IOB Evaluation
Better Ways of Trading

Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and
Regulations

IOB Evaluation | no. 420 | Better Ways of Trading | IOB Evaluation | no. 420 | Better Ways of Trading | IOB Evaluation | no. 420 | Better Ways of Tradin

IOB Evaluation
Better Ways of Trading

Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and
Regulations

December 2017

Preface

Preface
Aid for Trade (AfT) is defined as technical and financial assistance that helps developing countries,
in particular least developed countries (LDCs), to overcome trade capacity and infrastructural
constraints, in order to enhance their integration into the global trading system and the world
economy. This evaluation looks at one specific area of AfT: technical assistance (TA) for trade
policy and regulations (TP&R). The aim of TA for TP&R is to help developing countries build the
capacity to formulate trade policy, participate in trade negotiations, implement agreements,
build the required institutions, and create the regulatory framework to facilitate trade.
This evaluation assesses whether the Netherlands’ funding of TA for TP&R in the period
2007-2016 has reached its objectives and enhanced the integration of developing countries
into the world trading system and the world economy. It looks at all of the steps in the
process, from policy formulation to results.
The evaluators distinguished three Dutch policy priorities in this small but important type of
development assistance: (i) trade policy and negotiating capacity; (ii) trade facilitation; and
(iii) standards. Part of the evaluation of these three categories looks at the execution of the
programmes and answers the question: were things done right? Another part assesses the
likelihood that the TA affected trade. This part answers the question: did the Netherlands finance
the right things? Whereas the answer to the first question is generally positive, the second
question leads to answers of a different nature. The evaluation assesses the likely effect on trade of
improved trade policy and negotiating capacity as positive, but difficult to determine. It assesses
the effect of trade facilitation on trade as positive under certain conditions. However, the
evaluation could not find a significant effect on trade of the vast majority of the TA for standards.
This evaluation is part of a larger policy review of all expenditure under article 1 ‘Sustainable
Trade and Investment’ of chapter 17 of the Government Budget, due in 2020. The evaluation
complements other IOB evaluations of private sector development programmes that will
contribute to the 2020 policy review on the Netherlands’ policies on aid, trade, and investment.
This evaluation was conducted by Jan Bade, Martine de Groot, and Irene Ebrahimi Darsinouei.
Otto Genee, Antonie de Kemp and Bart van Rijsbergen provided internal quality support.
A reference group consisting of independent experts professor Bernard Hoekman and
professor Peter A.G. van Bergeijk and policymakers Ronald Roosdorp, director of IMH,
and Bert van Geel, strategic policy advisor of DDE, advised on the report.
The staff of the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in Geneva and the Embassies of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kampala and Cotonou have given valuable input as well.
The final responsibility for the report remains with IOB.
Dr Wendy Asbeek Brusse
Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

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Table of contents

Table of contents
Preface3
List of figures, tables and boxes
7
List of acronyms and abbreviations
8
Main findings and recommendations
Description of the subject
Approach of the evaluation
Main findings
Recommendations 

14
15
17
19
21

1
Objectives and delineation
1.1 Introduction
1.2	Defining technical assistance for trade policy and regulations
1.3 Evaluation questions
1.4 Dataset and selection of programmes
1.5 Methodology and limitations

26
27
27
31
33
35

2 Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic
2.1 Introduction
2.2	Aid for Trade in the Netherlands’ policy on trade and development
2.3 Intervention logic
2.4	Empirical evidence on trade-led economic growth and poverty reduction

38
39
39
51
55

3 Trade policy and negotiating capacity
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Achieved output and induced output
3.3 Donor coordination
3.4 Likelihood of outcomes
3.5 Conclusion

60
61
61
67
68
69

4 Trade facilitation
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Achieved output and induced output
4.3 Donor coordination
4.4 Likelihood of outcomes
4.5 Conclusion

72
73
73
80
82
85

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

5 Standards86
5.1 Introduction
87
5.2 Achieved output and induced output
88
5.3 Donor coordination and local ownership
97
5.4 Likelihood of outcomes
98
5.5 Conclusion
103
Appendices106
Appendix 1
Assessment of individual programmes under evaluation
107
Appendix 2
References
173
Appendix 3
List of interviewees
186
Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation
Department (IOB) published 2012-2017

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191

List of figures, tables and boxes

List of figures, tables and boxes
Figures
Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2
Figure 2.3
Figure 2.4

Dutch bilateral and multilateral expenditure on TA for TP&R (2007-2016)
Dutch bilateral and multilateral expenditure on TA for TP&R (2007-2016) 
Centralised versus decentralised TA for TP&R expenditure (2007-2016) 
Reconstructed intervention logic

Tables
Table 1.1 OECD/WTO subcategories of TA for TP&R
Table 1.2 Selected programmes: their primary goals and expenditure
Table 3.1 Intervention logic TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity
Table 4.1 Intervention logic TA for trade facilitation
Table 5.1 Intervention logic TA for standards
Table A1.1 ACWL intervention logic
Table A1.2 ACWL outputs (2007-2016)
Table A1.3 NTP intervention logic
Table A1.4 ICTSD intervention logic
Table A1.5 Tralac intervention logic
Table A1.6 GTJ intervention logic
Table A1.7 TMEA intervention logic
Table A1.8 MDTF-TD2 intervention logic
Table A1.9 TFF intervention logic
Table A1.10 ROCB-WCA intervention logic
Table A1.11 STDF intervention logic
Table A1.12 FWF intervention logic
Table A1.13 IDH intervention logic
Table A1.14 Solidaridad intervention logic
Table A.1.15 FTO intervention logic

Boxes
Box 2.1
Box 2.2
Box 2.3
Box 4.1

The Aid for Trade Initiative
The EU Aid for Trade Policy
The Trade Facilitation Agreement
Donor support to women in informal cross-border trade (ICBT)

49
50
51
53

29
34
62
74
88
108
109
114
117
123
127
134
139
142
146
151
158
162
167
171

41
44
47
81

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

List of acronyms and abbreviations

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ABSSA
Agence Béninoise de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments – Benin Food Safety Agency
ACP
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ACWL
Advisory Centre on WTO Law
AfT
Aid for Trade
AIS
Accion Internacional para la Salud Bolivia – Health Action International Bolivia
APIEx	
Agence de promotion des investissements et des exportations du Benin – Benin
Investment and Export Promotion Agency
ASC
Aquaculture Stewardship Council
ATN
African Trade Network
AWEPON
African Women’s Economic Policy Network
BCI
Better Cotton Initiative
BEMO
Beoordelingsmemorandum – project appraisal document
CB
Capacity building
CBI 	Centrum tot Bevordering van de Import uit ontwikkelingslanden – Centre for the
Promotion of Imports from developing countries
CCC
Clean Clothes Campaign
CCIB
Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie du Bénin – Chambre of Commerce of Benin
CFA
Communauté Financière Africaine – African Financial Community
CIN
Consumer Information Network
CNV	
Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond – National Federation of Christian Trade Unions
in the Netherlands
COFTA
Cooperation for Fair Trade in Africa
COMESA
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRS
Creditor Reporting System
CSO
Civil society organisation
CSR
Corporate social responsibility
CUTS
Consumer Unity & Trust Society
DANIDA
Danish International Development Agency
DAWS
Landelijke Vereniging van Wereldwinkels – Dutch Association of World Shops
DCP
Department of Crop Protection
DDE	
Directie Duurzame Economische Ontwikkeling – Department Sustainable Economic
Development
DDR
Doha Development Round
DENIVA
Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations
DfID
Department for International Development
DRC
Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSU
Dispute Settlement Unit of the WTO
DTIS
Diagnostic trade integration study
EAC
East African Community
EC
European Commission
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
ECTs
Electronic cargo tracking system

List of acronyms and abbreviations

EFTA
European Free Trade Association
EIF
Enhanced Integrated Framework
EKN
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
EPA
Economic partnership agreements
ESA
Eastern and Southern Africa
EU
European Union
EUR
Euro (€)
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI
Foreign direct investment
FINE
FLO, IFTA (currently WFTO), NEWS! and EFTA
FLO
Fairtrade International
FMO	
Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden – Dutch
Entrepreneurial Development Bank
FNV 	Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging – The Netherlands Trade Union
Confederation
FSC
Forest Stewardship Council
FSI
Floriculture Sustainability Initiative
FSP
Farmer Support Programme
FT
Fair Trade
FTA
Free Trade Agreement
FTO
Fair Trade Original
FWF
Fair Wear Foundation
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP
Gross domestic product
GoU
Government of Uganda
GRAPAD	
Groupe de Recherche et d’Action pour le Promotion de l’Agriculture et du Développement
GTJ
Globalising Trade Justice
GVC
Global value chain
IAC
International Agricultural Centre/Wageningen University & Research Centre
ICBT
Informal cross-border trade
ICCO	
Interkerkelijke Coördinatie Commissie voor Ontwikkelingshulp – Interdenominational
Coordination Committee for Development Aid
ICS
Internal control system
ICSR
International corporate social responsibility
ICTSD
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
ICT
Information and communication technology
IDEAS	
International Trade – Development – Economic Governance – Advisory Services
IDH
Initiatief Duurzame Handel – the Sustainable Trade Initiative
IF
Integrated framework
IFTA
International Fair Trade Alliance
IICA
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
ILO
International Labour Organization
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IMH	
Directie Internationale Marktordening en Handelspolitiek – Department of
International Trade Policy and Economic Governance

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

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INESC
Institute for Socioeconomic Studies
IOB	
Directie Internationaal Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie – Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department
IPPC
International Plant Protection Convention
ISO
ίσος / isos (equal) – International Organization for Standardization
ITC
International Trade Centre
ITTC
Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation
KCSA
Kenya Civil Society Alliance
KST
Kamerstuk – Parliamentary Paper
LDC
Least developed country
LNV
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
LPI
Logistics Performance Index of the World Bank
M&E
Monitoring and evaluation
MASP
Multi-annual strategic plan
MC
Ministerial Conference of the WTO
MDF
Management for Development Foundations
MDG
Millennium development goal
MDTF-TD2
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development phase 2
MFA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
MTR
Mid-term review
Mwengo
Mwelekeowa Ngo
NEWS!
Network of European World Shops
NGO
Non-governmental organisation
NTB
Non-tariff barrier
NTM
Non-tariff measure
NTP
Netherlands Trainee Programme
NUCAFE
National Union of Coffee Agribusiness and Farm Enterprises
NVWA	
Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit – the Netherlands Food and Consumer
Product Safety Authority
ODA
Official development assistance
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health (original name Office International des
Epizooties)
OPM
Oxford Publishing Group
OSBP
One-stop border post
PASCiB 	Plateforme des Acteurs de la Société Civile au Bénin – Platform of civil society actors
in Benin
PG
Project grant
PPG
Project preparation grant
PPM
Production and processing method
PPP
Public-private partnership
PRSP
Poverty reduction strategy paper/plan
PSD
Private sector development
PSO
Private sector organisation
PTA
Preferential trade agreement

List of acronyms and abbreviations

PvdA
Partij van de Arbeid – Labour Party
PwC
PricewaterhouseCoopers
R&D
Research and development
RBM
Results-based management
REA
Rapid evidence assessment
REC
Regional Economic Community
RI
Regional integration
ROCB-WCA
Regional Office for Capacity Building – West and Central Africa
RSPO
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
RTA
Regional trade agreement
RTC
Regional training centre
RTP
Regional training plan
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SAPSN
Southern Africa People’s Solidarity Network
SEATINI
Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute
SECO
Secrétariat d’État à l’économie – Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Sida
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation (previously known as Stichting
Nederlandse Vrijwilligers – Foundation of Dutch Volunteers)
SOMO	
Stichting Onderzoek Multinational Ondernemingen – Centre for Research on
Multinational Corporations
SOS	
Komitee Steun Onderontwikkelde Streken – Committee for Support to
Underdeveloped Regions, later to become Stichting Steun Ontwikkelings-Streken –
Society for Support to Developing Regions
SPS
Sanitary and phytosanitary (standards)
SSA
Sub-Saharan Africa(n)
STDF
Standards and Trade Development Facility
TA
Technical assistance, also used to indicate financial and technical assistance
TA for TP&R
Technical assistance for trade policy and regulations
TANGO
Tanzania Association of NGOs
TBT
Technical barriers to trade
TFA
Trade Facilitation Agreement
TFAF
Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility
TFF
Trade Facilitation Facility
TMEA
TradeMark East Africa
TMF	
Thematisch Medefinancierings Programma – Thematic Co-Financing Programme
of the Netherlands
ToC
Theory of change
TP&NC
Trade policy and negotiating capacity
TP&R
Trade policy and regulations
Tralac
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa
TRIPS
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UDHR
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UFEA
Uganda Flower Exporters Association
UK
United Kingdom

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

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UNBS
Uganda National Bureau of Standards
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNECE
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
US
United States
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
USD
United States dollar
VVD	
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy
WBTS
World Bank Trade Strategy
WCO
World Customs Organization
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union, also known as Union
Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA)
WEF
World Economic Forum
WFTO
World Fair Trade Organization
WG
Working group
WHO
World Health Organization
WITS
World Integrated Trade Solution
WRR	
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid – Scientific Council for
Government Policy
WTO
World Trade Organization
ZNF
Zuid-Noord Federatie – South-North Federation

List of acronyms and abbreviations

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Main findings and
recommendations

Main findings and recommendations

Description of the subject
Technical assistance for trade policy and regulations (TA for TP&R) is a small but important
part of Aid for Trade (AfT). TA for TP&R fundamentally affects the extent to which other
categories of AfT, such as productive capacity building and trade-related infrastructure, can
be successful. This form of AfT intends to help developing countries build their capacity to
negotiate favourable trade terms, implement multilateral and bilateral trade commitments,
reform national trade policies, facilitate trade processes and procedures, and build
trade-enhancing institutions, including standardising and conformity assessment bodies.
In line with the 2005 Aid for Trade Initiative, the overall goal of Dutch AfT policy in the
period 2007-2016 was to assist developing countries ‘to implement and benefit from the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade’
(WTO, 2005, par. 57). The Netherlands reported all of the expenditures evaluated in this
report to the OECD and WTO as AfT in support of this goal. Over time, the Netherlands’
AfT focused less on WTO Agreements and more on the broader objective of trade expansion.
The official policy on AfT over the whole period was to facilitate the integration of least
developed, low-, and middle-income countries into a predictable rules-based, global
trading system. The resulting increase in trade flows would lead to economic development
and poverty reduction in a sustainable and inclusive manner.
Dutch policy and the interventions that were financed focused on three main categories of
TP&R:
• trade policy and negotiating capacity (TP&NC);
• trade facilitation; and
• standards.
The figure below shows the relative shares of these three categories.

Dutch bilateral and multilateral expenditure on TA for TP&R (EUR 162.3 million,
from 2007-2016)

28%

44%

Trade Facilitation
28%

Standards Negotiating
Trade Policy and
Negotiating Capacity

Source: financial administration MFA (Piramide).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

From 2007 to 2016, the Netherlands spent a total of EUR 162.3 million on TA for TP&R
programmes. The sample of projects and programmes selected in this evaluation accounts
for 79% (approximately EUR 128.2 million) of total TA for TP&R between 2007 and 2016.
Technical assistance to strengthen trade policy and negotiating capacity consisted mainly of
funding studies, training, internships, lobbying, and advisory services. TA on trade
facilitation and TA for standards, on the other hand, involved a great deal of institutional
development in developing countries. The reason for distinguishing standards as a
subcategory is that the Netherlands finances a great deal of TA for standard setting, standard
promotion, and standard compliance and control (enforcement). This covers both public
(mandatory) standards and private (voluntary) standards (the latter often prescribing
production and processing methods). Private standards are not set by international
standardising bodies or trade agreements, and are therefore not classified by OECD/WTO as
international standards. TA for standards differs from TA for trade facilitation, as it does not
automatically lead to a reduction in trade costs.

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Dutch policy on trade policy and negotiating capacity emphasised two priorities: (i) Support
developing countries to enhance their knowledge and awareness of the role that trade can
play in development by integrating trade policies into development strategies, and (ii) Build
the capacity to negotiate more favourable trade terms in international trade negotiations.
Initially the policy focused on support to Geneva-based institutions, such as the International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL),
and WTO’s Netherlands Trainee Programme (NTP). Later, the emphasis shifted towards
mainstreaming trade policy into national and regional development strategies. For this,
the Netherlands supported Tralac, ICTSD, and the Zuid-Noord Federatie (ZNF), for their
programme on Globalising Trade Justice (GTJ), and recently once again the Enhanced
Integrated Framework (EIF).
With regard to trade facilitation, the emphasis was on reducing the complexity of trade
regulations and procedures and improving the timeliness of trade logistics. The reduction
in trade costs and transit time is expected to increase access to and competitiveness on
international markets and participation in international value chains. As for improving
regulations, one can think of customs rules, tax rules, security rules, visa formalities,
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) controls, transport rules, trade licensing, e-customs
procedures, insurance, pre-shipment inspection, and custom clearance procedures.
To improve trade facilitation, the focus was on supporting multilateral organisations
including TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), the World Bank’s Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF),
the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund on Trade Development II (MDTF-TD2), and the
World Customs Organization (WCO) Regional Office for Capacity Building in West and
Central Africa (ROCB-WCA).
With regard to standards, the policy emphasis was on creating awareness of the tradefacilitating role of public standard development and compliance, strengthening the
institutional framework in developing countries, and their participation in international
standardising bodies. Support to the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) was

Main findings and recommendations

an important instrument for implementing this policy. Over time, the emphasis and
support shifted to Dutch private sector and NGO initiatives for private standards based on
non-product-related production and processing methods, notably through the Sustainable
Trade Initiative (IDH), Solidaridad, Fair Trade Original (FTO), and the Fair Wear Foundation
(FWF). This evaluation only assessed the trade effects of international standards and certification,
both public and private. It did not evaluate the impact of these standards on environmental
sustainability, labour rights, or poverty. Nor did it evaluate the parts of these programmes1
that enhanced productivity and their effect on trade (these parts are not included in the
expenditure overview either).

Approach of the evaluation
Dutch policy on AfT is clear about the ultimate objective: the Netherlands provides AfT to
increase trade and trade diversification in developing countries, assuming that it will lead
to economic growth, and that it will have an overall positive effect on poverty reduction.
An evaluation of TA for TP&R should therefore investigate the link between TA for TP&R and
trade performance, as well as the assumptions about the effect of trade on economic growth
and poverty. Attributing better trade performance to technical assistance for policies,
agreements, and rules and regulations is too difficult, however, as the interventions affect
trade only indirectly through mechanisms that are influenced by many variables. This
evaluation therefore takes a three-step approach. First, it looks at effectiveness of the TA
programmes in terms of tangible (induced) outputs. Did the interventions establish the
preconditions for improved local and multilateral trade policy and did they improve the
negotiating capacity? Did the interventions simplify, harmonise and improve trade
regulations and procedures? And, did they enhance trade-facilitating standard compliance?
Second, it assesses the relation between these (induced) outputs and the interventions
policy financed by the Netherlands. Finally, it tries to validate the intervention logic to see if
the interventions contributed to the ultimate objective of AfT, namely more trade and trade
diversification, economic growth, and poverty alleviation.
In line with this reasoning, the objective was to answer the following central evaluation
question:
Has the technical assistance for trade policy and regulations financed by the Netherlands between 2007 and
2016 achieved its intended results?
The approach of this evaluation was to provide insight into and evidence of:
• the way the interventions fit into the overall Dutch trade and development policy;
• the way the interventions are supposed to serve the formulated development goals;
• the achievement of intended and induced outputs; and
• the likely (intermediate) outcomes of the programmes.

1

These were reviewed by IOB’s private sector development evaluation and the review of IDH. The delineation
and effect of standards on trade-enhancing factors such as value chain management and risk are discussed in
chapters 1 and 5.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Dutch policy on TA for TP&R was analysed by reviewing policy briefs, letters to Parliament,
online interviews with and speeches by (former) ministers, interviews held with policy
officers, and policy descriptions in programme appraisal reports.
Outputs (concrete deliverables) and induced outputs (intended, attributable results of direct
outputs) of the selected programmes were evaluated based on desk research, interviews
with policy officers and executing organisations in the Netherlands, and field visits. Primary
data collection took place through interviews and during field visits to Geneva, Uganda, and
Benin. These field visits were used to interview programme officers, executing agencies as
well as policymakers, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders. Existing project and
programme evaluations complemented the research inputs.

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The likelihood that the expected outcomes were the result of the intervention was assessed
based on information derived from interviews, existing (internal and external) evaluations,
and collected empirical evidence. Primary data collection on induced outputs consisted of
interviews and concentrated on the beneficiaries of the trainee programmes and capacity
building programmes and on programme officers, executing agencies, as well as
policymakers. The collected data and views were triangulated, where possible, to obtain an
accurate picture of the outputs and outcomes. The assessment of the likelihood of an
outcome effect on trade was largely based on evidence in the empirical literature.

Main findings and recommendations

Main findings
On trade policy and negotiating capacity
1)	The technical assistance for trade policy supported by the Netherlands increased the knowledge levels
and institutional capacity of beneficiary developing countries, resulting in enhanced participation in
WTO and more coherent trade-enhancing national and regional policies.
Support by the Netherlands to WTO, other Geneva-based organisations, and regional
organisations that build capacity on trade policy provided developing country policymakers
with knowledge as well as a framework for national, regional, and international trade
policy. The impact at the national level has been substantial. Trade has become an
integrated part of national policy in developing countries, often with functioning
coordination mechanisms in place. The impact of the technical assistance provided by WTO
and other Geneva-based organisations was significant, not only on multilateral but also on
regional trade negotiations, which often follow negotiation methods similar to those used
by WTO. The effectiveness of the institutional capacity building programmes depended on
the general quality of governance and on political ownership in the recipient countries.
2)	The extent of the positive effect of improved trade policy and negotiating capacity on trade differed
widely. The impact on trade depended on how deep, broad, and rapid trade reforms were, on the wider
trade-related environment, and on the capacity of the economy to benefit and adjust.
Better institutional capacity is not an end in itself. The impact on trade depends on actual
trade reforms, the wider trade-related environment, trade facilitation, including
investments in trade-related infrastructure, and the capacity of the economy to take
advantage of trade reforms. This capacity depends on the extent of systematically linking
private sector development (PSD) policy with trade policy. The success of trade policy
depends on a consistent broader policy approach targeted at easing constraints that limit
the economy’s ability to take advantage of trade opportunities. The World Bank’s Doing
Business indicators show that some countries, including least-developed countries (LDCs)
such as Rwanda, Uganda, Lesotho, and Nepal, are managing to ease these constraints, while
others, such as Nigeria, Benin, Bangladesh, and Sudan, are struggling for various reasons
and are therefore benefiting less from improved trade policy and negotiating capacity.

On trade facilitation
3)	Trade facilitation programmes supported by the Netherlands reduced transaction costs and are likely to
have contributed substantially to increased trade and gains from trade in beneficiary developing countries.
Most trade facilitation programmes achieved the projected outputs. These were
predominantly achieved in the areas of enhancing imports, formal trade, and trade in
goods. Little attention was paid to the importance of facilitating international payments and
trade finance (see recommendations for details). The programmes reduced trade costs and
transport time, and thereby increased the potential gains of trade. Based on the empirical
literature, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the programmes, these programmes
proved to be effective forms of Aid for Trade, as they boosted and diversified trade.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

4)	
The continuity and success of the trade facilitation programmes depended on the extent of alignment with the
recipient governments’ policies, the involvement of the private sector, and on how successful vested interests,
donor coordination, and integration in national private sector development policies were addressed.
The trade facilitation programmes contributed to better trade performance and
competitiveness (of both imports and exports). However, to ensure continuity, the
institutional and regulatory improvements require better embedding in national
governance structures. Programmes performed better when the private sector and civil
society organisations (CSOs) were involved. In the LDCs visited, the success of trade
facilitation programmes was partly hampered by a lack of alignment with government
policy, lack of political support, resistance from vested interests, poor donor coordination,
and limited integration into national development policies.

On standards

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5)	The activities on standards awareness and capacity building by STDF, which also focus on compliance
and institution building, are likely to have increased trade and facilitated the integration of developing
countries into the global trading system.
Most developing countries struggle with standards compliance. Stringent international
standards often affect their exports and imports negatively. Exports are negatively affected
by non-compliance (rejection) and high compliance costs, whereas imports are mainly
negatively affected by an increase in the cost price. The exception is when international
standards are also introduced into their domestic market. Then the overall net effect on
trade proves to be positive. This exception is important because it justifies building general
institutional capacity and government oversight on standards, such as national standards
bureaus that work on standard setting, standard implementation, and standard
enforcement. This is the kind of capacity building supported by STDF. The technical
assistance provided by STDF is likely to have had a positive effect on trade performance and
the participation and adaptation of beneficiary developing countries in the global trading
system. The whole process of project selection, management, monitoring and evaluation,
however, is relatively costly and puts pressure on the STDF’s resource-constrained secretariat.
6)	The activities of Dutch NGOs on standard setting and compliance, which are often based on covenants
with international trading and retail companies based in the Netherlands, have hardly had any effect
on enhancing trade value and diversification in beneficiary developing countries.
The likely effect on trade of the support for the Fair Wear Foundation’s activities has been at
best minor, if not negative. Supporting governments to enforce ILO labour standards, not
only for exports but also for domestic markets, is likely to have a more positive effect on
trade value than improving working conditions only in the export sectors with foreign
brands and exporting companies. Note that we evaluated the effect that the FWF has had
on trade, not the effect on labour conditions.
There is no evidence of a better trade performance to justify spending Dutch development
funds to introduce higher voluntary standards and support compliance to these standards
by producers, as was done by IDH, Solidaridad, and FTO. The latter’s programmes affected
trade by boosting productivity (trade development) as a reward for working towards

Main findings and recommendations

certification. The standard-setting part of these programmes was often not sustainable and
rarely managed to affect the national standards set for the domestic market, which was also
not a goal of these programmes. The standard-setting, certification and compliance part of
these programmes did not affect trade in a substantial and positive way.2 The work of these
programmes on standards had the same narrow focus as the FWF programme: the standards
are only export- and private sector-oriented. Successful interventions promoting
competitiveness and trade have introduced more stringent standards not only for exports
but also for the domestic market,3 which usually required oversight by government
institutions and the involvement of national standards bodies. The Dutch organisations
that were supported focused strongly on traditional developing countries’ export products,
consumed but not produced in Europe. Empirical evidence from many studies that were
used for this evaluation, however, demonstrates that trade gains from standards in
developing countries are primarily enjoyed at a regional level (the effects of standards
harmonisation and mutual recognition). An expansion of trade to (non-regional) third
country markets mainly occurs if standard compliance leads to trade diversification (which
usually means competing with products produced in third countries).

Recommendations
| 21 |

An important goal of the evaluation was to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of the
TP&R programmes that are financed by the Netherlands and their likely impact, in order to
advise on how the effectiveness of the programmes can be improved. For the sake of
consistency, the recommendations are categorised by intervention category.

On trade policy and negotiating capacity
1)	When supporting programmes on capacity building and trade policy, commit for at least ten years to
enhance their effectiveness.
Programmes on capacity building and policy support require long-term (multi-)donor
funding. The fact that multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO are currently in dire straits
is no reason to stop multilateral technical assistance for trade policy and negotiating
capacity, such as the support to ICTSD, ACWL, and the NTP. On the contrary, this kind of
technical assistance may help developing countries to become the new demandeurs for a
rules-based global trading system. Commitments for a period of at least ten years would
also incentivise the executing organisations to set up proper M&E systems with baselines
and to develop analytical capacity to measure impact and sustainability. For example,
organisations could create feedback loops using the networks of people who benefited
from capacity building and training. Such commitments could also prevent donor countries
from using their support as a lever to strengthen their negotiation positions in trade
negotiations.
2

3

In a separate impact evaluation, IOB will assess the effect of the Netherlands' international corporate social
responsibility (ICSR) policy. This evaluation did not look at the effects of private international standards that
specify production methods on the environment, on working conditions, or on individual farmers.
See Swann (2010).

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

2) Enhance the linkages to private sector development and general development policies.
Trade policy and negotiating capacity programmes can benefit from a broader perspective
on trade by explicitly incorporating policies that address behind-the-border constraints
affecting the enabling environment for the private sector. Linkages could be strengthened
to private sector development and more general development policies for partner
countries, including those aimed at strengthening good governance and the rule of law.
Giving developing countries more of a say in setting programme priorities could improve
their awareness of regional trade opportunities and would tailor programmes more to the
needs of LDCs. This could also make it easier to involve the domestic private sector and
CSOs in developing countries that work on trade and PSD policies.

| 22 |

3) Do not compromise on the selection criteria of trainees.
The success of training programmes on TP&NC depends primarily on the selection of ‘high
potential’ trainees and their (re)placement in permanent representations in the WTO or
trade ministries afterwards. Withstanding pressure to compromise on the selection criteria
and placement requirement is essential. Traineeship programmes could also include trainees
from a more multidisciplinary background (not only lawyers and economists). This would
stimulate discussion, broaden the perspectives within ministries and permanent
representations in Geneva, and encourage trade policy to be more broadly supported by
other ministries, the private sector, and CSOs.
4)	Strengthen the coordination and monitoring of the support of programmes on trade policy and
negotiating capacity by the Netherlands.
The permanent representation in Geneva is in a better position than policy officers in
The Hague to select, finance, manage, and monitor TA programmes on trade policy and
negotiating capacity that are implemented by organisations in Geneva. Better integration
into the broader Dutch aid and trade policy can reinforce the effectiveness and efficiency of
the programmes. A joint intervention strategy of policy officers in The Hague, Geneva, and
from Dutch embassies in partner countries could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
the programmes and make them more country specific. One could consider organising
debates on the best intervention strategies by policy officers, who work in The Hague,
Geneva, and at the Dutch embassies in selected beneficiary countries. For countries where
the Netherlands is active on trade and PSD, the publication of a regular WTO trade policy
review, a diagnostic trade integration study update, or an investment policy review would
provide a logical moment for these debates, as was once proposed by the permanent
representation in Geneva. Apart from representatives of the permanent representation of
that particular country, the permanent representation of the Netherlands could invite
organisations based in Geneva and other donors to participate in this process.

Main findings and recommendations

On trade facilitation
5)	Be aware of the lopsided effects of trade facilitation, when efforts concentrate on quick results, and on
facilitating only formal trade and trade in goods, and on either imports or exports.
Trade facilitation programmes need to focus on enhancing both exports and imports; both
sides require attention to strengthen participation in global value chains and to avoid the
negative effects of growing trade deficits. They also need to focus on facilitating trade in
services, in addition to trade in goods. Trade in services, such as logistical and business support
services, tourism, ICT, or the movement of labour, requires other types of facilitation
measures than trade in goods. If trade facilitation has adverse effects on small, informal
traders, programmes also need to help informal traders to cope with the changes.
Furthermore, trade facilitation programmes must address non-trade issues, such as
constraints on holding a bank account in a foreign currency. Ensuring that the effects of the
interventions are sustained is another issue, especially when reforms require institutional
capacity or specific ICT infrastructure. Maintaining institutional capacity after a reform paid for
by donors is expensive. Donors have to pay more attention to funding the recurrent costs of
trade facilitation in poorer developing countries.
6)	Improve the alignment of trade facilitation programmes with recipient governments’ trade policies,
involve the private sector more, and link the programmes with private sector development.
Full ownership of beneficiary governments is a prerequisite for effective trade facilitation
programmes with lasting results. Trade facilitation programmes need to be integrated into
national private sector policy and need to focus not only on bottlenecks in trade logistics, but
also on the enabling environment ‘behind the border’. Integration into national development
policy requires close monitoring of the effects on poverty, gender, and the spread of HIV (by
lorry drivers). Recipient countries need support to set up a coordinating unit on trade
facilitation to keep oversight. Private sector support can speed up implementation and
stimulate maintenance and continuity. The Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, although it
only focuses on the TFA and not on ‘behind the border constraints’, provides useful guidelines.
7)	Improve donor coordination of trade facilitation programmes to avoid duplication and uncoordinated
interventions and to reduce the administrative burden on recipients.
Improved donor coordination can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of trade facilitation
programmes, and thereby avoid overburdening developing countries’ administrative and
infrastructural capacity. Policy officers at Dutch embassies can play an essential role by
providing insight into the local context and make valuable contributions to increase the
likelihood of the programmes’ success in all phases.
8) Take the political economy into account.
Because trade facilitation produces winners and losers, implementing organisations need
to involve all stakeholders. The effect on and the resistance of losers have to be reckoned
with. Involving the private sector and CSOs in recipient countries may provide information
on potential losers and can mobilise political support. Political risk and special interests
require broadly supported mitigation strategies.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

9)	
Invest in a thorough impact analysis of the trade facilitation programmes’ effect on trade.
Analysis is paramount to increase our knowledge on the effects of different trade facilitation
interventions on trade, thereby differentiating between soft and hard infrastructure. Even
the evaluations of the largest trade facilitation programmes, such as TMEA and TFF show how
difficult it is to measure the extent of the attribution or contribution of these programmes to
trade. Trade diversion and shifts from informal to formal trade may overestimate the effects
of the programmes, whereas a lack of competition may reduce the effect of reductions in trade
costs. High-quality geographically disaggregated baseline data on formal trade, informal trade,
and prices will enable impact assessments which could help to improve the programmes.

On standards

| 24 |

10) Organise the support for capacity building on international standards more efficiently.
Encourage STDF to limit itself to the selection and financing of project preparation and
projects that can improve STDF’s network and support its function as a knowledge platform
for best practices. STDF is qualified and well situated to do project selection, but too small
to do other tasks such as management, monitoring, financial management, and project
evaluation. STDF can outsource these activities on a case-to-case basis even more than it
currently does, for example to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Bank,
or a suitable bilateral donor.
Institution building required for standards compliance can be more effective when capacity
building focuses on concrete standards that are linked to trade facilitation programmes.
National standard organisations in developing countries need to focus on export standards
as well. Doing so will enable these countries to reap the trade benefits from regional
standards harmonisation and mutual recognition. These organisations can also play a role
in avoiding non-compliance with increasingly stringent standards requirements by
high-income importing countries.
11)	Capacity building on compliance with international standards has to spill over to compliance for the
domestic market.
Donor programmes on the setting, implementation, development, and control of standards
need not be limited to exports or imports, but also need to help and build capacity for the
domestic market. Where feasible, internalising international standards has proven to
enhance developing countries’ capacity on standard setting and compliance, and to stimulate
their trade performance in general.
12)	Private standard setting and certification activities in developing countries have to generate lasting
effects and need to involve recipient government institutions.
Donor funding for covenants concluded with international trading and retail companies
and producers to comply with labour standards and/or produce in an environmentally more
sustainable way should not be qualified as Aid for Trade, as these production and process
standards generally do not increase trade or total export revenue. Donors who have decided
to fund the branding of sustainable trade labels, training and certification of producers of

Main findings and recommendations

primary commodities have mostly ended up backing farmer/extension type of programmes,
which have resulted in a proliferation of private standards in developing countries.
Potential new donor programmes on standards should be based on their sustainable impact
on the environment, labour conditions, and income growth, and the extent of recipient
governments’ involvement, rather than on their trade orientation. Dutch NGOs could be
encouraged to reorient part of their programmes towards assisting governments and
standardising bodies in developing countries to build their capacity to monitor and control
at least the official standards.

| 25 |

1
Objectives and delineation

Objectives and delineation

1.1

Introduction

This evaluation looks at technical assistance for trade policy and regulations (TA for TP&R)4
financed by the Netherland between 2007 and 2016. TA for TP&R is part of Aid for Trade
(AfT): a larger set of interventions that aims to assist developing countries in building the
institutions, infrastructure, and productive capacity needed to integrate into the global
trading system. The global trading system can only function properly and continuously if it
is predictable, fair and rules-based, and benefits all countries. Unfortunately, as pointed out
by numerous studies5, the international trading system is, a priori, not fair. Differences in
economic power, geographical accessibility, national policies, imperfect information,
asymmetric capacities to mitigate risk, asymmetric access to capital, collusion, unfair
competition due to dumping and subsidies, exchange-rate policies, tariffs, preferential
tariffs, and non-tariff barriers to trade may all lead to an uneven distribution of benefits.
Because the governments of many developing countries lack adequate means and capacity
to prioritise and implement trade capacity building, the international community provides
assistance in the form of Aid for Trade. Whether this is done only to help developing
countries or also to preserve the international trading system and its benefits to developed
countries is difficult to distinguish. ‘The Netherlands wants to move forward with the world
and the Netherlands wants to move forward in the world.’ This policy statement, made in
A World to Gain: A new Agenda for aid, Trade and Investment (2013: p. 5), illustrates the new
combined Dutch policy on ‘foreign trade’ and ‘development cooperation’. This evaluation,
however, looks only at the development effects of TA for TP&R and does not evaluate its
effects on Dutch trade. In this first chapter, we define the subject, formulate the evaluation
questions, list the selected sample of programmes, categorise these programmes, and
summarise the evaluation methodology.

1.2	Defining technical assistance for trade policy and
regulations
Because trade is a broad and complex activity, Aid for Trade is also broad and not easy to
define (wto.org, 2016). AfT has been defined in many ways, and according to some
definitions it comprises more than 25% of total official development assistance (ODA).
This study uses the internationally agreed definition formulated by OECD and the WTO.
According to this definition, AfT encompasses the financial and technical assistance (TA)
provided to developing countries, ‘to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related
infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO
Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade’ (WTO, 2005, par. 57). Under this
definition, the following categories of AfT are defined (Oecd.org, 2017a):

4

5

In this study, Aid for Trade, confined to trade policy and regulations, is referred to as ‘TA for TP&R’. The broader
term Aid for Trade is used for all of the categories combined.
An excellent article on the subject is Brown, A. G. and Stern, R. M. (2007), ‘Concepts of fairness in the World
Global Trading System’. Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 12, pp. 293-318.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

technical assistance for trade policy and regulations;
trade-related infrastructure;
productive capacity building (including trade development);
trade-related adjustment; and
other trade-related needs.

Category 1, the focus of this evaluation, is geared towards helping developing countries
build the capacity to negotiate favourable trade terms, implement multilateral and bilateral
trade commitments, reform national trade policies, facilitate trade processes and
procedures, and build trade-enhancing institutions, including standardising and
conformity assessment bodies. Moving down the categories, the scope of AfT broadens and
becomes less trade policy specific, and widens to assistance to build trade-related
infrastructure and productive capacity, and, in its widest form, assistance for economic
adjustment, (re)distributive measures, and trade-related needs.

1.2.1

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Defining TA for TP&R

TA for TP&R aims to help developing countries to deliver on multilateral and bilateral trade
commitments, improve domestic policymaking and the regulatory environment, facilitate
trade processes, and strengthen the bargaining power of developing countries in
international trade negotiations. TA for TP&R fundamentally affects the extent to which
other categories of AfT (such as productive capacity building and trade-related
infrastructure) achieve their intended results. As will become evident from the policy
reconstruction set out in chapter 2, Dutch TA for TP&R can be naturally subdivided into
three subcategories. First, the Netherlands helped developing countries to enhance their
knowledge and awareness of the role that trade can play in development, to integrate trade
policies into development strategies, and to build their negotiating capacity to secure
favourable trade terms. Second, there was an emphasis on reducing the complexity and cost
of trade regulations and procedures. Third, support was given to develop and comply with
international standards and strengthen the ability of public and private agencies in
developing countries to implement and enforce these standards. This evaluation is
organised around these three subcategories. They are referred to as: ‘trade policy and
negotiating capacity’, ‘trade facilitation’ and ‘standards’.
Strengthening trade policy and negotiating capacity is mainly implemented through
studies, training, internships, lobbying, and advisory services at the multilateral level.
Contrary to this, TA for trade facilitation and TA for standards involves a great deal of
institutional development in developing countries. The reason for classifying ‘TA for
standards’ as a separate category is that the Netherlands finances a great deal of TA for
standard setting, promotion, compliance, and control (enforcement). This includes not
only public standards (regulation), but also private standards, mainly based on production
and processing methods, which are often not part of international agreements and are
therefore not categorised as public standards by OECD/WTO. The work on standards also
differs from that on trade facilitation as it does not automatically lead to a reduction in
trade costs. Support provided for regional trade policy and regulations is seen as a crosscutting category with elements of the three categories mentioned above.

Objectives and delineation

The OECD/WTO reporting system provides an alternative categorisation of TA for TP&R in six
subcategories, as shown in table 1.1.
Table 1.1 OECD/WTO subcategories of TA for TP&R
CRS code

Description

Clarifications

33110

Trade policy and administrative
management

Trade policy and planning; support to ministries
and departments responsible for trade policy;
trade-related legislation and regulatory reforms;
policy analysis and implementation of multilateral
trade agreements, e.g. technical barriers to trade
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS)
except at the regional level (see below);
mainstreaming trade in national development
strategies (e.g. poverty reduction strategy
papers); wholesale/retail trade; unspecified trade
and trade promotion activities.

33120

Trade facilitation

Simplification and harmonisation of international
import and export procedures (e.g. customs
valuation, licensing procedures, transport
formalities, payments, insurance); support to
customs departments, tariff reforms.

33130

Regional trade agreements
(RTAs)

Support to regional trade arrangements,
including work on technical barriers to trade and
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS)
at the regional level; elaboration of rules of origin
and introduction of special and differential
treatment in RTAs.

33140

Multilateral trade negotiations

Support for developing countries’ effective
participation in multilateral trade negotiations,
including training of negotiators, assessing the
impact of negotiations; accession to the WTO and
other multilateral trade-related organisations.

33150

Trade-related adjustment

Contributions to the government budget to assist
the implementation of recipients’ own trade
reforms and adjustments to trade policy
measures by other countries; assistance to
manage shortfalls in the balance of payments
due to changes in the world trading environment.

33181

Trade education/ training

Human resources development in trade. Includes
university programmes in trade.

Source: aid-for-trade statistical queries – OECD.

Table 1.1 shows a categorisation of TA for TP&R based on Creditor Reporting System (CRS)
codes.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

These official codes are used in the Netherlands’ project database and for reporting official
development assistance to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. The three
subcategories applied in this evaluation consists of the following CRS codes:
• Trade policy and negotiating capacity: CRS codes 33110, 33140, 33150;
• Trade facilitation: CRS code 33120; and
• Standards: CRS codes 33110 (partly) and 33130.
This relation between codes and subcategories enabled the arrangement of the selected
Dutch programmes into the three specific subcategories. In turn, the subcategories make
it possible to draw conclusions at a higher level of aggregation than the programme level.
It is important to note that only one CRS code can be assigned to an aid programme.
This means that aid programmes with other CRS codes than the ones listed in table 1.1
may contain TP&R elements. This is especially the case for general programmes on public
service delivery and governance, on tax reform, and on commercial rule of law. Therefore,
we have underestimated the amount spent on TA for TP&R in this study.

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of International Trade Policy and Economic
Governance (IMH) is largely responsible for TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity,
whereas the Department of Sustainable Economic Development (DDE) handles most
activities related to trade facilitation and standards.
A detailed description of the three subcategories that form the core of this evaluation is
provided below.
Trade policy and negotiating capacity
TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity refers to the overall set of interventions intended to
enhance the beneficiary’s negotiating position in trade negotiations and ensure that national
policies promote growth and development and comply with international agreements. This
category includes interventions to enhance the beneficiary’s capacity to identify trade needs,
such as country studies, data collection, and the provision of information, and to negotiate
favourable trade agreements, e.g. by training the beneficiary in WTO law and negotiation
skills. However, trade policy is not only about negotiating trade agreements. Therefore, this
category also includes interventions that assist developing countries in effectively translating
agreements into trade and economic policies and subsequently in implementing and
enforcing policies and regulations at the regional and national level.
Trade facilitation
Trade facilitation programmes aim to make trade within a country and across borders faster,
cheaper, and more predictable, while guaranteeing that safety and quality standards are met
(UNECE, 2012). The enhanced connectivity and competitiveness that results from trade
facilitation should enable developing countries to specialise and integrate more into global
value chains (GVCs). TA for trade facilitation includes technical assistance to develop
physical infrastructure, also known as ‘hard infrastructure’, and technical assistance to
improve regulatory infrastructure, also known as ‘soft infrastructure’. Technical assistance

Objectives and delineation

for hard infrastructure includes roads, ports, and ICT hardware. Technical assistance for soft
infrastructure includes the effective implementation and enforcement of customs rules, tax
rules, trade licensing, e-customs procedures, foreign exchange regulations, and compliance
with technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. This
evaluation focuses only on those aspects of trade facilitation programmes that address soft
infrastructure capacity building. Technical assistance for improving hard infrastructure is
beyond the scope of TA for TP&R and thus falls outside the scope of this evaluation.
Standards
The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) defines a standard as the ‘document,
established by consensus and approved by a recognised body that provides, for common
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at
the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context’ (ISO, 2004: p.1).
Standards can be categorised by function or by the defining agent (Maskus and Wilson, 2001).
The categorisation by function distinguishes between ‘product standards’, ‘production and
processing method (PPM) standards’ and ‘labelling standards’. Product standards refer to
the physical characteristics that a good possesses. PPM standards refer to the conditions
under which the products were made, which can be product related, such as standards on
organic farming, or non-product related, such as certain labour conditions and
environmental requirements. Labelling standards specify the manner in which information
is provided to users. Categorisation by defining agent divides standards broadly into ‘private
standards’ (simply known as ‘standards’), which are voluntary and arise from market forces,
and ‘public standards’, which are set by the government and are mandatory, often defined
as ‘regulations’. In this evaluation we use the term standards for both voluntary (private)
standards and legally binding public standards (regulations), but we make the distinction
between private standards and public standards where necessary. Dutch support to standards
programmes focused on all three different functions and both on public and private
standards. The evaluation looked at those programmes that were categorised as TA for TP&R
and reviewed the effects of capacity building on standards on the objectives of Aid for Trade.

1.3 Evaluation questions
Policies, institutions, infrastructure, and regulations play an important role in facilitating
the integration of developing countries in the global economy. When discussing the
importance of AfT in general, OECD also mentions the importance of regional trade
agreements, lower investment barriers to multinational corporations, high-quality
infrastructure, speed, and flexibility of cross-border movement of physical goods and
information, effective legal and regulatory systems, efficient systems, and the capacity of
domestic firms to contribute to the supply chain (OECD, 2013, as stated in OECD/WTO, 2013).
Confined to TA for TP&R the World Economic Forum (WEF) emphasises that reducing
non-tariff barriers to trade could increase GDP up to six times more than reducing tariffs.
It mentions the importance of border administration, clear regulations, coordination
between agencies, and globally harmonised electronic forms and data-exchange (WEF, 2013).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Since the Netherlands’ TA for TP&R is part of ODA, it must have the ‘promotion of the
economic development and welfare of developing countries’ as its main objective.6
The Netherlands provides this technical assistance to increase trade and trade diversification,
which is assumed to lead to economic growth, and to have an overall positive effect on poverty
reduction. An evaluation of TA for TP&R should therefore investigate the link between TA
for TP&R and trade performance, as well as the assumptions on the nexus between economic
growth and poverty reduction.7 However, attributing better trade performance to technical
assistance for policies, agreements, rules and regulations is too difficult as the interventions
only affect trade indirectly through mechanisms that are influenced by many variables.
This evaluation therefore takes a three-step approach. First, it looks at Dutch policy
objectives and intended (induced) outputs with respect to TA for TP&R. Second, it assesses
the effectiveness of the policy implementation in terms of tangible (induced) outputs.
Did the interventions lead to improved local and multilateral trade policy and negotiating
capacity, trade facilitation, and standard compliance? Finally, it tries to validate the
intervention logic to see if the interventions contributed to the ultimate objective of aid for
trade, i.e. more trade and trade diversification.
In line with this reasoning, the objective of this evaluation is to answer the following
central evaluation question:
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Has the technical assistance for trade policy and regulations financed by the Netherlands between 2007 and
2016 achieved its intended results?
To answer the central evaluation question, the following sub-questions are addressed:
1. What was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy with respect to supporting TA for TP&R
between 2007 and 2016?
2. What were the intended (induced) outputs of the programmes financed by the
Netherlands between 2007 and 2016?
3. Were these (induced) outputs achieved?
4. Was Dutch support in the area of TA for TP&R between 2007 and 2016 coherent with and
complementary to interventions financed by other donors (bilateral and multilateral)?
5. What evidence is there for the effectiveness of AfT in general and TA for TP&R in
particular in increasing trade, enabling economic growth and reducing poverty?
6

7

See the OECD DAC definition of ODA (Oecd.org, 2017b). It is important to note that general support to the WTO
is not ‘ODAble’, not even for a small percentage. So even though the world trading system can be seen as a
global public good that also contributes to development, the regular contribution of the Netherlands to the
WTO is not evaluated as AfT. This study only looks at expenditure that qualifies as ODA. Some of the technical
assistance, however, facilitates developing countries in benefitting from this global good that is regulated by
the WTO. In that sense, the global good character of the world trading system is important for AfT.
The assumption of a positive and significant trade-growth nexus has been studied extensively and is discussed
in the next chapter, together with the relation between trade and poverty alleviation. The positive effects of
trade on poverty alleviation may be direct, through enhanced income as a result of trade, or indirect, as a result
of trade-induced growth (because of more innovation and competition) or increased stability of supply,
demand, and prices. However, an increase in trade may also increase poverty under certain conditions, e.g.
through an effect on inequality.

Objectives and delineation

The last evaluation of Dutch TA for TP&R dates back to 2003. Major changes since then in
bilateral and multilateral policies on trade and development, as well as new insights on AfT,
justify this revisit. The narrow scope of the study will allow us to maximise the potential for
learning.8 The conclusions of this evaluation will provide building blocks for the policy
review of the aid, trade, and investment agenda, due in 2020. This study complements
other IOB evaluations that will contribute to that review, such as the 2014 private sector
development (PSD) evaluation. Jointly these evaluations will inform policy discussions on
potential synergies between trade and development policies. The lessons learned from the
programmes financed by the Netherlands in the period 2007-2016 on TA for TP&R will also
provide relevant inputs for discussions on the future direction of the Aid for Trade Initiative
and the implementation of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation.9

1.4 Dataset and selection of programmes
Not all programmes reported as TA for TP&R are good candidates for evaluation. Some are
too small or too specific, such as contributions to conferences and side events of ministerial
meetings, or not at all representative of the category TA for TP&R.10 The selection of
programmes was based on size and type of intervention. After discarding programmes
that were too specific and non-representative for the category TA for TP&R, a selection was
made that covered nearly all programmes to which the Netherlands contributed more than
EUR 1 million. The selected programmes and their budgets are presented in table 1.2.
The selected sample of programmes accounts for 79% (approximately EUR 128.2 million)
of total TA for TP&R between 2007 and 2016.
One element that should be taken into account is the heterogeneity of the programmes in the
sample, even when classified under the same group heading. This study will nevertheless
try to evaluate them as part of one of the three categories, looking at their common
characteristics so that general conclusions and recommendations can be made. Details on
the programmes can be found in appendix 1.

8

9

10

In their 2013 review and monitoring exercise of the AfT Initiative, OECD and WTO state that ‘evaluations
undertaken by donors often have such a wide focus – on various countries, sectors, instruments and
dependent variables – that at times clear conclusions that would promote learning are lost’ (OECD/WTO, 2013:
p. 152).
In December 2013, the Netherlands signed ‘the Bali Package’. As part of the Bali Package, the Netherlands
committed to the Trade Facilitation Agreement, containing provisions for expediting the movement, release
and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. The Trade Facilitation Agreement is discussed more
extensively in chapter 2.
An example of an excluded programme is the funding of the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from
developing countries (CBI). CBI provides technical assistance for trade development, a category of AfT outside
the scope of this study. CBI was evaluated by IOB in 2015, in the study ‘Aided Trade’ (IOB, 2015).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Table 1.2 Selected programmes: their primary goals and expenditure
Programme

Primary goal(s)

Expenditure
2007-2016
(EUR)

Trade policy and negotiating capacity
Globalising Trade Justice
(GTJ)

Policymakers are informed about (the dangers of)
globalisation

351,279

International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable
Development (ICTSD)

Policymakers are informed about policy developments in the trade and sustainable development
field

11,077,117

Advisory Centre on WTO
Law (ACWL)

Developing countries successfully participate in
WTO dispute settlement and trade negotiations

4,813,719

Netherlands Trainee
Programme (NTP)

Officials from developing countries are empowered
and informed on matters dealt with in WTO

2,982,344

Trade Law Centre for
Southern Africa (Tralac)

Policymakers in SSA are informed about issues
relating to EPAs

1,492,505

Regional Office for Capacity
Building-West and Central
Africa (ROCB-WCA)

Customs administrations are modernised and
reformed, and regional cooperation is increased

974,883

Trade Facilitation Facility
(TFF)

Trade facilitation systems are modernised and
improved

10,341,174

Multi-Donor Trust Fund
Trade and Development
phase 2 (MDTF-TD2)

Countries’ capacity to trade is improved in the
areas of: trade competitiveness and diversification,
trade facilitation, market access, and international
trade cooperation

4,842,502

TradeMark East Africa
(TMEA)

Regional integration is improved through
enhanced trade facilitation

48,705,332

Projects in the area of SPS standards are successfully
developed, coordinated, and implemented

4,726,609

Sustainable Trade Initiative Companies implement sustainability standards and
(IDH)
obtain relevant certifications

13,352,877

Solidaridad

Farmers and workers comply with new, enhanced
sustainability standards.

10,641,422

Fair Trade Original (FTO)

Sustainable supply chains are set up, farmers
participate in those supply chains, and obtain
relevant certifications

3,316,662

Fair Wear Foundation
(FWF)

Labour conditions for garment workers are
improved in compliance with ILO standards

10,590,508

Trade facilitation
| 34 |

Standards
Standards and Trade
Development Facility
(STDF)

Total:
Table constructed based on appraisal documents and financial administration MFA, 2007-2016.

128,208,933

Objectives and delineation

1.5 Methodology and limitations
We used a combination of primary and secondary data to answer the sub-questions listed in
section 1.3. Secondary data were the main source of information, however. The analysis of
Dutch policy on AfT in general and TA for TP&R in particular was based on a review of policy
briefs, letters to Parliament, online interviews with and speeches by (former) ministers,
interviews held with policy officers, and policy descriptions in programme appraisal
reports. The analysis also took EU policy and Dutch positions in international organisations
such as the World Bank and the WTO into account.
The assumption that trade has a positive effect on economic growth and poverty reduction
was reviewed on the basis of the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical.
Indeed, there is a substantial body of literature on the effect of trade on economic growth
and poverty reduction.
Outputs (concrete deliverables) and induced outputs (intended, attributable results of direct
outputs) of the selected programmes were evaluated based on desk research, interviews
with policy officers and executing organisations in the Netherlands, and field visits. The
desk research first looked at programme planning, progress reports, final reports, and other
reports and included an assessment of (in)coherence and in some cases value for money.
This exercise provided an assessment of the direct output of the programmes that were
supported by Dutch financial contributions. The second phase of the desk research looked at
induced outputs. Existing evaluations of the programmes commissioned by the Netherlands,
other donors, and the implementing agencies provided information supplementary to the
sources mentioned above. Primary data collection on induced outputs took place in the
form of interviews with policy officers in The Hague and Dutch executing agencies, and
during field visits to Geneva, Uganda, and Benin. The field visits were used to interview
Dutch programme officers, executing agencies, policymakers, beneficiaries, and other
stakeholders in developing countries, and in some cases for fact finding.
Primary data collection took place during visits to Geneva, Uganda, and Benin. Geneva was
selected because of the presence of policymakers from developing countries that work there
and the fact that many executing agencies have their offices in Geneva. Uganda and Benin
were selected because these partner countries are non-fragile, least-developed countries
(LDCs), where relevant programmes were being implemented not only financed by the
central budget in The Hague, but also by the delegated aid budgets of the Dutch embassies in
these countries. This increased the involvement of the embassies and made them important
sources of information on programme execution, outcome, and donor coordination.
In addition, both countries have substantial amounts of transit trade with neighbouring
countries, which increases the potential benefits of trade policy and facilitation.
The evaluation went an extra mile to obtain information on the likelihood that the
expected outcomes have been achieved. This assessment was based on interviews and
existing internal and external evaluations. Primary data collection concentrated on the
beneficiaries of the programmes. Where possible, the collected information was

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

triangulated, i.e. verified by two or more sources, in order to obtain an accurate picture of
the outputs and outcomes. The empirical literature was the main source used to assess the
likelihood that the outcomes were achieved. Therefore, the empirical literature was also
used to discover which interventions were most suitable to achieve the policy goals. The
literature on the effectiveness of TA for TP&R for trade is essential because it is the main
source of evidence suggesting that the induced outputs of the programmes will lead to
more trade and more trade diversification. It is therefore crucial to the validation of the
intervention logic (see next chapter).
Based on this methodology the evaluation of TA for TP&R provides insight into:
• how the interventions fit into the overall Dutch policy on trade and development;
• how the interventions are supposed to serve the development goals;
• the (induced) outputs; and
• the likely outcomes of the programmes.
The emphasis, however, is on the programmes’ induced outputs, in order to better under­stand why these programmes were financed, and how they could possibly be improved.

| 36 |

There are some challenges and limitations to the methodological approach. First, as
indicated, the methodology relies partly on assumptions and on causalities that are only
validated by secondary sources. Second, the CRS codes are sometimes arbitrarily chosen by
policy officers, which may make it difficult to get a full overview of the subject. Third, effects
on informal trade are not fully taken into account, either in the programmes or in the
literature. Fourth, it should be noted that TA for TP&R focuses on trade in goods rather than
trade in services. This evaluation was not able to explain that choice. Fifth, programmes
tend to address either exports or imports, which makes it hard to assess the overall effect on
trade. Sixth, some programmes focus explicitly on exports to Western markets rather than
on trade in general, including in regional markets. The limitations of focusing on such
specific trade destinations were not evaluated. Finally, this evaluation did not look at the
effects of development policy coherence on trade. This means that the reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU), for example, was not evaluated as
a form of Aid for Trade.

1.6		 Organisation of this report
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Dutch policy, the intervention logic, and the portfolio
and expenditure on TA for TP&R of the Netherlands. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide the
evaluation findings and conclusions for the three respective categories: trade policy and
negotiating capacity, trade facilitation, and standards. A more detailed description and
assessment of the individual programmes in the sample is provided in appendix 1. The
evaluations of the individual programmes provide insight into the establishment and
objectives of the programmes, their donors, systematic reviews and existing evaluations,
findings on outputs, induced outputs, likely effects of the interventions, and conclusions.

Objectives and delineation

| 37 |

2
Policy reconstruction, portfolio,
and intervention logic

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

2.1 Introduction
Dutch Aid for Trade policy aims to enhance developing countries’ integration into the world
trading system, facilitate economic growth, and reduce poverty. Whereas this final goal has
remained unchanged over the years, the more specific policy objectives and instruments
have varied over time. Every minister for development cooperation has made his or her own
choices and has emphasised different aspects, reflected by preferences for countries,
channels, organisations, subjects, and methods.
This chapter is organised as follows. First, section 2.2 gives an overview of Dutch policy on
trade and development over time, with a special emphasis on AfT, and presents conclusions
on what this policy has meant for TA for TP&R. This section ends with the portfolio, because
the choice of interventions is an integral part of policy. Subsequently, we reconstruct an
intervention logic that was based on that policy (section 2.3). The intervention logic explains
how the chosen approach and selected instruments lead to the achievement of the policy
objectives. Finally, section 2.4 discusses empirical evidence on the relation between trade
and economic growth and poverty reduction.

2.2	Aid for Trade in the Netherlands’ policy on trade and
development
This section provides a reconstruction of the policy on trade and development over the
years. Without knowledge of the policy objectives, it is impossible to review the particular
intervention choices. We briefly discuss the evolution of the policy on trade and development
prior to 2007 to understand how AfT has come to the stage it has reached and what role it
plays in Dutch policy on trade and development today. There is very little in the trade and
development policy specifically related to TA for TP&R. Therefore, this policy overview is rather
general on trade and development with more detail on AfT and TA for TP&R, when possible.

2.2.1

Dutch policy prior to 2007

Trade has always been part of Dutch development policy. Initially, the focus was on
continuing historical links and historical colonial trade flows, such as the trading of spices,
cocoa, coffee, tea, rubber, and tin. In later years, the trade began to diversify. Until the late
1990s, Dutch development policy with respect to trade was based on promoting export and
import substitution. The idea was that exports would give developing countries the foreign
currency needed to buy capital goods and that high tariffs would protect emerging and new
(infant) industries. Support to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa was combined with more specific support
for exporting companies in developing countries, through the Centre for the Promotion of
Imports from developing countries (CBI). This policy was not very effective, as trade flows
between developing and developed countries did not change much and continued to
consist mainly of primary commodities and manufactures on the basis of preferential

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

tariffs. The impact of these trade preferences was often offset by overvalued exchange rates
in the exporting developing countries. And the high rates of import protection led to
inefficient production rather than new industries.
Structural adjustment, enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank, and GATT- and WTO-induced preference erosion, combined with impressive examples
of export-led growth in Asia, changed the attitude of many developing countries towards
trade. As a result, policies based on self-sufficiency and import substitution were
abandoned. Just as countries such as Brazil, India, and Chile began to open up unilaterally
and lead by example, Dutch development thinking began to change as well. It changed
from advocating infant industry protection to stressing the beneficial impact of openness
and competition on productivity. It changed from stressing the need for preferences to
stressing the need for lower transaction costs. These transaction costs were very high as a
result of poor infrastructure, a lack of economies of scale, and poorly developed regulatory
institutions, and were a larger barrier to trade than tariffs ever were.

| 40 |

This change in development thinking on trade in the Netherlands led to a change in policy
with the appointment of Eveline Herfkens (1998-2002), a former Permanent Representative
of the Netherlands to the WTO, as Minister for Development Cooperation. Minister Herfkens
put trade policy and policy coherence for development centre stage. AfT was placed primarily
in the context of a more equitable, multilateral rules-based trading system. Development
assistance was used for capacity building, to give developing countries more negotiating
capacity through better information and enhanced negotiation skills. Support was given to
organisations and programmes such as the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development (ICTSD), the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the Trade Law Centre for
Southern Africa (Tralac), the Zuid-Noord Federatie (ZNF), and the Netherlands Trainee
Programme (NTP). Minister Herfkens stated that the WTO system functioned like a ‘rich
man’s club’ (Trouw, 2001). Development cooperation would need to assist developing
countries in claiming their rightful positions in negotiations and adjust the WTO agenda to
also serve their needs. Dutch support was provided accordingly to achieve those purposes.
She further urged developing countries to change their development strategies by
integrating trade and development policies into them and by assisting the private sector in
developing countries to overcome obstacles to trade (Trouw, 2001). Trade policy for
development was also promoted by the Netherlands at the EU level in view of the EU’s
unique competence for trade. In 2001, the EU decided on zero tariffs for LDCs under the
Everything but Arms initiative, as part of their Generalised System of Preferences. The EU
also pleaded for lower tariffs among developing countries to stimulate South-South trade.
The change in Dutch development policy, with a new focus on trade, coincided with
developments at the WTO level. Launched in Doha, Qatar in 2001, the 9th WTO Trade Round,
the Doha Development Round (DDR), officially put development at the heart of the agenda.
Technical assistance and capacity building were recurring components in the Ministerial
Declaration (WTO, 2001). This was strongly supported by the Netherlands and was also in
line with the EU’s position. As part of the Doha Round, the Aid for Trade Initiative was
officially launched in Hong Kong at the Ministerial Conference in 2005.
Box 2.1 provides a detailed overview of the Aid for Trade Initiative.

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

Box 2.1

The Aid for Trade Initiative

The WTO’s Aid for Trade Initiative was officially launched at the Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference in 2005. Technical assistance for capacity building had been
part of the Doha agenda since the start of the Round in 2001. The Doha Declaration
acknowledged the need for technical assistance to complement the trade liberalisations under negotiation (WTO, 2001). In the Ministerial Conference of 2005 this
technical assistance was officially endorsed as the Aid for Trade Initiative.
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration confirmed the importance of AfT for
developing countries ‘to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO
Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade’ (WTO, 2005, par. 57).
Following Hong Kong, a Task Force was formed in 2006, to identify how the AfT
Initiative would need to be operationalised. Its mission was threefold: determine
the scope of AfT; determine how to deliver AfT; and determine who should manage
the transfers.* The Task Force report (WTO, 2006) made explicit recommendations.
Regarding the scope of the agenda, it suggested that the AfT Initiative should reach
beyond traditional TA for institutional capacity building. It recommended including
programmes for building infrastructural and productive capacity as well, and even
going beyond this, into support for adjustment and other trade-related needs.**
The Task Force recommended that WTO develop a global platform to monitor
progress and share best practices and lessons learned. By 2017, WTO and OECD has
co-organised six thematic Global Reviews. These reviews were accompanied by the
publication of Aid for Trade at a glance reports.
The Task Force’s report did not make any explicit recommendations regarding the
financial and institutional design for monitoring transfers. The AfT institutional
framework for delivering AfT was designed in a horizontal manner,*** built on the
progress of existing programmes and channels, pursuing more and better AfT
delivery rather than designing a new global fund for AfT. Within this horizontal
framework, several (multilateral) institutions now play a coordinating role in the
delivery of funds, the implementation of projects, and the M&E of results. These
include the World Bank, EIF, and the STDF, the latter both being hosted by the WTO.
*	Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) have classified these three aspects as the ‘needs question’: What should be
funded, the ‘instrument question’: in what form should funds be given, and the ‘institutional question’:
who should manage the transfer.
**	As outlined in chapter 1, the WTO specified six areas on the AfT agenda, namely: (1) trade policy and
regulations; (2) trade development; (3) trade-related infrastructure; (4) building productive capacity; (5)
trade-related adjustment; and (6) other trade-related needs.
***	In a horizontally structured AfT framework, funds are delivered via different, independent (pre-existing)
channels. Conversely, the design of a vertical mechanism implies that funds will be channelled through a
single organ to manage the collection and allocation of AfT, e.g. through a separate fund.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Minister Agnes van Ardenne (2002-2007) followed in the footsteps of her predecessor,
advocating trade integration for developing countries: ‘By providing trade-related assistance
we, and other development partners, will help poor countries develop their trade
competitiveness, and thus strengthen their economies in their gradual integration into the
global economy. A big shift for many economies, which requires measures to protect
vulnerable groups, and capacity building to effectively take those measures: Aid for trade.
I am shifting the focus of Dutch development assistance to that aim’ (Van Ardenne, 2004).

| 42 |

Worldwide, new types of import barriers, in particular TBTs and SPS standards, started to
proliferate during the years that minister Van Ardenne was in office. This happened in
anticipation of the reduction of tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies in the Doha
Round, and because of increased environmental awareness and consumer concerns about
product and food safety, especially in developed countries. It was recognised that this would
restrict the impact of trade reforms on development in developing countries. The Netherlands’
policy objective to assist in building SPS capacity was emphasised in the joint policy note of
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality (LNV) and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. It noted that SPS capacity constraints, such as the lack of certified laboratories,
improper regulations, and unqualified personnel made it difficult to comply with
international standards (KST 28.318-2, 2002). The Netherlands increased the number of
support programmes and public-private partnerships (PPPs). These programmes and PPPs
increased the capacity of producers in developing countries to comply with international
standards and even private standards, which often go beyond or differ from public
standards, but which are de facto a condition for exporting to Western markets. These
programmes are part of trade development, however, and therefore fall outside the scope of
this evaluation. Several policy notes also addressed the need to support developing
countries in building the necessary expertise and negotiation skills to participate in the
international standard-setting organisations (KST 28.318-2, 2002; KST 29.237-1, 2003).
Developing countries gave examples of the misuse of SPS and TBT measures to protect
developed countries’ markets and stressed the need for having scientific evidence as
justification rather than invoking the precautionary principle.11 In response to this, the
Netherlands started to support STDF and standard-setting programmes by the World Bank.

2.2.2	2007-2010: from development-friendly trade agreements to
facilitating trade
Because ‘it is simply not true that the tide of globalisation is lifting all the boats’ (Koenders,
2007, speech), Minister Bert Koenders (2007-2010) emphasised that a Dutch AfT strategy
should be designed to help developing countries translate trade agreements into inclusive
economic growth. Trade and economic growth policy needed to be integrated into the
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) of developing countries. Minister Koenders
decided to strengthen the role of producer organisations, trade unions, knowledge
11

The precautionary principle is part of the SPS Agreement. When faced with situations where little or only
unreliable evidence is available for the assessment of risks to health or the environment, countries have the
right to adopt appropriate provisional SPS measures to protect against risks under the precautionary principle
(UNCTAD, 2005). The precautionary principle can be applied for a ‘reasonable amount of time’ while in the
meantime, the additional scientific information is being obtained.

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

institutions, civil society, and media in partner countries to achieve more ownership and
local support for trade agreements that would benefit developing countries and have an
impact on poverty. This approach was expected to encourage dialogue and expand the
institutional capacity in terms of knowledge and expertise. Minister Koenders emphasised
the role of trade policy to promote inclusiveness and sustainable growth, which he saw as
important conditions for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 1, 7 and 8.12
A concrete example of how this policy was implemented was the start of the Sustainable
Trade Initiative (IDH) in 2008, a PPP that supports the organisation and establishment of
sustainable commodity chains. The policy note ‘Our Common Concern’ (2007) addressed
AfT only in broad terms, but was specific on the regulatory role for governments in
developing countries in support of PSD and economic growth. The note highlighted
support instruments such as trade facilitation, knowledge building, administrative justice,
and combating corruption (MFA, 2007).
In 2007, the Council of the EU and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States meeting within the Council, adopted conclusions on the ‘EU Strategy on Aid for
Trade: Enhancing EU support for trade-related needs in developing countries’. These were
completely in line with Dutch policy: ‘The EU will seek to broaden significantly the inclusion
of trade and AfT in poverty reduction and national development strategies by 2010, through:
• enhanced joint policy dialogue;
• supporting partner countries’ use of participatory processes, including local civil societies
and trade actors (e.g. private sector, consumer organisations, producer organisations)
when establishing poverty reduction and national development strategies; and
• engagement with other donors and international financial institutions to that end.’
(Council of the European Union, 2007: p. 6). The conclusions stated in particular that the
EU would help facilitate, implement and adjust to trade reform and liberalisation paying
specific attention to their impact on poverty reduction, in response to partner countries’
own trade-related priorities, in the context of poverty reduction strategies (Council of the
European Union, 2007).

12

MDG 1: To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; MDG 7: To ensure environmental sustainability; and MDG 8:
To develop a global partnership for development.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Box 2.2

The EU Aid for Trade Policy13

On 15 October 2007, the EU Council adopted the EU Aid for Trade Strategy aimed at
supporting developing countries integrate into world trade. The strategy is a joint
EU policy initiative, providing for a double and complementary focus on more
resources to AfT and better impact on development objectives, especially with a
view to poverty reduction. The EU AfT Strategy is articulated around five key
activities:
•	Scaling-up total EU AfT in general as well as increasing the specific funding of
Trade Related Assistance to reach EUR 2 billion annually by 2010 (EUR 1 billion
from EC, EUR 1 billion from EU member states), as promised by the EU in 2005;
•	Enhancing the impact and pro-poor focus of EU AfT;
•	Increasing EU-wide and member states’ donor capacity in line with globally
agreed aid effectiveness principles;
•	Supporting the ACP regional integration process; and
•	Ensuring an effective monitoring and reporting to sustain the process of
implementing commitments.
EU AfT is delivered as other EU aid, following agreed Aid Effectiveness principles.
This means going through policy dialogue, needs assessments, inclusion of
priorities into national and regional development strategies (such as Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers), and formulation of response strategies on this basis.
This is the only way to ensure ownership, coherent programmes and sustainability.

| 44 |

Dutch and EU development policy further stimulated regional integration among
developing countries to promote global integration. The ‘Our Common Concern’ policy
note (2007) stressed the importance of LDCs fully exploiting their trade potential. It called
on rapidly growing middle-income countries to open up to least developed countries’
products. It also advocated asymmetrical market access and flexible rules of origin under
the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) (MFA, 2007). Dutch and EU assistance to
regional integration included efforts to build the capacity to negotiate and implement
regional agreements as well as efforts to stimulate regional trade through trade facilitation.
The latter process included technical assistance to modernise and harmonise (customs)
procedures and institutional arrangements, including TBTs and SPS standards (Council of
the European Union, 2007). This policy concretely led to Dutch and EU support for the
World Customs Organization (WCO) for the West and Central Africa region. Regional
integration was a cross-cutting priority for all three subcategories of TA for TP&R. In 2009,
a working paper on AfT formalised Dutch policy along the lines of what the Netherlands
had reported to the OECD (the DDE Aid for Trade, Working Paper, 2009). Based on this
paper, the Netherlands decided to support the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund on trade
development.
13

Copied from the website of the European Commission (EC, 2009).

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

2.2.3

2010-2012: Budget cuts, supply-side constraints and value chains

In 2010, the new centre-conservative government cut the budget for development
cooperation from 0.8% to 0.7% of GDP. Secretary of State Ben Knapen (2010-2012) reduced
the number of themes, concentrating assistance on areas where the Netherlands held a
comparative advantage, and reduced the number of partner countries from 33 to 15
(KST 32.500-V-15, 2010).
In line with the recommendations of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy
(WRR, 2010),14 Dutch policy on trade and development remained focused on the
establishment of a fair and rules-based international trading system. The latter would give
developing countries the necessary support and space in negotiations to look after their
interests. Support to the institutions based in Geneva therefore continued.
Support to bilateral PSD programmes, including AfT programmes, was not restricted to the
15 partner countries. Support to the social sectors was partly phased out, putting more focus
on economic sectors: ‘The emphasis will be on self-reliance, as we move from aid to
investment’ (KST 32.500-V-15: p. 2). Dutch businesses got more involved in the
implementation of development programmes and projects. The PPP with Solidaridad is an
example (see KST 32605, no. 56, 2011). This PPP supported the setting up of business support
offices in developing countries to facilitate value chain development and the export of
commodities that are of strategic economic importance to the Netherlands and have a large
environmental impact. Solidaridad organised ‘Roundtables’ that included local farmers’
organisations as well as large multinational companies such as Rabobank, Unilever,
Coca Cola, Suikerunie, Nutreco, and Friesland Campina. The increase of domestic, regional,
and international sales by the private sector in developing countries became an indicator
of success. In 2011, the Netherlands decided to support TradeMark East Africa (TMEA),
which focuses on trade facilitation.

2.2.4

2012: A new agenda for aid, trade, and investment

In 2012, a new coalition government of the liberal conservative party (VVD) and the labour
party (PvdA) created a new ministerial post: Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.
Combining trade and development was expected to generate synergy. Both the Netherlands
and developing countries were to benefit from a more coherent policy on aid, trade, and
investment. Trade and investment became more prominent in development policy, because
‘no country can develop with aid alone’ (Ploumen, 2015, speech). The implicit assumption
behind that remark was that trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) – which provides
access to capital, technology, markets, and management – are necessary to boost PSD in
developing countries. Minister Ploumen particularly encouraged the promotion and
support of Dutch exports and investment through government instruments (subsidies and
loans), expecting this to boost inclusive growth and poverty reduction in developing
countries. Although she continued to stress the importance of institutions and a conducive
business climate, she put more emphasis on the role of the private sector and the
importance of FDI than her predecessors.
14

Knapen was a member of the WRR before becoming Secretary of State.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

In the ‘A World to Gain’ policy note (2013), Minister Ploumen underscored her strong
commitment to provide technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries
for trade facilitation so as to reduce trade costs. The note promised to help low- and
middle-income countries acquire the necessary knowledge of the trading system, its
procedures, and dispute settlement (ACWL was mentioned), in order to give them more
influence (MFA, 2013).

| 46 |

On standards, minister Ploumen wrote: ‘Products traded on European markets are subject
to strict safety, sustainability and packaging standards. These standards are a barrier to
products from low- and middle-income countries. They protect our consumers but
indirectly give our manufacturers a competitive advantage. Rather than lowering our
standards, we will encourage producers from developing countries to comply with them’
(MFA, 2013: pp. 21-22). Several processes were initiated to create sector-specific international
corporate social responsibility covenants (ICSR-covenants), e.g. in the garment and textiles
industry. The ICSR-covenants are a multi-stakeholder initiative, bringing together businesses,
NGOs, knowledge institutes, and the Dutch government, to address societal risks, such as
violations to human rights, labour rights, and the environment. Standards have also been a
focal area of the EU’s AFT strategy. The 2012 EU Communication on ‘Trade, growth and
development’ describes the need to strengthen developing countries’ compliance with
domestic and international labour and environmental standards (EC, 2012).
Similar to her predecessors, Minister Ploumen prioritised the completion of the EPAs in her
policy. She emphasised the benefits of the EPAs for developing countries in ICTSD’s Bridges
Africa review. She stated that Europe provides developing countries’ products with a large
consumer market. At the same time, the integration of developing countries into European
value chains would create opportunities for technical solutions and innovations from
Europe to strengthen developing countries’ business sectors (Ploumen, as stated in Bridges
Africa, 2014). The EPAs were also expected to boost regional cooperation and trade among
the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries). Regional integration
would not only provide a larger internal market, but also encourage developing countries to
form blocks to create a stronger global position for themselves in trade negotiations.
In December 2013, the Netherlands and all other WTO members signed the WTO’s Bali
Package. This package included a commitment to ratify and implement the Trade
Facilitation Agreement (TFA) (see box 2.3). By signing the Bali Package, the Netherlands
promised to assist developing countries with the necessary technology and investments for
building the institutional infrastructure to streamline and harmonise customs formalities,
procedures, and documentation requirements. The TFA was a breakthrough in the
negotiations since the start of the Doha Round. It differed from earlier WTO agreements
because this was the first time a WTO Agreement that linked the implementation of
commitments by developing countries to the availability of technical assistance.

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

Box 2.3

The Trade Facilitation Agreement

At the WTO’s 9th Ministerial Conference held in 2013 on Bali, Indonesia, WTO members
concluded negotiations on the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which was the
first multilateral trade agreement negotiated and adopted by all WTO members
since the start of the Doha Round. In February 2017, the TFA entered into force.
The agreement was part of the wider ‘Bali Package’, which aims to lower trade
barriers worldwide. The TFA is divided into three different sections.
Section I of the agreement contains provisions to expedite the movement, release and
clearance of goods, through cheaper, faster and more transparent border transactions*
(WTO TFAF, 2015). Moreover, this section includes provisions to encourage customs
cooperation and enhance regional integration. According to the 2015 WTO World Trade
Report, the full implementation of these measures has the potential to lead to an
additional export value of between USD 1.8 trillion and USD 3.6 trillion (WTO, 2015a).
Section II of the agreement contains the specifications for special and differential
treatment for developing countries and LDCs. It includes articles on the implementation period and the provision of technical assistance for building the necessary
capacity to implement the provisions. With trade barriers being particularly high in
developing countries, and with substantial potential efficiency gains on border
procedures, proponents of the TFA argue that it will benefit these countries in
particular.
Section III contains provisions that establish a permanent committee on trade
facilitation at the WTO and require members to have a national committee to
facilitate the coordination and implementation of the TFA.
The TFA came at an important moment, providing momentum for the continuation
of multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round, which focuses on integrating
developing countries into the WTO’s rules-based international trading system.
The commitment of WTO members to providing technical assistance is seen as a
down payment to developing countries to conclude the Doha Round.
More critical voices have expressed their concerns with the current imbalances in
the agreement. For instance, a report published by the Geneva-based South Centre
argued that because the TFA does not address priorities to increase production and
to invest in hard infrastructure, it will primarily lead to the facilitation of imports
and increase trade deficits in developing countries (South Centre, 2013). Another
criticism reflects the concern that developing countries are better off with tailored
agreements that allow them to reform in their own manner, rather than through
multilateral agreements with binding obligations (South Centre, 2013).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

The success of the TFA will depend on the implementation of trade facilitation and
the technical assistance provided to help developing countries tailor the agreement
to also benefit their exports and build trade capacity. The agreed technical
assistance falls completely within the AfT category of TP&R.
*	The integration of border posts and mandatory electronic payments (i.e. through the implementation of
electronic single windows) are at the basis of these reforms.

2.2.5

Policy objectives and interventions

The overarching goal of Dutch AfT policy in the period 2007-2016 was to facilitate the
integration of low- and middle-income countries into a rules-based global trading system,
so that increased trade flows would lead to economic development and poverty reduction in
a sustainable and inclusive manner. Three explicit policy objectives for TA for TP&R contributed
to this overarching goal and led to the specific interventions that are the subject of this
evaluation.

| 48 |

First, Dutch and EU TA for TP&R had to enhance the role of trade policy in development.
For this, support was given to strengthen developing countries’ trade policy and negotiating
of capacity. The emphasis was twofold. First, emphasis on knowledge and creating awareness
of the role that trade could play and of the advantages of a rules-based trading system, also
for developing countries. Second, emphasis on technical assistance to build the developing
countries’ capacity to negotiate trade terms, which would facilitate their economic
development. This translated into support to the institutions based in Geneva, such as the
ICTSD, ACWL, and the WTO (the Netherlands Trainee Programme (NTP)). Later, the emphasis
shifted to integrating trade policy into national and regional development strategies.
For this, support was given to ICTSD, Tralac, ZNF for their Globalising Trade Justice (GTJ)
programme, and more recently (in 2016) to the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF).
A second policy objective has been trade facilitation to reduce the complexity and cost of
regulations and procedures for developing a country’s trade. Trade facilitation can reduce
the cost and time of trade, thereby increasing developing countries’ access to and
competitiveness in international markets. As for improving regulations, one can think of
customs rules, tax rules, security rules, visa formalities, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
controls, transport rules, trade licensing, e-customs procedures, insurance, and clearance
procedures. Instruments to improve trade facilitation include TMEA, WCO, the World Bank
MDTF-TD2, and the World Bank TFF.
Third, Dutch and EU development policy underlined the role of standards, such as SPS and
TBT standards. This generated activities to reduce border rejection, maintain a market share
in existing markets, and increase access to new markets. Initially the emphasis was on
creating awareness of the trade-facilitating role of standard compliance, strengthening the
institutional framework in developing countries, and their participation in international
standard bodies. Support to STDF was in line with this. Later on, more emphasis and support
was given to private sector initiatives, notably through IDH, Solidaridad, Fair Trade Original
(FTO), and the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF).

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

Regional integration played a cross-cutting role. European and Dutch development policy
emphasised the role of regional development strategies, regional market development,
regional trade facilitation, and regional harmonisation and mutual recognition of
standards. The idea was that regional integration could serve as a stepping stone to global
integration. As developing countries gradually set and complied with higher standards, they
would eventually enter high-standard markets. Regional integration would also allow
developing countries to act as a trade block in trade negotiations, giving them a stronger
bargaining position.
An example of support for trade policy and negotiating capacity with a strong focus on
regional integration is the support to Tralac, including Tralac’s EPA Programme. Regional
integration was an important objective in the programme. Support to the ICTSD’s EPA
programme also specified the need to promote regional integration in African countries.
An example of a trade facilitation project with a focus on regional integration is the effort
by the World Bank’s TFF programme to reduce the transaction time and costs of trade for
compliant economic operators along the Abidjan-Lagos road corridor in Ghana and
Côte d’Ivoire and at their main ports.
Finally, support to STDF is an example of a programme that also focuses on regional
integration within the standards category. STDF provided funding to the Inter-American
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) and its country members to comply with the
SPS Agreement, in essence to encourage regional integration.

2.2.6

TA for TP&R portfolio and expenditure

During the period 2007-2016, a total of EUR 162.3 million was spent on TA for TP&R
programmes. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of expenditure across the three
subcategories.
Dutch bilateral and multilateral expenditure on TA for TP&R (2007-2016)

Figure 2.1

28%

44%

Trade Facilitation
28%

Standards Negotiating
Trade Policy and
Negotiating Capacity

Source: financial administration MFA (Piramide).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Figure 2.1 shows that trade facilitation programmes received the largest share of the budget
that was spent on TA for TP&R between 2007 and 2016. Total spending on trade facilitation
programmes in this period equalled EUR 72.3 million. Support to TMEA, TFF, and MDTF-TD2
formed the bulk of the expenditure in this category (accounting for over 88% of trade
facilitation expenditure). The shares of expenditure on standards and trade policy and
negotiating capacity, which amounted to EUR 45.4 million and EUR 44.7 million respectively,
were smaller. Support to STDF, IDH, Solidaridad and FWF formed the bulk of the expenditure
on standards programmes (together almost 87% of funding in this category). Support to
Geneva institutes (e.g. ACWL, ICTSD, and NTP)15 made up the greater share of expenditure
on trade policy and negotiating capacity programmes (71% of this category).
Figure 2.2 shows expenditure on TA for TP&R over time. The share of trade facilitation
programmes increased from EUR 0.6 million (5% of total TA for TP&R) in 2007 to
EUR 12.8 million (44%) in 2016. Spending on standard programmes also increased, from
EUR 2.3 million (21%) in 2007 to EUR 12.1 million (42%) in 2016. As a result, relatively speaking
funding for trade policy and negotiating capacity programmes decreased over time.
However, the absolute amounts in this category also decreased. Whereas it still accounted
for EUR 7.9 million (74%) in 2007, by 2016 this had been reduced to EUR 3.9 million (14%).
Figure 2.2

Dutch bilateral and multilateral expenditure on TA for TP&R (2007-2016)

40
35
30
EUR million

| 50 |

25
20
15
10
5
0
2007 2008 2009 2010
Standards

2011

Trade Facilitation

2012

2014

2015

2016

Trade Policy and Negotiating Capacity

Source: financial administration MFA (Piramide).

15

2013

This also includes programmes that are not part of the sample.

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

Figure 2.3 shows the division of labour between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in The
Hague and the Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKNs). Almost all of the
programmes were financed from central budgets. DDE was responsible for the majority of
the programmes in the dataset (75%, equalling EUR 121.1 million for the period 2007-2016).
Only a small part of the programmes (11.8%, equalling EUR 19.2 million for period 2007-2016)
was supported by the embassies’ decentralised budget. Annual expenditure from decentralised
budgets never exceeded EUR 4.0 million. Figure 2.3 also shows the percentage of decentralised
expenditure as a percentage of total spending on TA for TP&R. This percentage has decreased
over time, to 0.7% in 2016.
Figure 2.3

Centralised versus decentralised TA for TP&R expenditure (2007-2016)

40

100%
90%

35

80%

EUR million

30

70%
25

60%

20

50%
40%

15

30%

10

20%

5

10%

0

0%
2007 2008 2009 2010
decentralised

2011

2012

2013

centralised

2014

2015

2016

decentralised as
percentage of total

Source: constructed using data from financial administration MFA (Piramide).

2.3 Intervention logic
Our study of Dutch policy over the years revealed that policies concentrated on what should
be attained rather than how. Policy objectives were clearly formulated, although in general
terms and in terms of outcome. There were many objectives related to trade and Aid for
Trade in general, but very few on TA for TP&R in particular. How the policy objectives were
supposed to be achieved was hardly ever described in policy documents. How they were
thought to be achieved was evident from the selection of interventions. Of course, behind
this selection was the expectation that the interventions could attribute or at least contribute
to the policy objectives. To make this relation clear and verifiable, we constructed an

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

intervention logic (figure 2.4) that schematically shows how interventions are expected to
lead to results. This intervention logic was constructed based on information obtained from
policy officers, programme and project proposals, and appraisal reports. Policy officers
agreed with the intervention logic and often referred to theoretical and empirical literature
to underpin the assumption that increasing trade and trade diversification leads to
economic growth and poverty alleviation, the objectives of development cooperation.
The WTO AFT Task Force outlined multiple goals for AfT. They include assisting developing
countries to: increase exports, increase market access, build supply-side capacity, increase
adjustment capacities, enhance regional integration, improve growth prospects, and reduce
poverty (WTO, 2006). In this evaluation, we combined these goals in two overarching goals:
trade growth and trade diversification and examined the intensive margin (current traders/
countries trade in greater volumes) and the extensive margin (more markets and more
diversified products).

| 52 |

Ministries and
departments
responsible for
negotiating trade policy.

Trade policy & negotiating capacity
Building negotiating capacity: Support to enhance
developing country’s eﬀective participation in
international/regional trade fora and dispute
bodies; support to build capacity to assess impact
of MTAs and RTAs; support to build capacity to
negotiate favourable trade terms; support to
facilitate accession to WTO and other
multilateral trade-related organisations.

Customs departments,
revenue authorities,
and regulatory bodies.

Ministries and
departments responsible
for negotiating standards.

National standards
bodies, including testing,
measuring and quality
assurance bodies.

Trade facilitation
Reform administration and border agency
cooperation; support for the simpliﬁcation and
harmonisation of international import and
export procedures; ﬁscal adjustment and tariﬀ
reforms.

Standards
Building negotiating capacity: support for eﬀective
participation in standards negotiations, dispute
bodies and international and regional standards
bodies.

Standards
Standards implementation: support to mainstream
standards agreements in national policy;
support for standard setting, promotion, testing
and certiﬁcation.
Activity-speciﬁc: e.g.
number of standards
set, adopted, and
implemented.

Activity-speciﬁc: e.g.
number of oﬃcials
trained, and number
of oﬃcials
participating in
international bodies.

Activity-speciﬁc: e.g.
number of border
oﬃcials trained,
OSBPs opened,
and advice given.

Activity-speciﬁc:
e.g. number of
oﬃcials trained and
papers published.

Activity-speciﬁc:
e.g. number of
oﬃcials trained,
promotion activities
executed, or
notiﬁcations ﬁled.

outputs

Services
improved.

Trade procedures and
regulations simpliﬁed,
harmonised, and
improved; customs
systems modernised.

Changed national
standards policy;
more favourable
international standards
policy, national
application of
internationally agreed
standards; quality
harmonisation and
assurance; higher
quality products.

International trade
agreements negotiated
that represent
developing country
needs.

Improved negotiating
and institutional
capacity; enhanced
participation in
international
organisations.

Increased
market
access.

Transaction
costs and
transit time
reduced.

Changed policies;
enhanced
enforcement;
changed legislation;
trade integrated in
development policies.

More
and more
diversiﬁed
trade.

intermediate outcomes outcome

Enhanced knowledge
(legal, scientiﬁc,
economic); enhanced
cooperation across/
within ministries,
and between public
and private sector.

induced outputs

Increased
employment.

Poverty
reduction
and increased
prosperity.

impact

Figure 2.4

Trade associations,
NGOs, and CSOs.

Ministries, departments
and regulatory bodies
responsible for the
implementation of
trade policy.

applied to:

Trade policy & negotiating capacity
Trade policy: Support for trade policy analysis,
development, reform and enforcement;
mainstreaming trade in development plans;
implementing MTAs and RTAs; trade promotion
activities.

input / intervention

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

Reconstructed intervention logic

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

| 54 |

Figure 2.4 shows the steps and processes that should lead from the interventions to more
and/or more diversified trade. Interventions comprise activities such as training, traineeships,
national trade and development analyses, website development, reform of procedures, and
academic papers and publications. Outputs are the direct immediate results of the TA, which
are within the sphere of control of the executing agent. Measurable outputs include the
number of officials or trainees trained, national trade analyses and diagnostic studies done,
websites that went live, website visits, and papers published. Induced outputs are the direct
result of the outputs provided by the TA, but are beyond the control of the providers of TA.
Induced outputs consist of improved participation in negotiations, as well as the ability to
affect the results of negotiations, tax reforms, trade policies integrated into national
development strategies, streamlined customs procedures, improved participation in
international standard setting, and enhanced levels and enforcement of standards. The
intermediate outcomes are the stepping stones to more and increasingly diversified trade.
TA for TP&NC first requires a change of policy or a different outcome of trade negotiations
as intermediate outcomes. The other interventions lead more directly to the three
intermediate outcomes: improved services, lower trading costs, and increased market
access. Achieving these intermediate outcomes and their effect on the final outcome,
namely more trade and more diverse trade, takes time. This makes attribution very difficult.
Attribution is almost impossible if we look at the expected impact in terms of poverty
alleviation, increased prosperity, and employment. Nevertheless, this last step is necessary
to make the intervention logic consistent with Dutch development policy.
The intervention logic distinguishes between the three categories of interventions that we
defined in chapter 1. Interventions under TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity are
listed in two separate boxes. The top intervention box describes activities that support
countries primarily in developing, implementing, and enforcing trade policy and
integrating trade policy in development strategies. The second intervention box describes
activities directed at building institutional capacity to negotiate favourable trade terms.
The road from TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity to actual trade is longer than
from TA for trade facilitation to trade. To visualise that, two stages of intermediate
outcomes were incorporated into the intervention logic.
Interventions to improve the infrastructural capacity, which fall within the scope of TA for
TP&R, are interventions directed at the regulatory infrastructure, as explained in chapter 1.
This soft infrastructure includes customs rules, tax rules, security rules, visa formalities,
transport rules, trade licensing, e-customs procedures, duty payments, insurance, and
clearance procedures. Because TA for physical infrastructure is outside the scope of this
study, it is not included in the intervention logic.
The lower two intervention boxes describe interventions dealing with standards,
distinguishing between support for standard setting and negotiating capacity and support
for the implementation of standards. Regarding the first box, one can think of activities that
enhance negotiators’ knowledge on standards and on national limitations so they can
negotiate favourable standards in international standard-setting bodies. The second box
refers to support that enhances national standard bodies’ and other institutions’ abilities to

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

learn about, implement, maintain, and control standards, in order to reduce rejection from
export markets and enhance trade. The Netherlands has financed interventions that assist in
developing recipient countries’ institutional framework with respect to standardisation,
testing, and quality assurance services. This support included both public and private
institutions and the regulatory framework within which they operate.
We have constructed more detailed intervention logics for the three categories of
programmes in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Similarly, we have also constructed intervention logics
for the individual programmes, which can be found in appendix 1. Because the intervention
logic presented in figure 2.4 provides an aggregated description, it deviates somewhat from
the intervention logics of the individual programmes and from the intervention logics
constructed for the three categories.

2.4	Empirical evidence on trade-led economic growth
and poverty reduction
Maximising linkages with the rest of the economy and increasing adjustment capacities are
goals that are part and parcel of any trade-enhancing policy. Regional integration, inclusive
growth, and poverty reduction may be the results of trade, but they require a great deal
more than trade alone. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 evaluate the achieved outputs and induced
outputs and their likely effect on trade and trade diversification. The remainder of this
chapter looks at the assumptions that complete the intervention logic. We answer the
question of whether trade growth and trade diversification have led to economic growth
and poverty reduction by reviewing the empirical evidence in the economic literature.
Key questions are: is there an effect of trade on growth and poverty, is the effect positive or
negative, and what is the extent of the effect?

2.4.1

The effect of trade on economic growth

Economic theory generally supports the conclusion that trade positively affects economic
growth. The underlying effects of this relation consist of both static and dynamic effects. In
traditional trade theory, trade allows a country to specialise production and reallocate
resources more efficiently according to its comparative advantage. Other static benefits that
can be realised through trade include improved efficiency from increased competition and
economies of scale and scope due to the created larger and new (international) market(s).
Consequently, the (static) effect of an increase in trade (e.g. as result of a tariff reduction) is
a one-off increase in output and a (short-run) increase in the rate of economic growth
(Nowak-Lehmann, 2000). According to dynamic trade theory, trade also creates additional
dynamic effects. These effects enhance the rate of output growth in the long run, as
additional resources (e.g. human and physical capital and foreign exchange) become
available or as a result of learning by doing (also with respect to marketing). Dynamic
effects include the accumulation of capital via a spillover effect of technology and R&D
embodied in imported goods. Access to foreign exchange and learning by doing in market
penetration may also cause such dynamic effects. Finally, the indirect effects of trade, such

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

as enhanced quality of macroeconomic policy and increased x-efficiency16 may also
influence the rate of economic growth in the long run (Nowak-Lehmann, 2000).

| 56 |

Empirically proving the theoretical relation between trade and economic growth is not
easy.17 A wide array of empirical literature exists on the trade-growth nexus. Empirical
studies include different indicators to measure this relation. Indicators used include the
effect of ‘trade openness’ on income or the effect of ‘trade liberalisation’ on economic
growth. On the effect of trade on growth, the weight of the evidence indicates that there is
indeed a positive correlation (Busse and Königer, 2012; Higgins and Prowse, 2010; Winters
and Masters, 2013). Several studies further distinguish between imports and exports and
find positive effects on growth for both (e.g. Busse and Königer, 2012). Positive effects have
been found for countries at all levels of economic development, also for developing
countries (Busse and Königer, 2012; Brückner and Lederman, 2012). The empirical evidence
shows that the extent of the effect of trade on income depends on structural characteristics,
for countries as well as for different groups of people within a country. Higgins and Prowse
(2010) find that important factors influencing the extent of the effect include the types of
goods that are traded, political power structures, the investment climate, and macroeconomic variables. Improving the trade-related aspects of a country’s business and
investment climate, and creating an ‘enabling environment’ is therefore necessary to harness
the growth potential of trade. The enabling environment can be defined as the institutional
and infrastructural setting, including standards and customs, regulations, policies, trade
agreements, and trade-related infrastructure. A country’s enabling environment can
therefore facilitate or hinder a business in its ability to connect to GVCs. The importance of
the enabling environment for the trade-economic growth relation underpins the relevance
of TA for TP&R programmes that address the enabling environment. TA for TP&R can help
developing countries to achieve more trade-led economic growth.

2.4.2

The effect of trade on poverty reduction

Economic theory suggests that there are several channels through which trade can reduce
poverty. A direct effect of trade on poverty stressed in trade theory is that it improves returns
to production factors that the trading country is abundant in. For developing countries,
which are generally abundant in labour (with wages lower than international averages) and
scarce in capital (with interest rates higher than international averages), trade is expected to
help reduce poverty and improve income distribution. It can achieve the latter by improving
wage and employment conditions. Trade theory further postulates that trade generates
competition that increases product variety and lowers the price of products, including
products bought by poor consumers. Trade can also indirectly help to reduce poverty
through economic growth and macroeconomic stability. As mentioned when discussing the
trade-growth nexus, trade creates economies of scale and scope, and facilitates the diffusion
of knowledge and technological progress that enhance productivity. The resulting increase
16

17

Improvement of x-efficiency describes processes that enhance efficiency in a less-than-perfectly competitive
world. Improvements include better management and more productive staff, also in sectors other than the
exporting sectors.
See, for example, Brückner and Lederman (2012); Winters et al. (2004); and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) for a
more detailed discussion.

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

in production boosts incomes and government revenue. The use of government revenue in
a pro-poor manner, including spending on safety nets, education, and healthcare, will
benefit the poor. Finally, trade reduces the impact of local economic shocks, such as food
shortages, directly affecting poverty, or through the creation of more macroeconomic stability.
Empirical research on the trade and poverty nexus, however, has shown more ambiguous
results. The findings generally conclude that trade does have the effect of reducing poverty
(Winters and Martuscelli, 2014; Winters et al., 2004; EC, 2015). However, the evidence also
shows that the relation is complex. Indeed, the effect differs across countries, and the
extent of the effect is contingent on certain preconditions and contextual factors. In a 2008
cross-country assessment of the relationship between trade, development, and poverty
reduction CUTS found that the same set of policies resulted in distinct outcomes in different
country contexts (CUTS, 2008, as stated in Higgins and Prowse, 2010). Winters and
Martuscelli (2014) reviewed the trade and poverty literature and concluded that the impact
of trade reform varies case by case, depending on the pre-existing economic situation of the
country, the type of reforms, and the poor’s main sources of income (Winters and
Martuscelli, 2014). Le Goff and Singh (2013) empirically studied the effect of trade openness on
poverty and found that the effect may depend on complementary reforms that help a
country take advantage of international competition. Analysing a panel of 30 African
countries over a 30 years period they found that trade openness tends to reduce poverty in
countries where financial sectors are deep, education levels high, and governance strong (Le
Goff and Singh, 2013). An empirical study by the European Commission (EC) (2015) on the
effect of export performance on poverty provided strong empirical evidence that exports and
trade in general have the effect of reducing poverty, but also found that the impact is
contingent on having access to credit: ‘Key findings from the empirical exercise point
towards a poverty reducing impact of exports, if combined with a better access to credit,
which ensures that businesses can enter the market and profit from the opportunities
offered by the export market’ (EC, 2015: p. 6).

2.4.3

The role of Aid for Trade

The idea behind using ODA to enhance trade in developing countries is that trade is an
effective and efficient way to increase economic growth and welfare, including poverty
alleviation. AfT has been provided to help developing countries improve their trade
performance and better integrate into GVCs, thereby meeting certain preconditions that
allow for a positive effect on growth and poverty reduction. AfT intends to help overcome
structural and capacity constraints that hamper trade, in order to maximise the positive
effects of trade on growth and poverty. ‘Aid for Trade should be programmed to optimise
the positive, and limit the negative impact of trade expansion on poor people’ (Higgins and
Prowse, 2010: p. 12).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

The effect of AfT (all categories) on trade has been studied from multiple angles. Studies
include AfT disaggregated by sector, category of aid,18 geographical region, quantifiable
outcomes, such as trade costs and transit time, and a combination of these approaches.19
The empirical findings on the effectiveness of AfT have been somewhat mixed. Overall the
bulk of the evidence shows a positive and significant effect on trade performance, but the
impact tends to vary considerably depending on the income level and geographical region
of the recipient country, and on the areas of trade capacity that are addressed by the AfT
(Basnett et al., 2012). Various studies conclude on the basis of cross-country regression
analysis that trade facilitation and institutional infrastructure are the most effective
categories of AfT in terms of trade performance (Calì and Te Velde, 2011; Hühne et al., 2013;
Basnett et al., 2012).

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Hühne et al. (2013) find that AfT increases recipient exports to donors as well as recipient
imports from donors. Their estimations suggest that a doubling of total AfT would imply an
increase of 5 per cent of recipient exports to donors and an increase of 3 per cent of recipient
imports from donors. This is in line with findings by Helble et al. (2012) and contradicts the,
in the words of Hühne et al., ‘skeptical view that donors grant AfT primarily to promote
their own export interests’ (Hühne et al., 2013: p. 16). Hühne et al. find that their conclusion
on trade between donors and recipient countries also holds when disaggregating AfT into
its three subcategories ‘economic infrastructure’, ‘productive capacity’ and ‘trade policy and
regulations’. Interestingly, they find TP&R to be the most effective form of AfT. A doubling
would be associated with a ten per cent increase in recipient exports. This is in line with
similar findings by Calì and Te Velde (2011) and Helble et al. (2012).

18

19

For instance, defined by (groups of) CRS codes, such as AfT disaggregated according to Aid for Trade policy and
regulations, aid for economic infrastructure, and aid for productive capacity.
For an elaborate overview of different studies and their results, see for instance Basnett et al. (2012) and
Te Velde (2015).

Policy reconstruction, portfolio, and intervention logic

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3
Trade policy and negotiating
capacity

Trade policy and negotiating capacity

3.1 Introduction
The trade-related development policies of the Netherlands and the EU have emphasised the
need for TA for TP&R to build trade capacity in developing countries to facilitate their
integration into the rules-based global trade system. An important aspect of this type of
technical assistance is building trade policy and negotiating capacity (TP&NC) to enhance
developing countries’ ability to reform trade policies, integrate trade policies into national
development strategies, and negotiate favourable trade terms in regional and international
trade negotiations and dispute settlements.
This chapter provides the overall findings on the technical assistance (co-)financed by the
Netherlands on trade policy and negotiating capacity. It covers several elements. First, we
discuss the achieved output and induced output to assess effectiveness. Second, we review
the role donor coordination has played in achieving these outputs and induced outputs.
We look at donor coordination because engagement with other donors was mentioned in
the 2007 conclusions by the Council of the EU and because donor coordination can improve
the efficiency of the technical assistance programmes. Third, we draw conclusions about
the likelihood that the outputs and induced outputs have contributed to the achievement
of expected outcomes. Finally, we present our conclusions on the implementation and
results of this type of technical assistance.

3.2 Achieved output and induced output
The programmes evaluated as part of TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity are ACWL, ICTSD,
NTP, GTJ, and Tralac. A detailed, individual assessment of each of these five programmes is
provided in appendix 1. Together these five programmes account for EUR 20.7 million
(46.3% of total spending on TA for TP&NC) for the period 2007-2016. The outputs, induced
outputs, and expected intermediate outcomes that fall within the scope of this study are
presented in the intervention logic in table 3.1 in more detail than in figure 2.4.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Table 3.1 Intervention logic TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity
Output

Induced output

Expected intermediate
outcome

•	People trained;
•	Departments
reinforced;
•	
Studies and research
done and disseminated;
•	Seminars, workshops,
visits, and campaigns
organised;
•	Trade needs assessments executed;
•	Websites launched and
maintained;
•	Dialogue platforms
organised;
•	Policy and legal advice
given;
•	Networks created and
maintained.

•	Better understanding of international
trade agreements;
•	Better understanding of the WTO
system and the different positions
that the WTO members hold in trade
negotiations;
•	Enhanced cooperation across and
within ministerial departments;
•	Enhanced knowledge (legal, scientific,
economic) and improved negotiation
skills;
•	Increased involvement of private
sector and civil society in beneficiary
country;
•	
Enhanced participation in international
organisations and trade and dispute
bodies;
•	Better position in regional and
international trade negotiations and
dispute settlements.

•	Enhanced
implementation of
trade policies;
•	Enhanced trade law
enforcement;
•	Changed policies;
•	Changed legislation;
•	Trade policies
integrated into
development
strategies;
•	More favourable trade
terms.

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3.2.1

Achieved output

Data on achieved outputs were obtained from programme and project proposals, appraisal
reports, (annual) plans, internal reviews, evaluations, and interviews with policy officers,
beneficiaries, international organisations, and representatives from the programmes.
The programmes in question all documented their direct outputs, providing qualitative and
quantitative data. NTP maintained a database of alumni, including data on the number of
trainees trained annually, per region, and from LDCs, as well as data on what position
alumni hold in ministries. The number of people trained annually corresponded with the
intended number of trainees. In addition, the study trips that were planned, such as visits to
Clingendael and the Port of Rotterdam, went ahead. For ACWL, data provided on the
achieved outputs included a tally of legal opinions and advice provided by subject and by
level of development (GNP/capita), and information on alumni of ACWL’s traineeships.
Because ACWL used a demand-driven approach, there were no specific quantified targets.
ICTSD provided quantified documentation on direct outputs such as website visitors,
participants in organised events, seminars and dialogues, and the number of subscriptions
to Bridges.20 ICTSD had a high level of output. It produced many papers, actively used social
media, and organised numerous events. The output of Tralac and the GTJ programme also
generally went according to plan. Our findings on the achieved outputs correspond to those
20

Since 1997, ICTSD has been publishing Bridges, a tool to disseminate information and knowledge on global
trade and related topics, discussed from a sustainable development perspective. In addition to Bridges, ICTSD
also publishes regional and thematic periodicals, including BioRes (on the nexus of trade and environment) and
Bridges Africa (with an African perspective on trade).

Trade policy and negotiating capacity

in evaluations, which consistently indicate that the planned outputs have generally been
achieved (e.g. Ecorys, 2010; PwC, 2014; Saana Consulting, 2014b).
Yet there are differences in monitoring and evaluation. ICTSD puts a great deal of effort into
the M&E of outputs. ICTSD’s M&E system, which has a detailed log frame with specific
targets for all outputs, makes it possible for them to easily measure and assess their
achievements. ICTSD has published several impact reports and reported on the follow-up of
recommendations made in earlier evaluations. This willingness to be flexible and
continuously improve its M&E system is expected to contribute to the quality of ICTSD’s
outputs. And indeed, evaluations have described ICTSD’s knowledge products as ‘impartial’,
‘real-time’ (with an excellent ability to identify emerging priority areas), and of ‘high
quality’, and its dialogues as ‘fruitful’ (Turner, 2008; Saana Consulting, 2014c). NTP, ACWL,
and Tralac had more basic M&E systems in place. These organisations’ M&E systems
provided only limited information on the quality of outputs. Evaluations of training and
conferences typically asked about client satisfaction, only providing the subjective
appreciation of the usefulness and the quality of outputs. For certain other outputs, there
was no information whatsoever about the quality. ACWL provided very limited information
on outputs from dispute settlement support and legal advice, because of the confidential
nature of its services. While understandable, this made it difficult to assess the quality of
outputs. These findings were confirmed by the 2014 PwC evaluation of ACWL, which stated
that the restricted access to performance data made it difficult to determine the
effectiveness of ACWL’s outputs (PwC, 2014). GTJ did not have an M&E system in place at all.
The available documentation and the single evaluation indicated that generally outputs
were produced. But in the absence of an M&E system, it is impossible to draw conclusions
about the quality of the outputs.
External evaluations qualify the papers, contributions, conferences, and curricula of the
supported organisations as highly relevant. The quality of M&E systems is an indicator of
the professionalism of the organisation, reduces the risks of mistakes and therefore of
implementation costs, and increases the chance of successful and sustainable outcomes.
This was confirmed by the assessments of the files, the progress reports, evaluations, and
the interviews with policy officers, managers of the executing agencies, and stakeholders
who benefitted from the activities.

3.2.2

Achieved induced output

Unlike the generally convincing measurement and achievement of outputs, the measurement
and reporting of induced outputs was more limited. Nevertheless, evaluations and interviews
were used to provide some idea of the direct effects of achieved outputs. To gain insight
into the effect of the traineeships at NTP, ACWL (the Secondment Programme), and Tralac
(the Scholarship Programme), several former trainees, their supervisors at ministries, and
other parties involved were interviewed.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

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Traineeships
The information on the effect of the traineeships was positive and indicated that the
traineeships were helping to change trade policies, increase the integration of trade into
national development policy, and enhance negotiating capacity in trade negotiations. The
induced outputs that were mentioned and described included enhanced knowledge (legal,
scientific, economic) and improved negotiation skills. The training improved the alumni’s
knowledge of trade issues and WTO policy/law, and the alumni were able to show how they
had disseminated their knowledge since returning to their ministries. Activities they had
undertaken on their return included establishing a unit to monitor AfT in all ministries,
initiating high-level interdepartmental policy dialogues, participating in regional and WTO
negotiations, and providing advice to the minister of trade and country delegates on WTO
trade policy/law. Given the small size of many trade departments and the now senior
positions of former trainees in these trade departments,21 the impact of the induced outputs
was substantial. The alumni also mentioned that participating in the WTO process and
attending meetings increased their understanding of the WTO system and created a better
understanding of the different positions on trade issues of various member countries and of
the constraints that their countries faced. Trainees became ambassadors of the WTO system
and WTO policy/law and helped LDCs understand how effective participation in negotiations
can provide trade opportunities. They had a positive effect on the LDCs’ awareness of and
participation in the WTO system, as well as on their trade policy formulation and negotiating
capacity in general.
Another induced output that was mentioned was the integration and increased importance
of trade policy in national development strategies. To illustrate this, a superior of an
alumnus from the ACWL Traineeship noted that the Ministry of Trade had moved up in the
hierarchy of ministries, and that programmes such as the ACWL Traineeship has contributed
to this change. The evidence collected indicated a ripple effect that increased the
effectiveness of the programmes.22
The extent of the effect on policy, legislation, and trade agreements depends on the country’s
institutional capacity and general quality of governance, however. The effectiveness of LDCs
participating in the WTO depends on their level of institutional capacity and awareness of
the role of the WTO system. Traineeships can strengthen this capacity and awareness, but
cannot raise the general level. Tralac, for instance, noted that ‘Institutional capacity is as
necessary as individual competencies, if trade is to contribute to the achievement of
longer-term development priorities, such as employment creation and poverty alleviation.
... Lack of institutional capacity in many government departments, and other organisations
in Africa, is a key challenge for effective policymaking and implementation. Management of
policy processes, to ensure that all stakeholders contribute to and buy into policy, presents
important challenges’ (Tralac, 2006: pp. 5-6). The importance of a certain minimum' level
of capacity was also mentioned in interviews. A former lecturer in Tralac’s Scholarship
Programme noted that the level of the course was high, and required a post-graduate level
and a certain minimum level of professionalism from the scholars.
21
22

Several former trainees were promoted to high-level positions at ministries.
An extensive description of the induced outputs can be found in appendix 1.

Trade policy and negotiating capacity

A policy focus on LDCs therefore requires simultaneous and coordinated assistance to
increase the trade policy capacity of LDCs both at home and in Geneva. Cooperation among
LDCs and peer reviews can play an important role in this process. The WTO’s Sub-Committee
on LDCs provides a platform for cooperation that could be better used. The Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands, who currently holds the chair of this sub-committee,
could be instrumental.
Legal services
According to the former trainees interviewed and the evaluations and literature on ACWL,
the legal opinions and dispute settlement support provided by ACWL created more effective
negotiating positions for the beneficiary countries (Bown, 2009; PwC, 2014). However,
given the confidential nature of the support and the absence of an appropriate performance
framework, the extent of this effect could not be assessed. Because Dutch development
policy focuses on LDCs, the LDCs’ limited use of ACWL’s specific legal advice and Dispute
Settlement Unit (DSU) for litigation support is important. Yet the search for reasons was
inconclusive. A lack of knowledge of ACWL’s existence among policy officials in LDCs could
be a reason. In Uganda and Benin, knowledge of ACWL was very limited, even in ministries
of trade. Several highly positioned officials working on trade in ministries who were
interviewed during the field visits were unaware of the existence of ACWL. Dutch policy
officials confirmed our findings, stating that ACWL is well known among representatives of
LDCs in Geneva, but not in the capitals of LDCs. Another explanation of LDCs limited use of
ACWL’s services may be their lack of capacity to identify lost market access and their lack of
knowledge on the enforcement possibilities that WTO provides (Bown, 2009). Yet the most
important reasons why LDCs are not making more use of ACWL may be that they trade
primarily under preferential trade agreements, benefit from special and differential
treatment provisions in WTO Agreements, and receive other financial benefits that they do
not want to jeopardise by litigation in WTO. Despite the limited use of ACWL’s legal services
by LDCs, they did benefit from the organisation’s general legal support, such as the legal
support it provided during negotiations on the Trade Facilitation Agreement and on the
extension of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver.
Information services, networks, and dialogues
The provision of information services, including targeted research, pilot studies, and
specific policy support, and the building of networks and dialogues to extend knowledge
creation, to facilitate cooperation, and to disseminate information, had positive effects on
the institutional capacity in beneficiary developing countries. Reports, studies, and policy
research papers, e.g. on the EPAs, provided by organisations such as ICTSD, Tralac, Inzet,
BothENDS, and SOMO, proved to be effective instruments that provided developing
countries with useful information that enhanced their knowledge. However, the extent of
the effect depended on the communication infrastructure that developing countries need
so they can easily access the information and the reputation of the organisations that
provided the expertise.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

To illustrate this, both the interviews and evaluations (e.g. Saana (2014c) and Turner (2008))
provided evidence that ICTSD’s information services and the creation and dissemination of
knowledge in dialogues helped to enhance the institutional capacity of different private and
public sector stakeholders. In Uganda, ICTSD’s outputs were highly rated, and used by policy
officials to better understand trade issues and prepare for negotiations. Southern CSOs also
used that information, e.g. PASCiB23 in Benin and SEATINI24 in Uganda. PASCiB used the work
of ICTSD to strengthen its position in contributing to national and regional dialogues and
its advice to stakeholders on the implications of international agreements. It mentioned
Bridges as a useful tool for information dissemination and awareness creation, both for
PASCiB and other stakeholders in West Africa. SEATINI in Uganda said it used ICTSD’s
information platform to learn about EPAs, but also mentioned that ICTSD was too far
removed from their ideology and their opinion on how the position of Uganda as a
developing country should be strengthened in international trade negotiations, including
the EPA with the EU.

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The effect of ICTSD’s outputs on enhancing institutional capacity is generally rated as high,
but it is also influenced by ICTSD’s reputation among different stakeholders. The interviews
held in Geneva as well as Uganda and Benin showed that policymakers from developed
countries view ICTSD as a development organisation, while policymakers from developing
countries see them more as a neutral research organisation. CSOs in developing countries,
such as SEATINI, stated that ICTSD was too balanced in their analysis. The use of ICTSD’s
outputs is also determined by the reputation and perception of ICTSD. ICTSD indicated that
whether the knowledge obtained by country representatives in Geneva reached officials in
capitals depended on the capability of the country delegates to communicate this knowledge.
In general, ICTSD found that country delegates from LDCs have more difficulty acting as
knowledge brokers. The fact that not all LDCs have permanent representation in Geneva
further reduced the likelihood that knowledge created and acquired in Geneva reached
policy officials in the capitals of LDCs.
Support to CSOs
CSO networks are important, not only to inform the public and policymakers on trade
policies and specific trade effects, but also to increase support for trade policy as a vehicle
for sustainable development. CSOs hold governments accountable, and enhance policy
implementation and trade law enforcement. The achieved induced outputs by the GTJ
programme that supported CSOs was limited as far as could be assessed and depended
heavily on the existence and maintenance of long(er)-term relations and trust between
Northern and Southern CSOs. The GTJ programme only succeeded in empowering those
Southern partners that the ZNF organisations had known already for a long time. In other
23

24

Plateforme des Acteurs de la Société Civile au Bénin – Platform of civil society organisations in Benin. PASCiB is a
platform that aims to enhance the transparent and effective involvement of Beninese CSOs in the process of
developing, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating development policies and programmes.
The Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute. SEATINI is an NGO that aims
to advocate the position of non-governmental stakeholders in WTO negotiations and enhance civil society’s
understanding of the challenges of globalisation, the complexities of the WTO system, and the effect of
(multilateral) trade agreements.

Trade policy and negotiating capacity

cases, the outputs of this programme have hardly had any sustained effect because the CSOs
that were ‘empowered’ with knowledge and negotiating capacity were very small and had
limited absorptive and institutional capacity. Some of them do not even exist anymore.

3.3 Donor coordination
As was explained already, we looked specifically at donor coordination because of its role in
EU AfT policy and as an indicator of efficiency. Donor coordination is also one of the five
pillars of the Paris Declaration of 2005. Under the harmonisation principle, donor countries
and organisations have committed themselves to ‘coordinate their actions, simplify
procedures, and share information, to avoid duplication’ (Oecd.org, 2017c).
In the past, concrete steps were taken to improve donor coordination on AfT, notably
through the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF). The IF was
established in 1997 as a coordination mechanism to strengthen and streamline the
trade-related assistance delivered by the World Bank, the International Trade Centre (ITC),
IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP, and WTO to 49 eligible LDCs. It focused on three activities: help LDCs
meet WTO requirements and ensure the compatibility of laws with WTO commitments;
assist in devising strategies to benefit from and ensure trade regime conformity with trade
agreements; and enhance LDC capacity to analyse trade policies and problems facing the
external sector. The IF provided a channel to facilitate technical assistance for capacity
building in LDCs, and doing this through harmonised and complementary donor efforts.
The Netherlands was an active and supportive member of the IF. In 2007, the Enhanced
Integrated Framework (EIF) replaced the IF. The Netherlands had strong reservations with
respect to the Trust Fund that was created by the EIF, doubting its efficiency and
additionality. EIF’s Annual Report 2013 (p. 39) reports that for the period 2008-2013, the cost
of EIF’s Trust Manager and Executive Secretariat was USD 26 million or 34% of total
disbursements (EIF, 2013), proving the Dutch criticism correct. Nevertheless, the
Netherlands finally decided to join the EIF in 2016, contributing EUR 400,000, underscoring
its importance as a coordinating platform. The EIF continued the work of the IF, facilitating
cooperation between donors, the six core partner agencies,25 several observer agencies, and
other development partners, who are supporting LDCs to:
• integrate trade into national development strategies;
• set up structures needed to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance;
and
• build capacity to trade, also addressing critical supply-side constraints.
Furthermore, the OECD’s reporting system and the bi-annual publication of Aid for Trade at a
Glance provide insight into donor support for trade. Despite the existence of a platform and
the publication of data, donor coordination in practice has remained limited. This is the
case for coordination at the headquarters level and on the ground in beneficiary countries.

25

The agencies were IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank, and WTO.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Only three of the five Dutch programmes in the sample of this evaluation that were
categorised as trade policy and negotiating capacity programmes were supported by other
donors, namely two multilateral organisations in Geneva (ICTSD and ACWL), and one
regional one (Tralac). And even those were supported by only a few main donors, although
they indicated that they had been trying to broaden their support base for many years.
The lack of donor coordination can possibly be explained by donor countries’ reluctance
to provide aid in areas where they lack expertise. EU member states do not act as a
harmonised, single donor in providing TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity. They all
have their own national programmes, often executed by their own national organisations
on specific themes that they have expertise on. This reduces donor coordination.

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Donor coordination and the Dutch Embassies
Policy officers in Benin and Uganda, where there are Embassies of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, were not very familiar with TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity. This is
surprising because Uganda’s ambassador to the WTO was the coordinator of the LDC group
in 2014 and 2015, and Benin’s ambassador succeeded her in 2016. Since the WTO’s SubCommittee on LDCs was chaired in 2015-2016 by the ambassador of the Netherlands to the
WTO, one would have expected more bilateral contact at the country level on TA for trade
policy and negotiating capacity. The embassies in Benin and in Uganda were working on
trade issues, but emphasised that working with the private sector was often easier than
working with the government. This could be attributable to the fact that the Netherlands
does not give on-budget support anymore in these countries and that it is strongly
promoting Dutch enterprises. So, while the Netherlands actively pushed for the ‘Nairobi
package’26 (e.g. on cotton) in Geneva, the EKN in Cotonou did not discuss these issues at the
national level. On a positive note, the EKN in Cotonou was seen by many government
agencies as being strongly associated with EIF, which was not even supported by the
Netherlands at the time. These contacts could be explained by the focus on PSD and Dutch
support of the Chamber of Commerce of Benin, the national coordinator of EIF programmes.

3.4 Likelihood of outcomes
Developing countries have less bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations than
developed countries. Developing countries have traded mostly under preferential regimes
(providing better trade terms than the most-favoured-nation treatment under the WTO
Agreement) and have limited bargaining power as a result of the negligible market access
they can give or withhold. On top of that, developing countries face institutional capacity
constraints that limit their negotiating capacity. Key constraints identified include a lack of
awareness of the role of (multilateral) trade policy in national development strategies and
the limited availability and depth of human, financial, and technical resources to
adequately prepare for and participate in trade negotiations (e.g. Murphy, 2007, UNCTAD,
2010, and Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015).

26

Deliverables of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in 2015.

Trade policy and negotiating capacity

Anecdotal evidence obtained from the interviews indicated that the studies and training
improved the beneficiaries’ negotiating capacities and influenced negotiation positions.
Whether these induced outputs have contributed to more favourable trade terms, and if so,
how much, and whether they can be attributed to the interventions, could not be concluded
on the basis of these interviews and the desk study of reports and evaluations. Systematic
empirical evidence on the effect of TA for trade policy and negotiating capacity on
developing countries’ negotiation positions and, most importantly, the outcome of trade
negotiations (more favourable trade terms for improved services, reduced trade costs, and
increased market access) is not available.
Nevertheless, to shed some light on the importance of this type of TA, the effects of trade
agreements on trade and economic development are analysed. In 2015, the UK’s Department
for International Development (DfID) published a rapid evidence assessment (REA) of the
effect of free trade agreements (FTAs) on economic development. The REA concluded that
FTAs generally have a positive effect on the FTA members’ trade flows (DfID, 2015a). Several
studies reviewed in the REA have shown that FTAs have a positive effect on trade and
economic development (DfID, 2015a). The fact that the agreements were not seen to have
any negative effects means that there is nothing to support the assumption that TA for
TP&NC failed. However, the extent of the effect was found to differ widely. It depended on
how deep, broad, and rapid the trade reforms were, the wider trade-related environment,
and the capacity of the economy to increase the supply of products for which there was now
more demand thanks to the FTA. There is also limited evidence that FTAs encourage
investment, technology transfer, and firm upgrading (DfID, 2015a). Rigorous research
findings on the effect of FTAs on employment, income distribution, environment, and
government revenue were absent. The REA emphasised that the success of trade policy
depends on a consistent broader policy approach of easing constraints that limit the
economy’s ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by the FTA. This means that
other forms of AfT, such as trade facilitation, should complement TA for trade policy and
negotiating capacity.

3.5 Conclusion
A general conclusion that can be drawn from the reports, evaluations, and fieldwork is that
Dutch support to organisations that build trade policy and negotiating capacity provided
policymakers in developing countries with knowledge and instruments to reform and
implement national, regional, and international trade policy. Positive effects (induced
output) were found on direct beneficiaries, and on the quality of the work of CSOs and at
ministries in developing countries. Dutch support helped developing countries to better
integrate trade policy into their national policies, with often well-functioning coordination
mechanisms in place. The programmes required a certain level of institutional capacity and
local ownership in order to be effective, i.e. to achieve the intended induced outputs and
(intermediate) outcomes.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

However, the effectiveness of these programmes could be further improved by enhanced
donor coordination. There is ample scope for the EIF or the WTO to take the lead on donor
coordination. Recipient governments have too little influence on the programmes. The
monitoring of the programmes by the Netherlands requires better communication and
exchange of information between policy officers in The Hague and Geneva, and embassies
in partner countries. That could reinforce the effectiveness as well as the ownership and
efficiency of the programmes. The impact of the programmes on trade depended on how
deep, broad, and rapid the resulting trade reforms were on the wider trade-related
environment and on the capacity of the economy to benefit and adjust. The wider traderelated environment depends on trade facilitation and trade-related infrastructure, whereas
the capacity of the economy to benefit and adjust depends on systematically linking PSD
policy with trade policy. The success of trade policy depends on a consistent broader policy
approach targeted at easing constraints that limit the economy’s ability to take advantage of
the opportunities created.

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Trade policy and negotiating capacity

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4
Trade facilitation

Trade facilitation

4.1 Introduction
The integration of developing countries into the rules-based global trade system requires
more than good policy and negotiating skills. Making it easier and cheaper to trade is
important to reap the benefits of trade agreements (see section 3.4). Reducing red tape such
as unnecessary, non-transparent, and duplicative procedures facilitates the transit of goods
of services and reduces transaction costs. This increases the competitiveness of a country’s
exports and imports and may lead to the trading of previously non-traded goods and
services and stimulate competition, innovation, and economic growth.
This chapter provides the overall findings on the technical assistance (co-)financed by the
Netherlands on trade facilitation. This chapter is organised in the same way as chapter 3.
First, we discuss the achieved output and induced output to assess effectiveness. Second,
we assess the role that donor coordination played in achieving outputs and induced outputs
to be able to say at least something about efficiency. Third, we draw conclusions about the
likelihood that the outputs and induced outputs have helped to achieve the expected
outcomes. Finally, we present conclusions about the implementation and results of this
type of technical assistance.

4.2 Achieved output and induced output
The four selected programmes that are part of TA for trade facilitation are TradeMark East
Africa (TMEA), the World Bank’s Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund
for Trade and Development phase 2 (MDTF-TD2), and the World Customs Organization’s
(WCO) Regional Office for Capacity Building for the West and Central African Region
(ROCB-WCA).27 Together, these programmes accounted for approximately EUR 64.9 million,
covering almost 90% of total expenditure on TA for trade facilitation over the period
2007-2016. TMEA was the ‘heavyweight’ in the sample, accounting for EUR 48.7 million.
TFF received EUR 10.3 million, MDTF-TD2 EUR 4.8 million, and ROCB-WCA only a little less
than EUR 1.0 million. The relative weight of each programme was taken into account in
drawing the overall conclusions. The intervention logic in table 4.1 presents in more detail
than figure 2.4 the outputs, induced outputs, and expected intermediate outcomes that fall
within the scope of our study.

27

A detailed, individual assessment of each of these trade facilitation programmes is provided in appendix 1.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Table 4.1 Intervention logic TA for trade facilitation

| 74 |

Output

Expected induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Training, conferences, workshops, and
country dialogues (e.g. to build
institutional capacity of policymakers
and policy enforcers involved in
customs harmonisation and
simplification);
•	Advice, technical support, and
awareness-raising campaigns for policy
reform, institutional change, and
implementation of new regulations;
•	Analytical, diagnostic, and (pre)
feasibility studies;
•	Data collection;
•	Project design and pilots;
•	Establish knowledge management
systems and design trade facilitation
strategies and policy guidelines;
•	Institutional support for regional
cooperation (secretariats and
involvement of PSOs and CSOs);
•	Establishment and operationalisation
of one-stop border posts (OSBPs);
•	Digitalisation of trade procedures.

•	
Enhanced awareness of role of
trade facilitation procedures
on competitiveness and
better trade data available;
•	Enhanced knowledge on
where to find bottlenecks in
trade corridors;
•	Tariff reforms and fiscal
adjustment;
•	Reduced red tape/corruption,
better documentation of
trade procedures (e-trade);
•	Number of roadblocks and
weighbridges reduced;
•	Enhanced involvement of
PSOs and CSOs;
•	More transparency in laws
and regulation;
•	Less duplication and more
efficiency of trade procedures;
•	Enhanced regional and
international harmonisation
of laws and regulations.

•	More regionally
integrated value
chains;
•	Improved
services;
•	Better tax
collection;
•	Reduced
transaction costs
and transit time;
•	Increased market
access.

4.2.1

Achieved output

An extensive review of existing documentation, such as programme and project proposals,
appraisal reports, annual plans, internal reviews, annual reports, evaluations, complemented
by interviews with policy officers, the executing organisations and beneficiaries, provided
an overall positive picture of the direct outputs delivered by the four trade facilitation
programmes. With some variation in timeliness and quality, direct outputs were delivered.
TMEA’s annual reports indicated that it managed to establish the planned one-stop border
posts (OSBPs) in East Africa. It also conducted needs assessments, facilitated the
development of national policies for regional integration, and trained committees and
authorities. Although some delays were registered, the achieved outputs were qualified as
satisfactory and at times above expectation (Sida, 2013b). TMEA was commended by
beneficiaries for its result-oriented approach, its high degree of responsiveness and
flexibility, and its involvement in projects, in addition to providing funding and supporting
beneficiaries throughout the full process of projects (Sida, 2013b). TMEA was warned, however,
that it is in danger of doing too many things and not focusing enough (Sida, 2013b).

Trade facilitation

Documentation on the outputs of the two World Bank programmes also indicated that the
level of output achievement was up to standard. The achieved outputs for TFF included
research and studies, pilot projects, Roundtables, support to improve transit and border
management, customs procedures, and the setup of single windows. The outputs delivered
by MDTF-TD2 included the development of trade competitiveness diagnostics, global
datasets, such as the LPI28 and the WITS database29, and toolkits. These outputs were all part
of the ‘global window’.30 The ‘national/regional window’ delivered conferences, research
reports and studies, such as feasibility studies for customs modernisation. Delays in the
allocation of funding and implementation of the activities are not uncommon in World
Bank programmes. The review of internal documentation and external evaluations revealed
these delays (e.g. Saana Consulting, 2015 and Itad, 2015). The visits to Uganda and Benin
confirmed that the World Bank projects had suffered extensive delays. These delays were
caused by internal World Bank processes, such as slow disbursements of funds, but also by
external factors, such as political change in Benin. Despite the delays, World Bank
programmes were capable of achieving the intended outputs, which is not surprising, given
that the World Bank is a strong organisation, with good monitoring and reporting systems.
WCO’s ROCB-WCA programme, however, did not perform well on direct outputs. One of the
programme’s few successes was the establishment of regional training centres (RTCs) to
assist WCO members in modernising reforms and customs. Most of the other direct outputs
were not achieved or were below target. Only 6 of the 12 planned training sessions to
implement the regional training plan31 (RTP) were actually held. Surveys designed to obtain
information on the progress of customs modernisation had very low response rates. None
of the seven planned management workshops were held. The participation of middle
managers working in customs in a WCO traineeship programme was below target (a total of
8 rather than 14 participants) and the website was not launched (WCO Annual reports 2009,
2010, 2011; WCO final report 2009-2012). The reasons cited for this poor performance
included a lack of own funds or supplemental external funding, a lack of recognition of the
need for an RTP, and a lack of accredited experts in the region to give training.
If we were to disregard the ROCB-WCA programme, which accounts for only a marginal
share of Dutch trade facilitation funding, then the general conclusion would be that the
trade facilitation programmes were well executed and direct outputs were delivered.
Yet there is something to be said about the type of interventions that were chosen.
The missions to Uganda and Benin revealed some important caveats to the trade facilitation
programmes that may also apply to interventions in other countries.

28

29

30
31

The World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI) is a benchmarking tool that measures the relative ease and
efficiency with which products can be moved into and inside a country. The LPI weighs six key dimensions of
trade logistics. See https://lpi.worldbank.org/ for more information on the LPI.
The World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) is a trade database that enables users to query several
international trade databases. The database contains, among other things, data on export, import, re-exports,
re-imports, tariffs, and non-tariff measures.
MDTF-TD2 allocated funds via two different windows: the global window and the national/regional window.
RTPs were to be drafted and implemented as part of regional development strategies for WCO members.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

First, trade facilitation measures have focused, at least in Benin and Uganda, on imports
rather than on exports. This was surprising because of the mercantilist bias that usually
prevails in Geneva. As most of the imports into Benin are re-exported to Nigeria, the emphasis
on imports in Benin was understandable. Cotonou has to compete with Lagos and Lomé.
The emphasis on imports in Uganda can be explained by the fact that most of the larger
exporters are non-Ugandan. There simply has been little lobbying to facilitate exports.
While this may explain the import bias for both Benin and Uganda, it has contributed to
both countries’ trade deficit and their dependence on donors and foreign lending. Only
recently have things been changing in Uganda, with the president emphasising the
importance of exports to reduce the current account deficit and of Uganda’s attempts to
advocate regional integration and promote itself as a ‘land-linked’ country.
Second, trade facilitation has focused mainly on enhancing formal trade, whereas more
people have been involved in informal trade. Anecdotal evidence has indicated that this
may have affected poverty and inequality in a negative way. All the reviewed programmes
devoted attention to informal trade, but sometimes to formalise it rather than to facilitate
it. Nevertheless, there are some good pro-poor examples of developing semi-(in)formal
trade.32
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Third, trade facilitation programmes have focused on trade in goods. What this implies is
not immediately clear. There is little research that puts the comparative advantages of
trading goods versus trading in services side by side. OECD suggests that regulatory
heterogeneity in the service sectors as measured by the OECD Service Trade Restrictiveness
Index may generate costs equivalent to tariffs of between 20% and 75% (OECD, 2017).
Nevertheless, during the field research, the service sectors (such as tourism) were hardly
mentioned in relation to trade facilitation. The only time services were mentioned was in
relation to working in Kenya, and it concerned reducing travel time for bus passengers
between Kampala and Nairobi as a result of improved border procedures. Given the
increased relative importance of tourism in LDCs, which has been mentioned in
international trade fora and during our field visits, enhancing the focus on tourism in trade
facilitation programmes and AfT in general could possibly help to increase the impact of
trade facilitation.
Fourth, all of the officials interviewed emphasised the importance of regional trade and
trade with emerging markets. In Uganda, for instance, interviewees mentioned the African
problem of importing goods from China and exporting goods to the EU, which involves the
costly transport of empty containers. To ensure that products are exported to and imported
from multiple markets, thus increasing the extensive margin of trade, African trade must
find a way to penetrate different, new geographical markets. Regional and emerging
markets could provide a solution. The officials that we interviewed stressed the importance
of export and import diversification as they felt it would reduce the problem of empty
containers and decrease trade costs.
32

See, for example, the donor support provided to Women in Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT), discussed in
box 4.1.

Trade facilitation

Fifth, the interviewees stated that not enough is being done about financial regulatory
reform. For instance, it is not possible yet to open a Naira (the Nigerian currency) bank
account in Benin, nor is it possible to have a West African franc (CFA) account yet in Nigeria.
Money transfers between the two countries are difficult and costly. An example of how
financial regulatory reform can be stimulated is CBI’s support to the Investment and Exports
Promotion Agency (APIEx)33 in Benin, which aims to address and ultimately reduce currency
exchange constraints. Initiatives such as APIEx’s are valuable examples of necessary
financial reforms to facilitate trade.

4.2.2

Achieved induced output

Evaluating the achieved induced outputs was more problematic than direct outputs. The
ability of the organisations to measure and report them have varied. Overall, the findings
for the sample programmes provide good evidence that the programmes contributed well
to the intended induced outputs. This conclusion relies heavily on the large share that TMEA
and TFF occupy in the sample and the positive findings for these programmes.
The overall impression of TMEA is that it scored well on induced outputs. Documented
induced outputs for TMEA included a reported reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs),
more effective and efficient border agencies and procedures, and improved women traders’
awareness of the East African Community’s (EAC) regional integration and trade policy.
Furthermore, TMEA performed well in its efforts to measure and evaluate its work. TMEA
had an M&E framework in place that included monitoring induced outputs. This system
measured changes to which TMEA had contributed and estimated to what extent these
changes can be attributed to TMEA’s efforts. The changes that the estimates attributed to
TMEA were substantial and often exceeded what was forecast. Providing convincing
evidence rather than estimates of attribution has been difficult, however. A 2013 review by
Sida recommended improving M&E of attribution (Sida, 2013b).
Overall, the two World Bank programmes have been acclaimed for their demand-driven
approach. Case studies have suggested that the programmes contributed to the induced
outputs listed in table 4.1. However, a common factor in both programmes is their weak
M&E results framework, which makes it difficult to determine to what extent the outputs
contributed to induced outputs and which induced outputs can be attributed to the
programmes. The evaluation of TFF shows clear evidence, for the overall programme, that a
contributing relationship exists. The evaluation of the MDTF-TD2 was inconclusive on this
aspect, however. The programmes were criticised by evaluators for insufficient monitoring
of cross-cutting issues, such as the effects on gender, environment, and poverty.
Anecdotal evidence about the performance of TFF indicates that the capacity of customs
agencies actually increased. This includes improved management capacity to drive customs
reforms, enhanced technical capacity to apply international standards, and increased
coordination of agencies active at the border (Saana Consulting, 2015). However, as
mentioned above, the TFF log frame did not provide a useful tool for reporting on results
33

Agence de Promotion des Investissements et des Exportations (APIEx) du Bénin.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

(Saana Consulting, 2015). Consequently, there is no robust evidence at the project level that
can be aggregated to demonstrate that TFF achieved the intended induced outputs (Saana
Consulting, 2015). Despite this lack of measurement and reporting on the direct effect of
outputs, the positive findings for selected cases by evaluators provided adequate reason to
conclude that such an effect did indeed exist. Saana Consulting concluded that ‘there are
positive result stories from across the representative, and non-representative, samples that
show good evidence that the TFF has been successful in delivering projects, which respond
to the overarching aims, the vision, goal and purpose of the TFF’ (Saana Consulting, 2015:
p. 36).

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The evaluation by Itad (2015) provides examples of the MDTF-TD2 programme’s outputs that
are being used by beneficiaries to develop policy and strategy. These examples were based
on consultations, document reviews, and case studies. The evaluation provides evidence of
global window outputs such as research products and databases that were quoted and used
in policy/strategy dialogues (Itad, 2015). The evaluation also cited the use of outputs
produced under the national/regional window. Analytical support provided to the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was used in regional policy
dialogues. Support provided to set up a dialogue on the impact of non-trade measures
(NTMs) in Cambodia led to the identification of feasible policy options to streamline NTMs
(Itad, 2015). Whereas the evaluation found ample evidence of the MDTF-TD2’s potential to
contribute to the trust fund’s objectives, it found little systematic reporting on induced
outputs (Itad, 2015). The dissemination and use of the outputs do not provide evidence of
the extent to which there was improved knowledge and acquired capacity to identify trade
needs, reform trade policies, and reduce trade barriers. Such a relation may exist, as
statements made by interviewees suggest. Yet few of the statements on induced outputs
have been substantiated by supporting evidence (Itad, 2015). ‘There were few examples to
demonstrate the degree to which MDTF-TD2-funded activities inform and influence
national development strategies’ (Itad, 2015: p. 49). The evidence obtained in the reviews
provided insight into a few case studies and standalone examples, but it was not sufficient
to draw comprehensive conclusions that pertain to a portfolio of 139 grants (Itad, 2015).
In fact, the evaluation concludes that there are ‘deficiencies in the results framework’ and
an ‘absence of a well-developed theory of change’, and that ‘there is no systematic and
aggregate reporting against the MDTF-TD2, and therefore the World Bank Trade Strategy
(WBTS), results framework […]. Hence, it is very difficult to track the implementation of
139 grants at the output, outcome and impact levels, which limits the ability to draw
conclusions about the impact of MDTF-TD2 and how the fund has contributed to delivery of
WBTS’ (Itad, 2015: p. 59). The MDTF-TD2 programme may have achieved induced outputs,
yet the evidence to substantiate this is inconclusive.
ROCB-WCA did not achieve its intended induced outputs for the simple reason that it did
not deliver the majority of the planned outputs in the first place. Yet some of the outputs
may have had an effect. However, there is no reliable information on the implementation
of regional strategic plans due to a low response rate to the survey. Annual reports provided
no clear evidence that the programme helped to improve the understanding of the
requirements and regulations for regional integration by customs. The institutional

Trade facilitation

capacity at the RTCs was insufficient to help members reform and modernise customs
procedures. This was confirmed in the interviews. Implementation delays, WCO’s limited
institutional capacity, and a lack of funding were identified as constraints. Interviewees also
mentioned that limited political willingness to reform customs hampered the programme’s
chances of success (as discussed in the paragraph below). They were unable to identify
whether any of the intended induced outputs had been achieved.
Local ownership and political will
The evaluations and the fieldwork show that trade facilitation is a highly political issue, the
success of which depends on the local context. What works reasonably well in East Africa
does not necessarily work in West Africa. The success of trade facilitation programmes
depended largely on the political and administrative will to implement and enforce
reforms. The WCO programme felt the lack of political will to reform. Indeed, a similar
programme had been successfully implemented in the East and Southern African (ESA)
region (the WCO ESA-ROCB programme), but the West and Central African ROCB
programme supported by the Netherlands largely failed.
Analyses of the political economy of trade facilitation by Saana Consulting (2016a), the
World Bank (2016b), and Engel and Jouanjean (2015) clarify the importance of political
support. Engel and Jouanjean have stressed that in West Africa it is ‘pertinent to pay
attention to the role of specific vested interests and cartels that have a strong influence in
circumventing trade policies to reduce trade costs. The role of uncompetitive freight and
trucking markets, for example, can also help explain the inefficiency of many ports, border
crossings, and other infrastructure integral to regional commerce’. (Engel and Jouanjean,
2015: p. 12) Widespread bribery in the region is another important factor. The prevalence of
corruption at checkpoints throughout the region makes it difficult to reduce the number of
roadblocks. These findings are in line with the analysis in the 2011 multi-annual strategic
plan (MASP) of the EKN in Benin. The MASP stated that good governance was being
challenged by clientelism, a lack of motivation, political interference, bureaucratic
inefficiency, and corruption (MFA, 2011). Borderless Alliance, an organisation providing data
on the number of bribes, delays, and checkpoints along corridors in West Africa, found that
the number of checkpoints along some of the corridors in West Africa had actually gone up
again. Another issue raised in the interviews was the stiff competition between the
harbours of Cotonou and Lomé, with trade moving to Lomé at a time when the crisis in
Nigeria had hit both harbours. That was not exactly the right time, nor were they the ideal
conditions to facilitate trade along the Abidjan-Lagos corridor (assisted by part of the TFF
programme), including the trajectory from Lomé to Lagos through Benin. The Beninese
ministries avoided answering questions on this subject.
Local ownership and political support are vitally important. Not only for the
implementation of trade-facilitating measures, but especially for the continuity of the
intervention’s effects. The findings in Benin and the literature on the importance of
political support suggest that limited political support was an irrevocable constraint to the
success of the ROCB-WCA programme and some parts of the TFF programme.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Involvement of other local stakeholders
The engagement of CSOs and private companies is important to hold government
institutions accountable for the proper implementation of policies and regulations, and for
the dissemination of information and capacity building among stakeholders, such as the
users of corridors. To compare rulemaking in different countries, the World Bank ranks them
based on transparency, public consultation, impact, accessibility, and appeal and review
opportunities (Rulemaking.worldbank.org, 2017a). Of the 44 lowest scoring countries, 25 are
LDCs. Public consultation is important to build support and counter or mitigate possible
negative effects. The World Bank found that ‘poorer countries have significantly less
transparent and consultative rule-making processes than their richer counterparts. Less than
one-third of low-income countries notify the general public of proposed new business
regulations and publish draft texts in a place where stakeholders can view them (on websites
or in the federal register). This is compared to 81% of high-income countries. And slightly
over half of the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (25 of 46) make texts of proposed
regulations public before their enactment’ (Rulemaking.worldbank.org, 2017b).

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Interviews in Benin revealed that donors and the private sector considered the government
a constraint or an obstacle to be avoided in trade facilitation efforts, rather than a driving or
supporting force. In Uganda, the situation was perceived to be better, although there too
the private sector and donors have little trust in the efficacy of the government. This leads
us to conclude that without political will, engagement, and effective enforcement, it is
highly likely that corruption, crime, roadblocks, and inefficiency will continue. Worse,
these problems will undermine the effectiveness of trade facilitation programmes. It is
therefore important that the political economy is fully taken into account in the design and
implementation of trade facilitation programmes. The involvement of the private sector
and CSOs in recipient countries can help to mobilise political and public support and hold
government authorities accountable. Organisations such as Borderless Alliance deliver
accurate and transparent data on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and create platforms for
dialogue for private-public sector stakeholders. They provide a strong mechanism to create
political will and promote effective enforcement. The involvement of CSOs can help to
identify the effects of trade facilitation on poverty, provide information on the potential
losers of trade policy reforms, and mitigate the negative effects.34

4.3 Donor coordination
A lack of donor coordination has been an important problem for the efficient delivery of trade
facilitation programmes. Whereas at the national level recipient governments sometimes rise
to the challenge of coordinating donors, at the regional level the Regional Economic
Communities are generally too weak and often depend too much on donor funding. Neither
the World Bank nor the EU are willing or able to play the required coordinating role. As a
result, there is a lack of overview and there is duplication. Despite the role of EIF,
organisations are not coordinating their work in LDCs. Several evaluations highlighted this
34

Such as the support provided to CSOs that help women traders in cross-border trade.

Trade facilitation

problem. Turner and Fink (2013) pointed out the challenges that donors face coordinating
and aligning support for West African regional integration efforts. In part, this can be
attributed to logistical and geographic issues. Communication is not easy with USAID, the EC,
DfID or the World Bank, who manage their regional operations respectively from Ghana;
Nigeria and Brussels; Nigeria and Washington, D.C., Nigeria and Ghana. The evaluations of
the World Bank programmes (TFF and MDTF-TD2) not only criticise cooperation with other
donors, but also suggest that there is room for more and better cooperation within the World
Bank. Work financed by trust funds is not always mainstreamed in World Bank operations and
policy dialogue. Box 4.1 provides an illustrative example of a lack of donor coordination in
Uganda. The EU has also been confronted with the challenges of coordinating support. In
interviews, the people responsible for trade at the EU offices in Uganda and Benin admitted
that they had no overview of trade facilitation programmes financed by EU member states and
knew even less about the activities of other donors.

Box 4.1

Donor support to women in informal cross-border trade (ICBT)

Supporting women in informal cross-border-trade (ICBT) in Uganda was addressed
by the following programmes, often supported by the same donors, including the
Netherlands:
• UNECA’s African Trade Policy Centre, supported by the Canadian International
Development Agency, published a study in 2009, called Gender Dimensions of Cross
Border Trade in the East African Community by Masheti Masinjila. It revealed why women
benefit from informal trade at the Kenya-Uganda and Rwanda-Burundi borders.
•	TradeMark East Africa supported a study by the Eastern African Sub-Regional
Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women on female informal cross-border
traders in 2012.
•	ITC and the Uganda Export Promotion Board trained 500 women in 2015 as part
of a project called Facilitating Women in Informal Cross Border Trade in Uganda
to become formal traders.
•	MDTF-TD2 did a study on female traders working on the various borders
between DRC and neighbouring countries Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in 2011,
in particular on the effect of this trade on food security.
•	In 2015 the World Bank announced that it would start the Great Lakes Trade
Facilitation Project for Africa to facilitate cross-border trade by increasing the
capacity for commerce and reducing the costs faced by traders, especially
small-scale and women traders. Despite the description of the programme it
includes infrastructure, notably a highly contested new airport in Kigali.
•	TMEA and the Uganda Women Entrepreneurs Association Limited started a
USD 500,000 joint venture project called Women in Trade for over 4,000 urban
women traders in 2015.
•	
Since 2012, TMEA has been working with 25 women traders’ cooperatives in Rwanda
to improve cross-border trade with the DRC, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

The interviews revealed that the organisations may be aware of activities by others,
but there is no detailed knowledge, nor did we find incentives or initiatives, to
suggest that they have attempted to create synergy. There is a ‘let a thousand
flowers bloom’ mentality.

4.4 Likelihood of outcomes
The considerable trade costs and transit times in developing countries, and for SSA traders
in particular, have highlighted the importance of trade facilitation for better trade
performance and economic development, and hence a great deal of attention is being
devoted to the evaluation of the effects35 of trade facilitation.

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TMEA has made substantial efforts to go beyond the induced output levels and measure the
effect of its efforts on the cost and time of transport, an intermediate outcome. To monitor
progress in the northern and central corridor, a results meter was developed by Project
Economics Consulting. The results meter tries to measure the extent to which time and cost
reduction in the corridors can be attributed to TMEA. The analysis, however, is based on bold
assumptions, such as the extent to which TMEA’s efforts have helped to improve handling
time in the ports (5%), what the conversion rate of saved time is in terms of costs (USD 490/
day), and what the effect is of reduced costs on trade based on research by Limao and
Venables (2001). Nevertheless, it is an interesting attempt to estimate outcomes. The results
meter estimated that between 2011 and 2014, TMEA managed to reduce transport time for a
container travelling from Dar es Salaam or Mombasa to Bujumbura or Kigali by 9.0%,
compared to the 2011 baseline compiled by the World Bank (Project Economics Consulting,
undated). This attributable reduction in time compares to an overall improvement in the
corridors of 14.1% during the same period. Therefore, TMEA accounted for 64% of the
reduction. TMEA’s interventions during that same period resulted in an estimated 18%
decline in the economic cost of transport based on an estimated value of transport time of
USD 490/day. This decline in cost and time is estimated to have generated an 8.1% growth in
trade to/from the EAC, attributable to TMEA interventions (Project Economics Consulting,
undated). The figures presented by TMEA on reduced trade costs and increased trade are not
unrealistic, because part of the political change in regional integration and the enhanced
emphasis on exports can also be attributed to TMEA’s advocacy. This makes TMEA a successful
programme in terms of its effect on cross-border trading and on rules and regulations.
The ROCB-WCA project did not deliver the expected outputs and induced outputs.
The conclusion therefore is that it had no impact on trade.
As discussed in section 4.2.2, the World Bank programmes do not measure or report
induced outputs sufficiently. Nor do they attempt to measure intermediate outcomes.
35

For more information, see the report on the fifth WTO Aid for Trade Global Review (WTO, 2015b) and the joint
OECD/WTO publication Aid for Trade at a Glance (2015), which were dedicated to the theme ‘Reducing trade costs
for inclusive, sustainable growth’.

Trade facilitation

This makes it difficult to assess the overall likelihood that Dutch support has positively
affected trade and trade diversification. The likelihood can only be estimated quantitatively
by using cross-country data or very accurate price information (see remark on TMEA below).
We have reviewed the empirical literature in order to conclude what the likelihood is that
the programmes have affected trade and trade diversification. What follows is a summary of
these studies, complemented by findings from observations and the opinions of people
that were interviewed.
Empirical studies on trade facilitation using cross-country data have found that it has had a
positive and significant impact on trade. The coefficients that were found in cross-country
studies (Limao and Venables, 2001) were used by TMEA to estimate the effect of induced
outputs (transit time reduction and transport cost reduction) on trade. TMEA’s results meter
reported on the likely effect on trade of improved corridor conditions attributable to TMEA
at the end of phase one (2016), based on the targets TMEA had set at the project level. They
estimated that if TMEA were to meet its targets exactly by the end of phase one, which it
almost did, the end-to-end corridor transport time (from Mombasa to Bujumbura) would
have decreased by 17.1%, attributable to TMEA. The estimated economic cost of transport
would then have fallen by 33.1%. This, in turn, would (if the assumptions are right) have
increased trade by 15.4%.
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The bulk of empirical studies found that aid for trade facilitation (in monetary terms) had a
positive effect on trade, specifically on export performance (e.g. Calì and Te Velde, 2011;
Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2012). Calì and Te Velde (2011) found that aid for trade
facilitation reduced trade costs and significantly improved exports.36 Studies that specifically
looked at the impact of aid for trade facilitation in SSA countries showed similar findings
(Calì and Te Velde, 2011; Ivanic et al., 2006). Ivanic et al. (2006) found that aid for trade
facilitation reduced export costs worldwide on average by about 0.3%. For the SSA region,
aid for trade facilitation reduced trade costs by approximately 1.9% for all destinations,
2.4% for exports to developed countries, and even 3.7% for exports to Europe and Central Asia
(Ivanic et al., 2006). Note that these results seem to contradict the observations in Uganda
and Benin, namely that trade facilitation programmes were import-oriented. However, it is
possible that exports in those countries also benefited more from the programmes than
imports, even though exports were not targeted.
Some research on trade facilitation explicitly distinguished between its effect on the
probability to trade (the extensive trade margin) and its effect on trade volume (the
intensive margin). Beverelli et al. (2015) studied the effect of trade facilitation37 on export
diversification (an extensive margin effect). The authors found that trade facilitation had a
significant positive effect on the number of exported products and the number of export
destinations.
36

37

Costs were measured on the basis of the time and handling costs of transporting a 20-foot container to (or
from) the port of departure (or entry). Included were the costs of documentation, administrative fees, and
in-country transport fees. Tariffs and trade taxes were excluded.
Their study defined trade facilitation as ‘the narrow definition of trade facilitation’. The definition covers trade
facilitation activities defined under the TP&R category of this study.

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Different levels of development may have led trade facilitation to have different effects.
Moïsé et al. (2013b) researched the impact of various bilateral trade facilitation measures38
on the intensive margin of bilateral trade. The dataset included 107 countries at various
stages of development. The research revealed an overall positive impact of trade facilitation
measures on bilateral trade flows. For low-income countries, the most significant positive
effect found was the harmonisation and simplification of documents.
The evidence from empirical studies provides valuable insight into our efforts to identify a
relationship between the programmes we are studying and the observed changes in trade.
For the four programmes in question, there is no primary data on the effects of the
evaluated programmes. Even for TMEA the effects are calculated based on assumptions
rather than actual measurements. A decrease in transport time and costs and an increase in
trade have indeed been registered, but a direct causal relationship between the two has not
been proven. However, given the statistical significance of the coefficients found in the
literature, it seems likely that the decrease in time and costs has contributed to the increase
in trade. It is therefore also likely that TMEA and TFF have positively influenced the
competitiveness of tradeable goods and even turned non-traded goods, such as fresh
produce, into tradeable goods.
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It is important to note that trade statistics only measure registered trade (in some countries
both formal and informal, but not to the same extent). There may have been a considerable
shift from informal to formal trade and from unregistered to registered trade. In that case,
the effect of trade facilitation on trade creation may have been smaller than estimated by
the trade data. To cross-check the results, we would need a time series on the prices of
tradeable goods to see whether less costs lead to more demand and supply across borders.
The overall independent evaluation of TMEA, which is currently ongoing, is expected to
provide this type of cross-checking. A measurable effect is the increase of the number of
people crossing the border by bus. TMEA reports suggest that the number of people going
from Kampala to Nairobi to sell and buy goods has increased. This can be attributed to the
lower cost of border crossing or to the EAC’s integration process. Both are supported by
TMEA.
There is little to say about the likely effect of the MDTF-TD2 programme on trade. The
uncertainty about whether outputs have led to induced outputs of trade facilitation makes
it impossible to draw any conclusions on the likely effect on trade. MDTF-TD2 has probably
drawn attention and funds to trade facilitation, and it may even have specified what the
most effective interventions are. But the extent to which this has improved or facilitated the
interventions is unclear. This means it is impossible to determine whether the programme
is likely to have led to more trade and more diversified trade.
Given that the ROCB-WCA programme barely achieved any induced outputs, it is highly
unlikely that it has had a significantly positive effect on trade.
38

Measures included trade-related information, the simplification and harmonisation of documents, governance
and impartiality, fees and charges, and the streamlining of procedures.

Trade facilitation

Political context and outcome
Similar to the importance of political support in achieving induced outputs, political
support is also essential for trade facilitation to have an effect on outcomes in terms of
enhanced trade and trade diversification. Overall political support can be augmented by
integrating trade policy into general development policy, as we concluded in chapter 3, and
by paying attention to cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV (lorry drivers), and poverty.
This would make the benefits of trade (facilitation) widespread and inclusive. The
integration of trade policy is not only important to gain support in government, but also
because the success of trade facilitation depends on so-called ‘behind-the-border
measures’. This term was used by Hoekman and Nicita (2008) to indicate policy-induced
costs that affect trade, other than tariffs and the NTBs that only increase the cost of crossing
borders. Indicators such as the World Bank’s LPI and Ease of Doing Business Index shed light
on the importance of these behind-the-border factors and the necessary measures to
improve them. African countries are disproportionately disconnected from global, regional,
and even neighbouring markets and usually have weak institutions. The average rankings
for SSA on the Ease of Doing Business Index of 2016 show that the most room for
improvement is in the categories of ‘Getting Electricity’ (149), ‘Trading across Borders’ (136),
and ‘Paying Taxes’ (131) – all areas where SSA countries rank last among developing country
regions. It takes an exporter in the SSA region 108 hours and USD 542 on average, compared
with a global average of 64 hours and USD 389, to complete border compliance procedures
when conducting cross-border trading (World Bank, 2016a). Another illustrative example of
behind-the-border constraints are frequent power cuts and the resulting high cost of diesel
for back-up generators. This contributed, for example, to the failure of a plant for soluble
coffee in Uganda that could have potentially exported to other African countries and
Europe.

4.5 Conclusion
Trade facilitation programmes have a potentially major effect on trade. There is substantial
evidence to suggest that they also boost trade and diversify trade in practice, and that they
are one of the most effective ways of stimulating economic development. In LDCs, their
success is partly hampered by a lack of donor coordination and alignment, a lack of political
support, resistance from vested interests, and a lack of integration in national development
policies. The donor programmes do not always pay enough attention to cross-cutting
issues, informal trade, services, exports, and financial regulation. They could benefit from
more involvement by CSOs and the private sector. Nevertheless, the effects on trade are
likely to be significant and according to the empirical literature larger than those of most
other trade-enhancing programmes.

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5
Standards

Standards

5.1 Introduction
The development policies of the Netherlands and the EU have emphasised the importance
of technical assistance for standards in developing countries to facilitate the integration of
products from developing countries into global value chains. This technical assistance has
included capacity building for public standards, such as standards addressed in WTO’s SPS
and TBT Agreements, as well as capacity building for private standards. Standards are part of
trade regulations. Technical assistance for standards that is used in cross-border trade is
therefore part of TA for TP&R, the subject of this evaluation. Standards can both facilitate
and hamper trade. Technical assistance is meant to facilitate trade by reducing transaction
costs and rejection from export markets, and by providing access to new markets, as well as
maintaining and increasing the market share in existing markets.
This chapter provides the overall findings on technical assistance for standards, (co-)financed
by the Netherlands. It assesses whether the programmes on standards have achieved their
outputs and induced outputs. As mentioned before, only those parts of the funded
programmes are evaluated that fall within the scope of the study, i.e. TA for TP&R. In the case
of standards, this includes technical assistance to developing countries to participate in
international standard setting and to develop and improve their own national policy on
standards, national standard setting, promotion, testing, certification, and enforcement.
Both public and private standards have shown a trend towards becoming more stringent over
time. International public standards are negotiated internationally in standardising bodies.
The TBT and SPS Agreements of the WTO encourage WTO members to use or refer to such
standards when setting their own standards and require that the WTO be notified. Private
standards are developed by the private sector. They can be set unilaterally and often determine
the characteristics of products that actually enter markets. The private standard programmes
evaluated in this study often aspired sector-wide acceptance of higher private standards, and
they provided technical assistance for compliance for producers in developing countries.
The programmes used these private standards to influence production methods and other
conditions in developing countries and to satisfy consumer demands and concerns in the EU.
This evaluation does not question the legitimacy of raising standards nor does it evaluate the
effect of these standards on food safety, food security, health, labour conditions, producer
income, productivity, or the environment. We are only evaluating the effect of standards on
trade. The non-trade concerns that are targeted by these programmes are excluded from the
evaluation. In monetary terms, this means that we disregarded more than 85% of the
expenditures on programmes for private standards. The assessment confines itself to those
parts of the programmes that deal with standards for tradeable products. The judgements
do not apply to the full programmes. Consequently, the induced outputs also need to be
associated with outputs of activities that address standard-related parts of the activities
(see table 5.1). After the assessment of achieved (induced) outputs, we discuss international
support as well as local ownership and its efficiency, under the heading of donor
coordination. Finally, we evaluate whether the work on standards is likely to have led to
more and more diversified trade. Our conclusions are based on the assessment of the
programmes and on empirical evidence in the economic literature.

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5.2 Achieved output and induced output
The programmes in our sample that provide technical assistance for standards are: the
Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) and the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF),
which promote public standards; and Solidaridad, the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) and
Fair Trade Original (FTO), which work with private standards (for a detailed assessment of
these programmes, see appendix 1). Together, the technical assistance for standards in these
programmes accounted for approximately EUR 42.6 million over the period 2007-2016
(almost 94% of total expenditure on programmes on standards). EUR 15.3 million went to
the two public standards programmes and EUR 27.3 million to the three private standards
programmes. The outputs, induced outputs, and expected intermediate outcomes of the
technical assistance for standards are presented (in more detail than in table 2.4) in the
intervention logic in table 5.1. Data on achieved outputs and induced outputs have been
obtained through extensive review of existing documentations, such as programme and
project proposals, appraisal documents, (annual) plans, internal reviews, annual reports,
and evaluations, complemented by interviews with policy officers, the executing
organisations, and beneficiaries.

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Table 5.1 Intervention logic TA for standards
Output

Expected induced output

Expected
intermediate
outcome

•	Design of needs assessments,
feasibility studies, and capacity
building projects;
•	Collection and dissemination of
standards information and data (incl.
website development, publishing of
manuals, and training sessions);
•	Organisation of Roundtables and
specification of standards;
•	
Promotion of international standards;
•	Government involvement in
interventions;
•	
Strengthening inter-ministerial
cooperation and enhanced
participation in standard-setting
bodies;
•	Development, promotion and
implementation of labels;
•	Harmonisation and promotion of
sustainable standards;
•	Training of policy officers;
•	Development and improvement of
partnerships and networks between
different stakeholders;
•	Organisation of campaigns/
promotional events.

•	Improved beneficiary and global
awareness on standards;
•	Reduced certification costs;
•	
Uniform quality of traded products;
•	Enhanced credibility of labels and
more demand for certified
produce;
•	Enhanced involvement in
standard setting and compliance
of private sector and civil society
in beneficiary country;
•	More effective participation of
developing countries in
international organisations and
standard-setting bodies;
•	Improved capacity on standards
at ministries and other government
institutions;
•	Improved capacity at ministerial
departments to take part in
international standards
negotiations;
•	International standards
formulated that take into account
developing countries’ interests
and needs.

•	Lower
rejection
rates;
•	Increased
quality;
•	Lower
transaction
costs;
•	Increased
demand for
certified
products;
•	More certified
and
higher-quality
products
traded;
•	New products
traded.

Standards

5.2.1	Achieved output and induced output of international public
standards programmes
Dutch support to organisations working on international public standards included support
to the two organisations in the sample, STDF, which works on SPS measures, and FWF, which
works on labour standards. Other funding included support to the Codex Alimentarius of
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO),
which provides international standards, guidelines, and codes of practice for trade in all sorts
of food. Even though the Codex Alimentarius Commission is an important body in the field of
international public standards, its programme was not included in the sample. The reason
for this is that the programme focuses on enhancing the participation of developing
countries, in particular LDCs, in Codex Alimentarius meetings. Although this participation
may affect the institutional capacity of developing countries to negotiate more favourable
international standards, this effect is very difficult to assess. In combination with the small
size of the programme, this led to the exclusion from the sample.
The Standards and Trade Development Facility
STDF is a global partnership set up by the WTO, the World Bank, WHO, the World Organisation
for Animal Health (OIE) and FAO. It coordinates the development aspects of international SPS
standard setting by disseminating knowledge, strengthening collaboration, building capacity,
and promoting developing countries’ participation in the three standard-setting organisations.39
STDF is a small organisation, and its secretariat is hosted by WTO. The STDF has a dual role.
First, it serves as a knowledge platform and global coordinator. In this role, STDF disseminates
knowledge and good practices, provides capacity assessment tools, brings together global
networks, and coordinates capacity building efforts. Second, STDF provides support and
funding for the development and implementation of SPS capacity building projects.
STDF’s role as a knowledge platform and global coordinator has generated outputs such as
briefings,40 general lessons from project evaluations, capacity assessment tools, a Virtual
Library41 for knowledge dissemination, and the organisation of events, training activities,
and workshops. The need for STDF as a knowledge platform and global coordinator has
been described by Henson et al. (2000), who found that developing countries have difficulty
effectively participating in discussions on SPS matters. One of the key constraints they
identified was the low level of know-how among delegates from developing countries,
especially compared to the expertise of delegates from major developed countries
(Henson et al., 2000). The three external evaluations of STDF in the last 15 years have
confirmed the relevance of STDF as a platform. The overall performance of the STDF is
judged to be good and in many important areas very good. Slorach (2008) states: ‘It carries
out an important role that no other single body would be able to accomplish …’ (p. 24) and
‘Coordination is one of the two principal aims of the STDF and it is primarily in this area,
rather than acting simply as a project funder, that its future probably lies, since here it has a
comparative advantage and can play a unique role in assisting developing countries in the
future’ (p. 21).
39
40
41

The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), Codex Alimentarius (both part of FAO), and OIE.
STDF publishes briefings, which address specific topics related to SPS technical cooperation.
See appendix 1 for more details.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

This partnership has pooled the in-depth and diverse knowledge of its five different
organisations in the form of documents, tools, and dialogues. The 2008 evaluation already
concluded that with an expert base of five partner organisations, its donors, and observer
organisations, STDF has a high level of expertise in standards and development-related areas
(Slorach, 2008). The 2014 mid-term review (MTR) confirmed this and stated that STDF ‘has
coordinated an on-going collaborative discussion of the problems at well-attended
workshops, which have highlighted the need for coordinated responses by partners, donors,
developing countries, and other stakeholders’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a: p. v). STDF’s role as
knowledge platform and global coordinator was cited as a significant added value by most
members of the STDF Working Group, partners, donors, and experts from developing
countries, and a reason for their continued support and participation (Saana Consulting,
2014a). The evaluations also noted that despite an efficient and effective secretariat (Slorach,
2008), it was not always able to fulfil its role as a coordinating forum properly. The reasons
for this were the time-consuming procedures for the review and the approval of project
grants (PGs) and project preparation grants (PPGs) (Saana Consulting, 2014a).

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These findings on the quality and relevance of STDF’s outputs were confirmed by the
interviews that were held in The Hague, Geneva, Uganda, and Benin, which also provided
some evidence of induced outputs. One respondent highlighted the fact that the STDF’s
briefings help developing countries become more aware of SPS-related requirements. Policy
officials in Benin mentioned STDF’s website as a valuable source of information that creates
awareness of SPS requirements.
Despite the positive statements about raising awareness of the trade-facilitating role of
standards, this has not (yet) led Uganda or Benin to focus proper attention on standards in
their trade policies. In both countries, trade policy on standards focused mainly on import
control, rather than on promoting exports. The quality of imported products was a genuine
concern because of disease control and food safety. The controls served however also as a
non-trade import barrier. The Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) did not make
use of STDF’s services. This can be explained by the fact that UNBS was hardly aware of
STDF’s existence, let alone its outputs. STDF has managed to increase developing countries’
participation in international standard setting and awareness of the importance of
standards for trade, but there is still room for improvement at the country and regional
levels. Better results-based management was recommended by the 2014 MTR in this respect.
Existing evaluations emphasise the difficulty of measuring the effects (induced outputs) of
SDTF’s role as a platform. The 2014 MTR, for example writes: ‘Although it seems clear that
the activities produced the required results, it is difficult to accurately quantify the level of
any contribution, or indeed the level of achievement of the outputs themselves. Moreover,
it seems reasonable to expect that the core activities contributed towards the outcome of
‘increased coordination in the provision of technical cooperation on SPS issues’ covered
by the STDF mandate. The strength of this contribution (and the degree to which the
outcome was achieved) again is not clear as there are no specific indicators to measure.’
(Saana Consulting, 2014a: p. 25).

Standards

Based on interviews and secondary data, the MTR concludes, however, that ‘the STDF has
been successful in increasing the focus on SPS issues at the core of the AfT Initiative as well
as in the DTIS reports commissioned by the EIF’ (p. 37).
STDF’s second role is to fund the design and delivery of SPS projects, and build capacity on
standards in developing countries. As a fund for designing SPS projects, STDF started the
implementation of 57 PPGs, with a total value of USD 2.1 million, over the period 2007-2016.
As a fund for implementing SPS projects, it started 60 new PGs during this period, with a
total value of USD 57.0 million.42 STDF exceeded its target of 40% of PPGs and PGs addressing
capacity constraints and capacity building in LDCs and other low-income countries. Donors
noted that the grants programme allowed them to extend the range of their TA programmes
on SPS issues at a fraction of the cost they would incur if they were to do it themselves. This
was reportedly a critical factor in their decision to support STDF (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
During the visits to Benin and Uganda, the following PGs were reviewed: the Beninese SPS
information system project,43 the Beninese total diet study for SSA project44 (ongoing, not
only in Benin), and the project to strengthen standard controls in the Ugandan floriculture
sector.45
In Benin, both projects suffered serious delays. These delays were the result of problems at
the ministerial level, caused by an almost complete lack of ownership and by the generally
poor institutional capacity of the beneficiary agencies. The SPS information system was set
up within the Chamber of Commerce (CCIB). The project trained people, set up a focal
points network and notification system, and developed a website. However, the system
eventually collapsed because there was a lack of finance and ownership. The start of the
total diet study took two years, as it took a long time to get the Beninese Food Safety Agency
(ABSSA)46 up and running. Data collection started in 2016.
The Ugandan floriculture project was successful. It brought all relevant parties together and
set up a well-functioning control system. Like the projects in Benin, the Ugandan project
was subject to delays, caused by capacity constraints at the level of the Goverment of Uganda
(GoU) (e.g. shortage of qualified staff and delays in the delivery of contracted services).

42

43

44

45
46

A total of 78 PPGs (with a total value of USD 2.6 million) and 76 PGs (with a total value of USD 61.8 million)
have been approved from inception until and including 2017. See http://www.standardsfacility.org/
projectpreparationgrants and http://www.standardsfacility.org/projectgrants for more details on the grants. Data
obtained in October 2017.
STDF/PG/127: ‘SPS information system in Benin’ ran from 2008-2011 to improve information flows on SPS
requirements. The proposal was written with EU support in 2007.
STDF/PG303: ‘Regional total diet study for Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2014-ongoing) aims to strengthen the capacity
of risk managers to implement international standards based on good knowledge of hazards, risks, and
exposure levels to harmful substances in commonly produced and consumed food.
STDF/PG/335: ‘Strengthening phytosanitary controls in the floriculture sector in Uganda’ ran from 2012-2015.
Agence Béninoise de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

IOB’s findings on the delayed achievement of outputs in Uganda and Benin were not
exceptional. The reviews of STDF confirm that delays are common. The 2014 evaluation
mentioned that 30% of the projects required a time extension (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
Lack of continuity was also mentioned as an issue. Both issues were often due to
circumstances outside the control of the project, such as a lack of institutional capacity,
funding, or high staff turnover (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
The fact-finding efforts during the visits to Uganda and Benin led to the following
conclusions on direct results. The Beninese SPS information system project essentially
failed, as the system collapsed. However, there were some longer-lasting effects. The project
led to the decision which department should represent Benin in the Codex Alimentarius
Commission and to a protocol for food safety crises. Indirectly the establishment of ABSSA
was the result of the awareness created by the project (FAO, 2011). ABSSA, part of the
Ministry of Agriculture, started almost from scratch again in 2013, supported by Belgium,
STDF, and FAO. Thus far, the data collected and processed in Benin as part of the total diet
study for SSA have helped to enhance awareness on chemical contamination and bacteria,
and on the trade-reducing effect of non-compliance to certain standards.

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The Ugandan project achieved the intended induced outputs and generated good results.
The project managed to improve standard controls in the floriculture sector, which resulted
in a sharp decrease in the number of SPS-related rejections of consignments and a stronger
cooperation between the different stakeholders, namely the Department of Crop Protection
(DCP), Uganda Flower Exporters Association (UFEA), Makerere University, the Netherlands
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA), and IPPC.47 To guarantee continuity,
UFEA developed and operationalised a control system. The organisation of regular audits
for compliance at farms improved under the STDF project, resulting in better monitoring
and learning, and a reduction of audit time, from four to only one day. The system was still
in place at the time of our visit in 2016. The project provided a blueprint for similar projects
in other sectors in Uganda, but so far, there has been no spillover effect.
Despite the delays and discontinuities in Benin and Uganda, our overall conclusion, based
on our own research and available evaluations, is that the projects funded by STDF achieved
the planned outputs and that there is anecdotal evidence of induced outputs. The problems
that were encountered stress the importance of taking the institutional and political
context, within which projects are implemented, into account as they can irrevocably
constrain the success of the project.
The Fair Wear Foundation
The Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) is a European multi-stakeholder initiative, with its office
located in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. FWF does not provide a compliance label or certificate.
Instead, it is an international verification institute. It verifies workplace conditions in
companies in sourcing countries, based on the core conventions of ILO and the Universal
47

The STDF project ran from 2012 to 2015. Between 2014 and 2016, the number of SPS-related interceptions
decreased from 35 to 2.

Standards

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It primarily uses the private sector as the channel to
achieve this goal. So rather than setting standards, FWF promotes compliance. FWF-accredited
monitors verify workplace conditions in participating factories in 15 garment-producing
countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa48 and keep track of improvements. FWF’s approach
consists of issuing FWF memberships to clothing companies. By 2016, 81 companies
(representing 120 brands) held an FWF membership. This membership shows the clothing
company or brand’s commitment to FWF-organised multi-stakeholder coalitions to reform
labour conditions. Besides clothing companies, other stakeholders include sourcing factories,
trade unions, NGOs, and sometimes local governments. Apart from the memberships, FWF’s
direct outputs include factory audits, complaint investigations, the production of country
studies, new/improved tools and guidelines, research and dissemination of obtained knowledge,
and Roundtable meetings with stakeholders. FWF has generally achieved its outputs
according to plan. Yet until recently, FWF did not monitor whether its members improved
their performance over time. Since 2016, FWF has started to work on a theory of change.
Assessing FWF’s induced outputs has been constrained by the absence of a proper M&E
system or external evaluations of FWF. No data could be obtained during the visits to
Uganda and Benin, because there are no FWF members that source from these countries.
Consequently, progress reports, interviews in the Netherlands, and general research on
labour standards in the economic literature provided insight into achieved induced outputs
and intermediate outcomes of FWF’s work (see appendix 1). FWF mentioned in an interview
that it had achieved better labour conditions in the factories that its members source from.
However, FWF acknowledged that given the small share of FWF members in total global
production, the impact at the industry level is marginal. Other induced effects that FWF
mentioned are increased awareness and knowledge of improved labour conditions
worldwide, and the uptake of best practices and lessons learned. In 5.4.1, the likely effect on
trade will be addressed.

5.2.2	Achieved output and induced output of private standards programmes
IDH, Solidaridad, and FTO all aim to enhance the environmental, social, and financial
sustainability of global value chains in which small producers from developing countries
are involved. The three organisations have often formed coalitions or partnerships,49 but
they apply alternative approaches.
IDH’s approach relies on public-private partnerships consisting of donor governments,
NGOs, trade unions, and progressive multinationals (e.g. Unilever, Cargill, Ikea, and Mars).
Together with partners committed to sustainable production, IDH promotes, encourages,
and supports the certification of producers in developing countries. IDH calls itself a neutral
convenor and certification neutral. This means that IDH does not set standards and does
not have its own labels. Instead, it supports other voluntary certification programmes (such

48

49

Around 80% of the production by FWF members comes from Bangladesh, China, India, and Turkey (fairwear.
org, 2017).
For instance, in IDH’s Cocoa Improvement Programme 2008-2012, Solidaridad was the implementing party.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

as UTZ Certified, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Rainforest Alliance,50 and the
Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC)) as instruments to achieve more sustainability in
value chains. IDH’s approach starts with a select group of producers of primary commodities
in developing countries that supplies a lead multinational company. The demonstration
effect of this selected group is meant to eventually spill over to other producers and other
companies.
Solidaridad uses an alternative approach that addresses issues of sustainability in a
sector-wide manner. Solidaridad looks for companies as partners that are willing to act as
front runners, have impact in the sector due to volume or strong brand reputation,
and have an innovative approach towards sustainable supply chain development. Instead
of emphasising compliance with private standards, Solidaridad first stresses the need to
increase productivity in the sector. The approach also focuses on lifting all producers in
the sector, instead of only devoting attention to those willing to adopt new production
methods and meet standards compliance.

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FTO’s approach combines the promotion of sustainable production methods with fair trade
schemes for commodities such as coffee, tea, cocoa, fruit juice, and coconut milk. Fairtrade
schemes offer a minimum price and an explicit price premium (the ‘social premium’) to
participating farmers or cooperatives. The fairtrade standard includes various social and
environmental standards, such as a decent income or living wage, no forced or child labour,
and no hazardous labour conditions. FTO uses its own value chains to guarantee and
maintain the standards. This approach primarily translates consumer concerns into a
change in producers’ behaviour.
All three approaches accompany their support of certification schemes51 with measures that
aim to improve the effects of trade. This is achieved by offering better trading conditions
(e.g. better prices), better market access (e.g. facilitating direct buyer-supplier links and
promoting the certificate in end markets), and facilitating enhanced product quality (Oya et
al., 2017). In addition to the support of certification schemes, the three organisations are all
involved in activities that enhance the effectiveness of these schemes and the underlying
standards. This includes support to national platforms in developing countries to expand
the support base in civil society, the private sector, and local authorities. Despite the
different approaches, all three organisations address issues that are not addressed (enough)
by national governments and they all focus mainly on products for export.
An important feature of IDH, Solidaridad, and FTO is their work on improving production
standards for primary commodities that are not produced in Western countries (e.g. coffee,
cocoa, palm oil, cashews, and soy). The advantage is that these products are recognised by
end consumers as ‘Third World’ products associated with development needs. This
facilitates the moral appeal of the labelled products. The fact that Western companies
50

51

Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified have announced their intention to merge and continue as Rainforest
Alliance in June, 2017.
E.g. UTZ Certified, Better Cotton Initiative, Fairtrade, and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil.

Standards

dominate the value chain of these commodities also plays an important role. The downside
is that the programmes are commodity- and export-specific. This greatly reduces the
spillover effect to other sectors.52
Most of these three organisations’ work concentrates on improving production methods
and increasing productivity in a sustainable way. They help producers of products for export
increase their production and comply with standards, so that they can use a particular
private label. These activities fall under trade development (i.e. another category of AfT).
But some important aspects of the programmes fall within the scope of this evaluation in
terms of the effect of regulations on trade. These aspects include standard setting,
promotion, harmonisation and mutual recognition, implementation, certification,
testing and enforcement, and capacity building to reinforce the institutes that certify and
audit. We limited our assessment to only those activities. The three organisations’ activities
on standards generally achieved the planned outputs, which were often quite ambitious.
Measured outputs include the publication of studies, reports and training curricula,
the training and/or certification of producers, the organisation of and participation in
Roundtables, and the development of campaigns to create consumer demand. All three
private standards programmes have proper M&E systems on outputs in place, with outputs
measured in absolute terms and related to targeted outputs. Their performance on direct
output delivery is satisfactory (see appendix 1 for details and references).
The induced outputs, defined as the direct effects of the activities of the three organisations
with respect to standards, are limited and unfortunately not always sustainable. The desk
research looked at reporting on: (a) the promotion of uniformity of quality and the effect of
standards development on the quantity and value of certified produce, (b) enhanced
credibility of labels and more demand for certified products, (c) enhanced involvement in
standard setting and compliance of the private sector and civil society in beneficiary
countries, and finally (d) improved capacity on standards at ministries and other
government institutions.
One of the problems with certification and improving quality, which may increase trade
value and create a more predictable supply, is that many of the schemes that promote such
standards and certification are not sustainable. The 2014 IOB evaluation on IDH concluded
that in the longer run, the share of certified produce quickly decreased, because becoming
certified created bigger benefits for small producers than staying certified. In the process
of becoming certified, IDH provided training and expertise, which improved productivity,
and covered the starting costs of certification. Yet staying certified required producers to
continue to pay the recurrent costs of certification, while revenues decreased as premiums
on prices were phased out or evaporated as certified production became widespread.
Consequently, the relative costs of compliance increased and the incentive to stay certified
was often too small to make up for the extra costs. A problem that contributed to this is that

52

IDH seems to recognise this and has recently initiated a more inclusive approach called ‘landscapes’. More
details are provided on IDH’s website.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

there was often not enough demand for the certified product, which forced the producers
to sell part of their crops as a conventional product or forego a price premium (IOB 2014b).

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Evaluations of Solidaridad also conclude that the effect of certification on producers’
incomes is marginal and diminishing quickly (IOB, 2014a). Contributing in a sustainable
way to a higher producer price is a problem for all private standards. The reporting on price
premiums is mixed. Coffee seems to perform best. UTZ Certified reports a premium of USD
0.05 to USD 0.07 per pound (Riisgaard et al., 2009), which is about 3% of the average
producer price, but does not say how much production costs have increased. FTO pays a
higher price for coffee. It guarantees a minimum price and pays a ‘social premium’ (of
around 15 cents per pound). This often goes partly to the producer, whereas another portion
is for the benefit of the cooperative or for community projects. A lack of demand
for its coffee has forced FTO to limit the amounts they purchase from certified farmers.
A problem with these premiums is that the effect on the price of non-certified coffee, and
therefore the value and volume of the export of non-certified coffee, is unknown. Locally,
the effect on non-certified coffee may be positive. Such a positive effect is evident when the
cost of collecting coffee is reduced, due to economies of scale or stable producer-buyer
relations in certified coffee, and partly transferred to all primary producers (including those
that are not certified). The effect can also be positive, if better farming practices spill over
and raise the quality of non-certified coffee (Van Rijsbergen et al., 2015). However, at a more
macro-level, the overall effect on the price of non-certified coffee may be negative and may
offset the positive effects of price premiums.
For other commodities, there is no premium. In those cases, certification is part of the
technical assistance package that also helps producers to increase productivity. This explains
why there is a sustainability problem once the technical assistance stops.
The private standards programmes undertake all kinds of activities to increase the
involvement and improve the awareness of private sector organisations (PSOs), civil society
organisations (CSOs), and local authorities. This is done by engaging in dialogue, e.g. in
platforms, and by negotiating about compliance with production method standards. For
example, IDH negotiates on the provision of technical assistance in exchange for
participation and compliance of the parties that participate in the Roundtables and other
platforms. The 2014 Review of IDH is inconclusive about positive spillover effects, but
assumes that IDH’s work may have contributed to more debate and action by the
government and industry in recipient countries (IOB, 2014b). In that way, IDH may have
contributed indirectly to the better implementation and enforcement of national
legislation on standards.
The negative spillover effects of the private standards programmes did not receive much
attention. Examples of possible negative spillover effects include more rainforest being
destroyed for (less remunerative) crops instead of palm oil and a shift in child labour from
cocoa plantations to even more miserable jobs. These effects also fall outside the scope of
this evaluation, as they do not affect trade.

Standards

The visit to Uganda provided some evidence that the private standards programmes helped
to improve the awareness and enhance the involvement of NGOs and CSOs. One example is
the Ugandan National Union of Coffee Agribusiness and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE), a
beneficiary of IDH and FTO. NUCAFE declared that although not comparable to CBI/ITC’s
very well-received export promotion programme, IDH and FTO had been valuable partners
in helping Ugandan exporters become aware of the importance of standards and helped
build the institutional capacity of NGOs and CSOs on standards. There does not seem to
have been an effect on government institutions in Uganda and Benin, however. As long as
exported products were not rejected, compliance with standards for export products was a
non-issue for government organisations dealing with standards.
There is sufficient reason to conclude that these three organisations’ work on standards had
only a limited and temporary effect on the uniformity of the quality of products. Production
increased despite the introduction and certification of standards, because technical
assistance increased productivity. The effect on price was limited and did not last. Demand
for certified products did not keep up with production. The domestic private sector became
more involved in the global value chain, but mainly because of productivity increases (e.g.
through enhanced producers’ knowledge), preferred supplier arrangements, and an
autonomous globalisation trend and not so much because of the technical assistance for
setting up standards and certification. These advantages could very well have been reached
without certification. Good practice in terms of environmental and labour conditions and
quality (mainly food safety) of the crops was promoted, but the added value of certification
was not clear. Finally, we found no evidence of a significant positive effect of these
programmes on government oversight of standards.
All of this does not imply that the agricultural extension parts of the programmes were not
successful. Producers did benefit in other ways than the introduction of the standards: from
lessons learned, from economising on pesticide use, and increases in yields, regardless of
whether they remained certified (IOB, 2014b). The interviews that were part of this
evaluation confirmed this. Enhanced efficiency in production and along the value chain53
created a more competitive position for developing country producers and traders. Yet no
evidence was found that standards played a role in this process.

5.3 Donor coordination and local ownership
In 2015, STDF received contributions from 11 donors: Denmark, the EC, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Chinese Taipei, and the United States
(STDF, 2016).54 The interviews held with the secretariat and Dutch policy officers revealed
that donors agree that STDF is a key part of the WTO’s support infrastructure. Assistance to
LDCs and close cooperation with other organisations, such as the EIF on diagnostic studies,
53

54

Whether the increased quality or efficiency of production had an effect on income is beyond the scope of this
research and hence not included in our conclusions.
STDF’s largest donors are Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

were mentioned in particular. In several cases, projects funded by STDF were part of larger
overarching programmes by other donors. Support to ABSSA in Benin is an example. The
formalised approach of STDF’s capacity building initiatives, with a preparatory phase and a
project implementation phase, is also used by several other donors of capacity building
initiatives. For instance, EIF supports both the preparatory and implementation phases of
capacity building initiatives through two separate types of grants, the tier 1 window
(funding of preparatory work) and the tier 2 window (funding the actual implementation).
The formalised practices under which projects are run by these different donors – following
a systematic approach with similar, distinct stages and the recognition of each other’s
preparatory outputs as equivalent to their own – allows for more effective donor assistance.
It prevents efforts from being duplicated and ensures that the beneficiaries’ limited
administrative resources are not overburdened.

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IDH, Solidaridad, FTO, and FWF are all Dutch private organisations that are supported by the
Netherlands government to build capacity in the value chain. Although these organisations
are part of larger networks with similar foreign organisations, and despite occasional funding
by other donors, de facto they are executive agencies of the Netherlands’ official development
assistance in the area of private standards. The 2014 IOB study concluded that IDH should
improve its cooperation with the Dutch public sector. In particular it should cooperate more
with executing agencies of Dutch embassy programmes and collaborate with executive
agencies that use other instruments from the Dutch PSD programme (IOB, 2014b). While IDH
works with local stakeholder organisations in the field, its cooperation with Western
organisations is primarily with other Dutch organisations (such as ICCO, SNV, Agriterra, and
MADE-BY). On a more positive note, in 2013 IDH did receive contributions from Switzerland
(SECO) and Denmark (DANIDA). But FWF was mainly funded by Dutch organisations: the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and two trade unions, FNV and CNV. This implies that in practice
support to these organisations by the Netherlands is a form of tied aid. The focus of these
programmes on exports to the EU, and often only to the Netherlands, and their preference for
consumer-driven standards result in programmes that are to a considerable extent supply
driven, i.e. chosen by the Netherlands rather than the developing countries. This was
confirmed during our fieldwork. Neither other donors nor the governments in the recipient
countries were aware of the work of these programmes on standards. This has reduced
positive spillover effects, learning, scaling up, and efficiency in general.

5.4 Likelihood of outcomes
In this section, we draw conclusions on whether the work on standards by the programmes
in the sample are likely to have affected trade, and if so, in what way.
There is a growing body of empirical studies on the effect of standards on trade. The studies
generally assess the effect of an increase on the number and/or stringency of standards. They
show that public and private standards are typically more stringent in high-income countries
than in low-income countries, either because of laws or better enforcement or because of
consumer preferences, (Disdier et al., 2015; Ferro et al., 2013). This phenomenon has

Standards

generally been termed the ‘North-South standards divergence’. Whether higher standards
facilitate or hinder trade is referred to as the ‘standards-as-catalyst’ versus the ‘standards-asbarrier’ perspective. Obviously, AfT for standards should encourage the use of standards
from the first perspective and mitigate the effects of standards from the second.
The ‘standards-as-barrier’ perspective emphasises that stricter standards increase compliance
costs, and may do so (intentionally or unintentionally) in a disproportionate, protectionist
manner. If compliance goes hand in hand with additional fixed costs for both producers and
standards bodies, then stricter standards can become an entry barrier. When large
investments are needed to comply with destination market standards, fixed costs increase
substantially and require larger volumes to make the same profit. Some producers may be
able to finance these investments, but others may not. Compliance can also cause variable
costs to rise when, for instance, newly adopted product standards demand a higher-quality
product, requiring costlier inputs or more capital-intensive production methods. In less
developed countries, institutions are not as well developed, and often an adequate
infrastructure for standards and compliance is lacking. These countries also suffer from
private resource capacity constraints. As a result, exporters from less developed countries
generally face higher compliance costs than their competitors in more developed countries
(Moïsé et al., 2013a; Arvis et al. 2012; Lord, 2010). These factors explain why empirical studies
show that on average developing countries lose market share as standards increase or are
harmonised in their destination markets, whereas developed countries gain market share
(see Clougherty and Grajek, 2014, or Ferro et al., 2013, for example). Ferro et al. (2013) found
that more restrictive standards in destination markets make it less likely that firms export
their goods to those markets (a negative extensive margin effect). No statistically significant
effect on the volume/value of exports (an intensive margin effect) was found (Ferro et al.,
2013). Finally, discrimination, i.e. differences in the actual level of enforcement, with more
rigorous enforcement for imports than for domestic supplies, may have a negative effect.
This discriminatory effect does not occur with private standards, because they are voluntary
and are not enforced at the border. Neither do private standards preclude the possibility of
entering a market for non-certified produce, though the produce will often be sold at lower
prices. This would change, however, if private standards became public.
The ‘standards-as-catalyst’ perspective emphasises that standards are a potential means to
overcome information asymmetry. By creating agreed product and/or production
specifications, standards reduce transaction costs and enhance trust, signalling
characteristics that would otherwise not be communicated or would come at a high search
or quality assurance cost. An important example of standards contributing to risk reduction
in developing countries is the common practice of lead firms working with preferred small
and medium-sized suppliers or outgrowers. The buying party gets a steady supply that meets
a certain standard, while suppliers are guaranteed that they can sell their produce (if they
comply) for a ‘fair’ price, which is often set in advance (Oya, et al., 2015; Ruben, 2017). The
characteristics can be product related, such as information on product quality and product
safety, or non-product related, such as information on labour or environmental conditions.
By removing information asymmetries and risk, standards can reduce rejection at the border.

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Standards can also provide an incentive for developing countries to improve the institutional
efficiency of the value chain or the efficiency of the production process to stay competitive.
When developing countries harmonise national standards or mutually recognise each
other’s national standards, the size or number of market(s) that can be served increases,
allowing for economies of scale or a more stable supply, which improves their
competitiveness.55 Finally, standards can increase the value of trade, if higher standards lead
to higher prices and the price elasticity of the export demand is smaller than 1.
Which effects dominate, and whether standards catalyse or hamper trade, is influenced by
the level of development of the country. The capacity of the government and the industry,
and the strengths and weaknesses in the value chains are decisive factors. An active policy to
improve the necessary and appropriate management and control by the government or the
industry may create new forms of competitive advantage (Jaffee and Henson, 2005). This
knowledge provides a theoretical framework for assessing the likely effect of programmes
on trade.

5.4.1

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International public standards programmes

As described in section 5.2.1, STDF contributes to developing countries’ awareness of the
importance of international standards for trade and increased coordination in the provision
of technical cooperation on SPS issues. In its second role, STDF increases their capacity to
develop and enforce standards. These two roles are expected to reinforce one another. In its
role as a knowledge platform and global coordinator, STDF effectively enhances developing
countries’ awareness of the role of standards, and strengthens their participation in
standard-setting bodies and negotiations on SPS matters. The main outcome of this is that
developing countries are better informed and more aware of potential problems. Their
participation in international standard-setting bodies has also increased, but as the World
Bank concluded, ‘developing countries still have limited influence on the setting of many
internationally-recognised standards’ (World Bank, 2005: p. 114). The upshot of their
participation in standard setting and negotiations therefore is that they gain better
knowledge about which compliance problems they need technical assistance for, in order
to maintain their access to international markets and enhance their competitiveness. The
effect on exports may therefore be indirect. Or there may not be any effect. Creating
awareness has not led Uganda or Benin to change their trade policies on standards for
exports; in fact, the UNBS was hardly aware of STDF’s existence. The effect on trade in these
countries was on imports rather than exports. The awareness of the importance of SPS
standards encouraged developing countries to reinforce their SPS checks on imports. So the
likely net impact of these STDF activities on trade is not clear. Some countries may have used
the awareness to maintain their market share in export markets with a positive effect on
trade, while others have used it to restrict imports, mainly affecting South-South trade in a
negative way.
55

Chen and Mattoo (2004 and 2008) found, however, that when regional agreements on harmonisation and
mutual recognition are reached among developing countries (with stricter harmonised standards), nonparticipating developed countries generally experienced a positive effect on exports, whereas nonparticipating developing countries generally experienced a negative export effect.

Standards

SDTF also provides technical assistance to help reform national standards policy, to
implement international standards, and to set up an institutional framework to develop
and enforce standards. The need for this was convincingly shown by Wilson and Abiola (2003).
The authors found that in several African countries the management and enforcement of
standardisation lacked national coordination. Furthermore, national standards were not
harmonised, and regulatory roles and responsibilities were allocated across many different
national agencies (Wilson and Abiola, 2003). Primary data collection in Uganda and Benin
confirmed the need for capacity building. Overall, technical assistance funded by STDF was
successful. The 2014 evaluation concludes that the evaluated projects have generally
‘delivered results’, were ‘likely to be success stories’, and were expected ‘to have long-term
impacts’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a). Evaluations noted an absence of consistent and detailed
M&E procedures for projects (Slorach, 2008; Saana Consulting, 2014a), which explains the
words ‘likely’ and ‘expected’. SDTF intends to improve its M&E as indicated in the 2015-2019
medium-term strategy (STDF, undated-c).56 Evaluations indicated, however, that the small
size of the STDF Secretariat and the labour intensity of all these small projects create
difficulties, especially when follow-up is needed to guarantee sustainable effects. Taking up
more M&E work will aggravate this problem. In Uganda, the SPS-related rejection of flower
exports sharply decreased. This proves that building capacity will have a positive effect on
trade, if only by mitigating the negative effects of standards as barriers. General capacity
building on standards will reduce the institutional gap between developing and developed
countries and increase the likelihood that developing countries will benefit from
harmonised standards, rather than suffer negative consequences. In this respect,
developing countries are more likely to experience positive trade effects, if the more
stringent standards for exports are also introduced for products sold in the domestic
market. In an overview article of numerous studies, Swann (2010) concludes that the
adaptation of international standards in the domestic market positively and significantly
affects a country’s export and import performance.57 Clougherty and Grajek (2008 and 2014)
explain this effect by noting that the adoption of international standards at home leads
to more efficient production processes and more information symmetry in value chains.
This is in line with the standards-as-catalyst perspective on competitiveness. It underscores
the importance of STDF’s work on general capacity and government oversight in developing
countries, for which its role as a knowledge platform and global coordinator is also essential.
In section 5.2, we concluded that FWF helped to increase compliance with respect to labour
standards in the participating export companies that supply the Netherlands with garments.
Whether this induced output had any effect on trade has never been measured, nor has FWF
given it much thought. However, it is unlikely that such an effect would be measurable,
given the small share of FWF members in the total (global) garment industry. Theoretically,
one would expect an increase in cost to reduce trade, but the effect on productivity could
compensate for this. To confirm this, one would need a great deal of data on the impact of
56

57

The strategy refers to document 509, which ‘takes the existing M&E activities of STDF a step further by
establishing a practical monitoring and evaluation system, which not only reports on activities, but also tracks
progress in terms of achieving results’ (STDF, undated-a: p. 1).
This could partly be a proxy for the quality of governance in general, so the extent of the effect should be
appreciated with care.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

living wages on production cost, on the distribution of profit margins in the value chain, on
retail pricing, and on the value of well-established relations, leading to timely delivery and a
continuous high-quality supply. Anecdotal evidence indicates that competition among
Dutch buying companies is fierce and that Japanese and American brands generally pay
higher prices to their suppliers. Asked whether FWF-membership could lead to trade
diversion in the case of poor labour conditions or calamities,58 FWF said that its members
were unlikely to divert their orders to other source countries (with better conditions).
Instead, they have shown a willingness to use their leverage to improve the situation. As
mentioned, the empirical literature (Swann, 2010) indicates that adopting international
standards in domestic markets, if possible, has a positive effect on trade (on both exports
and imports). In this case, this means that there would be an effect on trade if FWF’s
activities had a massive spillover effect. In practice, this would require governments and
trade unions in the countries where garments are made to enforce core labour rights, not
only in export sectors, but all over the country, and in all sectors. This emphasises the
importance of involving national and local government authorities, to develop laws and
institutions for sector-wide enforcement of labour standards, also for the domestic market.
Roundtables and other sector platforms can provide a valuable tool to involve authorities,
to create local ownership. FWF was aware of the limitations of its approach and indicated
that it had increased its efforts to cooperate with governments.
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5.4.2

Private standards programmes

The reports and findings, as well as the evaluations and interviews on the outputs and
induced outputs of the private standards programmes, provide no evidence that the work
on standards by IDH, Solidaridad, and FTO had a substantial effect on trade. The standards
themselves rarely affect trade volumes, as they specify production methods rather than
product quality and because they are not official mandatory and therefore not enforceable
standards. If they were enforceable, total volumes would probably decrease. The standards
may have affected the competitiveness of the participating producers or the value chain (the
standards-as-catalyst perspective), however. Ruben (2017) indicates the possibility of
spillover effects to other (non-certified) farmers and spatial externalities at the landscape
level. He also mentions likely secondary effects related to behavioural change (risk and
trust) and local innovation dynamics. These are short-term effects of the introduction of
standards, however, that do not require standards to be maintained for many years or to be
internationally promoted. The accompanying technical assistance increased the
productivity of the producers, irrespective of the standards. The positive effects on the
programmes’ export volumes should be attributed to the increases in productivity that
came with the private standard certification process, rather than to these private standards
themselves. Some of the certified products, such as coffee, reportedly received an export
price that was a few per cent higher than non-certified products. For FTO’s niche coffee
value chain, this was even a few per cent more, but only for less than half of the certified
coffee supplied. The effect on price was also more permanent, because FTO managed to sell
its labelled products at a premium, partly through direct sales. Although the size of FTO’s
certified export market is very small, this may have affected the total export value of a few
58

Such as the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh in 2013.

Standards

countries in a positive way. However, this effect may have been offset by a very minor
negative effect of the premium for certified coffee on the price of non-certified coffee,
because of the higher price’s effect on supply. The work on standards did not change the
comparative advantage of developing versus developed countries, because these
organisations concentrated their efforts on products that are rarely produced in developed
countries. This suggests that their technical assistance for standard setting has most likely
not increased developing countries’ integration into the world economy through more and
more diverse trade.
The fact that the Dutch support of IDH, Solidaridad, and FTO on standard setting and
implementation has not generated a significant effect on trade does not mean that
standards never have such an effect. An obvious example is when technical assistance for
standards can help to create trade that has not yet emerged or has been prohibited.
The export of impala or kudu meat from the EAC and cheese from Masisi in Eastern Congo
(once exported to Belgium) are good examples. Harmonisation and mutual recognition of
standards can have a significant effect on trade. Especially in the context of regional
integration, trade diversion and trade creation opportunities arise through common
standards, specialisation, and economies of scale. There is scope for technical assistance in
supporting developing countries to harmonise and mutually recognise standards in the
process of regional integration. In Uganda and Benin, standards bureaus were far more
concerned with imports than with exports. They hampered rather than stimulated trade.
The ministers we interviewed, as well as employees of standards bureaus, exporters, and
importers in Benin and Uganda, acknowledged that the institutional infrastructure to
implement and enforce standards compliance was still very weak.

5.5 Conclusion
The general conclusion on the effects of more stringent standards on foreign, regional,
and domestic markets is that in developing countries the negative effect of compliance
costs dominates the positive effect of economies of scale, with compliance costs negatively
correlated with the development level. Developing countries struggle with compliance,
and higher standards affect their exports and imports negatively, except when they are in a
position to introduce these standards into their domestic market as well.59 This latter result
is important because it advocates building general institutional capacity and oversight on
standards, such as for standards bureaus that set, implement, develop, and control
standards. This is the kind of capacity that STDF supports, and it is likely that the technical
assistance it has been providing has had a positive effect on trade. We can conclude that
STDF has helped developing countries to integrate into the world’s trading system and the
world economy. However, the whole process of project selection, management, and
monitoring and evaluation is relatively costly and puts pressure on the resource-constrained
secretariat.
59

This could be explained by the absence of discontinuities. As a result, the compliance costs may be lower
whereas the harmonisation and catching-up effect stimulates trade.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

The empirical evidence on conditions that need to be met before standards can have a
positive effect on trade stresses the importance of having well-functioning institutions on
sector-wide standards enforcement, also for the domestic market. FWF’s orientation
towards exports and the private sector and its exclusive focus on labour standards do not
contribute to these conditions. The likely effect of Dutch support to FWF on trade was
minor at best, but could also have been negative. Enforcement of ILO labour standards, also
for domestic production, could have a more positive effect on trade, however (apart from a
more considerable effect on labour conditions). This requires impartial government
oversight and therefore a reorientation from private to public.

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In the same line of reasoning, no evidence was found to suggest that better trade
performances justify Dutch development financing of IDH, Solidaridad, and FTO to
introduce or support higher voluntary private standards and compliance. These
programmes mainly work on trade development, boosting production and trade volume by
improving production methods and the productivity of the farmers they support. The
regulatory standards part of these programmes is often not sustainable and unlikely to
affect trade in a positive way. These programmes’ work on standards has the same narrow
focus as FWF: the standards are oriented towards exports and the private sector, whereas
successful interventions that can promote competitiveness and trade introduce higher
standards into the domestic market and usually require the participation and oversight of
government institutions.

Standards

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Appendices

Appendices

Appendix 1		Assessment of individual
programmes under evaluation
In this appendix, we review the selected TP&R programmes (see section 1.4). The individual
assessments are the basis of the more aggregated findings in chapters 3, 4, and 5. For each
individual programme, we present a brief background and intervention logic. The
intervention logics are constructed based on different internal and external sources. These
sources include, for instance, programme and project proposals, appraisal documents,
annual plans, and interviews. The programme descriptions and intervention logics are
followed by IOB’s assessments, based on a desk study of progress reports and final reports,
evaluations by others, interviews with policy officers, executing agents, and policy officers
in beneficiary countries, as well as on theoretical and empirical literature. The assessments
review the achieved outputs and induced outputs and evaluate whether the programmes
are likely to have contributed to (intermediate) outcomes and Dutch policy objectives.
The organisation of a programme is only discussed if it influenced the effectiveness of the
programme.
Several programmes have repeatedly received funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
registered under different activity numbers. The assessment (including the construction of
the intervention logic) represents the overall objectives and findings of the combined
activities. The assessment focuses on trade policy and regulations, which means that other
(or even core) objectives of the programme will be disregarded in the assessment (and in
the intervention logic).

Trade policy and negotiating capacity
1. Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)
Background
At the WTO Ministerial Conference (MC) in Seattle in 1999, 29 countries signed the
Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law. The establishment was the result
of an initiative by the Netherlands and Columbia. In 2001, the agreement entered into force
and ACWL officially started its activities. Important donors of ACWL include Denmark, the
United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and the Netherlands. During the period under
examination, the Netherlands provided approximately EUR 4.8 million to ACWL, in the
form of core funding.
ACWL also receives income from its non-LDC members, through contributions to the
Endowment Fund60 and fees charged for ACWL’s support in dispute settlement procedures.
The size of the contributions and fees are determined on the non-LDC member’s share in
world trade and per capita income (ACWL, undated). LDCs are entitled to all services
60

The revenues from the Endowment Fund are another source of income for ACWL.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

without having to contribute to the endowment fund and have to pay only a modest fee for
legal representation in WTO dispute settlements.
ACWL’s objective is to assist developing countries and LDCs to overcome their lack of
expertise on WTO law and trade dispute management, as well as the institutional, financial,
and language61 constraints to acquire such expertise. By providing legal advice, support in
dispute settlement proceedings, and training,62 ACWL helps developing countries and LDCs
to understand their rights and obligations under WTO law and create an equal opportunity
for them to defend their interests in WTO dispute settlement proceedings (ACWL, undated).
The Secondment Programme, for instance, gives trainees (the primary beneficiaries) direct
access to WTO law-related knowledge so they can learn about WTO law, procedures, and
agreements. The policy advice and knowledge provided can subsequently be used by
administrations in developing country and LDCs (secondary beneficiaries) to reform
national policy. Additionally, the beneficiary country’s delegates (secondary beneficiaries)
can use the obtained negotiation skills and knowledge on WTO law in trade negotiations.
The intervention logic associated with these services is described in the table below.

Table A1.1 ACWL intervention logic

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61

62

Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

• Legal advice;
•	(Subsidised)
legal support
in dispute
settlement
proceedings;
•	Training;
•	(Joint)
organisation
of regional
training
workshops,
seminars,
and capacity
building
programmes;
•	Disputerelated
specialised
technical
research.

•	Legal advice given
on potential WTO
cases or WTO
conformity of
domestic laws in
the form of legal
opinions;
•	Provision of
support by ACWL in
dispute settlement;
•	Training given and
certificates
awarded;
•	(Joint) trainings,
workshops,
seminars, and
capacity building
programmes
organised;
•	Specialised
technical research
executed.

•	Enhanced awareness of the
role of WTO law in national
trade and development
policy;
•	WTO-related activities
organised and institutional
units set up by and in
developing countries and
LDCs (e.g. WTO notifications
filed and intergovernmental
workgroups on WTO law
set-up);
•	More effective negotiation of
developing countries and
LDCs;
•	Enhanced effectiveness of
developing countries and
LDCs in trade disputes
(as complainant, respondent,
or third party);
•	Increased WTO jurisprudence
from a developing country
perspective.

•	Trade terms that
better represent
developing
countries’ and
LDCs’ interests;
•	Enhanced
capacity of
developing
countries and
LDCs to handle
complex trade
disputes;
•	Enhanced
legitimacy of the
WTO system.

Language barriers may be the result of difficulties incurred by the (dis)ability to comprehend a foreign language
or by dealing with complex legal jargon, for example.
The Secondment Programme and annual courses on WTO law, for example.

Appendices

Findings
Information on the achieved direct outputs and induced outputs was obtained from annual
reports, internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with policy
officers, international organisations, other stakeholders, former trainees, and representatives
from ACWL. ACWL’s annual reports document the achieved outputs according to the
intervention logic. Annual reports present information on the number of legal opinions
provided by subject and by level of development of the beneficiary country (GNP/capita),
the number of WTO disputes in which ACWL provided support, the number of training
certificates awarded, and annual overviews of the conferences, seminars, and other events
which ACWL organised or in which it participated. Annual reports do not provide
information on targets, so achieved outputs cannot be compared with targets. ACWL
explains the absence of output targets by referring to its demand-based approach and
confidential client-attorney relationship, providing assistance on demand. Information on
outputs of dispute settlement support and legal advice is constrained by the confidential
nature of ACWL’s services. While understandable, this makes it more difficult to assess the
quality of these outputs. These findings were confirmed by the 2014 PwC evaluation of
ACWL, which stated that the restricted access to performance data made it difficult to
determine the effectiveness of ACWL’s outputs (PwC, 2014). An overview of some of ACWL’s
outputs is presented in the table below.
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Table A1.2 ACWL outputs (2007-2016)
Year

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

LEGAL ADVICE
Legal opinions on systemic
or procedural issues

48

83

81

94

99

90

116

71

73

69

Legal opinions on measures
of country seeking advice

39

61

53

64

71

94

56

70

57

76

Legal opinions on measures
of other countries

23

31

60

48

48

47

41

63

51

51

Total

110

175

194

206

218

231

215

204

181

196

WTO disputes in which
ACWL provided support

6

7

6

7

3

8

8

8

10

14

New requests for support in
WTO disputes

2

2

3

4

0

5

3

1

4

4

33

32

34

29

31

30

37

37

34

38

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

TRAINING
Certificates of annual
training courses awarded

Source: constructed from data from ACWL’s annual reports on operations 2007-2016.

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

LDCs benefit less from ACWL’s services than developing countries do. To illustrate, of the 35
trainees that participated in the Secondment Programme, only 9 trainees were from LDCs.
LDCs also benefit relatively less from legal advice (opinions on WTO legislation) and dispute
settlement support. In the period 2007-2016, only 11% of the legal advice provided by ACWL63
went to LDCs. And this percentage has fallen over time (16% in 2007, versus 6% in 2016). The
greater share of legal advice was provided to middle-income countries that are more actively
engaged in trade. ACWL’s assistance in dispute settlement proceedings was also mainly
provided to middle-income countries, with an average of 3% of support provided to LDCs
over the period 2001-2016 (ACWL, 2016). This can be explained by the fact that there are
hardly any disputes against LDCs, largely because of their small trading volumes, and by the
fact that retaliation would jeopardise development objectives. In their trade with developed
countries, LDCs also trade primarily under preferential trade arrangements where the WTO
dispute settlement system does not apply to possible trade disputes.

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However, institutional capacity constraints of developing countries, particularly LDCs, have
also limited the use of ACWL’s services. Because ACWL cannot ‘ambulance chase’,
developing countries must already have the monitoring capacity to identify lost market
access and be knowledgeable about the WTO and its enforcement process, in order to seek
assistance (Bown, 2009). Bown argues that ACWL has primarily affected the intensive margin,
by empowering previous users of its services to pursue more dispute cases, rather than
affecting the extensive margin, by providing assistance that allows new developing country
members, particularly LDCs, to use the Dispute Settlement Understanding64 (Bown, 2009).
The 2014 evaluation of ACWL by PwC also identified these capacity constraints for LDCs to
use and benefit from ACWL’s services, albeit beyond ACWL’s control. PwC concluded that
ACWL’s LDC strategy should be more proactively defined in order to remedy this (PwC, 2014).
A lack of awareness of ACWL’s existence in the capitals of LDCs was also evident in Uganda
and Benin, even in the Ministry of Trade, with the exception of those directly or indirectly
involved in the Secondment Programme. Several highly positioned officials working on
trade in ministries, who were interviewed during the field visits, indicated that they were
unaware of the existence of ACWL. Dutch policy officials confirmed that ACWL is well
known among representatives of LDCs in Geneva, but not in these countries’ capitals.
LDCs’ limited use of legal support (relative to middle-income countries) is mainly related to
political constraints that LDCs perceive when pursuing their legal rights in the WTO,
especially against powerful trading partners. To a certain extent, this prevents the Dutch
policy objective to focus on integrating LDCs in the WTO system from being achieved.
Despite the limited use of ACWL’s legal support and assistance in dispute settlement
procedures by LDCs, they did benefit from the general legal support that was provided,
such as the legal support that ACWL provided during negotiations on the Trade Facilitation
Agreement and on the extension of the TRIPS waiver.
63
64

Calculation based on the data provided in ACWL’s annual reports of operations 2007-2016.
The current dispute settlement system is embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, commonly referred to as the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

Appendices

ACWL has a limited M&E system. Satisfaction surveys are ACWL’s primary means of
evaluating the quality of its outputs. During the period under examination, beneficiaries of
direct outputs such as training and legal support reviewed ACWL’s services as ‘very useful’
and the quality as ‘highly satisfactory’ (ACWL’s annual reports of operations 2007-2016).
ACWL does not monitor induced outputs. Assessing attribution effects when moving along
the line of the intervention logic in the direction of outcomes is always difficult, but ACWL’s
limited M&E system has made it even more difficult. ACWL’s M&E only looks at directly
observable outputs. For instance, there is no systematic monitoring of where trainees go
after their training, making it difficult to determine whether and how the acquired
institutional capacity is put into use in developing countries. ACWL stresses that the
confidential nature of its services on dispute settlement makes it difficult to report on
improved use of the DSU by developing countries. Evaluations and interviews held with
policy officers, beneficiaries, international organisations, and representatives from ACWL
were used, to provide some idea of the effects of ACWL’s direct outputs.
To gain insight into the effects of the training activities and traineeships, former trainees
and secondary beneficiaries were interviewed. For instance, a former trainee of the
Secondment Programme was interviewed in Uganda. Both the alumnus and her supervisors
in the ministry perceived the Secondment Programme as very positive. The programme was
commended for applying a demand-driven approach, with interactive and practical
exercises, and a thorough study of WTO law, which improved the alumnus’ knowledge on
WTO law. Upon returning from the Secondment Programme, the alumnus was given a
position where she advised the Ministry of Trade and delegates from her country on trade
policy, on negotiation strategies, on the implementation of international agreements and
treaties, and on dispute settlement. She was involved in the EPA negotiations and in
formulating the Ugandan position within the EAC, COMESA, and CFTA. The alumnus set up
a staffed and equipped unit within the government that is linked to the university business
school in Geneva, and she started a high-level policy dialogue in a forum with officials from
other departments. Her superior noted that the Ministry of Trade has moved up in the
hierarchy of ministries, and that programmes such as the Secondment Programme
contributed to this. The alumnus remained in contact with her former fellow trainees, using
her network to obtain advice where necessary. This evidence shows a ripple effect that has
increased the effectiveness of the programme, beyond Geneva. Whereas the 2004 evaluation
by IOB concluded that ACWL had a ‘weak’ impact on the development of national policy at
the interface of trade and development (IOB, 2005), that impact could now, using the same
methodology, be rated as ‘fair’.
According to existing evaluations and the literature on ACWL, the legal opinions and
dispute settlement support created positive effects in terms of strengthening negotiation
positions for the beneficiary countries. Bown states, for example, that despite ACWL’s
inability to affect the extensive margin, the research does show that ACWL has successfully
empowered many developing countries with prior, albeit sometimes minimal, Dispute
Settlement Understanding experience to secure a better position in the WTO system (Bown,
2009). The evaluation by PwC (2014) calculated that for the period 2007-2013, 77% of the

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

legal advice that ACWL provided enabled developing countries to participate more
effectively in WTO decision-making (PwC, 2014), e.g. on the extension of the transition
period in the TRIPS Agreement for LDCs. Furthermore, ACWL’s services were found to
contribute to the legitimacy of the international trade system. It achieved this because the
legal advice provided by ACWL acts as a mechanism to stabilise the WTO system, helping
countries evaluate the consistency of their own trade policy measures with WTO obligations
(PwC, 2014).
However, the use of specific legal advice and DSU litigation support by LDCs is, as
mentioned, still very limited. Capacity constraints and the limited awareness of ACWL’s
services beyond Geneva restrict the use of its services and the possibility of generating
positive induced outputs.
Training activities and traineeships, such as the Secondment Programme, could play an
essential role in overcoming the problem of limited awareness of ACWL’s legal services in
the capitals of LDCs. Indeed, alumni who set up WTO law units and inter-departmental
policy dialogues upon returning home help to increase the awareness on ACWL’s services
within and across the ministries of LDCs.
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Despite the positive findings during our country visits, and in the literature and evaluations,
the ability to measure the extent of ACWL’s effect has been constrained by limited
performance data and the absence of a proper performance framework. While the
confidentiality of most of ACWL’s services explains some of the absence of detailed
information, the PwC evaluation states on this issue that the demand-driven and
confidential nature of ACWL’s work should not be an impediment to follow a results-based
management approach (PwC, 2014).
Furthermore, ACWL’s dependence on external funding from a small donor base remains a
matter of concern, as the insecurity of financing affects the amount of work that ACWL can
accept (emphasised, for example, in the PwC evaluation (2014) and the Report of the Task
Force (ACWL, 2015)). Predictable long-term financing is crucial for the institute’s type of
work and the quality of the organisation. The fact that these contributions come from
developed countries that sometimes are parties in a trade dispute does not affect ACWL’s
work. It may, however, influence developing countries’ choice to use ACWL’s services. ACWL
is an indispensable organisation in that it guarantees that the WTO’s rules-based system is
open and balanced, with equal access to dispute settlement. It would therefore make sense
if ACWL received core funding from the WTO, or at least a guarantee that the WTO will
support ACWL if donors pull out of their commitments.
Conclusion
ACWL’s support has contributed to Dutch policy objectives, as it has helped developing
countries to integrate into the rules-based international trading system. ACWL also
contributes to the fulfilment of the government’s obligation – as stipulated in the Dutch
constitution – by promoting enhanced access to justice and the development of WTO

Appendices

jurisprudence, as well as the development of the international legal order.65 Overall, ACWL
is considered to be highly relevant and to have contributed in a positive way to Dutch
development policy objectives, but the exact extent of that contribution has been difficult
to establish because of data limitations. However, the positive judgements found in the
evaluations and in the literature are in line with our, albeit neither systematic nor
representative, research findings. ACWL fulfils an important role in that it helps developing
countries to secure more effective positions in negotiations and disputes, which contributes
to the legitimacy of the WTO and the international, rules-based trading system.
Improvements could be made with respect to the systematic measurement of results and
predictable financing.

2. Netherlands Trainee Programme (NTP)
Background
The Netherlands Trainee Programme (NTP) was established in 2005 to succeed the Dutch
Internship Programme, which had been financed since 1998. NTP was set up to assist LDCs,
and comparably small and vulnerable economies, in building the necessary institutional
capacity to integrate into the international trading system. The programme offers
internships to (essentially junior) public officials, who come to work at the WTO Secretariat
and are supervised by WTO staff members. This exposes the trainees (the primary
beneficiaries) to the Secretariat’s ongoing activities and gives them direct access to, and
allows them to participate in, the WTO’s work in Geneva. The traineeship teaches trainees
about WTO regulation, procedures, and agreements, in order to provide relevant policy
advice that can be used by their home country administrations (secondary beneficiaries).
A maximum of 15 trainees is accepted each year, who follow a ten-month training period.
The selection is done by the WTO Secretariat. NTP falls within a larger set of WTO internship
programmes that are core TA products of the WTO’s Institute for Training and Technical
Cooperation66 (ITTC). Other internship programmes are the French-Irish Internship
Programme (formerly the Mission Internship Programme) and the WTO Accession
Internship Programme. During the period under examination, the Netherlands provided
approximately EUR 3.0 million of funding to NTP. The intervention logic of NTP is presented
below.

65

66

Article 90 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands reads: The Government shall promote the
development of the international legal order.
The Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation (ITTC) coordinates the WTO’s technical assistance and
training. Its main objective is to assist beneficiary countries in building trade policy and negotiating capacity.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Table A1.3 NTP intervention logic
Intervention

Output

Induced output

•	Training on, for
instance, WTO access,
EIF, services,
agriculture, and trade
policy reviews;
•	Visits to Clingendael,
the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and
the port of Rotterdam;
•	Meetings with
stakeholders (e.g.
ministers, labour
unions, and the
private sector);
•	Practical training and
exercises (including
simulations of tariff
reduction).

•	Trainee attendance •	
Enhanced knowledge
in training activities,
and understanding of
WTO meetings, and
the functioning of the
activities of other
WTO system and the
Geneva-based
role of trade in
organisations;
national develop•	Issue- and
ment;
country-specific
•	Improved coordinareports and RTA
tion of beneficiary
needs assessments;
country’s policy
•	Practical exercises
officer across
carried out;
different ministries
•	Analysis and review
in the design of
of documents;
trade policy;
• Preparatory work on •	Improved trade
WTO notifications
policy advice of
executed.
trainees to their own
government.

Expected inter­
mediate outcome
•	Enhanced
institutional
capacity of
developing
country/LDC
in WTO
negotiations;
•	Beneficiary
country is better
able to
implement its
commitments
made in WTO
agreements;
•	National policy
more in line with
WTO agreements.

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Findings
Achieving direct outputs and the direct effect of outputs has been assessed, based on WTO
reports, internal documentation, data, an external evaluation, and interviews with policy
officers, international organisations, other stakeholders, former trainees and
representatives of NTP. NTP has maintained a database of alumni, documenting participants
by year and nationality, and listing the positions the alumni hold in ministries. In the
period 2007-2016, 127 trainees participated in a traineeship (with the number of annual
trainees generally equal to the intended number of trainees). Of the participants, two-thirds
came from LDCs. NTP’s outputs included study visits, to Clingendael and the Port of
Rotterdam, for example, preparatory work related to WTO notifications, simulations of
tariff reduction, the attendance of meetings with delegates, the development of needs
assessments, and participation in activities of other organisations, such as UNCTAD,
IDEAS, and ICTSD (see, for instance, ITTC, 2011).
ITTC’s case study report stated that: ‘The WTO is highly committed to the results based
management (RBM) process’ and ‘having a results framework and adequate reporting
mechanism [...] will assist in determining whether a positive contribution has been made to
building capacity of beneficiary countries’ (ITTC, 2011: p. 2). Despite these commitments,
there is no clearly defined M&E framework for NTP-specific results. Instead, NTP is part of a
coherent, yet not highly sophisticated M&E system of the WTO’s trade-related technical
assistance (TRTA) programmes.
A very recent evaluation by Saana (2016b) of all WTO capacity building programmes in eight
countries, however, does provide some insight into the induced outputs achieved by NTP.
The evaluation assessed NTP positively in comparison with the other WTO programmes

Appendices

(Saana, 2016b,). This confirms the findings in ITTC’s report on WTO’s TRTA programmes in
general, stating (based on anecdotes): ‘Trainees found that they gained expertise on WTO
matters that enabled them to better handle their responsibilities in their capitals’ and that
the training had led to strengthened ‘analytical, critical thinking, communicative, and
collaborative skills’ (ITTC, 2011: p. 19). NTP’s own reporting shows that women’s participation
scored well, at 42%.
IOB’s findings on the induced effects of NTP’s outputs are similar to the NTP-specific
findings in Saana Consulting’s evaluation and the more general findings of the ITTC report.
Several former trainees and supervisors of former trainees were interviewed in Uganda and
Benin. Overall, the former trainees and their current supervisors gave NTP a positive
evaluation. Supervisors of former trainees emphasised the change in skills and attitude of
the former trainees, showing more mature and experienced behaviour. Former trainees
mentioned increased confidence as a positive personal effect. One alumnus, for instance,
said that having access to data, attending meetings, having contact with NTP staff (on an
equal level), and being responsible for specific tasks gave him a sense of being relevant.
This increased his confidence and his ability to execute his tasks.
Former trainees also indicated that the traineeship helped them understand why different
countries hold different positions in trade negotiations. An alumnus from Uganda mentioned
that the traineeship helps trainees not just to read about trade issues, but also to interact with
the people that defend different views. ‘Instead of seeing it on TV, discussions are brought
to life in conferences.’ An alumnus from Bangladesh, interviewed in Geneva, underscored
this as well, stating that interacting with trainees from different countries and attending
WTO meetings helped him understand the policy and negotiation positions of other
countries. This kind of understanding enables the beneficiary country to reflect on and
strengthen its own position, and contributes to the success of trade negotiations in general.
Furthermore, the visits to the Port of Rotterdam and Clingendael and the meetings with the
Dutch private sector and government officials were commended for providing insight in
how different stakeholders in the Netherlands interact and engage in dialogue, thus providing
the knowledge necessary to establish a negotiation position in line with country needs.
The general conclusion from our findings is that the predominant effect of NTP is that it
increases knowledge and offers hands-on experience to trainees on trade issues, WTO
policy, and the role of trade in development. Reportedly, policy officers that were new to a
ministry of trade or to the field of international trade were able to benefit in particular from
NTP, given the practical and interactive experiences it provided.
Former trainees also reported on how they used their knowledge and skills since returning
to their ministries, thereby providing insight into whether and how the effect on alumni
has trickled down to the ministries. An NTP alumnus from Uganda reported that upon his
return to the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Cooperatives, he discovered that there was
little knowledge at the ministry on AfT and the availability of technical assistance. He set up
an AfT unit in cooperation with other ministries. Today, the unit is staffed and operational,

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

and responsible for identifying gaps in the national notification system. The unit draws up
AfT funding proposals, and monitors and promotes AfT across Uganda’s ministries. This is a
good example of how the traineeship can result in a better understanding of the role of
trade in development and empower LDCs to benefit from the WTO system. Furthermore,
the NTP staff reported that later in their careers, former trainees often end up working in
permanent representations in Geneva, and that several former trainees have taken part in
WTO negotiations. For example, several NTP alumni participated in the seventh WTO
Ministerial Conference as part of their country’s delegation. These findings indicate that
NTP is able to select the right trainees, and that not only these trainees but also their
ministries and countries benefit from the programme in a structural way.

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Conclusion
The interviews and desk study findings give good reason to conclude that NTP has helped to
enhance the knowledge and skills of the trainees and changed their views on trade. Alumni
stated that the programme enhanced their knowledge of the system, critical/analytical
thinking, communication skills, and coordination skills. Some also indicated that it changed
their view on trade and the benefits of a rules-based system. The fact that trainees work for
the WTO Secretariat and not for the permanent representations of their respective countries
was mentioned as an important, positive element. Anecdotal evidence indicates that
alumni continue to work on trade policy after the traineeship. But drawing evidence-based
conclusions on whether NTP has contributed to the integration of LDCs and comparably
small and vulnerable economies into the international trading system has been constrained
by the absence of an NTP-specific external evaluation and a results framework. Measuring
the indirect effects and expected (intermediate) outcomes is especially difficult for
interventions that lead to a learning process (human capital and institutional capacity
building). Whereas several WTO documents provide information on the induced outputs
and expected intermediate outcomes of the traineeship, they are mostly anecdotal and not
measured systematically within a results framework with a well-defined yardstick. The
external evaluation by Saana Consulting (2016b) on WTO’s capacity building programmes
noted the difficulty of attributing results to the programme.
Nevertheless, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that NTP has had a positive effect on
the participation of beneficiary countries in the WTO system through the better use of the
opportunities that exist and through enhanced capacity of beneficiary country delegations.
Also, the better understanding of other countries’ negotiating position and the enhanced
coordination of stakeholders in trade (negotiation) suggests that NTP has helped to improve
the way that LDCs and comparably small and vulnerable economies function in the WTO system.

3. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)
Background
ICTSD is a Geneva-based, non-profit organisation founded in 1996. ICTSD’s objective is to
influence the international trade system and to advance the goal of sustainable
development (ICTSD, 2013). The centre assists NGOs, governments, and other stakeholders
in acquiring the necessary knowledge for trade policymaking and effective participation in

Appendices

negotiations, as well as to create dialogue and connections between stakeholders, and
within and across ministries.
Important donors of ICTSD include Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and
the Netherlands. Dutch funding of ICTSD in the period under examination, categorised as
TA for TP&R, amounted to EUR 11.1 million. This was primarily provided via core
contributions. As part of the total budget and additional to core funding, in 2013-2014,
EUR 271,384 was provided for the EPA project67 and EUR 750,600 was provided to support the
so-called ‘E-15 Initiative’.68 The intervention logic for ICTSD is presented in table A1.4.

Table A1.4 ICTSD intervention logic
Intervention

Output

•	Information and • Trade policymakers
context analysis
and influencers
(including
provided with a
scoping research);
regular flow of
•	
Targeted research
information,
and (LDC-specific)
evidence-based
background
data, and context
studies
analysis (through
(sometimes in
reports,
cooperation with
publications from
research centres,
e.g. Bridges,
think tanks, and
studies, and
universities in
briefs);
LDCs);
•	Expanded and
•	Broadening and
consolidated
strengthening
networks that
networks of
look at trade from
policy actors
a sustainable
and other
development
stakeholders;
perspective;
•	Dialogue
•	ICTSD initiatives
platforms and
(dialogues,
capacity building
platforms, and
events.
capacity building
events) organised.

67

68

Induced output

Expected inter­mediate
outcome

•	Trade policymakers
and influencers have
better insight into the
interests and
positions of different
stakeholders in
negotiations:
policymakers and
influencers provided
with strategic entry
points in trade
negotiations;
•	Better insight of LDCs
on their trade needs;
•	Better understanding
among stakeholders
of the effects of trade
agreements (and the
potential effects of
future agreements,
e.g. the EPAs);
•	Better coordination,
knowledge sharing,
and negotiation
between policy actors.

•	Stakeholder
empowerment:
multiple stakeholders
are represented in
negotiations;
•	LDCs’ trade needs well
reflected in regional
and multilateral trade
negotiations;
•	Policy reforms that
stimulate sustainable
trade and development
in developing countries;
•	LDCs have enhanced
negotiating capacity in
trade negotiations;
•	A more coherent
approach of
policymakers on
sustainable
development in
trade policy;
•	More credibility and
the effective
functioning of the
WTO system.

The EPA project was initiated to break the deadlock in the EPA negotiations between the EU and the three
sub-regions in Africa (East African Community, Western Africa, and Southern Africa). The programme consisted
of various dialogues in Brussels and the EPA regions, as well as region-specific analysis. ICTSD was approached
as an ‘unbiased facilitator’ to carry out these activities.
The E15 project is a highly ambitious initiative, jointly implemented with the WEF. It involves a range of global
institutions, experts, and the private sector to produce research and establish dialogue on a range of 21st century
trade and sustainable development issues. ICTSD convenes the expert groups and conducts research that
serves as input. The E15 Initiative was further funded by Switzerland (SECO) and from contributions from
ICTSD’s core donors.

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Findings
Information on achieved direct outputs and induced outputs was obtained from annual
reports, internal documentation, external evaluations, and interviews, with policy officers,
international organisations, other stakeholders, and representatives of ICTSD. ICTSD’s
programme and project proposals provide detailed information on the targeted outputs,
and annual impact reports provide information on the achieved outputs. Reporting on
measurable outputs includes the number of visits to the website, followers on social media,
ICTSD periodicals and their subscriptions, organised events and participation data, blogs,
research publications, and articles (see, e.g. the ICTSD 2016 Impact Assessment). Subsequent
reviews by Turner (2008), Ecorys (2010), and Saana Consulting (2014c) concluded that ICTSD
performed when it came to achieving outputs. The 2014 review concludes that ‘overall,
ICTSD has performed well in terms of delivery of activities and outputs’ (Saana Consulting,
2014c: p. 13). The level of outputs that was reached and the increase in the number of certain
outputs was considered ‘impressive’ (Ecorys, 2010), and in some areas ‘exceeding expectations’
(Saana Consulting, 2014c). The quality of outputs was also considered to be high. The reviews
indicate that the information and documents that were provided were of high quality, being
‘impartial’, ‘relevant’, and ‘value-adding’, and the dialogues were described as ‘fruitful’
(Turner, 2008; Ecorys, 2010; Saana Consulting, 2014c). ICTSD’s outputs are further valued
for the level of expertise and innovativeness. ICTSD has a wide network of experts, country
representatives, development organisations, and academic institutions, which they consult
and work with on a regular basis in Geneva (Saana Consulting, 2014c).
In 2007, ICTSD developed an all-encompassing M&E system that provided a planning and
monitoring log frame. Following up on recommendations made in evaluations, ICTSD has
developed this log frame over time. The M&E system, which includes a detailed framework
with specific targets for all outputs, has made it possible to assess ICTSD’s achievements.
It also contributed to the centre’s constant search for ways to improve the quality of outputs
and to follow up on the recommendations made in the reviews. In 2014, ICTSD defined
seven strategic goals. Under each goal, ICTSD has target outcomes, and beneath that, a
number of outputs. ICTSD’s role is to deliver at the output level, with the aim of influencing
change at the outcome level. The seven strategic goals are:
1. Diverse stakeholder groups engage effectively with each other to advance the global
agenda on trade and sustainable development;
2. The Multilateral Trading System functions effectively with rules and structures that
inherently promote sustainable development;
3. Policies and rules affecting the trade of agricultural goods improve food security,
support environmental sustainability, and enhance poverty reduction initiatives;
4. Trade contributes to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in LDCs and
Africa;
5. Innovation, creativity, and technology provide solutions to sustainable development
challenges;
6. Trade-related policies foster the sustainable use of natural resources; and
7. Policies on climate change, energy, and trade contribute to sustainable development.

Appendices

According to the annual impact reports: ‘Evidence of impact is collected on a continual
basis using a variety of channels, including, inter alia, stakeholder feedback and testimonials,
subscriber surveys, data analytics, digital media engagement, formal citations and
acknowledgements, and inside sources to policy processes.’ (ICTSD, 2016: p. 1). The annual
impact reports provide detailed overviews of activities and information on induced output
(see the intervention logic). However, although these reports also present expected
intermediate outcomes, they do not provide any information on whether they were
achieved or the extent of ICTSD’s contribution.
According to the 2014 review, ICTSD made good progress towards advancing sustainable
development issues, although it is difficult to attribute changes directly to ICTSD’s work.
The review cites specific examples of areas where ICTSD advanced sustainable development
issues (Saana Consulting, 2014c: pp. v-vi):
• the launch of negotiations on a new Environmental Goods Agreement in the WTO – there
is good evidence to suggest that the content and focus of these negotiations has been
influenced by ICTSD’s work;
• the Sustainable Energy Trade Initiative, where ICTSD has worked to bring climate change
and sustainable development to the forefront in trade negotiations and policy dialogue;
• the agenda-setting work on trade and sustainable development, through the E15 Initiative; and
• influence on trade negotiations and policy linked to agriculture including a much greater
focus on food security.
Stakeholder interviews conducted for the 2014 review, moreover, underline the contribution
ICTSD made to the preparation, analysis, and briefing before and during the ninth WTO
Ministerial Conference (Saana Consulting, 2014c). According to ICTSD, these appear to have
influenced negotiations and contributed to the outcome at Bali.
More moderate results were recorded on policy and negotiations linked to innovation and
technology, trade and growth in LDCs in Africa, and natural resources. According to the 2014
review this reflects in part the fact that these were not areas of focus for the Geneva-based
policymakers, and in part that African-focused trade issues are more likely to be discussed in
the region (Saana Consulting, 2014c).
According to the 2014 review, there are potential areas for improvement in terms of the
scope and focus of ICTSD’s work, specifically regarding goal 4, ‘Trade contributes to
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in LDCs and Africa’ (Saana Consulting,
2014c). The review states that there is less consistency and continuity regarding the EPAs,
LDCs and services, and value chains under this goal relative to the other goals. Interventions
are more project-based and the review states: ‘there is a risk that donor preferences, rather
than ICTSD strategic priorities, are driving strategic choices’ (Saana Consulting, 2014c: p. 14).

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The 2014 review presented a list of recommendations that included the following:
• ICTSD should refine and focus its strategy in relation to LDCs and Africa under Goal 4 – referring
specifically to the fact that ICTSD should avoid a situation where projects set priorities;
• ICTSD should develop a more focused methodology for tracking its contribution to key
policy changes/ negotiations (through case stories or contribution analysis);
• Value for Money should be included as a criterion for selecting projects and target; and
interventions;
• Formalising external consultation on strategic choices, by establishing an advisory committee.
The 2014 review notes that ICTSD’s impartiality has led to limited direct engagement with the
sub-committee on LDCs and its constituency (Saana Consulting, 2014c). Whereas this did not
undermine ICTSD’s performance, it may have decreased the effect that ICTSD had on one
specific Dutch policy objective: the inclusion of LDCs. When interviewed, ICTSD admitted that
whether the knowledge obtained by country representatives located in Geneva reached officials
in capitals very much depended on the capacity of the country delegates located in Geneva.
It stated that country delegates from LDCs are often less able to act as knowledge brokers.

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Furthermore, the reviews note that financial constraints have made planning difficult for
ICTSD. These constraints were linked to ICTSD’s small donor base and the restricted time
period of donor commitments (Turner, 2008; Ecorys, 2010; Saana Consulting, 2014c).
From interviews held in Uganda and Benin, IOB found that ICTSD’s outputs are being used
to build knowledge. The centre is well known in these countries to all stakeholders that deal
with trade policy issues. In Uganda, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Cooperatives even
requested ICTSD to do some work for them. ICTSD’s outputs were highly rated and were
used to better understand trade issues and prepare for negotiations. NGOs and CSOs in
Uganda and Benin were positive about the contribution of ICTSD’s work to their work on
trade policy. For instance, the Beninese CSO PASCiB69 used ICTSD’s work to strengthen its
position as a contributor to national and regional dialogues and provide advice to
stakeholders on the implications of international agreements. It mentioned Bridges as a
useful tool for information dissemination and awareness creation, both at PASCiB and
among other stakeholders in West Africa. SEATINI70 in Uganda also used ICTSD’s
information on EPAs to enhance its knowledge.
Despite these positive findings of the effect of ICTSD’s outputs on institutional capacity,
SEATINI also mentioned that it did not appreciate ICTSD’s impartiality. Whereas the
interviews revealed that policymakers from developing countries see ICTSD as a neutral
69

70

Plateforme des Acteurs de la Société Civile au Bénin – Platform of civil society organisations in Benin. PASCiB is a
platform that aims to enhance the transparent and effective involvement of Beninese CSOs in the process of
developing, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating development policies and programmes.
The Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute. SEATINI is an NGO that aims
to advocate the position of non-governmental stakeholders in WTO negotiations and enhance civil society’s
understanding of the challenges of globalisation, the complexities of the WTO system, and the effect of
(multilateral) trade agreements.

Appendices

research organisation, CSOs in developing countries found ICTSD to be too scientific and
not on their side politically. They questioned ICTSD’s independence, because donors with
specific trade interests finance ICTSD. SEATINI stated that ICTSD was too far away from their
ideology and their opinion on the right way of strengthening Uganda’s position (as a
developing country) in international trade negotiations, such as in negotiations on the EPA
with the EU. The 2014 review also described the effects of ICTSD’s impartiality, stating that
the centre’s impartiality limits the kind of support to particular interest groups or countries.
‘Whilst this is a worthy principle, ICTSD should remain pragmatic as this could limit their
strategic impact particularly in relation to supporting LDCs’ (Saana Consulting, 2014c: p. 17).
In Geneva, representatives of various institutions and delegations confirmed that ICTSD’s
research is an important input for trade policy and negotiating capacity building. ICTSD has
definitely helped developing countries to redefine their trade policies and move away from
import-substitution policies to more open trade policies, and to integrate trade policy into
development policies.
The use of Geneva-based ICTSD’s outputs (knowledge that is created and acquired in Geneva)
and the related effect of these outputs is also determined by the capability of the country
delegates in permanent representations to communicate this knowledge to officials in the
countries’ capitals. ICTSD indicated that whether the knowledge obtained by country
representatives in Geneva reaches officials in capitals depends on the capability of the
country delegates to communicate this knowledge. In general, ICTSD considered country
delegates of LDCs to have fewer means at their disposal to act as knowledge brokers. The fact
that not all LDCs have permanent representations in Geneva further reduces the chance that
the knowledge created and acquired in Geneva reached policy officials in the capitals of LDCs.
As mentioned before, ICTSD has made extensive efforts to develop its M&E system. According
to the 2014 review, ICTSD’s efforts to revise its log frame have made it more straightforward
to measure the achievement of outputs, although it is still very hard to trace attribution to
induced outputs and outcomes (Saana Consulting, 2014c). The review suggests that ICTSD
should ‘re-focus its analysis so it spends more time exploring lessons learned from successes
and failures and reviewing the organisations specific contribution to new decisions, policies,
negotiations and agreements’ (Saana Consulting, 2014c: p. vi). However, the costs and
benefits of this need to be assessed first. The review tested, in interviews with donors and
ICTSD, whether it was sufficient for ICTSD to generate knowledge, build awareness, and bring
the right stakeholders to the table, or if they needed to influence policy and decision-makers
directly in order to be considered successful. The general view of ICTSD management and a
core number of donors was that ICTSD should be assessed on their contribution to
facilitating change, and not just empowering stakeholders. This would imply that more
emphasis is needed on measuring ICTSD’s contribution at the (intermediate) outcome level.
Conclusion
IOB concludes that ICTSD is a valuable generator of impartial outputs, providing demanddriven, real-time information, as well as innovative, supply-driven insights that provoke
dialogue. ICTSD is valued for its broad network and high level of expertise. All interviews

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

confirm that ICTSD is an important organisation that plays an indispensable role in promoting
a rules-based, equitable, fair, and sustainable world trading system. The work by ICTSD not
only influences trade and development thinking in Geneva, but in developing countries as
well, where it contributes to better regional integration policies and better trade policies.

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Based on evaluations and interviews with stakeholders in Uganda, Benin, and Geneva, there
is enough evidence to conclude that ICTSD’s efforts have contributed to build trade policy
and negotiating capacity. ICTSD’s outputs certainly contributed to the induced outputs and
outcomes listed in the intervention logic, which is confirmed by convincing evidence.
The extent of this contribution is not known, however, and would require systematic M&E.
We therefore recommend that ICTSD measures and presents its contributions in a better way.
It needs to augment its logical framework towards a theory of change (ToC) and perform a
contribution analysis on a regular basis. A first step would be to add assumptions to its logical
framework and specify the actors and the actions that are required to proceed from outputs
to outcomes. Presenting progress on outcome, possibly based on indicators, would be a
second step, even if it is only possible to conclude that ICTSD contributed to these outcomes
and if it is not possible to indicate which (part of ) outcomes can be fully attributed to ICTSD’s
activities. Finally, reporting on the strategic planning of staff, activities to broaden the
financial (donor) basis, and the concrete influence of developing countries on the research
agenda could dispel misperceptions by donors that these issues do not get enough attention.

4. Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (Tralac)
Background
The Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (Tralac) is an independent, non-profit organisation
founded in 2002, with financial support from the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic
Affairs (SECO) (Tralac, 2017). Tralac’s mission is to build trade law and policy capacity in East
and Southern Africa, to enable the countries in these regions to develop their trade capacity
and to ensure that trade contributes to development, within a rules based international
trade system (Tralac, 2017). Beneficiaries of Tralac’s work include governments, actors from
the private sector, and CSOs. Its mission is pursued through activities including research,
the provision of legal advice and information on international trade law matters, and
through workshops, conferences, and training. During the period under examination,
important donors of Tralac included Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden,
and the Netherlands. During this period, Tralac received approximately EUR 1.5 million
from the Netherlands, categorised under TA for TP&R. A large share (40%) of Dutch funding
was dedicated to a project called ‘Maximising benefits from EPAs for Southern and Eastern
Africa’.71 The Netherlands was the only donor for this project. Another project, accounting for
42% of the funds, was called ‘Scholarship Funding Support for Postgraduate Diploma in Trade
Law and Policy Management’,72 set up to enhance trade law and policy competences of scholars,
71

72

The ‘Maximising benefits from EPAs for Southern and Eastern Africa’ project was part of a comprehensive
programme (Tralac’s EPA Programme) to support the ESA and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) configurations, to negotiate and implement EPAs that enhance development at the country and
regional levels.
From here on referred to as the ‘Scholarship Programme’.

Appendices

and subsequently the ministerial departments and organisations they work in. The remaining
funding (19% of funding) was used to help Tralac enhance its reputation and strengthen the
coordination of Tralac with the EKN in Pretoria. An intervention logic, limited to the
interventions that are part of TA for TP&R, is presented in table A1.5.

Table A1.5 Tralac intervention logic
Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Trade-related
analyses and
research;
•	Training on
e.g. technical
issues in trade
negotiations,
WTO law,
regional
integration,
and EPAs;
•	Conferences
and dialogues;
•	Scholarship
funding.

•	Trade-related analyses
and research
executed;
•	News articles, trade
briefs, working
papers, and
monographs
published;
•	
Training activities held;
•	Conferences and
dialogues visited by
stakeholders;
•	Published working
papers;
•	Graduation of scholars
in trade policy and
policy management
course;
•	Increased awareness
of the effects of trade
agreements and
enhanced participation
in trade negotiations.

•	Beneficiary countries
have increased
knowledge of technical/
substantive issues in
trade negotiations;
•	Participation of
scholarship graduates in
international trade
negotiations;
•	Enhanced negotiators’
ability to secure
negotiation positions
and negotiate
favourable trade terms;
•	Transfer of individual
knowledge of scholars
to the organisations
they work for;
•	National trade policy
needs identified;
•	Enhanced stakeholder
participation and awareness of role of trade.

•	Improved
negotiating
capacity (incl. on
technical issues);
•	Enhanced
institutional
capacity among
all stakeholders
on technical
issues, trade
agreements (incl.
EPAs), and their
implication;
•	International
trade terms more
tailored to
beneficiary
countries’ needs;
•	Enhanced
regional
integration.

Findings
Information on achieved direct and induced outputs was obtained from biannual reports
and annual plans, internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with
policy officers, international organisations, other stakeholders, and a former lecturer. Desk
research based on assessments by policy officers and Tralac’s annual reports indicate that
Tralac was successful in producing a wide variety of outputs, including working papers,
trade briefs, conferences, training, and a well-visited website. However, for the ‘Maximising
benefits from EPAs for Southern and Eastern Africa’ project, Tralac’s reporting lacked
accuracy,73 and some outputs did not fully reach the targeted level74 (information based on
73

74

Reporting periods overlapped, information was provided on activities that fell outside of the scope of the project
supported by the Netherlands, and information on activities that did fall within the scope of the project (such
as trade briefs) was missing or only provided on request (information obtained from internal communication).
The planned yearly output of six EPA trade briefs and three EPA working papers was not achieved (information
obtained from internal communication).

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internal documentation). Yet a broader range of services was produced. In consultation
with the Netherlands, and responding to new demands that arose while the project was
being implemented, a legal advisory facility and a broader range of analytical outputs were
provided, all within the project budget. This demonstrates Tralac’s ability to adjust to
beneficiary needs and to achieve outputs in a cost-efficient manner. The Scholarship
Programme is also commended for its outputs and the quality of these outputs. The
programme successfully produced graduates and a series of working papers, for instance on
WTO compatibility and the WTO Trade Policy Review. A former lecturer in the Scholarship
Programme emphasised the quality of the programme. Some of the aspects mentioned
include the interdisciplinarity of the course and the hands-on method applied, with
practical exercises of situations that trainees were likely to encounter in their work.
The evaluation of Tralac by Saana Consulting (2014b) also concluded that Tralac delivered
high-quality outputs. The evaluation states that in some areas of work, Tralac has even
exceeded expectations (Saana Consulting, 2014b). In line with our findings, the evaluation
concluded that Tralac’s reporting left room for improvement (Saana Consulting, 2014b).

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Evaluating the realisation of induced outputs proved more difficult. Tralac did not develop a
sufficient M&E system to track progress and measure ex-post results. Consequently, there is
a lack of insight on whether and how Tralac’s support increased the knowledge and skills
of negotiators, and how this translated into enhanced trade policy capacity and concrete
negotiating positions. However, information obtained in interviews, from the desk study,
and from existing evaluations provides some (mostly anecdotal) evidence of induced outputs.
The additional demand for a legal advisory facility and a broader range of analytical outputs
indicates that the stakeholders in the EPA negotiations had a demonstrable interest in the
support provided by the EPA programme. This makes it likely that the EPA programme led to
induced outputs.
There is stronger evidence that the Scholarship Programme led to the anticipated induced
outputs. The ministry’s monitoring reports and completion documents conclude that
participants of the postgraduate training course were often employed to represent their
countries in international positions (MFA, 2012a). Furthermore, many participants were
promoted within their organisations (MFA, 2012a), which can be seen as an indication,
albeit weak, of the course’s added value. The former lecturer interviewed said that the
course was designed to create change at the organisational level. The training course
targeted young professionals, who (after completing the course) were able to transfer their
knowledge to others within the organisation. The knowledge the students ‘bring’ to their
organisations or national delegations is primarily technical expertise. According to the
lecturer, the organisations and negotiators have used this expertise to negotiate more
effectively, and to better implement trade policies. The strengthened institutional capacity
described in internal reports and by the former lecturer, indicates that the outputs
generated induced outputs.

Appendices

In line with our general findings, the 2014 evaluation also concluded that, overall, Tralac’s
outputs have helped to strengthen institutional capacity. The evaluation concluded that
Tralac delivered high-quality outputs, which are actively used by beneficiaries in trade policy
debates and negotiations (Saana Consulting, 2014b).
The extent to which the projects and programmes contributed to induced outputs was also found to
depend on the institutional capacity and general quality of governance of the country (and,
in the case of the Scholarship Programme, of the organisation) the alumni returned to. In its
funding request for the Scholarship Programme, for instance, Tralac noted that ‘Institutional
capacity is as necessary as individual competencies, if trade is to contribute to the achievement
of longer-term development priorities, such as employment creation and poverty alleviation.
... Lack of institutional capacity in many government departments, and other organisations
in Africa, is a key challenge for effective policymaking and implementation. Management of
policy processes, to ensure that all stakeholders contribute to and buy into policy, presents
important challenges’ (Tralac, 2006: pp. 5-6). Whereas the Scholarship Programme aimed to
enhance the institutional capacity of African government departments and organisations, a
certain level of institutional capacity is already required at the beginning of the programme
in order for induced outputs to take place. The importance of a certain level of institutional
capacity was also mentioned in interviews. The former lecturer in Tralac’s Scholarship
Programme noted that the course was demanding, which required a post-graduate level and
professionalism from the participants in order for the outputs to translate into induced outputs.
Conclusion
Overall, Tralac has provided a wide array of different, highly rated outputs in a cost-efficient
manner, and at times, it exceeded expectations. Whereas the realisation of induced output
could not be established in a systematic way, there are enough indications that Tralac’s
outputs contributed to enhanced trade policy and negotiating capacity. Yet even when
outputs could be related to induced outputs, a clear attributive effect could not be found,
given the multitude of interventions at work (also by other donors and other programmes)
and the lack of a proper M&E system. To be able to monitor for results and to (better)
attribute results to induced outputs and even (intermediate) outcome achievement,
Tralac must improve its M&E system. Nevertheless, IOB’s overall conclusion is that Tralac’s
activities have contributed to building trade policy and negotiating capacity.

5. Globalising Trade Justice (GTJ)
Background
The Zuid-Noord Federatie (ZNF – South North Federation) was set up in 1991, as an alliance of
15 fair trade, environmental, human rights, and development organisations. Its members
included, among others, Fair Trade (Fair Trade Organisation and Fair Trade Assistance),
Hivos, Inzet,75 BothENDS, the Dutch Association of World Shops (DAWS), SNV, SOMO,
Wemos, and Solidariteitsfonds XminY. ZNF was set up to ‘provide a forum for exchange of
75

Inzet became part of BothENDS in 2003. In the remaining evaluation of GTJ, BothENDS will refer to Inzet, also
for the work done by Inzet prior to 2003.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

policy-views amongst its members and to strengthen and coordinate joint advocacy-projects
and campaigns on crosscutting north-south issues’ (ZNF, 2002: p. 3).

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Under the ZNF umbrella, a joint programme was developed in 2003 called Globalising Trade
Justice (GTJ). The central feature of this programme was to empower Southern partners to
become better equipped to lobby together for the protection of (economic, social, and
cultural) human rights in trade agreements. The proposal identified four criteria of success:
‘1. Participating Southern CSOs can show a clear record of lobbying their governments to
include human rights concerns in trade and investment negotiations; 2. Economic literacy
on trade and investment agreements is raised to a level that enables an informed public and
parliamentary debate in Southern countries, Europe and the Netherlands on trade policies
and priorities; 3. Southern small-scale producers and consumers have made their voice and
interests clearly heard in international NGO networks and coalitions; and 4. Tangible
proposals are tabled and public acceptance is raised to promote a better coherence between
trade and human rights law’ (ZNF, 2002: p. 4). Five organisations were responsible for the
implementation of GTJ: Fair Trade (FT), DAWS, Wemos, BothENDS, and SOMO. The ZNF
secretariat coordinated the activities. The five organisations and the ZNF Secretariat received
funding of EUR 240,000 each, under the Thematic Co-Financing Programme of the
Netherlands (TMF). Of this budget, approximately EUR 350,000 was contributed in 2007 and
2008, i.e. in the period covered by this evaluation. Interventions were categorised into three
themes. SOMO and BothENDS worked on ‘Trade, Market Access and Investment’; Wemos
implemented a rights-based programme on ‘Trade and Health’; while DAWS and FT focused
on ‘Fair Trade’. ZNF was dissolved in 2006, but the programme continued until 2007.
The intervention logic for GTJ is presented in table A1.6, categorised by theme. A 2008
evaluation by Management for Development Foundation and the International Agricultural
Centre of Wageningen University & Research Centre (MDF/IAC) (2008) was clear about the
proposal: ‘The logical frameworks for the 3 main components in this multi-actor project are
presented in different ways and are not very consistent with each other. Only 1 out of the 3
logical frameworks is clearly distinguishing between outputs and outcomes’ (MDF/IAC,
2008: p. 42).

Appendices

Wemos

BothENDS/SOMO

Table A1.6 GTJ intervention logic
Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Research and
studies;
•	Seminars;
•	Funding to
participate in
WTO meetings/
workshops;
•	Inputs and funding
for advocacy and
local awareness
campaigns.

•	Research and
studies carried
out and
information
exchanged with
partners;
•	Seminars held;
•	Partners’
participation in
WTO meetings/
workshops;
•	Lobby and
awareness
campaigns
organised.

•	Enhanced
knowledge of
Southern partners
on effects of trade
agreements in
Southern countries
(e.g. on EPAs);
•	Enhanced
representation
of Southern
NGOs/ CSOs in
WTO meetings;
•	Enhanced
negotiation and
lobbying capacity
of Southern
NGOs/CSOs;
•	Enhanced
stakeholder
awareness of
effects of trade
agreements.

•	More effective
participation of
Southern NGOs/
CSOs in national,
regional, and
international policy
debates on trade
and investment
agreements;
•	Better
representation of
Southern countries’
needs in trade
agreements.

•	More knowledge
and lobbying
capacity of
Southern NGOs/
CSOs;
•	A strong health,
food, and
trade-related
network;
•	More effective
(joint) lobbying
capacity of
NGOs/CSOs at
the national and
international levels;
•	More dialogue and
enhanced public
awareness of the
primacy of the
right to health over
economic and
trade law.

•	Trade agreements
that reflect the
primacy of the right
to health over
economic and trade
law, both at
national and
international levels.

•	Research and
studies;
•	Inputs and funding
for advocacy and
local awareness
campaigns;
•	Identify Southern
partner NGOs/
CSOs to introduce
to existing
networks or to set
up new networks.

•	Research and
studies carried
out;
•	Enhanced
knowledge of
national needs;
•	Information and
positions shared
with other
Southern NGOs/
CSOs and
networks to
strengthens
lobby capacity;
•	Campaigns
organised;
•	Southern NGOs/
CSOs identified
and networks
established.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

FT/DAWS

Table A1.6 GTJ intervention logic

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Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Workshops,
conferences,
and seminars;
•	Research;
•	Attendance FINE76
advocacy steering
group and other
relevant meetings;
•	Development and
promotion of an
Internal Control
System (ICS) and
Quality Management System
(QMS) models for
certification;
•	Activities to
increase public and
political awareness
of the need for fair
trade in developing countries and
the Netherlands;
•	Organisation of
World Fair Trade
Day;
•	Development of
website.

•	Workshops,
conferences,
and seminars
organised and
attended by
Southern NGOs/
CSOs;
•	Research
executed and
reports
developed;
•	Knowledge and
information
shared with
partners;
•	Participation in
FINE- and other
relevant
meetings;
•	ICS and QMS
models for
certification of
Fairtrade
developed and
promoted;
•	Awareness
campaigns
organised;
•	World Fair Trade
Day organised;
•	Website
developed.

•	Enhanced
cooperation with
Southern partners
(e.g. in networks);
•	Enhanced
cooperation of
networks overall;
•	Common advocacy
agenda developed,
with more active
involvement of
Southern
organisations in
developing the
agenda;
•	ICS- and
QMS-models more
widely used in
international
quality assurance
procedures;
•	Campaigns,
events, and
website have
raised increased
awareness and
political attention.

•	Enhanced lobbying
capacity of Southern
and international
fair trade
organisations;
•	Better representation of fair trade in
international trade
negotiations;
•	Enhanced
integration of
Fairtrade standards
and monitoring and
quality systems in
international trade
agreements;
•	Integration of fair
trade-related trade
issues in the
political debate in
Southern countries,
the EU, and the
Netherlands;
•	Strengthening of
the worldwide fair
trade network;
•	Enhanced
integration of
Southern fair trade
organisations in the
FINE network.

Findings
The programme consisted of three separate projects. The ZNF Secretariat coordinated the
programme, disseminated the results, represented the organisations, and did its own
research. Because of the differences between the three projects, they are assessed
individually. Following that, we provide some remarks on the role of the Secretariat.
Information on achieving direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with policy officers,
international organisations, and other stakeholders.

76

FINE stands for the informal association of four trade networks, established in 2000, namely Fairtrade
Labelling Organizations International (FLO), International Federation of Alternative Trade (IFAT, later known as
the International Fair Trade Association (IFTA) and now the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO)), Network of
European World Shops (NEWS!), and the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA).

Appendices

Trade, Market Access and Investment
BothENDS provided support to NGOs/CSOs in several African countries. Support was provided
to the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (Deniva) in Uganda,
the Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), and the Zambia Association for Research and
Development (ZARD). All three organisations had already participated in past WTO conferences.
SOMO provided support to its partners in South Africa: Mwelekeowa Ngo (Mwengo) in
Zimbabwe and Southern Africa People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) in South Africa. Progress
reports indicated that the direct outputs included the production of research, the provision
of information to partners, support to the ‘Stop EPA campaign’,77 travel expenses for partners
(to go to WTO meetings), lobbying material, and a workshop on the use of a manual.
Unfortunately, the progress reports provide very little information on the effects of these
outputs. Although the success criteria were listed in the proposal, there was no reporting on
progress based on these criteria. To get some insight into the achieved induced outputs under
the ‘Trade, Market Access and Investment’ theme, IOB interviewed two Southern partners that
received support from BothENDS during our field visits: SEATINI78 in Uganda and GRAPAD79
in Benin. Both organisations valued BothENDS as a Northern partner and both mentioned
the support to the Stop EPA campaign as a concrete example. The Stop EPA campaign was
supported by many NGOs, and though GTJ’s contribution was relatively small, the Stop EPA
campaign had the effect of raising awareness and political attention, both in the EU and in the
countries of the Southern partners. SEATINI and BothENDS exchanged analyses of political
processes, which enhanced the lobbying capacity of both organisations. To put the effect of
the intervention into perspective, it is important to mention that SEATINI also received
support from USAID, Oxfam, CUTS, and TMEA, and has worked with NGOs from Sweden,
Germany, Italy, and the United States. Furthermore, the cooperation between BothENDS
and SEATINI was not only financed by the GTJ programme, but it has continued afterwards.
In 2006, MDF/IAC looked at the GTJ programme as part of a larger evaluation of TMF
(published in 2008). MDF/IAC concluded that GTJ had contributed to the ‘10 Points Plan’ with
the Coalition for Fair Trade (Coalitie voor Eerlijke Handel, 2005) . The 10 Points Plan was
considered to have influenced the 2005 WTO MC in Hong Kong. This plan was welcomed by
the Dutch Parliament and the ministers of Economic Affairs and for Development Cooperation.
MDF/IAC was very positive about a conference organised by ZNF in Nairobi in 2004. This
conference brought together over 40 African NGOs. MDF/IAC states that this conference and
follow-up activities contributed to the following outcomes:
• The formation of the African Trade Network (ATN), which was encouraged by GTJ
initiatives, among other things (Econews, Kenya – BothENDS, the Netherlands);
• Putting Kenyan NGOs and the government far ahead in terms of information and
preparation for the WTO MC in Hong Kong (Econews, Kenya – SOMO, the Netherlands); and
77

78
79

The Stop EPA campaign was launched in 2004 and supported by 30 NGOs from Africa and the EU. In addition to
BothENDS, other NGOs included ICCO and Oxfam International.
Southern and East African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute.
Groupe de Recherche et d’Action pour la Promotion de l’Agriculture et du Développement – Research and Action Group for
the Promotion of Agriculture and Development.

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• The same holds for preparations for the EPA negotiations in 2006 (Econews, Kenya –
SOMO/BothENDS, the Netherlands).
This seems to be an overoptimistic assessment of contribution, however. Indeed, the
establishment of the new Kenya Civil Society Alliance (KCSA), supported by GTJ, and the
drafting of a constitution failed to get support from other Kenyan CSOs.
Based on the information obtained from reports, interviews, and the evaluation by MDF/
IAC, there is enough information to conclude that the intended outputs were delivered and
that the project contributed to its intended induced outputs. Little can be said, however,
about the extent of this contribution. The fact that the Southern NGOs still maintain contact
with BothENDS and SOMO is positive and an indication that the network is still operational.
But it is a condition for joint lobbying rather than an outcome.

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Trade and Health
Direct outputs achieved by Wemos include research papers, lobbying activities in
international fora, and the participation of Southern partners in international meetings.
However, an overview of the project’s budget reveals that a major part of the money was
spent on campaigns and lobbying in developing countries (see MDF/IAC, 2008). Wemos
worked with several Southern NGOs and CSOs, such as Arambe in Benin, CIN80 in Kenya,
AIS81 in Bolivia, and INESC82 in Brazil. However, Wemos also admits in its reporting that it
failed to achieve a number of objectives, such as building a strong food, trade, and health
network and public acceptance of the primacy of the right to health over trade.
To get more insight into the effects of Wemos’ work, we tried to approach Arambe in Benin.
Unfortunately, the organisation could not be found. An old website talked about an
awareness campaign by Arambe in 2003 on basic health and food. However, a healthcare
worker in a clinic in the area where Arambe used to hold office said she had worked there for
19 years and was not aware of Arambe or a campaign. Campaigns organised by other NGOs
and CSOs that partnered with Wemos may have been more successful, but without proper
M&E systems to substantiate the effectiveness of this work, conclusions cannot be drawn.
The evaluation by MDF/IAC (2008) provides some positive findings on induced outputs,
but these findings are based on a single visit to Kenya. It reported on CIN’s achievements
with respect to a Patient’s Rights Charter drafted and presented to the Kenyan government
and the introduction of a chapter of consumer rights in the draft constitution of Kenya
(MDF/IAC, 2008). However, the evaluation failed to explain GTJ’s role in reaching these
results. The evaluation report is not concrete. It reads: ‘The key for this success is, as
observed by the expert team during interviews, the professional confidence that CIN could
build among the Kenyan government officials. This confidence was based on convincing
evidence CIN could show on the basis of sound research and information from reputed
80
81
82

Consumer Information Network (CIN).
Acción Internacional para la Salud Bolivia – Health Action International Bolivia.
Institute for Socioeconomic Studies (Brazil).

Appendices

international NGOs and networks’ (p. 44). Then the report states: ‘The TMF project cannot
claim this success alone. More donors are working with CIN.’ (p. 44). But that does not
prevent them from suggesting that TMF played a substantial part: ‘Before the start of the GTJ
project, CIN was mainly Nairobi based and mostly oriented towards local consumers. With
respect to changes that have occurred over the year, CIN refers to a mind-shift from ‘street
emotion oriented’ to ‘table dialogue oriented’. […] The expert team is convinced that this
result can be attributed in particular to the tripartite partnership. Of course this success ‘has
many fathers’, but the expert team was able to observe that CIN, Wemos, and AIS themselves
were the main contributors to this success’ (p. 44). This attribution was not substantiated in
the evaluation, however. It may only have been based on the words of the apparently strong
and influential president of CIN at the time. Internet research revealed that CIN has shifted
its focus to CSR and tobacco, thereby concentrating on the limited aspects of health and
trade.
Most organisations supported by this project were very small in size (less than ten employees),
and some have ceased to exist. Therefore, it is difficult to make an overall conclusion on
effects. But it seems fair to conclude that the project has, at best, contributed to advocacy
on trade and health issues and has informed and stimulated the participating organisations.
Unfortunately, the network was not very strong, and fell apart.
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Fair Trade
Internal documentation and the 2008 evaluation of TMF by MDF/IAC describe the achieved
outputs. The achieved outputs are in line with the proposal, although there were no details
in the reporting about the number of workshops. International conferences were held (in
Arusha), the COFTA83 network was created, a delegation went to the WTO MC in Hong Kong,
and work was done on an Internal Control System and a Quality Management System.
Unfortunately, this initiative to improve quality by labelling and control did not succeed.
Tangible outputs were the incentive for the World Fair Trade Day and the development of a
website.
There is no reporting on induced outputs. Nevertheless, the judgement of the 2008 evaluation
by MDF/IAC was also rather positive about this project. The creation of the COFTA network
and the fact that a Kenyan organisation adopted quality standards as a side effect of the ICS
efforts were seen as indicators of success. FT and DAWS were involved in the setup of COFTA,
which is still up and running and now has 174 member organisations in 24 African countries.
But so was FINE, whose secretariat was run by FT and IFAT (now WFTO) at the time. The exact
role of GTJ is not specified, neither in progress reports, nor in the evaluation.
For the Fair Trade theme, we therefore conclude that most of the outputs on capacity building
were achieved, but, with the possible exception of COFTA, the extent of the contribution to
induced outputs cannot be established.

83

Cooperation for Fair Trade in Africa.

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

The role of the ZNF Secretariat
The ZNF Secretariat participated in international networks and took care of overall
coordination. The Secretariat’s staff also travelled, lobbied, did research, and organised
seminars and conferences. These activities targeted international NGO networks, where
they represented the ZNF member organisations. The Secretariat was also responsible for
the internal organisation of ZNF (keeping the programme with all its different targets and
activities coherent) and ZNF’s PR objectives with respect to the programme. The main
documented output of the ZNF Secretariat was the organisation of a conference in Nairobi,
in December 2004, with all partner organisations almost 40 of ZNF’s members to prepare
for the WTO MC in Hong Kong, in 2005.

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The conference was deemed a success. MDF/IAC writes: ‘A joint partner seminar was
organised by the bureau of the South-North Federation with the help of local consultants,
and took place from 8 to 10 December 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya. Close to 40 East African
partner organisations from 5 African countries participated, together with the 6 Dutch NGOs.
An East African contact group has been set up to share information on the civil society
consultations that take place in East Africa and to prepare a common agenda in the run up
to the WTO MC in Hong Kong, in December 2005. It also helped the Dutch partners in the
GTJ programme to understand better the possibilities, as well as the limitations, for close
co-operation between the food and health, the market access and investment, and the fair
trade chapters of the programme.’ (MDF/IAC, 2008: p. 40).
MDF/IAC is also very clear on the cooperation and reporting of ZNF: ‘Co-operation is rather
more an objective than an asset in this project. It is the character of the content of this
advocacy and networking project that makes it difficult to report concisely and clearly. The
expert team has observed that the project implementers (both in the South and the North)
do not show to be good management reporters. Information is provided mostly at the
activity and output level and this is done in a rather chaotic way, while information on
outcome and impact is scattered and not sufficiently addressed’ (MDF/IAC, 2008: p. 42).
Conclusions
Overall, GTJ proved to be a highly ambitious programme. More or less all of the outputs
were achieved, but the beneficiaries were often very small organisations and some have
ceased to exist. The programme generally contributed to the capacity of CSOs in developing
countries to influence trade policy, but the extent of the effects of the networks and
advocacy on trade policy and negotiating capacity is not clear. The main successes seem to
have been the 2004 Nairobi conference in preparation of the 2005 MC in Hong Kong and
the establishment of COFTA. The induced outputs of the programme were not monitored.
The MDF/IAC evaluation concluded that GTJ contributed to many important developments,
which influenced trade policy. It concluded: ‘The objectives of the GTJ were already met at
the time of evaluation and in most cases were beyond expectation’ (MDF/IAC, 2008: p. 46).
But the evaluation did not explain how GTJ contributed to these objectives. Therefore,
these things may simply have coincided.

Appendices

GTJ did not create the expected synergy. The fact that ZNF fell apart during the implementation
of the programme was telling. The organisations that were supposed to build networks
could not sustain their own network.

Trade facilitation
6. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA)
Background
TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is an East African not-for profit company limited by guarantee,
established in 2010 to support the growth of trade – both regional and international – in
East Africa. TMEA focuses on ensuring that gains from trade result in tangible gains for East
Africans. TMEA was funded by the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
the Netherlands, and later also by Canada and the United States. With the aim of growing
prosperity in East Africa through trade, TMEA aims to increase trade by unlocking economic
potential through: (1) Increased physical assess to markets, (2) an enhanced trade
environment, and (3) improved business competitiveness (trademarkea.com, 2017). TMEA is
the world’s largest trade facilitation programme and had a budget of USD 560 million for
6 years (2010-2016). In line with the focus of our study, only those projects of TMEA that fall
within the scope of TA for TP&R should be reviewed. In practice, however, the work on
infrastructure is almost impossible to untangle from the institutional and regulatory work.
One-stop border posts (OSBPs) require new buildings, because all of the agencies involved
in import and export clearance have to work together. Therefore, these new buildings are an
indispensable prerequisite and part and parcel of TP&R. Other examples of TMEA projects
include strengthening national capacity for policymaking, setting up dialogue platforms,
and implementing EAC trade initiatives.
For the period 2007-2016, the Netherlands supported TMEA with approximately EUR 48.7 million.
This accounted for 67% of total Dutch support for trade facilitation between 2007 and 2016,
but less than 10% of TMEA’s overall budget. TMEA’s other important donors during that
period included the United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden. The Netherlands’
support to the overall TMEA programme amounted to EUR 41.6 million, paid from the
central budget. The Uganda country programme received EUR 7.1 million (15.8% of the total
programme’s budget) from the delegated budget of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands (EKN) in Kampala (MFA, 2012b). The Uganda country programme, TMEA’s
second largest country programme after Kenya, was a five-year programme (2011-2016)
containing numerous different projects designed to facilitate trade and regional integration
(RI) in Uganda. Part of the EKN support was earmarked for facilitating informal women’s
trade. TMEA has collaborated with the Ugandan government (GoU), the private sector, CSOs,
and other development partners to implement this country programme. TMEA’s overall
intervention logic for TA for TP&R is presented below. The items have been aggregated.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Table A1.7 TMEA intervention logic

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Interventions

Output

Induced output

Expected
inter­mediate
outcome

•	Development of
OSBPs, port
berthing facilities,
and single
windows;
•	Training activities/
workshops;
•	Capacity building
(CB) among
government
officials,
producers, and
traders;
•	Consultancy advice
in regional
negotiations;
•	Strengthening of
the EAC Secretariat;
•	CB on standards
for tradable goods;
•	CB on border
management;
•	Set up of PSO/CSO
dialogue
platforms.

•	OSBPs and port
berths developed
and operational;
•	Trainings/
workshops given;
•	Border management improved;
•	Procedures and
standards
harmonised;
•	EAC Secretariat
supported on
trade facilitation
policy;
•	Activities
organised to
include PSOs and
CSOs in trade and
RI policies;
•	Comprehensive
framework for RI
designed;
•	Set up of PSO/
CSO dialogue
platforms.

•	Improved implementation of trade laws and
regulation;
•	Enhanced capacity and
efficiency of transport
infrastructure;
•	Effective trade systems,
agencies, and procedures
at the national and
regional levels;
•	Enhanced knowledge
sharing and participation
of PSOs and CSOs in
trade policy and RI
negotiations;
•	Reduced NTB reporting;
•	Improved processes for
traders, especially
women;
•	Strengthened EAC
regional trade integration capacity (including
standards harmonisation
and reduction of tariffs
and NTBs).

•	Reduced
transport time
and costs;
•	Fewer instances
of border
rejection;
•	Increased ease of
trading across
borders;
•	Enhanced
business
environment for
trade/improved
trade-supporting
services;
•	Efficient trade
logistics services;
•	Improved export
capability.

Findings
Information on achieving direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with policy officers,
international organisations, other stakeholders, and representatives of TMEA.
TMEA has an excellent reporting system on outputs. TMEA has a highly elaborate results
framework with outputs and end-of-project outcomes defined for all 185 projects. Every
project identified progress. TMEA’s annual reports provide detailed information and score
the extent to which outputs met expectations. A quick scan of these reports revealed that
most projects and especially the larger ones performed well. Even the projects in South
Sudan managed to succeed quite well under difficult circumstances.
Outputs achieved under the country programmes include, for example, the establishment
of several fully operational OSBPs,84 the development of needs assessments, support to

84

For instance, the establishment of the OSBP at the Burundi-Tanzania frontier in 2015, the OSBP at the
Uganda-Rwanda frontier in 2015, and OSBP at the Kenya-Uganda frontier.

Appendices

develop revenue authorities,85 and the design and launch of Electronic Cargo Tracking Systems
(ECTs) in Rwanda and Uganda.86 Outputs achieved under regional programmes include
studies,87 training activities, the development of a national policy for regional integration,
and the operationalisation of the East African Monitoring System88 (see TMEA’s annual
reports for more achieved outputs). Although some delays were registered, the achievement
of outputs was qualified as satisfactory, and at times even above expectation (Sida, 2013b).
TMEA has been commended by beneficiaries for its result-oriented approach, its high degree
of responsiveness and flexibility, and its involvement in projects in addition to providing funding.
Indeed, it has supported beneficiaries throughout the full process of projects (Sida, 2013b).
TMEA’s wide scope of activities has received some criticism, however. The 2013 Sida
evaluation indicated that TMEA was running the risk of doing too many things and not
focusing enough (Sida, 2013b). An example of this is TMEA’s involvement in agricultural
policy and production-enhancing programmes. One could argue that the introduction of
standards and standards control is part of the trade environment, but training farmers to
reach these standards, as TMEA does with SEATINI in Uganda, seems a step too far.
TMEA performed well in its efforts to measure and evaluate its work. Annual progress
reports provide an overview of the TMEA programmes’ induced outputs. These reports,
which are based on more specific country and project reports, document progress in
attaining induced outputs (called ‘expected end-of-project outcome’ by TMEA). These
induced outputs are scored depending on achievement. The overall impression is that TMEA
also scored well on achieving these induced outputs (see TMEA, 2014). TMEA’s 2014 progress
report provides details on the achievement of several induced outputs, including reduced
NTBs89 and increased women’s awareness of EAC’s Regional Integration and Common
Market Protocol90 (TMEA, 2014). The achieved induced outputs are also documented in
impact stories reports. To illustrate, the 2015 impact stories report tells about a small
business owner to illustrate how border procedures have improved between the border of
Tanzania and Burundi, making it easier for the business owner to do business. Two separate
border posts (Kabanga, Tanzania and Kobero, Burundi) have been integrated into one
border post, and border procedures have been regionally harmonised, digitised, and
85

86

87
88

89

90

For example, support was given to Burundi’s Revenue Authority to facilitate tax reforms (IT and customs
management).
In Uganda, IOB visited the Electronic Cargo Tracking System of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). The ECTs
makes it possible to digitise customs, seal tax leakages and tame the diversion of goods on transit. The ECTs
was developed and made operational for the project, and business and URA staff were trained to use the system.
For instance, freight logistics studies.
The East African Monitoring System is used to report on the implementation status of the EAC Common Market
Protocol and decisions by the Summit and Council of Ministers.
Following advocacy meetings held by the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Cooperatives in Uganda with relevant
national and regional stakeholders, and bilateral meetings held with Rwanda, 10 NTBs were eliminated.
The NTBs that were eliminated included the removal of police roadblocks and checkpoints and the removal of
the Kenyan requirement to provide a bank guarantee.
The African Women’s Economic Policy Network trained 160 women traders in Masaka, Kampala, Mbale and
Gulu in Uganda. Reportedly, the levels of awareness on EAC’s Regional Integration and Common Market
Protocol increased from 20% to 85% (TMEA, 2014).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

streamlined, thereby enhancing the efficiency of cross-border processes and eliminating
unnecessary NTBs (TMEA, 2015).

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To monitor progress in reducing transport costs and transit time (an intermediate outcome)
for the Northern and Central corridor, a Results Meter was developed by Project Economics
Consultants. The Results Meter tries to measure the extent to which time and cost reduction
on the corridors can be attributed to TMEA. The analysis is based on bold assumptions, such
as the size of the contribution of TMEA’s efforts to improve handling time in the ports (5%),
the conversion rate of time into costs (USD 490/day), and on the effect of reduced costs on
trade (based on research by Limao and Venables (2001)). Nevertheless, it in an interesting
attempt to measure outcome. The Results Meter estimated that between 2011 and 2014,
TMEA has reduced the transport time for a container to travel from Dar es Salaam or
Mombasa to Bujumbura/Kigali by 9.0%, relative to the 2011 baseline compiled by the World
Bank (Project Economics Consulting, undated). This attributable reduction in time
compares to an overall improvement on the corridors of 14.1% during that period. Thus,
TMEA accounted for 64% of the reduction. During the same period, TMEA’s interventions
resulted in an estimated 18% decline in the economic cost of transport based on an
estimated value of transport time of USD 490/day. This decline in cost and time is estimated
to have generated an 8.1% growth in trade to/from the EAC, attributable to TMEA
interventions (Project Economics Consulting, undated).
The Results Meter also forecasts corridor conditions attributable to TMEA at the end of
Phase 1, based on the targets TMEA has set at the project level. Should TMEA exactly meet its
targets by the end of Phase 1, the end-to-end corridor transport time will fall by 17.1%,
attributable to TMEA. The economic cost of transport will fall by 33.1% and trade will grow
by 15.4% (Project Economics Consulting, undated).
External reviews also provide positive findings for TMEA’s work. By the end of the second
year, Saana Consulting (2012) concluded that in general TMEA can be viewed as an innovative
and unique vehicle to deliver regional AfT in Africa (Saana Consulting, 2012). Compared to
other regional trade and integration programmes, TMEA performed well, having booked
good progress and achieved some noteworthy initial results (Saana Consulting, 2012).
An evaluation ordered by Sida and carried out at the end of 2013 by BKP Development
Research & Consulting GmbH underscored the noteworthy performance of TMEA and
specifically addressed TMEAs achievement in addressing cross-cutting issues in its
programmes (Sida, 2013b). The evaluation stated that TMEA performed better on crosscutting issues than the World Bank’s Trade Facilitation Facility. Yet it concluded that in terms
of staffing it could do better on gender, environment, and poverty (Sida, 2013b).

Appendices

An external overall impact evaluation of TMEA by the Oxford Policy Management (OPM) Group
started in 2016, but it is only expected to present a final report in 2019. TMEA measures its
success through four main indicators:
1. increase in total value of exports from the EAC region to the rest of the world (target of 10%);
2. reduction in average time for trucks crossing selected borders (target of 30%);
3. reduction in average time to export/import a container from Mombasa or Dar es Salaam
to Rwanda or Burundi (target of 15%); and
4. increase in intra-regional exports compared with total exports from the region (target
of 25%).
OPM will look at these indicators. Furthermore, the evaluation will look at direct and indirect
effects on poverty.
Interviews with policy officers, TMEA staff, other donors, and representatives from
beneficiary governments confirmed that TMEA was successful, but they also confirmed the
recommendations that TMEA needs more focus, a better M&E system that provides evidence
of an attribution to the impact on trade and poverty, a simpler results framework, and more
gender and environmental impact specialists.
Conclusions
Overall, IOB finds that the conclusions in the 2013 review still stand. TMEA is well established
and has grown into a major regional trade development player. The programme has achieved
significant outputs and end-of-project outcomes (induced outputs), but delays mean
(intermediate) outcomes and impact may also be delayed.
Its broad focus puts TMEA at possible risk of not achieving its critical trade development
goals within the agreed time frame. The country programmes have created a ‘silo’ culture and
this means that TMEA risks losing its critical regional dimension. TMEA’s ‘increased trade’
goals may be reached – but it may prove difficult to attribute success to TMEA’s interventions,
given the limited output achievement by that date. The external evaluation by OPM, due in
2019, will hopefully shed more light on the effects on trade and poverty that can be
attributed to the half a billion euros that have been spent.

7. Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development phase II (MDTF-TD2)
Background
In 2011, the World Bank issued its new Trade Strategy. This World Bank Trade Strategy (WBTS)
was the framework that the World Bank used in the years to come to address the trade
dimension of its core work. The WBTS identified the primary axes for World Bank engagement
and support activities and areas where action is likely to have the greatest positive impact in
terms of helping developing countries to enhance their export performance and integrate
further into the world economy (Hoekman, 2013). Support activities were envisioned to help
developing countries design better export policies, reduce trade costs, and enhance
productivity.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

To implement the WBTS, and following the previous Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund for Trade and Development phase II (MDTF-TD2) was launched in 2012. The
MDTF-TD2 is the World Bank’s largest source of donor funds for analytical trade work. The
fund received a total of USD 34.5 million91 in pledges from the United Kingdom, Sweden,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Japan (Itad, 2015). Dutch contributions to the
fund totalled approximately EUR 4.8 million (16.5% of the fund’s total budget).
The objective of the MDTF-TD2 was to deepen understanding of trade-related issues, support
the mainstreaming of trade within the World Bank’s operations, and enhance trade support
through research, the development of knowledge products, toolkits, and diagnostics. Activities
included demand-driven analytical work and capacity building activities. The selected activities
were categorised according to four different priority areas, as outlined in the WBTS:
1. trade competitiveness and diversification;
2. trade facilitation, transport logistics and trade finance;
3. support for market access and international trade cooperation; and
4. managing shocks and promoting greater inclusion.

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Certain activities supported trade policy and could be classified under TA for trade policy
and negotiating capacity, rather than under TA for trade facilitation. However, the bulk of
the activities focused on trade facilitation in a broad sense, i.e. border management and
behind-the-border activities that improve the enabling environment for trade. Therefore,
this programme is categorised under trade facilitation. The envisaged outcome was the
improved trade performance of developing countries, through increased competitiveness,
trade diversification, exports in services, and enhanced logistics (MFA, 2012c).
MDTF-TD2 allocated funds via two different windows: the national/regional window and the
global window. The grand share of funding, approximately 70%, was allocated via the
national/regional window (Itad, 2015). Regional/country work in Africa was financed by this
type of funding. The other 30% was allocated via the global window, to central units in the
World Bank working on trade-related activities, including data collection, research and
advocacy, e.g. in the context of the G20 or the WTO (Itad, 2015). The intervention logic for
the overarching MDTF-TD2 programme is presented in table A1.8.

91

Latest data found.

Appendices

Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

Global window

•	Global
research and
data
collection;
•	Global
advocacy.

•	Global research
executed and
knowledge
obtained and
disseminated;
•	Global trade
information
provided (incl.
databases) and
used;
•	Global advocacy
performed.

•	Enhanced global knowledge
on trade policy;
•	Changed opinions as a result
of advocacy;
•	Multilateral policy/strategy
dialogues facilitating more
global consensus on trade and
development policies.

•	Reduced trade
costs and transit
time;
•	Increased market
access and
improved
competitiveness
of beneficiary
countries.

National/regional window

Table A1.8 MDTF-TD2 intervention logic

•	Research and
diagnostics;
•	Policy
analysis and
guides;
•	Data
collection/
surveys;
•	Development
of toolkits
and
assessments;
•	Knowledge
management,
platforms,
and
dissemination;
•	TA and
training;
•	Conferences
and
workshops;
•	Consultations
and country
dialogues;
•	Project
preparation.

•	Research and
diagnostics
performed;
•	Policy analysis
and guides
produced;
•	Data collected/
surveys done;
•	Analytical toolkits
and assessments
developed;
•	Knowledgemanagement,
platforms and
dissemination
organised and
executed;
•	TA and training
held;
•	Conferences and
workshops held;
•	Consultations and
dialogues held;
•	Policy guides
and project
preparation
activities
formulated.

•	WB staff and developing
•	Reduced trade
countries use assessments,
costs and transit
analystic tools, policy guides,
time;
research and diagnostics, and •	Increased market
data;
access and
•	Developing countries use,
improved
and have obtained knowledge
competitiveness
from consultations,
of beneficiary
workshops, and dialogues;
countries;
•	WB and developing countries
•	Improved
use and obtain information
services.
from project appraisal studies;
•	Developing countries have
increased knowledge of
current national/regional
bottlenecks and trade needs;
•	Developing countries have
increased capacity and
knowledge to adopt national/
regional trade facilitation
policies and reform measures
for trade policy mainstreaming;
•	Developing countries have
implemented reform measures;
•	Developing countries have
mainstreamed trade in
national development
strategies.

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Findings
The achieved outputs and induced outputs have been assessed, based on programme
documentation, evaluations, and interviews with policy officers, international organisations,
World Bank representatives, and other stakeholders. Examples of outputs achieved under the
global window include Trade Competitiveness Diagnostics, global datasets,92 practical
toolkits,93 and inputs for M&E.94 Examples of outputs achieved under the national/regional
window are technical assistance provided to modernise customs operations, research and
studies,95 and conferences96 (DfID, 2016). The evaluation by Itad (2015) indicates that the
MDTF-TD2 was flexible in its provision of support. It provided demand-driven support and
was able to respond quickly to changing priorities and needs, both internally and externally
(Itad, 2015). However, targets were not always reached and delays were not uncommon.
By 2015 (the initial end date of the programme), outputs had fallen short of the target.
A 12-month extension made it possible to achieve the target, and even a little bit more.

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Reviews revealed that delays in implementation were due to the slow disbursements of
funds (Itad, 2015; DfID, 2016). Interviews held during field visits in Benin and Uganda
indicated that delays in allocating funds and the implementation of projects is common for
World Bank projects in general. Internal WB processes, but also external factors, caused
these delays. Furthermore, MDTF-TD2 has been criticised for having provided little
information on cross-cutting issues, such as gender, environment, and poverty. Whether
this is due to the inadequate coverage of these issues or to the lack of reporting on these
issues is unclear.
Evidence of achieved induced outputs, however, has been harder to find. The evaluation by
Itad (2015) provided examples of MDTF-TD2-funded outputs that were used to inform and
influence beneficiaries in policy and strategy formulation. These examples were based on
consultations, document reviews, and case studies. The evaluation also provided evidence
of the dissemination, quotation, and use of research products and databases (global window
outputs) in policy/strategy dialogues (Itad, 2015). In addition, there are also examples of
evidence of the use of outputs produced under the national/regional window. These include
analytical support provided to ECOWAS, which has been used in policy dialogues. Another
example is support to organise a dialogue on the impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) in
Cambodia, which identified feasible policy options to streamline NTMs (Itad, 2015).
Whereas the evaluation found ample evidence that MDTF-TD2 had the potential to
contribute to the fund’s objective, it found little systematic reporting on induced outputs
(Itad, 2015). The dissemination and use of the outputs does not provide evidence on the
extent of improved knowledge and the acquired capacity to identify trade needs, reform
trade policies, and reduce trade barriers. Such a relation may indeed exist, as statements
made by interviewees suggest. Yet few of the statements on induced outputs are
92
93
94
95

96

For instance, the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).
For instance, toolkits for border management and trade and transport facilitation assessments (DfID, 2016)
For instance, lorry driver surveys and port dwell time surveys.
For example, the study on the full implementation of the ECOWAS common external tariff: a study of the
facillitation of transport in the WAEMU (UEMOA).
For example, the conference held in the DRC/Rwanda on cross-border trade in the Great Lakes.

Appendices

substantiated by supporting evidence (Itad, 2015). As stated by Itad (2015), ‘there were few
examples to demonstrate the degree to which MDTF-TD2 funded activities inform and
influence national development strategies’ (p. 49). Furthermore, the evidence obtained in
the reviews provided insights into a few case studies and standalone examples, which did
not provide enough reason to draw comprehensive conclusions that pertain to the entire
portfolio of 139 grants (Itad, 2015). In fact, Itad concluded that there are ‘deficiencies in the
results framework’ and an ‘absence of a well-developed theory of change’ and that ‘there is
no systematic and aggregate reporting against the MDTF-TD2 (and therefore WBTS) results
framework […] Hence, it is very difficult to track the implementation of 139 grants (at output,
outcome and impact levels), limiting the ability to draw conclusions on the impact of the
MDTF-TD2 and how the fund has contributed to delivery of the WBTS’ (Itad, 2015: pp. 58-59).
Thus, the MDTF-TD2 programme may have been effective in achieving induced outputs,
after all, though there is inconclusive evidence to substantiate such an effect.
Conclusion
IOB concludes that MDTD-TD2 has provided a diverse array of products and services that
contributed to increased beneficiaries’ awareness of trade (bottlenecks) and enhanced their
ability to mainstream and reform trade policies. The fund also enhanced global research,
databases, and advocacy for trade and development, leveraging additional resources.
The fund has been praised for its flexibility and demand-driven approach, but has been
constrained by delays in the allocation of funds and implementation of projects. Though
numerous outputs have been achieved, the fund’s weak reporting mechanism and absence
of a well-developed ToC has made it impossible to determine whether and to what extent
the projects have contributed to induced outputs and (intermediate) outcomes.

8. Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF)
Background
The Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF) was launched in 2009, as a four-year, multi-donor trust
fund to help developing countries meet their obligations under trade agreements and to
take better advantage of global trade opportunities. The facility was managed by the World
Bank and funding was provided by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Canada (Saana Consulting, 2015). The Netherlands provided approximately a quarter
(EUR 10.3 million) of the total budget of USD 52.7 million.
By investing in activities to improve trade facilitation systems, the TFF focused on reducing
trade costs, increasing trade volume, investment, and jobs. The definition of trade
facilitation was deliberately broad, so that it could accommodate the range of constraints
faced by low-income countries. The term trade facilitation referred to the ‘infrastructure,
institutions, services, policies, procedures, and market-oriented regulatory system that
enable firms to conduct international trade on time and at low costs’ (Njinkeu and
Hartmann, 2015: p. 2). Support was provided to countries and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs). The facility’s portfolio consisted of 71 projects, or Grant Fund
Requests, with project values ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 3.25 million. Almost
three-quarters of the total USD 52.7 million was spent on transport and logistics (32%) and

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

customs and border management (40%) (Njinkeu and Hartmann, 2015). Although low-income
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were the major beneficiaries (79% of the funding),
the facility also financed activities in low-income countries in Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern and Central Europe (Njinkeu and
Hartmann, 2015). The TFF was closed in 2015. The intervention logic, depicted table A1.9,
is confined to interventions that fall under the definition TA of TP&R. This means that
infrastructure such as road construction (which was sometimes part of a project) has been
left out of the intervention logic.

Table A1.9 TFF intervention logic

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Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Data collection,
analyses, and
information
sharing (e.g.
dissemination
through trainings
and workshops);
•	Scoping,
(pre)feasibility,
and pilot
activities;
•	Support for the
modernisation of
border
management
institutions and
processes, and
for the
reorganisation of
trade-supporting
services (e.g.
logistics and
border security).

•	Data collected and
inefficiencies in
border procedures
and trade facilitation
systems identified,
documented, and
analysed, and
findings shared;
•	(Pre)feasibility and
scoping studies used
to design project
proposals;
•	Pilot projects
executed and
activities expanded/
replicated;
•	Border management
institutions and
processes reformed
and modernised;
•	Improved organisation of trade
supporting services.

•	Increased awareness
on trade facilitation,
to reduce trade
bottlenecks, and the
role of trade mainstreaming in development plans;
•	Improved capacity to
develop policies;
•	Reformed trade
procedures and
regulations at the
national and regional
levels;
•	Increased trade-related
soft infrastructure
development at the
national and regional
levels;
•	Increased efficiency/
capacity of trade
gateways and corridors
and trade-supporting
services.

•	Improved
services;
•	Reduced trade
costs and transit
time;
•	Increased market
access and
improved
competitiveness
of beneficiary
countries’ exports.

Findings
Information on achieving direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
progress reports, internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with
policy officers from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, international organisations, and
other stakeholders. Other important stakeholders interviewed include Borderless Alliance,
an independent organisation that provides a sub-regional platform for leading companies
involved in trade to facilitate trade by reducing borders.97

97

See http://www.borderlesswa.com for more information on the work of Borderless Alliance.

Appendices

The achieved outputs include time-release studies, advocacy notes, project preparation and
scoping missions (e.g. for the establishment of single windows and OSBPs), Roundtables,
pilot projects, and projects on such issues as the harmonisation of road specifications and
customs collaboration (see, for instance, TFF, 2013; Njinkeu and Hartmann, 2015). The
annual reports document outputs and progress, categorised by geographical region and
implementation level (national, multi-national, or regional) (TFF, 2013). The DfID evaluation
conducted by Saana Consulting states that TFF projects respond to the policies, strategies,
and needs of the beneficiaries (Saana Consulting, 2015). There is sufficient evidence to say
that TFF projects are demand-driven. Saana Consulting (2015), for instance, notes that TFF
has been managed in an adaptive and pragmatic way, delivering outputs that respond to
beneficiary needs (Saana Consulting, 2015). This increases the likelihood that projects are
relevant.
However, internal reports and external reviews also mention delays in the disbursement and
implementation of approved funds (e.g. TFF Donor Community, 2013; TFF, 2013; Saana
Consulting, 2015). The TFF programme took two years longer than the four years originally
planned.
The fact that World Bank operations in West Africa are coordinated in Abuja and Accra,
and operations in East Africa are coordinated in Nairobi, made it very difficult to obtain
information on induced outputs during our field visits to Benin and Uganda. The small
local World Bank offices in Benin and Uganda were hardly aware of the TFF programme.
In Benin, this was surprising, because almost USD 10 million was spent in West Africa and
country projects were undertaken in seven countries, including Benin (Njinkeu and
Hartmann, 2015). It was less surprising in Uganda, since there was no country programme
there. Although a great deal of coordination and management can be done from a distance,
by email and occasional visits, the lack of knowledge at the local World Bank offices was
worrying, as it must have jeopardised synergies with other World Bank programmes, not to
mention donor coordination, policy dialogue, and country ownership.
Furthermore, existing evaluations mention that it is difficult to draw conclusions about
achieved induced outputs, as TFF has been poor at times at monitoring and evaluating
them. Indeed, the Saana Consulting evaluation notes that the TFF’s M&E system was weak
and inadequate as a framework for reporting results. The World Bank did not submit a
robust log frame for approval by donors until 2012. Even after the log frame was put into
place, output, outcome, and impact indicators were not set in a clear and consistent
manner, and the log frame could not be used to report on results (Saana Consulting, 2015).
At the project level, this has constrained the ability to generate a robust evidence base,
to assess whether TFF’s outputs have resulted in induced outputs (Saana Consulting, 2015).
It also stated that the M&E process should have addressed cross-cutting issues (like gender,
HIV, and poverty) more systematically within the project (Saana Consulting, 2015).

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Having said that, there are several positive stories about results in individual projects.
Positive result stories describe induced outputs that indicate the increased capacity of
customs, for instance. Examples include improved management capacity to drive customs
reforms, enhanced technical capacity to apply international standards, and increased
coordination of border organisations (Saana Consulting, 2015). Therefore, despite the lack
of proper M&E to fully substantiate the effect of TFF outputs on induced outputs, the
positive findings for individual reports give good reason to conclude TFF achieved the
induced outputs in general and has contributed to (intermediate) outcomes. Saana
Consulting states that ‘there are positive result stories from across the representative, and
non-representative, samples that show good evidence that the TFF has been successful in
delivering projects, which respond to the overarching aims, the vision, goal and purpose of
the TFF’ (Saana Consulting, 2015; p. 36).
Furthermore, the evaluation has been positive about TFF in capitalising on and creating
synergies with other World Bank initiatives and other development organisations and
programmes (including the World Bank MDTF-TD2) and WCO and TMEA programmes
(Saana Consulting, 2015).

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An essential result achieved by TFF (which is not concretely defined in the intervention
logic, but which indirectly added to the extent and sustainability of results) has been in the
area of creating awareness of the importance of the role of trade facilitation in trade and
development. This was not only the case for developing countries: TFF increased awareness
of the importance of trade facilitation in the whole world. As mentioned in the DfID project
completion review (2015b): ‘Perhaps the single most important contribution of TFF
operations has been the elevation of trade facilitation as a priority in the global community’
(DfID, 2015b: p. 2).
Conclusion
Overall, IOB concludes that TFF has been a relevant instrument for trade facilitation. TFF
delivered projects that responded well to the needs of the beneficiary countries and which
effectively contributed to the objective of improving trade facilitation systems in developing
countries. The programme performed well on outputs, although delays were not
uncommon.
The programme was criticised for the lack of proper M&E at the induced output and
outcome level, and for not having an M&E system that looked at the impact on cross-cutting
issues like gender, HIV, and poverty. Nevertheless, the existing evaluations have concluded
that, despite the lack of proper M&E to substantiate the effect of TFF outputs on induced
outputs, the positive findings presented for individual reports give good reason to suggest
that TFF achieved the induced outputs in general and has contributed to the intended
(intermediate) outcomes. No conclusions could be drawn on results at the (intermediate)
outcome level. But there was sufficient evidence to conclude that TFF has helped to increase
awareness among the global community on the importance of trade facilitation and
triggered the development of additional World Bank projects and loans related to trade
facilitation (DfID, 2015b).

Appendices

9.	
Regional Office for Capacity Building for West and Central Africa
(ROCB-WCA)

Background
In 1952, the convention establishing the Customs Cooperation Council entered into force,
with the objective of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of customs administrations
worldwide. In 1994, the council adopted the informal name World Customs Organization
(WCO) to better reflect the organisation’s global approach (Basel.int, 2017).
WCO has initiated several capacity building programmes. The Columbus Programme is one
of WCO’s most significant capacity building programmes, initiated in 2006 to sustainably
modernise customs and implement trade facilitation standards and procedures in developing
member countries. The Regional Office for Capacity Building for West and Central Africa
(ROCB-WCA) was set up as part of the overarching Columbus Programme. The ROCB-WCA was
set up in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in 2008. The ‘Support to ROCB in the WCA region’ project
(referred to as the ROCB-WCA project) was initiated to find support for its further establishment.
This support included funding for recurring costs and backing for the development
initiatives it mandated to undertake to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency,
and predictability of customs rules and procedures in the WCA region (MFA, 2009). From
2009 to 2012, the Netherlands financed this project, for a total sum of almost EUR 975,000.
The Netherlands was the only donor for this particular ROCB-WCA project (MFA, 2009).
Yet the WCO received other funding for support in the WCA region from donors such as
Belgium, the EU, Finland, France, Sweden, Switzerland, and the World Bank. At the time the
project concluded, WCO was in negotiations with the African Development Bank and the EU
to fund projects for the WCA region for the 2013-2017 period. An intervention logic of the
ROCB-WCA project is presented in table A1.10.

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Table A1.10

ROCB-WCA intervention logic

Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected
inter­mediate
outcome

•	Collection, analysis,
and publishing of
statistics relevant for
regional customs;
•	Draft and implementation of a
Regional Training
Plan (RTP) (as part of
the Regional
Strategic Plan (RSP));
•	Execute baseline
study on progress of
ROCB-WCA
members on
modernising
customs and
implementing the
RSP (2009-2012)
implementation;
•	Draft of training
strategy for Regional
Training Centre (RTC)
in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso;
•	Setting up second
RTC;
•	Launch of website
and publication of
information on
ROCB’s activities;
•	Efforts to identify
funding from the
region;
•	CB activities;
•	7 management
workshops;
•	WCO Fellowship
Programme training
of 14 customs
middle managers.

•	Data collected,
analysed (e.g. to
identify policy
gaps), and
published;
•	RTP drafted and
implemented;
•	Baseline study
completed;
•	Training strategy
for RTC in
Ouagadougou
designed;
•	Second RTC
established;
•	ROCB-WCA
website launched
and information
on ROCB’s
activities
published;
•	Identification of
regional sources
of funding;
•	CB activities
carried out;
•	Management
workshops held
and attended;
•	Customs middle
managers
participated in
WCO Fellowship
Programme.

At ROCB-WCA level:
•	Improved liaison between
WCO Secretariat and members;
•	Improved coordination and
information exchange with
RECs;
•	Better promotion of
WCO instruments and
conventions;
•	Improved dialogue with
private sector on SAFE
framework of standards98;
•	Improved commitment to
implement RSP;
•	Improved implementation
and maintenance of RSP;
•	Increased institutional
capacity and understanding
and buy-in for holistic
development;
•	Greater regional integration of
customs;
•	Improved support in business
case development for
potential donors;
•	Identification of donor
funding;
•	Improved management of
regional training and learning
infrastructure;
•	More WCO accredited experts
from WCA;
•	Reduced costs of training and
assistance through use of
regional experts;
•	Improved management of
regional training and learning
infrastructure.

•	Increased
national
revenue
collection;
•	Improved
services;
•	Reduced
trade costs
and transit
time;
•	Better
(regional)
market
access.

98

The SAFE framework of standards is an instrument that contains supply chain security and facilitation standards.
See http://tfig.unece.org/contents/wco-safe.htm for a thorough explanation of the SAFE framework standards.

Appendices

Table A1.10

ROCB-WCA intervention logic

Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected
inter­mediate
outcome

At WCO member level:
Enhanced effectiveness,
efficiency, transparency, and
predictability of customs
regulations and procedures
through:
•	Improved insight of members
on work of WCO on standards;
• Increased ability to understand
standards
and convert these in
administrative changes;
•	Increased ability of customs to
influence and administer
government policy and
international standards;
•	Enhanced capacity and better
implementation of WCO
agreements and conventions;
•	Establishment of an
Authorised Economic
Operators pilot programme in
both sub-regions;
•	More officials with understanding of holistic development;
•	Increased ability to identify
organisational development
needs;
•	Increased number of
structures for organisational
development;
•	Improved governance and
integrity in customs and trade;
•	Increased acceptance for and
use of modern customs
techniques and rules;
•	Increased number of Revised
Kyoto Convention99 studies to
determine the level of
compliance;
•	Establishment of a
pan-regional private sector
consultative committee.

99

Providing the updated and revised version of the convention that aimed to simplify and harmonise customs
procedures.

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Findings
Information on achieved direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports, internal
documentation and interviews with policy officers and beneficiaries. No specific evaluation
of the ROCB-WCA project was found, but an evaluation of WCO’s overall capacity building
mission by Sida includes a review of the ROCB-WCA project and provides valuable insights.
The ROCB-WCA project did not perform well on direct outputs. WCO’s annual reports
(for 2009, 2010, and 2011) and WCO’s final report (2012) clearly indicate the poor achievement
of outputs. Several outputs were not achieved at all. For instance, the launch of a website
publishing information on the ROCB’s activities did not occur during the project period.100
Furthermore, the ROCB-WCA was unable to produce reliable customs-relevant statistics for the
region and the seven planned management workshops never took place. Several planned CB
activities failed to materialise as well. For example, the ROCB-WCA wanted to create a common
electronic platform that would use the internet to facilitate customs information exchange
within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). First efforts had already
taken place in 2008 to get this project off the ground, but it too failed to ever materialise
(Sida, 2013a). Several attempts to relaunch this activity were also unsuccessful (Sida, 2013a).

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Furthermore, several outputs were not fully achieved. For instance, a Regional Training Plan
(RTP) was drafted, but its implementation was poor: only 3 of the 5 planned training
sessions were held in 2010, and 3 out of 7 in 2011. The following reasons were given for the
poor track record in achieving outputs: the lack of external funding, the lack of recognition
of the need for training, understaffing at the ROCB, and the lack of a functioning regional
training infrastructure and accredited trainers/experts in the region (WCO, 2011). The
attempt to do a baseline study on WCA members’ progress on customs modernisation and
the implementation of and commitment to the Regional Strategic Plan (RSP) failed,
because only 7 of the 23 WCA members responded to the surveys to measure progress.
Furthermore, the WCO Fellowship Programme had participants from the WCA region every
year, but participation was far below targeted levels: 2 in 2009, 4 in 2010, and 2 in 2011 – a
total of 8 rather than 14 participants (WCO, 2009, 2010, and 2011).
Outputs that were successfully achieved include the establishment of two (instead of one)
additional Regional Training Centres (RTCs), and the drafting of a training strategy for the
RTC in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Several meetings were held to set up and discuss
collaboration between the ROCB-WCA and the Regional Economic Communities, namely
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the ECOWAS (WCO, 2011).
The poor performance on achieving outputs had an enormous impact on the achievement
of induced outputs, as described in WCO’s annual reports (2009-2011) and final report (2012).
The absence of a website seriously hampered the chances of dialogue, coordination,
understanding, and promotion of the WCO instruments and conventions. With only seven
of the members responding to the distributed survey, no reliable information could be
100

No further information was provided in the final report (WCO, 2012).

Appendices

obtained about the level of progress in modernising customs and the implementation and
commitment level of the Regional Strategic Plan for 2009-2012. The training did not achieve
its objectives because the regional training infrastructure did not function well and
accredited regional experts were not sufficiently experienced to deliver. The extent to which
customs administrations were able to translate the obtained knowledge into changes was
not documented. By 2012, all WCA customs administrations had established multi-annual
strategic reform plans and/or action plans to identify their development needs, but not all
administrations had taken ownership of reform (WCO, 2012).
An induced output that was achieved was the improved liaison between WCO and the members
in the WCA region. A tangible output of this improved relation was the development of a
capacity building plan for the region. According to the final report (2012), this plan helped
to streamline the different methodologies used by donors. This was achieved by promoting
WCO conventions and instruments, enabling members to request donor assistance (based
on action plans developed with the WCO), and reducing overlap between donors. Contact
between WCO and ECOWAS, CEMEC, and WAEMU also improved. Finally, despite the lack of
a website and electronic forum, information and experience sharing across customs
administrations happened on a regular basis (WCO, 2012). This included sharing
information and experience, for example, on new trends and developments (WCO, 2012).
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Despite these modest successes, the overall performance of the project, and the ROCB-WCA in
particular, was very poor. By the end of the project, the ROCB-WCA’s staff asked for additional
funding to continue (or actually start) assessing and advising customs administrations. The
ROCB-WCA had not organised any CB missions itself. Existing documentation and interviews
that were held have revealed that human capital constraints were an important cause, as the
office was understaffed. There was no English-speaking staff and thus not all countries in
the region could be served (WCO, 2011). In addition, the motivation, engagement, and
qualifications of the ROCB-WCA staff was unsatisfactory. Poor performance in data collection,
needs analysis, leadership, and M&E were also identified as reasons for the lack of success
(WCO, 2010; WCO, 2011; Sida, 2013a). Moreover, constraints that existed in member states,
such as the lack of participation of national customs administrations (WCO, 2010; WCO, 2011;
Sida, 2013a), explain the project’s lack of success. On top of that, funding issues and the
political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire contributed to the project’s poor performance. Interviews with
policy officers have highlighted the problems identified in the WCO reports. In particular,
policy officers cited the ROCB’s limited capacity as a reason why the project was slow to take
off and had a poor overall performance. All of the problems mentioned above were sufficient
reason for the Netherlands to stop financing the project. Surprisingly, the ROCB-WCA still exists
and is being kept up and running, at least to some extent, by contributions from member
states. An interview with a Beninese customs officer further revealed that the ROCB-WCA is
known as a regional office that facilitates customs modernisation and regional integration.
The lesson to be learned from the failure of this project is that training and capacity building
only works if there is a genuine demand for it. Widespread corruption makes projects to
reform customs in the WCA region risky. The programme should have taken country- and
region-specific characteristics into account, rather than copy a blueprint approach from

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

East Africa. An assessment of political support should have been part of the feasibility study,
and building political support should have been integrated into the design of the project,
as was in fact advised by Dutch embassies in the region before the start of the programme.
Conclusion
IOB concludes that the ROCB-WCA project failed to deliver the expected outputs and induced
outputs. The small improvements in cooperation did not justify the project. Reasons for the
lack of success were the insufficiently qualified and motivated ROCB-WCA staff, a lack of
willingness on the part of member countries to participate and reform their customs
administrations, and the poor execution of essential parts of the project, such as a baseline
study, a needs assessment and the setup of an M&E system. The political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire
and funding issues also added to the malfunctioning and poor performance of the project.

Standards
10. Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF)
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Background
The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) was formally established in 2004.
STDF’s founding partners are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO),
and the WTO. Later, developing country experts (6), donors (13), and observers from other
international organisations (7) joined the Working Group (WG) that together with the
Secretariat steers STDF. The WTO serves as the executing institution and houses the STDF
Secretariat. Since its inception, STDF has been supported by 17 donors, who have
contributed over USD 52 million since its inception (FAO/WTO, 2017). STDF’s donors include
the Netherlands, the EC, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.101 Dutch funding
to STDF forms part of a larger portfolio of funding of WTO programmes. During the period
under examination, the Netherlands provided approximately EUR 4.7 million.
STDF is a global partnership that supports developing countries by building their capacity to
implement international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, guidelines, and
recommendations as a means to improve their human, animal, and plant health status, and
their ability to gain and maintain access to markets (tfafacility.org, 2015). STDF’s mandate is to:
1. Increase awareness, mobilise resources, strengthen collaboration, encourage and
coordinate the international debate on SPS standards and trade, and identify and
disseminate good practice (tfafacility.org, 2015); and
2. Provide support and funding to develop and implement projects that promote
compliance with international SPS requirements (tfafacility.org, 2015) and facilitate the
more effective participation of developing countries in the three standard-setting
organisations.102
101
102

See http://standardsfacility.org for a full list of donors.
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), Codex Alimentarius (both part of FAO), and OIE.

Appendices

STDF thus performs a dual role. First, STDF serves as a knowledge platform and global coordinator.
In this role, STDF disseminates knowledge and good practices, provides tools, brings
together global networks, and coordinates capacity building efforts. Second, STDF serves as
a fund for the development and implementation of SPS capacity building projects. It
provides Project Preparation Grants (PPGs) to develop needs assessments, feasibility
studies, and project proposals, and Project Grants (PGs) to implement SPS capacity building
projects. These two roles are expected to reinforce one another. STDF’s intervention logic is
presented in table A1.11. It explains how STDF’s support is expected to affect trade.

Table A1.11

STDF intervention logic

Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected Inter­
mediate outcome

•	Research and
analyses (e.g.
to identify key
SPS constraints,
opportunities,
and good
practices);
•	Development
of capacity
assessment
tools and best
practices;
•	Organisation of
events,
presentations,
and workshops;
•	Maintaining a
website and
Virtual Library;
•	WG meetings;
•	Partner events
and meetings;
•	PPGs;
•	PGs.

•	Research and
analyses carried out
and information
disseminated (e.g.
through online
publications);
•	Tools and
approaches
developed and in
use (e.g. through
publications and
workshops);
•	
Events, presentations,
and workshops
organised and
attended;
•	WG meetings held;
•	STDF participation in
external (partner)
events and meetings;
•	Website and Virtual
Library kept up to
date;
•	Cases for collaboration identified and
encouraged;
•	Needs assessments,
feasibility studies,
and programme and
project proposals
developed;
•	SPS capacity
building projects
implemented;
•	Technical advice
provided to
beneficiaries.

•	Improved knowledge
sharing;
•	Enhanced cooperation/
stronger alliances between
public-private actors,
standard-setting bodies,
and implementing and
financing institutions to
enhance standards
harmonisation and the
effectiveness of CB
projects;
•	Enhanced beneficiary
awareness on SPS and the
ability to identify and
prioritise SPS needs;
•	Changed SPS policies and
legislation (e.g. streamlined/simplified SPS
policies and procedures
and better organisation of
SPS authorities and
customs);
•	SPS policy mainstreamed
in beneficiary’s trade and
development policy;
•	Increased capacity of
developing countries to
implement international
SPS standards;
•	Enhanced participation of
developing countries in
international standardsetting bodies;
•	International standards
better tailored to
developing country needs.

•	Enhanced SPS
compliance of
beneficiary
country trade;
•	Improved SPS
framework in
developing
countries (e.g.
metrology,
standardisation,
testing, and
quality management);
•	Increased global/
regional standards
harmonisation
and mutual
recognition;
•	Reduced trade
costs and transit
time;
•	Increased market
access.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Findings
Information on achieving direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with policy officers,
representatives from STDF, beneficiaries, international organisations, and other stakeholders.
STDF as knowledge platform and global coordinator
STDF’s role as a knowledge platform and global coordinator resulted in outputs such as the
development of briefings,103 general lessons from project evaluations, capacity assessment
tools, a Virtual Library,104 the organisation of events,105 training activities and workshops,
participation of the STDF Secretariat in external (partner) events, collaboration with EIF in
Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS), and collaborative WG meetings106 (see STDF
annual reports 2007-2016).

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All external reviews of STDF over the last 15 years were positive about the value of STDF’s
achieved outputs as an information platform and coordination hub. Slorach (2008), for
instance, states that, as a coordination platform, STDF ‘has a comparative advantage and can
play a unique role in assisting developing countries in the future’ (p. 21). The partnership of
five different organisations has combined in-depth and diverse knowledge reflected in its
documents, tools, and dialogues. The 2008 evaluation already concluded that with an
expert base of five partner organisations, its donors, developing country experts, and
observer organisations, STDF has a high level of expertise in standards and developmentrelated areas (Slorach, 2008). The 2014 mid-term review (MTR) has further stated that STDF
‘has coordinated an on-going collaborative discussion of the problems at well-attended
workshops, which have highlighting the need for coordinated responses by partners, donors,
developing countries, and other stakeholders’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a: p. v). The MTR added
that ‘Its role as a coordination forum was cited as a significant value added by most members
of the STDF WG and a reason for their continued support and participation.’ (Saana Consulting,
2014a: p. v). In addition, partners, donors and experts from developing countries stressed
STDF’s significant added value in its coordination of efforts, for instance through its
cooperation with EIF and the broader WTO-led AfT Initiative (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
The evaluations, however, also noted that despite an efficient and effective secretariat
(Slorach, 2008), STDF was not always able to fulfil its role as a coordinating forum properly.
The reasons for this were the time-consuming procedures for the review and approval of
Project Grants and Project Preparation Grants (Saana Consulting, 2014a).

103

104

105

106

The STDF publishes briefings, providing information on particular topics related to SPS technical cooperation.
See http://www.standardsfacility.org/briefings for examples of briefings.
In 2012, STDF launched the STDF Virtual Library on its website. The Virtual Library provides a central repository
containing electronic documentation, including SPS needs assessments, action plans, training materials,
research papers, and articles from various publishers and sources (STDF, 2011)
For instance, thematic events on SPS issues, such as invasive alien species, climate change, and public-private
partnerships.
The STDF Working Group consists of partners, bilateral donors, and developing country experts, who combine their
expertise and skills. Other international, regional, and national organisations involved in SPS capacity building
often participate and share information on their programmes. ‘Experience has highlighted the value of these
meetings in enhancing collaboration and initiating new partnerships among members’ (STDF, undated-b: p. 1).

Appendices

The generally positive findings on the quality and relevance of STDF’s outputs were
confirmed by the interviews that were held in The Hague, Geneva, Uganda, and Benin. The
interviewees expressed their appreciation for the facility’s contribution to EIF studies and its
briefings, for example, which provided detailed and relevant SPS information.
Furthermore, the interviewees were also able to provide some evidence on induced outputs.
One respondent highlighted the fact that STDF’s briefings help developing countries to
become more aware of SPS-related requirements. Policy officials in Benin mentioned STDF’s
website as a valuable source of information that creates awareness of existing SPS
requirements and the ability to identify and prioritise SPS needs. That STDF’s activities have
contributed to building awareness is also underscored in evaluations. In the 2008 review, a
German representative commented that regional workshops organised by STDF were useful
as an awareness-building exercise and a good approach to organising joint efforts to tackle
common problems in a region, such as the fruit fly (Slorach, 2008).
Induced outputs also include the improved participation of developing countries in
international standard-setting bodies. For example, a project that aimed to strengthen the
Beninese SPS information system helped to steer Benin in the right direction on the
question of which department should represent Benin in the Codex Alimentarius, for
example. However, as the World Bank concluded, ‘developing countries still have limited
influence on the setting of many internationally-recognised standards’ (World Bank, 2005:
p. 114). The upshot of their participation in standard setting and negotiations therefore is
that they gain better knowledge about which compliance problems they need technical
assistance for, in order to maintain their access to international markets and enhance their
competitiveness. The effect on exports may therefore be indirect.
Despite the positive statements about raising more awareness of the trade-facilitating role
of standards, IOB concludes that this has not (yet) led Uganda or Benin to focus proper
attention on standards in their trade policies or change SPS policies and legislation in their
respective countries. In both countries, trade policy on standards focused mainly on import
control, rather than on promoting exports. The quality of imported products was a concern
because of disease control and food safety. The controls also served as a non-trade import
barrier. The Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) did not make use of STDF’s
services. This can be explained by the fact that UNBS was hardly aware of STDF’s existence,
let alone its outputs. Therefore, IOB concludes that STDF has managed to increase
developing countries’ participation in international standard setting and awareness of the
importance of standards for trade, but there is still room for improvement at the country
and regional levels. Better results-based management is necessary in this respect.
Existing evaluations emphasise the difficulty of measuring effects. The 2014 MTR, for
example, writes: ‘Although it seems clear that the activities produced the required results,
it is difficult to accurately quantify the level of any contribution, or indeed the level of
achievement of the outputs themselves. Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect that the
core activities contributed towards the outcome of ‘increased coordination in the provision
of technical cooperation on SPS issues’ covered by the STDF mandate. The strength of this

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

contribution (and the degree to which the outcome was achieved) again is not clear as there
are no specific indicators to measure.’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a: p. 25).
Based on interviews and secondary data the MTR concludes, however, that ‘the STDF has
been successful in increasing the focus on SPS issues at the core of the AfT Initiative as well
as in the DTIS reports commissioned by the EIF. The STDF has the potential to create
significant impact in a cost effective manner as strategies and development programs are
implemented but there will be a time lag of at least 3-5 years before any discernible impact
from this can be evidenced.’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a: p. 37). The MTR recommends a better
M&E system and results-based management. These recommendations were addressed by
STDF in its 2015-2019 medium term strategy (STDF, undated-c).
STDF as SPS capacity building fund
From 2007 to 2016, STDF implemented 57 new Project Preparation Grants, with a total value
of USD 2.1 million, and 60 new Project Grants, with a total value of USD 57 million.107 In
addition to STDF funding, STDF projects have also secured resources from governments,
donors, and the private sector (STDF, 2016).108

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STDF exceeded its target of 40% for LDCs and other low-income countries. LDCs and other
low-income countries benefitted from 64% (in terms of value) of the PGs and PPGs from
STDF’s inception until the end of 2016 (STDF, 2016). Donors noted that the grants
programme allowed them to extend the range of their technical assistance for SPS issues at
a fraction of the cost they would incur if they were to do it themselves. This was reportedly a
critical factor in their decision to support STDF (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
In Benin, IOB did a quick assessment of the following projects (PGs): the Beninese SPS
information system project109 (implementation period: 2008-2011, status completed);
the Beninese project within the larger regional total diet study for SSA110 (start date: 2014,
ongoing); and the project to strengthen standard controls in the Ugandan floriculture
sector.111 In Benin, both projects suffered from serious delays. These delays were the result
of problems at the ministerial level, caused by an almost complete lack of ownership,
by a generally poor institutional capacity of the beneficiary agencies, and by financial
constraints. Financial constraints jeopardised particularly the continuity of the
achievements. The SPS information system project, for which the Beninese Chamber of
Commerce (CCIB112) received support, aimed to improve SPS regulation in the shrimp sector.
107

108

109
110

111
112

A total of 78 PPGs (with a total value of USD 2.6 million) and 76 PGs (with a total value of USD 61.8 million)
have been implemented from inception until 2017. See http://www.standardsfacility.org/projectpreparationgrants and
http://www.standardsfacility.org/projectgrants for more details on the grants (Data obtained: October, 2017).
To date, STDF projects have leveraged approximately USD 23.5 million in additional resources (in-kind and
financial) from governments, donors and the private sector (STDF, 2016).
STDF/PG/127. ‘SPS information system in Benin’ aimed to improve information flows on SPS requirements.
STDF/PG303. ‘Regional total diet study for Sub-Saharan Africa’ aimed to strengthen capacity of risk managers
to implement international standards based on good knowledge of hazards, risks and exposure levels to
harmful substances in commonly produced and consumed food.
STDF/PG/335: ‘Strengthening phytosanitary controls in the floriculture sector in Uganda’.
See http://www.ccibenin.org for more information on CCIB.

Appendices

As part of the project, a notification system was set up, people were trained, and
information was collected in order to create a framework for SPS regulation in the shrimp
sector, which was then put on a website. Information collection went well. However, the
development of the website took longer than expected. The reasons for this were financial
delays and a lack of ownership at CCIB when there was a change of presidency. The lack of
financial and institutional capacity at CCIB after the completion of the project meant that
the website went off the air, thus terminating the exercise. The notification system also
broke down. Furthermore, the total diet study already suffered delays in its early days.
The project was only launched two years after originally planned. Delays have been related
to internal staff problems and the fact that it took a long time to get the Beninese Food
Safety Agency (ABSSA)113 up and running.
In Uganda, IOB conducted a quick assessment of the implementation of the project to
strengthen standards control in the Ugandan floriculture sector114 (implementation period:
2012-2015, completed). Support was provided to the Ugandan government (GoU) to increase
Uganda’s trade capacity to export flowers to the EU. Achieved outputs include training
activities, phytosanitary certificates, and documentation of procedures that were developed
and implemented. Like the projects in Benin, the Ugandan project was subject to delays,
caused by capacity constraints at the level of the GoU (e.g. shortage of qualified staff and
delays in the delivery of contracted services).
IOB’s findings on the delayed achievement of outputs in Uganda and Benin are in line with
the general findings on delays in the reviews of STDF’s overall performance. The 2014
evaluation mentioned that 30% of the projects required a time extension (Saana Consulting,
2014a). Lack of continuity was also mentioned as an issue. Both were often due to
circumstances outside the control of the project, such as lack of beneficiary capacity or
operational funding constraints, or high staff turnover (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
Despite delays and the lack of continuity in project implementation, interviewees in Benin
and Uganda reviewed the quality of the outputs positively. CCIB stated that the development
and launch of the website was highly appreciated, providing access to valuable SPS
information. Similarly, for the total diet study, ABSSA valued highly outputs such as
participation in regional workshops and the assistance it received. The achieved outputs in
the Ugandan projects, such as practical training, documentation, and the development of
manuals were highly valued for their quality.
The 2008 and 2014 external evaluations reinforce these findings. On STDF’s role as a project
support fund, the 2014 mid-term review (for the period 2009-2013), concludes that ‘the
results are impressive and a testament to the effective operation of the STDF WG approval
process as well as the support provided by the STDF Secretariat’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a: p. 38).
The 2008 evaluation writes: ‘The STDF has approved a rich portfolio of projects and PPGs
covering a wide range of SPS related issues’ (Slorach, 2008: p. 21). Donors further noted that
113
114

Agence Béninoise de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments (Benin Food Safety Agency).
STDF/PG/335. ‘Strengthening phytosanitary controls in the floriculture sector in Uganda’.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

the grant-funding programme allowed them to extend the range of their technical
assistance to SPS capacity building programmes at a fraction of the cost they would incur if
they had to do it themselves (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
The assessment of the projects in Benin and Uganda proved that progress is not always a straight
line, but can have ups and downs, delays, and discontinuities. Even if not all outputs were
achieved and even if hardly anything was delivered on time, the projects generated induced
outputs and even some notable intermediate outcomes. For instance, CCIB indicated that
the project aimed at strengthening the Beninese SPS information system helped to steer Benin
in the right direction on the question of which department should represent Benin in the Codex
Alimentarius Commission and enhanced Benin’s capacity to deal with WTO notifications.
It also led to a protocol for food safety crises. Indirectly the establishment of ABSSA was the
result of the awareness created by the project (FAO, 2011). ABSSA, part of the Ministry of
Agriculture, started almost from scratch again in 2013, supported by Belgium, STDF, and FAO.
Interviewees also noted that thus far the data collected and processed in Benin as part of the
total diet study for SSA have helped to enhance awareness on chemical contamination and
bacteria, and on the trade-reducing effect of non-compliance to certain standards.
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Finally, the Ugandan project managed to improve standard controls in the floriculture
sector, which resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of SPS-related rejections. Between
2014 and 2016, the number of SPS-related interceptions fell from 35 to two. To guarantee
continuity, the Uganda Flower Exporters Association (UFEA) developed and operationalised
a control system. The organisation of regular audits for compliance at farms improved
under the STDF project, resulting in better monitoring and learning, and a reduction of
audit time, from four to only one day. The system was still in place at the time of our visit in
2016. According to the UFEA, the project also strengthened the coordination of stakeholders
in the sector. During the implementation of the STDF project, UFEA, the Department of
Crop Protection (DCP), Makere University, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product
Safety Authority (NVWA), and IPPC worked together. UFEA said that this enhanced
institutional capacity in the sector and increased the coordination of different national
stakeholders. The project provided a blueprint for similar projects in other sectors in
Uganda, but so far, this spill over effect has not occurred.
STDF projects are evaluated on a regular basis by independent external evaluators.
These projects are selected by STDF. Sometimes they are randomly chosen and sometimes
specifically, because they are innovative or informative. Much like the generally positive
findings in Benin and Uganda, the 2014 evaluation concluded that these evaluated projects
in general ‘delivered results’, were ‘likely to be success stories’, and are expected ‘to have
long-term impacts’ (Saana Consulting, 2014a). External evaluations, however, noted an
absence of consistent and detailed M&E procedures for projects (Slorach, 2008; Saana
Consulting, 2014a), which explains the words ‘likely’ and ‘expected’. As mentioned before,
SDTF intends to improve M&E in the coming years (STDF, undated-c).115
115

The strategy refers to document 509, which ‘takes the existing M&E activities of STDF a step further by
establishing a practical monitoring and evaluation system, which not only reports on activities, but also tracks
progress in terms of achieving results’ (STDF, undated-a: p. 1).

Appendices

Whereas STDF’s role as an SPS capacity building fund was thus considered successful and
made the institute more widely known, it also constrained its ability to effectively fulfil its
role as an information platform and coordination hub. Procedures for the review and
approval of PPGs and PGs were so time consuming that they limited the time available for
STDF to fulfil its role as a coordination forum (Saana Consulting, 2014a).
Conclusion
IOB concludes that STDF has contributed to enhancing SPS awareness and knowledge, not only
among LDCs, but also across the global trade community. STDF is valued for its role as a
knowledge platform and coordination forum, and plays a key role in the AfT Initiative. Through
its PGs and PPGs, it helps beneficiary countries to increase their capacity to implement
standards. STDF has a good record of accomplishment on output, although projects were often
delayed. There is some evidence that STDF’s outputs led to induced outputs and are likely to
have led to the expected intermediate results. Projects selected by STDF for external evaluation
were quite successful, but case studies shed doubt on the continuity and spill over effects of the
projects. A systematic assessment was constrained by the absence of a representative and
detailed M&E system. However, the 2015-2019 medium-term strategy has addressed this issue
(STDF, undated-c). STDF is qualified and well situated to select PGs and PPGs, but needs to
avoid overburdening its small secretariat with review, approval, and evaluation procedures.
In general, IOB concludes that STDF is likely to have had a positive effect on the trade
performance of beneficiary countries and their integration into the global trading system.

11. Fair Wear Foundation (FWF)
Background
The Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) is a European multi-stakeholder foundation mandated to
promote ‘fair fashion’ through better workplace conditions in the garment industry. FWF
was established in Amsterdam, the Netherlands in 1999 by a consortium of trade unions,
NGOs, business associations in the garment industry, and the Dutch chapter of the Clean
Clothes Campaign (CCC).116 FWF does not provide a standards compliance label or
certificate. Instead, it is an international verification institute. It verifies workplace
conditions in factories in sourcing companies. FWF-accredited monitors verify workplace
conditions on the basis of the core conventions of ILO and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), called the ‘FWF Codes of Labour Practices’.
FWF’s interventions consist of committing clothing companies to become members of FWF and
engage in FWF-organised cooperation with other companies, brands, factories, trade unions,
NGOs, and the Dutch government, to ensure that core labour standards are monitored.
FWF uses a process approach in which members must demonstrate their progress towards
implementing the Codes of Labour Practices (standardsmap.org, 2017). Companies that
commit to FWF membership are given a time frame for implementation. Certain standards
must be met immediately (e.g. child labour, minimum wage, and freedom of association),
while other standards must be met within one, three, or five years (standardsmap.org, 2017).
116

CCC is a European multi-stakeholder NGO. It is a founding member of FWF and uses FWF as an instrument to
monitor its code, complaints processes, and remediation, remaining independent of corporate influence.

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Between 2007 and 2016, support provided by the Dutch government to FWF, categorised as
TA for TP&R, amounted to approximately EUR 10.6 million. The largest share of this funding
(67%) was provided under the TMF programme. Another substantial share of the funding
(18%) was provided as part of the Human Rights Fund. In addition to the Dutch ministry,
other donors are the EU, FNV, and CNV.
The constructed intervention logic for FWF, which explains how FWF activities can
potentially affect trade, is depicted in table A1.12. It should be noted, however, that FWF
focuses on labour conditions rather than trade.

Table A1.12 FWF intervention logic

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Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	FWF memberships117;
•	Independent
verification
visits to
measure the
impact of
membership;
•	Development
of performance
benchmarks/
assessment
tools;
•	Setting up/
scaling up
worker
complaint
hotlines;
•	Training,
manuals, and
country
studies;
•	Sharing
experience
and social
dialogue with
stakeholders;
•	Roundtables,
strategic
partnerships,
and other
cooperation
activities.

• Company memberships obtained
and corrective plans
developed;
•	Independent
verification visits
executed;
•	Performance
benchmark
instrument created;
•	Worker complaint
hotlines set up/
scaled up and
operational;
•	Training given,
manuals established,
and country studies
executed;
•	Industry, trade
unions, FWF, and
governments
participated in
cooperation
activities and social
dialogues,
experiences shared.
•	Roundtables,
strategic partnership
meetings, and other
cooperation
activities organised.

•	Enhanced credibility and
effectiveness of FWF code;
•	More transparency in
value chain (reduced
transaction costs to signal
good practices);
•	Enhanced due diligence of
member companies and
enhanced labour
standards in factories;
•	Better reputation of
members (reduced cost to
promote/signal reputation);
•	Enhanced monitoring of
working conditions and
improved knowledge
on status quo and
developments in labour
standards worldwide;
•	More awareness of labour
rights and enhanced
stakeholder involvement
in policymaking
(increased capacity for
lobbying and advocacy);
•	Improved embeddedness
and enforcement of ILO
and UDHR standards in
national and international
policy;
•	Stronger stakeholder
cooperation and
enhanced dialogue.

•	Enhanced market
share of
FWF-coded
products in
markets;
•	Reduced
transaction costs.

117

Membership follows after a process of the applicant designing a work plan, signing FWF codes of conduct, and
informing its suppliers of its FWF membership. Work plans are annually provided by FWF members to strive for
continuous improvements.

Appendices

Findings
Information on achieved direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, literature, and interviews with policy officers, representatives from
FWF, and other stakeholders. Annual reports and progress reports have indicated that FWF’s
planned output targets were generally met. An important output that was documented is
the issuance of FWF memberships. In 2016, 81 companies held an FWF membership.
Together these companies represented over 120 brands, sourcing from 2,500 factories,
located in 10 producing countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa118 (FWF, 2016). Other
documented direct outputs include factory audits, complaint investigations, the production
of country studies, new/improved tools and guides, research and dissemination of obtained
knowledge, and discussions in Roundtables (FWF, 2015; FWF, 2016). Until recently, FWF did
not monitor whether its members improved their performance over time. Since 2016, FWF
has started to work on a Theory of Change.
IOB’s assessment of induced outputs has been constrained by the absence of a proper M&E
system, impact measurement, and (external) evaluations of FWF. No data could be obtained
from the fieldwork in Uganda and Benin, because none of the FWF members sourced from
these countries. Consequently, IOB’s findings are only based on progress reports, interviews
in the Netherlands, and evidence from the empirical literature.
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In an interview with FWF, FWF mentioned that it had achieved better labour conditions in
the factories that its members source from. FWF acknowledged, however, that given the
small share of FWF members in total global production, the effect at industry level is
marginal. Other induced effects that FWF mentioned are increased awareness and
knowledge of improved labour conditions worldwide, and the uptake of best practices and
lessons learned. This enhanced knowledge determined, according to FWF, the success of its
lobbying efforts.
Asked if their activities on labour standards had had an effect on trade, FWF answered that it
had never tried to measure this. And even so, it is unlikely that such an effect would be
measurable, given the small share of FWF members in the total garment industry.
Theoretically, one would expect an increase in cost price to reduce trade, but that the
network effects could compensate for this. One would need a great deal of data on the
impact of living wages on production costs, on the distribution of profit margins in the
value chain, on retail pricing, and on the value of timely delivery and continuing supply
relations to determine this. Anecdotal evidence indicates that competition among Dutch
companies is fierce and that Japanese and American brands pay higher prices to their
suppliers. Asked about trade diversion in the case of poor labour conditions or calamities,119
FWF said that its members were unlikely to divert their orders to other source countries and
instead have shown a willingness to use their leverage to improve the situation.

118

119

Around 80% of the production by FWF members comes from Bangladesh, China, India, and Turkey (fairwear.
org, 2017).
Such as the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh in 2013.

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

As mentioned before, the empirical literature indicates that adopting international
standards, such as labour standards, on domestic markets generally has a positive effect on
trade (both on exports and imports; see Swann (2010) for an extensive review of the
literature). In this case, it means that there would be an effect on trade if there was a
massive spill over effect of the labour standards in the garment industry to other sectors in
the economy of the sourcing country. In practice, this would require governments and trade
unions in the countries where garments are made to enforce core labour rights, not only in
export sectors, but all over the country, and in all sectors. This emphasises the importance
of involving national and local government authorities to develop institutions for the
sector-wide enforcement of labour standards, also for the domestic market. Roundtables
and other sector platforms can provide a valuable tool to involve authorities and create
local ownership. FWF was aware of the limitations of its approach and indicated that it has
increased its efforts to cooperate with governments.

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Conclusion
IOB’s assessment of induced outputs and potential outcomes was highly constrained by the
absence of impact measurement and external evaluations, and the lack of a proper M&E
system. Based on the interviews and general findings from empirical studies, the likely
effect of Dutch support to FWF on trade was minor at best, but could also have been
negative. Enforcement of ILO labour standards, also for domestic production, could have a
more positive effect on trade, however (apart from a more considerable effect on labour
conditions). This requires government involvement and local ownership. Yet, as mentioned
before, it must be recognised that FWF’s focus is on improving labour conditions rather
than on trade.
FWF acknowledged that the effect of its work on national enforcement policy has been
limited, not just regarding the effect on trade, but also in terms of changing labour
conditions. In recent years, FWF has begun to expand its scope, directing more of its efforts
to influencing the enabling environment, to make effective use of the existing internal
institutional capacity and to pursue more ambitious and sustainable results.

12. Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH (Initiatief Duurzame Handel)
Background
The Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH – Initiatief Duurzame Handel) was set up in 2008 as a
multi-stakeholder initiative of private companies, CSOs, trade unions, and the Dutch
government. IDH’s objective is to catalyse and support the sustainability of international
trade and production chains by promoting social, environmental, and economic
sustainability in developing countries (MFA, 2008). IDH’s interventions focus on improving
and transforming the supply chain of internationally traded commodities, such as coffee,
tea, cotton, timber, palm oil, and fish. Its key activities include promoting good agricultural
practices, training farmers, and providing certification (IOB, 2014b). IDH’s work can be
categorised into three specific areas: to convene and facilitate coalitions; to provide
assistance for sector improvement programmes; and to act as a knowledge broker. IDH’s
approach when providing assistance for sector improvement programmes starts with a

Appendices

selective group of producers of primary commodities in developing countries that supply a
lead multinational company. The demonstration effect of this selected group is meant to
eventually spill over to other producers and other companies.120
In addition to the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark have become ‘funding partners’
of IDH as well. During the period under examination, Dutch funding of IDH’s activities that
fall within the scope of our study amounted to approximately EUR 13.4 million. In the original
setup agreed in 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to finance the IDH Secretariat and
up to half of the individual sector improvement programmes. The other half of the sector
improvement programmes was to be funded by contributions from other partners, of which
at least 25% would come from the private sector (IOB, 2014b). By 2013, a target was set that
every public euro had to be matched by at least 1.8 euros of private funding (IOB, 2014b).
IDH is part of this evaluation because it promotes international standards and labels.
In addition to IDH, we also reviewed Solidaridad and Fair Trade Original, in order to assess
the effect of voluntary private standards on trade (value and diversification). IDH’s main
objective is environmental sustainability. Its work on international supply chains, however,
is characterised as Aid for Trade and often given as an example of how aid and trade can
benefit from cooperating with the private sector. Therefore, there is good reason to look at
the effects on trade. Two IOB reviews of IDH – one from 2014 and the Food Security Policy
Review (see IOB, 2014b and IOB, 2017, respectively) – have looked at the effects of trade
development. These effects on trade are the result of technical assistance for higher
productivity and the introduction of outgrowers’ schemes for guaranteed purchase and
sometimes guaranteed minimum price. This evaluation does not look at the effects of trade
development on trade, but only at the effects of private standards and certification. There
are four important direct effects to look at. First, the higher requirements of these voluntary
standards can reduce supply and therefore trade when producers are unable to meet the
new standards. Because the standards in the IDH programme were voluntary and did not
affect the market for non-certified produce, this negative effect on export did not occur.
Second, standards can facilitate trade by removing information asymmetries and risk, thus
reducing the cost of quality assessments and control, and reducing rejection rates. Third,
the standard requirements can stimulate economies of scale or a more stable supply, which
improves competitiveness. Fourth, standards can increase the value of trade, if higher
standards lead to higher prices (and the price elasticity of export demand is smaller than 1).
One can also see the certified good as a new product that contributes to trade diversification.121
Moreover, standards can influence trade through indirect effects. For instance, standards can
provide an incentive for developing countries to improve the institutional efficiency of the
value chain or the efficiency of the production process to stay competitive (a trade
120

121

More recently, IDH adopted ‘landscape programmes’. Instead of focusing on a select group of producers, the
landscape approach builds multi-stakeholder coalitions, involving public and private actors and community
stakeholders. The landscape approach aims to drive sustainable production, while taking into account the
socioeconomic and environmental impact of the landscapes in which production takes place (IDH, 2016).
For an elaborate review of the effects of standards on trade see, for instance, Jaffee and Henson (2004) and
Ferro et al. (2013).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

development effect (Ruben, 2017)). Furthermore, the proliferation of private standards
could affect trade if they were to spill over into official government policy and regulations.
The focus in the intervention logic for IDH, as depicted below, is on institutional capacity
building, including activities focusing on supporting activities of standard setting,
harmonisation and mutual recognition, implementation, certification, testing,
enforcement, and promotion. The role of IDH in trade development – to help producers
increase their productivity and comply with standards and good agricultural practices, which
IDH said it spends about 90%122 of its budget on – is beyond the scope of this study. IDH’s
overarching intervention logic for its work on TP&R is presented in the table table A1.13.

Table A1.13 IDH intervention logic

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Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected
inter­mediate
outcome

•	Convening and
building coalitions
public-private
partnerships with
Northern and
Southern partners e.g.
private companies,
NGOs, trade unions,
and local partners;
•	Coalitions with other
European sustainability initiatives;
•	Providing expertise
and funding for sector
improvement
programmes (e.g. for
scoping papers, (joint)
implementation plans,
development of codes
of conduct, setting up
platforms, and
certification schemes);
•	Development of
sectoral and
inter-sectoral learning
programmes and
knowledge exchange.

•	Coalitions
formed and
stakeholders
committed to
programmes;
•	Coalitions
formed with
other
initiatives;
•	Programme
activities
carried out (e.g.
trainings held,
certifications
accredited,
platforms
established,
and traceability
systems set up);
•	Knowledge and
experiences on
sustainable
trade shared
and supply
chain
approaches
developed.

•	Codes of conduct created
by coalitions;
•	Promotion,
harmonisation, and
coordination of different
sustainable standards
(e.g. setting up control
protocols, training, and
audits);
•	Codes of conduct taken
over by mainstream
sector;
•	Enhanced involvement
of private sector in policy
making;
•	Codes of conduct
adopted/integrated into
trade policy;
•	Improved standards
quality management;
•	Integration of developing country producers
in sustainable global
value chains;
•	Enhanced knowledge of
sustainable trade in the
Netherlands and Europe.

•	Reduced costs of
standards testing
(e.g. at borders);
•	Reduced
transaction costs
and transit time;
•	Economies of
scale and more
stable supply;
•	Increased
demand for
certified
products;
•	Increased market
access to niche
markets (for
certified
products).

122

The percentage is based on calculations generated from internal documentation, and confirmed by IDH.

Appendices

Findings
Information on achieving direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with policy officers,
representatives from IDH, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders.
By convening and facilitating coalitions, IDH has contributed to the emergence of new ones,
including the Trustea initiative in India, the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC), the
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative (FSI), and the Cocoa
Improvement Programme (CIP). In addition, IDH provided funds and administrative support,
participated in steering committee meetings, and completed a letter of intent to the cocoa
sector (IOB, 2014b). The 2014 IOB Review concluded that IDH played an important convening
role in several commodity chain initiatives, and is recognised for getting initiatives going,
acting as programme coordinator, and taking a neutral position (IOB, 2014b). IDH calls itself
a neutral convenor and certification neutral. This means that IDH does not set standards,
nor does it have its own labels. However, it supported certain certification programmes,
such as UTZ Certified, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Rainforest Alliance, and
ASC. By doing so, it has contributed to the effects these standards have brought about.
In sector improvement programmes, IDH funded technical assistance and programme
implementation. The achieved outputs include setting up and supporting platforms,
facilitating and promoting certification schemes, coordination, and M&E (e.g. IDH, 2016;
IOB 2014b). These activities, which focus on standards and certification, fall under TA for
TP&R. Key performance indicators set for the period 2012-2015 reveal that the output targets
for all IDH programmes were generally achieved (IDH, 2015). The 2014 IOB Review, which
evaluated several IDH Programmes,123 also concluded that there were considerable outputs
and that the set targets were largely achieved (IOB, 2014b).
The outputs IDH achieved as a knowledge broker include organising conferences and
workshops, holding discussions, conducting in-depth research, and publishing studies
(IDH, 2016; IOB, 2014b). The IOB Review’s conclusion regarding the quality of these outputs
was as follows: ‘The reports are generally of good quality’ (IOB, 2014b: p. 91).
Looking at induced outputs with respect to standards and certification, the programme did
not perform very well. Whereas certification schemes were, in general, successfully
introduced, many of these schemes did not prove to be sustainable.124 The 2014 IOB Review
concluded that in the longer run, the share of certified produce eventually diminished,
because becoming certified created bigger benefits than staying certified. In the process of
becoming certified, IDH provided training and expertise on good agricultural practice,
which improved productivity and covered the starting costs of certification. Yet staying
certified required producers to pay for the recurring costs of certification, while additional
premiums were phased out or evaporated as certified production became more widespread.
123
124

The 2014 IOB Review evaluated the programmes on aquaculture, tea, cotton, and cocoa.
This study refrains from drawing conclusions on the effects of the certification schemes and the associated
support on productivity, income, and food security. This is done by the IOB policy review on Food Security (2017).

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Consequently, compliance costs increased. The economic incentive to stay certified was
often too small to make up for the costs. An additional problem was that effective market
uptake for certified produce remained a challenge. Both the literature and interviews
revealed that generally there is a lack of demand for certified products, which forces
producers to sell without receiving a price premium. For example, the IOB Review found for
the period 2010-2013 that only 10% of the cotton produced under the BCI licence was
bought as BCI cotton by end users. For cocoa and ASC certified fish, the percentage of
certified produce finding its way into certified end products was 30% and 36% respectively
(IOB, 2014b). When farmers cease to comply with the requirements, the potential trade
facilitation effects will fail to materialise. And, when certified products are sold as generic,
non-certified products, there is of course no price premium. This means that they cannot be
seen as ‘new products’ and are therefore not increasing trade diversification.

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IDH-supported discussions (e.g. taking place at national platforms), in which the private
sector and governments discuss policies and regulations, have the potential to (indirectly)
affect regulation. The 2014 IOB Review stated that in ‘countries such as Ivory Coast (cocoa),
Vietnam (coffee), and Brazil (coffee), IDH is active in national platforms in which the private
sector and government discuss policies and regulations to prioritise sustainability issues in
commodity production’ (IOB, 2014b, p. 18). Several authors have found that private
sustainability standards have had a positive effect on public standard compliance and
enforcement (Kessler et al., 2012, as cited in IOB, 2014b). The 2014 Review of IDH is
inconclusive on positive spill over effects, but assumes that IDH’s work may have
contributed to more debate and action by the government and industry in recipient
countries (IOB, 2014b). Therefore, IDH may have contributed indirectly to the better
implementation and enforcement of national legislation on standards.
This may have had an indirect effect on trade, as was suggested in a review by Swann (2010).
Both IDH and the people interviewed agreed, however, that the effect of certification on
policy, (where codes of conduct have been mainstreamed and integrated into general and
official regulation) was, in fact, very limited. In general, the certification requirements
exceed those of official and, de facto, (voluntary) national standards. An exception is the
Trustea initiative launched in India.125 The Trustea standard is based on Indian realities, but
as it is similar to UTZ and Rainforest Alliance certification requirements, the Trustea
initiative resembles international sustainability standards. With 80% of Indian tea
production being sold on the domestic market, the Trustea standard is a good example of
international standards being introduced, not just for exports but also for the domestic
market. According to the empirical literature, adapting to international standards on the
domestic market positively and significantly affects a country’s trade performance (Swann,
2010). IDH’s work on initiatives such as Trustea could potentially contribute to the adoption
of these standards, not only for tea, but preferably for all agricultural produce on the
domestic market. Such an effect would have an impact on trade. The 2014 Review’s
125

The Trustea initiative was launched in India in 2013. The influential Tea Board chairs the initiative. IDH acts as
programme coordinator and provides financial support to the programme, alongside Unilever and Tata.
Solidaridad is the main implementing agency. The code resembles UTZ and Rainforest Alliance certification.

Appendices

conclusion is along the same lines: ‘An indirect effect of standards and certification in
Western markets is a growing interest in developing countries of devising national standards
(and sometimes legislation), partly aligned with international standards. Trustea in India is a
typical example. This offers new perspectives, in particular in developing countries with
substantial local markets, or with high commodity exports to other than Western markets.
Working on these standards requires closer involvement with governments and other
authorities in developing countries (IDH’s local convening ambition), whereas developed
countries’ governments could also play a facilitating role.’ (IOB, 2014b: p. 23).
Whereas the direct outputs of the knowledge products were deemed to be of good quality,
there is little evidence that these products enhanced knowledge on sustainable trade and
created more demand for certified products, nor that they spilled over to other sectors. On
IDH’s role as a knowledge broker, the 2014 IOB Review stated that not everyone interviewed
understood this role or perceived it to be less important than IDH’s role as a convenor and
funder (IOB, 2014b).
IDH’s annual reports show that there are M&E systems on output in place, which monitor
progress in absolute terms and against targets. There is room for improvement regarding
M&E on results. Whereas a more in-depth evaluation of the impact of PSD programmes has
been conducted since 2011 (following up on the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
the 2014 IOB Review concludes that in recent ‘impact’ evaluations of cocoa, tea, and cotton
programmes, ‘IDH has let itself be tempted to selective use of data’ (IOB, 2014b: p. 81).
Consequently, the contribution effects found cannot be substantiated with systematic evidence.
Conclusion
IDH’s general objective, to catalyse and support the sustainability of international trade
and production chains, was not the subject of this evaluation. This evaluation looked at
the effects of IDH’s work on private standards and certification on trade policy, trade
facilitation, and ultimately trade value and diversification.
The direct effects of certification on trade, supported by IDH, can be summarised as follows.
There was little evidence that the reduction of the cost of quality assessments and control,
economies of scale, a more stable supply, and a price premium for certified produce had an
enhancing effect on trade. The lack of international demand for certified produce and weak
control systems prevented these factors, which could potentially have effected trade from
materialising. The indirect effect of the certification programmes on trade, as a result of
spill over to official government policy and regulation on standards, could not be
substantiated. Nevertheless, this is an area with potential, where IDH may convince
governments to encourage sector organisations to adopt international standards, also for
the domestic market.
Thus, there is little evidence that IDH’s work on introducing higher voluntary standards and
supporting producers to become certified and meet these standards, has affected trade.
These programmes mainly worked on trade development, boosting production and trade by
improving production methods and the productivity of producers, introducing good

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Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

agricultural practices and increased productivity, while working towards certification. The
standard-setting part of these programmes was often not sustainable, suffered from a lack
of demand, and was too sector-specific to influence national trade policy and promote the
adoption of international standards on the domestic market. IDH’s newly adopted
landscape approach, which involves a variety of stakeholders, including local governments,
may have positive effects, such as knowledge sharing, and may spill over to other
‘landscapes’ and to official government policy and regulation on standards.

13. Solidaridad

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Background
Solidaridad was launched in 1969 to provide development funding for Latin America. In the
next 25 years, the organisation expanded when several programmes run by Christian
churches joined Solidaridad. The organisation broadened its scope with projects in Asia and
Africa. Important developments for Solidaridad include the establishment of Stichting Max
Havelaar (the first label to certify fair trade coffee) in 1998, the co-founding of Fairtrade
International (to streamline certificates) in 1991, the introduction of fair trade Oké tropical
fruits in 1996, and the co-founding of Stichting UTZ Certified in 2002. In 2010, Solidaridad
let go of its Christian identity and transformed itself into a network: the Solidaridad
Network. The new structure encompasses 5 continental organisations, 9 regional expertise
centres, and 20 country offices. During the period under examination, Dutch contributions
to Solidaridad, which fall under funding of TA for TP&R, amounted to approximately EUR
10.6 million. Between 2007 and 2016, approximately EUR 96,000 was provided under the
TMF programme, EUR 3.5 million was provided as part of the MFS programme, EUR 5.5
million was provided for a PPP programme, EUR 840,000 was provided as part of the
Schokland fund, and EUR 665,000 was provided as part of the strategic partnerships.
Besides the Netherlands, other key donors include the EU and Ireland.
Solidaridad’s objective is to create innovative methods of enhancing sector productivity
(lifting all producers in the sector), while guaranteeing that production does not harm
humans or the environment (Solidaridad.nl, 2017). Mainstreaming fair trade has played an
important role. Solidaridad works in 13 different value chains, including cotton, tea, coffee,
gold, soy, cocoa, and palm oil. Solidaridad spends the bulk of its budget on trade
development and stresses the need to increase productivity in the sector. Only an estimated
17.5% was spent on standards capacity.126 However, in this evaluation we focus on
institutional capacity building on standards, including activities on standard setting,
harmonisation and mutual recognition, implementation, certification, testing,
enforcement, and promotion. The intervention logic for Solidaridad’s work on TP&R is
presented in table A1.14.

126

The percentage is based on calculations generated from internal documentation, and confirmed by Solidaridad.

Appendices

Table A1.14

Solidaridad intervention logic

Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Research, sector
analyses, impact
assessments,
strategy
development,
and knowledge
sharing;
•	Facilitation of
strategic
partnerships;
•	Coordinating/
implementing
programmes
(incl. knowledge
building on
good practices
and certification
activities);
•	(Co-)founding
of fair trade
organisations
and labels that
promote
sustainability;
•	Awareness
raising and
promotion
activities;
•	Co-founding
and
participation in
conferences and
consultative
bodies (e.g.
Roundtables)
for policy
development;
•	Activities to get
CSOs and local
governments
involved;
•	Facilitating
contact of
sustainable
producers,
traders, and
companies.

•	Research and impact
assessments carried
out and sector
constraints identified;
•	Knowledge, lessons
learned, and
developed strategies
shared among
stakeholders;
•	Strategic partnerships
formed;
•	Programmes
coordinated/
implemented (incl.
certifications applied);
•	Sustainabilitypromoting initiatives/
labels co-founded and
supported (consumers
informed on
sustainability, and
stakeholder
commitment to
sustainability);
•	Dialogue between
different Roundtable
members (incl. PSOs,
CSOs, donors, and
regulatory authorities), knowledge
shared and sustainability targets set;
•	Standards set,
national implementation bodies in place,
and certification
process operational;
•	Civil society and local
governments included
in activities;
•	Links between
sustainable producers,
traders, and
companies formed.

•	Enhanced knowledge
and awareness of
sustainability among
all stakeholders in
value chain (incl. local
authorities);
•	Strategic partnerships
used to enhance
compliance and
adoption of
sustainability
standards;
•	More certified
smallholders;
•	More sustainable and
certified produce and
more harmonised
quality products/
production;
•	More conscious
purchasing;
•	Sustainability
standards embedded in
mainstream markets
and uptake in
standards policy;
•	Standards policy better
addresses needs of
multiple stakeholders;
•	Enhanced capacity of
CSOs and local
governments on
sustainability;
•	Enhanced influence of
CSOs in policymaking;
•	Innovative approaches
for sustainable
production developed
and shared;
•	Enhanced number of
(credible) compliance
mechanisms available;
•	Enhanced quality
management.

•	Enhanced market
share of certified
products;
•	Rejection rates
reduced;
•	Reduced
transaction costs
of certified
products;
•	Improved
services.

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Findings
Information on achieved direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, evaluations and literature, and interviews with policy officers,
representatives from Solidaridad, and other stakeholders.

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Solidaridad’s annual reports document a large variety of direct outputs. Outputs include
outreach and discussions, the organisation of and involvement in sector platforms,
involvement in the development and uptake of good agricultural practices and certification
systems, strategic partnerships, institutional capacity building, and awareness campaigns
(Solidaridad, 2010 and 2013). It proved very difficult to find specific reporting on the outputs
that may influence trade policy and regulations. General reviews and assessments of
Solidaridad and its programmes, however, concluded that outputs were in line with its
objectives and targets. For instance, the external evaluation by Aidenvironment (2016) of
the Farmer Support Programme (FSP)127 concluded that ‘FSP achieved almost all quantitative
targets’ (p. 4), and in some cases even led to additional outputs that were not included in
the original project design, such as the development of a national platform in Honduras .
However, delays, especially at the level of project implementation, were not uncommon
(Aidenvironment, 2016). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ internal documentation and
Solidaridad’s annual reports also document implementation delays in other programmes.
However, in most cases these were related to circumstances outside the control of
Solidaridad (e.g. delays in reimbursements and stakeholder consent).
The achievement of induced outputs has been less evident and harder to assess.
Nevertheless, there are evaluations that describe some induced outputs. Based on an
in-depth evaluation of case studies, the evaluation by Aidenvironment (2016) identified
Solidaridad’s involvement in setting up and supporting Roundtables and other sector
platforms as important output. The report then described several induced outputs that
resulted from these Roundtables and sector platforms. These included an increased
awareness of voluntary sustainability standards in target countries, knowledge sharing,
incentivising value chain actors to join projects, and increased trust (Aidenvironment,
2016). Also other outputs were documented to have resulted in induced outputs. For
example, in the soy and live-stock case study, as a result of the farm projects, spill-over
effects of good practices were found (both to other producers in the same sector and to the
production of other crops) (Aidenvironment, 2016). Furthermore, ‘in the producer support
project cases, the projects as well as Solidaridad’s own activities (e.g. participation in
conferences, market promotion and facilitating communication between project partners
and the Round Tables) contributed to an increasing awareness on the voluntary
sustainability standards in the target countries’ (Aidenvironment, 2016). However, neither
the persons IOB interviewed nor the external evaluations identified cases in which the
internationally set or accepted voluntary standards resulted in policy or actions that affected
127

The FSP exists of activities under ‘Producer Support’ (such as support for good social, environmental and
economic practices and/or certification), ‘Innovation’ (demonstrating innovations beyond certification and
supply chains), ‘Expertise Center Development’ (building capacity of the Solidaridad Network), and ‘Learning,
Governance and Outreach’ (such as support to and the development of platforms) (Aidenvironment, 2016).

Appendices

trade. The Aidenvironment evaluation described one situation in Honduras, in which the
adoption of the principles outlined in the guidelines for best environmental management
practices for palm oil became a condition for new plantations to obtain a legal permit. This
was described as a step by the government towards making the RPSO128 standard
compulsory. It provides an example of how the national adoption of international
standards may have had an effect on other regulations.
Several studies concluded that certification itself had limited induced outputs, owing to a
lack of market demand for certified goods and high certification costs. CIDIN (2014) found
that only a quarter to a half of certified coffee was absorbed by the market as fair trade
coffee, with the rest being sold as non-certified coffee (CIDIN, 2014). Similarly, the FSP
evaluation stated that ‘certification itself was considered to have limited added value due to
a lack of market demand and related certification costs’ (Aidenvironment, 2016: p. 5). The
IOB Review of IDH (2014b) concluded that the effects of certification on income were
marginal and eventually diminished (IOB, 2014b). When certification does have a limited
effect on income, the incentive to remain certified vanishes quickly. Both this lack of
incentive to be certified and the lack of demand caused the certified products to be sold as
non-certified goods, without a significant effect on trade value and diversification.
Conclusion
Based on the findings presented above, IOB concludes that Solidaridad has been quite
successful in its activities. Its support to sector platforms, such as Roundtables, helped to
increase collaboration among value chain actors, enhanced awareness and knowledge
sharing, increased trust, and improved the predictability of supply and demand. However,
incentives for farmers to remain certified were weak and the larger share of certified
produce was not sold as such. Therefore, there is no evidence that these interventions by
Solidaridad, focussed on facilitating the development and uptake of certified produce,
helped to increase or significantly diversify trade. There is no evidence that the standard
compliance needed for certification has had an effect on trade.
14. Fair Trade Original (FTO)
Background
Fair Trade Original (FTO) was established in 1959 as the Committee for Support to
Underdeveloped Regions (Komitee Steun voor Onderontwikkelde Streken (SOS)), and later renamed
Stichting Steun Ontwikkelings Streken (SOS). In its early years, Stichting SOS provided humanitarian
aid. By the late 1960s, the focus shifted to trade-related aid, contributing to sustainable
development through better trading conditions and a ‘fair price’. Important developments
for the foundation were the start of coffee imports from developing country smallholders129
from 1973 onwards, and the opening in 1974 of SOS shops (later organised in the Dutch
Association of World Shops (DAWS)) (fairforward.nl, 2013). In 1994, Stichting SOS was
128

129

The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil was established in 2004 to promote sustainable production and use
of palm oil.
Starting in 1973, with coffee imports from Guatemalan smallholder cooperatives.

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renamed Fair Trade Organisatie, and a separate organisation, Fair Trade Assistance, was set
up for technical assistance and capacity building (fairforward.nl, 2013). In 2006, Fair Trade
Original (FTO) was introduced as a new name for the organisation as well as a brand name.
Fair Trade Assistance then merged into the new FTO structure.

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FTO’s objective is to make trade fair and transparent (FTO, 2016). FTO has several specific goals:
more fair trade products in the shops, a stronger position for producers and employees in
developing countries, enhanced added value in the country of origin, more transparency in
value chains, promoting fair trade among other brands and consumers, and raising
awareness on sustainability issues (FTO, 2016). The FTO label is a brand, not a certification
scheme. However, FTO labelled products carry the Fairtrade certificate or, in a few cases, the
Fair for Life130 certificate.131 FTO’s non-foods are provided by Fairforward. The products are
supplied by Fairforward’s partners, which ‘underwrite the Fairtrade principles’ (fairforward.
nl, 2013). The Fairtrade label is internationally defined and represents sustainable
production and development, based on environmentally friendly cultivation, respect
for labour rights, and a transparent and democratic approach in farmer cooperations
(maxhavelaar.nl, 2015). Fairtrade offers a minimum price and an explicit ‘Fairtrade price
premium’ (the ‘social premium’) to cooperatives (maxhavelaar.nl, 2015). The Fairtrade
standard includes labour and environmental requirements. FTO uses its own value chains
to guarantee and maintain the standards it applies. The approach intends to translate
consumer preferences into a change in producers’ behaviour.
The Dutch contribution to FTO, during the period under examination and as part of TA
for TP&R, amounted to approximately EUR 3.3 million. Within the scope of TA for TP&R,
the greatest share of funding (EUR 1.9 million) was provided under the MFS programme,
for the Change the World Branding programme (2006-2011). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
provided approximately 80% of the funding for this programme. The remaining 20% was
provided by FTO (FTO, 2009). Besides the ministry, other FTO donors included the EU, Hivos,
and ICCO.
The Change the World Branding project was a trade development project that aimed to
improve access to the European market for trade partners in developing countries certified
by Fairtrade International. This was done by making them less dependent on FTO and by
reinforcing the marketing capacity of these trade partners and the production capacity of
the producers they purchased from. Also, the FTO label was marketed to increase demand
for fair trade products sold under the label. The interventions of FTO that can be classified
as TA for TP&R are presented in table A1.15. The outputs achieved as part of the GTJ
programme can be found in the intervention logic of the GTJ programme, described in
table A1.6. FTO’s activities in trade development are not included in the intervention logic.

130
131

See http://fairforlife.org for more information on the standard.
Sometimes farmers do not supply products under the conditions of the label yet, but are said to be in the
process of reaching the required standards of the label.

Appendices

Table A.1.15 FTO intervention logic
Intervention

Output

Induced output

Expected inter­
mediate outcome

•	Organisation of
promotional events,
publications, branding
strategies, and
instruments in Western
markets, to promote fair
trade (labels);
•	Storytelling to enhance
consumer awareness on
and promote fair trade
and the FTO brand (e.g.
design of online
promotion materials and
organisation of visits for
consumers and media);
•	Market intelligence
research to better target
promotion activities;
•	(As part of EFTA) Design
of Fairtrade criteria and
better monitoring of fair
trade (standard setting/
monitoring);
•	Opening of World Shops.

•	Promotional
events
organised;
•	Publications,
strategies and
instruments
developed and
disseminated;
•	Storytelling
events
organised;
•	Research
executed;
•	Fairtrade criteria
designed and
monitoring
enhanced;
•	World Shops
opened.

•	Better promotion of
fair trade (and fair
trade labels) in
Western markets;
•	Enhanced awareness
of FTO brand and
fair trade among
consumers in
Western markets;
•	Enhanced Fairtrade
criteria set and
better monitoring
applied;
•	More channels
through which fair
trade produce can
enter Western
markets (e.g. sales in
supermarket, online,
and in World Shops);
•	Higher quality goods
supplied.

•	Reduced
transaction costs
to enter
mainstream and
niche markets
(e.g. promotional
costs lower);
•	Increased market
access of FTO
branded (incl. fair
trade labelled)
produce in
mainstream and
niche markets.

Findings
Information on achieving direct and induced outputs was obtained from annual reports,
internal documentation, literature, and interviews with policy officers, representatives from
FTO, and other stakeholders. No external evaluations on FTO were found.
FTO’s annual reports describe establishment and maintenance of retail channels (such as
the World Shops and WAAR-shops), the development and maintenance of websites, and the
organisation of campaigns (FTO, 2009 and 2010). FTO has an M&E system in place that reports
on output in absolute terms as well relative to the targets that have been set. Based on the
information provided in FTO’s annual reports, FTO’s performance on output was satisfactory,
with direct outputs in line with targets, and in some cases even exceeding those targets.
The absence of an external evaluation report limited the ability to assess whether and to
what extent induced outputs were achieved. Fair Trade Assistance and DAWS, however,
contributed to the GTJ programme, which was evaluated as part of the larger Dutch TMF
programme, by MDF/IAC (as discussed earlier, under the trade policy and negotiating
capacity programmes). This evaluation was mainly based on a field study in Kenya. The
evaluation described Fair Trade Assistance/DAWS’s activities to support the creation of a
network of Southern partners and the promotion of an Internal Control System developed

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by FTO. The evaluation could not draw conclusions, however, on the effect of these activities,
because the GTJ project was still in its infancy in Kenya at the time of the evaluation, which
was three years after the project was launched. Nevertheless, the evaluators were positive
about the expected outcome. We now know that this was too optimistic.
Just as was done for the IDH and Solidaridad programmes, the assessment of FTO needs to
answer the question of whether FTO managed to affect trade. For FTO, the effects were
limited by the fact that demand did not keep up with the supply of fair trade products.
Fairtrade International, for instance, reported that a substantial part of production was not
sold as certified produce. The percentage of coffee sold as certified coffee was 67% in 2008,
42% in 2009-2010, and 28% in 2013-2014 (Fairtrade International, 2010, 2011, and 2015).

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Scientists have spent a great deal of time researching fair trade coffee. In a systematic
review, Oya et al. (2017) combined 43 studies on the effect of certification, more than half of
which examined fair trade schemes. Because Fairtrade controls the whole value chain, it is
able to pay an average higher farm gate price of around 10% (Riisgaard et al., 2009). This is
also enough to give an incentive to farmers to stay certified and comply with the standard.
Essentially this means that Fairtrade certification could increase the trade value if the higher
price does not affect demand too much. Unfortunately, there are other effects. The NGO
NUCAFE132 in Uganda reported, when interviewed, that household decision-making is
complex and that higher prices may lead to less production because women do not want
their husbands, who typically sell the produce, to spend too much money on beer. This
would partly explain the minute overall effects on household income found by Oya et al.
(2017) (less time for off-farm labour being the other explanation). But the most important
effect is that large parts of the certified production cannot be sold with a premium, which
leads to purchase rationing or a lower premium. This means that the increase in export
value is determined by demand for this higher priced product, which is very limited.
Conclusion
Although FTO received support for trade development, we assessed the part of the project
that dealt with certification. As was the case with IDH and Solidaridad, standards and
certification had hardly any effect on trade, although FTO managed to pay a price premium.
The price premium and the volumes, however, were too small to have a significant effect on
trade value.

132

National Union of Coffee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises.

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Vijil, M. and Wagner, L. (2012). ’Does Aid for Trade enhance export performance?
Investigating on the infrastructure channel’. The World Economy. Vol. 35(7), pp. 838-868.
WCO (2009). ‘Support to capacity building activities in the WCO West and Central African
region’. Annual narrative Report 2009 – Netherlands Government project to support capacity building in
West and Central Africa. Internal documentation.

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WCO (2010). ‘Support to capacity building activities in the WCO West and Central African
region’. Annual narrative Report 2010 – Netherlands Government project to support capacity building in
West and Central Africa. Internal documentation.
WCO (2011). ‘Support to capacity building activities in the WCO West and Central African
region’. Annual narrative Report 2011 – Netherlands Government project to support capacity building in
West and Central Africa. Internal documentation.
WCO (2012). ‘Support to capacity building activities in the WCO West and Central African
region’. Final Report 2009-2012 – Netherlands Government project to support capacity building in West
and Central Africa. Internal documentation.
WEF (2013), Enabling trade: Valuing growth opportunities’. In collaboration with Bain &
Company and the World Bank. WEF: Geneva. http://www.weforum.org/reports/
enabling-trade-valuing-growth-opportunities.
Wilson J.S. and Abiola V.O. (2003). ‘Introduction’. In: Wilson J.S. and Abiola V.O. (eds.) Standards
and Global Trade: A Voice for Africa. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Chapter 1, pp. 25-52.
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Winters, L. A. McCulloch, N. and McKay, A. (2004). ‘Trade liberalization and poverty:
the evidence so far.’ Journal of economic literature 42(1) (2004): 72-115.
Winters, L. A. and Martuscelli, A. (2014). ‘Trade liberalisation and poverty: What have we
learned in a decade?’ Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. Vol. 6(1), pp. 493-512.
Winters, L. A. and Masters, A. (2013). ‘Openness and growth: still an open question?’
J. Int. Dev. Vol. 25 pp. 1060-1070.
World Bank (2003). Donor Support for SPS Capacity Building: Taking Stock and Drawing Lessons.
Written by Sewadeh, M. and Ferrer, V.
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Developing Country Exports. World Bank Research Paper. No. 31207. Written by Jaffee et al.
World Bank (2016a). ‘Ranking of economies – doing business – World Bank Group’. Website:
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WTO (2001). ‘Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration’. Nov. 20, 2001. Accessed
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Appendices

WTO (2005). ‘Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration’. Sixth session, Hong Kong, Dec. 13-18, 2005.
Paragraph 57. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm.
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WTO (2015b). Fifth Global Review of Aid for Trade – Reducing Trade Costs for Inclusive,
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Wto.org (2016). ‘Aid for Trade Factsheet’. WTO | Development. [Online] Accessed Oct. 2, 2016.
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WTO Trade Facilitating Agreement Facility (2015). ‘The trade facilitation Agreement’. Website.
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ZNF (2002). ‘Globalising Trade Justice’. TMF project proposal ZNF. July, 2002.
| 185 |

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Appendix 3		

List of interviewees

Policy officers Ministry of Foreign Affairs

| 186 |

Name

Function

Location

Mr

Bert Vermaat

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Jaap Smit

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Ronald Goldberg

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Sjeng Smeets

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Olaf Terlouw

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Henk Eggink

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Maarten ten Wolde

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Henny Gerner

Former policy officer, EKN Kampala

The Hague

Mr

Paul Schoenmakers

Policy officer

The Hague

Ms

Nicole Doeswijk

Policy officer

The Hague

Ms

Monique Calon

Policy officer

The Hague

Mr

Paul Litjens

Former head of development cooperation,
EKN Cotonou

The Hague

Mr

Roderick van Schreven

Ambassador, permanent representation
Geneva

Geneva

Mr

Pieter Gooren

Policy officer, permanent representation
Geneva

Geneva

Ms

Caroline Ramaekers

Policy officer, permanent representation
Geneva

Geneva

Ms

Elsbeth Akkerman

Policy officer, permanent representation
Geneva

Geneva

Mr

Henk-Jan Bakker

Ambassador, EKN Kampala

Kampala

Mr

Hans Peter van der Woude

Head of development cooperation, EKN
Kampala

Kampala

Mr

Harry van Dijk

Ambassador, EKN Cotonou

Cotonou

Mr

Jaap Jan Speelman

Head of development cooperation, EKN
Cotonou

Cotonou

Mr

Ayindé Soulé

Policy officer, EKN Cotonou

Cotonou

Mr

David Quenum

Policy officer, EKN Cotonou

Cotonou

Appendices

Trade policy and negotiating capacity
Name

Function / Organisation

Interview
related to

Location

Mr

Nial Meagher

Executive director, ACWL

ACWL

Geneva

Mr

Stuart Robinson

Chair of management board,
ACWL

ACWL

Geneva

Ms

Karyn Sandra Aneno

ACWL Secondment Programme
alumni / Sr. legal officer,
Government of Uganda

ACWL

Kampala

Mr

Maarten Smeets

Head of Section Technical
Assistance Coordination,
Partnerships and Internship
Programmes ITTC, WTO

NTP

Geneva

Mr

Dick Nuwamanya
Kamuganga

NTP alumni / Academic teacher,
Makarere university

NTP

Kampala

Mr

Reuben Rwekuuta

NTP alumni / Principle officer
MSME – Marketing & Promotions,
MTIC, Government of Uganda

NTP

Kampala

Ms

Deborah Vorhies

Managing director, ICTSD

ICTSD

Geneva

Mr

Andrew Crosby

Managing director, ICTSD

ICTSD

Geneva

Mr

James Mathis

Guest Lecturer at Tralac’s
Postgraduate Diploma in Trade
Law & Policy Management /
Lecturer Amsterdam Law School,
University of Amsterdam

Tralac

The Hague

Mr

Aurélien Comlan
Atidegla

President, Plateforme des
Acteurs de la Société Civile au
Bénin (PASCIB)

GTJ

Cotonou

Mr

Taufiqur Rahman

Head of LDC Unit, WTO

TP&NC in general

Geneva

Mr

Michael Roberts

AfT division, WTO

TP&NC in general

Geneva

Mr

Mostafa Abid Khan

Minister, permanent
representation of Bangladesh

TP&NC in general

Geneva

Ms

Desiree van Gorp

Member advisory board Chairs
programme, WTO

Chairs programme
/ TP&NC in general

Geneva

| 187 |

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Trade facilitation

| 188 |

Name

Function / Organisation

Interview
related to

Location

Mr

Moses Sabiiti

Country director, TMEA

TMEA

Kampala

Mr

Dicksons C.
Kateshumbwa

Comissioner customs
department, Uganda Revenue
Authority

TMEA / Trade
facilitation in
general

Kampala

Mr

Franklin Mutahakana

Sr Operations Officer,
World Bank

World Bank
MDTF-TD2, TFF

Kampala

Mr

Louis Akakpo

Programme coordinator, IFC

World Bank
MDTF-TD2, TFF

Cotonou

Mr

Razack Yessoufou

Focal point, Borderless Alliance

Borderless
Alliance / Trade
facilitation in
general

Cotonou

Mr

Bienvenu Thierry
Mayaba

Coordonator and customs
inspector Guichet Unique
Commerce Exterieur,
Government of Benin

Trade facilitation
in general

Cotonou

Mr

Is-Dine Bouraima

Director general, APIEx

Trade facilitation
in general

Cotonou

Ms

Faith Lumonya

Programme officer, SEATINI

Trade facilitation
in general

Kampala

Mr

Africa Kiiza

Programme officer, SEATINI

Trade facilitation
in general

Kampala

Appendices

Standards
Name

Function / Organisation

Interview
related to

Location

Mr

Melvin Spreij

Head, STDF

STDF

Geneva

Ms

Esther Nekambi

Programme officer, Uganda
Flower Exporters Association

STDF / PG 335

Kampala

Mr

Hossou Epiphane

Secretary-general, ABSSA

STDF / PG 303

Cotonou

Ms

Joelle Goussanou

National Coordinator STDF
programme, Chambre of
Commerce (CCIB), Government
of Benin

STDF / PG 127

Cotonou

Mr

Joost Oorthuizen

Executive director, IDH

IDH

Utrecht

Mr

Lucian Peppelenbos

Sr. manager Learning and
Innovation, IDH

IDH

Utrecht

Mr

Steven Collet

Operational director, IDH

IDH

Utrecht

Mr

Nico Roozen

Director, Solidaridad

Solidaridad

Utrecht

Mr

Martin Boon

Development manager, FTO

FTO

Culemborg

Ms

Margreet Vrieling

Associate director, FWF

FWF

Amsterdam

Mr

Omwa Samuel
Samson

Business development and
innovation manager, UCDA

Standards in
general

Kampala

Mr

David Livingstone
Ebiru

Deputy executive director /
Head management & financial
services, UNBS

Standards in
general

Kampala

Mr

Kaleebi Mathias

Head central inspectorate
imports inspection, UNBS

Standards in
general

Kampala

Mr

Innocence

Manager Eastern region, UNBS

Standards in
general

Kampala

Mr

David Eboku

Manager standard department,
NUCAFE

Standards in
general

Kampala

Ms

Caroline Nabukonde

Manager gender equity,
NUCAFE

Standards in
general

Kampala

Mr

Deus Nuwagaba

Manager entrepreneurship
services, NUCAFE

Standards in
general

Kampala

Mr

Elohim Agbakou

Enhanced Integrated Framework

Trade capacity,
private sector
development,
standards

Cotonou

Mr

Euloge C.V. Houngbo

National Coordinator, EIF

Trade capacity,
private sector
development,
standards

Cotonou

Mr

Rémy Sohou

Project manager, EIF

Trade capacity,
private sector
development,
standards

Cotonou

| 189 |

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

Miscellaneous / General
Name

Function / Organisation

Interview
related to

Location

Mr

Stefano Inama

Chief Technical Cooperation and
Enhanced Integrated Framework, UNCTAD

ICTSD, STDF,
ACWL

Geneva

Mr

Massimo Diomedi
Camassei

Oprations Advisor Trade and
Private Sector, EU

AfT, trade capacity
Uganda, regional
integration

Kampala

Mr

Rafal Lapkowski

Team Leader Development
Cooperation, EU

AfT, trade capacity
Benin, regional
integration

Cotonou

Mr

Silver Ojakol

Commissioner external trade,
MITC, Government of Uganda /
Manager of NTP alumni

AfT, trade capacity
Uganda, regional
integration

Kampala

Ms

Maris Wanyera

Sr. economist and commissioner
for Development, Aid & Regional
Cooperation Department /
Commissioner Tax Body
Department, MoFPED,
Government of Uganda

AfT, trade position
Uganda, regional
integration, trade
facilitation

Kampala

Mr

Andrew Masaba

Sr economist, Development
Assistance and Regional
Cooperation Department

AfT, trade position
Uganda, regional
integration, trade
facilitation

Kampala

Ms

Claire Manuel

Commissioner Tax Body
Department, MoFPED,
Government of Uganda

AfT, trade position
Uganda, regional
integration, trade
facilitation

Kampala

Mr

Emmanuel Atwine

Sr commercial officer, MTIC,
Government of Uganda

AfT, trade position
Uganda, regional
integration, trade
facilitation

Kampala

Mr

Amzat Bissiriou
Salami

Secretary-general, Ministry of
Commerce, Industry and SME’s,
Government of Benin

AfT, trade capacity
Benin, regional
integration, trade
facilitation

Cotonou

Mr

Dieudonne Assouvi
Coffi

Deputy director regional
integration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Government of Benin

AfT, trade capacity
Benin, regional
integration, trade
facilitation

Cotonou

Mr

Jean-Claude B.
Mayaba

Deputy director regional
integration, Mininstry of
Finance, Government of Benin

AfT, trade capacity
Benin, regional
integration

Cotonou

Mr

Yaovi Kounhunde

Head, UEMOA Cotonou

Trade facilitation,
regional
integration

Cotonou

| 190 |

Appendices

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2012-2017
Evaluation reports published before 2012 can be found on the IOB website: www.iob-evaluatie.nl or
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations The reports below can also be downloaded there.
IOB no. Year Report

ISBN

419

2017 Food for thought: Review of Dutch food security policy 2012-2016 978-90-5328-495-7

418

2017 Policy review of Dutch development aid policy for improved water 978-90-5328-496-4
management, 2006-2016

417

2017 Policy review of Dutch cooperation with UN development agencies 978-90-5328-493-3

417

2017 Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse samenwerking met de
ontwikkelingsorganisaties van de Verenigde Naties

978-90-5328-492-6

416

2017 Shifting Interests, Changing Relations, Support Under Pressure:
Policy review of Dutch support to Southern civil society development

978-90-5328-489-6

415

2016 The gaps left behind: An evaluation of the impact of ending aid

978-90-5328-484-1

414

2016 Voorkomen is beter dan genezen. Nederland en de WHO
(2011-2015)

978-90-5328-482-7

413

2016 Policy Review Public Diplomacy 2010-2014

978-90-5328-491-9

413

2016 Beleidsdoorlichting publieksdiplomatie 2010-2014

978-90-5328-487-2

412

2016 How to break the vicious cycle: Evaluation of Dutch development
cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014

978-90-5328-483-4

411

2016 Cultuur als kans. Beleidsdoorlichting van het internationaal
cultuurbeleid 2009-2014

978-90-5328-480-3

410

2015 Vreedzame geschillenbeslechting en het tegengaan van straffeloosheid. Beleidsdoorlichting internationale rechtsorde

978-90-5328-478-0

409

2015 Evaluation of the Matra Programme in the Eastern Partnership
countries 2008-2014

978-90-5328-475-9

408

2015 Aided Trade: An evaluation of the Centre for the Promotion of
Imports from Developing Countries (2005-2012)

978-90-5328-477-3

407

2015 Opening doors and unlocking potential: Key lessons from an
evaluation of support for Policy Influencing, Lobbying and
Advocacy (PILA)

978-90-5328-474-2

406

2015 Policy Review of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance, 2009-2014

978-90-5328-481-0

406

2015 Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse humanitaire hulp
2009-2014

978-90-5328-473-5

405

2015 Gender sense & sensitivity: Policy evaluation on women’s rights
and gender equality (2007-2014)

978-90-5328-471-1

404

2015 Renewable energy: Policy review on the Dutch contribution to
renewable energy and development. Summary report

978-90-5328-476-6

| 191 |

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

| 192 |

IOB no. Year Report

ISBN

404

2015 Met hernieuwde energie. Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse
bijdrage aan hernieuwbare energie en ontwikkeling

978-90-5328-472-8

403

2015 Premises and promises: A study of the premises underlying the
Dutch policy for women’s rights and gender equality

978-90-5328-469-8

402

2015 Work in Progress: Evaluation of the ORET Programme: Investing in 978-90-5328-470-4
Public Infrastructure in Developing Countries

401

2015 Evaluation of the MDG3 Fund: ‘Investing in Equality’ (2008-2011)

400

2015 The Only Constant is Change: Evaluation of the Dutch contribution 978-90-5328-467-4
to transition in the Arab region (2009-2013)

399

2015 Gender, peace and security: Evaluation of the Netherlands and UN
Security Council resolution 1325

978-90-5328-465-0

398

2014 Navigating a sea of interests: Policy evaluation of Dutch foreign
human rights policy 2008-2013

978-90-5328-460-5

397

2014 Riding the wave of sustainable commodity sourcing: Review of the 978-90-5328-464-3
Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH 2008-2013

396

2014 Access to Energy in Rwanda. Impact evaluation of activities
978-90-5328-463-6
supported by the Dutch Promoting Renewable Energy Programme

395

2014 A strategic approach? Dutch coalition-building and the ‘multi-bi
approach’ in the context of EU decision-making (2008-2012).
Summary, main findings and issues for consideration

978-90-5328-462-9

395

2014 Strategie bij benadering. Nederlandse coalitievorming en de
multi-bi benadering in het kader van de EU-besluitvorming
(2008-2012)

978-90-5328-462-9

394

2014 Autonomy, partnership and beyond: A counterfactual analysis of
policy coherence for Ghana

978-90-5328-459-9

393

2014 Balanceren tussen koopmanschap en diplomatie. Evaluatie van de 978-90-5328-458-2
Netherlands Business Support Offices 2008-2013

392

2014 Good things come to those who make them happen: Return on
aid for Dutch exports

978-90-5328-456-8

391

2014 Useful patchwork: Direct Funding of Local NGOs by Netherlands
Embassies 2006-2012

978-90-5328-455-1

390

2014 Investeren in wereldburgerschap. Evaluatie van de Nationale
Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking en Duurzame
Ontwikkeling (NCDO)

978-90-5328-454-4

389

2014 In search of focus and effectiveness: Policy review of Dutch
support for private sector development 2005-2012 (extensive
summary)

978-90-5328-461-2

389

2014 Op zoek naar focus en effectiviteit. Beleidsdoorlichting van de
Nederlandse inzet voor Private Sector Ontwikkeling 2005-2012

978-90-5328-451-3

388

2013 Évaluation d’impact des foyers améliorés au Burkina Faso : Étude 978-90-5328-452-0
de l’impact de deux activités bénéficiant du soutien du Programme
de promotion des énergies renouvelables

978-90-5328-468-1

Appendices

IOB no. Year Report

ISBN

388

2013 Impact evaluation of improved cooking stoves in Burkina Faso:
The impact of two activities supported by the Promoting
Renewable Energy Programme

978-90-5328-449-0

387

2013 Between Ambitions and Ambivalence: Mid-term Evaluation SNV
Programme 2007-2015

978-90-5328-448-3

386

2013 Evaluation issues in financing for development: Analysing effects
of Dutch corporate tax policy on developing countries.

978-90-5328-447-6

385

2013 Economic diplomacy in practice: An evaluation of Dutch economic 978-90-5328-446-9
diplomacy in Latin America

384

2013 Achieving universal access to sexual and reproductive health and
rights: Synthesis of multilateral contribution to advancing sexual
and reproductive health and rights (2006-2012)

978-90-5328-445-2

383

2013 NGOs in action: A study of activities in sexual and reproductive
health and rights by Dutch NGOs

978-90-5328-444-5

382

2013 Buscando novas relações : Avaliação da política externa dos Países 978-90-5328-453-7
Baixos para a América Latina. Informe especial sobre o Brasil

382

2013 En busca de nuevas relaciones: Evaluatión de la politica exterior de 978-90-5328-450-6
los Paísos Bajos en América Latina. Resumen del informe principal

382

2013 Op zoek naar nieuwe verhoudingen. Evaluatie van het Nederlandse 978-90-5328-443-8
buitenlandbeleid in Latijns-Amerika

381

2013 Balancing Ideals with Practice: Policy evaluation of Dutch
involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights
2007-2012

978-90-5328-442-1

380

2013 Linking Relief and Development: More than old solutions for old
problems?

978-90-5328-441-4

379

2013 Investeren in stabiliteit. Het Nederlandse fragiele statenbeleid
doorgelicht

978-90-5328-440-7

378

2013 Public private partnerships in developing countries. A systematic
literature review

978-90-5328-439-1

377

2013 Corporate Social Responsibility: the role of public policy.
A systematic literature review of the effects of government
supported interventions on the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) behaviour of enterprises in developing countries

978-90-5328-438-4

376

2013 Renewable Energy: Access and Impact. A systematic literature
review of the impact on livelihoods of interventions providing
access to renewable energy in developing countries

978-90-5328-437-7

375

2013 The Netherlands and the European Development Fund – Principles 978-90-5328-436-0
and practices. Evaluation of Dutch involvement in EU development
cooperation (1998-2012)

374

2013 Working with the World Bank. Evaluation of Dutch World Bank
policies and funding 2000-2011

373

2012 Evaluation of Dutch support to human rights projects. (2008-2011) 978-90-5328-433-9

978-90-5328-435-3

| 193 |

Better Ways of Trading | Evaluation of Technical Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations

IOB no. Year Report

ISBN

372

2012 Beziehungen, Ergebnisse und Ertrag: Evaluierung der Zusammenarbeit in der Benelux-Union aus niederländischer Perspektive.
Haupterkentnisse und Anregungen

978-90-5328-431-5

372

2012 Relations, résultats et rendement. Évaluation de la coopération au 978-90-5328-434-6
sein de l’Union Benelux du point de vue des Pays-Bas

372

2012 Relaties, resultaten en rendement. Evaluatie van de Benelux
Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands perspectief

978-90-5328-431-5

371

2012 Convirtiendo un derecho en práctica. Evaluación de impacto del
programa del cáncer cérvico-uterino del Centro de Mujeres lxchen
en Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-432-2

371

2012 Turning a right into practice. Impact evaluation of the Ixchen
Centre for Women cervical cancer programme in Nicaragua
(2005-2009)

978-90-5328-429-2

370

2012 Equity, accountability and effectiveness in decentralisation policies 978-90-5328-428-5
in Bolivia

369

2012 Budget support: Conditional results – Review of an instrument
(2000-2011)

978-90-5328-427-8

369

2012 Begrotingssteun: Resultaten onder voorwaarden – Doorlichting
van een instrument (2000-2011)

978-90-5328-426-1

368

2012 Civil Society, Aid, and Development: A Cross-Country Analysis

979-90-5328-425-4

367

2012 Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid – Beleidsdoorlichting 2006-2010

979-90-5328-424-7

366

2012 Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the Dutch
Development Cooperation 1990-2011

978-90-5328-423-0

366

2012 Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen – Beleidsdoorlichting van
het OS-beleid 1990-2011

978-90-5328-422-3

365

2012 Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept – De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch Concept 2010

978-90-5328-421-6

364

2012 Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: Methoden en
Resultaten van onderzoek.

978-90-5328-420-9

| 194 |

| 195 |

Published by:

| 196 |

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
http://english.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
Photo cover: Many parked cargo trucks stand stranded at the border | Aftab Alam Siddiqui,
Hollandse Hoogte.
Photo Main findings and recommendations: Border between Rwanda and Congo | Jan Bade.
Photo chapter 1: African woman holding a globe and a mobile phone | Shutterstock.
Photo chapter 2: Trading chain wheel | Shutterstock.
Photo chapter 3: Meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee of the African
Union launching the African Continental Free Trade Area | Liu Tianran / Xinhua / Eyevine,
Hollandse Hoogte.
Photo chapter 4: Ghana border crossing sign with ‘Customs’ and ‘Check point’ | Roel
Burgler, Hollandse Hoogte.
Photo chapter 5: Carrots | Shutterstock.
Photo page 103: African man on a moped trading shoes | Martine de Groot.
Layout: Xerox/OBT | The Hague
Print: Xerox/OBT | The Hague
ISBN: 978-90-5328-494-0
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | December 2017

B Evaluation | no. 420 | Better Ways of Trading | IOB Evaluation | no. 420 | Better Ways of Trading | IOB Evaluation | no. 420 | Better Ways of Trading |

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
http://english.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | December 2017
18BUZ113112|E