ENTSOG
YEARLY SUPPLY OUTLOOK
2022/2023

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 3
1.

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 5

2.

Assumptions ........................................................................................................................ 6
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 6
Demand .............................................................................................................................. 6
Supply ................................................................................................................................. 7
Cooperation ........................................................................................................................ 8
Underground Storage (UGS) inventory .............................................................................. 8

3.

Modelling results .............................................................................................................. 11
3.1

Baseline Scenario – disruption starting on 1st July 2022, firm technical capacities .............. 11

3.2

Sensitivity 1 – disruption starting on 1st July, enhanced capacities ...................................... 13

3.3

Sensitivity 2 – disruption starting on 1st July, enhanced capacities, additional LNG ........... 16

3.4

Sensitivity 3 – disruption starting on 1st July, enhanced capacities, demand reduction ..... 18

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 main findings ..................................................................... 20
Annex A – Underground storages assumptions ....................................................................... 22
Annex B – Supply assumptions................................................................................................. 22
Annex C – Summary of Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 assumptions ................................ 23
Annex D – Data for Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 ............................................................ 24
Annex E – Modelling approach ................................................................................................ 25
Annex F – RESULTS INTERPRETATION AND EXTRAPOLATION ................................................. 26
Annex G – List of Figures and Tables ........................................................................................ 27
Tables: ...................................................................................................................................... 27

Page 2 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Executive Summary
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has triggered severe energy security concerns in Europe.
Therefore, ENTSOG decided to publish an extraordinary report focused on the full gas year
disruption of the gas supply from Russia to Europe.
The analysis investigates the possible evolution of the gas supply as well as the ability of the
gas infrastructures to meet the demand, the exports and the storage injection needs during
the gas year 2022/2023 (from 1st of October 2022 to 30th of September 2023). ENTSOG has
run additional sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of a full Russian supply disruption
starting from 1st July 2022 and continuing for the entire 2022/2023 gas year and the possible
measures that could be envisaged in the EU to mitigate this.
Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 main findings
 Without immediate market/political reaction (with respect to the actions listed below),
most of the European gas storages would be depleted during the winter period and most
Central Eastern European (CEE), North-Western (NW) and South-Eastern Europe (SEE)
countries will not be able to fill storages during Summer 2023 to levels necessary to ensure
security of gas supply for Winter 2023/2024.
 The gas storages significantly contribute to security of gas supply. Therefore, it is
important that all European storages continue to inject gas as much as possible during
Summer 2022 (up to the maximum levels possible).
 In case of supply disruption from Russia, some efficient actions can improve the security
of the gas supply for the gas year 2022/2023:
1. Capacity enhancement in Europe can additionally improve the cooperation
possibilities between Member States and allow for more efficient storage utilization.
2. Additional LNG volumes available on the global market along with enhanced
transmission capacities and optimised LNG terminal capacity utilisation can allow for
an additional 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) (~130TWh) of imports in Winter 2022/2023,
therefore reducing demand curtailment (provided they are available on the global
market).
3. Storages play an essential role to ensure security of supply. However, without
preparedness for Winter 2023/2024, the situation could deteriorate over the next gas
year 2022/2023: storages would be depleted in April 2023 and sites located in Central
and South-Eastern Europe would be filled less than 15% on 1 October 2023, leaving
the EU more exposed to risks of SoS for the winter 2023/2024.
4. In the event of a mild winter, a demand reduction of ca. -15% (as a result of organic
reduction due to high prices or policy-based demand measures) and Member States
cooperation would be required to mitigate the risk demand curtailment in EU
Page 3 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

countries. Furthermore, additional measures would be required to ensure sufficient
storage inventory for Winter 2023/24.
 In case of a cold winter, EU demand curtailment would be higher than the results given in
this report.
 The assessment further identifies import capacity limitations in CEE as well as
infrastructure bottlenecks in the NW and SEE preventing additional gas to flow from West
– including France and Iberian Peninsula – and South to CEE, therefore limiting a possible
mitigation of the gas storage deficit for the next winter 2023/2024.
Important:
ENTSOG Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 is an assessment of the readiness of the gas
infrastructure to cope with the upcoming gas year under different scenarios, but this
assessment is not a forecast of the expected gas supply situation. The model assumes
cooperative behaviour among Member States as well as LNG distribution to terminals and
storage utilisation according to security of supply needs. The actual utilisation of the gas
infrastructure, including the development of the gas storage levels, will be determined by
availability of supply sources, the decisions of the market participants (e.g. price driven instead
of security of supply) and influenced by external factors such as policy decisions.
When interpreting the results, it should be considered that in case of a supply disruption
happening during the gas year 2022/2023, the storage levels at the end of the period are
dependent on the storage levels at the date of the disruption. Hence, a disruption starting
later than on 1 July 2022 would allow to fill the gas storages up by an additional volume
compared to what is presented in this report.

Page 4 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

1. Introduction
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has triggered severe energy security concerns in Europe.
Therefore, ENTSOG decided to publish an extraordinary report focused on the full gas year
disruption (from October 2022 to the end of September 2023) of the gas supply from Russia
to Europe.
This edition builds on previous Summer and Winter Supply Outlooks. It aims at assessing the
ability of the European gas infrastructure to provide sufficient flexibility to shippers during the
coming gas year and assesses the ability of the European gas network to use storages in case
of Russian supply disruption.
The summer months (from April to September) provide shippers the opportunity to refill
storages in anticipation of the next winter months (from October to March). The level of
injection targeted by shippers varies from one country to the other and from one season to
the other due to climatic, price and legal parameters.
The modelling considers as a starting point the actual storage levels as of 1 st July 2022 with
the assumption that gas stops flowing from Russia on that day and will not resume for the
entire observed period of the yearly outlook 2022/2023.
Additionally, to the baseline scenario without Russian gas supplies for the whole year and firm
capacities, ENTSOG also undertook 3 additional sensitivity assessments of possible mitigation
actions as set out below:
1. Impact of the enhanced capacities (additional capacity enhancement that could be
introduced in case of crisis to the benefit of European cooperation)
2. Impact of the additional LNG imports and enhanced capacities (exceeding historically
observed LNG flow to EU) provided they are available on the global market
3. Impact of the demand reduction (ca. -15% demand reduction subtracted on a country
level)
For an accurate modelling of the storage injection capacities – which vary with the storage
levels – ENTSOG applies injection capacity curves provided by Gas Storage Europe (GSE)
members.
The topology of the network model has been upgraded in order to reflect the firm technical
capacities that are offered for the upcoming year and variety of the additional coordinated
preparedness actions (see sensitivities assessed in the report). However, in the supply
disruption scenario, those capacities may not reflect perfectly the situation, as gas flows and
pressure may vary significantly from the usual operational conditions. Mechanism of this
improvement is described in the annex F to this report.
Page 5 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

2. Assumptions
The Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 is developed based on assumptions specific to the
upcoming gas year (12 months between October 2022 and September 2023). In any case
actual usage of storages and supply mix (including LNG distribution to European terminals)
will result from the decisions of market participants which may e.g. be price-driven instead of
being optimised for security of demand. The demand data has been provided by TSOs on a
monthly granularity level. An average daily demand has been considered within each month.
The modelling tool used for the Yearly Supply Outlook 2022 is PLEXOS.
Infrastructure
The simulations consider the existing European gas infrastructure including the projects (gas
pipelines and LNG terminals/FSRUs) to be commissioned during the investigated period1
based on the information available as of July 1st 2022.

GWh

Demand
This Yearly Outlook assessment considers a standard (not cold) winter. Figure 1 shows the
European demand for the gas year 2022/2023. Figure 2 presents geographical distribution of
the European demand.

Figure 1. - European yearly demand [GWh] (forecast for gas year 2022/2023) (H and L gas).

1 Technical (and enhanced) capacities are provided by TSOs.

Page 6 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Figure 2. - Geographical distribution of the European gas demand

Supply
The maximum daily supply potentials of the different sources providing gas to EU are based
on a ten-year history (historical availability) and presented in the Figure 3. The detailed data
is provided in the annexes.

Page 7 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

No supplies from Russia in Yearly supply Outlook

Figure 3. – Maximum supply potential

Regarding European (EU27+UK) domestic production, it is estimated to be 778 TWh during
the gas year 2022/2023 which on average corresponds to ca. 2,150 GWh/d.
Cooperation
All countries cooperate to avoid demand curtailment or to share it when it is impossible to
avoid it, and to inject to storages (and withdraw) in cooperative mode.
Underground Storage (UGS) inventory
Historical usage of the underground storage during injection and withdraw seasons can be
found in Summer and Winter Supply Outlooks published by ENTSOG2 as well as evolution of
working gas volume. In this Yearly Outlook simulation, the actual storage levels were taken
from AGSI+3, the gas storage platform operated by GIE4. On 1st of July 2022, the average
storage level over Europe reached 59% on average. In the simulations ENTSOG assumes that
countries, following a cooperative behaviour, would help themselves even by fully sharing gas
in the storages, not considering constraints in the utilisation of the strategic reserves. In fact,
some countries could be reserving part of their own gas stock constituted as strategic reserves

2

https://entsog.eu/outlooks-reviews
https://agsi.gie.eu
4
The allocation of the storages in countries corresponds to the allocation on AGSI+.
3

Page 8 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

for the country to be used only for the purpose of satisfying their own demand. However, it is
not reflected in this analysis.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the storage injection-withdraw curve in 2022 compared to the
storage evolution 2015-2020. In the comparison 2021 data was not included as injection to
the storages was historically slow. 75% storage level on the 1st of October 2021 was historically
the lowest level recorded at the start of the Winter Season.

Storage evolution 2022 vs. 2015-2020

% of total EU WGV

-

Figure 4. – Gas storage evolution 2022 compared to the storage evolution 2015-2020

For the modelling of the different scenarios, Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 considers the
storage inventory level per country on 1st of July 2022 as the initial storage level. These storage
levels were used as an input to the summer supply outlook simulation for this report to
estimate storage levels on 1st of October 2022 (the starting date for the Yearly Outlook
simulation). The summer assumptions considered for this simulation are based on the
Summer Supply Outlook 20225 considering no gas supply from Russia. The estimated 1st of
October 2022 storage levels per country6 used for the Yearly Outlook and provided by this
simulation are shown in Figure 5. These values give an average EU storage filling level of 71%.

5

https://entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2022-04/SO003522_Summer_Supply_Outlook_2022_BOA_Rev8.1_220427%20for%20publication.pdf
6
For H and L gas
Page 9 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Figure 5. - Estimated H and L-gas storage inventory levels on 1st October 2022 for Yearly Supply Outlook simulations
(result of the updated summer supply outlook simulation without Russian supply starting from 1st July and initial storage
levels at 1st July). 7

The aggregated European storage level on 1st October is the average of the country level
values. However, there are substantial differences from one country to the other. Storages in
NW Europe could reach higher levels whereas countries located in SEE are in the lower range.
These storage levels per country have been used as a starting point for the Yearly Supply
Outlook 2022/2023.

7 The %Full has been calculated using the gas in the storage from AGSI+ platform and the Working Gas Volume from GSE

Storage MAP database; since the last update was January 2018, updated AGSI values for WGV have been taken into account
for those storages with remarkable difference.
Page 10 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

3. Modelling results
3.1
Baseline Scenario – Russian gas supply disruption starting on 1st of July 2022, firm
technical capacities
Based on these assumptions, the modelling has been used to check how, during the entire
year, the gas demand can be satisfied.
The simulations show that in the case of full Russian supply disruption (starting 1st of July
2022), demand cannot be satisfied during the winter season 2022/2023, with levels of demand
curtailment that differs among EU countries and this divergence further increase if additional
winter 2023/2024 preparedness (i.e. reaching 90% of the gas storages on 1st of October 2023
for all European gas storages) is taken into consideration.

Figure 6. – Demand curtailment levels considering firm capacities and no winter 2023/2024 preparedness (target gas
storages level at 90 % on 1st October 2023 is not considered) in situation without Russian gas supply entire year8.
Maximum monthly Winter curtailment; average winter curtailment; Summer maximum

Figure 7. – Demand curtailment levels considering firm capacities and winter 2023/2024 preparedness (target gas
storages level 90 % on 1st October 2023 is considered) in situation without Russian gas supply entire gas year 2022/2023.
Maximum monthly Winter curtailment; average winter curtailment; Summer average

8 Demand curtailment in Finland is presented excluding the country-specific possibility to use other back-up fuels for gas.

Page 11 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Figure 8. – gas storage utilisation – scenario with and without 90% storage target at the end of the investigated gas year
2022/2023

The simulations show that in case of full Russian supply disruption, demand in Europe cannot
be satisfied fully during winter 2022/2023 without any further actions. Internal EU bottlenecks
on infrastructure prevent sufficient transportation of gas from west to the east of Europe and
from south to north, so disruption can only be evenly shared on a limited basis. CEE, SEE, the
Baltic States and Finland could be curtailed at levels of 20% (on average) of their demand every
day of winter season (including April). Curtailment in that scenario would correspond to a
shortage of approx. 18 bcm (~198 TWh) of gas being supplied over the year, mainly in winter.
During the rest of the year, it is not possible to both satisfy demand for gas and store sufficient
volumes in the gas storages. On average, Europe would be able to store about 45% of their
total working gas volumes (which is a deterioration compared to the initial value on the 1st of
October 2022) but it differs at country level (approximately 90% in NW Europe, and around
15% in CEE, SEE, the Baltic States and Finland) presented in Figure 9. Some storages could be
fully depleted at the end of winter period 2022/2023 and this situation would continue for the
first months after winter.

Page 12 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Considering the storage target of 90% on 1st of October 2023, curtailment over Europe during
gas year 2022/2023 would be higher. To achieve the target the filling of storages has priority
over satisfying customer demand. It corresponds to additional 50 bcm (~ 550 TWh) of gas to
be stored in the gas storages which corresponds to ~10 % of the yearly European demand.

Figure 9. – Estimated gas storage levels at the beginning of 1st October 2023 considering only firm capacities and no
specific measures

3.2

Sensitivity-analysis 1 – disruption starting on 1st of July 2022, enhanced capacities

Given the uncertainty of the situation, TSOs identified and estimated possible enhancements
of capacity that could further improve internal bottlenecks and maximise gas flow from west
to east.
Figure 10 provides the curtailment allocation results after capacity enhancements, taking into
account an initial EU storage level of 71%. These further changes could improve the possibility
to share curtailment through cooperation (South-Western Europe shares a bigger part of the
curtailment to support rest of Europe). The total curtailment in this situation is not changing
in comparison to the situation with only firm capacities and it corresponds to a level around
18 bcm (~190 TWh), but it is distributed more equally over Europe.

Page 13 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Figure 10. - Demand curtailment levels considering enhanced capacities and no winter preparedness in situation without
Russian gas supply entire year.

Even if capacity enhancement allows for more cooperation, it cannot improve the overall gas
storage situation at the end of the investigated period. Gas stock is slightly better distributed
across Europe but on average European countries would be able to store about only 45% of
their total working gas volumes (deterioration compared to 1st of October 2022 for all
countries). Figure 11 shows the possible gas stock level country by country considering
enhanced capacity during the whole 2022/2023 gas year.

Figure 11. - Estimated gas storage levels at the beginning of 1st October 2023 considering only enhanced capacities no
winter preparedness and with full Russian disruption starting already on 1th July 2022

Initial storage level
It is important to underline that a better storage situation on October 1st 2022 (80% or 90%
for all storages) would directly improve the entire year situation in terms of reducing demand
curtailment (especially in the CEE and SEE countries), providing additional volumes of gas to
be used during the winter season 2022/2023. Every 10% additional storage level at EU level
corresponds to an additional 10 bcm (~ 110 TWh) available for the market in winter. However,
Page 14 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

without a preparedness action (according to sensitivities assessed in the report) and storage
target for 1st October 2023, even with higher initial storage levels on 1st of October 2022, the
European storages would end at similar fill levels, around 45% on 1st of October 2023 as the
extra volumes will be used to mitigate disruption.

Figure 12 – Demand curtailment in winter depending on the initial storage level considered on 1 October 2022 with the
winter 2023 preparedness (enhanced capacities)

Page 15 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

firm capacity

enhanced capacity

Figure 13 – Gas storage inventory with firm (left) and enhanced (right) capacities and no specific measures with an initial
level of 71% (updated SSO 2022 simulation + full RU disruption from 1st of July 2022), 80% and 90%

3.3
Sensitivity-analysis 2 – Russian gas supply disruption starting on 1st July 2022,
enhanced capacities, additional LNG
This sensitivity evaluates the ability of the European gas system to import additional LNG
supplies (assuming the availability on the global market) after capacity enhancements are
introduced. In this simulation, the global LNG supply potential is assumed unlimited – this way
the European gas infrastructure system sets the import limitation due to infrastructure
bottlenecks. This sensitivity assumes also enhanced capacities, since they are necessary for
LNG import potential to be maximised. EU average initial storage levels are again at 71%.
Figure 14 provides the curtailment allocation results after capacity enhancement and
additional LNG supplies. This enhanced capacity together with additional LNG could further
improve the possibility to share curtailment through cooperation. Western Europe mitigates
its demand curtailment and sends significant volumes in the Eastern direction. The total
curtailment in this situation is estimated at the level around 6 bcm (~65 TWh), meaning 12
bcm (~130 TWh) of demand curtailment could be reduced compared to the baseline scenario
thanks to additional LNG supplies (out of which 3 bcm (~30 TWh) could be possible with firm
capacities alone and additional 9 bcm (~100 TWh) with optimised capacity). This reduction is
mainly only possible over the winter period.

Page 16 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Figure 14. – Demand curtailment levels considering enhanced capacities, additional LNG supplies and no winter
2023/2024 preparedness (target gas storages level at 90 % on 1st of October 2023 is not considered) in situation without
Russian gas supply entire year.

Figure 15 shows additional LNG vs. historical LNG max supply to EU over the entire simulated
period and provides information on which months additional LNG could be imported to EU.
Additional LNG imports could be possible during certain winter months, however during the
summer demand can be satisfied without additional LNG. However, regarding global LNG
export capacity and demand outside the EU, there is clearly significant uncertainty
surrounding this additional availability of LNG.

Figure 15. – additional LNG vs historical LNG max supply to EU.

A higher LNG supply (in combination with capacity enhancement allows for more cooperation
and higher reduction of demand curtailment over Europe, but it cannot improve the overall
gas storage situation at the end of the investigated period. Gas stocks are slightly better
Page 17 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

distributed across Europe but on average Europe would still only be able to store about 45%
of their total working gas volumes (deterioration compared to 1st of October 2022 for all
countries). Figure 16 shows the possible gas stock level country by country considering
enhanced capacity (and additional LNG) during the whole 2022/2023 gas year.

Figure 16. – Estimated gas storage levels at the beginning of 1st October 2023 considering enhanced capacities and
additional LNG.

3.4
Sensitivity-analysis 3 – Russian gas supply disruption starting on 1st of July 2022,
enhanced capacities, demand reduction
Coordinated long term demand reduction could be one of the possible actions that may
improve the situation on the gas market during long term disruption. In comparison to the
previous years, Europe has recently been experiencing some demand reduction, likely in
response to high gas prices or other measures disrupting normal functioning of the market
(e.g. COVID measures). Coordinated actions initiated by policy makers leading to an equal
demand response over Europe cannot be omitted as a mitigating measure but at the same
time it would be a major challenge.
Demand response at the level of 15% all over Europe together with enhanced capacities fully
mitigates demand curtailment when no longer-term preparedness is considered (no storage
target for 1st October 2023).
If a demand response to the extent of -15% would be evenly introduced all over Europe
together with enhanced capacities, it would not fully ensure a better preparedness for the
next winter in SEE (in the sense of allowing a uniform storage level of 90 % on 1st October
2023). Storage levels on the 1st of October 2023 are presented in Figure 17. Even if the gas
stock situation improves, it still does not give a comfortable 90% fill level at the beginning of
Page 18 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

October 2023 everywhere. On average, Europe could be able to store 70% with firm capacity
(with a challenge to reach levels higher than 40% in CEE and SEE), or 85% with enhanced
capacities (but still SEE would struggle to store more than 40%).

Figure 17. Estimated gas capacities and minus 15% demand response country by country.

85%

85%

Page 19 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 main findings
 Without immediate market/political reaction (with respect to the actions listed below),
most of the European gas storages would be depleted during the winter period and most
Central Eastern European (CEE), North-Western (NW) and South-Eastern Europe (SEE)
countries will not be able to fill storages during Summer 2023 to levels necessary to ensure
security of gas supply for Winter 2023/2024.
 The gas storages significantly contribute to security of gas supply. Therefore, it is
important that all European storages continue to inject gas as much as possible during
Summer 2022 (up to the maximum levels possible).
 In case of supply disruption from Russia, some efficient actions can improve the security
of the gas supply for the gas year 2022/2023:
1. Capacity enhancement in Europe can additionally improve the cooperation
possibilities between Member States and allow for more efficient storage utilisation.
2. Additional LNG volumes available on the global market along with enhanced
transmission capacities and optimised LNG terminal capacity utilisation can allow for
an additional 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) (~130TWh) of imports in Winter 2022/2023,
therefore reducing demand curtailment (provided they are available on the global
market).
3. Storages play an essential role to ensure security of supply. However, without
preparedness for Winter 2023/2024, the situation could deteriorate over the next gas
year 2022/2023: storages would be depleted in April 2023 and sites located in Central
and Southern Eastern Europe would be filled less than 15% on 1 st of October 2023,
leaving the EU more exposed to risks of SoS for the winter 2023/2024.
4. In the event of a mild winter, a demand reduction of ca. -15% (as a result of organic
reduction due to high prices or policy-based demand measures) and Member State
cooperation would be required to mitigate the risk demand curtailment in EU
countries. Furthermore, additional measures would be required to ensure sufficient
storage inventory for Winter 2023/24.
 In case of a cold winter, EU demand curtailment would be higher than the results given in
this report.
 The assessment further identifies import capacity limitations in CEE as well as
infrastructure bottlenecks in the NW and SEE preventing additional gas to flow from West
– including France and Iberian Peninsula – and South to CEE, therefore limiting a possible
mitigation of the gas storage deficit for the next winter 2023/2024.

Page 20 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Legal Notice
The current analysis is developed specifically for this Yearly Supply Outlook. It results from
TSOs experience, ENTSOG modelling and supply assumptions and should not be considered as
a forecast. The actual supply mix and storage level on 30th of September 2023 will depend on
market behaviour and global factors.
ENTSOG has prepared this Yearly Supply Outlook in good faith and has endeavoured to
prepare this document in a manner which is, as far as reasonably possible, objective, using
information collected and compiled by ENTSOG from its members and from stakeholders
together with its own assumptions on the usage of the gas transmission system. While
ENTSOG has not sought to mislead any person as to the contents of this document, readers
should rely on their own information (and not on the information contained in this document)
when determining their respective commercial positions. ENTSOG accepts no liability for any
loss or damage incurred as a result of relying upon or using the information contained in this
document.

Page 21 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Annex A – Underground storages assumptions
Underground storage assumptions used in the Yearly Outlook are based on the Summer
Supply Outlook 2022 assumptions and Winter Supply Outlook 2021/2022 assumptions9.
Exceptions are the initial gas storage levels and full Russian gas supply disruption starting by
1st of July 2022.

Annex B – Supply assumptions
Minimum supply per source: The minimum supply per source, on daily average, is set 0 for all
supply sources.
Maximum supply per source: The maximum supply per source, on daily average, is set as the
average of maximum monthly supply of the last years for each supply source.
Use of Supplies: Modelling is handled as to ensure use of the different supply sources prorata of their maximum.
Sources
Caspian
Libya
Algeria
LNG
Norway
Russia

Minimum
0
0
0
0
0
0

Maximum [GWh/d]
375
247
1,389
4,745
4,153
0

Table 1. – Minimum and maximum supply source.

Note: The gas supplies are a modelling result that depends on the supply assumptions.

9

https://entsog.eu/outlooks-reviews
Page 22 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Annex C – Summary of Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 assumptions
Assumptions

Reference case

Demand and National
Production

Average monthly demand and production anticipated by
TSOs.

Monthly injection

Monthly injection (aggregated and per Zone) is a result of
the modelling.

Overall supply

Sum of demand (satisfied, i.e. without curtailment) and
injection for the gas year 2022/2023.

Supply shares

Supply shares is a result of the modelling.

Import routes

Split between import routes is a result of the modelling.

Cross-border capacity

Firm technical capacity as provided by TSOs considering
reductions due to maintenance.

Cross-border enhanced
capacity

Conditional firm technical capacity as provided by TSOs to
allow for more gas to be transported from Western to
Eastern Europe.

Exports towards Ukraine

344.9 GWh/d each month

Page 23 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Annex D – Data for Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
The data for Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023 was submitted by European TSOs and is
available online as an annex of this report. The data available is specifically:
•

Linearization curves of the injection and withdrawal in the storages (source GSE
members).

•

Average monthly national production forecast.

•

Average monthly demand forecast.

•

Average monthly final and power demand forecast.

Page 24 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Annex E – Modelling approach
The network used in this report is up to date at the time of data collection (June 2022) and
reflects changes in topology submitted by TSOs. The simulation is based on firm and enhanced
technical capacities between the individual European entry-exit-systems. However, the
calculation is no hydrodynamical simulation and does not take all possible physical
congestions caused by the distorted load situation within the entry-exit-systems themselves
into account.
The following elements are part of the modelling:
•

Definition of 12 temporal periods, representing the months from October 2022 to
September 2023.

•

Temporal optimization means the optimisation of the gas year as a whole period in a
single simulation. This implies that the model anticipates an event, adapting the flows in
the previous months and mitigating its impact.

•

Use of linearization curves for storage injection/withdrawal capacities, as provided by GSE
Members, to consider the reduction of injection capacity when the stock level increases.

Modelling enables the identification of potential capacity and supply limitations, if any,
preventing the targeted stock level in each European storage by 30th of September 2023 being
reached.

Page 25 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Annex F – RESULTS INTERPRETATION AND EXTRAPOLATION
Relation between Demand and Injection / Withdrawal Level
When a specific area has no supply flexibility due to infrastructure limitations (bottlenecks) at
its borders, Demand and Storage injection/withdrawal are interdependent.
In such cases, a reduction in demand would allow additional storage injection to the extent
the storage injection capacity is not fully used.
For instance, in case of a disruption scenario, a reduction of the demand (5 TWh) in a specific
area with no additional flexibility could allow to additionally inject the same amount of gas in
the storages of the same area (5 TWh)
Impact of a delayed disruption scenario (not starting on 1st July 2022)
Disruption scenarios are simulated from 1st of October 2022 to 30 September 2023, but as
input data, to estimate initial storage levels on 1st of October disruption was assumed on 1st
of July 2022. However, in case a disruption would start at a later stage, a combination of the
baseline scenario and the disruption scenario should be considered as a proxy to assess the
impact of such a variant scenario at EU level.
To understand this mechanism please follow the example below.
If the disruption started on 1st of August, the baseline scenario could be considered from 1
July 2022 to 1st of August 2022, and from 1st of August 2022 to 30th of September 2023, the
evolution of the disruption scenario can be assessed by shifting the storage curve along the yaxis (storage level) so that the storage levels are aligned on 1 August.
However, this only gives a higher value for initial storages levels at the start of full year
simulation for gas year 2022/2023. Unfortunately, the effect on demand curtailment and final
storage levels cannot easily be estimated on the balance sheet without additional simulations.

Page 26 of 27

Yearly Supply Outlook 2022/2023
SO0036-22
20/07/2022

Annex G – List of Figures and Tables
 Figures:
Figure 1. - European yearly demand [GWh] (forecast for gas year 2022/2023) (H and L gas). . 6
Figure 2. - Geographical distribution of the European gas demand .......................................... 7
Figure 3. – Maximum supply potential ...................................................................................... 8
Figure 4. – Gas storage evolution 2022 compared to the storage evolution 2015-2020 .......... 9
Figure 5. - Estimated H and L-gas storage inventory levels on 1st October 2022 for Yearly Supply
Outlook simulations (result of the updated summer supply outlook simulation without Russian
supply starting from 1st July and initial storage levels at 1st July). .......................................... 10
Figure 6. – Demand curtailment levels considering firm capacities and no winter 2023/2024
preparedness (target gas storages level at 90 % on 1st October 2023 is not considered) in
situation without Russian gas supply entire year. ................................................................... 11
Figure 7. – Demand curtailment levels considering firm capacities and winter 2023/2024
preparedness (target gas storages level 90 % on 1st October 2023 is considered) in situation
without Russian gas supply entire gas year 2022/2023. ......................................................... 11
Figure 8. – gas storage utilisation – scenario with and without 90% storage target at the end
of the investigated gas year 2022/2023 .................................................................................. 12
Figure 9. – Estimated gas storage levels at the beginning of 1st October 2023 considering only
firm capacities and no specific measures ................................................................................ 13
Figure 10. - Demand curtailment levels considering enhanced capacities and no winter
preparedness in situation without Russian gas supply entire year. ........................................ 14
Figure 11. - Estimated gas storage levels at the beginning of 1st October 2023 considering only
enhanced capacities no winter preparedness and with full Russian disruption starting already
on 1th July 2022 ....................................................................................................................... 14
Figure 12 – Demand curtailment in winter depending on the initial storage level considered
on 1 October 2022 with the winter 2023 preparedness (enhanced capacities) ..................... 15
Figure 13 – Gas storage inventory with firm (left) and enhanced (right) capacities and no
specific measures with an initial level of 71% (updated SSO 2022 simulation + full RU disruption
from 1st July 2022), 80% and 90% ............................................................................................ 16
Figure 14. – Demand curtailment levels considering enhanced capacities, additional LNG
supplies and no winter 2023/2024 preparedness (target gas storages level at 90 % on 1 st
October 2023 is not considered) in situation without Russian gas supply entire year. .......... 17
Figure 15. – additional LNG vs historical LNG max supply to EU. ............................................ 17
Figure 16. – Estimated gas storage levels at the beginning of 1st October 2023 considering
enhanced capacities and additional LNG. ................................................................................ 18
Figure 17. Estimated gas capacities and minus 15% demand response country by country. . 19
Tables:
Table 1. – Minimum and maximum supply source. ................................................................. 22
Page 27 of 27

Publisher	ENTSOG AISBL
Avenue de Cortenbergh 100
1000 Brussels, Belgium
Authors

Kacper Zeromski, Louis Watine and Jacques Reberol

Cover picture

Courtesy of Enagás

ENTSOG aisbl
Avenue de Cortenbergh 100 | 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel. +32 2 894 51 00
info@entsog.eu | www.entsog.eu