topic.

2.3.2 Interviews
32. The Ministry of BZK provided a list of potential interviewees in the Netherlands, Sint Maarten, Saba
and Sint Eustatius. The evaluation team selected interviewees, and some additional resource
persons were added. The Ministry of BZK also sent messages to selected interviewees to introduce
the evaluators, but had no further involvement in the actual interviews. It was decided that
interviews would be undertaken jointly between the evaluators of parts I / III and part II, so as to
avoid the stakeholder fatigue. All interviews in the Netherlands were held by video or audioconferencing, due to the prevailing Covid-19 related public health situation.
33. Some 50 persons were interviewed in the Netherlands, and interview guides were used. Most
resource persons were government staff, having been involved in post-Irma activities within the
Ministry of BZK. Based on their consent, their names and roles are mentioned in Annex I.
Interviews on Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius took place in person during the field visit (see
list of names in Annex I).

28

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

34. In advance of the respective appointments, semi-structured interview guides were shared with
prospective resource persons. At the start of each interview, the evaluator clearly explained the
scope and objectives of the policy review and the purpose of the interview. They also assured the
interviewee of the confidentiality of their responses. This also included that any information and
viewpoints shared with the evaluation team would not be attributed to individual respondents, both
in the report and in general.

2.3.3 Visit to Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius
35. Ecorys consultants and Lucien Bäck undertook a joint mission to Sint Maarten between 8 and 20
November 2021. On 15 and 18 November, the Ecorys team was on Saba and Sint Eustatius,
respectively. The Office of the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten kindly planned and facilitated
meetings based on suggestions communicated in advance. The purpose of these meetings was for
the evaluation team to gain information on results and context on the ground, and to hear
viewpoints and perspectives of stakeholders in Sint Maarten. On Saba and Sint Eustatius, meetings
and project visits were efficiently organised by the public entities, giving the team the opportunity to
gather all necessary information in one day.
36. Interviewees in Sint Maarten included technical staff of line ministries (e.g. the Ministry of
Education), staff of the National Reconstruction Program Bureau (NRPB), the management team of
the Sint Maarten Medical Centre, staff of implementing organisations of Trust Fund projects (e.g.
VNG-International / R4CR, Red Cross Netherlands, UNICEF-NL, Qredits) as well as other NGOs.
The team did not get to interview Members of Cabinet, despite requests to do so. Interviewees in
Saba included the Saba Executive Council and Planning Bureau Department. In Sint Eustatius, a
meeting was planned with the members of the crisis team, and reconstruction projects were also
visited.

2.3.4 Triangulation of information
37. All available information was – to the greatest possible extent – triangulated, i.e. drawn from
different sources, critically assessed and compared, with a view to drawing well-founded evidencebased findings and reliable and credible conclusions. The review aimed at the greatest possible
impartiality and objectivity, without bias, personal perspectives or viewpoints. Conclusions and
recommendations are meant to be constructive and practical, to allow for an improvement of
policies in the future.
38. The evidence collected for this review is, by and large, sufficiently robust to allow for some
meaningful conclusions and recommendations. However, the level of detail in the information
available varied significantly across the phases, with the early recovery phase as a positive
exception. Challenges to accessing and receiving the documentary, and other evidence on the
emergency assistance and the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Maarten, were mostly overcome;
but this did require a huge effort, and took more time than had been originally expected.
2.3.5 Limitations and causality
39. Several limitations need to be mentioned
•

In the first place, this policy review cannot draw on a proper results framework with specific,
measurable, achievable and time-bound objectives concerning the Dutch contribution to the
emergency assistance, early recovery and reconstruction on the islands.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

29

•

There are a number of evaluations carried out by departments and bodies involved in the
emergency assistance. However, they provided a scattered and incomplete picture of the whole
emergency phase.

•

There are no comprehensive project evaluations and reviews for the reconstruction of Saba and
Sint Eustatius. Likewise, there is no information available on the project selection and how this
is related to the damage assessments.

•

Financial data is also not completely conclusive. As a result, it required some time to gain an
adequate overview of the activities carried out, and to achieve an accurate picture of the
expenditure.

40. These shortcomings could only be partially compensated through more in depth desk research,
e.g. requests on assistance, interviews and the field visit. Due to high staff turnover in the Ministry
of BZK and other Ministries and NGOs, interviewees were often involved in the Article 8-funded
activities for short periods of time. As a result, interviewees themselves were often unable to
provide comprehensive overviews.

30

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

3

Design of the emergency response, early
recovery and reconstruction activities

3.1

Timeline

41. This policy review covers the period between 6 September 2017 and the end of 2021, and roughly
follows the three phases below:
•

The Emergency Response phase spans from 7 September 2017 (when the Netherlands first
sent emergency relief) to 1 December 2017 (the cut-off date set by the Ministry of BZK for
emergency assistance to be invoiced by other departments under this budgetary line).12

•

The Early Recovery phase spans from 21 December 2017 to mid-2018 and refers to the
projects implemented in Sint Maarten as a result of a call for project proposals. The Netherlands
began negotiations for the signing of the Trust Fund at an early stage, during a visit to
Washington in October 2017 and ultimately signed the administration arrangement with the
World Bank on 16 April, 2018. It will be in place until 2025 and is currently undergoing its midterm review under Part II. An initial budget was earmarked for direct support, i.e. funding to be
provided for activities implemented through bilateral cooperation between the Netherlands and
Sint Maarten, without involvement of the World Bank.

•

The Reconstruction for Saba and Sint Eustatius period ran from 10 November 2017, when
the Council of Ministers decided to provide financial support for recovery to the public entities, to
31 December 2021.

3.2

Design of the emergency response

42. In this section, we describe how disaster management and emergency assistance is set up on the
different islands. As Sint Maarten is an autonomous country within the Kingdom, it has been
responsible for its national response to disasters since the administrative reforms of 2010,
supported by the assurance that the four countries of the Kingdom can provide assistance to each
other when needed (Article 36 of the Charter). Saba and Sint Eustatius, on the other hand, received
the assistance they requested from the Netherlands as a result of their position as public entities of
the country.

3.2.1 Emergency response on Sint Maarten
43. The disaster management system of Sint Maarten is laid down in the National Ordinance Disaster
Management (“Landsverordening rampenbestrijding”13). This national ordinance highlights the
duties and responsibilities in the event of a disaster. It also includes the obligation to draw up a
contingency plan, which stipulates how to effectively act in the event of a disaster.
44. The National Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) plays a central role within the disaster
management structure of Sint Maarten (see Figure 3.1). The EOC is activated when a natural
disaster approaches. This took place on 1 September 2017, five days before Hurricane Irma
reached Sint Maarten. When the EOC is activated, the Prime Minister is elevated to a commanding

12

13

As coordinating ministry, the total budget was placed on the budget of BZK (Article 8). Ministries that were requested to
help by the Ministry of BZK could then submit their invoices to the Ministry of BZK before 1 December 2017.
https://lokaleregelgeving.overheid.nl/CVDR206085

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

31

position and is responsible for taking final decisions at the strategic level. Within the EOC, the
coordinating role is assigned to the chief of the fire department (“Fire Chief”).14 This organisational
structure facilitates and accelerates decision-making, which can increase effectiveness. Another
part of the disaster management structure is the Emergency Service Functions (ESF), a group of
ten thematic supporting bodies that operate during emergency situations. Inventory of required
support of both resources and products is crucial, time sensitive and should be one of the first
assessments to be made after a major calamity. Due to the multiple sectors the ESF can be the
main provider of this inventory of emergency goods. Local NGOs on Sint Maarten can provide
emergency assistance and support in case of emergencies, and are embedded into the ESFs.
Figure 3.1 Organisation structure disaster management Sint Maarten

Source: http://www.sintmaartengov.org/PressReleases/Pages/The-Sint-Maarten-Disaster-ManagementOrganization.aspx

45. Sint Maarten, as an autonomous country within the Kingdom, is responsible for its own disaster
management during a crisis. The decision making process at the top (in the hands of the Prime
Minister of Sint Maarten) was weak in the aftermath of the crisis, in part due to a largely absent
Prime Minister. In addition, there were ambiguities about the division of tasks and responsibilities
on the practical level, between the ESFs. As a result, the counterparts of BZK on the island lacked
proper guidance and coordination. Due to this lack of coordination, the flow of information was
inadequate and prioritisation was difficult on the European part of the Netherlands. Action was
therefore carried out in the days following Irma based on estimates on the side of The Hague
(push) – rather than being demand-driven from the islands (pull). Although the worst effects of the
hurricanes were quickly addressed, it was not due to the proper functioning of the system.15 A
supra-island coordination point or coordination team was not included in supra-island plans,
national plans or any other way.

14
15

32

The World Bank. Sint Maarten National Recovery and Resilience Plan, p 12.
Ministerie van JenV (mei 2018), Onderzoek naar het system van de rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

3.2.2 Emergency response on Saba and Sint Eustatius
46. The system for disaster management on Saba and Sint Eustatius is laid down in the BES Safety
Act (Veiligheidswet BES).16 This law came into effect on 10 October 2010 and contains provisions
on the police fire service, disaster relief and crisis management in the Caribbean Netherlands. The
law stipulates that the Island Governors on Saba and Sint Eustatius play a central role, similarly to
the role of a mayor in the municipalities within the Netherlands. The Island Governor has supreme
command over his or her territory in the event of a disaster or crisis in that territory. The Island
Governor is also charged with maintaining public order and crisis communication, and heads the
Island (crisis) Policy Team (EBT in Dutch). External officials can also be brought in for this purpose.
The role of island disaster coordinator is fulfilled by the Island Secretary. This person is the first
point of contact for the provision of information and coordination of communication. When scaling
up the crisis or disaster to the higher national level, the supreme command remains with the
governor(s). In case of upscaling and assistance, the Kingdom Representative, stationed at
Bonaire, acts as a link between the Caribbean Netherlands and the European Netherlands.17

3.2.3 Constitutional differences
47. The disaster management systems on the islands are primarily intended for disasters with a local
(island) scope. Due to the magnitude of damage caused by Hurricanes Irma, Jose and Maria – and
the fact that all three islands were hit – it soon became clear that aid from the Netherlands was
desired and necessary. The crisis management structure, therefore, needed to be upscaled.
48. The position of the three islands in the constitutional structure (which defines Sint Maarten as an
autonomous country within the Kingdom, and Saba and Sint Eustatius as public entities of the
Netherlands) created an unclear situation for the Ministry of BZK. The Ministry is responsible for the
coordination of a crisis in the Netherlands, but not for a crisis in an autonomous country of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Consequently, an investigation had to be made into the legal grounds
upon which the national crisis organisation could support Sint Maarten, which took some time. 18 In
the meantime, the Ministry of Defence was in charge of emergency assistance. Defence was
already on site and prepared to act in crisis situations.. Within two weeks (formally from 18
September 2017), the Ministry of BZK had taken over operational leadership and the chairmanship
of Defence in meetings.19
49. Official requests for assistance are key for the provision of emergency assistance. Requests for
assistance from Sint Maarten are made by invoking the Charter for Kingdom of the Netherlands
(Article 36 the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten provide each other with help and
assistance). In contrast to Saba and Sint Eustatius, the official requests for needs and relief
supplies from Sint Maarten only came later (starting from 12 September). The late submission of
requests for assistance by the government of Sint Maarten came as a result of the management of
the EOC not working properly in the beginning. In the face of the devastation on Sint Maarten and
the threats to public law and order, the Netherlands took immediate action to respond to perceived
emergency needs in some instances in a way that went beyond what was formally requested. The
Ministry of Defence recognised that the decision to deploy additional military personnel (whereas
initially 10 FTEs were requested, more were deployed) on Sint Maarten did not follow conventional
16
17

18

19

https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0028586/2018-08-01
Ministry of Justice and Security & Ministry of BZK, Handboek crisisbeheersing voor de Caribische delen van het Koninkrijk,
Den Haag, June 2020.
COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma,
Rotterdam (p.9).
Ministerie van Defensie (mei 2020), Evaluatie militaire inzet orkaan Irma 2017, Den Haag (p. 16).

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

33

legal procedure (due to the lack of an official request) but was instead prompted by moral
responsibility.
50. For the BES islands, the task of the Kingdom Representative in the Caribbean Netherlands is to
assess a request for assistance made by an island and to forward it to the relevant ministries. All
military-related requests for assistance were forwarded to the Ministry of Defence, and all other
requests for assistance were forwarded to the Ministry of BZK. In practice, however, the emergency
assistance to Saba and Sint Eustatius was organised primarily through existing connections with
the various ministries. Formal and informal requests for assistance were directly routed to the
different departments and thereafter coordinated with BZK, which led to confusion. 20
Shortly after the disaster, most requests for assistance from Saba and Sint Eustatius focused on
the provision of drinking water, food and medication. Requests for assistance from the islands
directly to the Ministry of BZK mainly concerned the provision of building materials. Chapter 4
contains a detailed overview of the requests for assistance. Due to the existing working
relationships between Saba and Sint Eustatius’ governments and the various Ministries of the
Netherlands, emergency assistance to Sint Eustatius and Saba was often provided in a direct
manner. The usual rules were not always applied, usual procedures were waived and people often
relied on informal relations to ensure things progressed. While the official process for submitting
requests for assistance for the three islands goes through the Kingdom Representative in the
Caribbean Netherlands, who is stationed on Bonaire (see also chapter 4), information was not
always centralised and a full overview of requests of assistance is lacking.

3.2.4 Coordination between the islands after the hurricanes
51. The Ministry of BZK used the national crisis structure to guarantee administrative support and
coordination after the hurricanes. The national crisis structure consists of the Interdepartmental
Crisis Management Committee (ICCB) and the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee (MCCB).
The MCCB is chaired by the Minister of Justice and Security, or the Prime Minister, and decides (by
majority vote) on all measures and provisions with a view to a coherent approach in a crisis
situation.21 The ICCB advises the MCCB and, if necessary and possible, also takes decisions itself.
Both are supported and advised by an Interdepartmental Coordination Council (IAO). The key to
the structure is its flexibility, where experts can be brought in as required and the structure can be
adapted as needed.22 The ICCB met on the morning of 7 September 2017 and was activated in
consultation and in support of the Ministry of BZK and J&V. The invited ministries were BZK, AZ,
Defence, BuZa and I&W. During this meeting, parties agreed to give priority to the supply of food
and water for at least 5 days, and to prepare for Hurricane Jose by expanding the number of
operational shelters and restoring the airport and seaport for transport. 23
52. The Ministry of BZK has a coordinating role in relation to the cooperation with the other countries
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten) and with the public entities
in the Caribbean Netherlands (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), including in the event of a crisis
with regards to the provision of aid and assistance. On the islands, the Representation of the
Netherlands acts as an outpost of the Dutch government.
20

21
22

23

34

Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid/ Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (mei 2018), Onderzoek naar het Systeem van
rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden. Incidentenonderzoek naar aanleiding van de passage van de orkanen Irma, Jose
en Maria. Den Haag (p.37).
National Crisis Structure, consulted at: https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/nationale-crisisstructuur.
COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma,
Rotterdam (p.5).
COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma,
Rotterdam (p.11).

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

53. In order to give substance to the coordinating role of the Ministry of BZK, a project director general
“Reconstruction of the Windward Islands” was appointed two days after the islands were hit. Shortly
afterwards, a crisis team was also set up in The Hague with the responsibility of coordinating the
emergency assistance, including the matching of supply and demand. This crisis team consisted of
the Ministerial Committee on Crisis Management (MCCB) and the Interdepartmental Committee on
Crisis Management (ICCB) with representatives from, among others, the ministries of the Interior,
Defence, Infrastructure and Water Management, Foreign Affairs and Justice and Security. A few
days after the hurricane, a civil mission from BZK was also sent to Sint Maarten. The civil mission
addressed urgent needs including waste disposal, water supply, electricity and immediate housing
needs. The team also undertook a needs assessment and conveyed this to The Hague. 24 The civil
mission was active from 2 days after the hurricane until the end of November 2017. Communication
between the civil mission in Sint Maarten and the coordinators in The Hague did not go smoothly at
the start, in part because of the loss of crucial infrastructure and in part because processes, roles
and responsibilities were still being figured out.
54. The Caribbean part of the Kingdom had no existing joint structure or specific administrative plans in
the event of a crisis. One exception is the role of the Ministry of Defence, which has a permanent
presence in the Caribbean for military tasks – providing military assistance to local authorities,
including the provision of emergency assistance. Due to the lack of a specific approach, there was
an immediate need for improvisation. To this end, the so-called Crisis Support Consultation
Curaçao (COOC) was established on Curacao.25 The cooperation within the COOC was not based
on the transfer of powers and mandate, but rather on added value, and was initially coordinated by
the Commander NL Forces Caribbean (CZMCARIB). The meetings of the COOC covered a wide
variety of topics. This resulted in lengthy meetings, which were neither efficient nor effective for all
involved.26 At a later stage, the coordination was taken over by the Representative of the
Netherlands, as soon as the Representation of the Netherlands in Willemstad (VNW) was
reinforced with personnel.
55. A study carried out on behalf of the Ministry of JenV looked into the functioning of the existing
disaster management systems on Saba and Sint Eustatius during the aftermath of Hurricanes Irma,
Jose and Maria in. It concluded that while all separate parts of the disaster management system
were operational in 2017, there was a lack of coherence and coordination between these parts.27
The report therefore found that the disaster management system on the BES islands did not yet
fully function as intended in the BES Safety Act.
56. Improvements were needed in relation to cooperation and coordination, in particular between the
islands and the organisation between the European Netherlands and the Kingdom Representative.
In addition to the difficulty of communication, the lack of knowledge of each party’s responsibilities
and roles also played its part. For example, parties kept their own lists (of requested and provided
assistance) and there was no clear central overview, as the study of the Ministry of JenV
concluded. The issue of logistics was also mentioned, as with the exception of gathering an
emergency stock, logistics is not included in the planning of Saba and Sint Eustatius in the event of
disasters. Because logistic processes were mainly focused on Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint
Eustatius became dependent on the relief goods that were delivered to Sint Maarten.

24
25
26
27

ABD Blad 4, donderdag 14 december 2017.
Ministry of Interior, Report “Lessons Learned of the Crisis Ondersteuningsoverleg Curaçao”, July 2018.
Verslag COOC.
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid/ Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (mei 2018), Onderzoek naar het Systeem van
rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden. Incidentenonderzoek naar aanleiding van de passage van de orkanen Irma, Jose
en Maria. Den Haag (p.5)

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

35

Following the conclusions in the evaluation of the Ministry of JenV about the system for the disaster
management of hurricanes Irma, Jose and Maria, the coordination plan for supra-island disaster
relief and crisis management Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba was already adjusted in January
2020. An important adjustment compared to the version of the coordination plan from 2017 was the
tightening up and clarification of the roles, tasks and powers of Saba, Sint Eustatius and Bonaire,
the Kingdom Representative and the relationship with the European Netherlands. 28 A “Crisis
Management Handbook for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom” was drawn up in June 2020 as a
result of the experiences with Hurricane Irma. This handbook is a joint publication of the Ministry of
JenV and the Ministry of BZK. It is meant to be consulted when the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom
are hit by a disaster or crisis and assistance from the European part of the Netherlands is required.
It contains agreements about the cooperation and the main processes that must be followed during
a supra-(island) country disaster or crisis. It is precisely these island-transcending agreements on
cooperation and implementation of the main processes that were not properly arranged prior to
Hurricane Irma. The handbook does not discuss the preparation phase because this preparation is
the responsibility of the individual countries within the Kingdom.
57. An independent evaluation of the BES Safety Act was carried out and finalised in 2022, which
found it still lacking.29 The role of the Kingdom Representative does not get sufficient support from
public entities, who on their side do not see the value added of the coordinating role of the Kingdom
Representative. The evaluation mentions bottlenecks in the coordination with Sint Maarten,
because the country is not part of the Safety Act and no formal arrangements exist. It furthermore
recommends drawing up a mutual arrangement on the basis of the Charter, clarifying the
assistance referred to in Article 36.

3.3

Design of the early recovery

58. Longer-term reconstruction needs were already being considered during the emergency assistance
stages. As early as 15 September 2017, a little more than a week after the hurricane, a Ministerial
Committee for the Reconstruction of the Windward Islands and an Inter-Departmental Programme
Commission were created in the Netherlands. Requests for assistance for reconstruction were
received on 17 September 2017 in the case of Saba and on 14 September 2017 in the case of Sint
Eustatius.30 On 13 October 2017, the Minister of BZK, Mr. R.H.A. Plasterk, addressed a letter to the
Government of Sint Maarten announcing that a significant financial package could be made
available for the reconstruction of the island. This letter also contained conditions 31 to be met for the
financial support to be made available. Consent to conditionalities was expected by 31 October
2017. However, the Prime Minister in Sint Maarten at the time, Mr. William Marlin, did not agree to
the conditions, which led to two votes of no-confidence in the Parliament of Sint Maarten and an
instruction by the Kingdom Council of Ministers (Rijksministerraad). Prime Minister Marlin left office
in November 2017 and the interim Government consented to the conditions soon after.32
59. The early recovery phase in Sint Maarten would act as bridging phase between the initial
emergency response and the longer-term reconstruction activities. With these longer-term activities
requiring more time for their design and set-up, there was an acknowledgement that shorter-term,
28

29

30

31
32

36

https://www.rijksdienstcn.com/over-de-rijksdienst-caribisch-nederland/documenten/publicaties/rv/coordinatieplanrampenbestrijding/coordinatieplan-rampenbestrijding-en-crisisbeheersing/index
Pro Facto & University of Curacao, Evaluatie Veiligheidswet BES, March 2022. Available at:
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2022/04/25/tk-bijlage-1-evaluatie-veiligheidswet-bes-eindrapport
Rijksvertegenwoordiger voor Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba. Brief aan minister Plasterk met het verzoek om bijstand
wederopbouw.14 september 2017. Kenmerk Rv/17u/106.
Namely, strengthening of border control and the establishment of an Integrity Chamber.
Kst-34 773. Interim Prime Minister Rafael Boasma was replaced by Interim Prime Minister Ms. Leona Marlin-Romeo on 15
January 2018.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

more practical projects needed to fill this gap. A similar phase was not developed for Saba and Sint
Eustatius. Since the damage was not as extensive as in Sint Maarten, emergency assistance
addressed many of their immediate needs. This more limited damage – and the position of the
islands as public entities – also meant that reconstruction activities did not require the setting up of
a Trust Fund as in the case of Sint Maarten, and were therefore able to be rolled out quicker,
eliminating the need for a transition phase.
60. Organisations invited to participate in the early recovery projects were seen as being best placed to
identify urgent needs; using their own capacity to deliver results for the duration of the early
recovery timeline. It emerges from the interviews with these organisations that they were given
considerable freedom to develop their proposals, BZK assumed that these organisations
understood the urgent needs well due to their local involvement or prior experience in disaster
situations. Project proposals were submitted in December 2017 after a general call for proposals. In
some cases, organisations were also approached directly by the Hague or the Dutch Civil Mission
and asked to submit a proposal.
61. The project proposals themselves were not subject to strict technical or financial requirements,
though organisations did require an auditor’s report containing historical financial information to
qualify. The development of the final project proposals often included rounds of discussion between
the organisations and members of the Civil Mission.33 Final project proposals, which varied
significantly in length and level of detail, contained a general description of the aim and the
approach, as well as an initial cost estimate and breakdown. In practice, this meant that most of the
projects had to further define or adapt their approach in the implementation phase (see Chapter 5),
making it difficult to speak of effectiveness vis-à-vis changing targets.

3.4

Design of the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius

62. The damage on Saba and Sint Eustatius after the hurricanes was relatively limited compared to
Sint Maarten; concerning mainly houses and public spaces. On 8 September 2017, two days after
the hurricane, the Minister of BZK, R.H.A. Plasterk, indicated that Saba and Sint Eustatius would
receive assistance in the reconstruction. On 12 September, Prime Minister Rutte again confirmed
this. On 14 and 17 September 2017 respectively, Sint Eustatius and Saba requested assistance for
the reconstruction of the island.34,35 On 21 September, Minister R.H.A. Plasterk mentioned in
“algemeen overleg” that “Sint Eustatius and Saba shall not be forgotten and are part of the recovery
programme”.36 On 10 November 2017, the Council of Ministers made a formal decision to provide
financial support to the public entities of Sint Eustatius and Saba for recovery. 37
“In addition, the Council of Ministers has decided that a one-off amount of €67 million will be made
available for the reconstruction of the public entities of Saba and Sint Eustatius. This amount is
separate from the amount of €550 million destined for Sint Maarten.”38

33

34

35
36
37

38

The evaluators had access to the e-mails containing project proposals submissions, for both selected and not selected
projects. From these e-mails it was clear that conversations about the objectives of projects and ideas on how to achieve
them had, in many cases, already taken place.
Rijksvertegenwoordiger voor Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba. Brief aan minister Plasterk met het verzoek om bijstand
wederopbouw.14 september 2017. Kenmerk Rv/17u/106.
Public Entity of Saba. Overview of all measures requested. 15 november 2017.
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Verslag van een algemeen overleg. 21 september 2017.
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Brief van de staatssecretaris van binnenlandse zaken en koninkrijksrelaties.
Vergaderjaar 2017-2018. Kenmerk: 34 773. 10 november 2017.
Kamerbrief van 10 november 2017 (kst-34773-D, ISSN 0921 – 7371, ’s-Gravenhage 2017)

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

37

63. The budget for the reconstruction was composed of various departmental budgets, depending on
their responsibilities on the islands. This was also mentioned in a Letter to the Parliament from 18
December 2017:
“The budget for the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius is processed through various
departmental budgets according to responsibility, and can be consulted in the overview of the
Caribbean Netherlands of the BES Fund”39.

64. While the Ministry of BZK kept an overall coordinating role over the reconstruction of Saba and Sint
Eustatius, other Ministries were in charge of the implementation and finances of specific projects,
depending on their mandate and expertise. The projects themselves were chosen by the islands, in
consultation with the Ministries who then relied on their internal budgets to support the projects.
Article 8 funded projects were therefore only a part of the projects under the reconstruction phase
for the two islands.

3.5

Financial overview Article 8
Emergency response

65. The Dutch government immediately provided a humanitarian emergency response for the three
islands, for which a total of €55 million was initially reserved. In the structure that had been
established, all parties could declare their costs until the end of 2017, and with special exceptions
for the first part of 2018. In total, €40.4 million was declared by the different stakeholders.40
Early recovery
66. A budget of €7 million was allocated for the early recovery phase, within the reconstruction budget
of €550 million for SXM. The budgetary envelopes for early recovery and reconstruction were
developed simultaneously. Interviewed stakeholders described this procedure as somewhat
improvised and not based on an explicit cost assessment, but rather on the costs of reconstruction
after Hurricane Luis, adjusted for inflation. A small share of this total was then allocated to early
recovery. The inter-ministerial committee in charge of establishing the amount, far removed from
the situation on the ground, had little insight into the specific needs.41 At that time, it was not yet
clear as to the exact amounts which would eventually become available from insurance pay-outs on
the island. The total expenditure came to €6.7 million, though many implementing parties made use
of co-financing from other sources to bolster their activities.
Reconstruction
67. The Dutch government made a maximum of €67 million available for the reconstruction of Saba
and Sint Eustatius. The projects were implemented by several departments, according to each
department’s responsibilities. A complete financial overview of all stakeholders is included in
chapter 6. The projects under the responsibility of the Ministry of BZK fell under article 8 and had to
be implemented by the end of 2021. The Ministry of BZK covered €18 million of this budget from
article 8, allocating €15.0 million to Sint Eustatius, €3.9 million to Saba and €1.5 million to the SSCS
Sea Cable.

39
40

41

38

kamerbrief van 18 december 2017 (kst-34845-IV-3, ISSN 0921 – 7371, ’s-Gravenhage 2017)
Verslag houdende lijst van Vragen en antwoorden. Wijziging van de begrotingsstaten van Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) en het
BES-fonds (H) voor het jaar 2018 (wijziging samenhangende met de Najaarsnota) - 35 095 IV.
From interviewed stakeholders involved in the process.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

Table 3.1 Expenditures on emergency response, early recovery and reconstruction on Article 8.2
(in € x 1.000)
Budgeted

Realisation

Emergency response

55.0

40.4

Early recovery

7.0

6.7 a)

Reconstruction

20.4
Saba

b)

3.9

Sint Eustatius

b)

15.0

Subsidy SSCS Sea cable
Total
a)
b)

b)
62 + b)

1.5
67.5

Source: Financieel overzicht WBE SXM 15072021
Initial budget not known – not provided in the documentation

Establishment of the budgets
68. In the emergency phase, an inventory was created of what was needed and how much it would
cost during implementation. The total amount of estimated costs was the budget for the emergency
response. The budget was included in the regular treatment of the 2nd supplementary bill.
69. The establishment of the budget for the early recovery is closely related with the decision to spend
a large portion of the envelope of €550 million through a World Bank executed Trust Fund in Sint
Maarten. This decision was made rather quickly at political level in the Netherlands in November
2017 (see also Part II of the policy review). The expediency observed by both the Government of
the Netherlands and the World Bank in establishing the Trust Fund created the impression that
project activities would commence rapidly after signature of the Administration Arrangement, thus
responding to the needs of the population on the ground within a short timeframe. The Government
of the Netherlands was apparently under this impression as well, as the intended early recovery
phase involved only a comparatively small fund of €7 million.
70. After the emergency response phase, all departments assumed their own responsibilities for the
reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius. During the interviews, the team heard that the authorities
on the islands could propose reconstruction projects themselves, in consultation with the line
ministries. The cost estimates of these projects added up to the reconstruction budget. The Ministry
of BZK was, among others, responsible for house repairs and repairs in public space (including the
stabilisation of the cliff). The budget of this phase was mainly based on damage assessment
reports.
Activities with a lower or higher budget
71. A policy review also looks at policy options in the case of a 20% higher or 20% lower budget. In a
crisis situation this question poses some challenges. For both the emergency relief and the early
recovery phase, the size of the budget was a political decision. One could also have decided that
less aid should be granted for the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. After all, there is no provision in
the Statute of the Kingdom concerning how much assistance must be provided. However, given the
nature of the disaster and the suffering it caused, the political decision was made in an early phase
to be generous.
72. If there was actually 20% less budget available for support in a similar subsequent disaster, fewer
requests for assistance could be approved in the emergency response phase. Good prioritisation is
necessary here. In the case of the early recovery phase in Sint Maarten, our findings show that
several projects went over budget as a result of underestimations, or requested extensions to
continue meetings a segment of the population’s needs. Lower budgets would have resulted in
shorter projects with less impact. As regards the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius, the

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

39

Ministry of BZK did have certain responsibilities. With a lower budget, fewer or lower quality repairs
could have been carried out. This would certainly have impacted the islands’ resilience for future
hurricanes.
73. Had a 20% larger budget been made available, it is unlikely that the emergence assistance phase
in Sint Maarten would have gone differently. Requests for assistance were met, and any issues with
regards to speed or appropriateness of delivered goods or services that occurred over the course of
the period are not generally attributable to a lack of funds. Likewise for the reconstruction of Saba
and Sint Eustatius, were the requested works and support were carried out, and additional funds
would not likely have improved the impact of the support in a proportional manner to the increase in
funds. While there is no doubt that additional funds could have been put to good use on the islands,
the activities carried out during the reconstruction often already went beyond addressing hurricanerelated damage, instead building back better and improving resilience. Additional budgets would
likely have stretched to other types of maintenance beyond the impact of the 2017 hurricanes.
74. The exception is the early recovery phase in Sint Maarten. An 20% larger budget would have
allowed activities within projects to continue. As costs are often made in the setting up of projects,
additional budget would also have resulted in efficiency gains, destined to keeping activities going
and making better value for money.

3.6

Conclusions on the design
Conclusion 1 The government of the Netherlands was quick to recognise the scale of the havoc
wreaked by Hurricane Irma (shortly followed by Hurricanes Maria and Jose) and the fact that it
required immediate action. Therefore, the government in the Netherlands made financial resources
available shortly after the disaster occurred. The amount set aside was generous, demonstrating
concern for and engagement with the people of the islands.

75. Hurricane Irma was an extremely powerful hurricane that caused widespread destruction, followed
by Maria two weeks later. As a result of the massive damage (particularly on Sint Maarten but also
to a lesser degree on Saba and Sint Eustatius) the government of the Netherlands quickly
understood that sufficient financial resources would need to be made available to provide the initial
emergency assistance – resulting in a total amount of €55 million being made available. This
amount was later complemented by more resources destined for the subsequent phases of early
recovery and reconstruction.
Conclusion 2 All three islands had existing structures for disaster relief developed over decades of
experience dealing with hurricanes. While these structures had been fit for purpose in years prior,
the scale of Hurricane Irma (shortly followed by Hurricanes Jose and Maria) required an entirely
different degree of preparation, responsiveness and cooperation. Because of the scale of the
disaster per island, the existing structures were insufficiently equipped in advance to swiftly and
jointly provide emergency assistance. Logically, improvisation was therefore necessary as full
preparedness in the event of a disaster of this scale is almost impossible.
76. At the time of Hurricane Irma, Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius had their own structures for
disaster relief. Sint Maarten, as an autonomous country within the Kingdom, is responsible for its
own control and assistance in a crisis scenario, but can rely on the assistance of other countries
within the Kingdom, including the Netherlands, on the basis of the Charter.

40

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

77. Although the Netherlands had a national crisis structure, it was not specifically prepared to manage
a crisis in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, or to organise emergency assistance for an
autonomous country inside the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It was therefore initially unclear on the
Dutch side as to which ministry was responsible.42 In the event of a disaster or crisis in the
Netherlands, the Ministry of JenV usually takes responsibility. In the case of Irma, it seemed most
obvious that the Ministry of BZK would take on the coordination of the relief effort. The evaluation
by the Ministry of BZK of its own role shows that it was underprepared for this role and therefore
had to improvise (out of necessity).43
78. The “Crisis Management Handbook for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom” was drawn up in 2020
to provide more clarity about the division of tasks and responsibilities and applies if the Caribbean
parts of the Kingdom are hit by a disaster or crisis and assistance is offered from the European
Netherlands and addresses the types of agreements on cooperation and implementation that were
not clear in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma. The manual cannot be viewed in isolation from its
practical application. The handbook does not discuss the preparation phase because this
preparation is the responsibility of the individual countries within the Kingdom.
79. Although Sint Maarten, as an autonomous country within the Kingdom, is responsible for its own
control and assistance in a crisis scenario, it turned out that the management of the EOC by the
Prime Minister of Sint Maarten was weak. In addition, there were ambiguities regarding the division
of tasks and responsibilities between the ESFs. As a result, the counterpart of BZK on the island
was also lacking proper coordination. Consequently, the flow of information was inadequate and
prioritisation was difficult on the Dutch side. Action was therefore carried out in the initial days after
Irma based on an estimate (push) – not demand-driven from the islands (pull). Although the effects
of the hurricanes were quickly combated, it was not due to the proper functioning of the system.44 A
supra-island coordination point or coordination team is not included in supra-island plans, national
plans or arranged in another way.

42
43
44

Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (2018), Lessen uit crises en mini crises 2017, Arnhem/ Zoetermeer.
Ministerie van BZK (mei 2018), Sint Maarten, Irma en BZK: evaluatie crisisbeheer ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken
Ministerie van JenV (mei 2018), Onderzoek naar het system van de rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

41

4

Emergency response

4.1

Introduction

80. This section discusses the emergency response phase in more detail. This phase commenced
shortly before Hurricane Irma hit the islands on 6 September and formally ended on 1 December,
2017. The emergency response was an immediate humanitarian emergency response for the three
islands in the period after the disaster – consisting of the provision of security, health care, drinking
water, etc. based on requests for assistance. The goal of this first phase was to meet the first needs
of the islands' population.
81. Section 4.2 initially discusses the way in which the emergency response phase was implemented in
practice, to provide context. Subsequently, sections 4.3 and 4.4 take a closer look at the requests
for assistance and the emergency assistance provided, as well as the activities undertaken.
Effectiveness and efficiency are discussed in sections 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. The chapter ends
with a section on conclusions.

4.2

Damage assessment
Initial damage assessments

82. In the days after Hurricane Irma hit, several damage assessments were carried out by, among
others, Defence, the media, NGOs and local people. All these damage assessments together
formed a picture of the situation on the islands. In a Letter to the Parliament dated 8 September
2017 (kst-34773-1, ISSN 0921 - 7371, 's-Gravenhage 2017), the extent of the damage caused by
Irma was described to the parliament:
83.

Sint Maarten
“Sint Maarten has seen widespread destruction of infrastructure, houses and businesses. Many residents
have become homeless. The provision of emergency aid has encountered challenges, mainly due to the
island’s limited connectivity. This also makes it difficult to support the local government. Basic supplies are
limited. There is no electricity, no petrol, no running water and communication is difficult. There is also talk
of looting and other public order disturbances.

The current priorities lie in providing water and food and public order assistance, and in restoring the
infrastructure needed to deliver relief supplies. Utmost efforts are being carried out to urgently pick up
patients in Sint Maarten who are in critical condition. Defence aircraft and ambulance helicopters have
been deployed from Sint Eustatius for this purpose.”

84.

Saba en Sint Eustatius
“There have been no fatalities or serious injuries on Saba. The Island Governor of Saba, Mr. Johnson, has
indicated that the infrastructure (i.e. roads, airport and seaport) appears to be intact, but that there has
been material damage to the houses. The soldiers present on the island are currently aiding the people of
Saba’s first recovery efforts. Information supplied by the acting Island Governor of Sint Eustatius, Mr.
Woodley, confirms that there have been no fatalities or serious injuries on Sint Eustatius either. There has
however been significant damage to houses and the natural environment. The electricity supply lines that
have been affected are currently being rebuilt. The seaport and airport are operational but not operating at
full capacity.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

43

For both Saba and Sint Eustatius, the need for emergency aid in the coming period will mainly consist of
repair work and replenishment of the water and food supply, for which these two islands typically depend
on Sint Maarten. For healthcare, options are being explored to allow for the medical care that normally
takes place on Sint Maarten to take place elsewhere.”

85. Based on this damage assessment, the primary needs of the people on Sint Maarten were:
•

Provision of food and water;

•

Assistance in maintaining law and order;

•

Restoration of infrastructure required for the delivery of relief supplies;

•

Help to patients in critical condition;

•

Repairs of houses, schools and businesses (although not mentioned as a primary need, this
could be inferred from the letter);
In order to prevent different assessments from emerging in the aftermath of a disaster, the
Handbook on crisis management for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom also stipulates that
joint assessments need to be drawn up in the event of a disaster that affects multiple islands, so
that there is more clarity and coordination and importantly, so that assistance requests can be
streamlined and similarly interpreted.

86. For Saba and Sint Eustatius, the primary needs were mainly the replenishment of food and water
supplies. There was also an urgent need for health care options other than Sint Maarten’s hospital.
The first global damage assessments were then refined in the following weeks and used to further
elaborate and substantiate the requests for assistance.

4.3

Requests for assistance

87. The island governments on Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius submitted requests for
assistance to the national government in the Netherlands. The following tables contain detailed
overviews of the requests for assistance submitted from Sint Maarten (table 4.1), Saba (table 4.2)
and Sint Eustatius (table 4.3). Some of these requests for assistance from the islands were
formulated in very general terms and the crisis organisation in the Netherlands had to make efforts
to interpret the expressed needs and identify the best solution – despite sometimes lacking the
technical know-how or familiarity with the topics to do so. As a result, there were instances of
mismatches, with some of the provided supplies not having the right characteristics or not fitting to
the context of the islands. In other requests for assistance, however, the requested goods were
described very precisely, such as the request of 21 September, for assistance for extra help in the
form of ambulance care.
Saba and Sint Eustatius
88. On Saba and Sint Eustatius, official requests for assistance were submitted some days before Irma
hit the islands. These requests for assistance initially related to military assistance. After Irma
reached the islands, the focus initially shifted to requests for acute emergency assistance (including
requests for food and water and the evacuation of patients). From late September to early October,
the focus shifted more towards requests for assistance to clean up and repair the worst damage on
both islands. Compared to Sint Eustatius, the number of requests for assistance on Saba was
higher and more specific. The official process for submitting requests for assistance for the three
islands goes through the Kingdom Representative for the Caribbean Netherlands. However, Saba
also submitted direct requests for assistance to the national government in the Netherlands
(however with a copy to the Kingdom Representative), which was not according to the usual way of
rules, and sometimes led to confusion.

44

1001543

89. On both islands, the majority of requests for assistance were honoured. The rejected requests for
assistance were mostly rejected on the basis of their nature felling outside the stated definition of
emergency response, being more related to reconstruction. At a later stage, these requests of
assistance were honoured as part of the reconstruction phase.
Sint Maarten
90. The Governor of Sint Maarten addressed a formal request for assistance to the Netherlands
Ministry of Defence on 4 September 2017, when it became clear that the island would be impacted
by Hurricane Irma. The Ministry of Defence was best prepared to offer immediate emergency
support and also had the advantage of being present in the region. Initial assistance was to
comprise setting up shelters, damage assessments and maintaining public law and order. Military
staff and equipment were expedited from Curaçao on 3 September and arrived in Sint Maarten on
5 September 2017. The initial mandate was to expire on 10 September, but it was extended until
further order by another request emanating from the Governor on 8 September 2017 45.
Because timely assessments of needs from Sint Maarten were not initially forthcoming, the request
for needs on 12 Sept were decided on the basis of mutual consultation and logical reasoning. The
so-called "Navy Ship List of needs Government Sint Maarten" played an important role in the
response. This list contained an inventory that was drawn up in response to statements by the
various departments on Sint Maarten. Because the departments on Sint Maarten could not agree
on a definitive list, the Netherlands made its own choices on emergency relief supplies based on a
judgement of urgency. These choices were necessary because of the limited available cargo space
on the Karel Doorman, the ship that departed from the Netherlands with relief supplies and because
the two-week sailing time from the Netherlands to Sint Maarten meant the goods had to be shipped
out as soon as possible. Cargo space on the Karel Doorman was also reserved for UK emergency
relief supplies destined to Dominica.
Table 4.1 Overview requests for assistance Sint Maarten
Date
4 Sept

12 Sept.

Details
Initial assistance was to comprise setting up shelters,
damage assessments and maintaining public law and
order.

Department
Defence

Response
Yes

Evacuation according to the following order of
priorities:
1. Due to medical necessity (applying to all
nationalities);
2. Families of military personnel, aid workers and
other personnel involved in providing emergency aid;
3. Tourists (applies to all nationalities); and
4. Temporary residents (such as interns, consultants,
etc. of all nationalities).
TEATT-MET/Civil aviation office, JUS, VSA, VROMI,
TelEm en OCJS

MP CUR

Via
Curacao.

BZK/ I&M

Requested
goods
partly
delivered.
3 teams
supported
during 3
weeks.
No
information.

16 Sept

Navy Ship List of Needs of the
Government of Sint Maarten, later
also referred to as the “Wishlist”.

21 Sept.

Extra support for ambulance
services.

Ambulance service: 5 drivers, 5 nurses and 5
dispatchers.

VWS

21 Sept.

Material and support to set up a
“waste train”.

BZK

25 Sept.

Temporary transfer of detainees from
Sint Maarten to the Netherlands.
Police assistance.

The “waste train” required:
• 3 Bob Cats for picking up the waste;
•1 garbage truck for processing and covering the
waste;
• 1 “suction spray lance car;
• Sufficient overalls, gloves, shovels and brooms;
• Sufficient chloride and quicklime.
The request also asked for an advisor to guide the
process and train the staff to run the train.
Transfer of 9 detainees.

V&J

Yes

Caribbean police assistance to KPSM (from 1-10 to
1-11 /30 fte) (1-11 to 5-1 /10 fte) +59 fte from NL
(concerning extension)

BZK/ V&J

Yes

1 Oct.

45

Sint Maarten request
The Governor of Sint Maarten
addressed a formal request for
assistance to the Netherlands
Ministry of Defence
Technical assistance for the
reception and transit of evacuees to
their home country.
-Prioritization for the evaluation of
people in Sint Maarten (not being
permanent residents).
-Financial resources needed for the
reception and transit of these people.

The respective correspondence was made available to the evaluators by the Ministry of Defence.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

45

Date
5 Oct.

Sint Maarten request
Temporary transfer of detainees from
Sint Maarten.

11 Oct.

Embosser Stamp

12 Oct.

Teacher assistance

13 Oct.

Prison support.

17 Oct.

Department
V&J

Response
Yes

BZK/ VNW

Yes

BZK/ OCW

No
information
found.

BZK/ V&J

No
information
found.

V&J

No
information
found.

Details
In accordance with article 7 paragraph 1 BES Security
Act assistance by the armed forces (6 military
personnel and 1 liaison of Defence).
Water and food for about 2100 people.

Department
Defence

Response
Yes

BZK

Yes

Support new supply routes through contacts on other
islands so that local companies can design and
implement new supply routes.
List of requested medicines supplied.
Extension order of the current military support already
on Saba.
Scope of the request:
a) Organise a new medical evacuation facility for Saba;
b) Indicate the procedure that Saba must follow if a
medical evacuation is requested;
c) Indicate which telecommunications lines can be used
based on the limited means available.
A point of contact of Defence to facilitate
communication with Defence and to advise on the
possibilities of Defence within the Caribbean to support
the response operation on Saba.
Setting up new temporary sources of income for
residents, for example through cash for work programs.

BZK

Yes

BZK
Defence

Yes
Yes

BZK

No
information
found.

BZK

Yes

BZK

New supply routes for money
transport.
Temporary increase in social
assistance.

New supply routes for money transport.

BZK

No, not
considered
emergency
assistance.
Yes

Temporary increase in social assistance to meet the
expected price increases of primary necessities.

BZK

Temporarily lifting ABB (General
Expenditure Tax) and other import
duties.

Temporarily lifting ABB (General Expenditure Tax) and
other import duties

BZK

Repayment for the Public Works
Department.

Repayment for the public works service with the
qualifications
-Experience in the tasks of public works;
-Experience in managing employees;
-Experience with post-hurricane reconstruction.
Relief and support for the employees of the garbage
dump.
Support for the employees involved in supporting the
needy with repairs to public and private buildings.

BZK

No, not
considered
emergency
assistance.
No, not
considered
emergency
assistance.
No

BZK

No

BZK

Nee

Extra relief for the operational services, namely the
basic care police team via KPCN and the fire service
team via BKCN.
Relief and support of the crisis management
consultant/information manager with a number of
specific qualifications.
Extension of the military assistance already provided in
the form of the Defence liaison

BZK

Yes

BZK

Yes

Defence

No

Defence/
Kmar
Defence

Yes

Extension of help and assistance
provided by the National Police of the
Netherlands.

Details
Transfer 23 detainees to the Netherlands and 30
detainees to Curacao. Total costs for this estimated
at €665,000.
Stamp (a tool used to create colourless raised
impressions for official documents)
Assistance for 6-10 teachers to return from the
Netherlands and immediate assistance for a
minimum of 10-20 interim teachers in both primary
and secondary education.
Expert from the Judicial Institutions Service (DJI) to
support the prison system in the field of prisoner
registration.
A construction engineer from the Government Real
Estate Department of the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations to draw up a report on the
structural condition of the prison.
Extension of the aid and assistance provided by the
National Police of the Netherlands to the Sint
Maarten Police Force (KPSM), under the same
conditions as is currently the case until at least the
end of January 2018.

Table 4.2 Overview of requests for assistance/assistance requests Saba
Date
3 Sept.

Saba request
Military support.

7 Sept.

Logistical supply of drinking water
and food.

7 Sept.

Medicines
Extension military support.

7 Sept.

Support to medical evacuations.

10 Sept.

Point Of Contact for Defence.

10 Sept.

Restarting the economy and new,
temporary sources of income.

10 Sept.

Relief/support for garbage dump
employees.
Relief and support for people in
need of assistance with the
restoration of public and private
buildings.
Extra relief for operational police
and fire services.
Relief and support to the crisis
management advisor

46

10 Sept.

Extension defence support.

13 Sept.

Border control.

17 Sept.

Military support.

1001543

It was agreed on September 12 (until further notice) to
deploy units from CZMCARIB during and after the
passage of hurricanes Irma and Jose. It is requested
that this support also be used for Maria.

Yes

Date
19 Sept.

Saba request
Support UNICEF though
psychosocial support in schools.

Details
Request to UNICEF on support staff to:
1. Support schools, out-of-school care and childcare.
Pedagogically trained with knowledge of the region.
2. Support social work.
3. Support activities for the youth on Saba.

Department
BZK

Response
Yes

21 Sept.

Water and food for approximately 2200 people.

BZK

Yes

New supply routes through contacts on other islands.

BZK

Yes

22 Sept.

Logistical supply of drinking water
and food.
New supply routes/contacts
islands.
Personnel support logistics

One medical logistics coordinator.

BZK

27 Sept.

Supplement building materials.

Requests for:
- 1000 pieces of 2"" x 4""- 16'
- 200 sheets of 3/4"" plywood
- 180 sheets of T1 - 11; Thickness of 5/8""
- 256 pieces of 2"" x 6"" - 16'
- 80 pieces of 3"" x 6"" - 16'

BZK

No
information
found.
Yes

2 Oct.

Improving the accessibility of
Saba, in particular the transport
options for people and goods by air
and/or by sea.

Increase the accessibility of Saba by air in addition to
increasing the accessibility of Saba by sea.

BZK

Yes

13 Oct.

Additional machinery.

I&M
BZK

Yes
Yes

17 Oct.

Contribution to disaster relief costs.

BZK/
VenJ

Yes

19 Oct.

Funding for the Disaster Recovery
of the Landfill and Recycling Plant

BZK

No, not
considered
emergency
aid.

26 Oct.

Financial coverage for emergency
aid measures

BZK

Yes.

6 Nov.

Financial resources labour costs

Set up temporary flight routes between the islands
- Chainsaws;
- Small car with elevator function (to repair street lights);
- Extra truck with open body and tail lift;
- A motor-driven concrete mixer with wheels;
- A wood chipper (€ 77,000) for processing tree stumps.
According to Saba, hurricanes Irma and Maria fall
under the definition of a disaster according to the BES
Safety Act. Request for all costs incurred through a
contribution based on Article 70 of the BES Safety Act
in conjunction with art. 4 to reimburse the costs of the
BES Safety Act. Total costs incurred: $894,768.92.
In view of the limited financial resources of all
organisations involved, request for a quick decision.
The Executive Council is the recipient of the
contribution;
Damage to landfill and recycling factory. Financial
assistance for the emergency repair of garbage
disposal $ 969,600 (Facade walls, roll up doors, ramps,
inspection (replacement and repair of damaged
equipment).
Total amount $1,285,863
- Excl. deployment of extra staff
- Building material $135,863
- Debris removal weighing $190,000
- Road repairs $70,000
- Temporary Housing $180,000, Port Relief $500,000,
Water Plants $200,000, Primary Necessities $10,000
Financial assistance for labour costs amounting to
$2,500,000 for the repair of the buildings.

BZK

Yes, partly.

Details
Assistance by the armed forces, including the LNO
team, pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 1 of the BES
Security Act. 8 soldiers for the duration of 14 days

Department
Defence

Response
Yes

Full list attached to the request.

Defence
BZK

Yes
Yes

List of cliff reinforcement supplies.
Full list included with the request.

BZK
BZK

On September 12 (reference: BS2017028076) the
deployment of units of the CZMCARIB was approved
(until further notice) during and after the passage of
hurricanes Irma and Jose. It is requested that this
support on Saba also be used for Maria. It is also
requested to deploy comparable support on St.
Eustatius until further notice.
Full list in dossier folder.

Defence

Yes
To be
supplied from
Curacao.
Yes

Placing these fences requires specific expertise, which
the island does not have. Costs amount to €112.500
excluding VAT.
12 container homes, 1 mobile kitchen, 2 manual Jack
Forklifts, 15 first aid tool kits

BZK

Yes,
purchasing
through
Curacao.
Yes

BZK

Yes

Table 4.3 Overview requests Sint Eustatius
Date
1 Sept.

Saba request
Military support.

10 Sept.
10 Sept.

Extension liaison defence.
Logistical supply of drinking water
and food.
Stabilisation cliff.
Support in the medium and long
term in the reconstruction of Sint
Eustatius.
Military assistance Sint Eustatius

10 Sept.
14 Sept.

17 Sept.

18 Sept.

Crisis management / additional
building material.

29 Sept.

Expert staff for cliff fencing.

17 Oct.

Shelter 12 families, with Statian
background from Sint Maarten

BZK

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

47

Date
10 Nov.

Saba request
Replacement of an operational
seaport boat.

Details
Operational seaport boat from Rijkswaterstaat (RWS)
that can serve as a replacement for the current boat,
the Waterman. Replacement costs have yet to be
requested. Cost of repair is estimated at $83,500
(excluding ABB and transport costs) (€ 71,000).

Department
BZK

Request for a patrol/workboat from Rijkswaterstaat that
can serve as a replacement for the Waterman.
In the case of no available boat, funding was requested
for the repair work for the Waterman.

4.4

Results achieved

91.

This section examines which projects and activities were carried out to meet the primary needs of
the people on Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius by the various ministries and other parties.
Ministry of Defence

92.

During the emergency response phase, personnel from the navy, army, air force and military police
(the Royal Marechaussee) were engaged in the provision of emergency assistance on the
Windward Islands. Based on data from the Ministry of Defence, a total of approximately 1,000
military personnel were involved in the support from 5 September to 28 November 2017. At its
peak, more than 600 military personnel were sent to the islands, with a further 400 military
personnel supporting from ships.

93.

Prior to Irma’s arrival, 100 military personnel stationed in Aruba went to the Windward Islands to
assist the population with the preparations against the incoming hurricane. Shortly after the
hurricane hit, navy ships Zr. Ms Zeeland and Zr. Ms Pelican were sent from Curacao to Sint
Maarten with extra soldiers, vehicles and relief supplies. The air force deployed cargo planes from
the Netherlands to bring food and water to the affected areas. Patients and tourist were evacuated
from Sint Maarten to Curacao through flights. In mid-September, the largest naval vessel (Zr. MS.
Karel Doorman) left Den Helder with one million kilos of relief supplies for Sint Maarten, Saba and
Sint Eustatius. In the Caribbean, the Karel Doorman also functioned as a pumping station by
supplying various naval ships with fuel.

94.

Military personnel, already present on Sint Maarten, provided assistance from September until
November 2017 by reopening the roads, enabling access to water and electricity supply, and
repairing other damage.46
The total costs for the emergency response charged by the Ministry of Defence amounted to
approximately €16.8 million. A significant amount of this related to the deployment of the

95.

aforementioned ships and the hiring of additional aircraft. Other relatively large items included the
purchase of food, water and building materials for emergency repairs. The Ministry of Defence
carried out the activities almost entirely with their own personnel, and the corresponding wage costs
of these personnel were not invoiced to the Ministry of BZK.

96.

It should be noted that in the initial phase of emergency response, transport costs of materials and
resources were paid for by the Ministry of Defence. Since formal involvement of this ministry in

46

48

Source https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/historische-missies/missie-overzicht/2017/orkaan-irma

1001543

Response
Yes

emergency assistance ended on 29 October,47 the Ministry of BZK then took over this
responsibility.
Table 4.4 Projects emergency response (Ministry of Defence)
Projects

Expenses (x €

Output

Results

1000)
Hire air transport

3.834

More than 4,000 people

Help to inhabitants in

Airline tickets

446

were evacuated from

critical condition.

3.639

Sint Maarten, of which

Use of your own aircraft

1,608 by the Dutch
armed forces.
Deployment ships

3.405

Supply and deployment
distribution

Distribution of food,

of ships Pelikaan and

care products and other

Zeeland from Curaçao.

emergency supplies on
the island

The Karel Doorman was
primarily used for sea
transport (from the
Netherlands) of
equipment and relief
supplies.
Communication and

815

Restored

connections
Hire vehicles

160

Construction materials

457

Assistance with repair

communication lines,

and clean-up work

clean-up activities and
make infrastructure
usable again

Food and water

1.119

Transport from Curaçao

Provision of food and

Medical articles

100

of food, water and

water and medical

medical material to Sint

articles to inhabitants in

Maarten.

critical condition

Personnel care/aftercare

245

Dutch soldiers support

Ammunition

56

the local authorities, for

Clothing and personal

344

example in maintaining

equipment

public order and safety,

Assistance in

but also in the

maintaining law and

distribution of food and

order

water. The soldiers
were also deployed for
recovery and clean-up
work
Other

2.216

Total

16.836

Source: Submitted invoices (dd. 11 October, 24 November and 13 December of 2017) of the Ministry of Defence
a)

The sum of the amounts on the 3 invoices does not match the total amount. Therefore, a residual item has been included
in the table.

97.

An evaluation48 carried out on the military effort during Hurricane Irma concluded that the Ministry
of Defence can provide added value in the field of emergency assistance and humanitarian aid. The

47
48

Ministerie van Defensie (mei 2020), Evaluatie militaire inzet orkaan Irma 2017, Den Haag (p. 7).
Ministerie van Defensie (mei 2020), Evaluatie militaire inzet orkaan Irma 2017, Den Haag (p. 30).

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

49

Ministry of Defence is able to provide a wide range of support and aid in a short period of time,
although the capabilities of Defence can be used more effectively by tailoring the activities to local
needs. The evaluation mentioned the following points of attention: addressing safety at an earlier
stage; ensuring a faster and broader distribution of emergency goods; and improving the
dissemination of information regarding emergency assistance and military presence. The evaluation
indicates that the primary responsibility for this lies within the crisis response of Sint Maarten, but in
this regard, the Ministry of Defence can offer support.
Contributions to (inter)national organisations
98.

During the emergency response phase, the Ministry of BZK provided financial support to national
and international organisations. The Netherlands Red Cross provided food and water on Sint
Maarten following Hurricane Irma. The hurricane shelter on Sint Eustatius, which played a pivotal
role in the Emergency Response operations, is operated by the Red Cross. This shelter was
operational during the storms and was visited by some 25 persons.49 Another organisation that
made significant contributions during the emergency response was USAR, which in case of Irma
were paid by BZK. A USAR team (40 members) departed from the Netherlands to Curacao on a
civilian flight on 9 September. The team arrived on Sint Maarten on 13 September. These
organisations, together with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team
(UNDAC) and local aid workers, identified the initial priorities for emergency assistance. In total,
these organisations received €1.7 million (almost €1 million for USAR) during the emergency
response phase.
Table 4.5 Projects emergency response - Contributions to (inter)national organisations
Expenses (x € 1000)

Projects

Output

Results

Handing out food and

Help to inhabitants in

national organisations for

water to the local

critical condition

emergency response

population and

Contribution to (inter)

1.716

delivery of other first
aid.

Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (IenW)
99. A significant amount (approximately €6.35 million) of the total costs for the emergency response
(€40.4 million) were spent on the account of the Ministry of IenW. The role of this Ministry at the
time was focused on the restoration of primary infrastructural facilities, i.e. seaport, airport, drinking
water. These contributions were key in the swift and smooth running of the emergency response,
and in laying the foundation for further recovery. The projects in table 4.3 were carried out in
response to submitted requests for assistance. The costs for the execution of the work were
charged by means of partial invoices, with less detail and information than what would be typically
required. The invoices submitted are accompanied by an annex in which the expenses are further
specified.
Table 4.6 Projects emergency response (Ministry of IenW)
Expenses (x € 1000)

Projects
Transport relief supplies
Drinking water supply and
distribution

49

50

Request for support, Sint. Eustatius.

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130

1.018

Output
Transport emergency and
relief goods
Restore production and
supply of drinking water

Results

Projects

Expenses (x € 1000)

Waste Disposal

1.288

St Maarten Airport Access

1.900

Output

Results

Waste disposal
contribution

Restoration of critical
infrastructure
required for the

Mateo package and
personnel deployment

delivery of relief

333

Restore infrastructure and

Dredging and making
harbour Saba breakbeat

900

again

accessible
St Eustatius repair seawall

supplies;

make islands accessible

700

dams
Communication tools

89

Total

6.350

Better coordination and
consultation

Source: Inventarisatie kosten noodhulp Ministry of IenW (17 November 2017)

100. Commissioned by the Ministry of IenW, IFV (Institute for Physical Safety) carried out an evaluation
of IenW’s performance in 2018.50 This evaluation showed that the Ministry of IenW was more
focused on Saba and Sint Eustatius, as it was more familiar with working with overseas public
entities. The Ministry of IenW had less of a track record working in and with Sint Maarten and had
not previously considered that it may have to act in an autonomous country within the Kingdom in
the case of a crisis. It therefore needed to improvise when it came to its procedures for taking
action in Sint Maarten, and it took several days before they got a clear picture of the damage done
through a proper damage assessment. Based on this, the Ministry of IenW then set to work and the
airport, seaport and later, drinking water supply, were given priority.
101. In the execution, the distance and time difference between the Netherlands and the islands were
challenging. The evaluation also points to problems with the delivery of the necessary
miscellaneous goods and materials needed to carry out the emergency repairs. Finally, there was
some ambiguity – and discussions took place between the party responsible for the submission of
the request for assistance and the responsible department– about the definition of emergency
assistance and reconstruction.
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS)
102. The evacuation of medical emergency patients from Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba was
completed shortly after Hurricane Irma hit. This included patients who required kidney dialysis, and
people who just had an operation. On 8 September 2017, 35 kidney dialysis patients were
transported from Sint Maarten to Aruba and Bonaire. The remaining 28 kidney dialysis patients and
wounded were evacuated to Curacao and Aruba on 9 September 2017.51 The total expenditure on
emergency assistance for VWS amounted to €1.68 million. This amount is specified in the following
table.
Table 4.7 Projects emergency response (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport)
Projects

Expenses (x €

Output

Results

1000)
Transport patients

50

51

270

Institute for Physical Safety (April 2018), Hurricane Irma affects Sint Maarten and the Caribbean Netherlands: an
evaluation of the Crisis Management provided by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, Arnhem/
Zoetermeer.
COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma,
Rotterdam (p. 24).

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

51

Expenses (x €

Projects

Output

Results

1000)
Stay of patients

506

Transport, stay and care

Successful evacuation of

Care patients

495

of 63 kidney dialysis and

people with a medical

411

wounded patients

emergency from Sint Maarten,

Medicines and transport

Sint Eustatius and Saba to
Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire
Total

1.682

Although there was considerable material damage caused by Irma, the number of casualties was
limited. An initial inventory of the Ministry of Defence (dated 7 September) shows that there was
one death (natural death during the passage of the storm), one injured and four injured while in
hospital. A few days later the number of fatalities on Sint Maarten was adjusted to four.52
The evaluation53 conducted by the COT states that additional concerns did exist as there were
initially no agreements regarding the care of patients in the region. For example, there was no
suitable transport available. There were also logistical problems, such as limited flying capacity.
Ultimately, the Bonaire health insurance office played an important role in the coordination of the
evacuation. Lessons learned include making better agreements in advance on medical evacuations
in the event of a disaster. In this context, the evaluation54 also emphasised the need to make an
inventory of the options available for emergency patients in the vicinity of the islands.
Ministry of Justice and Security (JenV)
103. Hurricane Irma caused extensive damage to the Point Blanche prison on Sint Maarten, rendering
parts of the complex unusable. The Ministry of JenV provided assistance by setting up a temporary
detention facility and swiftly transferring detainees to prisons in the Netherlands and Curaçao. 55 In
addition, a total of 34 detainees were transferred and resettled to the Netherlands and 30 detainees
to Curacao. The Ministry of Justice and Security offered also assistance through the deployment of
extra police and personnel for the fire brigades on each of the islands.
Table 4.8 Projects emergency response (Ministry of JenV)
Projects

Expenses

Output

Results

facility

Transfer and

Temporary resettlement of

Temporary detention SXM

resettlement of 34

detainees in the

detainees in the Netherlands

detainees to the

Netherlands and Curacao

and Curacao

Netherlands and 30

(x € 1000)
Cost of temporary detention

Temporary detention SXM

1.230

665

54

detainees to Curacao.

detainees in the Netherlands
and Curacao

52

53

54

55

52

COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma,
Rotterdam (p. 22 and p. 25).
COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma,
Rotterdam (p. 22 and p. 25).
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid/ Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (mei 2018), Onderzoek naar het Systeem van
rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden. Incidentenonderzoek naar aanleiding van de passage van de orkanen Irma, Jose
en Maria. Den Haag (p.8).
https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/mensonterende-gevangenis-op-sint-maarten-wordt-geholpen-met-nederlandcontainercellen~b5c24823/

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Projects

Expenses

Output

Results

BES (including extra staff and

Deployment of extra

Assist emergency services

hiring private staff)

staff

on the islands

(x € 1000)
Kostenbesluit Veiligheidswet

761

Police deployment

2.614

Deployment of fire brigade

129

Total

5.453

The evaluation of the Ministry of BZK56 states that the prison of Sint Maarten had been seriously
damaged because of Irma. However, the evacuation of 64 prisoners did not take place until after
the emergency response phase, when the request for assistance came through.
104. Commissioned by the Ministry of JenV, the Justice and Security Inspectorate evaluated whether the
system of disaster management on the BES islands was adequate. However, the aforementioned
evaluation does not explicitly address the specific activities from the table above, which were
performed by the Ministry of JenV, in the context of emergency assistance. In a more general
sense, the evaluation noted the vulnerability of the logistic system and the dependence on logistics
facilities on Sint Maarten. This also made it difficult to organise the evacuation of prisoners.
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW)
105. Hurricane Irma also damaged school buildings and the first request from Sint Maarten focused on
receiving support to reopen the schools. Temporary buildings and facilities were needed. The
Ministry of OCW immediately bought large pavilion tents with air-conditioning and sent them via the
Karel Doorman. A total of 36 school classes fit in the three pavilion tents.57 However, the two-week
period of shipment meant that once the tents arrived and could get set up, needs on the island had
shifted. The military police helped with setting up the tents. The first schools were already
reopening on Monday 3 October 58 and the tents were in the end not used as school tents.
No evaluation was carried out specifically for OCW’s response.
Table 4.9 Projects emergency response (Ministry of OCW)
Projects

Expenses (x €

Output

Results

1000)
Purchase pavilion tents

642

3 Pavilion tents

Coordination installation

73

Installation tents

Air-conditioning units

Educational materials

Setting up of temporary
airconditioned spaces and

tents
25

96

Aircon units for the 3

purchase of educational

pavilion tents

materials to restart education

Supply of school

for students as soon as

materials (exercises,

possible

scissors, ballpoint pens,
pencils, etc.), classroom
furnishings (clocks,
whiteboard erasers,
brooms, etc.), other

56

57
58

Ministerie van BZK (mei 2018), Sint Maarten, Irma en BZK: Evaluatie crisisbeheer ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken,
Den Haag (p. 9).
https://www.noordhollandsdagblad.nl/cnt/dmf20180921_56435137?utm_source=google&utm_medium=organic
https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/425366/scholen-op-sint-maarten-weer-open

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

53

necessities (backpacks,
cups, stirrers, etc.)
Total

836

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BuZa59)
106. The Ministry of BuZa, which has substantial experience in emergency assistance during and after
crises and disasters, could only play a limited role as Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten are
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands – where other departments hold the responsibility of
handling emergency assistance. The Ministry of BuZa was mainly involved with the evacuations of
stranded tourists and other visitors from the Netherlands and other countries on the islands.
Formally, the Ministry of BuZa had no role here, as it this is not considered evacuation from abroad.
We deduce, from e-mail exchanges, that the Ministry of BZK requested the Ministry of BuZa to
support the evacuation process, since the Ministry of BZK does not have that knowledge and
expertise. The transport for the evacuations was mainly provided by the Ministry of Defence. BuZa
mostly arranged the administrative handling of the evacuations, but it did however, hire – on 16
September – a KLM Boeing 747 to evacuate a number of remaining people from Sint Maarten to
Aruba. The aircraft offered seats for 268 passengers and made a stopover in Curaçao to bring
personnel and relief supplies to Sint Maarten. The majority of the costs made by BuZa are related
to the rental of the KLM Boeing 747.
Table 4.10 Projects emergency response (Ministry of BuZa)
Expenses (x € 1000)

Projects

Output

Results

Arranging transport

Administrative handling of

and handling

evacuations

foreigners + other costs

evacuations of

Evacuation of 268 visitors

for evacuation and

visitors and other

and other foreigners on

support

foreigners

Sint Maarten

Deployment of aircraft for
evacuation visitors and

318

Source: Ministry of BuZa invoice for emergency response, including Annex with overview (dated 8 December 2017)

Ministry of BZK
107. Various requests for assistance were issued from the islands to the Ministry of BZK to provide
assistance and support during the emergency response phase. Many of the costs related to the
rental of transport and provision of necessary resources. The following table provides an overview
of the assignments issued.
108. Emails containing the invoices show that there was some confusion in the aftermath of the
hurricanes regarding the coverage of costs. However, over time, the ministry of BZK paid almost all
invoices, even when it was unclear if the ministry had formally ordered the service.
Table 4.11 Support emergency response
Project

Expenses

Output

Activities

Curacao – Sint Maarten 16

Transport of people

trips, 25 days

and light materials.

52 Better Shelter houses

Housing for

(x € 1000)
Fliteline Antonov – cargo aircraft

Emergency housing

772

32

homeless families

59

54

Formally shortened to BZ, but kept as BuZa to avoid confusion with BZK.

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Project

Expenses

Output

Activities

Transport of 15 sea

Transport of heavy

containers (40 ft)

materials.

(x € 1000)
Rhenus air transport emergency

180

supplies

3 containers for heavy
material (20 ft)
1 container for office
supplies (40 ft)
From Rotterdam to
Phillipsburg
Heavy material KDM.

1.769

Heavy-duty rolling stock for

Rehabilitation of

rehabilitation of vital

vital infrastructure.

infrastructure (dump trucks,
water tank trucks for water
distribution, bulldozers and
excavators to clean up
debris).
Transport costs ship November

139

20th

Ambulance costs RAV

Deployment of VRU information

71

294

managers

Cargo space ship RDAM >

Transport of heavy

SXM.

materials.

Ambulance services: 5 amb.

Support to

drivers, 5 amb. nurses, 5

ambulance

amb. dispatchers

services.

1.185 hour front office (BZK)

Unknown.

1.185 hour back office
(veiligheidsinformatiecentrum
VRU)
Overhead (coordination,
travel and parking costs)

Costs Saba

901

Repair work roads, harbour,

Repairs to public

buildings, water works

space

Costs Statia

443

Repair work

Unknown

Wood chipper Saba

77

Wood chipper for Saba,

Repairs to public

ordered in the USA.

space

Return of evacuees Sint Maarten.

100

Charter Insel Air (diabetes

Evacuees returned

patients) 20k

to safer places

Repair Cliff Statia

136

Fence to prevent further

Fencing off of cliff

erosion of the cliff.
Labour costs Saba

235

Labour costs for house

House repairs

repairs (6 houses)
Waterman Statia

84

Transport emergency
supplies with the Waterman

Children's rights UNICEF

33

Child Protection programme

Identification of the

specialist, hotel costs, tickets

needs of children

and expenses expert
Customs service vehicles signalling

8

Three custom services

Unknown

vehicles signalling sets
Costs OM PPG repair work

47

Repair work

Unknown

Transport office furniture OM

57

Surplus office furniture

Unknown

collected, transported within

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

55

Project

Expenses

Output

Activities

(x € 1000)
the Netherlands and shipped
to the Sint Maarten
rehabilitation centre
Cost RST

92

Port handling

Unknown

Outbreak prevention

50

Reduce insect nuisance on

Preventing against

St Maarten by using

disease outbreaks

pesticides and equipment
and hiring an expert to make
them work.
Expansion community helpdesks

204

Information provision

Unknown

NIVRE

297

Measure uninsured damage

Unknown

to government property
Costs 3W

300

Other

Unknown

Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (use of

1.028

The reconnaissance team,

Identification

together with the United

damage and first

Nations Disaster

aid

USAR and goods from stock)

Assessment and
and Coordination team
(UNDAC) and the local
government, establish the
key priorities.

Purchase of 350 field beds,
220 medical blankets and a
jerry can.
Total

4.5

7.348

Effectiveness
Basic needs had already been addressed on 13 September on Saba and Sint Eustatius

109. On 13 September, His Majesty the King visited Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius. The report
on his visit60 proofs the effectiveness of the emergency assistance to Saba and Sint Eustatius.
““For Saba and Sint Eustatius, daily life has resumed after the rapid recovery of primary infrastructure such as
roads, water distribution, electricity supply, airports and port.”

110. The above section is a first indication that the emergency response to Saba and Sint Eustatius was
likely to be effective.
The emergency situation lasted longer on Sint Maarten
111. In the same report, on the visit of His Majesty the King on 18 September, the first steps in the
emergency response for Sint Maarten were described:
“Over the past few days, the focus of emergency response for the three affected islands has been on the initial
restoration of vital infrastructure, including air traffic, port accessibility, road rehabilitation and water distribution.”

60

56

Kamerbrief van 18 september 2017. Verslag bezoek Zijne Majesteit de Koning aan Sint Maarten, Saba en Sint Eustaitus
en stand van zaken Nederlandse bijdrage aan noodhulp aan de Bovenwindse eilanden. 2017-0000455128.

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112. This letter also outlined the next steps in the emergency response process:
“For the coming period, the priority for Sint Maarten will be the further restoration of the vital infrastructure
(airport, seaport, prison), water pipes, houses, hospital, GP practices, pharmacies, schools and improving the
functioning of the distribution points, so that the population is enabled to resume their daily life as soon as
possible.”

113. The assessment of the Damage Assessment Team61, from 20 September 2017 (after Hurricane
Maria), showed that the main roads, the airport and the harbour were partly functioning again, but
still needed further repairs. The situation was the same regarding water supply, electricity supply,
gas stations, public services (hospital, police station, fire station and ambulance station) and
schools.
114. Most public services were operational approximately one month later, in the first week of October.
The majority of aid workers had left the country. On 10 October 2017, Princess Juliana International
Airport (SXM) reopened to commercial services. Prior to this, the airport had only been operating
military and relief flights. Although the terminal hall was not operational, all airlines were set to
resume operations.
115. The Netherlands provided emergency assistance for the period until 30 November 2017, after
which it began contributing to the reconstruction of St Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius.

4.6

Efficiency

116. A key question in a policy review concerns the efficiency of the implemented policy. Policy
efficiency is defined as the degree to which the optimal effect is achieved – at the least possible
cost and with the least possible undesirable side effects. In contrast to many other policy fields,
efficiency is not the main priority in case of emergency assistance and crisis situations; only timely
action and the right support is essential.
In the case of Irma, this was done by assessing primary needs and by prioritising what needed to
be done at an early stage. The roles of each respective ministry were then determined, and asked
to make financial resources available. This approach meant that the financing of the emergency
response was quickly arranged and secured.
117. In order to ensure that the funds were spent efficiently, it was agreed in the MCCB of Thursday, 7
September that the costs for the provision of emergency assistance to Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius
and Saba would be financed centrally from the budget of the Ministry of BZK. The following
definition was used for direct emergency assistance: "direct emergency assistance is aimed at
keeping the stricken population safe, keeping dangerous situations directly related to the disaster
under control and maintaining public order and safety". The activities consist of rescuing and
temporarily sheltering victims, setting up and organising an adequately functioning vital
infrastructure, organising food, setting up adequate facilities and countering looting.62
118. In view of the need to act quickly, a modified waiver procedure was developed by the Ministry of
BZK for emergency assistance requests. In this modified procedure, the usual procurement
procedures are waived for emergency assistance, and only a record of the purchase order and
61
62

Koninklijke Luchtmacht, 20 september 2017. Schadebeeld Sint Maarten na orkanen IRMA en MARIA 2017.
See Ministerie van BZK (14 september 2017), Nota Waiver procedure- inzake noodhulp orkaan Irma Sint Maarten.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

57

grounds for exception are required. In case of disagreement on topics between the Ministry of BZK
and other departments, the decision will still be submitted to the Director of
“Concernondersteuning”.
119. Despite the commitment that the Ministry of BZK covered the emergency assistance costs incurred
by other departments, it was determined in advance that the relevant departments themselves were
responsible for the lawful application of the procurement law63. After all, it was not the Ministry of
BZK, but rather the departments themselves which were responsible for the purchases of goods
and services used for emergency assistance.
Given the need to act quickly, however, it can be assumed that the lowest cost was not the most
important selection criterion, but rather the timely availability of the necessary goods. During the
interviews, examples of this were mentioned such as the purchase of bottled drinking water in the
supermarkets on Curacao. This method, while not cheap, was the only (and therefore effective and
efficient) option for quickly supplying necessary drinking water. Better water storage at local level
could have saved significant costs. The lack of adequate air transport capacity should also be
noted64, which forced Defence (and later the Ministry of BZK) to hire additional capacity.

4.7

Improvements to the emergency response after Irma

120. Since 2018, the Government of the Netherlands has reviewed its role and capacity to respond to
large scale crises in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom. Fundamental considerations have been
the autonomous status of Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten and the responsibilities for emergency
preparedness and immediate disaster response accruing from this autonomous status.
Furthermore, The Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security is the National Coordinator of the
Fight against Terrorism and of Security (NCTV ) for crisis management both in the European
Netherlands and in the Caribbean Netherlands. As was the case in 2017, the Ministry of BZK is
likely to be called upon to assume a major role in disaster responses in the Caribbean parts of the
Kingdom. In 2019, it was concluded on the basis of lessons learned from post-Irma experiences
that the Ministry of BZK needed to be strengthened to be better prepared for this role. A dedicated
crisis team was created in the Ministry of BZK in 201965 comprising professional staff in the
Netherlands and in the Caribbean. The structure is supposed to provide leadership and cooperate
closely with all relevant partners in the Netherlands and in the Caribbean.
121. In June 2020, the Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security and the Ministry of BZK published a
handbook66 on crisis management for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom. The handbook draws
lessons from the post-hurricane experiences in 2017 and seeks to clarify roles and procedures of
different ministries in the Netherlands and other partners in case the European Netherlands is
requested to intervene in disaster management in the Caribbean. The handbook does not discuss
disaster preparedness and response on the islands, as this is considered part of local
responsibilities in Sint Eustatius and Saba and a national responsibility in the case of Sint Maarten.
It is understood that procedures defined in the handbook need to be tested and disseminated in
practice. Since 2020, this has been done in joint disaster drills (Hurricane Experience, HUREX),
during which different parties to be called upon can familiarize themselves with what is expected

63
64

65

66

58

See Ministerie van BZK (14 september 2017), Nota Waiver procedure- inzake noodhulp orkaan Irma Sint Maarten.
Ministerie van BZK, Vertegenwoordiging van Nederland Willemstad (Juli 2018), Verslag “Lessons learned” van het Crisis
Ondersteuningsoverleg Curaçao (p. 11)
See Ministry of Finance, Voorjaarsnota 2019
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z10306&did=2019D21200,
Ministerie van Justitie & Veiligheid & Ministerie van BZK (juni 2020), Handboek Crisisbeheersing voor de Caribische delen
van het Koninkrijk, Den Haag.

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from them. In addition, various ministries in the Netherlands have further elaborated their roles and
relevant procedures in concrete internal instructions and handbooks since 2018. Of particular
interest have been arrangements under the Regional Platform for Crisis Cooperation.

4.8

Conclusions on emergency response
Conclusion 3 In the initial phase, global assessments were carried out by various parties to
determine the damage. For assistance, the “requests for assistance” are the most important
instrument. Due to the coordination problems mentioned, the requests for assistance from Sint
Maarten only got underway late (from 12 September 2017) and could have benefitted from a
greater level of detail. The system worked better on Saba and Sint Eustatius, and requests for
assistance were made to the Netherlands before Irma came ashore.

122. When a disaster occurs, it is crucial – especially in the beginning – to identify both the extent of the
damage, and what is most-needed at an early stage. In the days following Hurricane Irma, several
such damage assessments were distributed; by Defence, the media, NGOs and local people,
among others. The sum of these damage assessments together formed a picture of the situation on
the islands. In a Letter to the Parliament, dated 8 September 2017 (kst-34773-1, ISSN 0921 - 7371,
's-Gravenhage 2017), the extent of damage caused by Irma was described. These assessments
were intended to get an initial idea of the scale of the disaster and to determine the level of
resources to be reserved.
Requests for assistance in the emergency assistance system are of great importance for the actual
implementation of emergency assistance, and for the delivery of relief goods and services. Due to
the coordination problems previously mentioned, the requests for further assistance for needs and
relief supplies from Sint Maarten to the Netherlands only began late. Furthermore, as requests for
assistance were in some cases not formulated in a detailed manner they left room for interpretation,
at times leading to supplies being sent that were not best suited to meet the demands.
In addition, decisions were sometimes made because of time pressure. In the case of the Karel
Doorman, for example, it was important to load the ship quickly, because the sailing time between
the Netherlands and the Caribbean meant that the goods would only arrive 2 weeks after send-off.
Because the departments on Sint Maarten could not agree on a definitive list, the Netherlands
made its own choices on emergency relief supplies.
123. In the case of Saba and Sint Eustatius, requests for assistance were made to the Netherlands
before Irma came ashore. Here the system worked faster and better, so that help could be provided
in a much more targeted way, especially in the first period after Irma.
Conclusion 4 The Ministry of Defence was well equipped to provide the initial emergency
assistance shortly before, and in the first weeks after, Irma's passage. After that, the Ministry of
BZK took over the coordinating role. According to the evaluations carried out, this transfer was not
smooth.
124. In the initial phase of emergency assistance, the Ministry of Defence was particularly active in
providing relief. Saba and Sint Eustatius had also requested aid early, via an official request for
help. The Ministry of Defence was well equipped in this regard, owing to its presence in the region
with a base of operations in both Curacao and Aruba. On 18 September, the Ministry of Defence
officially transferred the directing role to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The
Ministry of Defence evaluation shows that the transfer was difficult in the beginning. At the time of

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

59

Irma, the Ministry of the Interior was not well prepared or equipped for such tasks, and had no
experience in them. These conclusions are confirmed in the evaluation carried out by the Ministry of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations. After these start-up problems, coordination from the Ministry of
the Interior gradually improved.
Conclusion 5 In view of the need to act quickly, a modified waiver procedure was developed by
the Ministry of BZK for emergency assistance requests. This worked well in practice and ensured
an appropriately fast and flexible approach in the fact of urgency.
125. The Government of the Netherlands undertook rapid action and made financial resources available
for Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten very shortly after the hurricane(s) hit. To ensure
adequate and efficient spending, it was agreed – in the Ministerial Committee and Crisis
Management (MCCB) of 7 September 2017 – that the costs for the provision of emergency
assistance to Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten would be financed centrally from the budget of
the Ministry of BZK.
126. In view of the need to act quickly, a modified waiver procedure was developed by the Ministry of
BZK for emergency assistance requests. In this modified procedure, the usual procurement
procedures for emergency assistance were waived, and only a record of the purchase order and
grounds for the exception were required. The modified waiver procedure made it possible for
Ministries to identify needs and act quickly, without being hampered by lengthy procedures.
Conclusion 6 The help and support provided during the emergency response phase was effective
in the sense that almost all requests for assistance were met. However, the effectiveness of the
provided support would have greatly benefited from a more streamlined process, linking clear
damage assessments to requests for assistance and ensuring better communication between those
witnessing the situation on the island and those doing the processing of requests for assistance.
127. It can be deduced from the requests for assistance – those which were made available – that
almost all requests for assistance could be met. Because the emergency assistance phase formally
lasted until 1 December, some assistance requests that were less urgent were moved to the
reconstruction phase. The evaluation team cautiously concludes that the emergency assistance
provided was effective, as the requests for assistance from the Netherlands could be met. This
conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the damage was mostly physical, there were no outbreaks
of diseases despite the damage to crucial facilities, and food shortages and other calamities did not
occur after the disaster. Moreover, shortly after the emergency assistance phase, preparation could
begin for further repair and reconstruction work on all three islands.
128. There are however caveats to this conclusion. The emergency assistance provided through Art. 8
was ‘bound’ by requests for assistance, which creates some distance between those identifying
needs, those describing them, those interpreting them, those procuring supplies and finally, those in
charge of sending them back. The communication between these persons needs to be clear and
timely, particularly when dealing with shipments requiring weeks to arrive, to ensure effectiveness.
The assistance might have more effectively addressed the real needs if the requests for assistance
had been timelier and more detailed, and if those matching requests to procurement had more
technical expertise. Timelier requests for assistance would have allowed those processing the
request to ask for clarifications or the specificities of the requests for assistance, or to reach out to
the right type of expertise to do so.

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Conclusion 7 The extent to which the emergency goods were procured at the best possible price
cannot be determined. This is an important caveat in assessing cost-effectiveness..
129. The goods and services offered during the emergency assistance phase were diverse. Requests
for assistance were often accompanied by an exhaustive, detailed list of requested articles. From
the available documentation, a request for medicines included quantities, brands, etc. A request for
building materials included the requested number of screws, nails, m2 of wood, etc. Due to this
highly-detailed level, it cannot be verified whether the most efficient method of purchase or
acquisition was chosen for the requested goods. Certainly in the initial phase, there was little or
insufficient time for this, as speed of action was necessary. This does not alter the fact that, in a
number of cases, (certainly for the larger expenditure items) quotations were requested from
several parties during the emergency assistance phase. In the available documentation, there are
emails in which an employee asks his superior for approval of a certain purchase. However, it is not
clear from the available sources on which basis a choice was ultimately made for one of the
providers.
Conclusion 8 The coordinating role of the Ministry of BZK and the modified waver procedure for
procurement gave ministries sufficient flexibility to act with the desired speed, but also resulted in
highly fragmented documentation regarding the decision-making process and the choices made.
130. The experience with Article 8 shows that activities funded under emergency response are poorly
documented. Because various ministries and other parties were involved in the implementation, the
available documentation is also difficult to access. Financial documentation of the Ministry of BZK is
not always well-labelled, and adjustments due to exchange rate fluctuations are often not related to
specific disbursements. Even more importantly, implementing partners report on activities in highly
generic terms. For this policy review, an inordinate amount of time (more than nine months) was
spent tracing documents in financial archives and in Digidoc. This is due to shortcomings in the
institutional memory of the Ministry.
Conclusion 9 On the basis of lessons learned during the post-Irma crisis, the Government of the
Netherlands has reviewed its role and capacity to respond to large scale crises in the Caribbean
parts of the Kingdom and took a variety of measures. Fundamental considerations have been the
autonomous status of Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten and the responsibilities for emergency
preparedness and immediate disaster response accruing from this autonomous status.
131. As from 2018, the Government of the Netherlands took a variety of measures to improve on its
disaster response capacity on the basis of lessons learned during the post-Irma crisis. In June
2020, the Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security and the Ministry of BZK published a
handbook on crisis management for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom. The Handbook on crisis
management for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom published in June 2020 draws lessons from
the post-hurricane experiences in 2017 and seeks to clarify roles and procedures of different
ministries in the Netherlands and other partners in case the European Netherlands is requested to
intervene in disaster management in the Caribbean. The handbook does not discuss disaster
preparedness and response on the islands, as this is considered part of local responsibilities in Sint
Eustatius and Saba and a national responsibility in the case of Sint Maarten. It is understood that
procedures defined in the handbook need to be tested and disseminated in practice. Since 2020,
this has been done in joint disaster drills (HUREX), during which different parties to be called upon
can familiarize themselves with what is expected from them.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

61

5

Support for Early Recovery of Sint Maarten

5.1

Introduction
Bridging emergency response and reconstruction

132.

As the emergency response phase came to an end in December 2017, the Ministry of BZK
continued providing support to Sint Maarten. Three months into the aftermath of the Hurricane, the
perception was that many immediate needs had been addressed to but that a large part of the
population was still vulnerable. In this so-called ‘early recovery’ period, the Ministry of BZK
therefore focused on funding projects meant to be implemented quickly and to have a costeffective, direct impact on the situation of vulnerable people on the island, particularly the young
and the elderly. These early recovery projects would furthermore act as a bridging phase between
the initial emergency response described in the previous chapter and the longer-term
reconstruction activities planned for the coming years.67 With these longer-term activities requiring
more time for their design and set-up, there was an acknowledgement that shorter-term, more
practical projects needed to fill this gap and prepare the ground for reconstruction.
“Although the talks with the World Bank are at an advanced stage, I estimate that it will take a few weeks
before the Trust Fund is operational because a number of steps still have to be completed. That is why I
foresee a bridging phase, the so-called early recovery, in which visible and noticeable results are achieved
to alleviate the most urgent needs of the population and to prevent a standstill and a deterioration of the
starting position for reconstruction. A budget of €7 million will be made available for this from the resources
for the reconstruction of Sint Maarten that are reserved at the Supplementary Post. With this I will finance
projects that can start quickly and have a direct effect on the population. The basic principle is that the
projects have a maximum duration of 6 months. In order to guarantee the lawful and efficient use of these
funds, a contribution is made to renowned international and local non-governmental organizations (such as
the UN, the Red Cross and the White Yellow Cross Care Foundation) and links are made to existing
initiatives. In the expenditure of the €7 million, the focus is on meeting the basic needs of the inhabitants of
Sint Maarten, with special attention being paid to the most vulnerable groups such as children and the
elderly.

133.

The early recovery projects were therefore meant to fulfil a dual purpose: address the most urgent
needs of the population and achieve visible results, and prevent a standstill and/or a deterioration of
the starting position for reconstruction activities.68 In this case, deterioration was understood as a
worsening of the post-hurricane situation with regards to income and employment, the economy,
social well-being and public safety.69 It is important to keep in mind that the early recovery phase
was meant to be limited in size, scope and duration by design. 70 As described in the Letter to
Parliament (see above), the starting points assumed a maximum duration of six months. The
support for early recovery was intended to be a minor part of the overall reconstruction phase, with
the bulk of the resources to be channelled through the World Bank Trust Fund.
Working with trusted parties

134.

As a way of ensuring a responsible and efficient use of the funds destined for these projects, the
Ministry of BZK chose to assign, as implementing parties, established international organisations

67

Letter from the State Secretary for Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations to the President of the House of Representative of
General States, The Hague, 21 December 2017.
68
Briefing Wereldbank & Early Recovery, DGWBE, 6th of December of 2017.
69
Spending plan “Bestedingsplan” for Early Recovery, 7th of December of 2017.
70
Spending plan “Bestedingsplan” for Early Recovery, 7th of December of 2017.

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and local NGOs. Preference was given to those already active on the ground and those with
existing links to ongoing activities under the emergency response. These organisations were
thought to be best suited to identify needs and develop project proposals to address these needs.
135.

The rolled-out projects (see Section 5.2) can be grouped under the components of food provision
(school meals), housing (construction projects, voucher programme and rebuilding small
community infrastructure), psychosocial support (psychosocial assistance) and labour market
(re)integration (retraining courses, life skills education, waste to work, island clean up), with
organisations often tackling several of these issues under one programme.
Table 5.1 Budget of the early recovery projects on Article 8.1 (in € x 1.000)
Total
White Yellow Cross Care Foundation

980
Construction project

851

Retraining courses

129

UNICEF Netherlands

453
Psychosocial assistance

102

Life skills education

259

Project management and other costs

92

Netherlands Red Cross

1.225
Waste to work

225

School meals

1.000

UNDP

2.242
Voucher programme 500 houses

1.645

Rebuilding small community infrastructure

-

Island clean up

597

Qredits

555
Soft loans

SMDF

555
1.280

Elderly home repair project
Total Early Recovery (in €)

1.293
6.735

Source: Financieel overzicht WBE SXM 15072021

5.2

Effectiveness and efficiency

136.

The activities carried out under the early recovery phase are presented below, organised by
implementing organisation. The activities have not undergone independent evaluations –
implementing parties self-reported results and progress under the obligatory reporting procedure of
the Ministry of BZK.
White Yellow Cross Care Foundation (WYCCF)

137.

The White Yellow Cross Care Foundation is a local foundation that provides professional care
services such as hospice, elderly care, nursing home care and general nursing care to the elderly in
Sint Maarten. Their long history providing these services on the island71, and their work during the
emergency response phase, made them a natural partner for activities under the early recovery

71

The White Yellow Cross Care Foundation having been founded in 1970 and the White Yellow Cross Care Foundation in
2003.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

63

phase. The WYCCF is furthermore embedded into Sint Maarten’s ESFs and is well-connected with
the Government of Sint Maarten and other NGOs.72
Table 5.2 White Yellow Cross Care Foundation projects in the early recovery phase
Projects and timeline

Expenses

Target and results

(USS)
Construction Project ‘Beter Bouwen’

$ 941,116

January 2018 – August 2018

•

Initial target: 45 households.

•

Output: 48 households received
construction support.

Retraining Project Construction Assistant

$ 138,516

‘Nieuwe Kansen’

•

Outcome: 48 households repaired

•

Initial target: 20 graduates.

•

Output: 24 participants and 17

January 2018 – June 2018

graduates.
•

Outcome: 80% of graduates found a job
within 3 months after graduation.

Retraining Project Care Assistant ‘Zorgen

$ 138,786

voor Elkaar’

•

Initial target: 20 graduates.

•

Output: 25 participants and 20

January 2018 – June 2018

graduates.
•

Outcome: 90% of graduates found a job
within 3 months after graduation.

Note: Results taken from the WYCCF Final Report produced, three months after training graduation.

138. The WYCCF proposed two training projects and one home repair project, targeting those left
unemployed or inadequately sheltered after the hurricane. The work skills training projects (‘Nieuwe
kansen’ en ‘Zorgen voor Elkaar’) focused on equipping those previously employed in the tourism
and hospitality sectors with the necessary skills to find employment in other sectors with higher
demand in a post-hurricane context.73 The construction project (‘Beter Bouwen’) targeted the
housing of existing clients of the WYCCF’s community-care and day-care services, which includes
persons that are chronically ill, elderly and physically or mentally handicapped. 74
Home repairs of the vulnerable clients of the WYCCF
139. The home repair project got off the ground quickly. District nurses at the WYCCF used a form to
collect information on the type of help that was needed at different addresses in their registry. This
form had already been developed by the WYCCF in the aftermath of the disaster to proactively
begin collecting information. Interviewees at the foundation noted that being able to quickly identify
needs was crucial — it allowed them to start construction activities before other organisations,
which also meant that they had access to construction workers and materials before these became
scarce on the island. The WYCCF carried out 200 social assessments in total, verifying whether the
households met the social and financial criteria for support. The hired construction firm carried out
85 technical assessments to gauge the level of damage.
140. The home repair project surpassed its target of 45 homes, with construction and repair activities
carried out in 48 homes. The foundation requested additional financial support which was approved
by the Ministry of BZK. This was required to cover higher costs than those originally budgeted for
and to restore the additional homes.75 The average costs per house was US$18,850.00, which is
72

As expressed by multiple interviewees during the field mission.
https://www.soualiganewsday.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=18753:white-yellow-cross-on-track-withclients%E2%80%99-home-repair&Itemid=450
74
Early Recovery Projecten Wederopbouw Sint Maarten, January 25th 2018. Available here.
75
During the early phases the costs appeared to be lower than initially expected, so that the target was moved to 50 homes.
Costs afterwards proved to be higher. The additional budget, provided by the Ministry of BZK on top of the original value
73

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largely comparable to similar efforts. It is important to note that the scale of work varied significantly
between houses, with some repairs costing less than US$1,000 and the most expensive one being
nearly US$30,000. The WYCCF self-reported that they benefited from dealing with a regular
clientele and the fact that, as a private foundation, they could appoint a contractor directly and thus
were not dependent on public tenders.
Developing employable skills in the population
141. The care training projects rapidly received 115 registrations, primarily from women who worked in
hospitality, most of whom were reached through social media channels. Men, who tend to be less
active on these channels, proved to be harder to reach at the beginning, requiring the WYCCF to
proactively search for candidates. Trainees received a stipend as well as theoretical and practical
training. Trainees in the care programme participated in rotating 4-day internship programs within
the WYCCF facilities, SMMC and external contractors.76 A total of 37 trainees graduated and five
got certificates for finished modules. The average expense per trainee was approximately
US$5,659. The programme had a low drop-out rate and a high workforce integration rate, with
approximately 80% of construction graduates and 90% of healthcare trainees having found a job
three months after graduation.77
142. The three projects implemented by the WYCCF either met or came close to meeting their initial
targets. The projects were implemented within the expected timeframe and largely within the
expected budget. The designed interventions were highly relevant, as a result of the WYCCF’s
understanding of the context and existing relations on the ground. The project benefitted from the
implementing party’s knowledge of its clients — which allowed for a quick and accurate mapping of
housing needs — and from the project’s design — which allowed some of the trained personnel to
take up jobs within the WYCCF shortly after graduation. The established relationship between the
WYCCF and the main contracted construction company78 also allowed for easy contracting and
smooth collaboration.
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF NL)
143. UNICEF is the United Nations agency responsible for providing humanitarian and developmental
aid to children. UNICEF Netherlands is a National Committee with the primary task of fund raising
for the UNICEF organisation, which does advocacy and humanitarian work in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands. UNICEF NL had a small office staffed with volunteers in Sint Maarten before the
hurricane. In the aftermath of the hurricane, UNICEF NL was formally invited by the Government of
Sint Maarten to conduct a post-disaster needs assessments in the areas of child protection and
education.79 This assessment found that the hurricane had worsened existing vulnerabilities,80 and
informed UNICEF NL’s proposal for two projects designed to provide life skills education for
adolescents and psychosocial support to children.

Table 5.3 UNICEF NL projects in the early recovery phase
Project and timeline

Expenses

Target and results

Life skills education through sports for

€259,145

•

adolescents

Initial target: 25-30 trained local football
coaches.

January 2018 – September 2018

and by re-allocating some excess funds from the training projects, was of $65,000. Source: White Yellow Cross Care
Foundation, Final Report Reconstruction Projects, September 30th 2018.
76
White Yellow Cross Care Foundation, 3rd Report, 5 June 2018.
77
White Yellow Cross Care Foundation, 3rd Report, 5 June 2018
78
Leeward Island Construction Company, LICCOM)
79
UNICEF Nederland, Sint Maarten Post-Hurricane Irma Assessment, November 2017
80
UNICEF Nederland, Early Recovery Final Report, 13 December 2018

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

65

•

Output: 17 coaches and 9 physical
education teachers have completed the
programme.

•

Output: 650 children participated in the
activities
organised by the World Coaches
programme.

•

Output: 14 after-school sport and activities
organisations supplied with materials

Psychosocial assistance for children

€101,995

•

affected by Hurricane Irma

implement the Return to Happiness (RTH)

January 2018 – June 2018, with extension
up to 30 September 2018

Initial target: 120 professionals trained to

programme.
•

Output: 98 professionals trained and 55
received an abridged version of the
training.

•

Output: 200 children participated in the
Child Rights Film Festival (CRFF).

•

Output: 5 films prepared for the Children’s
Rights Film Festival.

Note: While the implementation period ran until the end of September, several activities concluded in October and November.
Note II: The Netherlands Red Cross provided funds obtained through a national fundraising activity in the Netherlands. These
funds allowed UNICEF to request a no-cost extension81 and to use the funds to continue the work.
Note III: Expenses excluding project management and other costs

Improving the self-confidence and emotional wellbeing of youth
144. The goal of the Life Skills Education project was to engage children and adolescents through sports
and messages to improve their self-confidence and emotional wellbeing.82 UNICEF involved the
World Coaches programme of the Royal Netherlands Football Association (KNVB), several
institutions of the Government of Sint Maarten83, and the Sint Maarten Football Federation
(SXMFF) as implementing partners. The project consisted of carrying out a gap analysis of the
services available to adolescents, supplying recreational kits to schools and after-school
programmes, organising football clinics and tournaments, and training football coaches and
physical education teachers to integrate life skills into coaching.
145. The UNICEF Netherlands Community Mobiliser joined the team in April and completed a mapping
exercise by compiling a list of existing after-school programmes and services for children –
reviewing their needs after the hurricane. Recreation kits, initially planned to be distributed in a
standardised manner, were distributed by demand. The timeline allowed for organisations to submit
a list of needs, and for UNICEF to supply 104 recreation kits. In all, 26 people completed the
programme and a total of 650 children participated in the World Coaches activities. The programme
cost €63,29384, resulting in roughly €2,434 per person trained.
146. The final report highlighted the efforts made to ensure the local ownership and sustainability of the
initiatives by engaging local organisations, namely the SXMFF. In fact, the World Coaches
programme continued beyond the early recovery funding, with a KNVB World Coach taking over
the technical directorship of the SXMFF and another providing support to take the programme into

81

Granted until 31 March 2019.
Project Plan UNICEF Sint Maarten BZK
83
Specifically, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sport (MECYS), Department of Sport, the National Sport Institute
(NSI).
84
The KNVB World Coaches Programme includes the participation of children in the various tournaments. The €63,292
represents personnel costs for both the training, coaching and overall project management and does not include sports
clothing and equipment for participating children nor travel costs for personnel.
82

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the following year. The programme continued into 2019 with implementation by the SXMFF and
regular funding from the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA). 85
Support training to address emotional stress after a disaster
147. The goal of the Psychosocial Assistance project was to reduce the incidence of children showing
signs of emotional stress after the hurricane.86 The project was planned around two components,
namely, the provision of psychosocial support training and materials87 and the organisation of a
Children’s Rights Film Festival (CRFF).88 The support training was based on the existing UNICEF
Return to Happiness (RtH) programme, designed for children who have experienced trauma, and
adapted to the Caribbean context. The programme had a train-the-trainers approach, where
individuals having completed the training were expected to be able to pass on the training to peers
in the future. The programme therefore had two tranches, with initial training in April and a follow-up
RtH peer-to-peer training in May.
148. The peer-to-peer component did not roll out as envisioned, as teachers were busy with other
training and often struggled to find time away from the classroom. There was also a slight change in
training focus. The RtH programme was intended to address the needs of children living in adverse
circumstances after the hurricane. Due to delays in the implementation — attributed to the hectic
calendars of the teachers — the training shifted to preparing those to implement the RtH
programme after a (future) disaster, and not for dealing with the immediate aftermath of Hurricane
Irma.89
149. The film components involved the training of 18 teachers and youth leaders, and resulted in five
films premiering at an event attended by close to 250 people. Six children who had participated in
the projects travelled to Curacao to participate in the film festival. UNICEF had initially intended for
the children to reflect on experiences related to the hurricane in their drawings and the resulting film
scripts. However, this was not the case, with the children largely focusing their projects on other
topics. The final report for the project attributes this to the teachers receiving insufficient training on
the subject matter, and therefore, being more comfortable with other topics on children’s rights (e.g.
protection from drugs or the right to education).
The Netherlands Red Cross (NLRC)
150. The Red Cross was present in Sint Maarten prior to the hurricane, with a local chapter made up
mostly of volunteers. This chapter came into action quickly and received €19 million through the
fundraising campaign ‘Nationale Actie Nederland Helpt Sint Maarten’ – immediately following the
hurricane – in the Netherlands. These funds were used for food assistance and for roof and
housing repairs, including technical assessments of physical damage provided on request. 90
151. The NLRC team on the island needed reinforcements to be able to disburse the amounts of funding
coming in, so volunteers and personnel were brought in from the Netherlands. In the first months
there was a high turnover of Heads of Mission, which affected the Red Cross’ efforts internally and
the potential collaboration with other groups active on the ground. This situation, however, was
stabilised in 2018. The NLRC proposed two projects to the Ministry of BZK, to complement their
ongoing activities.
Table 5.4 Netherlands Red Cross projects in the early recovery phase
85

UNICEF Nederland, Early Recovery Final Report, 13 December 2018.
UNICEF Nederland, Project Proposal, December 2017.
87
The distribution of RtH materials was funded by the Red Cross.
88
Based on the existing UNICEF Film Festival in the Netherlands and similar events organised by UNICEF worldwide, the
Festival is employed as a tool to broaden knowledge about children’s rights within society and to express the perspectives
of children also after disaster.
89
UNICEF Nederland, Early Recovery Final Report, 13 December 2018.
90
Red Cross, Terugkoppeling 2017-2021 Nationale Actie ‘Nederland Helpt Sint Maarten’, September 2021
86

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

67

Project

Expenses

Target and results

School Meals Programme

€1,000,000

•

January 2018 — July 2018

Output: 875,782 meals distributed among 18
elementary schools and 5 secondary
schools.

•

Outcome: 3116 children were part of the
project and received meals over the course
of the entire programme.

•
Waste to Work Initiative

€225,000

•

January 2018 – May 2018

Output: Assessment carried out on wasterelated opportunities.

•

Output: Makerspace identified and set up.

•

Outcome: Project network established and
international entrepreneur portfolio set up.
Website shows evidence of some longerterm projects and results.

Note: The School Meals Programme ran from October 2017 to July 2018. Contributions from the Ministry of BZK came in on
January 2018. The School Meal Project’s total expenditure between January and July was of €1,044,187, with the additional
expenses funded by the NLRC’s Irma fundraising campaign.

Providing meals to children in public schools
152. The School Meals Programme was set up to alleviate (financial) pressure on the parents, and to
encourage children to go back to school by supplying breakfast and one hot meal per day. 91 The
programme set up a kitchen and prepared meals that were distributed through 18 elementary and
five secondary schools, with 3116 children having been consistently part of the programme. The
average cost per meal was approximately €1.19. A survey rolled out in March 2018, among the
parents of the children, found that 62% did indeed experience “some financial relief” 92 through the
project and 94% wished for it to continue. The Red Cross did identify as one of the lessons learned
that parents could have been better engaged through the project, provided with better information
and given more ownership.
Turning debris and waste into innovative initiatives
153. Waste to Work was envisioned as a longer-term project to “create an ecosystem in which
entrepreneurship and innovation thrive and stimulate the circular economy and employment on Sint
Maarten”.93 The project proposal put forward two outcomes, (i) an established physical location
where entrepreneurs could collect waste material, create, collaborate with other entrepreneurs and
receive training, and (ii) participation of Dutch start-ups in Sint Maarten in the field of waste.
154. Due to the longer nature of such an initiative, the plans were for the early recovery funds to allow
the NLRC to set up the preconditions for this ecosystem. NLRC funds were then to be used to
continue the initiative. The priority for the first months of the project was therefore setting up a
‘makerspace’, a (semi-)permanent location that offered space to entrepreneurs to develop their
waste to work concept. The project’s vision, on the other hand, was developed over the course of
its implementation, with discussions on narrowing the project’s vision still ongoing in May 2018.94
The team succeeded in setting up a physical, community-operated workspace and creating links
with Dutch start-ups.95 The initiative continued its activities up to at least early 2021,96 so that the

91 Red Cross, Final narrative Report NLRC School Meal Project.
92
Red Cross, 3rd Progress Report, June 2018.
93
Red Cross, Waste to Work Project Proposal, 17 December 2017.
94
As seen in email correspondence.
95
Red Cross Project Site: From Waste to Work – Startup Solutions for Sint Maarten. Available at:
https://www.rodekruis.nl/nieuwsbericht/iati/from-waste-to-work-startup-solutions-for-sint-maarten/
96
Based on last posts on Waste2WorkSXM website.

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project can be said to have been effective in establishing the necessary pre-conditions required for
this initiative.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
155. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a UN organisation tasked with eradicating
poverty and reducing inequalities through the sustainable development of nations. At the time of the
hurricane UNDP had a regional presence and a running programme with the Government of Sint
Maarten. The organisation arrived in Sint Maarten shortly after the hurricane and was active during
the emergency response period.97
156. The UNDP proposed a comprehensive programme titled Recovering Back Better, consisting of
three activities: the clearance of debris with a cash-for-work scheme, an emergency employment
scheme for vulnerable local people, and the repairs of roofs belonging to disadvantaged
homeowners or families otherwise in need of help.98 The programme was phased to start with a
stronger focus on the debris removal and the employment scheme, and to later have a stronger
focus on the housing programme.
Table 5.5 UNDP projects in the early recovery phase
Project

Expenses

Target and results

Housing Voucher programme ‘500 Huizen’

$2,604,976

•

January 2018 – January 2019

Initial target: 500 dwellings to be
repaired.

•

Adjusted target: 75 dwellings to be
repaired.

Island Clean up

$706,000

•

Output/outcome: 76 dwellings repaired.

•

Initial target: 500 people benefit from an
emergency employment scheme through
clean-up activities.

•

Adjusted target: 300 people.

•

Output: 204 people participated.

•

Outcome: 16 000m3 of hurricane debris
removed and 87 backyards and public
spaces cleaned up.

Rebuilding small community

$572,000

•

infrastructure
n.a.

Initial target: 50 community
infrastructures rehabilitated.

•

Output/outcome: none.

Note: The total contribution of the Ministry of BZK was of €2,242,000. UNDP contributed €664,000 to the projects. The
completion of the Housing Voucher project required a re-allocation of funds from the Small Community Infrastructure project.

Repairing 500 houses in Sint Maarten
157. The Housing programme aimed to support the reconstruction and repair of 500 houses (of the
island’s most vulnerable). As with most of the house repair projects after the hurricane, the focus
was primarily on roof repair. The activities were to be implemented through the training and hiring of
ten local teams, in line with the employment-intensive approach planned for the UNDP’s
intervention.

97

In particular, the UNDP brought in an expert from the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) to
provide coordination support. The coordination activities carried out were regarded favourably by other NGOs, as reported
by stakeholders.
98
UNDP, Sint Maarten Recovering Back Better Project Final Report, 2019.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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158. The original (cost) plan was based on assumptions developed on the basis of the UNDP’s
experience in the region, assumptions which were later found not to always hold in the case of Sint
Maarten.99 The UNDP had assumed that there would be multiple houses with minimal damage.
meaning that a small cash contribution could effectively support building back better. 100 It
furthermore assumed that households and families would themselves be busy re-constructing
houses, so that the UNDP’s support could be a co-contribution to ongoing repair works. The original
goal of using the unemployed and homeowners for the repairs was found to be unrealistic once the
project started, with most lacking the required technical capacity. Finally, the organisation assumed
that local authorities would have created a preliminary list of potential beneficiaries that
organisations such as the UNDP could make use of.
159. The assumptions resulted in a serious underestimation of the costs, which became evident once
the activities started, and which caused a delay in the activities. The UNDP requested a no-cost
extension of the project from the Ministry of BZK, which was granted after a comprehensive internal
project review was carried out by the UNDP.101 The target was readjusted from 500 to 75 houses,
and a Project Revision Document was drafted between the UNDP and the Ministry of BZK. The
UNDP furthermore made a direct contribution of over US$600,000 to meet the new target.
160. The project encountered other challenges in implementation related to the way it was managed.
Important controls and procedures were missing, including e.g. quality control of finalised works or
procedures for feedback management. The Ministry of BZK lodged formal complaints with the
UNDP and the government of Sint Maarten expressed its concerns as well.102 The project review
therefore also focused on improving procedures and correcting the management of the project.
161. The final average cost of roof repairs was US$24,767 per roof, tenfold the initial estimate of
US$1,800 to US$2,100 per house. It must be noted that an Ombudsman report, investigating
construction activities carried out after Hurricane Irma, reported multiple complaints about the
quality of the roof repairs carried out under this project.103
Compensating people to remove debris across the island
162. The Island Clean Up project was meant to simultaneously clear hurricane debris and provide 300
people with a source of income, through a cash-for-work scheme. UNDP rolled out a process to
identify, select and recruit vulnerable people. The cleaning activities focused on backyards and
public spaces and were carried out over 20 clean-up days, for which 204 participants received a
daily renumeration. One achievement worth highlighting was the inclusion of women in these
activities. While the work of removing debris is usually heavily male-dominated, 40% of the cashfor-work scheme beneficiaries were women.104
Rehabilitating community infrastructure
The project made initial progress in identifying potential sites for rehabilitation activities, but ran into
difficulties at the tendering stage. The UNDP divided expected activities into lots, according to the
type of infrastructure being targeting. Two lots did not receive bids, and the sole bids in the other
three lots were three to four times more than the initial costs.105 Additional resources from the failed
community structure component were allocated towards housing.

99

Idem.
Idem.
101
Idem.
102
Idem.
103
Ombudsman Sint Maarten, Home Repair: A Revelation of a Social Crisis, 2019.
104
Idem.
105
UNDP, Sint Maarten Recovering and Building Back Better 3rd Progress Report, June 2018.
100

70

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163. Target indicators were significantly re-adjusted during the timeline, as was the approach to meeting
them. The UNDP-implemented projects can therefore not be considered to have been implemented
effectively or efficiently. While the roof repair project surpassed the adjusted target (76 out of 75),
the employment scheme project did not (204 out of 300) and the community infrastructure project
was not implemented. Costs significantly increased and required a contribution from the UNDP for
project continuation.
Qredits
164. Qredits is a Dutch, non-profit microfinance institution106 that assists entrepreneurs with loans and
mentoring, particularly those that are typically excluded from accessing credit through regular
channels. Qredits was already active in the region prior to the hurricane and had recently set up an
office in Sint Maarten.107
Table 5.6 Qredits projects in the early recovery phase
Project and timeline
90 Soft loans

Expenses
€555,000

Target and results
•

1 December 2017 to 30 June 2018

Initial target: 90 loans granted under
soft loan conditions.

•

Output: 90 loans granted.

Note: A total of 96 loans were granted under soft loan conditions, of which 6 were financed by Qredits.

165. Qredits’ proposal to the Ministry of BZK was to set up new microloans (of up to US$25,000) at an
interest rate of 2% – compared to their usual rate of 9% – and with a grace period of one year for
90 entrepreneurs. The project budget was used to offer credit access to Micro, Small and Mediumsized Enterprises (MSMEs) and entrepreneurs against these new rates. The project proposal
requested €550,000 to cover the difference between the usual rate of 9.75% and the proposed
temporary ‘Early Recovery’ rate of 2%, as well as cover personnel costs and project costs
associated with the expected increase of applications. The default risks of these loans were taken
on by Qredits.108
166. Qredits received 218 requests during the period of December 2017 to June 2018 and granted 96
loans for a total value of US$2.3 million. The project was well received and found to support
existing businesses in investing in the recovery (or expansion) of their business, as well as
supporting entrepreneurs to set up new businesses. The high rate of applications — more than
double the monthly applications received in, for example, Aruba109 — showed that the loans were
responding to a real need amongst the population in a post-hurricane setting. The selection process
also proved successful, with only four fully defaulting on their loans, and ten falling behind on
payment.
167. As of the end of the early recovery period, Qredits still had 64 open requests for loans to process.
In May 2018, the organisation sent a formal request to the Ministry of BZK to fund a second tranche
of 100 loans. This request was rejected, under the reasoning that the early recovery phase was
coming to an end and that further financing should be funded by the Trust Fund. 110 Qredits
expressed its disappointment at the lack of continuation of a successful intervention in the Final
Report.111 The organisation continued offering its “standard” loan package after the early recovery

106

Qredits is established as a non-profit with ANBI status (Algemeen Nut Beogende Instelling) which translates to a Public
Benefit Organisation
107
The office was set up in August 2017 and also services Saba and Sint Eustatius. Source: Proposal ‘Ondersteuning MKB op
Bovenwindse Eilanden bij Wederopbouw’, Qcredits. December 20th 2017.
108
Final Report “Eindverslag subsidiebeschikking onder nummer 2017-0000662632”, Qredits, July 2021.
109
Final Report “Eindverslag subsidiebeschikking onder nummer 2017-0000662632”, Qredits, July 2021.
110
Final Report “Eindverslag subsidiebeschikking onder nummer 2017-0000662632”, Qredits, July 2021.
111
Final Report “Eindverslag subsidiebeschikking onder nummer 2017-0000662632”, Qredits, July 2021.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

71

phase. It also covered the six additional loans that had already been approved under soft loan
conditions.112
Sint Maarten Development Fund (SMDF)
168. The Sint Maarten Development Fund Foundation was created in 2013 and acts as a development
agency on the island to focus on the development and financing of programmes and projects
geared towards poverty reduction and sustainable social development.113 It was set up by the
government of Sint Maarten to fill the gap left in the financing of social development with the
dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles and the subsequent closing of AMFO.114
Table 5.7 SMDF projects in the early recovery phase
Project

Expenses and Timeline

Elderly Home Repair Project

€1,280,000

Target and results
•

Initial target: 75 senior homes
repaired.

•

Output: 76 senior homes
repaired and 16 homes made
of concrete built.

169. The Elderly Home Repair project was an extension of a running project, financed with leftover
AMFO funds. Prior to the hurricane, SMDF had already secured financing from the Ministry of BZK
for the reparation of 75 senior citizen homes. Due to the extensive damage these homes
experienced during the hurricane, SMDF requested and received additional funding to strengthen
efforts on these same houses during the early recovery phase.115
170. The SMDF was able to build 16 concrete homes that had been entirely destroyed, and repair a total
of 76 senior citizens’ houses,116 surpassing the target of 75 houses. The estimated cost was
€13,913 per home.117 The project was completed within budget and within the timeline, and
surpassed its target indicators.

5.3

Conclusions on early recovery
Conclusion 10 The Ministry of BZK opted for a project-based approach for the early recovery
phase, granting established and experienced organisations the freedom to propose and design
their own interventions. This project approach largely paid off, and allowed for the funds to be
rapidly allocated and implemented. The most successful cases were those implemented by local
organisations or as extensions of running programmes.

171. The decision to maintain a flexible process for the selection of procedures resulted in a fast
procedure, with organisations able to kick off activities within a month of the design of the early
recovery phase. The choice by the Ministry of BZK to work with established, familiar organisations
like (WYCCF, UNICEF, UNDP) yielded positive results. Thanks to their experience, organisations
were able to put together — and adjust — proposals quickly, sometimes in the span of hours.

112

More information available on the National Recovery Programme Bureau project website: https://nrpbsxm.org/esp/.
From SMDF website, available at: https://smdf.sx/history/.
114
AMFO, or the Stichting Antillean Medefinancierings Organisatie, used to serve a similar purpose throughout the former
Netherlands Antilles.
115
Sint Maarten OM Special Report Outreach 2019 on Home Repair.
116
As reported in the Progress Report of February 2019.
117
Including the homes that were built.
113

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Most of the projects met the goal of getting to a quick start and directly impacting affected
populations, though effectiveness and efficiency varied across projects. Most projects did at some
stage have to adjust their scope and/or targets, as a result of changing costs or initial costs having
been based on assumptions that did not hold. Regardless, most projects can be judged to have
been moderately to strongly effective and efficient, with the main exception being those under the
UNDP programme, which were neither effective nor efficient.
Qredits’ soft loans, and the SMDF’s housing project, built on ongoing activities and allowed
organisations to establish realistic goals and meet these within the time period. Similarly, the
WYCCF embedded the training and construction activities into their structure, allowing them to
make use of existing relations and networks. The UNDP, an organisation with less experience on
the island, had to significantly adjust its project targets across the programme, after finding out that
several of the assumptions made at proposal stage did not hold, as well as encountering tendering
issues. The NLRC had a mixed experience. Their school meals programme can be deemed a
success, but their roofing repair project (not funded by Article 8) encountered some challenges.
Other projects (such as UNICEF’s psychosocial assistance to children and the NLRC’s
Waste2Work initiative) required some adaptation during implementation to be able to meet their
output targets.
Conclusion 11 The overarching objective of the early recovery phase, to act as a bridging phase
and to prevent a standstill of reconstruction efforts between the initial emergency response on Sint
Maarten and the Trust Fund becoming operational, was not achieved. Several of the early recovery
funded projects were well-suited to continue for longer periods of time, beyond the defined 6-month
period. Additional budget would have allowed these projects to continue and to effectively
contribute to filling the gap in reconstruction efforts that ensued.
172. The Trust Fund, through which the larger part of reconstruction activities were channelled, became
operational91 in March 2019,118 while most of the early recovery activities wrapped up in June 2018.
The overall instrument of Direct Support119 funded reconstruction activities which were not
considered appropriate for the Trust Fund and included direct support and liquidity support in
addition to early recovery projects. However, the Direct Support rolled out in in 2018 and 2019
mainly supported activities for border control, police and detention, which, while certainly important,
did in no way build on or match the initiatives of the early recovery part of the instrument. Sint
Maarten can therefore be said to have experienced a significant gap in Article 8-funded social
activities over the course of 2019.
173. This ‘standstill period’ was mentioned by multiple interviewees on the ground, who furthermore
explained that there was a loss of confidence in the Article 8-funded reconstruction efforts when
activities ceased. Most of the progress – related to the planning and set-up of the Trust Fund –
happened behind the scenes, giving the impression that activities had halted. 120 The activities
meanwhile being funded under Direct Support were not targeting the population. Furthermore, the
total budget for reconstruction (€550 million) had been largely publicised, and generated
expectations in the population about the types of activities that would be rolled out in late 2018 or
early 2019. Some stakeholders explained that locals began to feel sceptical about the Dutch-funded
reconstruction activities when these expectations were not met.

118

The Emergency Recovery Project under the Trust Fund was approved in July 2018 and started disbursements on March
2019. See also the Report on Part II of the Policy Review of Article 8.
119
See Report on Part II of the Policy Review of Article 8.
120
As expressed by interviewees.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

73

174. Finally, there was no clear bridging between the phases from a reconstruction point of view.
Projects in the early recovery phase were completed and, in most cases, did not explicitly link to
activities under the Trust Fund. Those that were able to continue activities under the Trust Fund
(such as Qredits) filled the space between the two phases with their own activities and funding. In
addition the Dutch Disaster Fund (Nationaal Rampenfonds) and the Samenwerkende Fondsen
Cariben (SFC) have contributed in bridging this gap. It is difficult to say whether this was due to
faulty design – overlooking the need for social activities during this period; or miscalculations –
underestimating the time it would take for the Trust Fund to become operational.

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6

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba

6.1

Introduction

175. On 14 September 2017 Sint Eustatius requested assistance for the reconstruction of the island.121
The damages extended to: private homes (over 100 homes damaged), small businesses and
hotels, utility poles and powerlines, the vegetation (80% of the vegetation was damaged) and the
agricultural sector, with entire farm lands flattened and fruit trees uprooted.
176. The crisis organisation on Saba scaled down on 13 September. An estimation for reconstruction
work and supporting measures after hurricane Irma was sent to BZK on 17 September. In total, the
estimated funds required were approximately US$10.8 million and included works on the airport,
roads, buildings and support for economic development. Hurricane Maria caused additional
damage on Saba, adding to the destruction already caused by hurricane Irma. On 2 October an
additional cost estimation with regard to the damage resulting from Maria was submitted. This
estimation focused on the reconstruction and reparation costs of the harbour, waste management
system, roads, economy and disaster management. In total, these estimated funds amounted to
US$16.3 million.
177. On 10 November the Council of Ministers agreed to provide financial support to the public entities
of Sint Eustatius and Saba. The total available envelope for the reconstruction amounted to €67
million. For Sint Eustatius, roughly €43 million was made available; for Saba, about €23.8 million.
These amounts covered nearly the entirety of the costs of estimated damages. The total amount
was placed on the general budget line of the Ministry of Finance.
178. The islands proposed reconstruction projects in consultation with line ministries and under the
coordination of the Ministry of BZK. BZK was therefore not financially accountable for projects
managed by other departments and implemented their own set of projects, including house repairs
and repairs in the public space (including the stabilisation of the cliff). The amount for these projects
was transferred from the general post to Article 8 of the Ministry of BZK. Table 6.1 shows all
reconstruction projects, including those of other ministries focused on e.g. the airport, roads,
harbour and education.
Table 6.1 Financial budget of the reconstruction on Sint Eustatius and Saba after Irma (all ministries) (in
EUR x 1.000)
Part

Sint Eustatius (EUR x 1 000)

Saba (EUR x 1 000)

28.737

18.069

Airport

4.825

675

Erosion Airport

10.000

Harbour

12.000

Ministry of IenW

15.000

Roads

400

300

Garbage

1.312

1.894

Water

200

200

Ministry of OCW

273

170

Education

273

170

121

Letter to minister Plasterk with request for assistance for reconstruction.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

75

Part

Sint Eustatius (EUR x 1 000)

Saba (EUR x 1 000)

Ministry of BZK

12.631

3.861

Cliff (incl. exchange rate

9.279

differences)
Housing & public space

2.552

3.661

Nature and environment

800

200

Ministry of EZK

955

1659

Touristic sector

955

1.659

Total in EUR

42.596

23.759

Subsidy SSCS sea cable

1.538

Total in EUR

67.893

Source: Documentation received from BZK regarding all ministries and Article 8 overiew.xls for BZK data

179. When the projects carried out on Saba and Sint Eustatius are compared to the damage
assessments carried out after the hurricanes, it is clear that the objective of the projects went
beyond damage repair. There was a distinct focus on building back better and making the islands
more resilient for the future. The precarious situation of the cliff in Sint Eustatius had, for example,
already been discussed with BZK in 2016, prior to the hurricane. The criteria for choosing the
implemented projects is not clear, and no documentation was shared detailing the selection
process.
180. The overarching coordinating role of the Ministry of BZK over the projects was not always clear.
While BZK was understood to be in a coordinating position, what this meant in practice within a
project structure caused some confusion. One example provided in the interviews, expressed that
no one is responsible for the totality of the project and that while 6-monthly meetings are held, a
representative from BZK joins occasionally, yet does not have a clear role.
181. This chapter covers the reconstruction projects on Sint Eustatius and Saba financed by the Ministry
of BZK after Hurricane Maria and Hurricane Irma.

6.2

Effectiveness and efficiency of the reconstruction of Sint Eustatius

182. The reconstruction budget of BZK Article 8 in Sint Eustatius totalled €15.0 million, most of which
was reserved for the restoration of the cliff (€11.6 million). Just over €2.5 million was reserved for
house repairs and rehabilitation of the public space and €800.000 was reserved for projects in
nature and environment.
Table 6.2 Financial contributions Article 8 for the reconstruction on Sint Eustatius after Irma (in € x
1.000)
Part

76

Amount (€)

Cliff (incl. exchange rate differences)

11.640

Housing & public space; of which:

2.552

-

House repairs

430

-

Repair NH Church

109

-

Repair of monuments

26

-

Repair Ruin

-

Unpaved roads

1001543

26
1.118

Part

Amount (€)

-

Water storage

129

-

Public graveyards

405

-

Fence old administrative building

23

Nature and environment; of which:

800

-

Repair agriculture and fishery

118

-

Water catchment agricultural businesses

129

-

Coral recovery

91

-

Repair buoys and mooring system marine

37

park
-

Recovery botanical garden

36

-

Reforest

331

-

Recovery breeding of sea turtles

26

-

Iguana population

5

-

Conservation fence behind Stenapa

Total in €

26
14.992

183. Communication between Sint Eustatius and the Ministry of BZK was clear during the reconstruction
phase, which started immediately after the emergency assistance. Effective relations resulted in
short lines and quick action. The budgets were allocated in a timely manner and the projects started
rapidly thereafter. Some of the projects were delayed due to shortage of materials and labour,
however, extensions were provided by the Ministry of BZK in order to overcome these issues.
Stabilisation of the cliff
184. The majority of the budget was spent on the stabilisation of the cliff. The project aimed to increase
stability and stop the erosion of the cliff for the next five decades. The project addressed a
combination of hurricane damage and deferred maintenance. The project had already been
discussed with BZK in 2016, due to severe safety issues. The hurricane worsened the situation;
however, the structure was already in a precarious state and required attention before the
hurricane. The funds from the cliff, under the reconstruction, are part of the total reconstruction
funds of the Ministry of BZK, but as a project it was independent and was not placed under the local
reconstruction program.
185. The allocation of the budget was done in 5 tranches, and the project was tendered internationally.
The project was too complex, too specialised and too large to tender locally. Only a few selected
parties responded to the tender, and one was selected. A contract was signed in January between
the public entity, Sint Eustatius, and contractor, Acrobat X Caraibes St. Martin/Acrobat X France,
concerning the re-stabilisation of the cliff surrounding Fort Oranje.122 The project was monitored by
RoyalHaskoning, who advised the Ministry of BZK before the next tranche was allocated to the
project.123
186. In total, 2,800 anchors, 7,400 square metres of canvas and just under 16,000 m3 of mesh were
placed124 since 2019. The construction works ended in May 2020. However, some additional funds
were required in order to complete the works. On 24 September 2021, a request was made by the
Government Commissioner of Sint Eustatius for the expansion of the budget within the
reconstruction funds for the stabilisation of the cliff. The additional works consisted of the building of
122
123

124

https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/statia-cliff-protection-project-in-full-swing
Beschikking bijzondere uitkering eerste tranche wederopbouwmiddelen stabilisering klif Sint Eustatius. 11 december 2018.
Kenmerk: 2018-0000948301.
https://www.statiagovernment.com/news-and-tenders/news/2020/05/06/cliff-stabilization-project-fort-oranje-nearscompletion

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

77

a fence to restrict public access to the cliff, and a cascade to channel drainage to the sea. The
additional costs are estimated to have been up to US$1.1 million.125
187. RoyalHaskoning carried out an inspection of the cliff works one year after its completion.126 The
inspection found that the work done on the cliff met its purpose, but that in order to prevent it from
deteriorating it needed to be quickly covered in vegetation. On a large part of the cliff, the
vegetation had already taken root but had not yet grown as much as was needed to anchor the
upper layer of the cliff. At that time, the expectation was that with the rainy season, the vegetation
would increase in size and this would not be a problem.
House repairs and public space
188. A subsidy of just over €2.5 million was allocated to repair damaged buildings and public space.
Directly after the hurricane, the Royal Netherlands Navy conducted an inventory of the house
damage. A Dutch project manager was assigned by the Ministry of BZK to coordinate and execute
those repairs. In 2017, the program was not supported by the island administrators of that time
(council and deputies). The project manager, however, had access to a well-informed, equipped
team in order to ensure timely implementation with the use of local constructors.127 The provision of
goods and building materials, including building materials for houses, businesses and public
buildings, commenced two months after Hurricane Irma. The team ensured prioritisation, tendering,
proper supervision and enforcement. Due to the damage throughout the whole region, prices for
building materials increased, and the quality of the building materials decreased. The costs of
construction work before the hurricanes were known to the reconstruction team; this knowledge
was used to prevent the price development from rising exponentially, and to make mutual price
agreements that would artificially inflate prices. The contractors agreed to certain price margins,
because work was guaranteed for a longer period of time under uncompetitive conditions. However,
due to the higher prices on materials, the project could not complete all activities within the
available budget. For the last houses, the project team decided to provide the materials and forego
the provision of labour to repair the houses. People were also asked to return any unused materials
to a central location in order for them to be reused. Finally, all 137 houses in the project were
repaired before the end of 2019.128,129 This made Sint Eustatius the first island in the region to
have the damaged houses repaired. The use of local constructors not only boosted the economy,
but also ensured effective compliance with building procedures (BES Bouwbesluit130).
189. The initial focus was on house repairs. The expansion of the focus to the public space occurred in
phases after 7 February 2018131. The reason was that the Government of the Netherlands had an
unfulfilled responsibility in this field after the dismantling of the Netherlands Antilles (10-10-10). The
repair in the public space included the repair of monuments, the NH Church, public graveyards, the
fence of the old administration building, a ruin and unpaved roads. A number of monuments were
already in poor condition before the hurricanes struck. The arrival of the hurricanes worsened the
situation and caused even more safety issues. These projects were selected in order to ensure

125

126
127

128
129
130

131

78

Brief van de staatssecretaris van binnenlandse zaken en koninkrijksrelaties. Herstel van de voorzieningen in het bestuur
van het openbaar lichaam Sint Eustatius (Wet herstel voorzieningen Sint Eustatius). Den Haag 31 mei 2021.
RoyalHaskoningDHV, 10 juni 2021. Afronding en overdracht Klif Stabilisatie Project. Sint Eustatius.
Vierde Uitvoeringsrapport Sint Eustatius. Available at:
https://www.jhtm.nl/statianews/bibliotheek/begrotingsuitvoering_2019_nr4.pdf
Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, Betreft Septemberbrief Sint Eustatius. Kenmerk: 2019-0000489161
3e uitvoeringsrapportage Statia.
Building decree, available at: https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0036000/2017-07-01. The Building Decree as well as
theunderlying BES code, were only available in the Dutch language. These have been translated into English, because the
official language on St. Eustatius is English and the highly technically described regulations were therefore unclear to
many in Dutch. In addition, the local contractors have adapted the BES code in specially set up working groups based on
years of local expertise, which suggestions have been tested, praised and implemented by TU Delft.
Before 7 February 2018, the program fell under the responsibility of acting Lieutenant Governor Julian Woodley and after
the Dutch political-administrative intervention under government commissioner Marcolino Franco.

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safety and were almost all locally tendered. Due to the busy schedule of local contractors, these
projects were pushed back slightly, as priority was given to repairing houses. At the time of writing,
all projects have been completed.
Nature and environment
190. The environmental damage affected the flora and fauna on the island. Projects established to
restore the natural environment included, amongst others, projects focused on agricultural
recovery, agricultural water supply, coral restoration, recovery buoys and mooring system,
restoration of the botanical garden, reforestation and recovery of breeding sea turtles. STENAPA
(Sint Eustatius National Parks Foundation) was the implementing party for the majority of the nature
and environment projects. STENAPA is dedicated to managing, conserving and restoring Sint
Eustatius’ natural resources and educating the community of its values.132 The projects aligned
largely with their mission and vision. All projects met the expectations and have been finalised
according to the progress reports, which state that the latest projects were expected to be finished
at the end of 2021.
Concluding remarks on the reconstruction in Sint Eustatius
191. Reconstruction on Sint Eustatius was carried out effectively and efficiently and furthermore, made
the island more resilient and future-proof. The largest project, the stabilisation of the cliff, was
finalised in time and without any major issues. Upon the team’s mission in 2021 the team was
informed that it was still holding up and that the much needed vegetation had grown in well. The
housing repairs carried out on the island were similarly effective and, despite some issues with
rising costs of material, carried out efficiently. A highly dedicated team ensured all targeted houses
got repaired, and that this was done according to the building decree.

6.3

Effectiveness and efficiency of the reconstruction of Saba

192. The budget from Article 8 for Saba totals €3.9 million, the majority of which was reserved for
housing and public space (€3.7 million). €200.000 was reserved for projects in nature and
environment. The Public Entity Saba received the reconstruction budget from the Ministry of BZK.
Table 6.3 Financial contributions of Article 8 of the reconstruction on Saba after Irma (in € x 1.000)
Part

Amount (€)

Housing & public space; of which:
-

3.661

Personnel and materials non-governmental

2.300

buildings
-

Furniture

200

-

Governmental buildings

800

-

Demolishing inhabitable buildings

300

-

Playgrounds

61

Nature and environment

200

Total in €

132

3.861

Website STENAPA: https://www.statiapark.org/about-us/

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

79

Housing and public space
193. The inhabitants of Saba started their preparations a week before hurricane Irma hit, based on
previous experiences and following advice from the media. They cleaned up their gardens and
surroundings and strengthened their homes.133 It is important to note, however, that preparations
could only achieve so much and could not prevent damage to the island’s buildings. The island’s
capital, The Bottom, and nearby village St. Johns, suffered the most damaged homes.134 The
damage assessment report for over 100 houses, churches, governmental buildings and businesses
was finished by the Planning Bureau on 4 October 2017. The total damage amounted to US$1.9
million135, although the exact extent of the damage can only be determined during the execution of
the work. This estimation was based on the reconstruction of the houses ‘as is’ – without extra
investments for building back better and keeping in mind the insurance settlements being paid out.
194. The Public Entity of Saba sent a request for assistance to BZK, to help with the reconstruction.
Project plans were submitted, and the Public Entity Saba received the reconstruction budget from
the Ministry of BZK. The Public Entity delegated the construction works for the houses and public
space to the Planning Bureau, which is responsible for the implementation of civil works projects
initiated by the government. The Planning Bureau planned the projects, tendered for proposals and
evaluated the bids. They supervised the contractors to ensure that the projects were executed to
the outlined specifications. The Planning Bureau is the competent authority on the island and,
therefore, the designated party to conduct these works.
195. Homeowners who were (partly) covered by their insurance policies also got supplied materials by
Public Entity of Saba.136 However, few people were (and are) insured, due to high insurance
costs.137 In the reconstruction phase, extra attention was paid to reinforcements to better withstand
future hurricanes. For example, roofs have since been reinforced with concrete, and safe spaces
have been built in the houses. In order to reduce the costs, materials were bought in large
numbers. However, given the damage on the other islands and in Florida, orders were
unfortunately delayed.138,139 Furthermore, given the island’s small structure, the lack of availability
of labour caused some delays in repairs.140
196. All damaged buildings were repaired by local construction companies, and the works were
monitored by the Planning Bureau.141 The process started with the search for a contractor,
materials and labour. All of them were difficult to find due to the greatly increased demand
throughout the entire Caribbean region, and owing to the limited capacity of local construction
workers. The construction works lasted until June/July 2020 (the COVID-19 lockdown also slowed
down the process). The focus was on the homes, with governmental buildings the last to be
repaired.
Nature and environment
197. An amount of €200.000 was allocated to rectify the damage caused to nature and the surrounding
environment. Most of it went to compensation for fishermen and farmers, and a very small portion
to repairing equipment and signs on nature trails.

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

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Interviews on Saba.
https://caribbeannetwork.ntr.nl/2017/12/27/local-contractors-start-with-renovation-of-homes-on-saba-after-irma/
Planning Bureau of the Public Enitity Saba, 4 October 2017.
https://caribbeannetwork.ntr.nl/2017/12/27/local-contractors-start-with-renovation-of-homes-on-saba-after-irma/
Interview on Saba.
https://antilliaansdagblad.com/bonaire/18679-herstel-huizen-saba-bijna-klaar
https://www.sxm-talks.com/the-daily-herald/damaged-roof-repairs-get-underway-in-saba/
Interview on Saba.
Interviews on Saba.

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Concluding remarks on the reconstruction in Saba
198. The reconstruction activities in Saba were carried out effectively and efficiently as all projects were
delivered, despite the challenges faced in findings supplies and labour on the island and across the
region in the aftermath of the hurricane and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The reconstruction of
houses and public spaces was furthermore done according to good practices for more resilient
buildings. The island also benefited from its population’s discipline in cleaning up debris and storing
away loose items in anticipation of the hurricane, which mitigated the damage caused by the
hurricane(s).

6.4

Other activities
Repair of the SSCS sea cable

199. Around €1.5 million was allocated to a subsidy to repair the SSCS sea cable.
Table 6.4 Financial contributions Article 8 for the repair of the SSCS sea cable after Irma (in € x 1.000)
Part

Amount (€)

Subsidy SSCS sea cable

1.538

200. The islands of Saba and Sint Eustatius have been connected via a submarine network to the
international sea cable network of St. Kitts, Sint Maarten and St. Bart’s since 2013. However, the
hurricanes damaged the cable protection and landing constructions. SSCS set up a tender
procedure and commissioned Walhout Civil to design a new cable landing structure in Saba. Works
were delayed due to COVID-19 restrictions142 and were therefore only conducted later in 2020 and
during 2021, but have now been finalised.143,144 The system was constructed more robustly than
prior to Hurricane Irma ('build back better').145 EY Curacao was hired to conduct a final report on the
works and to complete an audit at the end of the project.146
Relation with other relevant policies
201. The goal of the reconstruction phase fits the ambition to change the socio-economic perspective to
improve the Caribbean Netherlands – which has been the central focus point of the Government of
the Netherlands’ policy in recent years. The objective of the support from the government is to
reduce poverty on the islands.147 On Sint Eustatius, ‘gross neglect of duty’, by the island
commissioners and the island council prior to 2018, had a harmful effect on the island’s people and
businesses.148 Furthermore, the delays in projects to improve the island’s roads, water supply,
housing and waste processing had a direct impact on people’s lives. The recovery budget was used
to accelerate measures, which boosted the economy and raised the quality of life. For Saba, the
Saba Package was signed in 2019. This administrative agreement is aimed at anchoring and
further developing the positive cooperation between the Government of the Netherlands and the
public entity Saba. The Saba Package provides a more focused approach to the challenges and
opportunities that exist on Saba, and on which the Central Government and the Public Entity of
Saba are working together.149 Some of the projects that were started in the emergency phase and
142
143
144

145
146
147
148

149

Document: Overzicht bepsreken voortgang SSCS B.V. herstelreparatie orkaanschade. 27 augustus 2021.
Brief betreffende vertraging resterende werkzaamheden zeekabel. D.d. 1 april 2021.
Website Walhout Civil. Available at: https://www.walhoutcivil.com/en/projects/design-cofferdam-and-breakwatersubmarine-cable-landing-saba
Document: Toelichting herstelwerkzaamheden aan de SSCS zeekabel.
SSCS B.V. Tussenrapportage subsidie reparative cable system. 14 januari 2020.
Ministery of Interior. BZK introductiedossier 2021 deel I. 2021.
https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-the-interior-and-kingdom-relations/documents/questions-andanswers/questions-and-answers-about-the-intervention-in-statia/index
Rijksdiensten. Saba Package regelt gerichte samenwerking tussen Rijk en Saba. 27 June 2019. Available at:
https://www.rijksdienstcn.com/actueel/nieuws/2019/juni/27/saba-package-regelt-gerichte-samenwerking-tussen-rijk-ensaba

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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the reconstruction phase (e.g. the harbour and renovation of the airport), were included in the Saba
Package.150

6.5

Conclusions on the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius
Conclusion 12 The projects for the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius were implemented
by several departments, depending on the responsibilities of the department. A very limited amount
(24%) of the reconstruction budget fell under article 8 of the Ministry of BZK. The choice to place
the responsibility of the reconstruction projects on different ministries is logical due to the
administration relationships and governance of the islands. The disadvantage is that a total
overview is missing and accountability afterwards is difficult.

202. The Government of the Netherlands made €67 million available for the reconstruction of Saba and
Sint Eustatius. The projects that fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of BZK under article 8
had to be implemented by the end of 2021. The Ministry of BZK covered €18 million of this from
article 8, allocating €12.6 million for Sint Eustatius, €3.9 million for Saba and €1.5 million for the
SSCS Sea Cable. The remaining €48 million was allocated for projects under the responsibility of
other ministries, including I&W.
The choice to place the responsibilities of the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius with the
various ministries is logical due to the existing administrative relationships and the professional
knowledge of the relevant ministries. It was formally agreed that each ministry is individually
responsible for the introduction and implementation of policy of the respective ministry. In this policy
review, we only look at projects that have been carried out by the Ministry of BZK under Article 8..
Conclusion 13 Information obtained during the interviews and the field visit about the state of
affairs and implementation practice showed that the reconstruction activities were effectively
implemented as houses and public space were repaired, nature was restored and the cliff was
stabilised. Targets were therefore met. However the considerations for the selection of
reconstruction projects on Saba and Sint Eustatius are unclear because they do not completely
relate to the damage assessments.
203. Assessments were carried out for both Saba and Sint Eustatius to map out the damage. The
assessments performed do not completely relate to the projects that were selected, or the costs
that were made for the repairs. A number of the implemented projects were, however, also reflected
in the requests for assistance, and therefore reflect the island's stated needs. The final choice of
reconstruction projects (and related costs) carried out under the responsibility of the Ministry of
BZK, and the relation with the damage assessments, remains unclear to the evaluation team. As a
result, it is not easy to make statements about the effectiveness and efficiency of the BZK effort
without additional information.
204. Additional information was obtained for some major components and projects that were carried out
under the responsibility of the Ministry of BZK. The information provided in the interviews, field visits
and related documents showed that targets were met, as houses and public space were repaired,
nature was restored and the cliff was stabilised. While some activities ran into problems with
planning and budget, affecting their efficiency, most of issues were circumstantial and can be

150

82

Openbaar lichaam Saba. Saba Package Uitvoeringsagenda januari-december 2019. Available at:
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarplannen/2019/06/03/saba-package-uitvoeringsagenda-januari-december2019

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attributed to e.g. a lack of construction supplies in the region or a small workforce on the island(s).
Some major conclusions are:
a.

All houses that were part of the damage assessment were repaired. On Sint Eustatius, the
cost of the damage and the duration of the house repairs were estimated to be lower than
finally realised for several reasons. Materials and manpower became scarce, which drove
up prices and delayed the process. In addition, on Saba the impression of the evaluation
team is that more expensive improvements to the structures of the buildings were made –
as part of building back better to withstand future hurricanes – than initially included in the
damage assessment. The team noted that measures were taken during the
implementation to carry out the projects as efficiently as possible.

b.

The majority of the budget for reconstruction on Sint Eustatius was spent on the
stabilisation of the cliff. The project is currently finished. The project addressed a
combination of hurricane damage and deferred maintenance. While the hurricane
significantly worsened the situation, the structures had already been in a precarious state
and required attention before the hurricane.

c.

This also applies to a number of public spaces on Sint Eustatius (graveyards, NH
church).

Although all projects were implemented, the selection of projects on Saba and Sint Eustatius shows
that the focus from BZK and other ministries was broader than solely damage repair after the
hurricane. The focus was definitely on building back better and making the islands resilient for the
future.

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7

Recommendations

7.1

Governance and design
Recommendation 1 The aftermath of Hurricane Irma highlighted the importance of swift action.
Work has been done to further optimize the way these structures are implemented in practice and
the way they coordinate between each other and with the other actors in the Kingdom. A Handbook
on crisis management for the Caribbean parts of the Netherlands has been drawn up as a result of
the experiences with Hurricane Irma. Such agreements need to be constantly revisited before each
hurricane season to ensure they continue to work as expected.

205. The disaster structure of Sint Maarten proved to be insufficiently prepared for a hurricane the scale
of Irma. While the ESFs appoint responsible and supporting parties across thematic areas, the
parties were unclear on what their responsibilities were. Furthermore, familiarity with the disaster
structure was low, partly due to staff turnover within government, coupled with the fact that a long
time had passed since the previous disaster. An improved structure would benefit from wider
divulgation of its functioning within the government and emergency services, so that once it would
need to be activated roles and responsibilities would be clearer. However, tightening up the disaster
structure on Sint Maarten is not the responsibility of the Netherlands, but of the country itself.
206. The disaster structures of Saba and Sint Eustatius were better able to deal with the disaster but are
still reliant on regional cooperation, particularly for supplies. To reduce such dependency in the
event of subsequent calamities, it is desirable to map out what the role of other islands could be in
optimizing disaster management.
207. Overall, the multiple disaster structures need more practical experience with the approach and
mutual cooperation in the event of a calamity. Parties must be further familiarised with each other's
roles by conducting joint disaster drills (e.g. in the HUREX). To ensure (improved) involvement in a
future crisis, frequent drills should be carried out for the public entities Bonaire, Saba and Sint
Eustatius (and their staff), the national crisis structure, and the Ministry of Defence.
Recommendation 2 Requests for assistance are an important instrument in providing mutual
assistance between the countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and between the BES
islands and the Netherlands. This instrument could be improved through a more careful discussion
of the interpretation of Article 36 of the Statute and clear agreements between the various countries
within the Kingdom regarding the preparation and submission of requests for assistance.
208. An important basis for cooperation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands is the Statute for the
Kingdom. This statute regulates the legal order in the Kingdom of the Netherlands between the
Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The basic principles of the Charter are one
common Dutch nationality for all residents of the Kingdom, one head of state, one common foreign
policy and one common defence. The statute offers opportunities for cooperation, but the countries
of the Kingdom are, to a large extent, autonomous in arranging their own internal affairs.
209. The underlying articles of the statute have been formulated in general terms for political
administrative reasons. This offers freedom of action, but also leaves room for one's own
interpretations and therefore to ambiguities in implementation. This also applies to Article 36 “The
Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten provide each other with help and assistance”, which
in the case of Irma formed the basis for the provision of emergency assistance and support from

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the Netherlands to Sint Maarten. As concluded earlier, the vague wording of this article also caused
uncertainties and delays in practice, because Article 36 does not specify the nature of such help
and assistance.
210. To be better prepared in the future – and to allow for quicker action in a potential crisis – the
meaning and interpretation of Article 36 of the Statute should be carefully discussed within the
Kingdom. It would also be beneficial to make better agreements between the various countries
within the Kingdom regarding the preparation and submission of requests for assistance. This will
result in quicker action being taken in emergency situations.
211. In the case of Saba and Sint Eustatius, requests for assistance must be formally submitted via the
Kingdom Representative, the administrative link between the Caribbean Netherlands and the
European Netherlands. This was particularly difficult in the initial days of Irma, due to both
communication issues and also to the distance to Bonaire (the location of the Kingdom
Representative). In order to promote speed of action in emergency situations, it is desirable to
consider how the process of requesting assistance in times of emergency can be optimized. As
noted earlier, as a result of the evaluation of the Ministry of JenV on the system for the disaster
management of hurricanes Irma, Jose and Maria, the coordination plan for supra-island disaster
relief and crisis management on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba was already adjusted in January
2020. This mainly concerned sharpening and clarifying the roles, tasks and powers of the Saba,
Sint Eustatius and Bonaire, the Kingdom Representative and the relationship with the European
Netherlands.
Recommendation 3 This evaluation found shortcomings in the data and document storage
systems of the Ministry of BZK. The Ministry’s financial management and its document storage
system, Digidoc, can be improved, with a view to enhancing accountability for disbursements.
Specific guidelines and procedures should be developed in this regard and staff may have to be
trained for this purpose.
212. There is room for improvement in both financial and administrative documentation of disbursements
made by the Ministry of BZK under Article 8. In financial overviews, labelling of disbursements
needs to be more consistent and systematic, and ex-post corrections (due to exchange rate
calculations or corrections of mistakes) need to be more systematically related to the respective
budget lines. One would also expect that specific disbursements can be more easily linked to
underlying administrative decisions/contractual agreements with implementing organisations, as
well as narrative reporting related to the agreements.

7.2

Emergency response
Recommendation 4 The aftermath of Hurricane Irma highlighted the importance of coordination in
the event of an emergency is crucial. Coordination should be improved, through better agreements
in advance about the delineation of tasks and responsibilities between the various ministries in the
event of a disaster in the Caribbean part of the Netherlands. In preparation of hurricanes or other
disasters that may occur in the future, the Ministry of BZK should further strengthen its capacities in
assisting the islands in strengthening emergency preparedness, drawing up post disaster needs
assessments and developing relief and reconstruction plans

213. The Ministry of Defence plays a key role here, especially at the start of a calamity, due to the
representation of Defence on Curacao and Aruba and the availability of manpower and material
that can be deployed quickly. Over time, this responsibility is transferred to another ministry. In

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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relation to the Caribbean Netherlands, the role of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
is clear. However, the experiences with Irma show that this transition needs to be smoother.
214. This can be achieved by making better agreements in advance about the delineation of tasks and
responsibilities between the various ministries and between the ministries and the Red Cross (who
by royal decree has a role in disaster response) in the event of a disaster in the Caribbean part of
the Netherlands. It would also be appropriate to set up a crisis organisation within BZK in advance
with associated tasks and responsibilities. In the case of Irma, it became apparent that the Ministry
of BZK was insufficiently prepared for its tasks as coordinator and had to improvise. Knowledge
sharing between such an organisation and e.g. the humanitarian aid department of the Ministry of
BuZa should be encouraged.
215. In preparation of hurricanes or other disasters that may occur in the future the Ministry of BZK
should further strengthen its capacities in assisting the islands in strengthening emergency
preparedness, drawing up post disaster needs assessments and developing relief and
reconstruction plans. If requested, the Ministry of BZK should provide capacity development in this
regard to the islands well before future disasters. Within the Ministry of BZK this may involve staff
(re-) training and / or attracting more staff with these competencies.

Recommendation 5 Implementing parties were satisfied with the workability of the adjusted and
flexible purchasing policy. Maintaining such adapted procedures in subsequent calamities is
advisable/recommended.
216. Under normal circumstances, governments in the Netherlands must adhere to the rules of the
Public Procurement Act when tendering. One of the aims of the Procurement Act is to stimulate
competition between companies and to ensure that entrepreneurs have a fair chance to win a
government contract. Application of the procurement rules takes time both to give entrepreneurs
sufficient opportunity to react, and also because of the administrative procedures involved.
217. In the event of a disaster, reaction time is crucial. Regular application of the procurement rules
would have meant a delay in providing necessary emergency assistance. This was avoided due to
the (temporary) adjustment of the tendering procedures. Executing parties were satisfied with the
workability of the adjusted and flexible purchasing policy, which means that action could be taken
faster and more flexibly. The use of such modified procedures in subsequent calamities is
advisable.
218. In addition, to facilitate accountability afterwards, it is desirable to tighten up the administrative
processes (see also recommendation 5).

7.3

Early recovery
Recommendation 6: There was a significant period of standstill between the article 8-funded
social activities in the early recovery phase in Sint Maarten and the longer-term reconstruction
activities to be financed from the World Bank Trust Fund. Action in future crises should ensure the
continuity of social activities to support the most vulnerable of a population in the transition from
emergence assistance to reconstruction activities.

219. The Ministry of BZK identified the need for a bridging phase between the initial emergency
response and the longer-term reconstruction activities, to avoid a standstill. Unfortunately, the

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relatively small share of budget allocated to the early recovery projects, combined with the short
timeline of six months, and the long set-up period of the Trust Fund resulted in a significant gap. A
longer, more comprehensive early recovery phase would have been useful to further solidify social
activities, especially considering the success of some projects and the effectiveness and value-formoney of continuing running activities. A longer period might have also allowed a closer handover
between early recovery projects and those later channelled through the Trust Fund.
Recommendation 7: Some of the more successful projects in the early recovery phase were those
implemented by local NGOs or organisations with running activities that could be expanded with
early recovery funds. Betting on local know-how proved successful, and should be kept in mind in
future similar scenarios.
220. The projects in the early recovery phase were carried out by different types of organisations with
different levels of presence and experience in Sint Maarten. Broadly speaking, the more successful
interventions were those that built on ongoing activities and allowed organisations to establish
realistic goals and meet these within the time period. Others were able to embed early recovery
activities into their existing structure, allowing them to make use of their local relations and
networks. Organisations with less experience on the island, had to significantly adjust its project
targets across the programme, after finding out that several of the assumptions made at proposal
stage did not hold. Local know-how, feet on the ground and established networks proved to be key
elements for successful in the quick-win set-up of the early recovery phase, focused on smaller
projects with shorter timelines.

7.4

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba
Recommendation 8 The reconstruction projects were managed per ministry, which means that a
clear overview is lacking and coordination between the various projects was made more difficult. It
may be better to opt for a reconstruction programme for Saba and Sint Eustatius, like in Sint
Maarten, with centralised management during the implementation phase. The coordinating role of
the Ministry of BZK should be clarified and moved forward.

221. For the BES islands, the relevant line ministries are responsible for the implementation of their own
policy, just like in the Netherlands. In the event of a disaster such as Irma, it may be better to opt for
a reconstruction programme for Saba and Sint Eustatius, like in Sint Maarten, with centralised
management during the implementation phase. This could also include arranging financing from a
budget item in the event of subsequent calamities. Funding for the reconstruction projects can now
go partly through the budget of Article 8, but also through the budgets of the other ministries
involved. This makes the reconstruction process more transparent and it is expected that the
choices made can be better justified afterwards. The Ministry of BZK already takes the lead in
centralised management in the event of a disaster on the BES islands.
Recommendation 9 As the frequency and strength of hurricanes increases, it remains important to
prevent potential damage in the future by using the principles of ‘building back better’.
222. The Building Back Better principle is emphatically central to the reconstruction of Saba, Sint
Eustatius and Sint Maarten. The approach integrates disaster risk reduction measures into the
restoration of physical infrastructure, social systems and shelter, and the revitalization of
livelihoods, economies and the environment.151 Examples of the principle include underground
cables, panic rooms, concrete roofs and the relocation of essential infrastructure if possible.
151

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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223. For this reason, it is recommended to apply the principle of Building Back Better in a broad sense in
reconstruction projects, but also in other (future) projects on the islands. This approach now
requires additional investment, but contributes to limiting future damage as much as possible.

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Annex I: References
Documents
Algemene Rekenkamer (2018), Resultaten verantwoordingsonderzoek 2017 - Koninkrijksrelaties
(IV) en BES-fonds (H) - Rapport bij het jaarverslag, Den Haag
Eppinga, M.B. and Pucko C.A (2018), The impact of hurricanes Irma and Maria on the forest
ecosystems of Saba and St. Eustatius, northern Caribbean, In: BiotropicaVolume 50, Issue
5 p. 723-728.
COT: Insitiuut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (juli 2018), Evaluatie Nationale
Crisisorganisatie Orkaan Irma, Rotterdam.
Ministerie van BZK (14 September 2017), Nota Waiver procedure- inzake noodhulp orkaan Irma
St. Maarten, Den Haag.
Ministerie van BZK (mei 2018), Sint Maarten, Irma en BZK: evaluatie crisisbeheer ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken, Den Haag.
Ministerie van BZK, Vertegenwoordiging van Nederland Willemstad (Juli 2018), Verslag
“Lessons learned” van het Crisis Ondersteuningsoverleg Curaçao.
Ministerie van BZK (2021), Introductiedossier 2021 deel I., Den Haag.
Ministerie van Defensie (mei 2020), Evaluatie militaire inzet orkaan Irma 2017, Den Haag.
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (17 november 2017), Inventarisatie kosten
noodhulp, Den Haag.
Ministerie van Justitie & Veiligheid & Ministerie van BZK (juni 2020), Handboek
Crisisbeheersing voor de Caribische delen van het Koninkrijk, Den Haag.
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid/ Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid (mei 2018), Onderzoek
naar het Systeem van rampenbestrijding op de BES-eilanden. Incidentenonderzoek naar
aanleiding van de passage van de orkanen Irma, Jose en Maria. Den Haag.
Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (2018), Lessen uit crises en mini-crises 2017, Arnhem/ Zoetermeer.
Pro Facto & University of Curacao (March 2022), Evaluatie Veiligheidswet BES.
Red Cross, Final narrative Report NLRC School Meal Project
Red Cross (October 2018), From Waste to Work Final Report
Red Cross (September 2021), Terugkoppeling 2017-2021 Nationale Actie ‘Nederland Helpt Sint
Maarten’, Den Haag.
Qcredits. (December 20th 2017), Proposal ‘Ondersteuning MKB op Bovenwindse Eilanden bij

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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Wederopbouw’
Qredits (July 2021), Eindverslag subsidiebeschikking onder nummer 2017-0000662632”
Sint Maarten OM (2019), Special Report Outreach 2019 on Home Repair
The World Bank (2018), Sint Maarten National Recovery and Resilience Plan, Washington.
UNDP (2019), Sint Maarten Recovering Back Better Project Final Report
UNICEF Nederland (November 2017), Sint Maarten Post-Hurricane Irma Assessment, Den Haag.
UNICEF Nederland (December 13th 2018), Early Recovery Final Report, Den Haag.
White Yellow Cross Care Foundation (June 5th 2018), 3rd Report, Sint Maarten.
White Yellow Cross Care Foundation (September 30th 2018), Final Report Reconstruction
Projects, Sint Maarten.

Overige documenten
Ministerie van BZK, Budgetrealisatie 2017 & 2018
Ministry of Finance, Regulation for evaluation surveys
Financieel overzicht WBE SXM 15072021
Verslag houdende lijst van Vragen en antwoorden. Wijziging van de begrotingsstaten van
Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) en het BES-fonds (H) voor het jaar 2018 (wijziging samenhangende met de
Najaarsnota) - 35 095 IV.
Documentation received from BZK regarding all ministries and Article 8 overiew.xls for BZK data
Ingediende facturen met kostenverantwoording (dd. 11 okt, 24 nov and 13 dec 2017) van het
Ministry of Defence
Factuur Ministry of Foreign Affairs voor invordering noodhulp inclusief bijlage met overzichten
(datum 8 december 2017)
Letter from the State Secretary for Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations to the President of the
House of Representative of General States, The Hague, 21 December 2017.
Briefing Wereldbank & Early Recovery, DGWBE, 6th of December of 2017.
Brief aan minister Plasterk met het verzoek om bijstand wederopbouw.14 september 2017.
Kenmerk Rv/17u/106.
Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, Betreft Septemberbrief Sint Eustatius. Kenmerk: 2019-0000489161

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Commissie van Wijzen, ‘Nabijheid of distantie, een wereld van verschil’. 5 februari 2018.
Brief van de staatssecretaris van binnenlandse zaken en koninkrijksrelaties. Herstel van de
voorzieningen in het bestuur van het openbaar lichaam Sint Eustatius (Wet herstel voorzieningen
Sint Eustatius). Den Haag 31 mei 2021.
Zesde voortgangsbrief wederopbouw St. Eustatius.
Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, Betreft Septemberbrief Sint Eustatius. Kenmerk: 2019-0000489161
3e uitvoeringsrapportage Statia.
6e uitvoeringsrapportage Statia.

Internet
https://rijksbegroting.nl/beleidsevaluaties/evaluaties-en-beleidsdoorlichtingen/handreiking)
https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/historische-missies/missie-overzicht/2017/orkaan-irma
https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/mensonterende-gevangenis-op-sint-maarten-wordt-geholpen-metnederland-containercellen~b5c24823/
https://www.noordhollandsdagblad.nl/cnt/dmf20180921_56435137?utm_source=google&utm_medi
um=organic
https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/425366/scholen-op-sint-maarten-weer-open
www.soualiganewsday.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=18753:white-yellow-crosson-track-with-clients%E2%80%99-home-repair&Itemid=450
https://stmaartennews.com/social/jollification-strengthen-restore-sense-wellbeing-sfpo/
https://www.rodekruis.nl/nieuwsbericht/iati/from-waste-to-work-startup-solutions-for-sint-maarten/
https://nrpbsxm.org/esp/.
https://smdf.sx/history/.
https://bes-reporter.com/cliff-stabilization-project-fort-oranje-nears-completion/
https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/statia-cliff-protection-project-in-full-swing
https://www.statiagovernment.com/news-and-tenders/news/2020/05/06/cliff-stabilization-projectfort-oranje-nears-completion
https://www.thedailyherald.sx/islands/statia-cliff-protection-project-in-full-swing
https://www.jhtm.nl/statianews/bibliotheek/begrotingsuitvoering_2019_nr4.pdf
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34877-F.html

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-35000-IV-27.html
https://www.statiagovernment.com/news-and-tenders/news/2021/04/20/statia-completesconnection-between-solar-park-and-water-retention-pond
https://www.walhoutcivil.com/en/projects/reconstruction-of-breakwaters-quays-and-coastaldefenses-st-eustatius-saba
http://curacaochronicle.com/region/saba-starts-preparations-for-big-harbour-project/
https://www.saba-news.com/new-harbor-project-makes-progress-various-studies-completed/
https://caribbeannetwork.ntr.nl/2017/12/27/local-contractors-start-with-renovation-of-homes-onsaba-after-irma/
https://www.nieuwsbzk.nl/1911095.aspx?t=Saba-ontvangt-1-miljoen-dollarhttps://caribbeannetwork.ntr.nl/2017/12/27/local-contractors-start-with-renovation-of-homes-onsaba-after-irma/
https://antilliaansdagblad.com/bonaire/18679-herstel-huizen-saba-bijna-klaar
https://www.sxm-talks.com/the-daily-herald/damaged-roof-repairs-get-underway-in-saba/
http://www.beleidsonderzoekonline.nl/tijdschrift
https://www.rijksdienstcn.com/over-de-rijksdienst-caribischnederland/documenten/publicaties/rv/coordinatieplan-rampenbestrijding/coordinatieplanrampenbestrijding-en-crisisbeheersing/index

Interviewed persons and institutions
Table 1a Interviews Netherlands
Organisation

Person

Function152

Ministry of BZK

Gerard Schulting

Advisor Relations with France

Koninklijke Marechaussee

Yor Burlet

Persoonlijk adviseur
Commandant Koninklijke
Marechaussee

Ministry of BZK

Erwin Arkenbout

Ministry of BZK

Henk Brons

Ministry of BZK

Stella Dagelet

Ministry of BZK

Merel van Hoeve

Vertegenwoordiger Nl voor
Curaçao, Aruba en Sint Maarten;.
Directeur-Generaal
Koninkrijksrelaties
DGKR/TWO Sint Maarten;
adviseur landen
Beleidsmedewerker
wederopbouw SXM

Ministry of BZK

Sarah van der Horn - Plante

Beleidsmedewerker Bestuurlijke
Ontwikkeling (DGKR)

152

92

Note: the function of the interviewed person can refer to either the function held during the implementation of Article 8
activities or the one currently held, depending on the relevance to the conversation.

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Organisation

Person

Function152

Ministry of BZK

Chris Johnson

Vertegenwoordiger Nederland
Sint Maarten

Ministry of BZK

Sanne Kouwenhoven

Programmamanager Sint Maarten

Ministry of BZK

Sjoerd van Wetten

Liaison Officer bij de Permanente
Vertegenwoordiging van
Nederland op Sint Maarten

Ministry of BZK

Lenneke Joosen-Parie

Ministry of BZK

Celine Wijsman

Ministry of BZK

Reza Tabatabaie

Manager afdeling Veiligheid
DGKR
Manager afdeling Veiligheid
DGKR
Manager afdeling Economie en
Financiën DGKR

Ministry of BZK

Saskia de Reuver

Directeur Landen
Koninkrijksrelaties DGKR

Ministry of BZK

Dirk Jan Bonnet

Directeur Caribisch Nederland
DGKR

Ministry of BZK

Frans Weekers

Speciaal gezant BZK
wederopbouw

Ministry of BZK

Hans Leijten

Project-directeur-generaal
Wederopbouw Bovenwindse
Eilanden

Ministry of BZK

Hans van der Stelt

Voormalig programmadirecteur
wederopbouw

Ministry of BZK

Mirte Coppelman-De Vries

NL vertegenwoordiging SXM

Ministry of BZK

Wim Bekker

Beleidsmedewerker SXM bij

Ministry of BZK

Sjoerd van Meulen

DGKR
Senior Advisor Financial
Economic Affairs
Ministry of BZK

Joris Knops

BZK

Ministry of BZK

Erik van Borkulo

BZK

Ministry of Defence

Bas Beijnvoort

Noodhulp

Ministry of Defence

Roos Wagemaker

Beleidsmedewerker
wederopbouw SXM; noodhulp en
early recovery

Ministry of Finance

Thijs Slippens

Tijdelijk detachering naar
Programma-organisatie
Wederopbouw Bovenwindse
Eilanden

Ministry of Justice and Security

Wouter Brand

Nationaal Crisiscentrum (NCTV)

Ministry of Justice and Security

Koen Gerritse

Crisis Coordination Advisor

Ministry of Justice and Security

Willy Steenbakkers

Crisis Coordinator NCTV

Ministry of Infrastructure and

Anneke Tjalma

Senior Advisor Ministry of

Water Management

Infrastructure and Environment

NOS

Matthijs van der Wiel

Noodhulp

Ministry of OWC

Mirjam De Rijke

Programmamanager
onderwijshuisvesting Caribisch
Nederland

Qredits

Elwin Groeneveld

CEO Qredits

Dutch Representation SXM

Robert Jan de Wilde

NL vertegenwoordiging SXM

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

93

Organisation

Person

Function152

Red Cross NL

Yvonne Wilmers

Partnership and portfolio
coördinator (prior)

Red Cross NL

Carla Jonkers

Head of International Disaster
Response Unit & Caribbean
Branches

Red Cross NL

Fanny de Swarte

Head of Mission

Schiphol Group

Kjell Kloosterziel

Director Schiphol International

Ministry of BZK

Cecile Pluijmaekers
Wendele van der Wiele

Voormalig senior
beleidsmedewerker
wederopbouw bovenwindse
eilanden.

Wilfred Muller

Senior adviseur crisisbeheersing

Geert Jansen

Table 1b Interviews Sint Maarten
Organisation

Gesprekspersoon

Function

Airport Project (tour)

Damien Schmidt

Project Coordinator

Airport Project (tour)

Mirto Breel

Project Director

Cabinet of the Prime Minister/

Nerissa Ellis-Cornelia

Legal Policy Advisor

Fire Brigade

Clive Richardson

Chief Fire Brigade / Disaster

K1 Britannia Foundation

Alan Schet

Program Manager

Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial

Miklos Giterson

Former Minister

Fenna Arnell

Public Health Department Head /

Minister of General Affairs

Coordinator

Planning, Environment and
Infrastructure VROMI
Ministry of Public Health, Social
Development and Labor – Public

ESF 6 Coordinator

Health
Ministry of Public Health, Social

Chantale George-Groeneveldt

Development and Labor -

Dept Head of Community
Development / ESF Coordinator

Community Outreach (VSA)
National Recovery Programme

Claret Connor

Director

Bureau

Abel Knottnerus

Deputy Director / Legal Officer

Marcel Gumbs

Steering Committee Member

NRPB – Emergency Recovery

Olivia lake

Program Manager

Project - 1

Paul Sijssens

Project Manager

Alfonoso Carazo

Project Coordinator

NRPB – Emergency Debris

Thijn Laurensse

Program Manager EDMP

Management

Rueben Thomsson

Head Safeguards Team

NRPB - Enterprise Support

Anisa Dijkhoffz

Project Manager

Project

Elozona Ochu

Senior Advisor

R4CR programme and the

Jose Sommers

Foundation Founder / Managing

NPOwer project under Foresee

Director

Foundation

94

Qcredits

Edsel Gumbs

Senior Business Advisor

Sint Maarten Development

Makhicia Brooks

Managing Director

Foundation

Keith Franca

Former Managing Director

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Organisation

Gesprekspersoon

Function

Sint Maarten Medical Centre

Ingeborg Verwoerdt

Project Manager

(Hospital Resiliency &

Felix Holiday

Medical Director

Preparedness Project)

Project Management Unit

n.a.

Stichting Katholiek Onderwijs

M. Halley

President

Tanja Frederiks

Project Manager

VNG International

Rolf Hunink

Team Leader R4CR

VNP - Dutch Representation

Chris Johnson

Head of the Representation

Office in Sint Maarten

Erwin Arkenbout

Representative of the

White Yellow Cross Care

Bregje Boetekees

Operations Manager

Organisation

Gesprekspersoon

Function

Fort Bay Harbour Project

Ton van der Plas

Project Manager

Planning Bureau Department

Bobby Zagers

Head of Planning Bureau

Saba Executive Council

Tim Muller

Island Secretary

Saba Executive Council

Piet Gerritsen

Policy Advisor

Organisation

Gesprekspersoon

Function

Public Entity St. Eustatius

Joury Ranzijn

Program Project Office – Project

Public Entity St. Eustatius

Mel Raboen dé Sánchez Pacheco

Netherlands

Foundation

Table 1c Interviews Saba

Table 1d Interviews St Eustatius

Manager
Change Manager Cabinet
Government Commissioner
Crisis team

Multiple persons

Full list of members to be
included in Final Report upon
confirmation by contact persons
in Sint Eustatius.

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96

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Annex II: Evaluation matrix

Table 0.1
EQ #
1

Evaluation matrix for Part I – Emergency assistance across the three islands and early recovery Sint Maarten
Evaluation question
Which parts of policies of the Government of the Netherlands

Short description
Three phases are included in this report:

aiming at emergency assistance, early recovery and

•

Emergency response

reconstruction in the wake of 2017 hurricanes in the Leeward

•

Early Recovery of St. Maarten

Islands (Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations) are

•

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba

•

The reconstruction of Sint Maarten is included in a separate report

Find

§ 1.3

covered by the present policy reviews?
2

How are other relevant parts of policies mentioned in Evaluation
Question 1 addressed by the current policy reviews?

3

§ 1.3

evaluated by Lucien Bäck (Part II).

What was the motivation behind the policy of the Government of

•

The intervention logic is included.

the Netherlands for the emergency assistance of the three

•

Sint Maarten is an autonomous country within the Kingdom and has

islands under Article 8 Part I? What is its current relevance?

§ 2.1 and § 3.2

had its own responsibility in the event of calamities and disasters
since the administrative reforms of 2010. However, under the Statute
for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Article 36) the four countries
provide aid and assistance to each other when needed.
•

Saba and Sint Eustatius have both been a special municipality since
2010. The Ministry of BZK also has this coordinating role in the event
of a crisis or calamity for the provision of aid and assistance to the
islands.

•
4.a

What is the responsibility of the Government of the Netherlands

The structure of the Emergency Response is still relevant.

See above.

§ 2.1 and § 3.2

See above.

§ 2.1 and § 3.2

for emergency assistance in the three islands in the context of
the Statute of Kingdom Relations?
4.b

Which have been the responsibilities of the Governments of the
three islands for providing emergency assistance, in the context
of the Statute of Kingdom Relations?

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EQ #
5

Evaluation question

Short description

Find

How coherent were the instruments used in the emergency

•

§ 3.2

response activities in relation to each other?

Sint Maarten, as an autonomous country within the Kingdom, is
responsible for control and assistance in case of a crisis. For that
reason Sint Maarten has its own crisis structure to act.

•

The Government of the Netherlands did not have administrative
plans for acting in crisis situations in the Caribbean part of the
Kingdom (p. 4).

•

In the beginning it was unclear on the Dutch side which Ministry was
responsible. The evaluation by the Ministry of BZK of its own role
shows that the Ministry was hardly prepared for this role and
therefore had to improvise (of necessity).

6

What was the expenditure in emergency assistance provided to

•

do these relate to overall expenditure for the early recovery and
reconstruction provided under Article 8 as whole, as well as

For emergency assistance, € 55 million was been made available

§ 3.5

from general resources, of which ultimately € 40.4 million has been

Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten under Article 8.2 and how

declared by the different stakeholders.
•

A budget of € 7 million was allocated for the Early Recovery phase.
The total expenditure came to € 6.8 million, though many

other funding mobilised from public and private sources?

implementing parties made use of co-financing from other sources to
bolster their activities.
•

The Government of the Netherlands has made € 67 million available
for the reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius. The Ministry of
BZK covered € 20.4 million of this budget, allocating € 15.0 million
for Sint Eustatius, € 3.9 million for Saba and € 1.5 million for the
SSCS Sea Cable.

7

To what extent has the emergency response provided Article

•

Most organisations involved in the emergency response conducted

8.2 been evaluated thus far? Which evaluations have been

an evaluation of their own input afterwards. These evaluations

conducted, how were they carried out and with what purpose?

looked at the learning experiences and what could be done better in

§ 2.3

the future. For further detailed information, we used the available
correspondence, email exchanges, chamber letters, etc..
8

Which parts of the emergency response provided under Article
8.2 I have not been evaluated (yet)?

•

However, what is missing in the evaluations performed is a reflection
on the entire process. The interviews were mainly intended to obtain
this overall picture.

98

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§ 2.3

EQ #
9

Evaluation question

Short description

Find

To what extent is there sufficient documentary evidence to

•

§ 2.3

assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the emergency

on (internal) interviews. Hard statements about effectiveness and

assistance provided under Article 8 Part I?
10.a

How effective has the emergency support provided by the

The evaluations performed mainly provide a qualitative picture based

efficiency are usually lacking in the evaluations carried out.
•

Emergency response is provided immediately after a (natural)

Government of the Netherlands in Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint

disaster, crisis or violent conflict and aims to save lives and protect

Maarten under Article 8.2 been in terms of outputs, outcomes

those directly affected and provide them with basic necessities.

and impact? Have there been positive or negative side-effects?

•

§ 4.1 – 4.6

In the case of Irma, the emergency assistance was largely based on
damage assesments and the many and specified requests for
assistance from the local authorities.

•

The help and support provided during the emergency response
phase was effective in the sense that almost all requests for help
assistance were met. However, the effectiveness of the provided
support would have greatly benefited from a more streamlined
process, linking clear damage assessments to requests for
assistance and ensuring better communication between those
witnessing the situation on the island and those doing the processing
of requests for assistance.

10.b.

On what basis were the projects undertaken during the early

•

recovery phase under Article 8 Part I chosen? Were these

To ensure a responsible and efficient use of the funds destined for

§ 5.1

these projects, the Ministry of BZK chose to assign as implementing

decisions based on the actual needs?

parties International organizations (e.g. UNDP) and NGOs.
•

particularly those already active on the ground and with existing links
to ongoing activities under the emergency response.

•

Invited organisations were seen as being best placed to identify
urgent needs and their own capacity to deliver results for the
duration of the Early Recovery timeline.

11

What was the justification for expenditure under Article 8 in

•

terms of volume / use and standards / prices?

In view of the need to act quickly, a modified (and more efficient)

§ 3.5

waiver procedure has been developed by the Ministry of BZK for
emergency assistance requests.
•

Despite the commitment that the Ministry of BZK covered the
emergency assistance costs incurred by other departments, it was
determined in advance that the relevant departments themselves
were responsible for the lawful application of the procurement law .

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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EQ #

Evaluation question

Short description

Find

Because of this atypical procedure, it is harder to determine the
efficiency in retrospect. After all, it was not the Ministry of the Interior,
but rather the departments themselves that were responsible for the
purchases of goods and services used for emergency assistance.
•

Given the need to act quickly, however, it can be assumed that the
lowest cost was not chosen in all cases, but rather the timely
availability of the necessary goods was considered.

12.a.

How efficient have policies of the Government of the

•

Netherlands to provide emergency response been?

In the case of Irma, this was done by assessing primary needs and

§ 4.6

by prioritising what needed to be done at an early stage. The roles of
each respective ministry were then determined, and asked to make
financial resources available. This approach meant that the financing
of the emergency response was quickly arranged and secured.
•

In view of the need to act quickly, a modified waiver procedure was
developed by the Ministry of BZK for emergency assistance requests

•

Given the need to act quickly, it can be assumed that the lowest cost
was not the most important selection criterion, but rather the timely
availability of the necessary goods.

12.b

Did the existing crisis structure allow for an efficient provision of

•

See above.

§ 4.6

•

For both the emergency relief and the early recovery phase, the size

§ 3.5

the emergency support?

13

Which policy options exist in case there were significantly more
or fewer means available (20 % more or less than budgeted)?

of the budget was a political decision. One could also have decided
that less aid should be granted for the Caribbean part of the
Kingdom. After all, there is no provision in the Statute of the
Kingdom concerning how much assistance must be provided.
However, given the nature of the disaster and the suffering it caused,
the political decision was made in an early phase to be generous.

14

100

Did the projects chosen in the early recovery phase contribute to

•

The projects chosen in the early recovery phase were carried out

building the necessary conditions under which the goals of the

effectively and addressed pressing needs of the population. The

rebuilding efforts could be achieved? Has this been achieved in

projects can therefore be said to have contributed to building

an effective manner?

necessary conditions. The duration and scope of the phase was,

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§ 5.3

EQ #

Evaluation question

Short description

Find

however, not sufficient to lay the necessary conditions for
reconstruction efforts.
•

The significant standstill of social activities between the early
recovery project and reconstruction activities created a risk of further
deterioration of conditions.

15

Which lessons can be learnt for similar future crisis situations

Governance and design

caused by hurricanes?

•

Chapter 7

Recommendation 1 The aftermath of Hurricane Irma highlighted
the importance of swift action. Although the three islands have an
existing disaster structure, it is desirable to further optimize the way
these structures are implemented in practice and the way they
coordinate between each other and with the other actors in the
Kingdom.

•

Recommendation 2 Requests for assistance are an important
instrument in providing mutual assistance between the countries
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and between the BES
islands and the European part of the Netherlands. This instrument
could be improved through a more careful discussion of the
interpretation of Article 36 of the Statute and clear agreements
between the various countries within the Kingdom regarding the
preparation and submission of requests for assistance.

•

Recommendation 3 This evaluation found shortcomings in the
data and document storage systems of the Ministry of BZK. The
Ministry’s financial management and its document storage system,
Digidoc, can be improved, with a view to enhancing accountability
for disbursements.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

101

EQ #

Evaluation question

Short description
Emergency response
•

Recommendation 4 Coordination should be improved through
better agreements in advance about the delineation of tasks and
responsibilities between the various ministries in the event of a
disaster in the Caribbean part of the Netherlands. It would also be
appropriate to set up a crisis organisation within BZK in advance
with associated tasks and responsibilities

•

Recommendation 5 Implementing parties were satisfied with the
workability of the adjusted and flexible purchasing policy.
Maintaining such adapted procedures in subsequent calamities is
advisable/recommended.

Early recovery
•

Recommendation 6 There was a significant period of standstill
between the article 8-funded social activities in the early recovery
phase in Sint Maarten and the longer-term reconstruction activities
to be financed from the World Bank Trust Fund. Action in future
crises should ensure the continuity of social activities to support the
most vulnerable of a population in the transition from emergence
assistance to reconstruction activities.

•

Recommendation 7 Some of the more successful projects in the
early recovery phase were those implemented by local NGOs or
organisations with running activities that could be expanded with
early recovery funds. Betting on local know-how proved successful,
and should be kept in mind in future similar scenarios.

102

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Find

Table 0.2
EQ

Evaluation matrix for Part III - Reconstruction Efforts in Saba and Sint Eustatius.
Evaluation question

Short description

St. Eustatius

Saba

§ 2.1 & § 3.4

§ 2.1 & § 3.4

•

Coordination by Ministry of the Interior
Funding provided by the Ministry of BZK from Article 8 to
Saba and Sint Eustatius
Additional funding provided by other departments

How are other relevant parts of policies

•

Goals are in line with other policies

§ 1.3 & §2.1

§ 1.3 & §2.1

mentioned in Evaluation Question 1

•

The reconstruction of Sint Maarten is included in a

§ 3.4

§ 3.4

§ 3.4 and § 3.5

§ 3.4 and § 3.5

#
General questions
1

Which parts of policies of the Government
of the Netherlands aiming at emergency
assistance, early recovery and

•
•

reconstruction in the wake of 2017
hurricanes in the Leeward Islands (Article 8
of the Budget for Kingdom Relations) are
covered by the present policy reviews?

2

addressed by the current policy reviews?

3

What was the motivation behind the policy

separate report evaluated by Lucien Bäck (Part II).
•

of the Government of the Netherlands for
the reconstruction of Saba and Sint

Kingdom Relations.
•

Eustatius under Article 8 Part III? What is its
current relevance?

Obligations for the Netherlands arising from the Statute of

Request for assistance were sent from Saba and Sint
Eustatius.

•

Disposals (beschikkingen) were sent to the islands.

•

Positions expressed in statements and letters by the NL
Parliament (kamerstukken) since 2017.

4

What is the responsibility of the

•

The reconstruction of Saba and Sint Eustatius is

Government of the Netherlands for

coordinated by the Minister of BZK. In addition to the

reconstruction in Saba and Sint Eustatius in

Ministry of BZK, the Ministries of Education, Culture and

the context of the Statute of Kingdom

Science (OCW), Economic Affairs and Climate (EZK) and

Relations?

Infrastructure and Water Management (IenW) are also
involved in the reconstruction. The resources for these
projects are included in the budgets of the Ministries of
BZK, OCW, EZK and IenW.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

103

EQ

Evaluation question

Short description

St. Eustatius

Saba

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

§ 3.4

§ 3.4

§ 6.1

§ 6.1

§ 6.1

§ 6.1

§ 2.3

§ 2.3

#
4.a

How has the Minister of BZK fulfilled the

•

The Minister had delated this task to the State Secretary.

coordinating role (regisseursrol) in the area

•

The State Secretary informs the second chamber on a

of the reconstruction of Saba and Sint
Eustatius?

general level about the projects;
•

Coordination of the activities and the division of
responsibilities is sometimes difficult, given the financing
from different departments

4.b

Which have been the responsibilities and

•

obligations of the Governments of Saba and
Sint Eustatius for reconstruction in the

Kingdom of the Netherlands.
•

context of the Statute of Kingdom
Relations?

Sint Eustatius and Saba are Public entities within the

The Public Entities of both islands are responsible for the
execution of the projects.

•

The different departments have all their own responsibilities
on the island.

5

6

How coherent were the instruments used in

•

Extent to which the activities implemented with funding

the recovery and reconstruction activities in

through direct support were coherent between each other,

relation to each other?

based on a full inventory and analysis.

What have the expenses been for

•

reconstruction efforts in Saba and Sint

Netherlands for reconstruction on Sint Eustatius and Saba
is € 42.6 million and € 23.8 million respectively.

Eustatius under Article 8 Part III and how do
these relate to overall expenditure for the

The total expenditure by the Government of the

•

The total expenditure by the Government of the

emergency, early recovery and

Netherlands for reconstruction in Sint Eustatius and Saba

reconstruction under Article 8 and other

inside of Article 8 is € 12.6 million and € 3.9 million

funding mobilised from public and private
sources?

respectively.
•

Private funds are not monetarized in the available
documents.

7

To what extent has the reconstruction policy
under Article 8 Part III been evaluated in the
past? Which evaluations have been

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•

No earlier evaluations took place.

EQ

Evaluation question

Short description

St. Eustatius

Saba

#
conducted, how has the policy been
evaluated and for which reasons?
8

Which parts of the reconstruction policy

•

No earlier evaluations took place.

§ 2.3

§ 2.3

•

The documentation provided by the ministry of BZK on the

§ 2.3

§ 2.3

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

under Article 8 Part III have not been
evaluated (yet)?

9

To what extent is there sufficient
documentary evidence to assess the
effectiveness and efficiency of the

reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba is limited
•

reconstruction policy under Article 8 Part II?

Assessment was done based on other documentation,
interviews and field visits.

Effectiveness
10.a

To what extent have projects undertaken

•

All projects that were initiated under Article 8 are finished;

during the reconstruction activities in Saba

•

Projects were assessed as being effective by the evaluator.

To what extent have the objectives of the

•

All projects that were initiated under Article 8 are finished;

reconstruction policy of the Government of

•

Projects were assessed as being effective by the evaluator.

the Netherlands aiming at reconstruction in

•

No negative side effects have been found

How has “building back better” been

•

Damage assessments have been made.

realized in terms of improved physical

•

Structures are improved in comparison with the situation

and Sint Eustatius? How effective was this?

10.b

Saba and Sint Eustatius been realized?
Have there been positive or negative sideeffects?

Building back better
11.a.

infrastructure?

11.b

How has “building back better” been

before Irma and Maria.
•

“Building back better” is been realized

•

No projects were aiming at this point from Article 8.

realized in terms of crisis and disaster

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

105

EQ

Evaluation question

Short description

St. Eustatius

Saba

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

§ 6.2

§ 6.3

§ 3.5

§ 3.5

#
management, including preparedness for
future natural disasters?

11.c

How has “building back better” been

•

realized in terms of diversification of the
economy, strengthening of good

favoured the local economy;
•

governance and civil society, including
psychosocial care?

The relatively smaller projects were locally tendered and

The reconstruction of houses, schools and public space
unfavoured increase of quality of life;

•

No projects were been carried out on the topic of
psychosocial care.

Efficiency
12

What was the justification for expenditure

•

under Article 8 in terms of volume / use and
prices / standards?

The larger projects (including cliff and SSCS) were
tendered internationally and expenses were audited;

•

The smaller projects were tendered locally by well-known
organisations;

•

No justification for the expenditure under Article 8 has been
made in terms of volume/ use and prices / standards.

•

Given the procedures followed and parties involved, the
evaluator assesses the expenses as efficient.

13

How efficient have policies of the

•

Government of the Netherlands aiming at
recovery of Saba and Sint Eustatius been?

The larger projects (including cliff and SSCS) were
tendered internationally and expenses were audited;

•

The smaller projects were tendered locally by well-known
organisations;

•

No justification for the expenditure under Article 8 has been
made in terms of volume/ use and prices / standards.

•

Given the procedures followed and parties involved, the
evaluator assesses the expenses as efficient.

14

Which policy options exist in case there
were significantly more or fewer means

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•

Assessment of the situation that would have prevailed with
20 % less funding

EQ

Evaluation question

Short description

St. Eustatius

Saba

§ 7.4

§ 7.4

#
•

available (20 % more or less than
budgeted)?

Assessment of the situation that would have prevailed with
20 % more funding

Looking forward
15

Which measures can be taken to enhance

Reconstruction of Sint Eustatius and Saba

effectiveness and efficiency of

•

Recommendation 8 The reconstruction projects were

reconstruction policies in Saba and Sint

managed per ministry, which means that a clear overview is

Eustatius?

lacking and coordination between the various projects was made
more difficult. It may be better to opt for a reconstruction
programme for Saba and Sint Eustatius, like in Sint Maarten,
with centralised management during the implementation phase.
The coordinating role of the Ministry of BZK should be clarified.
•

Recommendation 9 As the frequency and strength of
hurricanes increases, it becomes increasingly important to
prevent potential damage in the future by building back better.

Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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Policy Review of Article 8 of the Budget for Kingdom Relations

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