Going for Green
Growth
The case for ambitious and immediate
EU low carbon action

The Green Growth Group

Going for Green
Growth
The case for ambitious and immediate
EU low carbon action

The Green Growth Group

Contents
Ministerial Foreword: A call for ambitious and immediate EU low carbon action

5

10 key policy statements

7

PART 1
The economic and wider costs of delayed or unambitious climate action
are substantial and rising

8

Climate change risks and costs are growing

9

Policy uncertainty is deterring urgently needed energy investments

12

Europe’s energy security is at risk and fossil fuel import bills are rising

13

Indecision today risks locking in higher costs tomorrow

14

PART 2

The economic opportunities and wider benefits of ambitious and immediate low
carbon action are substantial

15

Let’s unlock energy investments to build a modern, and competitive low carbon
energy infrastructure

16

Let’s win the global low carbon business race

18

Let’s strengthen Europe’s energy security and reduce our growing fossil fuel
import dependency

20

Let’s support millions of new low carbon sector jobs and develop a modern
and innovative industrial base

22

Let’s unlock the full range of co-benefits from low carbon ambition

26

Let's further lower decarbonisation costs by integrating energy markets and
promoting international carbon pricing

27

Let’s open up new low carbon markets through the single market
and EU free trade deals

29

Ambitious and immediate action is critical for delivering cost-effective decarbonisation
and the full range of low carbon benefits

30

ANNEXES

Snapshot of what the rest of the world is doing

31

References

34

Figures and sources

37

4

Ministerial Foreword

A call for ambitious and immediate
EU low carbon action
The European Union faces many challenges,
but the challenge of how to build a competitive
economy while tackling climate change is one of
the most pressing. Some would argue that you
can’t do both at the same time – that one must
take priority over the other. We firmly disagree.
Economic growth and sustainability are not
mutually exclusive. We believe that Europe must
see cutting harmful emissions and cost-efficiently
and cost-effectively decarbonising our economy
as part of the solution to our economic and wider
challenges, as well as a moral imperative.

the diversified deployment of renewables and
other safe and sustainable low carbon energy or
consuming energy much more efficiently. Unlocking
investment in a range of safe and sustainable low
carbon technologies and innovation will avoid the
burdens of late or inadequate action. Providing
clear and early investment signals beyond 2020
is essential and a reformed EU Emissions Trading
System must be a key driver to that end.
Moreover, taking ambitious EU action now is the
best way to ensure we unlock the full range of
immediate economic opportunities and longerterm benefits from decarbonisation: stimulating
the massive private sector investments to build
safe and sustainable lower carbon energy
infrastructure; supporting millions of low carbon
sector jobs in this and future decades; developing
a new high-tech industrial base and export
sector to supply the global low carbon business
boom; improving citizens’ health and productivity;
strengthening our resource efficiency; and
reducing our growing and increasingly costly
dependence on fossil fuel imports.

The scientific evidence is clear: climate change
is happening. The climate experts looking at this
for the UN are more certain than ever before that
mankind is the dominant cause. The impacts
are assessed as dangerous and costly, and will
only get worse without much more ambitious
action. An ambitious global climate agreement is
essential if we are to keep the 2°C climate goal
within reach. Clear EU leadership is needed.
Ambitious EU low carbon action now, at the EU
and Member State level, is the best way to avoid
the most extreme costs of both climate change
and decarbonisation. We fully recognise that
decarbonisation does not come without some
costs. There will be difficult decisions ahead and
we must be vigilant against any genuine risks of
carbon leakage and mindful of the needs of the
less well off in society.

This pamphlet makes the over-arching economic
and strategic case for early and ambitious EU
low carbon action to deliver a cost-efficient and
cost-effective EU decarbonisation that delivers
maximum economic and wider benefits for
Europe. It reviews the recent evidence from
respected international bodies, economists, think
tanks, business organisations and academics,
and makes a number of key policy statements to
inform the debate. While there will be many other
measures needed in due course, the immediate
priority EU actions are clear:

However, there are many tools at our disposal to
ensure our low carbon transition is manageable,
cost-efficient and cost-effective, whether through
integrating Europe’s energy markets, fostering

5

3 Ensure the EU uses the opportunity
offered by the Ban Ki-Moon Climate
Summit in autumn 2014, by being in a
position to put an ambitious EU emissions
reduction offer on the table, in order to
drive momentum and progress towards the
world’s first truly global climate deal in 2015.

1 Agree an ambitious target-based post-2020
policy framework in line with the EU Low
Carbon and Energy Roadmaps and our 2°C
climate goal. This will give the private sector
the certainty they to need to invest now;
2 Reform the structure of the EU Emissions
Trading System helping to cut emissions
cheaply and further incentivising low carbon
investments;

Edward Davey
Secretary of State for Energy
& Climate Change
United Kingdom

Melchior Wathelet
Secretary of State for
Environment, Energy & Mobility
Belgium

Peter Altmaier
Federal Minister for the
Environment, Nature Conservation
and Nuclear Safety
Germany

Jorge Moreira Da Silva
Minister of Environment,
Spatial Planning and Energy
Portugal
Lena Ek
Minister for the Environment
Sweden

Philippe Martin
Minister of Ecology, Sustainable
Development and Energy
France

Martin Lidegaard
Minister for Climate,
Energy and Building
Denmark

Andrea Orlando
Minister of the Environment
Italy

Ville Niinistö
Minister for the Environment
Finland

Miguel Arias Cañete
Minister of Agriculture,
Food and Environment
Spain

Dejan Židan
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Agriculture and the
Environment
Slovenia

Wilma Mansveld
Minister for the Environment
Netherlands

Keit Pentus-Rosimannus
Minister for the Environment
Estonia

6

10 key policy statements

1 The scientific evidence on man-made climate
change is stronger than ever. The world is on
course for dangerous increases in average
global temperatures that will incur substantial
and growing costs to Europe’s and the
world’s economies.

6 From well before the recession, EU GDP
has grown while emissions have fallen and
we are well placed to benefit from the global
low carbon business boom. But we must
re-energise our efforts to compete in an
increasingly competitive global low carbon
market.

2 Delaying ambitious efforts to cut emissions
now will only increase our carbon debt and
make it much more expensive to pay off in
the future.

7 Ambitious decarbonisation will support
millions of low carbon sector jobs and spur
industrial innovation. We must be vigilant
against any genuine risks of low carbon
leakage based on sound analysis.

3 Giving certainty over future EU policy and
clear price signals will help unlock the private
sector investment we urgently need to build
a more modern, safe and sustainable lower
carbon energy infrastructure.

8 Ambitious decarbonisation and fostering
technology innovation will unlock co-benefits
on many wider EU priorities, such as cutting
health and industry costs from air pollution,
boosting biodiversity and green business and
tackling fuel poverty through energy efficiency.

4 Decarbonisation can be compatible with public
deficit reduction, in particular, by leveraging
maximum investment from the private sector
and through raising public revenues, such as
through a reformed EU ETS.

9 Deeper integration of the internal energy
market will make our decarbonisation cheaper
by providing more efficient and effective
energy supplies, furthering the integration of
renewable and other safe and sustainable low
carbon energy and better use of production
capacity.

5 Risks to EU energy security will grow unless
we reverse our growing dependency on fossil
fuel imports. Using energy more efficiently and
increasing domestic, safe and sustainable lower
carbon energy are key.

10 Building and maintaining a leading position
in clean technology will help increase the
EU’s share of the low carbon market and
contribute to an increase in its exports.
International carbon trading can further lower
mitigation costs.

7

PART 1
The economic and wider costs of
delayed or unambitious climate action
are substantial and rising
1

8

Climate change risks and
costs are growing

“

The scientific evidence on climate change is
overwhelming. The scientific community is now
95% certain that the majority of the increase in
average global temperatures since 1951 is due
to rising levels of man-made greenhouse gas
concentrations2. The evidence of our changing
climate is increasingly evident3:

The question is not whether we need to
act… 97% of scientists, including some
who originally disputed the data, have
now put that to rest… the question now
is whether we will have the courage to act
before it’s too late. 8

”

US President Barack Obama, June 2013

• Each of the last three decades has been
successively warmer at the Earth’s surface
than any preceding decade since 18504.
• Arctic sea ice has shrunk to its smallest
summer extent since satellite records began5.
• After 2,000 years of little change, global
average sea levels have risen throughout the
twentieth century and at an accelerating rate
in recent years6.
• There is growing scientific evidence that
climate change is helping to drive more
frequent, intense and costly extreme weather
events7.

Figure 1
Decline in Arctic sea-ice summer minimum 1979-2013. Data
from NSIDC
Average monthly artic sea ice extent September 1979–2013
8.0
Extent (million square kilometers)

7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0

To avoid the most dangerous impacts of climate
change we need to limit global temperature rises
to no more than 2°C above 1850-1900 levels9.
However, it is increasingly clear that the world is
well off course to meeting this climate goal.

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

2013

Figure 2
Global Mean Sea Level Change (relative to 1900–1905 mean,
all datasets), IPCC11

Without substantial emissions reductions, the
world could see average temperature rises of
as much as 5°C above pre-industrial levels by
the end of this century10.

200
150

(mm)

100
50
0
-50

9

1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

Putting aside the projected damage to world
economic growth and stability, the European
Environment Agency (EEA) projects that the
direct costs of climate change to the EU are
substantial and will materialise in different ways
across the EU as shown in figure 318.

The costs of climate change are immense
and could be as high as 14% of average world
consumption per person12. The global insurance
industry estimates the annual insured world
economic losses attributable to climate-related
disasters has grown from $5bn in the 1970s
to $60bn today13. Climate change is now
considered a top threat by many security experts
and military chiefs14.

“

Europe must use the opportunity offered by the
Ban Ki-Moon Climate Summit in Autumn 2014
to generate further high-level momentum, and
help steer the world towards agreeing a global
climate deal at the UNFCCC meeting in 2015,
which should take place in Paris.

I got it wrong on climate change –
it’s far, far worse.
Nicholas Stern, 201315

”

“

Europe is already feeling the economic
impact of climate change, including:
• Falling average rainfall and more intense,
frequent and lengthy heat waves and
droughts across southern Europe.
• Rising rainfall levels, and greater river and
coastal flooding across central and northern
Europe.
• Extreme weather events increasingly linked to
climate change16.

“

“

The world needs an EU that keeps
its leadership… That leads the fight
against climate change.

”

Commission President Barroso, State of the Union
Speech 201219

I invite all of you to a Climate Summit
meeting one year from now... I
challenge you to bring to the Summit
bold pledges… that will close the
emissions gap and put us on track for
an ambitious legal agreement through
the UNFCCC process.

”

If we do nothing, the temperature of
our planet will have increased by 3 to 4
degrees by the end of the century. We
know the consequences: flooding in some
places, drought in others, direct threats to
peace around the world.

Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General, Address to the UN
General Assembly, September 201320

”

François Hollande, President of France, September 201217

10

Figure 3
Projections of Climate Change Impacts across Europe, EEA (2012)

ARCTIC
Temperature rise much larger than global average
Decrease in Arctic sea ice coverage
Decrease in Greenland ice sheet
Decrease in permafrost areas
Increasing risk of biodiversity loss
Intensified shipping and exploitation of oil and gas resources

NORTHERN EUROPE
Temperature rise much larger than global average
Decrease in snow, lake and river ice cover
Increase in river flows
Northward movement of species
Increase in crop yields
Decrease in energy demand for heating
Increase in hydropower potential
Increasing damage risk from winter storms
Increase in summer tourism

NORTH-WESTERN EUROPE
Increase in winter precipitation
Increase in river flow
Northward movement of species
Decrease in energy demand for heating
Increasing risk of river and coastal flooding

MOUNTAIN AREAS
Temperature rise larger than European average
Decrease in glacier extent and volume
Decrease in mountain permafrost areas
Upward shift of plant and animal species
High risk of species extinction in Alpine regions
Increasing risk of soil erosion
Decrease in ski tourism

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Increase in warm temperature extremes
Decrease in summer precipitation
Increase in water temperature
Increaseing risk of forest fire
Decrease in economic value of forests

MEDITERRANEAN REGION
Temperature rise larger than European average
Decrease in annual precipitation
Decrease in annual river flow
Increase risk of biodiversity loss
Increasing risk of desertification
Increasing water demand for agriculture
Decrease in crop yields
Increasing risk of forest fire
Increase in mortality from heat waves
Expansion of habitats for southern disease vectors
Decrease in hydropower potential
Decrease in summer tourism and potential increase in other seasons

COASTAL ZONES AND REGIONAL SEAS
Sea-level rise
Increase in sea surface temperatures
Increase in ocean acidity
Northward expansion of fish and plankton species
Changes in phytoplankton communities
Increasing risk for fish stocks
REGION BORDER
COUNTRY BORDER
11

Policy uncertainty is deterring
urgently needed energy investments
• Slump in the EU Carbon Price: Emissions
Trading allows the most cost effective emissions
reductions by allowing abatement to take place
where it is cheapest. However, driven in part by
the recession, a huge surplus of allowances has
built up in the EU Emissions Trading System
(ETS) leading to a dramatic slump in the EU
carbon price28. This is damaging investor
confidence. It also risks steering investments
towards high carbon technology and away from
low carbon solutions, risking locking Europe in
to a new generation of high emission energy
production for decades.

There is an urgent need to reverse the decline
in private sector investments in order to build a
modern, low carbon and competitive EU energy
infrastructure:
• To keep the lights on and stay on a cost-effective
decarbonisation path, Europe must replace a
fleet of old power stations with cleaner energy,
and substantially upgrade its infrastructure.
• It is estimated that this will require Europe-wide
investments of €1 trillion by 202021, €2.5 trillion by
202522 and up to €7 trillion by 205023. This means
energy investments must increase by 30% for
gas and 70% for electricity this decade24.
• With public budgets constrained, much of this
investment must come from the private sector
and long-term institutional investors25.

“

But post-2020 EU policy uncertainty and the
slump in the EU carbon price risk delaying
EU-wide lower carbon energy investments26.

”

World Bank, Mapping Carbon Price Initiatives, 201329

• Alternative Investment Drivers? Without clear
EU-level low carbon investment drivers, national
governments may choose to opt for fragmented
national approaches to promote lower carbon
energy investments. This could add costs to
industry and businesses, confuse the regulatory
landscape and undermine the EU’s internal
market in the process30.

• Future Policy Uncertainty: The EU’s low
carbon policy framework runs to 2020.
However, energy investments have a lifespan of
several decades. Businesses and Investors tell
us that this is creating an ‘EU 2020 policy cliffedge’ that is damaging the confidence required
to make billions in energy investment.

“

The uncertainty surrounding the future of
existing carbon markets in recent years has
prevented valuable resources from being
channelled to low-carbon investments,
particularly from the private sector.

“

We are concerned that we are unlikely
to have certainty about the post-2020
framework until 2015 or beyond. This is
‘yesterday’ from an infrastructure investment
perspective… if this uncertainty continues,
the cost of capital for Europe’s energy
sector will be higher and major investment
decisions will be deferred... if uncertainty is
too great, the sector may simply become
un-investable.

Until the current conflicting and
contradictory signals are resolved,
investors will avoid the European
electricity market… the delay while we
wait for a policy signal poses a serious
threat to security of supply and to the
feasibility of meeting climate targets.
Crucially it puts at risk the goal of
affordable energy. 31

”

”

Eurelectric, Power Choices Reloaded, 2013

Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, 2013,
who hold EU-wide assets of €7.5 trillion, over 50% of EU GDP27.
12

Europe’s energy security is at risk
and fossil fuel import bills are rising

• According to the IEA, the EU is on course
for its annual fossil fuel import bill to rise to
over $615 billion by 203537. By 2050, the
Commission estimates the EU’s oil and gas
import bill could double, costing an extra
€400 billion per year by 2050 or 3% of today’s
GDP38.

Real Crude Oil Prices per Barrel, US$ 2012, BP
Gas imports

• Since 1998, real crude oil and gas prices have
risen substantially34. Global primary energy
demand is expected to rise by 47% and
global electricity demand by 89% over the
next 25 years35. The IEA projects continued
rises in fossil fuel prices and price volatility36.

120
100
80
60
40
20
0

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

Figure 5
Current IEA Predictions of Oil and Gas import dependence40
Net oil and gas import dependence by region (%)
100

Japan

2010
2035

80

European Union

60
40
China

20

United States

0
Gas exports

• The EU already imports over 80% of its oil and
over 60% of its gas needs. The International
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that by 2035,
this will rise to over 90% for oil and over 80%
for gas32. Europe’s oil and gas supplies are
increasingly sourced from potentially risky or
unstable parts of the world33.

Figure 4
Real Crude Oil Prices per Barrel, US$ 2012, BP (2013)39

-20

20

40

60

India

80

100
Oil imports

Figure 6
Share of EU Oil imports from certain countries of origin,
2002 vs. 2010, Eurostat
35

2002
2010

30
25
(mm)

Europe’s energy security is increasingly at risk
and our fossil fuel import bill is rising.
IEA forecasts show that unless we change
course, the EU will become even more
dependent on fossil fuel imports over the next 25
years, further increasing our exposure to rising
and increasingly volatile fossil fuel prices, risking
price spikes and supply shocks.

20
15
10
5
0

13

Russia

Iran

Libya

Kazakh- Azerstan
baijan

Nigeria

Iraq

Norway

Indecision today risks locking in
higher costs tomorrow

“

Waiting is not an option… if we do nothing
at this stage, everything will simply
become much more expensive.

”

Chancellor Angela Merkel, Petersberg Climate Dialogue,
May 201341

• In Europe in the last twenty years economic
growth has been decoupled from increasing
carbon emissions42.
• However, without urgent action beyond 2020
to trigger lower carbon investments now, we
will have to cut emissions harder, faster later.
• Without decisive policy action to 2030, Europe
risks being locked into high carbon energy
sources. There are already 69 new high
carbon emitting coal plants being planned
across Europe with a capacity of over 65
gigawatts43, over 150% of the total capacity of
all new EU power installations in 201144.
The IEA’s recent World Energy Outlook
Reports45 highlight how economically counterproductive it is to avoid taking early and
ambitious low carbon action:

• Delaying further action until after 2020
could require an extra $5 trillion of global
investments between 2020-2035 in order to
meet the 2°C target.

“

Delaying action on climate change is a
false economy 46

”

International Energy Agency, 2013

In the power sector alone, decarbonisation could
lead to a dramatic dash to catch up later on,
causing bottlenecks in equipment supply, price
rises due to overheated demand and stranded
assets because of over-investment in redundant
capacity.

“

If there is a lack of confidence that
climate change policies will persist, then
businesses may not factor a carbon price
into their decision-making. The result
may be overinvestment in long-lived,
high-carbon infrastructure which will
make emissions cuts later on much more
expensive and difficult. 47
Nicholas Stern, 2006

”

Figure 7
EU GDP growth vs. GHG Emissions 1990–2010, EEA Eurostat
EU GDP and Emissions have decoupled

150
140
130
1990=100

One of the lessons from the economic crisis is
that building up evermore private and public debt
today only makes it that much more painful and
difficult to pay off later. The same is true of climate
change. Releasing greenhouse gas emissions
is like racking up a huge carbon credit card
bill: one day, we will have to pay for it, either
gradually starting today, or we allow it to grow
and have to face higher and more painful
costs tomorrow.

120
110
100
90

• Every year of delayed mitigation action adds
$500 billion to the global low carbon energy
investment bill between 2010 and 2030.
• Every $1 of low carbon investment avoided
today means $4.30 of low carbon investments
needed after 2020 to meet the 2°C goal.

80
70
60
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
EU 27 Emissions (-18% vs 1990)
EU 27 GDP (+48% vs 1990)

14

PART 2
The economic opportunities and wider
benefits of ambitious and immediate low
carbon action are substantial

15

Let’s unlock energy investments to
build a modern and competitive low
carbon energy infrastructure

“

Providing clear EU low carbon price signals
and post-2020 policy certainty will help
unlock the huge private sector investment in
lower carbon energy we urgently need. This
will lay the foundations of a more competitive
EU economy, and could help support
Europe’s economic recovery in the process:
• Modern energy assets and infrastructure built
today could provide decades of economic
benefits to the EU48. Energy investments
represent one of the most productive forms of
infrastructure investment available49.
• Unlocking the huge energy investments
needed in Europe may also help support
Europe’s economic recovery by generating
fiscal multipliers50. Many of Europe’s energy
projects needing investment are ready to be
built without undue delay, delivering potential
positive benefits quickly51.
• Energy investment can be compatible with
public deficit reduction: it is largely private
sector-led and long-term52, especially suited
to institutional investors who collectively hold
€13.8 trillion in assets, equivalent to 100% of
EU GDP53.
• With borrowing costs low and private capital
underemployed, now is an ideal time to trigger
investments54. European Investment Bank,
Connecting Europe Facility and EU Project
Bond financing can further help leverage
greater private sector investments55.
• Europe’s major competitors have invested
over 15% of their post-crisis stimulus
packages in low carbon energy projects,
totalling some $380bn56.

Energy infrastructure is essential for
economic growth. Since before the
industrial revolution transformations in
how energy is generated, transported
and consumed have underpinned
technological progress… Longer term
certainty for private investors drives down
costs for taxpayers and consumers,
releases efficiency savings from long-term
planning and consistency and gives the
supply chain greater clarity. 58

”

Her Majesty’s Treasury, UK Government, 2013

16

Figure 8
EU Energy, Transport and Broadband Investment Needs by 2020,
European Commission57

EU 2020 Investment Needs

1000
900
800

(€ billions)

700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Energy

Transport

17

Broadband

Let’s win the global
low carbon business race

“

As an existing low carbon market leader,
Europe is well-placed to build a major export
manufacturing and services industry to
supply the rapidly growing global demand for
low carbon goods and services.

”

US President Barack Obama, June 2013

Figure 9
Global Growth in the low carbon and environmental
business market, BIS LCEGS Data
Global Low Carbon & Environment Business Market Size
(€ trillions)
5

4.5
(trillions)

• The global low carbon and environmental
business market is worth around €4 trillion
a year and is expected to grow at over 4%
a year to nearly €5 trillion by 201659. Since
2004, global clean energy investments alone
have increased by 669% to $269bn a year60.
• The EU has carved out a 22% share of the
global low carbon and environmental business
market worth over €900 billion a year,
compared with a 19% share for the US, 13%
for China and 6% for both India and Japan61.
• Over the last four years Europe’s low carbon
market has grown by over 10%, over €85bn62.
It has been estimated that if the EU can
build and maintain a leading position in clean
technology, increased exports could contribute
€25 billion a year to GDP this decade63.
• Low carbon business is becoming increasingly
mainstreamed throughout the economy, along
the value chain and across the EU. Some of
the most dynamic low carbon markets are now
among Visegrad and South East Member States
with average market growth of over 6% a year64.
• Europe is a major hub for low carbon
innovation filing around 35% of all global low
carbon patents today65.
• According to the IEA, the role of renewable
sources in the global power mix continue to
increase. On a percentage basis, renewables
continue to be the fastest-growing global
power sources and are set to become the
world’s second most important electricity
source by 2016, after coal66.

Action on climate change is one of the
great economic opportunities of the 21st
century. 67

4

3.5

3

2008–09

2011–12

Projected
2016–17

Figure 10
Share of Global Sales (%) – Global Low Carbon and
Environmental Goods and Services Sector

Rest of the World

EU-28

20
Indonesia
Canada
South Korea
Mexico
Russian
Federation
Brazil

2
2
2
2
3

%

3
6
Japan

19
US

6
India

18

22

13
China

Global competition for low carbon business
is already fierce, and is only set to intensify.
China and the US are aggressively targeting
low carbon commerce, and new and ambitious
low carbon competitors are emerging. Europe
needs to re-energise its commitment to
decarbonisation to turn potential low carbon
business opportunities into a commercial reality,
and to compete in this marketplace.

Figure 11
Clean Energy Investments (US$ Billions) in 2009 and 2012,
Bloomberg New Energy Finance
70

(US$ Billions)

50
40
30
20

• While global clean energy investments have
grown sixfold since 2004 to nearly $270bn68,
the EU share is down from 40% in 2009 to
just 25% in 201269.
• Chinese clean energy investments are now on
a par with the EU at £65bn per year70 (24% of
the global total) and rising rapidly. China will
invest up to $1.28 trillion in its green economy
between 2011 and 201571.
• The US global low carbon business market
is almost on a par with the EU, worth over
$800bn72. The US is investing record sums in
clean energy73 and has recently become the
world’s largest investor in low carbon energy
RD&D74.
• Though still high, the EU’s share of global low
carbon patents filed is on the decline having
fallen to just around a third from almost a half
share in 199975.
• Ambitious low carbon competitors are rapidly
emerging, especially in Japan, South Korea
and India, while non-G-20 country clean
energy investments increased by over 50%
last year alone76.

“

2009
2012

60

10

S.Korea

Canada

Australia

S.Africa

India

Japan

Non-G20

USA

China

EU-27

0

See the Annex for an overview of Climate
Commitments, Actions and Low Carbon
Business activity across Eurpoe’s major global
low carbon competitors.

We are in a global race and the countries
that succeed in that race, the economies
in Europe which prosper, will be those
that are the greenest and most energy
efficient,

”

Rt Hon David Cameron MP, UK Prime Minister, Feb. 201377

19

Let’s strengthen Europe’s energy
security and reduce our growing fossil
fuel import dependency
Decarbonisation, especially through low
carbon energy and energy efficiency, has
helped enhance energy security.

KG Oil equivalent per €1,000 GDP

230
220
210
200
190
180
170
160
150
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Figure 13
International comparison of vehicle fuel economy standards
(miles per gallon), ICCT 201384
60

Japan
EU
China
California
US

55
50
(mm)

• Yearly average oil prices have risen by over
200% since 2003 alone78 while EU oil import
dependency has risen to 85%79. Without
major energy efficiency improvements
and growing domestic low carbon energy
capacity, the economic costs of recent fossil
fuel price rises would have been even higher.
• The EU’s energy intensity has fallen
consistently and substantially over the last
20 years: today, Europe uses one-third less
energy for every €1,000 of GDP added to the
EU economy. IEA statistics show the EU is
one of, if not the, most energy efficient major
economy in the world80.
• European-built cars are among the most fuel
efficient in the world and are set to outstrip
their competitors further81. For example, EU
energy efficiency labelling for tyres alone could
cumulatively deliver savings equivalent to 15m
tonnes of oil by 2020 (equal to Denmark’s
annual final energy consumption) and lower
emissions equivalent to removing 1.3m cars
from Europe’s roads every year82.
• The Commission estimates that the EU
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
could support 450,000 new jobs in the
construction sector, Energy End-Use rules
could save equivalent to 120m tonnes of
oil by 2016 alone (more than the annual EU
aviation industry’s energy consumption), and
Eco-design standards could save equivalent
to 70m tonnes of oil by 2020 (half UK annual
final energy consumption)83.

Figure 12
EU-27 Energy Intensity 1990–2010, Eurostat

40
35
30
25
2002

20

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

Looking ahead, renewed ambitious
decarbonisation can offer much greater and
wider welfare, competitiveness and energy
security benefits in the future.

650
600

(US$ billions)

550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200

2011

2035 Under current
policy trends

2035 Under 2°C
consistent policy
trends

Figure 15
Solar PV Price Drop, Bloomberg New Energy Finance &
CleanTech
Declining cost of solar PVs (Crystalline silicon module
prices in $/W) Bloomberg New Energy Finance and uarterly
filings of Chinese publicly quoted goods
4.5
4
3.5

(US$/W)

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Q2 2008

Nov. 2010

Oct. 2012

Figure 16
Wind Turbine Price Index by date of delivery, cost per MWh of
expected production (€MWh), Bloomberg New Energy Finance
30
28
26
24
(€MW/h))

• The Commission estimates that reaching our
20% energy saving target by 2020 could reduce
EU oil imports by the equivalent of 2.6bn barrels
a year and potentially saving up to €200bn a
year (the size of the Finnish economy85)86.
• Cost-effective energy efficiency measures can
pay back within 2 years, making much energy
efficiency investment a clear net positive even in
the short term and often the quickest and most
cost-effective way to decarbonise87.
• By 2035, the IEA estimates that 2°C
consistent policies could cut the EU’s annual
fossil fuel import bill by 46% or €275bn (1%
of EU GDP), lower oil imports by over 7.3bn
barrels a year and gas imports by 190bn cubic
metres a year88. The Commission estimates
that by 2050, a 2°C pathway could reduce EU
fuel costs by up to €320bn per year by 205089,
the savings equivalent of 2.5% of 2008 EU
GDP every year90.
• A recent Fraunhofer Institute study81 found that
maximising Europe’s energy efficiency potential
could cut EU energy demand in half by 2050
compared with projections, saving energy equal
to 11 times Poland’s 2008 final energy demand
and 118% of EU energy imports in 2008, deliver
financial savings of €500bn annually by 2050
and emission cuts of by 79% on 1990 levels.
• The costs of scaling up our domestic low
carbon energy are coming down all the time.
For example, wind turbine prices the world over
are down by 30% in the last 4 years92 and solar
PV installation costs are down 50% in the last 5
years alone93.
• The cumulative global installed solar PV capacity
grew by around 70% in 2011 resulting in
significant price declines in recent years. With
continuing cost degression, some renewable
technologies could soon reach grid parity with
some residential electricity tariffs and certain
conventional power generation. For certain
technologies, in certain locations, this is already
the case.

Figure 14
Projected EU Fossil Fuel Import Bill in 2035 under Current
Trends and 2°C Consistent Policies, IEA

22
20
18
16
14
12
10

21

H1 2009

H2 2011

H2 2013

Let’s support millions of new low
carbon sector jobs and develop a
modern and innovative industrial base
Ambitious decarbonisation will help
support millions of low carbon sector jobs
across Europe.

3

2.5

2

(millions)

• In 2011, an estimated 7.8 million Europeans
were employed in the EU’s low carbon and
environmental business sector94.
• The Commission estimates that up to 6.5
million jobs could be created or retained by
2020 in renewables, energy efficiency and
from reinvested ETS revenues alone95.
• Given the knock-on supply chain benefits, and
the much wider range of low carbon business
activities, the overall low carbon sector
employment potential is likely to be much
greater, even in the short term96.
• Across Europe, low carbon sector jobs have
grown significantly, even in those countries
experiencing severe recessions97.

Figure 17
EU low carbon sector job creation and retention in potential
in 3 low carbon sectors, European Commission98

1.5

1

0.5

We must support our industry to prosper in a
low carbon future. This means:

0

• Working with industry to build an innovative
and export-led low carbon industrial base,
building on our comparative advantages
and converting low carbon Research,
Development and Deployment (RD&D) into
commercial successes.
• Supporting the modernisation of Europe’s
industries to adopt cutting edge energy
efficient equipment.
• Where needed and justified, continuing to
provide targeted help to industries to transition
towards a modern low carbon future, and
ensure low carbon growth delivers maximum
benefits along the supply chain, especially for
Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs).

22

Reinvested
Renewables
ETS Revenues

Energy
Efficiency

Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) are crucial
for our low carbon economic future, for
example99:

Some industries will need focused support to
adapt to a decarbonising Europe:
• While there is growing evidence that only
a few sectors are likely to be at high risk of
carbon leakage105, some energy intensive
sectors will need help to transition to a low
carbon future. We should continue to provide
sufficient and targeted support to these
industries, based on sound analysis of carbon
leakage risks.
• Direct energy costs represent a small
fraction of most industries' overall costs. For
example, energy costs represent just 3% of
total production costs for German106 and UK
manufacturers on average107.
• There are great many factors that make up the
overall costs of energy bills of which climate
and energy policies are just one. Others
include wholesale energy costs, network and
operational costs and profit margins108.

• The IEA estimates that, compared to current
policy trends, many EIIs particularly benefit
from energy price falls under 2°C-consistent
policies, allowing spending to be redirected
towards capital and labour and leading to
increased activity through to 2020100.
• Chemicals: Essential to produce insulation,
double glazing, wind turbines, light weight
plane and vehicle materials and low
temperature detergents. The materials
save double the CO2 produced in their
manufacture101.
• Cement, Metals, Plastics: Up to 150t of
cement and steel are needed to build a
megawatt of low carbon energy102. Increasing
quantities of strong, lightweight steel,
aluminium and plastics are needed to increase
vehicle fuel efficiency.
• Ceramics: Ceramic refractory materials
are needed for efficient metal and glass
manufacturing. Energy efficient building
retrofits require up to 100kg of tiles and brick
for every square metre of retrofitted housing
space103.
• Glass: Energy efficient building retrofits
requires up to 3kg of glass for every square
metre of retrofitted housing space104.

23

The EU ETS is designed to help cut emissions
cheaply and further incentivise low carbon
investments. In the case of a reduction in the
volume of allowances auctioned, the reduction
could be more than offset by the increase in the
price of allowances generating significant extra
revenue for national treasuries. These direct
national revenues could be used by national
governments as they wished, such as helping
the decarbonisation process or supporting public
deficit reduction.

Figure 18
Energy share of production costs – German Industrial
Sectors in 2010, European Commission109
Share of Energy as % of production costs – Selected
German Industrial Sectors (2010)
18
16
14

(%)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Basic
Iron and
Steel

Glass

Basic
pharmaceuticals

Average

Furniture

Automotive Consumer
electronics

Figure 19
Drivers of UK Household Energy Bill Increases 2010–2012,
DECC110
Estimated breakdown of average UK dual fuel household
energy bill 2013, DECC
VAT
Energy and
Climate Policy Costs

5

9

Other Supplier
Costs and
Margins

%

19

20
Network Costs

24

47

Wholesale
Energy Costs

Figure 20
Estimated Change in Total National EU ETS Auction Revenues over 2013–2020
(in € per capita) from a Retirement of 900Mt and 1700 Mt of EUAs111

900

900Mt Retirement
1700 Mt retirement

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100

* The change in Estonian public revenues from permanently retiring
1700Mt of allowances equates to an estimated €1,299 per capita

25

France

Sweden

Latvia

Italy

Hungary

UK

Austria

Portugal

Lithuania

Spain

Netherlands

Ireland

Slovenia

Belgium

Denmark

Luxembourg

Romania

Germany

Malta

Slovakia

Cyprus

Greece

Poland

Finland

Bulgaria

Czech Rep.

Estonia*

0

Let’s unlock the full range of
co-benefits from low carbon ambition
The study of the wider co-benefits and policy
synergies from ambitious decarbonisation is at
an early stage. But it is already clear that the
potential benefits are substantial. For example:

• Nature Conservation & Biodiversity: Carbon
mitigation requires protecting and promoting
natural environments that absorb carbon
dioxide emissions. In the process, this can
help boost economically critical biodiversity
and reduce the need for mitigating emissions
through other more expensive means.
According to The Economics of Ecosystems
and Biodiversity (TEEB) global initiative, the
global business opportunities from investing
in biodiversity could be worth around US$
2-6 trillion by 2050119 and conserving global
forests will avoid greenhouse gas emissions
worth $3.7 trillion120.

• Health & Air Pollution: Some 500,000
premature deaths occur in Europe
each year due to the concentration of
air pollutants112 costing Europe around
€537bn every year113. Ambitious
decarbonisation can cut healthcare and
air pollution control costs substantially
by lowering air pollution from power and
transportation. The Commission estimates
that achieving a 30% emissions target
by 2020 could bring health benefits of €8
billion a year114, and 2°C consistent policies
will reduce mortality rates with benefits
of up €17 billion a year in 2030, and €38
billion a year in 2050. With 2°C consistent
policies, the EU could cut air pollution
control costs by $8 billion a year by 2020
and $30 billion a year by 2035 according
to the IEA115, and by €50bn a year by 2050
according to the Commission116.

Figure 21
Projected Annual Health Benefits & Air Pollution Control
Cost Savings with 2°C Consistent Low Carbon Policies
(€bn), European Commission & IEA
Estimated Annual EU Health Benefits & Air Pollution Control
Savings in selected years with 2°C Consistent Policies (€bn)
90
80
70
60
(€Billions)

• Fuel Poverty & Energy Efficiency: An
energy efficiency drive as part of our
decarbonisation can help lower fuel bills,
combatting fuel poverty among the poorest
in society while driving down energy costs
for European households and consumers
across the board. The European
Commission estimates, for instance, that
meeting our 20% energy saving target
could lower average household energy
bills by as much as €1,000 a year117. EU
fuel efficiency standards for vehicles are
substantially driving down fuel costs for
drivers and EU energy efficient tyre labelling
could cut drivers’ fuel bills by up to 10% by
2020118.

50
40
30
20
10
0

26

2020

2035

2050

Let’s further lower decarbonisation costs
by integrating energy markets and
promoting international carbon pricing
• Regional approaches could accelerate the
realisation of these benefits, enabling a diverse
regional portfolio of low carbon energy to
balance, trade and improve the security of
power supplies. For example, a Commons
Inquiry found that a North Sea supergrid could
cut renewable deployment costs by 25%,
while delivering more balanced and efficient
electricity126. Cost-effective regional energy
market integration opportunities exist right
across the EU.

Europe has other key tools at its disposal
to ensure we decarbonise in the most costeffective way. Most importantly, a modern,
deeply integrated and interconnected EU
internal energy market will be vital to securing
a least cost energy decarbonisation pathway.

“

A single energy market is Europe’s best
asset to promote the shift to low carbon,
resource efficient growth… and reap the
benefits of the expected growth in ecoindustries. 121

”

The recent difficulties with the EU ETS have
masked the accelerating growth in carbon
markets and emission trading schemes in
many other parts of the world. Moving to
greater international carbon pricing could
bring major efficiency gains that can further
cut decarbonisation costs:

Mario Monti, Former European Commissioner and
Italian PM, 2010

• An integrated, interconnected and competitive
electricity market could enable low carbon
energy to be built in the most cost-efficient
locations across Europe, with power traded
across the EU to where it is in high demand122.
• The total net gains from integrating Europe’s
electricity markets are estimated to be up to
€40bn a year by 2030, a net saving of €80 per
person per year123.
• Increased demand management through
smart grid technologies could help reduce
peak demand, potentially saving up to €5bn a
year by 2030124.
• This will help in balancing intermittent
renewable supplies which could, according to
some estimates, deliver operational savings
of up €3bn a year, while potentially reducing
back-up power needs significantly125.

• The World Bank credits the growth in carbon
markets in operation or under development
around the world to the demonstrative power
of the EU ETS127. Carbon trading has grown
to cover 10 billion tCO2e in transactions every
year worth over €130 billion annually128.

27

“

Today, countries with carbon pricing
mechanisms implemented and scheduled
emit equivalent to 21% of the 50 GtCO2e
emitted globally. If China, Brazil, Chile,
and the other emerging economies eyeing
these mechanisms are included, carbon
pricing mechanisms could reach countries
emitting almost half of the total global
emissions.

”

World Bank, 2013129

• The growth in carbon trading is extremely
promising. The EU can use its carbon market
leadership to further export carbon trading,
and pave the way for linking cap-and-trade
schemes towards a global carbon price. This
could deliver multiple economic and climate
benefits:

“

• Enable emission reductions to take place
wherever they are cheapest on a global
scale130, lowering the costs of mitigation at
home and abroad131.
• Increase carbon market liquidity and help
stabilise the price for investors132.
• Accelerate the expansion of global low
carbon business opportunities and drive
greater global climate cooperation in the
process133.

The next 10 to 20 years will be a period
of transition, from a world where carbonpricing schemes are in their infancy, to
one where carbon pricing is universal and
is automatically factored into decision
making. 134

”

Nicholas Stern, 2006

28

Let’s open up new low carbon
markets through the single market
and EU free trade deals
The single market and EU free trade policy
can help accelerate the uptake of new low
carbon technologies and services, lower
costs for consumers, open new trade
opportunities and create global low carbon
business champions135.
• The EU’s single market, worth over €12
trillion a year in economic activity, is the
largest in the world. If EU single market policy
can keep pace with low carbon economy
developments, businesses and innovators
can benefit from an EU-wide market of 500m
consumers from the outset, and offer low
carbon goods and services to citizens more
cheaply136.
• Europe can use its collective weight in free
trade negotiations to unlock new low carbon
trade access, set international low carbon
standards and ensure developing countries
can access the most cost-effective low
carbon technologies and providers137.
• The EU-South Korea FTA will remove almost
all tariffs for environmental technologies within
3 years, giving EU companies full access to
South Korea’s green market worth over €70bn
annually138.
• The EU-US trade deal (TTIP) could provide EU
businesses with full access to a low carbon
and environmental market139 worth nearly
€800bn a year140, while the EU-Japan FTA
could open up free trade with a Japanese
green business market141 worth nearly €250bn
annually142.
• The World Bank found that removing trade
barriers in 18 high-emitting developing
countries in efficient lighting, solar and wind
technology could increase trade volume gains
by over 60%143.

29

Ambitious and immediate action is critical
for delivering cost-effective decarbonisation
and the full range of low carbon benefits
This pamphlet has illustrated that Europe has
enormous potential to work together to ensure
that our decarbonisation is manageable,
cost-effective and unlocks the full range of
immediate low carbon economic opportunities
and longer-term benefits.
This will require sustained, comprehensive and
ambitious low carbon action over many decades,
at all levels of governance, and across all parts of
society, especially the private sector.
However, the decisions the EU makes
today will be critical to delivering costeffective decarbonisation and to maximise
the economic benefits. The EU’s urgent low
carbon priority actions are clear:
• Give investors and businesses ambitious
long-term policy certainty: We must
give post-2020 EU policy certainty that
investors and businesses need today. This
means agreeing an ambitious target-based
post-2020 EU Energy and Climate policy
framework soon.
• Repair the EU ETS: We must reform the EU
ETS so that it remains our central EU level
climate tool, providing a more stable carbon
price to drive cost-effective mitigation and low
carbon investment.
• Help drive ambition and progress at the
UN: We must help to secure a UN global
climate deal at the UNFCCC meeting in 2015,
that steers the world back towards our 2℃
goal. This requires the EU to be in a position
to put an ambitious EU emissions reduction
offer on the table at the Ban Ki-Moon Global
Climate Summit in autumn 2014, and to drive
high-level momentum towards a global climate
deal through to 2015.

30

Annex 1
Snapshot of what the rest of the
world is doing
Emissions
Commitment/Pledges

% of Global Examples of Recent Action
GHGs (2010)

Examples of
Low Carbon Economy Progress

CHINA
Cut carbon intensity by
40–45% on 2005 levels
by 2020.

22%

• Plan to increase low carbon
energy to 15% of primary energy
mix by 2020, and renewables
(excl. hydro) to 34% by 2050.
• Clean energy, energy efficiency
and clean vehicles are 3 of the
7 ‘magic growth sectors’ in the
latest Five Year Plan.
• Piloting 7 city/ regional Emissions
Trading Schemes.
• Forest coverage and stock
increase targets in place.
• Possible new Climate Law with a
‘peak emissions year’

• $1.28 trillion to the green economy from
2011 to 2015.
• In 2012, China had the second largest share
of the global low carbon and environmental
market by country at 13% worth over €500bn.
• In 2012, China was the biggest single
country investor in clean energy with
$65.1bn (a 20% increase on 2011), adding
16 GW of wind and 3.2 GW of solar
generating capacity that year.
• 152 GW of clean energy capacity overall,
23% of the world total.
• Reduced its energy intensity by 21.2% from
2001 to 2010.

13%

• EPA directed to bring forward first
Federal GHG emission standards
for new and existing power plants.
• Tightening fuel efficiency/
emissions standards for vehicles
and energy efficiency standards
for buildings.
• Aim to double the renewables
capacity from 2013 to 2020,
with renewable tax credits and a
biofuels target.
• Several states have emissions
trading schemes and GHG goals
– e.g. Californian ETS and goal to
reduce GHG levels to 1990 levels
by 2020, and by 80% below this
by 2050.

• In 2012, the US had the largest share of the
global low carbon and environmental market
by country at over 19% worth nearly €800bn.
• US stimulus plan allocated $94bn to green
technologies.
• Record US clean energy investments in
2011 of $45.5bn, largest of any single
country in the world (up 46% on previous
year).
• Largest emission cut of any country since
2006.
• 49% of all new energy capacity built in 2012
was renewable.
• Reduced its energy intensity by over 15%
between 2000 and 2010.

5.4%

• Renewables taxed at half the rate • 2nd fastest global clean energy investment
of conventional energy.
growth in 2011 to $10.2 billion, installing
• Set a goal of deploying 20GW of
2.8GW of extra wind capacity in one year.
solar energy by 2020.
• Reduced its energy intensity by over 26%
• Recent levy on coal power used
between 2000 and 2010, more than almost
to fund clean energy investments.
any other country.
• Variety of energy efficiency
• In 2012, India had the 4th largest share of
schemes and standards.
the global low carbon and environmental
• National Expert Group recently
market by country and worth over €250bn
established to set out pathway for
annually.
low carbon growth in India.

USA
Cut emissions by 17%
on 2005 levels by 2020
and by 80% by 2050.

INDIA
Pledged to cut carbon
intensity by 20–25% by
2020 on 2005 levels.

31

Emissions
Commitment/Pledges

RUSSIA

Pledge of 15–25%
emissions reduction by
2020 from 1990 levels.

% of Global Examples of Recent Action
GHGs (2010)

Examples of
Low Carbon Economy Progress

5%

• Increasingly extensive energy
• Though from a very high baseline, Russia
efficiency legislation in place.
reduced its energy intensity by over 25%
• Legislation with modest targets to
between 2000 and 2010.
increase renewables.
• In 2012, Russia’s low carbon and
• Recent legislation to restrict and
environmental goods and services market was
limit the use of flaring.
worth nearly €100bn annually.

3.9%

• Variety of on-going legislative and
financial initiatives to move to
more sustainable forestry.
• Regulatory and financial incentive
regime to drive increase in
geothermal and biofuels in place.

• Rapidly increasing geothermal generation
and biofuels. Indonesia has 40% of the
world’s estimated geothermal capacity.
• World’s fastest growth rate in installed clean
energy capacity in 2011 of 520% with over
$1 billion investments.
• In 2012, Indonesia’s low carbon and
environmental market was worth €63bn
annually and has grown by 17% in the last 4
years.
• Reduced its energy intensity by over 18%
between 2000 and 2010.

3.2%

• Developed a ‘National Climate
Plan’ aiming to reduce annual
deforestation by 80% by 2020,
boost energy efficiency and
renewable energy.
• Mainstreamed biofuels in the
transportation sector.
• Aim to source 80% of its energy
from renewables by 2030.
• New measures to boost energy
efficiency including a drive to
promote smart meters.

• Expect to overachieve on its 2020 emission
reductions target.
• Clean energy increased by 10% in 2011 to
$8bn (10th globally).
• 3rd fastest clean energy capacity growth in
the last five years.
• World leader in installed biomass capacity
and biodiesel output.
• In 2012, had the 7th largest share of the
global low carbon and environmental market
by country worth over €120bn, with growth
of nearly 24% over the last four years.

2.8%

• Introduced a carbon tax in 2012.
• 2012 Energy Strategy seeks to
maximise uptake of clean energy
to reduce import dependency and
cut emissions.
• New feed-in tariff system in place
for renewables.
• A leading energy efficient
economy already but variety of
measures in place to drive this
further.

• 2012 Clean energy investment was $16.3
billion, 5th highest globally.
• Over 2GW of distributed solar capacity
installed in 2012.
• Working to improve battery performance,
advance electric vehicles, and extend charging
infrastructure.
• Reduced its energy intensity by over 7%
between 2000 and 2010 and is one of the
most energy efficiency economies in the world.
• In 2012, Japan had the 3rd largest share of the
global low carbon and environmental market
by country worth €250bn annually.

INDONESIA
Committed to 26%
emission reduction
by 2020 against BAU
scenario.

BRAZIL
Legislated for
reductions of 36.1%
to 38.9% by 2020
compared to BAU.

JAPAN
Committed to 80%
reduction by 2050.

32

Emissions
Commitment/Pledges

% of Global Examples of Recent Action
GHGs (2010)

Examples of
Low Carbon Economy Progress

MEXICO
Emissions cut target of
30% by 2030, 50% by
2050 on 1990 levels.

1.3%

• Recent Climate Change Act
passed based on UK model.
• New forest protection legislation
in place.
• Legislation and funding
mechanisms in place to increase
renewable energy and energy
efficiency.

• In 2012, Mexico’s low carbon and
environmental market was worth over €80bn
annually and has grown by over 20% in the
last 4 years.
• 548% growth in clean energy investments in
2012 to over $2 billion with a 50% increase
in wind capacity to 700MW.

1.3%

• Plans to allocate 2% of GDP to
cut emissions, improve energy
security, and promote new low
carbon growth.
• Target to increase S. Korea’s
share of global clean technology
exports from 2% to 8% by 2012.
• Legislation in place to launch
an ETS in 2015 covering the
country’s 500 largest emitters.
• Promotes early climate action
benefits to the region.
• Aims to cut energy intensity by
46% from 2007 to 2030.

• In 2012, South Korea’s low carbon and
environmental market was worth over €70bn
annually, having grown by 17% in 4 years.
• 50% increase in clean energy investments in
2012 with significant increases in renewables
generation capacity.
• Reduced its energy intensity by nearly 10%
between 2000 and 2010.

0.84%

• Recent White Paper with a range
of mitigation options.
• Tax incentives for CDM projects,
energy efficiency measures and
carbon tax on flight passengers in
place.
• Will introduce a carbon tax
regime for all sectors and funding
mechanisms for energy efficiency
and renewables.
• 12% energy efficiency
improvement target by 2015,
including sub-targets for sectors.

• In 2012, South Africa’s low carbon and
environmental goods and services market
was worth nearly €35bn.
• Clean energy investment in South Africa
increased from $100m in 2011 to $5.5bn
in 2012, taking it 9th position in the global
rankings.
• Reduced its energy intensity by over 12%
between 2000 and 2010.

SOUTH KOREA
Pledge to cut
emissions by 30% on
BAU scenario by 2020.

SOUTH AFRICA
Pledge to meet 34%
emissions reduction
from BAU scenario
by 2020 and 42% by
2025.

Sources:
• UK Business, Innovation & Skills Department Reports: Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and Services Reports.
• Bloomberg New Energy Finance Reports: Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?
• Globe International Reports: Global Climate Legislation Studies.
• HSBC (2009): A Climate for Recovery: The colour of stimulus goes green.
• IEA Energy Intensity Data
• Emission data (including LULUCF) EC-JRC/PBL. EDGAR version 4.1. http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/, 2010
• http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/14/content_27105642.htm
• http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-08/13/content_16891946.htm
• President Obama’s Speech 25th June 2013, Georgetown University, announcing his new climate change policy.
33

Annex 2
References
1. The following information and references have been compiled by UK
DECC.
2. IPCC (2013) 5th Assessment Report, Summary for Policy Makers, see:
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. “State of the Climate in 2012”, Special Supplement to the Bulletin from the
American Meteorological Association, Vol. 94, No. 8, August 2013: http://
www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/state-climate-2012highlights; http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/
6. US Environmental Protection Agency Climate Change Indicators, Oceans
(2012): http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/CI-oceans-2012.pdf; http://
www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/
7. IPCC (2011) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to
advance climate change adaptation, see: http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/
SREX/images/uploads/SREX-SPMbrochure_FINAL.pdf, Peterson T.C. et
al (2013) Explaining Extreme Events of 2012 from a Climate Perspective,
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, see: http://www.ametsoc.
org/2012extremeeventsclimate.pdf, and Peterson T.C. et al (2012) Explaining
Extreme Events of 2011 from a Climate Perspective, Bulletin of the American
Meteorological Society, see: http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cmb/
bams-sotc/2011-peterson-et-al.pdf
8. President Obama’s Speech 25th June 2013, Georgetown University,
announcing his new climate change policy.
9. IPCC 4th Assessment Report; EU Climate Change Expert Group, 2008,
The 2C degree target, see: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/
negotiations/future/docs/brochure_2c_en.pdf
10. IPCC (2013) 5th Assessment Report, Summary for Policy Makers, see:
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf
11. Ibid
12. OECD (2012) Environmental Outlook to 2050: the consequences of
inaction: Key Facts and Figures, see: http://www.oecd.org/environment/indicators-modelling-outlooks/49910023.pdf
13. Climatewise (2012) Climate Principles: The Fifth Independent Review,
see: http://www.climatewise.org.uk/storage/_website-2012/fifth-anniversary-review-and-summit/ClimateWise%205th%20Year%20Review%20
2012%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf
14. UK Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti, UK Special Envoy on Climate Change,
June 2013, see: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/30/climate-change-security-threat-envoy US Navy Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III,
Commander of the US Pacific Command, Interview with the Boston Globe,
June 2013, see: http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/09/
admiral-samuel-locklear-commander-pacific-forces-warns-that-climate-change-top-threat/BHdPVCLrWEMxRe9IXJZcHL/story.html CAN
Corporation (2007) National Security and the Threat Climate Change, signed
by 11 former US Military Chiefs, see: http://www.cna.org/reports/climate
15. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/27/nicholas-sternclimate-change-davos
16. IPCC (2011) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to
advance climate change adaptation, see: http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/
images/uploads/SREX-SPMbrochure_FINAL.pdf; World Bank Report (2012)
Turn Down the Heat, Why a four degrees centigrade warmer world must be
avoided, see: http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_
Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_
avoided.pdf; Peterson T.C. et al (2013) Explaining Extreme Events of 2012
from a Climate Perspective, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society,
see: http://www.ametsoc.org/2012extremeeventsclimate.pdf; Peterson T.C.
et al (2012) Explaining Extreme Events of 2011 from a Climate Perspective,
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, see: http://www1.ncdc.
noaa.gov/pub/data/cmb/bams-sotc/2011-peterson-et-al.pdf
17. Francois Hollande, French President, Address to the UN General Assembly, September 24th 2013, see: http://www.ambafrance-in.org/Francois-Hollande-addresses-UN,11666

18. EEA Report (2012) Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe
2012, see: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-impacts-and-vulnerability-2012
19. Commission President Barroso (2012) State of the Union Speech, see:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm
20. http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.
asp?statID=1985
21. Presentation by Commission President Barroso, http://ec.europa.
eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
22. IEA (2012) World Energy Outlook 2012
23. Institutional Investors Group for Climate Change (2103) 2030 Energy &
Climate Change Green Paper Consultation Submission, see: http://www.
iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/15453/IIGCC-Investment-grade-climate-policy-the-next-phase-for-Europe.pdf
24. European Commission (2012) Investment Projects in Energy Infrastructure, see: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121115_iem_
swd_0367_en.pdf
25. House of Lords (2013) No country is an Energy Island, see: http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-d/energy/euenergypolicyfinalreport.pdf ; European Commission (2013) Long-term Financing
of the European Economy, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0150:FIN:EN:PDF
26. Ibid
27. Institutional Investors Group for Climate Change (2103) 2030 Energy &
Climate Change Green Paper Consultation Submission, see: http://www.
iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/15453/IIGCC-Investment-grade-climate-policy-the-next-phase-for-Europe.pdf
28. Connie Hedegaard: “Emissions trading data underline need for swift action on back-loading”, Online: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/
hedegaard/headlines/news/2013-05-16_01_en.htm
29. World Bank (2013) Mapping Carbon Price Initiatives, see: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05
/23/000350881_20130523172114/Rendered/PDF/779550WP0Mappi0til050290130morning0.pdf
30. Ministerial Joint Statement on the Emissions Trading System (2013), see:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/209860/Joint_Statement_on_the_EU_Emissions_Trading_System__2_.
pdf
31. Eurelectric (2013) Power Choices Reloaded, see: http://www.eurelectric.
org/media/79057/power_choices_2013_final-2013-030-0353-01-e.pdf
32. Commission President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013 European
Council, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/
archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
33. Eurostat
34. BP (2013) Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, see: http://www.
bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013.html
35. Institutional Investors Group for Climate Change (2103) 2030 Energy &
Climate Change Green Paper Consultation Submission, see: http://www.
iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/15453/IIGCC-Investment-grade-climate-policy-the-next-phase-for-Europe.pdf
36. IEA (2011) World Energy Outlook 2011.
37. IEA (2013) World Energy Outlook Special Report 2013: Redrawing the
Energy Climate Map, see: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/
publication/name,38764,en.html
38. European Commission (2011) A Roadmap for moving to a competitive
low carbon economy in 2050, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0112:FIN:EN:PDF
39. BP (2013) Statistical review of World Energy, see: http://www.bp.com/
en/global/corporate/about-bp/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013.
html?utm_source=Google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=bp+statistical+review&utm_campaign=BP+Statistical+Review+2013+-+Exact&gclid=CJ7pvJzG4bkCFbHKtAodeRsAYw
40. Commission President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013 European

Council, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/
archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
Angela Merkel Statement at the Petersberg Climate Dialogue,
May 2013, see: http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2013/05/2013-05-06-petersberger-klimadialog.html
41. EEA Data (2013) see: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/
data-viewers/greenhouse-gases-viewer
42. World Resources Institute (2012) Global Coal Risk Assessment, see:
http://pdf.wri.org/global_coal_risk_assessment.pdf
43. Eurostat, New Capacity Installed during the Year, see: http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:New_capacity_connected_during_the_year,_2011_(MW).png&filetimestamp=20130304150838
44. IEA (2009) World Energy Outlook 2009, see: http://www.iea.org/
weo/2009.asp IEA (2011) World Energy Outlook 2011, see: http://www.iea.
org/publications/worldenergyoutlook/publications/weo-2011/; IEA (2013)
World Energy Outlook Special Report 2013: Redrawing the Energy Climate
Map, see: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
name,38764,en.html
45. IEA (2013) World Energy Outlook Special Report 2013: Redrawing the
Energy Climate Map, see: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/
publication/name,38764,en.html
46. Lord Stern (2006) The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change:
Executive Summary: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/
Resources/226271-1170911056314/3428109-1174614780539/SternReviewEng.pdf
47. OECD (2009) Going for Growth, see: http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/
economicpolicyreformsgoingforgrowth2009.htm
48. Ernst & Young (2012) Powering the UK, see: http://www.energy-uk.org.
uk/publication/finish/5-research-and-reports/298-powering-the-uk-ernst-ayoung-report-on-the-role-of-the-power-and-gas-sector-in-the-wider-economy.html
49. Zenghelis, The Grantham Institute (2012) A strategy for restoring confidence and economic growth through green investment and innovation, see:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/Policy/docs/PB-Zenghelis-economic-growth-green-investment-innovation.pdf; IDDRI Sciences Po
(2012) Green Investments in a European Growth Package, see: http://www.
iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/WP1112_European%20growth%20package.pdf
50. IDDRI Sciences Po (2012) Green Investments in a European Growth
Package, see: http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-ledebat/WP1112_European%20growth%20package.pdf
51. IEA Business Energy Council (2013), see: http://www.iea.org/energybusinesscouncil/
52. HM Treasury (2013) Investing in Britain’s Future, see: https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209279/
PU1524_IUK_new_template.pdf
53. European Commission (2013) Long-term Financing of the European
Economy, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2013:0150:FIN:EN:PDF
54. Zenghelis, The Grantham Institute (2012) A strategy for restoring confidence and economic growth through green investment and innovation, see:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/Policy/docs/PB-Zenghelis-economic-growth-green-investment-innovation.pdf
55. House of Lords (2013) No country is an Energy Island, see: http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-d/energy/euenergypolicyfinalreport.pdf
56. HSBC (2009) A Climate for Recovery: The colour of stimulus goes
green, see: http://www.sbc.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/52619/HSBC-A-Climate-for-Recovery.pdf
57. European Commission (2013) Investment Needs Webpage, DG Economic & Financial Affairs, see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/investment_needs_en.htm
58. HM Treasury (2013) Investing in Britain’s Future, see: https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209279/
PU1524_IUK_new_template.pdf
59. Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and Services Report for the
UK’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, page 13, July 2013:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/224068/bis-13-p143-low-carbon-and-environmental-goods-and-services-report-2011-12.pdf
60. BNEF (2013) Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?
61. Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and Services Report for the
UK’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, page 15, July 2013:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/224068/bis-13-p143-low-carbon-and-environmental-goods-and-services-report-2011-12.pdf

62. BIS LCEGS Underlying Data
63. European Climate Foundation (2011) 2050 Roadmap, see: http://www.
roadmap2050.eu/attachments/files/Volume1_ExecutiveSummary.pdf
64. BIS LCEGS Underlying Data
65. OECD Statistics: Patents in Environmental Technologies. Note, ‘Low
Carbon Patents’ interpreted as those filed under (i) energy generation from
renewable and non-fossil fuel sources, (ii) combustion technologies with
mitigation potential, (iii) technologies specific to climate change mitigation, (iv)
technologies with potential or indirect contribution to emissions mitigation,
(v) emissions abatement and fuel efficiency in transportation and (vi) energy
efficiency in buildings and lighting.
66. International Energy Agency (2013) Medium-Term Market Report 2013,
see: http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTrenew2013SUM.pdf
67. President Obama’s Speech 25th June 2013, Georgetown University,
announcing his new climate change policy.
68. BNEF(2013) Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?
69. Ibid
70. Taken from the 2012, 2011 and 2010 Editions of the Bloomberg New
Energy Finance Reports Who is Winning the Global Clean Energy Race?
71. http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/14/content_27105642.htm
72. UK Business, Innovation & Skills Dept (2013) Low carbon & Environmental Goods & Services Report for 2011/12, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224068/bis-13-p143low-carbon-and-environmental-goods-and-services-report-2011-12.pdf
73. Data extracted from the IEA’s Data Service, Energy RD&D Data, see:
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/tableView.aspx
74. Low Carbon Energy RD&D taken to include IEA defined energy RD&D
investments in energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear, hydrogen and fuels
cells, and other power and storage.
75. Bloomberg New Energy Finance
76. BNEF (2013) Global Trends in Rewewable Energy Investment, see:
http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/attachments/gtr2013keyfindings.
pdf
77. Financial Times (Feb. 2013) Cameron Reasserts Green Policy Agenda,
see: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/95f1943e-6ef8-11e2-b6da-00144feab49a.
html
78. See reference 36.
79. Eurostat
80. IEA Data extracted from OECD Statistics, see: http://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/3012021ec042.pdf?expires=1376588342&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=8909648188967D34BE3DDD19C727FD1B
81. UN DESA( 2011) Global Overview on Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle
Emissions Standards, see: http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/
csd-19/Background-paper3-transport.pdf ; ICCT (2013) Global Passenger
Vehicle Standards, see: http://www.theicct.org/info-tools/global-passenger-vehicle-standards
82. European Commission(2011) Progress report of the Energy Efficiency
Action Plan 2006, see: http://www.inogate-ee.org/sites/default/files/document/SEC%20(2011)%20275-2%20Commission%20staff%20working%20
document%20on%20progress%20report%20of%20the%20Energy%20
Efficiency%20Action.pdf; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1820_
en.htm?locale=en
83. Ibid
84. ICCT (2013) Global Passenger Vehicle Standards, see: http://www.
theicct.org/info-tools/global-passenger-vehicle-standards
85. Commission President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013 European
Council, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/
archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
86. Ibid
87. IDDRI Sciences Po (2012) Green Investments in a European Growth
Package, see: http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-ledebat/WP1112_European%20growth%20package.pdf; IEA World Energy
Outlook 2012, see: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo2012/
88. IEA (2013) World Energy Outlook Special Report: Redrawing the
Energy Climate Map, see: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimatemap/#d.en.36900
89. Commission President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013 European
Council, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/
archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
90. IDDRI Sciences Po (2012) Green Investments in a European Growth
Package.
91. Fraunhofer Institute (2012) Contribution of Energy Efficiency Measures to
Climate Protection within the European Union until 2050, see:
92. Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Wind Turbine Price Index Feb 2013

93. Bloomberg, PV Market Outlook, Q1 2013
94. Underlying Data for the 2011 LCEGS Report for the UK’s Department for
Business, Innovation & Skills.
95. European Commission (2012) Exploiting the Employment Potential of
Green Growth, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/docs/swd_2012_04_18_en.pdf
96. European Commission (2012) Exploiting the Employment Potential of
Green Growth, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/docs/swd_2012_04_18_en.pdf
97. ILO (2012) Green Jobs for Sustainable Development: A Case Study of
Spain: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/
documents/publication/wcms_186715.pdf
98. European Commission (2012) Exploiting the Employment Potential of
Green Growth, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/docs/swd_2012_04_18_en.pdf
99. EEF (2013) Tech for Growth: Delivering green growth through technology,
see: http://www.eef.org.uk/publications/reports/Tech-for-Growth-Deliveringgreen-growth-through-technology.htm
100. IEA (2013) World Energy Outlook Special Report: Redrawing the
Energy Climate Map, see: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimatemap/#d.en.36900
101. CBI (2012) Colour of Growth: Maximising the potential of green
business, see: http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/1552876/energy_climatechangerpt_web.pdf
102. Ibid
103. Ibid
104. Ibid
105. De Bruyn, S., Markowska, A., & Nelissen, D. (2010). Will the energy-intensive industry profit from EU ETS under Phase 3? CE Delft Report.; Laing,
T., Sato, M., Grubb, M., & Comberti, C. (2013). Assessing the effectiveness
of the EU Emissions Trading System. Centre for Climate Change Economics
and Policy, Grantham Research Institute Report; Climate Strategies (UK) Reports (2007 – 2009) on: Tackling Leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices, see: http://climatestrategies.org/our-reports/category/32.html; Hourcade
et al (2007) Differentiation and Dynamics of EU ETS Industrial Competitiveness Impacts, Climate Strategies (http://www.climatestrategies.org/research/
our-reports/category/6/37.html); Öko-Institut (Germany), Fraunhofer ISI, DIW
(September 2008) Impacts of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on the
industrial competitiveness in Germany, see: http://www.umweltdaten.de/
publikationen/fpdf-l/3625.pdf; Carbon leakage and the future of the EU ETS
market - CE Delft, see: http://www.cedelft.eu/art/uploads/CE_Delft_7917_
Carbon_leakage_future_EU_ETS_market_Final.pdf
106. Commission President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013 European Council, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/
news/archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
107. HM Treasury, UK
108. DECC (2013) Estimated Impacts of Energy & Climate Policies on
Energy Prices & Bills, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
estimated-impacts-of-energy-and-climate-change-policies-on-energy-prices-and-bills
109. Commission President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013 European Council, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/
news/archives/2013/05/pdf/energy_en.pdf
110. DECC (2013) Estimated Impact of Energy & Climate Policies on Energy
Prices and Bills, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/172923/130326_-_Price_and_Bill_Impacts_Report_Final.pdf
111. DECC Analysis (2012) Impacts of back-loading or permanently
retiring EU ETS allowances, see: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20130103034550/http://decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/cutting-emissions/
eu-ets/6819-impacts-backloading-retiring-euets-allow.pdf
112. EEA (2011) Air Quality Report in Europe, see: http://www.eea.europa.
eu/publications/air-quality-in-europe-2011#tab-news-about-this-publication
113. Assessment of Health-Cost Externalities of Air Pollution at the National
Level using the EVA Model System, J. Brandt et al., CEEH 2011.
114. European Commission (2010) Analysis of options to move beyond
20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon
leakage, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=C
OM:2010:0265:FIN:EN:PDF; European Commission (2011) 2050 Low
Carbon Roadmap, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2011:0112:FIN:EN:PDF
115. IEA (2013) World Energy Outlook Special Report: Redrawing the
Energy Climate Map, see: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/
publication/WEO_RedrawingEnergyClimateMap.pdf
116. European Commission (2011) 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2011:0112:FIN:EN:PDF

117. Staff Working Paper (2011) Analysis associated with the Roadmap to a
Resource Efficient Europe, see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/resource_
efficiency/pdf/working_paper_part1.pdf
118. Sourced from SEC(2011) 275/2
119. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, see: http://www.
teebweb.org/
120. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (2010), ‘Mainstreaming
the economics of nature’
121. Mario Monti (2010) A New Strategy for the Single Market, see: http://
ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf
122. Agency for the Cooperation of Electricity Regulators (2012) Market
Monitoring Report 2011, see: http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Market%20Monitoring%20Report%202012.pdf
123. Booz & Co (2013) Benefits of an Integrated European Energy Market,
see: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/studies/doc/20130902_energy_integration_benefits.pdf
124. Ibid
125. Mott McDonald (2013) Impact Assessment on European Electricity
Balancing Market, see: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/studies/
doc/electricity/20130610_eu_balancing_master.pdf
126. House of Commons Energy & Climate Change Committee (2010)
A European Supergrid, see: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmenergy/1040/1040.pdf
127. World Bank (2013) Mapping Carbon Price Initiatives, see: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05
/23/000350881_20130523172114/Rendered/PDF/779550WP0Mappi0til050290130morning0.pdf
128. World Bank (2013) Mapping Carbon Price Initiatives, see: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05
/23/000350881_20130523172114/Rendered/PDF/779550WP0Mappi0til050290130morning0.pdf
129. World Bank (2013) Mapping Carbon Price Initiatives, see: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05
/23/000350881_20130523172114/Rendered/PDF/779550WP0Mappi0til050290130morning0.pdf
130. IISD (2009) http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/international_carbon_market_mechanisms.pdf
131. EEF (2013) Tech for Growth: Delivering green growth through technology, see:
132. European Commission International Carbon Trading website, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm
133. European Commission International Carbon Trading website, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm
134. Lord Stern (2006) The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate
Change: Executive Summary: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/3428109-1174614780539/
SternReviewEng.pdf
135. IDEA Consult (2010) Scoping Study on completing the European Single
Market for environmental goods and services, see: http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/enveco/economics_policy/pdf/sm_egs_july2010.pdf
136. Mario Monti (2010) A New Strategy for the Single Market, see: http://
ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf
137. WTO (2013) World Trade Report, see: http://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report13_e.pdf ; WTO & UNEP (2009) Trade &
Climate Change, see: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf
138. European Commission (2010) Memo on EU-South Korea FTA, see:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/october/tradoc_146695.pdf
139. European Commission (2013) Trade and Sustainable Development:
Initial EU Position Paper, see: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/
july/tradoc_151626.pdf
140. UK Business, Innovation & Skills Dept (2013) Low carbon & Environmental Goods & Services Report for 2011/12, see: https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224068/bis-13p143-low-carbon-and-environmental-goods-and-services-report-2011-12.
pdf
141. European Commission Impact Assessment for EU-Japan Free Trade
Agreement, see: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/july/tradoc_149809.pdf
142. Department of Business, Innovation & Skills (2013) Low Carbon and
Environmental Goods and Services Data for 2011-12.
143. World Bank (2007) International Trade and Climate Change, see: http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2
007/11/15/000310607_20071115153905/Rendered/PDF/41453optmzd0PA101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf

Annex 3
Figures and sources
Figure 1
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center
Figure 2
Source: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Figure SPM.3 (d)
Figure 3
Source: EEA Report (2012) Climate change, impacts
and vulnerability in Europe 2012
Figure 4
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
Figure 5
Source: World Energy Outlook 2012 © OECD/IEA,
2012
Figure 6
Source: Eurostat, © European Union , http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 1995-2013. Responsibility
for the adaptation lies entirely with UK Department
of Energy & Climate Change
Figure 7
Source: EEA; Eurostat, © European Union ,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 1995-2013.
Responsibility for the adaptation lies entirely with UK
Department of Energy & Climate Change
Figure 8
Source: European Commission
Figure 9
Source: Department of Business, Innovation & Skills
(2013) Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and
Services Report for 2011/12
Figure 10
Source: Department of Business, Innovation & Skills
(2013) Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and
Services Report for 2011/12.
Figure 11
Source: Clean Energy Investment Trends
©Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2012

Figure 12
Source: EEA; Eurostat, © European Union , http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 1995-2013. Responsibility
for the adaptation lies entirely with UK Department of
Energy & Climate Change
Figure 13
Source: ICCT Global Passenger Vehicle Standards
2013
Figure 14
Source: World Energy Outlook Special Report:
Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map © OECD/IEA,
2013
Figure 15
Source: Average factory-gate module price, 20002013 ($/W), Solar Insight Service © Bloomberg New
Energy Finance 2011
Figure 16
Source: Wind Research note © Bloomberg Finance
L.P. 2013
Figure 17
Source: European Commission (2012) Exploiting the
Employment Potential of Green Growth
Figure 18
Source: European Commission, Commission
President Barroso, Presentation to the June 2013
European Council
Figure 19
Source: Department of Energy and Climate Change
(2013) Estimated Impact of Energy & Climate
Policies on Energy Prices and Bills
Figure 20
Source: Department of Energy and Climate
Change Analysis (2012) Impacts of back-loading or
permanently retiring EU ETS allowances
Figure 21
Sources: European Commission (2010) Analysis
of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas
emission reductions and assessing the risk of
carbon leakage; European Commission (2011)
2050 Low Carbon Roadmap; World Energy Outlook
Special Report: Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map
© OECD/IEA, 2013
37