ACTIVITY REPORT
SEPTEMBER 2007- FEBRUARY 2009

European Coordinator
JOZIAS VAN AARTSEN

PROJECT OF EUROPEAN INTEREST
Project of European interest n° NG 3

Brussels, 04 February 2009

This report only represents the opinion of the European Coordinator
and does not prejudge the official position of the Commission.
The content of this report is established as of 04 February 2009.

REPORT OF JOZIAS VAN AARTSEN

1.

THE MANDATE & PARAMETERS OF WORK

Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks (TEN-E),
foresees the appointment of European coordinators in order to monitor and to facilitate
the implementation of the most critical identified priority projects. In this context, the
appointment of Coordinators was mentioned as an opportunity for important
infrastructures encountering difficulties in the conclusions of the European Council of
8/9 March 2007.
Four European coordinators were appointed on the 12 September 2007 by the
Commission for a duration of four years and they will monitor projects facing technical,
political or financial difficulties. The "Priority Interconnection Plan" adopted by the
Commission on 10 January 2007 in the framework of the so-called "energy package" and
the Action Plan adopted by the European Council on 9 March 2007 mentions specifically
the nomination of European Coordinators for specified projects.
The mandate that I accepted is defined1:
as European coordinator for the project of European interest n° NG 3 and in
particular the natural gas connection Turkey-Austria, through Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria (NABUCCO project), as defined in Annex I to this Decision pursuant to
Article 10 of Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy
networks (TEN-E).
NG 3 (Natural gas route 3) is defined (in the TEN – E context) as;
NG.3. Caspian Sea countries - Middle East - European Union:
new gas pipeline networks to the European Union from new sources, including the
Turkey - Greece, Greece - Italy and Turkey - Austria gas pipelines.
Although commonly referred to as the Nabucco Co-ordinator2, I have deliberately
avoided using that name for my role, referring to the technically correct 'NG3' (hereafter
called the Southern Corridor) terminology. I have placed a special emphasis on work
related to achieving the Nabucco pipeline, but I have not forgotten that other pipelines
may also achieve the strategic aim implied in the NG3 title (Nabucco, ITGI, TAP and

1

See Annex I

2

In any case, 'Nabucco' is often used as a surrogate or synonym for NG3 or Southern Corridor; in
addition, many commentators use 'Nabucco' without any reference to the actual pipeline project, or
without any reference to that project's feasibility and development timetable.
2

WhiteStream would qualify), namely to link the European Union to new sources of gas
in the Middle East and the Caspian region3.
Let me digress slightly. Physically, there is much gas in the ground within the territory
of near abroad of the European Union. But it will stay there unless we get the terms of
trade right. When we speak of there being little gas, what we mean in fact is that there is
little gas that will be supplied to the European Union under current terms. If we change
the terms then gas will come – there will be more gas. Moreover, although it is obviously
true, it is good to remind ourselves that the future is unknown. Without getting into the
unknown unknowns, one of the known knowns is that future gas use depends on choices
made today, so there is a high variability in future gas projections, depending on whether
the EU goes green, nuclear or some other variant. Actual future gas use is unknown
which leads to high risk perceptions for capital intensive investment.
Nabucco will in plateau phase deliver 31 billion cubic metres of gas per year (bcma), or
about 5% of EU gas consumption by 2020 (and proportionately more of imports)4. The
Southern Corridor should supply more as a percentage of consumption. (Please note that
these are 'ball-park' figures, not predictions.) ITGI, TAP and WhiteStream will supply far
less individually (at least as planned now).
If, in the future and according to developments, the European Union was to increase its
target for the amount of gas coming through NG3, the adoption as such of a target would
imply three consequences: (1) we cannot accept a Nabucco–unique regime (or one
unique to any other pipeline) or policy: we must strive for a general regime, a general
policy and a general strategic aim, independent of any particular company/pipeline
involved, (2) all planned pipeline projects may be feasible in this wider scheme and the
question becomes one of scheduling the pipelines to come on-stream when gas is
available, rather than competing for a finite initial resource; but that (3) we have to
assume that non-commercial risks will be reduced if we are to see any investment.
Moreover, the likely growth of gas demand in the European Union5 means that – even
adopting a higher target – we need new pipelines from traditional suppliers. Projects like
Southstream are compatible with Nabucco – my job is in part to promote the harmonious
development of these projects, to the benefit of the European Union.
The European Union has always pursued a diversification of actors and partners. This is
in a way just another translation amongst many of the underlying free-market and
competition-based pillars on which the European Union is based. Contrary to some
concerns voiced by certain commentators, the Southern Corridor is a project that

3

See the excellent work of the IEA "Perspectives on Caspian Oil and Gas Development" – December
2008.

4

There are many scenarios for future gas use and I have not adopted any particular one; this figure is an
arbitrary composite.

5

I refer to the Strategic Energy Review http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/doc/2008_11_ser2/strategic_energy_review_wd_future_pos
ition2.pdf

3

enhances gas producers access to the EU market and is a positive contribution to the
attractiveness of gas as a fuel in the EU fuel mix.
The role of transit states is also an issue that needs to be addressed in abstract before we
deal with any states in particular. Purely in trade terms, the European Union needs to
insist that the right of free transit for trade is respected. GATT Article 5 provides for that
free transit (and this is reproduced in the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy
Community treaty). Without that insistence, any neighbouring state in whatever product
sector may seek to interfere with trade and trade routes for commercial and political
advantage; the Commission should be firm in protecting the principle of free transit. We
cannot accept an imposition on free trade.
Diversification has a multi-dimensional rationale. It is notably a strategic response to
perceptions of risk. In that light, it makes no sense to diversify in ways that increase
political and economic risks, rather than reducing them. Within the Commission (and the
European Union more generally), this issue must be addressed in the light of wider
ambitions that Europe has in terms of enlargement, transatlantic relations and
Neighbourhood Policy.
2.

METHODOLOGY

Throughout 2007 and into early 2008, my aim was to focus on the internal issues facing
the European Union and Turkey. Once I had achieved some level of consensus within
the European Union and Turkey, my aim was to make recommendations to the European
Commission (in mid – 2008).
My method has been to listen to stakeholders, governments, international agencies and
others, and I have listed6 the most important meetings that I have had.
3.

FINDINGS
Key findings emerged from the listening exercise.
3.1.

Concentration of the external sources

The increasing loss of domestic gas supply within the European Union will lead to
an increased dependence on external suppliers. Whether or not we reduce energy
consumption, shift into other energy sources, use more coal or nuclear, it is
inevitable that a higher proportion of our gas will come from abroad.
Firstly, there will be an impact on competition. As diversity dwindles, so will
competition. As is already clear, company consolidation will continue in foreign
suppliers, and many, if not all, of the companies involved will be state-owned or
controlled. We could be faced with four or five external company suppliers, staterun, that will have ample possibility to establish a means to divide markets and
establish price discrimination, whether formal or not. Two responses are necessary,
the first being outside of my mandate, but which is the fostering of supplier
company diversity, and the second, which is to find new suppliers.
6

Annex II
4

The second impact will be an increased influence of governments on the energy
market. Even more important for the European Union, in this event, than speaking
with one voice is acting with one will, and most often, the European Union acts as
the result of legal imperatives. I urge the European Union to put in place the
necessary legal defence mechanisms7 and to use the powers that it already has8, and
to do so by developing the internal market and using that internal mandate for
external influence. The Commission must unambiguously assume jurisdiction of
external natural gas pipelines, both those existing and those planned, and apply a
single set of rules, including third party access, de-monopolisation, and investment
protection and pursue gas company diversification; there should never be one
company facing the European Union at the other end of a pipe.
This prognosis is alleviated by the circumstance that the European Union is
surrounded by gas from non-traditional suppliers, all within pipe-line distance.
From a perspective of proven reserves, much more gas is to be found in the Caspian
– Middle East region9, and the spread of this gas amongst many countries implies a
very high degree of political, route and counterparty risk diversification.
3.2.

Paradigm Change

The delivery of gas through pipelines to the European market requires a lot of
infrastructure and a lot of co-operative behaviour. Until recently the paradigm for
the achievement of that infrastructure was state-to-state negotiation and
implementation through state-owned companies. This was the paradigm that was
dominant when the major Russia – EU pipelines were built, with co-ordination for
all intermediate states on one side being done by the then USSR. The situation now
is more complicated and the regulatory hurdles much higher. Environmental impact
assessments, as an example, are difficult to carry out across borders. And there are
many more borders to cross. Nabucco has four Member States and one external
partner to deal with directly. Its suppliers potentially constitute up to nine other
countries, and its shippers and consumers could be situated in as many as ten
Member States; it also has at least two important potential additional transit
countries to be concerned with (Georgia and Syria).
The European Union should make additional efforts to adapt to this new situation
and thereby providing the right framework for our companies to cope with the
challenges.
However, our political and legal support mechanisms are weak.
The Commission should take the lead in this area and for every pipeline offer
considerable political and legal assistance. Practically, the Commission could offer
to support co-ordinating committees for all pipelines. The Commission could also
standardise the agreements that underpin pipeline development (intergovernmental
agreements, host government agreements, mechanisms for the implementation of

7

The 3rd country clause is a welcome start in the new legislative package.

8

In competition law and in secondary legislation, such as the hydrocarbons licensing directive.

9

See map in Annex III
5

strategic and project environmental assessment, etc) and offer a one-stop shop for
all regulatory approvals (instead of an institutional maze). The Commission also
needs to promote priorities; and contrary to what is now the case, we cannot have
four or five 'equal' priorities.
3.3.

Support to Transit States

Transit states need support. There is no defensible political rationale for these states
to allow transit if the result is that there is a domestic shortage (even if there is no
link between transit and domestic conditions). We must be concerned with transit
states' energy and economic development.
I will not hide the fact that this is the major issue with Turkey. Turkey’s gas
consumption is expected (in its own estimation) to double in the coming 15 years
(though the recession might change that heady forecast). Turkey has secured its gas
supplies until about 2015; afterwards contracts should be extended and new
contracts concluded in order to cover the supply gap due to the increased demand. A
further handicap to the Turkish gas system is the very limited amount of storage and
thus the lack of seasonal balancing. Suppliers outside of Turkey have to provide the
flexibility that Turkey needs.
The biggest obstacle to the Turkish gas market is the lack of reform; the laws in
place seem to be unimplemented and BOTAS, the incumbent, continues to have a
strong influence on policy and supply. Needless to say, BOTAS, like all
incumbents, is not keen on competition.
Turkey had adopted a position of 'taxing' – on an ad hoc and unpredictable basis every project that plans to pass through its territory to help resolve its domestic gas
supply issues, though this approach seems to be evolving. I can only welcome that
evolution.
In summary, we must be flexible with regard to transit states, support them when we
can, and offer them long term partnership, the Energy Community being an ideal
vehicle. But one fundamental item must be sure and non-negotiable; that is, the
basis for transit must be unimpeded access to markets, without quantative restriction
or measures having similar effect, or of unwarranted charges. This is the basic,
fundamental principle of the European Community, of GATT Article 5 and of the
Energy Charter.
3.4.

Network Reform and a "Virtual Nabucco"

Contrary to popular perception, the EU is already linked to many parts of the
Caspian and Middle East region. Physical links already exist up to the waters of the
Caspian Sea, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. However, for a variety of historical
reasons, no gas actually flows to the EU over these links, save for some small
contractual flows.
One of the more interesting ideas I have encountered is that there is an organic
approach to development of the Southern Corridor. By using existing facilities,
building new small interconnectors and optimising the flow of gas in existing
networks, gas could turn up in the EU. It is certainly laudable in the short-term, and
my understanding is that we could make it work fairly simply.
6

3.5.

Scheduling

The four major pipelines10 being planned for the Southern Corridor to some extent
rely on new gas from the gas field in Azerbaijan called Shah Deniz Phase II (SD2).
SD2 is a field in joint ownership by a consortium of international companies,
amongst which is the Azeri national hydrocarbons company SOCAR. SD2 will
provide between 8 to 16 bcma of gas somewhere in the period of 2014 to 2016
(depending on your information source).
Five pipelines11, whose total capacity is between about 65-75 bcma, are competing
for a gas field that at maximum could supply 16. This is surely as any producer
would wish. In addition, SD2 could be sold using existing networks to Russian
consumers. The potential end consumers/buyers of gas are probably the same
behind all the pipelines, and the right combination of price and transit arrangements
ought to win the contest.
Clearly not all pipelines can get gas, and yet the European Union has designated (in
the TEN – E programme) three of the pipelines as of strategic importance (ITGI,
Nabucco & WhiteStream), and some Member States have been vocal in support of
another (Southstream). (The other one is TAP.)
Azerbaijan is known to be interested in diversifying its gas supplies, and notably to
gain new customers in the European Union in order to get access to EU prices and
price data. The European Union should be providing the possibility for Azerbaijan
to access EU markets. The next months and years will be critical in this regard. But
what is not right is that the Member States promote each pipeline by undercutting
the others. Observers are right to find this activity objectionable amongst Member
States who ought formally to be acting together.
4.

PROPOSALS
I have made formal and specific proposals in letters to Commissioner Piebalgs and
Minister Güler in July 2008. I would like to position those proposals in a wider
setting.
After 18 months in office, I can see that the difficulty in the development of the
Southern Corridor is at the same level as its importance. There are many actors,
many states, many companies and many interests and they are not all working in the
same direction. But I would like to set out a framework, or a schedule, if you wish,
of how to approach the Southern Corridor, from a political perspective.
Firstly, I think the organic approach is important. There are lots of small actions that
need to be taken and I know the Commission (and the Energy Community) are
dealing with this. Implementing and enforcing small rules, cancelling nonperforming concessions, building small links, allowing reverse flow of gas, etc. will
get gas flowing and that coupled with an emphasis on contractual diversification
and trading can bring measurable benefits to the countries of Central and South East

10

WhiteStream, Nabucco, ITGI, TAP

11

The above four, plus Southstream.
7

Europe. Such actions can be taken up in the Madrid and Maribor Gas Forums, and
demolishing the internal European Union transit regime12 (replacing it with the
more logical and flexible transmission regime) can be dealt with by the Commission
in Brussels. You might summarise this as simply completing the internal market.
Secondly, we need to build from the bottom up. Small amounts of gas can get from
Azerbaijan to the EU now and we need to send a message that we expect reasonable
volumes in the near future and that we expect an early start. That is why SD2 is so
important; if we envisage that 8 bcma is offered into the EU market from SD2, 4 is
offered into the Turkey market and smaller volumes offered into Georgia and
Azerbaijan, we should be able to find common ground with Turkey, Georgia, but
most importantly Azerbaijan (after all, it is their gas).
I think that we, the European Union, should have a view on the pipelines and their
respective merits. My own view (reinforced by the most recent crisis) is that any
pipeline that delivers the most gas into the most liquid markets (and therefore
provides the most security), that provides regional security benefits in the Southern
Balkans in particular and that links up to such initiatives as the Balkan Gas Ring
and NETS, should be favoured.
WhiteStream, Nabucco, TAP and ITGI should be judged by criteria derived from
this objective standard. Diversification projects, such as Nabucco, TAP,
WhiteStream and ITGI, are mutually reinforcing if combined with the integration of
isolated networks, through efforts such as the NETS project. An integrated market
becomes more attractive for new gas, and this helps new infrastructure projects to
come on stream. Politically though, we must increase diversification in the
Southern Balkans as a priority.
Thirdly, we need to build volumes and demand. This means that suppliers, transit
countries and consumers have to act in common. I have noted how we will need
probably more gas from 3rd states in the European Union (in all likelihood); I have
also noted how little gas seems to be on offer. More gas before 2020 for more
pipelines will only come from beyond the Caspian Sea, in my view. And yet
demand is not certain in the EU. Moreover, to get gas flowing, everyone along the
value chain will have to respect rules that maintain the value of the resource to the
producer state. If consumers do not say how much they want and transit states do
not state how they will treat transit, how can producers react?.
In a producer country, like Turkmenistan, these signals might be difficult to
interpret, especially when set against other offers. In my letters to Commissioner
Piebalgs and to Minister Guler, I suggested that the European Community and
Turkey engage in a joint initiative to develop a demand aggregator in the Caspian
region. This aggregator, called provisionally the Caspian Development Corporation
(CDC), would do three things – provide secure demand for gas, provide limited
infrastructure and perform cash management functions. The CDC would collect gas
in Azerbaijan (but not include Azeri produced gas in its functions) and sell it on to
downstream purchasers for a transitional period. Purchasers would use whatever
logistics solution would suit them best to get their gas to market.

12

Article 32 of the gas directive.
8

The CDC will secure demand and supply.
To make Turkey attractive as a destination transit state, Turkey would have to
establish a clear transmission regime based on cost, and reject its current ad hoc
approach; indeed, I would consider it a precondition that Turkey adopt this position
before it can take part in CDC. Moreover, I proposed a joint Azeri – Georgia –
Turkey - EC Gas Corridor Transmission Agreement to build a base for the
development of the Southern Corridor, based on GATT Article V and cost based
transmission principles, strengthened with a mutual assistance obligation.
The Corridor Agreement will fix the transit regime once and for all.
I am glad to see that the idea of CDC and the Southern Corridor was adopted by the
Commission in its Strategic Energy Review. As yet Turkey has not indicated its
views on the CDC and the Corridor Agreement decisively. The European
Community should not wait on this and should proceed.
Fourthly, optionality and diversification go hand in hand. My experiences of
dealing with the Southern Gas Corridor have lead me to a strengthened conviction
that the European Union is, without apparent reflection, sedulously transferring its
eggs from one basket to another. At the same time, and in the same process, we are
closing down the optionality of potential suppliers to the EU. The current policy of
the Commission is to emphasise the strategic importance of Turkey as an energy
bridge. The Commission should not be seen to support the role of Turkey as a gatekeeper taking a toll on all traffic. Turkey, if it has a role, should act as a bridge for
free exchange.
As an alternative, but more ambitious approach to the Corridor Agreement, may I
suggest the Energy Community. Turkey, Ukraine and Moldova are all interested in
eventual membership of the Energy Community Treaty, a preliminary step (in my
view) to their inclusion into the European family. Georgia is an Observer. The
Energy Community Treaty provides a framework for energy market reform. Reform
would be especially important for Turkey and would relieve some of the uncertainty
in its energy market. I would support the eventual inclusion of Georgia and
Azerbaijan into the Energy Community, thus ensuring a single legal framework for
solidarity and market reform between the EU and the states that lead to the Caspian
Basin.
Under the precautionary principle, the Commission should explore all alternatives
even if an acceptable Corridor Agreement would (or would not) be found with
Turkey. I therefore welcome the launching a feasibility study on White Stream. I
am especially intrigued by the prospect of developing a direct sub-sea route from
Georgia to Romania and then overland to Italy (along the Pan-European Oil
Pipeline Route).
If the Commission is to provide a diversification of suppliers, then the Commission
should promote direct contacts with supplier countries. We should provide
optionality to potential suppliers so they can supply us if they wish. My view is that
the EU market will always be attractive (it is a big market with high prices), so we
do not have to force relationships, we can attract partners. In that regard, I would
suggest that the Southern Corridor, apart from the current priority, Turkey, include
LNG development in Egypt and Qatar, linking to Krk in Croatia and to Constanza in
Romania (perhaps Bulgaria too), a greater emphasis on linking Cyprus, Crete and
9

Greece into a supply route, and the development of Greece as a regional hub, taking
southern gas from North Africa, the Caspian region and providing energy security
products to its North and into Central Europe. We should, in discussion with Iraq,
provide multiple export routes for Iraqi gas, through LNG in the South (Basra and
Alexandria), and through pipelines to the North and West (to the Mediterranean
coast).
In conclusion, diversification and optionality will lead to a spreading of political
and economic risk throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. I think that will be
healthy for the European Commission, Turkey and for the region. The Caspian
Development Corporation and the spreading of risk would lead to four price points
(hubs if you wish) being developed, in Baku, in Romania, in Greece and in Austria.
I think that is a much more diversified risk profile than a single hub collecting all
gas to send to the European Union.

10

ANNEX I : TERMS OF REFERENCE OF APPOINTMENT

Mission statement
EUROPEAN
COORDINATOR
IN
THE
FIELD
Gas connection Turkey-Austria: coordinator Mr van Aartsen

OF

ENERGY

On the basis of Commission Decision No [....], the Commission has designated you
as European coordinator for the project of European interest n° NG 3 and in
particular the natural gas connection Turkey-Austria, through Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria (NABUCCO project), as defined in Annex I to this Decision pursuant to
Article 10 of Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy
networks (TEN-E).
The Commission adopted on 10 January 200713 the "energy package", which
includes a communication to European Parliament and Council on a Priority
Interconnection Plan (PIP). In the framework of this Priority Interconnection Plan,
an in-depth analysis of the status of the projects of highest priority specified in the
2006 TEN-E Guidelines has been carried out. In that context, the NABUCCO
project was identified as a key project for the European Union. The spring 2007
European Council highlighted its importance for the long term security of gas
supply.
In this context, the aim of the project is to develop a new gas supply route for gas
produced in the Central Asia, the Caspian region and the Middle East. As European
coordinator, you will play a role of "facilitator" and support, where necessary, the
NABUCCO International consortium and the Member States authorities concerned
in the promotion of this project.
Your mission as a European coordinator will be for a four-year period and will be
renewable by mutual agreement. Your tasks, in line with those defined in the TENE guidelines, will include:
–

Promotion of the project, in consultation with the Commission and the project
promoters;

–

Identification of all existing obstacles and hurdles in the way of the project
implementation, including legal, practical, (real-) political, administrative and
economic bottlenecks and their impact on the progress of the project in terms of
timing and finance; this relates in particular also to joint actions of regulatory
authorities, as well as to the necessary approvals, concessions, licences, rights of
way, and environmental and social impact assessments;

13

An energy policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1.
11

–

Identification of possible solutions to overcome the identified obstacles together
with the project sponsors, the relevant national, regional and European
authorities and representatives of civil society involved in the relevant
discussion point;

–

Consultation, together with the Member States and Candidate countries
concerned, of the project promoters and potential gas suppliers in order to better
define the content of the project and to monitor the environmental impact
assessment;

–

Consultation, where necessary, with the project promoters and interested
financial institutions concerning the financing of the project;

–

Drawing up of an annual report for the Commission, for transmission to the
European Parliament and the Member States concerned, on the progress made in
implementing the project, new regulatory or other developments which may
affect the characteristics and any difficulties or obstacles likely to cause serious
delay affecting its completion;
In the performance of your duties, I request you to plan and realise any mission in
third countries well in advance and in close cooperation with my services, which
will ensure coordination with the other competent services in the Commission, in
particular for any contacts, mission and discussions with third countries.
During the performance of your mission you may not make commitments on behalf
of the Commission without its prior written agreement. Accordingly, you must act
impartially, in an independent and confidential manner, and apply to the best of
your abilities your professional knowledge and skills solely in the interests of the
Communities.
You must avoid any situation giving rise to a conflict of interest regarding the areas
in which you are requested to intervene. Any conflict of interest emerging during
your mandate will have to be pointed out to the European Commissioner
responsible for energy without delay.
Moreover, you commit yourselves not to use nor reveal any document or
information brought to your attention at the time of the performance of your duties,
unless this information has already been made public. All the results produced by
you shall be the property of the European Communities, which can use and publish
them if it considers it necessary.
During the performance of your mission, which is unpaid, you will be granted a
monthly flat-rate allowance of € 1.500 to cover ongoing expenses. Your mission
expenses will also be reimbursed in accordance with current Commission rules. In
addition, you will be given technical and administrative support by the Commission.
The Director for the Security of supply and energy markets is your contact person in
the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport. The Commission can assure you
in advance that you will have the full support, in the implementation of your
mission, of the Director and the member of staff who will be designated to assist
you on a day-to-day basis at the technical and administrative level.

12

The Commission is convinced that your support, on which it really counts, will be
crucial for the success of the trans-European networks.
The Directorate-General for Energy and Transport will organise regular meetings
between the European coordinators to allow information and experience to be
shared.
The Belgian courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any dispute
concerning the validity, application or interpretation of this contract. This contract is
governed by Belgian law.

13

ANNEX II: REPRESENTATIVE & SELECTED CONTACTS/MEETINGS (THIS IS NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST)
Auli, Werner
Bagis, Egemen
Barrett, Tom
Barroso, Jose-Manuel
Bartenstein, Martin
Basescu, Traian
Boltz, Walter
Bowden, Julian
Briatta, Gilles
Bryza, Matt
Chase, Howard
Davutoğlu, Ahmet
Day, Catherine
De Giovanni, Daniele
De Luca, Vicenzo
Denchev, Lyubomir
Denisov, Ivan
Dialuce, Gilberto
Dimitrov, Petar
Duzyol, Huseyin Saltuk
Eggington, Ann
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip
Eyyubov, Emin
Ferrero-Waldner, Benita
Fidan, Hakan
Gallistl, Hans
Goksel, Osman
Gould, Tim
14

Gul, Abdullah
Guler, Mehmet Hilmi
Gupta, Atul
Gusenbauer, Alfred
Hernadi, Zsolt
Hilbrecht, Heinz
Houtman, Ann
Judisch, Stefan
Kohnstamm, Steve
Koka, Janos
Kroes, Neelie
Lamy, Jean
Levitte, Jean David
Louvot, Matthieu
Maystadt, Phillippe
McAllister, Mike
Menat, Pierre
Miller, Angus
Mitschek, Reinhard
Molterer, Wilhelm
Morel, Pierre
Neykov, Slavtcho
Ogutcu, Mehmet
Papalexandri, Katerini
Piebalgs, Andris
Popescu, Tariceanu
Raynaud, Fabien
Rehn, Oli
Ruttenstorfer, Wolfgang
Setton, Phillipe
15

Simsek, Mehmet
Stefanov, Stanislav
Target, Patrick
Tosheva, Galina
Van der Loo, Hans
Vosganian, Varujan
Wicks, Malcolm

16

ANNEX III

Source: IEA, used with Permission

17

ANNEX IV

Source: IEA, used with Permission

18