| The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017 | IOB Evaluation No. 425 | The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017 | IOB Evaluation No. 425 | The Dutch contribu

The Dutch contribution to the
European Neighbourhood Policy
2011-2017

Preface
Given the current instabilities in its neighbouring regions, developing a foreign policy for
the EU represents a major policy challenge. The Dutch government is committed to
contributing to an effective, efficient and coherent EU foreign policy, including its
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). To what extent has it managed to do so, and what
can we learn from past experience to improve its contributions? These are the central
questions in this IOB policy review of the Dutch contribution to the ENP, a policy
framework which reflects many of the complexities and dilemmas of developing an
effective overall EU external policy.
For several reasons, the period under review (2011-2017) was an important transition
phase for the ENP. Firstly, the foreign policy innovations of the Lisbon Treaty started
functioning. Secondly, in response to political turmoil in its neighbourhood, the EU
initiated two ENP revisions, in 2011 and 2015. These reflected shifts in political thinking and
in policy aspirations, culminating in the EU Global Strategy (June 2016), in which the ENP
featured prominently.
Evidently, the contribution of a middle-sized member state such as the Netherlands to a
more effective ENP can only be modest. For this reason, this evaluation assesses to what
extent the Dutch contribution could be considered helpful for its effectiveness in an
indirect manner, based on a prior assessment of the ENP’s strengths and weaknesses. This
analysis focused on the issues of conditionality, coherence, ownership and the role played
by external actors. Based on this, the evaluation formulates recommendations to improve
the Dutch government’s future contribution to the ENP.
The policy review was conducted by policy researchers Bas Limonard (until December
2018), Tim Scheerder (until 15 March 2017) and Sam Streefkerk (from 15 March 2017 until
August 2018). The research was supported by interns Fleur Sjaardema (July-October 2016)
and Danique de Jonge (February-August 2017). Policy researcher Josine Polak revised the
final draft report in 2019. The study was supervised by Arjan Schuthof.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

In the reference group for this study, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was represented by
Johanneke de Hoogh, Dirk-Jan Kop and Adriaan Palm of the Europe Department, Luc
Schillings and Bert Meijerman of the North Africa and Middle East Department, Huub
Alberse, Sunita Verlinde, Blanche Voorneman and Pieter van den Berg of the European
Integration Department, Rob Anderson and Manja Simons of the Political Affairs Bureau,
and Bert Vermaat, Yvonne Stassen and Jaco Mebius of the Financial and Economic Affairs
Department. Simone Zwijsen, Mahamed Xasan and Joris Blaauw represented the
Inspectorate of the Budget of the Ministry of Finance. Independent members were dr. Max
Bader of Leiden University and prof. dr. Peter van Elsuwege of Ghent University. The
reference group gave valuable input for the Terms of Reference and commented on
several draft versions of the report, for which IOB is very grateful. The internal IOB
advisory group who provided valuable feedback consisted of Paul de Nooijer, Meie Kiel
and Wendy Asbeek Brusse.
A word of thanks goes to the staff of the Dutch embassies in Tbilisi, Baku, Cairo and Tunis,
for putting so much time and effort into facilitating IOB’s country visits and for
participating in interviews and briefing sessions. Their support during the evaluation was
indispensable.
Over 200 people contributed to the policy review as interviewee. IOB is very grateful for
their cooperation and their openness.
Final responsibility for this report rests with IOB.
Wendy Asbeek Brusse
Director, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

Table of Contents
Preface � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 02
List of boxes, figures and tables � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 04
List of abbreviations and acronyms � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 05
Main findings and recommendations � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 08
What this review does�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 09
The ENP: from idealism towards more pragmatism��������������������������������������������������� 09
Conditionality���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10
Coherence���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11
Ownership���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12
External actors��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12

Introduction � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 14
Evaluation framework��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15
Methodology����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17
Reading guide���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18

Part I The European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017���������������� 19
1

Context and policy development � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 20

1.1
1.2
1.3

The ENP before 2011���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21
Policy development 2011-2017: between continuity and change������������������������ 21
The ENP between 2011-2017: from idealism to realism��������������������������������������� 27

2

Instruments and implementation� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 29

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6

Agreements between the EU and ENP countries������������������������������������������������ 30
Money�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31
Market������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33
Mobility���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 34
Security instruments�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 34
A myriad of instruments��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35

3

Examining the factors influencing ENP effectiveness � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 37

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

Conditionality������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 38
Coherence�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41
The ENP lacked ownership in ENP countries������������������������������������������������������� 44
External actors exerted considerable influence on the neighbourhood������������ 46
The ENP’s performance on key factors was weak but is now improving����������� 47

Part II The Netherlands and the ENP� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 50
4

The Dutch contribution to the ENP � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 51

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

The Netherlands generally supported the ENP��������������������������������������������������� 52
The Netherlands was too firm on conditionality������������������������������������������������ 52
The Netherlands supported ENP coherence������������������������������������������������������� 58
Dutch support for government ownership of the ENP was inconsistent,
but the Netherlands did stimulate local civil society ownership������������������������ 62
4.5 Like most other EU actors, the Netherlands initially overlooked the role of
external actors in the ENP����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 63
4.6 The overall Dutch contribution to the ENP was constructive,
but on occasions dogmatic and ambiguous������������������������������������������������������� 64

5

Beleidsopties in geval van significant minder
of meer middelen (-/+ 20%) � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 69

5.1 Beleidsopties voor begrotingsartikel 3.1������������������������������������������������������������� 70
5.2 Beleidsopties voor begrotingsartikel 2.5�������������������������������������������������������������� 71

Annexes � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 78

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Annex 1: References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 78
Annex 2: Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation
Department (IOB) published 2012-2019������������������������������������������������������� 84

List of boxes, figures and tables
Text boxes
Text box 1 Evaluation questions specified in the Order on periodic evaluation 2018
Text box 2 The tasks of EU actors in the ENP framework

Page
16

Tables
Table 1

EU-ENP country relations

Page
30

22

Table 2

ENI expenditure to neighbourhood countries in EUR million

31

Text box 3

Guiding principles of the ENP in the European Neighbourhood Instrument

26

Table 3

Dutch financial contribution attributable to ENI 2011-2016

56

Text box 4

Projects funded by ENI and other EU funds

32

Text box 5

Examples of Macro-Financial Assistance

33

Tabel 1

Text box 6

Examples of special measures

33

72

Text box 7

Implementing the ENP: no clear benchmarks and lack of consistency

40

Overzicht artikel 2.5 budgetten Matra en Shiraka – ontwerpbegroting
2019
Overzicht financiële omvang besparing/intensivering ENB deel NFRP

Text box 8

Efficiency of financial and technical assistance

41

Text box 9

EU evaluations on ownership

46

Text box 10 Dutch efforts to block references to membership perspectives
Text box 11 Dutch bilateral assistance in the neighbourhood: Matra and Shiraka

55

Figures
Figure 1

The European neighbourhood

Page
07

Figure 2

Instruments implemented per country

32

59

Tabel 2
Tabel 3
Tabel 4
Tabel 5
Tabel 6

Tabel 7
Tabel 8
Tabel 9

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

 0% korting NFRP Matra door niet opnieuw inzetten vrijvallende
2
middelen Visegrád fonds, wijziging in miljoenen
20% korting NFRP Matra door besparing op ondersteuning overheden
en maatschappelijk middenveld, wijziging in miljoenen
20% korting NFRP Shiraka door minder toename gedelegeerde
budgetten posten, wijziging in miljoenen
20% korting NFRP Shiraka door minder toename gedelegeerde
budgetten posten in combinatie met stopzetten MENAbeurzenprogramma, wijziging in miljoenen
20% intensivering NFRP Matra door extra centrale en decentrale
projecten, wijziging in miljoenen
20% intensivering NFRP Matra door opzetten faciliteit voor middelgrote
projecten, wijziging in miljoenen
20% intensivering NFRP Shiraka door extra centrale en decentrale
projecten, wijziging in miljoenen

72
73
74
74
75
75
76
77

List of abbreviations and acronyms
Abbreviation
AA

Association Agreement

Abbreviation
EMP

European Mediterranean Policy

AP

Action Plan

ENI

European Neighbourhood Instrument

BTI

Bertelsmann Transition Index

ENP

European Neighbourhood Policy

BZ

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

ENPI

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

CA

Cooperation Agreement

EU

European Union

CEPA

Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement

EUR

Euro

CEPS

Centre for European Policy Studies

EUSR

European Union Special Representative

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

GAMM

Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

CGEA

Commissioners’ Group on External Action

GIZ

Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

Coreper

Committee of permanent representatives

HoM

Heads of Mission

CSDP

Common Security and Defence Policy

HR/VP

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

DAM

North Africa and Middle East Department

IcSP

High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President
of the European Commission
Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability

DCFTA

Deep and Comprehensive Trade Area (agreement)

IFI

International Financial Institution

Development Co-operation Instrument

IfS

Instrument for Stability

Directorate General

IMH

International Trade Policy and Economic Governance Department

Director-general for European Cooperation

INSI

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations

IOB

Policy and Operations Evaluation Department

Director-general for Political Affairs

IOM

International Organisation for Migration

European Integration Department

IPA

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

External Policy division, European Integration Department

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights Department

LGBT

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender

Eurasian Economic Union

MENA

Middle East and North Africa

Eastern Partnership

MFA

Macro-Financial Assistance

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

MFF

Multiannual Financial Framework

European Development Fund

NFRP

Netherlands’ Fund for Regional Partnerships

European Economic Area

NSI

Nuclear Security Instrument

European External Action Service

PermRep

Permanent Representation

EIDHR

European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights

PCA

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

| 05 |

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

DCI
DG
DGES
DG NEAR
DGPZ
DIE
DIE-EX
DMM
EAEU
EaP
ECHO
EDF
EEA
EEAS

Abbreviation
PPs

Partnership Priorities

RELEX

External Relations

RPE

Order on periodic evaluation

SMEs

Small and medium-sized enterprises

SPs

Strategic Priorities

SSF

Single Support Framework

UfM

Union for the Mediterranean

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

US

United States of America

VLAP

Visa liberalisation action plan

WB

World Bank

WTO

World Trade Organisation

| 06 |

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Figure 1 The European neighbourhood
European Union (EU)
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

| 07 |

Main findings and recommendations

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

What this review does
In this policy review, IOB examines the Dutch contribution to the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the period 2011-2017.1 The ENP is the EU’s main policy
framework guiding the relations between the Union and sixteen of its neighbouring
countries in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and the Middle-East and North Africa
(MENA).2 Its inception was driven by the wish to prevent the EU’s enlargement of 2004
from causing new dividing lines within Europe, and from creating negative spill-overs,
such as illegal trafficking or organised crime. The ENP should foster an area of stability,
peace and prosperity. Partner countries under the ENP were expected to implement
democratic, human rights and economic reforms in exchange for financial and technical
assistance, and better access for goods, services and people coming into the EU.
Like other member states, the Netherlands had various forums and opportunities available
to provide input into the different phases of the policy-making process, including agenda
setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. This review takes an indirect
approach to examining the Dutch contribution to the ENP, by looking at the Dutch policy
input on four key factors identified in the literature as influencing the ENP’s effectiveness.
They are:
• the way in which the EU applied the principle of conditionality;
• the degree of policy coherence between the EU and its member states and across the
EU’s various policies;
• the level of ownership of the ENP in neighbourhood countries; and
• the role played by external actors in the neighbourhood.
How did these factors play out in the ENP and in the neighbourhood, and to what degree
and in which direction did the Dutch policy interventions on the ENP influence these
factors? It is on these questions that the review focuses. Our assumption is, that if the
Dutch policy contribution to these influencing factors was constructive, this increased the
likelihood of a positive Dutch contribution to the ENP’s effectiveness. This indirect
approach is required, since it is not possible to isolate ENP developments and outcomes,
nor the Dutch contributions to these outcomes, from all the other mechanisms, influences
and actors that shaped the EU’s neighbourhood. Nor is it possible to establish direct causal
links between the ENP and developments in ENP countries, or to evaluate the
appropriateness of the EU’s policy response towards individual ENP countries.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

The ENP: from idealism towards more
pragmatism
Since its inception in 2004, the ENP underwent two revisions, both of which took place
during the evaluation period. The first, in 2011, was motivated by the entry into force of
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010 and came about following civic unrest in the Arab region
leading to the ‘Arab Spring’. It breathed the spirit of idealism concerning both the
opportunities for democratisation in ENP countries, and the EU’s potential role in
supporting deep and sustainable democracy, good governance, sustainable and inclusive
economic growth and job creation in the region. Moreover, it intended to pay more
attention to civil society, to strengthen cooperation under the Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreements, to enhance sector cooperation, and to build effective
regional partnerships within the ENP.
However, the suppression of the Arab Spring, Russia’s more assertive role in the Eastern
neighbourhood, the war in Syria, the rise of ISIL/Da’esh, the migration crisis and rising
terrorism, all prompted the EU to reconsider its aims and ambitions. As a result, the ENP’s
second revision in 2015 took on a more pragmatic and realpolitik line, emphasising the EU’s
own interest in (short-term) stability and security in its neighbourhood. Economic and
social development, security, migration and mobility became key priorities for
cooperation. Fostering processes of long-term democratisation and strengthening human
rights in ENP countries were not abandoned as policy aims, but in practice they often took
on secondary importance. The revised ENP was more lenient on conditionality, it again
emphasised the need for differentiation and flexibility, gave more support to civil society
and paid more attention to external actors and developments in ‘the neighbours of the
neighbours’.

The overall Dutch contribution to the ENP was constructive,
but on occasions dogmatic and ambiguous
For several reasons, the Dutch government considers the ENP as crucial for promoting
peace, prosperity and stability in neighbourhood countries. Firstly, acting on behalf of all
member states, the EU as a whole can offer much more leverage and a larger capacity to
act than individual member states. Secondly, the ENP also incorporates policy areas for
which the EU holds exclusive competencies, such as trade and visa policies. Thirdly, and

especially after 2015, the Netherlands and other member states were acutely aware that
disengaging from the EU’s neighbourhood policy was not a viable option. Thus, it sees the
ENP as a valuable element in the EU’s broader foreign policy, therefore also supporting its
instruments and implementation programmes. Since 2011, it has tried to influence the ENP
through several EU formats such as the Council of the EU (dealing with e.g. the ENP
reviews in 2011 and 2015 and visa liberalisation) and Brussels’ committees overseeing the
ENP’s implementation (e.g. the ENI committee on programming EU financial assistance to
the neighbourhood). Embassies also took part in local EU coordination structures (relevant
for e.g. – joint – assistance programming).
The Dutch government’s contributions to discussions on the ENP’s design and
implementation largely supported the preferences of the European Commission, the
European External Action Service (EEAS) and several larger member states. However, the
government was generally stricter with regard to conditionality, emphasising the EU’s
continued role in promoting democracy, human rights and market reforms. It was also
known for advocating prudent EU spending, and for insisting on not offering concrete
membership perspective to Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries in exchange for further
reforms.

Conditionality
The effectiveness of EU conditionality under the ENP was limited
throughout 2011-2017, especially in promoting democracy and
human rights. However, the Netherlands remained in favour of
using negative as well as positive conditionality.
Evaluations by the EU itself, as well as academic studies and successive ENP reviews have
shown that EU conditionality, the ENP’s key operating principle, has had limited effects on
democratic reforms in its neighbourhood. One main explanation is that in many countries
the domestic costs of EU-supported democratic reforms were perceived to outweigh the
benefits offered by EU incentives. If the political, economic, reputational, or other costs
are expected to outweigh the benefits, the EU is unlikely to muster enough leverage.
However, it is notoriously difficult to assess whether this would indeed be the case,
or whether conditionality may still stand a chance of producing results. Another main

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

explanation for the limited effectiveness of conditionality on democratic reforms is that
after 2011, political and economic instability and immanent security risks on Europe’s
borders began to dominate domestic and international agendas.
The Dutch stance on the ENP’s key concept of conditionality remained rather dogmatic.
Despite growing indications that conditionality was not generally effective in promoting
democratic reforms, the Netherlands continued to call for its application throughout the
period 2011-2017. The Dutch contributions to the policy discussions on the ENP’s revisions
in 2011 and 2015 suggest a move away from an uncompromising stance that both positive
and negative conditionality should remain part and parcel of the ENP’s toolbox, towards a
more pragmatic and realist approach, acknowledging that applying conditionality should
be weighed against other European and Dutch interests at stake in the EU’s changing
security environment. However, how this approach should be operationalised in concrete
situations, was left ambiguous. As a result, conditionality and its effective application
remained leitmotivs of Dutch policy thinking.
The government proposed several measures supporting strict and consistent application
of conditionality, some of which were accepted by the member states in the Council. For
example, the Council accepted the government’s proposal inviting the Commission to use
general impact assessments to judge whether the visa liberalisation process should be
continued. It also accepted the Dutch proposal to adopt an emergency brake procedure
allowing the EU to suspend visa freedom if certain criteria were no longer met. The
government did not find sufficient support for its proposals to introduce a more objective
and transparent procedure for measuring ENP countries’ progress on reforms.
On many occasions, Dutch parliamentarians insisted the government use conditionality to
promote democratic and human rights reforms. They filed motions for the general
application of conditionality in exchange for support to ENP countries, and also demanded
the application of negative conditionality in reaction to human rights violations, for
instance in Egypt and Morocco. The government usually responded by promising to
address such human rights abuses in the EU’s discussions on the neighbourhood. After
2015, conditionality also began to play a more important role in politically sensitive
debates in parliament, and within the government coalition on stopping illegal migration
from Southern (ENP) countries. As a result, continued adherence to conditionality
remained the preferred Dutch policy option.

Recommendations
For the ENP’s incentives-based approach to work more effectively, it has to be applied
both in a more strategic and context-specific manner. This requires the use of thorough,
detailed and regularly updated assessments of:
1. the extent of the EU’s long-term leverage within regions and towards individual
partner countries;
2. key domestic political, social and economic developments and potential change
agents; and
3. current and future windows of opportunities and risks in individual partner countries
and in the EU’s wider neighbourhood.
So far, the EU’s policy response towards neighbourhood countries has often been
motivated by reporting on ad hoc (positive or negative) developments rather than being
based on objective comprehensive analyses reflecting long-term trends in ENP countries.
The EU’s public reports on country progress have been rather diplomatic. The Dutch
government’s policy appreciations to parliament on the ENP have tended to mirror
these reports.
If the Netherlands wants to contribute to a more context-sensitive application of
conditionality, it could try and find support among EU member states for initiating a
process of objective, expert-driven reporting on progress, on longer-term development
trends, on key reform players, and on windows of opportunity and risks within these
partner countries. Such reporting should also involve experts from ENP countries. It may
not only provide a sound basis for the EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood, but it could
also facilitate a more sophisticated and detailed discussion both within national
parliaments and within the European Parliament on the implementation of the ENP in
neighbourhood countries.
If this initiative fails to obtain broader support from EU members or the Commission, the
Netherlands could consider organising its own expert-informed seminars and discussions
on progress, trends and policy options in all neighbourhood countries, or in specific Dutch
priority countries on the basis of existing expert reports. This could also inform Dutch
parliamentarians’ standpoints on where, when and how conditionality may be applied in a
productive manner. To minimise the burden on Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) staff and to

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

avoid duplicating the detailed work already carried out by country and regional experts,
these discussions could for instance be based on the bi-annual country reports by the
Bertelsmann Foundation and on additional hearings with its country and regional experts,
including local experts from ENP countries. These country reports also have the advantage
of identifying strategic options and (sector-specific) windows of opportunity.3 In its 2018
country report for Ukraine, for instance, Bertelsmann experts recommend external actors
such as the EU, to continue using conditionality indirectly as leverage by strengthening
‘the capacity of civil society, young political parties, alternative trade unions, media and
other social actors, especially at the local level’,4 because they all challenge the old system
and push for reforms. It urged the EU to assist in training and supporting a new generation
of experts, civil society activists and politicians.

Coherence
The ENP was plagued by weak coherence. However, where
possible, the Netherlands contributed positively to policy
coherence.
Whereas ENP instruments were complementary, wider policy integration was lacking: the
ENP did not constitute the overarching framework for the EU’s policy towards the
neighbourhood. In addition, in bilateral relations with ENP partners, member states
frequently failed to adhere to agreed EU policy principles, leaving responsibility to convey
difficult messages on human rights violations to the Commission, the EEAS and the EU
delegations. The Netherlands’ contribution to policy coherence was mostly positive.
Firstly, it supported aligning ENP instruments with other EU foreign policy instruments,
and it also favoured integrating the ENP and the CFSP/CSDP. Secondly, in bilateral relations
with ENP countries, the Netherlands generally acted in line with EU policy. Compared to
other embassies, Dutch embassies were particularly vocal on democratisation and human
rights. Matra and Shiraka, the only Dutch bilateral assistance programmes specifically
targeted at the neighbourhood region, aimed at complementing the ENP. Their
accessibility and flexibility provided added value. However, their limited budget and
fragmented implementation reduced programme effectiveness. Staff capacity constraints
at embassies also hampered a more proactive Dutch role in joint programming, which the

Netherlands successfully advocated under the Dutch Council Presidency to increase
coherence of both EU and member states’ assistance programming. Thus, while
supporting joint programming on paper, Dutch support remained limited in practice.

Recommendations
The Netherlands is only one of many policy players in the neighbourhood region. If it
wants to exert more influence on the ENP’s actual implementation and on joint action on
the ground, it should invest in supporting EU institutions and other member states in
identifying more concrete opportunities for (sectoral) reforms (see also the previous
recommendation). It should ensure that the size of its bilateral assistance and its staff
capacity at embassies match this ambition. Furthermore, it should maintain programmes
such as Matra and Shiraka at appropriate levels to support the Netherlands’ network in,
and knowledge of, ENP countries.
If the Netherlands wants to enhance policy coherence, it could encourage the practices of
formulating joint local analyses by EU delegations and member states’ embassies, of
sharing information, and of joint reporting to Brussels. It could also consider
experimenting with appointing special representatives from member states

Ownership
ENP ownership in partner countries was weak. Dutch support for
ENP government ownership was inconsistent, but the
Netherlands did stimulate local ownership among civil society
actors.
The ENP was often implemented in a one-size-fits-all manner that did not sufficiently
accommodate for the different ambitions, abilities and interests of neighbourhood
countries. The EU’s ‘model’ of liberal democracy and human rights often met with
opposition from neighbourhood governments or societies, especially in the Southern
neighbourhood. In addition, the ENP was imposed in a top-down manner and the EU did
not build real partnerships with governments and societies. The 2015 ENP revision stressed
the EU would increase ownership by increasing differentiation and introducing a real
partnership approach, leading to a greater sense of local ownership. Despite some

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

improvements since this review, the ENP continues to suffer from a lack of ownership, also
because conditionality remained key to the ENP. Whilst the Dutch government supported
the EU’s attempts to enhance ownership in ENP countries, its contribution remained
ambiguous. Firstly, its insistence that the EU promote its values in the neighbourhood was
sometimes insensitive to local sentiments on the EU’s ‘model’ of liberal democracy,
especially in the South. Secondly, the government’s attempts to increase Council control
over the ENP’s implementation hindered the ambition to increase ENP government
ownership. Since the government did not explicitly address these tensions, the extent of
its commitment to increasing ownership remained unclear.
The Dutch government’s focus on cooperating with local civil society contributed to
enhanced ownership. Dutch embassies engaged with local CSOs in the framework of
bilateral assistance programmes, even though they sometimes faced constraints.

Recommendations
While member states’ involvement and ownership are important ENP features, the EU and
the Netherlands should give the EEAS and the Commission more flexibility and freedom in
their interactions with neighbouring countries by drawing up less detailed negotiation
mandates that take into account local contexts, local demands and the need for adaptive
programming. The EU and the Dutch government should continue to look out for
opportunities to support societal ownership through involving CSOs, the private sector,
and local authorities.

External actors
External actors exerted considerable influence on the
neighbourhood. This was initially overlooked both by the EU
institutions and by EU member states, including by the
Netherlands.
The EU and its member states initially overlooked the role of external actors and
developments in the neighbourhood. Over time, the assertive role played by the Russian
Federation in the Eastern neighbourhood region and the migration crisis served as
‘wake-up calls’. As a result, the 2015 ENP review paid more attention to the role of external

actors and their impact on the EU’s leverage in the neighbourhood. The Dutch government
agreed that the ENP should take into better account the Eastern countries’ relations with
Russia. It also argued that the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ in North Africa, the Middle
East and Central Asia, as well as other strategic actors such as the US, should be involved
more closely in the ENP. In addition, institutional cooperation with regional forums of
which ENP countries were members, such as the Council of Europe, the African Union and
the Arab League, had to be strengthened. However, the Dutch position did not indicate
how coherence between the ENP and the EU’s approach to the ‘neighbours of the
neighbours’ should be ensured.

Endnotes | Main findings and recommendations
1
2

3

Recommendations
The Netherlands should invite the EU to draw up regular strategic updates on the Southern
and Eastern neighbourhood, addressing also the role played by external actors and
factors. These should assist both the EU and the member states in periodically reassessing
their potential influence and leverage in relation to other (external) policy actors, in
re-examining their added value and the potential windows of opportunity in EU and
bilateral relations with ENP countries.

4

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

This policy review covers the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget articles 3.2 and 2.5.
The ENP currently applies to six of the EU’s eastern neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and to ten countries in the southern
neighbourhood (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian
Territories, Syria, and Tunisia).
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s so-called Transformation index (BTI) evaluates if and how
developing countries and countries in transition follow a path towards democracy and a
market economy. Using a standardised codebook, country experts assess the degree to
which 17 criteria have been met in each of a total of 129 countries, including also all of the
EU’s ENP partners. Each expert writes a country assessment report, which is then
reviewed by a second expert. In addition, to assure consistency, each of the 49 individual
scores per country is subjected to regional and interregional calibration processes. The
results of the individual country studies of transformation processes are aggregated into
a so-called Status Index representing the country’s situation with regard to democracy
under the rule of law and social market economy. The Governance Index assesses the
quality of the political leadership steering the transformation in the individual countries.
There are five criteria for political transformation, i.e. stateness, political participation,
rule of law, stability of democratic institutions and political and social integration. Seven
criteria measure economic transformation: levels of socio-economic development,
organisation of the market and competition, currency and price stability, private property,
welfare regime, economic performance and sustainability. Governance is measured by
steering capacity, resource efficiency, consensus-building, international cooperation and
level of difficulty.
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019b.

Introduction

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

In the period 2011-2017 the European neighbourhood was in flux. Events extending from
the popular uprisings in Tunisia and other parts of the Arab region (‘Arab Spring’), to the
revolution in Ukraine, had profound effects on politics and society in affected countries.
The negative spill overs of these events – amongst which terrorism and illegal migration
– have also affected the stability within the European Union. As a result, the initial
optimism of EU member states that the uprisings and revolutions might bring about
democracy, peace and stability in a large part of Europe’s neighbourhood increasingly gave
way to concerns about the EU’s own interests in areas such as security and migration.
This changing stance of the European Union in relation to its neighbourhood was reflected
in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was originally conceived to
promote peace, stability and prosperity across the Union’s ‘new neighbours’ after the
2004 EU enlargement. It had to prevent the EU’s new borders from creating new lines of
division within Europe. The optimism felt amongst EU member states in 2011 following the
Arab Spring resulted in a revision of the ENP, the aim of which was now to promote
‘deep-rooted and sustainable democracy’ in the Southern neighbourhood. However, by
2015 the ambition of achieving stabilisation and protecting the interests of the Union in
areas such as security and migration gained prominence.
In this policy review, IOB examines the contribution of the Netherlands to the ENP in the
period 2011-2017. It does so by looking at the Dutch policy input on key factors identified
in the literature as influencing the ENP’s effectiveness. These relate to conditionality,
coherence, ownership, and external actors. The review also synthesises existing
evaluations on Matra and Shiraka, the largest Dutch bilateral assistance programmes in
the Eastern neighbourhood countries and in the Arab region.1
The objective of this review is twofold. First, to provide the Dutch Minister of Foreign
Affairs (BZ) with the information on The Netherlands’ contribution to the ENP, and on
Dutch bilateral assistance to the neighbourhood countries to be accountable to
Parliament. Secondly, it aims to contribute to policy learning, by providing
recommendations for future (EU and Dutch) policy formulation on the ENP and on Dutch
bilateral assistance to the neighbourhood.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Evaluation framework
This paragraph describes the evaluation framework. (For an extensive description, please
consult the terms of reference).2 During the research, the evaluators partially deviated
from the terms of reference. These deviations are also explained in this section.

Delimitation
This policy review concerns two policy objectives of the annual budget of the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘Promoting transition in priority areas’ (Article 2.5) and ‘An
effective, efficient and coherent conduct of the [European] Union vis-à-vis third countries
and regions, including developing countries’ (Article 3.2).3
Expenditures under Article 2.5 for the ENP countries are covered by two earlier IOB
evaluations on Matra and Shiraka, implemented respectively in Eastern neighbourhood
countries and in the Arab region. The findings of these evaluations are synthesised in the
current review.4
For reasons of feasibility, IOB chose to restrict the research on Article 3.2 – which covers
the EU’s broader foreign policy – to the EU’s policy towards neighbourhood countries.
Nonetheless, this still concerns an important part of the EU’s broader foreign policy efforts
to create stability and security. It also encompasses a wide range of policy areas, amongst
which the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its policies for external
trade, development cooperation, migration and energy security. Moreover, the ENP faces
many of the substantial and institutional challenges and dilemmas that are so typical of
the EU’s foreign policy at large.
The review covers the time period January 2011-June 2017. This was not only a tumultuous
period for many neighbouring countries, but also for the EU itself, since it underwent the
negative spill-overs from the instability throughout its neighbourhood.

Evaluation questions
This policy review is guided by the evaluation questions listed in the Dutch ‘Order on
periodic evaluation’ (RPE) (see text box 1).5

Text box 1 Evaluation questions specified in the Order on periodic evaluation 2018
1. Which policy article(s) (or components thereof) is or are covered in the policy
review?
2. If applicable, when will the other components be evaluated?
3. What was the reason for the policy? Is this reason still relevant?
4. What is the responsibility of the Dutch government?
5. What is the nature and coherence of the instruments used?
6. What expenditure is involved, including costs in other areas or for other parties?
7. What is the justification of spending? How to relate these to the components
volume / use and prices / rates?
8. Which evaluations have been performed (mention the sources), in which way has
it been evaluated and for what reasons?
9. Which policies have not (yet) been evaluated? Including explanations about the
possibility and impossibility of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the
policy in the future.
10. To what extent does the available evidence allow statements about the
effectiveness and efficiency of the policy?
11. Have the goals of the policy been achieved?
12. How effective has the policy been? Are there positive and / or negative side
effects?
13. How efficient has the policy been?
14. What measures could be taken to further increase the efficiency and effectiveness?
15. In the event that significantly fewer resources are available (approximately 20% of
the resources) on the policy article(s), what policy options are available?

The responsibility for answering questions 1-14 lies with IOB. The relevant policy
departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for answering question 15,
which will be presented in Chapter 5.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Effectiveness
RPE question 12 concerns policy effectiveness. Effectiveness generally relates to the extent
to which the results of interventions (output) contribute to the sustainable achievement of
policy objectives (outcome).6 Evaluating the ENP’s effectiveness in terms of attribution,
however, is not feasible given the broad and vague character of its policy goals, the
fast-paced nature of developments in Europe’s neighbourhood in the period 2011-2017,
and the influence of a wide array of other actors (beyond the EU) and other factors
(beyond ENP interventions) that played a role in the region’s development. This review
does refer to individual cases in which causal relations between the ENP and country
developments are clear, without using such references as a basis for broad conclusions on
policy effectiveness.
Instead of evaluating effectiveness directly, this review focuses on four key factors that are
considered to contribute to the policy’s effectiveness on the ground. These factors have
been identified in the literature review carried out for this study (see below). They are:
• the way in which the EU applied the principle of conditionality;
• the degree of policy coherence between the EU and its member states and across the
EU’s various policies;
• the level of ownership of the ENP in neighbourhood countries;
• the role played by external actors in the neighbourhood.7
How did these factors play out in the ENP and in the neighbourhood, and to what degree
and in which direction did the Dutch policy interventions on the ENP influence these
factors? It is on these questions that the review focuses. Our assumption is that if the
Dutch policy contribution to these influencing factors was constructive, this increased the
likelihood of a positive Dutch contribution to the ENP’s effectiveness. Thus, we take an
indirect approach to examining the Dutch policy contribution to the ENP, since it is not
possible to isolate ENP developments and outcomes, nor the Dutch contributions to these
outcomes, from all the other mechanisms, influences and actors that shaped the EU’s
neighbourhood.
The review does not examine the effectiveness of the Dutch government’s negotiations to
influence policy formulation in Brussels. Instead, it studies the Dutch positions on the ENP,
the extent to which these positions are reflected in the ENP and to which these positions

were likely to have contributed positively to the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of
the ENP. The Dutch government’s effectiveness in EU negotiations was the subject of an
earlier IOB review.8

Efficiency
Question 13 deals with policy efficiency. Efficiency measures how economically resources
(inputs) are converted into direct results. The concept therefore illustrates the relationship
between inputs and outputs,9 or between inputs and outcomes.10 Since it was too difficult
to relate ENP inputs to effects at outcome level, the review focuses on input-output
relations. Concretely, it synthesises the conclusions of existing evaluation and audit
reports on the efficiency of EU assistance programmes implemented in the ENP countries.

Coherence
Question 5 concerns policy coherence. For the purposes of this study, coherence will be
defined as: the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions, creating
synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives. Coherence is generally considered to
be instrumental for foreign policy effectiveness. In this review, the following three types of
coherence are relevant:11
• horizontal coherence, namely the extent to which the EU’s various policy areas and
instruments (e.g. trade, assistance, mobility, energy, CFSP) have been implemented in a
mutually reinforcing way;
• vertical coherence, namely the extent to which the policies of the member states
vis-à-vis the neighbourhood countries were aligned with agreed EU policy; and
• institutional coherence, which refers to the extent to which working relations between
the EU institutions/actors allowed for effective and efficient policy.

Methodology
The review builds on primary and secondary research carried out by IOB; a literature
review and a review of evaluations and audit reports on EU assistance to ENP countries both commissioned by IOB - and existing IOB evaluations. The research also benefited
from four country studies. The research methods are detailed below.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

IOB carried out a desk study, for which the following main sources were consulted:
• EU policy documents, amongst which joint communications, strategy documents, action
plans, Council conclusions, ENP progress reports and evaluations and audits of EU aid
programmes;
• Dutch policy documents, including parliamentary letters and proceedings, internal
memorandums, instructions for and reports of EU working group meetings and
diplomatic cables between embassies and The Hague; and
• academic and ‘grey’ literature.
The review benefited from interviews with a variety of stakeholders. IOB conducted
semi-structured on-site interviews with policy makers and experts in The Hague and
Brussels. Staff of the Dutch embassies in the ENP countries that were not visited were
interviewed by phone or video call.
IOB studied the ENP from an overall perspective, but also undertook country case studies
that were meant to provide in-depth insights into both, the implementation of the ENP on
the ground, and the role played by the Netherlands in this regard. The following countries
were selected for study: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Tunisia. These countries were
characterised by many of the issues at play in the wider neighbourhood region in the
period 2011-2017. They maintained different types of relations with the EU. Georgia and
Tunisia maintained the closest relations with the EU and could be considered to be
‘frontrunners’ in, respectively, the Eastern and the Southern neighbourhood region. The
Union’s relations with Azerbaijan and Egypt were less close and more complicated. The
country case studies were conducted via a desk study, interviews and country visits. During
the country visits, interviews were held with staff of the embassies of the Netherlands,
other EU-member states and non-EU states, EU delegations, missions of international
organisations, local parliamentarians, civil society representatives, journalists, and
government representatives, as well as local academics and other experts. The country
visits took place between October 2016 and January 2017.
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) carried out a literature review,
commissioned by IOB, on existing knowledge on the ENP’s effectiveness and coherence.12
The review was discussed during a seminar involving academic experts and policy
practitioners in Brussels on 8 March 2017. Both the review and the seminar provided
valuable input for IOB’s analysis of the effectiveness and coherence of the ENP.

A research team by APE Public Economics conducted a review synthesising the findings of
various evaluations and European Court of Auditors reports on EU assistance programmes
that were implemented in ENP countries.

Endnotes | Introduction
1

This policy review also uses the findings of two IOB evaluations on support to transition in
the Eastern neighbourhood and in the Arab region.13 IOB did not conduct additional
research on this topic.

Reading guide
Part I of this review focuses on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Chapter 1 provides an
overview of policy developments in the period 2011-2017. Chapter 2 focuses on policy
instruments. Chapter 3 reviews the ENP’s performance regarding the four key factors that
are taken to influence its effectiveness.

2
3

4
5
6

Part II focuses on the Dutch government’s policy interventions to influence the ENP’s
formulation and implementation, and on Dutch bilateral policies towards the
neighbourhood through Matra and Shiraka (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 (in Dutch) describes
policy options in case of the availability of substantially less or more buget (-/+ 20%).

7

8
9
10
11

12
13

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Until 2016, these programmes were named ‘Matra East’ and ‘Matra South’, respectively.
With the establishment of the Netherlands Fund for Regional Partnerships (NFRP) in 2016
– which covers both programmes – ‘Matra South’ was renamed ‘Shiraka’ and ‘Matra East’
was integrated into the programme ‘Matra for European cooperation’ targeting both, the
EaP countries, and the pre-accession countries. In this policy review IOB uses ‘Shiraka’
and ‘Matra’.
See: IOB, 2016, on English.iob-evaluatie.nl.
The financial contribution by the Netherlands to the EU’s external instruments
implemented in the European neighbourhood countries is part of the Dutch national
contribution to the EU budget. This contribution is posted under Article 3.1 of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs budget (‘Financial contribution to the EU’).
IOB, 2015a; IOB, 2015b.
Ministry of Finance, 2018.
IOB, 2009: 18.
The literature review also includes citizens’ perceptions of the ENP and the visibility of
the ENP in the neighbourhood as factors explaining policy effectiveness. The policy
review does not include these as separate elements.
IOB, 2014.
IOB, 2009: 17.
Ministry of Finance, 2018.
Initially, the review was to focus on four levels of coherence (see the Terms of Reference).
Research on the fourth level – multilateral coherence – however, did not deliver extensive
results.
Kostanyan (ed.), 2017.
IOB, 2015a; 2015b.

Part I
The European Neighbourhood
Policy 2011-2017
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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

1 Context and policy development
This chapter sheds light on the characteristics of the ENP and its development over time. It starts with a
general outlook and then moves onto assessing the main elements of the 2011 and 2015 ENP reviews.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

1.1

The ENP before 2011

The ENP is the EU’s main policy framework guiding the relations between the Union and
sixteen of its neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA).1 Its inception was directly driven by the 2004
enlargement of the EU, which prompted the need to create an approach to the Union’s
new neighbours that did not have the perspective of EU membership. The goal of what
later came to be known as the ENP was considered twofold:
• preventing the EU’s new borders from causing new dividing lines within Europe; and
• fostering an area of stability, peace and prosperity so that the spill-over effects of
instability in the form of illegal trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, pollution,
et cetera would not lead to instability in the EU.2
The ENP’s inception can only be understood against the backdrop of previous attempts
since 1995 to create stability in its wider neighbourhood.

Southern neighbourhood
In the Southern neighbourhood, formal relations were established in 1995, with the
so-called European Mediterranean Policy (EMP) or Barcelona Process, during an
atmosphere of optimism after the conclusion of the Oslo Peace Agreements. The policy
assumed that fostering mutual market access, foreign direct investments and EU
assistance in the region would in the long term also strengthen the rule of law and
human rights, as well as foster political liberalisation.3 However, the EMP’s practical
implementation remained fairly technical and economically-oriented. Ten years later,
evaluations showed that the policy had contributed little to economic reforms,
democratisation and human rights.4
Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on US soil, as well as major terrorist attacks
in Tunisia (2002) and Madrid (2004) sent shockwaves throughout the Western and Arab
world.5 As one of the EMP’s successor’s strategies, the ENP (2004) abandoned the
idealistic assumption that economic reforms would ultimately also lead to
democratisation. Its architects at the Commission aimed to foster stability, security and
prosperity in the entire arc around the EU, while simultaneously promoting its values by
pushing political liberalisation and human rights higher up the agenda. In 2008 the Union
for the Mediterranean was established, which was designed to organise regional

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

cooperation between the EU and its partner countries, including not only the ENP
countries, but also actors such as Turkey and the Western Balkan countries.

Eastern neighbourhood
In the Eastern neighbourhood, the ENP initiative was originally launched to avoid creating
new divisions in Europe after the EU accession of ten countries in the East. Its offshoot, the
Eastern Partnership (2009), promoted political association and economic integration of
the EU with its six partner countries. It aimed at advancing human rights and good
governance norms through the creation of a free-trade zone.

1.2 Policy development 2011-2017:
between continuity and change
The ENP is characterised by both continuity and change. From its conception in 2004, the
ENP was designed to employ conditionality, differentiation, and joint ownership. The EU
would offer financial assistance, market access and increased mobility to ENP countries in
exchange for political, judicial and economic reforms. Assistance and other benefits were
conditional not only on the implementation of these reforms, but also on the extent to
which ENP countries would adhere to the EU’s ‘model’ of liberal democracy, based on the
values of respect for human rights and of political freedom, and on EU standards for good
governance, market economies and sustainable development. The process intended to
not be EU centred – with the EU setting priorities for cooperation. Instead, it should be
implemented through political dialogue with neighbourhood countries.
In practice, the ‘ring of well-governed countries’ foreseen by the EU6 did not materialise.
Between 2004 and 2011, Eastern neighbourhood countries did not always engage in closer
cooperation with the EU, and in the Southern neighbourhood, Islamic activism was
gaining strength politically and socially. In terms of the latter, the EU model became
increasingly challenged.7 The ENP itself was implemented in a rather technocratic fashion,
taking little notice of the changing international power dynamics, and mounting political
and economic tensions in the neighbourhood countries.8
The ENP was revised twice: in 2011 and 2015. Both revisions are discussed in the following
paragraphs.

1.2.1 The 2011 ENP review: optimism and ambition
Initially, the 2011 ENP review was motivated by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon
in 2009. The Treaty introduced two novelties relevant to the ENP. First, it introduced
explicit provisions on the Union’s relations with its neighbourhood. It posits that ‘[t]he
Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish
an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’.9 To this effect, the EU
may conclude agreements with neighbourhood countries.10
New, too, were a number of institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The
Treaty introduced the function of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and

Security, who is also a Vice President of the European Commission (hereafter: HR/VP). The
HR should conduct the Union’s foreign policy, ensure the consistency of the EU’s external
action, as well as ensure implementation of the decisions taken by the European Council
and the Council of the European Union in the area of the Union’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP).11 The HR/VP is assisted by the European External Action Service
(EEAS),12 consisting of a headquarter in Brussels and EU delegations worldwide. According
to the Joint Communication, the Lisbon Treaty ‘allowed the EU to strengthen the delivery
of its foreign policy: co-operation with neighbouring countries can now be broadened to
cover the full range of issues in an integrated and more effective manner’.13 Text box 2
provides a snapshot of the roles played by other EU actors in the ENP framework.

Text box 2 The tasks of EU actors in the ENP framework
Combining the functions of High Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy and
Vice-President of the Commission into one person, the HR/VP, both, holds the political
mandate to represent the Union diplomatically in ENP countries, and implements the
Union’s external policy instruments (in areas such as trade, development cooperation
and humanitarian aid) in the neighbourhood.
The European Commission and the EEAS manage the EU’s working relations with the ENP
countries. The EEAS has several key tasks within the ENP framework: managing daily
relations with partner countries and EU delegations; drafting briefings for the ENP
Commissioner, the HR/VP, and the relevant EEAS/Commission hierarchy; coordinating
political dialogue and events (such as EaP and UfM summits); and assisting in
programming of funds and projects. The EEAS also sets out the broader policy guidelines.
The Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Neighbourhood and Enlargement
Negotiations (DG NEAR) has a lot of technical expertise and manages funding. Other line
DGs are involved in the ENP where relevant.
The EU delegations, which are present in all ENP countries, function as ‘EU embassies’.
They represent the EU and implement EU policy. Delegations play a role regarding the
programming of EU assistance by defining priorities for the EU, as well as in the
identification, formulation and monitoring of projects. As such, they are in contact with,
both, the government authorities and societal stakeholders in neighbourhood countries,
and the EEAS country desks and relevant Commission services in Brussels.

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The member states gathering in the Council of Ministers hold the decision-making powers.
In most areas, decision making is based on consensus. In practice, member state
influence varies across cases. Member states are strongly involved in the process of
drafting Eastern Partnership Summit declarations. Here, member states have to agree
– via Council working parties and the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(Coreper) – with a draft presented by the Commission, before declarations are shared
with partner countries. Member states also play quite a pronounced role in determining
priorities for cooperation with ENP countries because of the function they play in the
establishment of contractual relations (such as AAs and PCAs), action plans and
partnership priorities. They do so via the relevant Council working groups. Member
states can also attend many EaP and UfM meetings. Conversely, they have less influence
on the programming of the ENI. Although they have to agree on the EU’s seven-year
Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) and are represented in the ENI committee
which approves programming, programming documents are quite advanced by the time
the member states get involved. This leaves the member states with relatively little room
to exercise any real influence.
On the ground, EU delegations organise local coordination meetings involving the
delegations and member state embassies. In addition, there are coordination
mechanisms involving local representations of the broader international (donor)
community, including the UN, OSCE, World Bank and third-country embassies.

While initially motivated by the Lisbon Treaty, the revision of the ENP was spurred further
by the public revolts in several Arab countries, which came to be known as the ‘Arab
Spring’. According to the EU institutions, the EU needed ‘to rise to the historical
challenges’ in the neighbourhood.14 The European Commission issued a joint
communication, which underlined that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring
countries had met with limited results and that ‘a new response to the changing
neighbourhood’ was needed.15 This response should ‘strengthen the partnership between
the EU and the countries and societies of the neighbourhood’.16 The joint communication
stipulates the following goals, priorities and ways of working.

Besides, the EU was supposed to intensify political and security cooperation. It should step up
its involvement in solving protracted conflict (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
Transnistrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan). The EU should also address other security concerns and
common interests (for example in the areas of energy security, climate change and
international crime and terrorism). These issues should be dealt with not only using ENP
instruments, but also with CFSP and other instruments (such as rule of law missions).
Finally, the EU pledged to promote joint action with ENP countries in international forums
(such as the United Nations (UN) and other international conferences).19

a) The objective: supporting progress towards deep democracy

b)	Priorities for cooperation: supporting sustainable economic and social
development

The EU was to support progress towards ‘deep and sustainable democracy’, which the
communication conceptualises as:
the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form
competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from
accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and noncorrupt [sic] civil service
— and other civil and human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom
of thought, conscience and religion.17
To this end, the communication formulates three sub-goals. First, the EU should aim to
adapt levels of EU support to partners according to progress on political reforms and deep
democracy (‘more for more’). Reforms based on these elements were not only thought to
strengthen democracy, but also to help create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive
economic growth, which in turn would stimulate trade and investment.
Moreover, the communication aims to establish partnerships with societies in neighbouring
countries as a complement to EU engagement at a state level. Civil society actors are key
to promoting democratisation and inclusive economic growth and to empowering citizens
to express their concerns, provide input to policymaking and hold governments to
account. Civil society was to be supported by the EU, for example through providing
greater accessibility of funding for civil society organisations (CSOs), by supporting the
organisations’ unhindered access to the internet and the use of electronic communications
technologies, and through reinforcing the human rights dialogue between the EU and
neighbouring states.18

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A second goal of the 2011 review was to promote sustainable economic and social
development. To this end, the EU should support partner countries’ adoption of policies
that are conducive to stronger, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and job creation.
Strengthening industrial cooperation, promoting investment and supporting agricultural
development, as well as macro-financial dialogue and Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)
were amongst the instruments to be used by the EU in this regard.
Moreover, the EU should strive to implement trade arrangements. Depending on the needs
and capabilities of neighbourhood countries, these could range from far-reaching
agreements on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) for countries that
were willing and able to embark on a DCFTA, to more modest trade concessions for other
countries.
Furthermore, the EU intended to enhance sector cooperation. Enhanced cooperation could
take place in all sectors relevant to the internal market, but would focus in particular on
knowledge and innovation, climate change and the environment, energy, transport and
technology. Cooperation could come in various forms, such as policy dialogue, capacity
building, and regulatory convergence. Enhanced cooperation would take place in line with
the ‘more for more’ approach.
Finally, measures in the area of migration and mobility were meant, both, to support
sustainable economic development in the neighbourhood, and to fight irregular migration
from neighbourhood countries into the EU. The EU was to pursue visa facilitation or visa

liberalisation, as well as to develop (existing) mobility partnerships. The member states
were called upon to make full use of the opportunities offered by the Visa Code, which lays
down rules for issuance of visa for a maximum of ninety days (‘Schengen visa’) and which
allows for a simplification of the visa procedure (for example by issuing multi-entry visa to
categories of visa applicants).

c)

Guiding principles: differentiation and conditionality

Activities to implement these goals were to be guided by the principles of conditionality
and differentiation. EU support was to be conditional on countries’ commitment to
universal values (see above) and to implementing reforms. The more, and the faster a
country progressed in its internal reforms, the more support it would get from the EU
(‘more for more’). For countries where reform did not take place, the EU would reconsider
or even reduce funding (‘less for less’). Relations with governments engaged in violations
of human rights and democracy standards would be curtailed. In case of the latter, support
to civil society was to be strengthened further and the channels for dialogue with the
government, civil society and other stakeholders would remain open. Besides, EU support
would be differentiated according to, both, the needs of each country, and the regional
context.20

d)	The regional dimension: building effective regional partnerships
within the ENP
While the ENP constitutes a single, overarching policy framework for all neighbourhood
countries and takes a bilateral approach to individual countries, it also includes a southern
and an eastern dimension: the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern
Mediterranean (2011); the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM; established in 2008),21 and the
Eastern Partnership (EaP; founded in 2009),22 respectively. These multilateral frameworks
are intended to complement the bilateral dimension of the ENP, by fostering regional
cooperation and developing regional responses to specific challenges of each region. The
2011 review set different intentions for the ENP countries in the Mediterranean region and
for EaP countries.
In relation to ENP countries in the Mediterranean region, the EU aimed to build a
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean, which was meant
to provide ‘an ambitious response to the momentous changes’ ongoing in the Southern
Mediterranean. In this regard, the EU was to pursue the following three principles:
democratic transformation and institution-building; a stronger partnership with the

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

people; and sustainable and inclusive economic development. Depending on the needs
and level of ambition of each country, different policies and instruments could be
implemented: comprehensive institution-building programmes; dialogue on migration,
mobility and security; industrial cooperation; support to agricultural and rural
development; sub-regional cooperation; and enhanced dialogue on employment and
social policies. In addition, the Partnership should be focused more on concrete projects to
generate growth, innovation and jobs throughout the region.
The Partnership was to be implemented alongside the existing Union for the Mediterranean,
which was designed to organise regional cooperation between the EU and its partner
countries, including not only the ENP countries, but also actors such as Turkey and the
Western Balkan countries. The UfM was to ensure more effective cooperation, for
example by taking a more pragmatic and project-based approach, as well as through
increased involvement of the HR and the Commission.
In relation to the Eastern Partnership, the EU would move to conclude and implement
Association Agreements, including DCFTAs; pursue visa facilitation and visa liberalisation;
enhance sectoral cooperation, notably in the area of rural development; promote the
benefits of the EaP to citizens; and step up work with civil society and social partners.
Earlier progress made by the EaP countries regarding compliance with universal values
such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, implementing reforms, and the
resolution of protracted conflicts was varied. Partners that were most advanced and
committed to reforms were to benefit the most from EaP instruments (‘more for more’).
At the same time, more differentiation between countries was deemed necessary:
notwithstanding the region-wide focus of the EaP, EaP instruments needed to be better
tailored to the situations of individual countries.

e) Policy delivery: simplification and coherence
The EU was to implement a simplified and coherent ENP policy and programme
framework. To this end, ENP Action Plans, which constituted the framework for
cooperation and EU assistance, should focus on a smaller number of short- and mediumterm priorities, incorporating more precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions.
Moreover, funding should be increased and implemented in a flexible fashion, in line with
the conditionality principle. Additional loan possibilities for ENP countries by the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) were to be created, and the EBRD mandate to selected southern Mediterranean

countries was to be extended. Finally, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – the key
source of ENP funding – was to be ‘increasingly policy-driven and provide for increased
differentiation, more flexibility, stricter conditionality and incentives for best performers,
reflecting the ambition of each partnership’.

1.2.2 The 2015 ENP review: a sobering focus on
achieving stability
Whereas in 2011 optimism prevailed about the future course of Europe’s neighbourhood,
in 2015 this had given way to a sobering assessment of the state of affairs in
neighbourhood countries.23 Both the Eastern and the Southern region faced challenges
threatening democratisation in many countries, affecting the stability within the EU itself.
In the East, Russian foreign policy had become increasingly assertive, as became apparent
from, for example, the illegal annexation of Crimea, as well as the destabilisation of
eastern Ukraine. Instability and conflicts in the MENA region resulted in refugee flows to
the EU, and there were also terrorist attacks in several of the EU’s member states. 24
Previously considered to be a buffer zone for the EU, the region was now perceived as a
source of insecurity itself. According to the communication issued by the European
Commission, a new ENP was needed if the Union was to build ‘effective partnerships’ in
Europe’s neighbourhood.25

a) A new objective: stabilising the neighbourhood
In the 2015 ENP review, the notion that the EU should support ‘deep and sustainable
democracy’ is nowhere to be found; meanwhile, stabilisation of neighbourhood countries is
set as the main priority. While the ENP was meant to be a long-term engagement with
neighbourhood countries, it also needed to take into account the most urgent challenges
– and in many parts of the neighbourhood, stability was considered to be one of them.
Since the causes of instability often lie outside the security domain, the EU should not only
seek cooperation in the security sector, but comprehensively address sources of instability
across sectors. Poverty, inequality, corruption and weak economic and social development
are amongst these sources. Such a comprehensive approach was intended to improve
prospects for the local population, as well as help tackle the ‘uncontrolled movement of
people’. Moreover, the EU was to help strengthen the resilience of countries in the face of
external pressures, as well as their ability to make their own sovereign choices.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

The 2015 review underlined the EU’s commitment to upholding and promoting universal
values throughout the ENP. The EU’s interest in stability would not come at the expense of
the promotion of values: the EU would pursue its own interests, but these interests ‘would
include the promotion of universal values’, since ‘the EU’s own stability is built on
democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness’. In other words,
neighbouring countries’ compliance with universal values was understood to be
instrumental to achieving stability.
To underscore the importance of the promotion of values, the EU pledged to engage with
all stakeholders in an inclusive dialogue on human rights and democracy, and to do more
to support civil society, for example through capacity building, and by stimulating
independent media and supporting a free internet.

b)	New priorities for cooperation: economic and social development,
security, migration and mobility
To achieve stabilisation, the EU was to focus on the following priorities for cooperation:
• Economic and social development. This should be at the heart of the EU’s contribution to
stabilising the neighbourhood, for example by means of Macro-Financial Assistance
operations, private-sector development, trade agreements, transport connectivity and
telecommunications, and energy cooperation.
• Security. The new ENP was to prioritise tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation;
disrupting serious and organised cross-border crime and corruption; improving judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, and fighting cybercrime. In addition, the new ENP
would tackle cross-cutting migration related security challenges, such as smuggling of
migrants, human trafficking, social cohesion and border protection/management.
• Migration and mobility. The EU would intensify cooperation on regular and irregular
migration. On the one hand, the Union would focus on addressing the root causes of
irregular migration and forced displacement, and work on effective cooperation on
returns and readmission, and sustainable reintegration.26 On the other hand, the EU
would better support circular migration and encourage mutually beneficial legal
migration (for example by promoting skilled labour migration schemes).

c)	A re-definition of guiding principles: differentiation, coherence,
conditionality
The 2015 ENP review partly reaffirms and partly deviates from the guiding principles of the
EU’s approach to neighbourhood countries laid down in the 2011 review. While the 2011
ENP review mentioned that EU support should be adapted according to the needs of each
country and the regional context, differentiation is a pivotal notion in the 2015 review.
According to the review, partnerships needed to be more tailor-made in order to reflect
the different ambitions, abilities and interests of the neighbourhood countries. The
different patterns that would emerge would lead to a greater sense of ownership on the
side of, both, ENP countries, and the EU.
Similar to the 2011 review, the 2015 review calls for a more common approach and a single
message by the EU and the member states. The Council and the member states were to

play a greater role in identifying priorities and supporting their implementation, including
through joint programming of financial and technical assistance.
While central to the 2011 review, in the 2015 review the principle of conditionality (‘more for
more’) is no longer used as a guiding principle in cases where there is no political will to
reform. In these cases, the EU would explore ‘more effective ways’ to make its case for
fundamental reforms with partners, including through engagement with civil, economic
and social actors. This signals a pragmatic shift in the policy logic.
The importance that the Union endows to these principles appears not only from the 2015
review, but also from the fact that they are laid down in legally binding rules on the
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which is the main EU funding instrument for
the ENP (see text box 3). The ENI regulation preceded the 2015 ENP review; it was adopted
by the Council and the Parliament in 2014.27

Text box 3 Guiding principles of the ENP in the European Neighbourhood Instrument
The European Neighbourhood Instrument is meant to advance the general goals of the
ENP, namely, promoting an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness between
the Union and the partner countries.28 It aims to do so via:
• promoting human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption and good governance;
• achieving progressive integration into the EU’s internal market;
• creating conditions for better organisation of legal migration/mobility;
• supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive development;
• promoting confidence-building measures; and
• enhancing regional and ENP-wide collaboration.
Funding under the regulation should comply with the Union’s values of liberty,
democracy, and human rights and fundamental freedoms, and with the principles of
equality and the rule of law. Besides, Union support is to be established in partnership
with the beneficiaries: national and local authorities as well as civil society organisations
should be involved in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of EU support.
Moreover, the amount of financial support provided to partner countries is to be
incentive-based and differentiated in forms and amounts.

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In line with the incentive-based (‘more for more’) approach, the share of available
resources offered to partner countries is to be adapted primarily according to their
progress in building and consolidating ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ and in
implementing agreed political, economic and social reforms. While the ‘more for more’
approach was introduced in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and thus already existed
under the predecessor of the ENI – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI) – , it was formalised in the ENI Regulation. The Regulation establishes
the ‘Umbrella Programme’, which allows a maximum of 10% of the ENI budget to be
allocated to neighbourhood countries, based on their progress in advancing ‘deep and
sustainable democracy’. It also states that, depending on reforms implemented, the
bilateral allocation to countries could vary within a 20% range of the initial indicative
allocation (the ‘range mechanism’).
The incentive-based approach does not apply to all types of EU support; the ENI
regulation stipulates that it shall not apply to support civil society, people-to-people
contacts (including cooperation between local authorities), support for the improvement
of human rights, or crisis-related support measures.

d) The regional dimension: engagement with third countries
While the 2011 ENP review did not elaborate on the role of third countries in the
neighbourhood, the 2015 review pays particular attention to ‘the neighbours of the
neighbours’. In addition to strengthening regional cooperation within the neighbourhood,
the review aims to find new ways of working with third countries where required,
especially in the priority areas of migration, energy and security. Cooperation was to be
sought with, amongst others, Turkey, the Russian Federation, countries in sub-Saharan
Africa and the Sahel region, and non-ENP countries in the MENA region, but also with
countries in Central Asia. The EU was also to engage with a plurality of forums, such as the
League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union.

e) Policy delivery: more flexibility and more visibility
Finally, similar to the 2011 review, the 2015 review calls for more effective policy delivery. To
achieve this, more financial resources were to be allocated to neighbourhood countries, and
assistance needed to respond more rapidly and flexibly to evolving political circumstances
and priorities. Joint programming ‘around the EU brand’ was meant not only to maximise
resources, but also to increase the visibility of the EU’s contribution to the neighbourhood.
Visibility should be helped, too, by better communication about the benefits of EU policies
to citizens in the neighbourhood. To this end, the EU was to support the strategic
communication capacity of ENP governments, expose misinformation, and promote
independent media. Expanded outreach to civil society was also expected to create more
co-ownership of the ENP in neighbourhood countries.
The EU itself should also develop communication tools to allow better insight into the
perceptions in neighbourhood countries, to explain the benefits of the ENP and to create a
positive narrative about cooperation with the EU. More involvement of the member states
in setting communication priorities should help ensure a more coherent EU voice. To
implement this agenda, the EU was to engage more with governments, non-governmental
organisations and citizens, in particular the youth.
All in all, the 2015 ENP review constitutes a much more sobering and pragmatic approach
than the 2011 review. It also includes a more modest perspective on the potential
achievements of the EU in the neighbourhood. In contrast to previously existing policy, the
new ENP was not aimed at building and consolidating ‘healthy democracies’, but would
‘play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development’. Also absent in
the 2011 review, the 2015 review contains the notion that ‘[t]he EU cannot alone solve the
many challenges of the region’ and that ‘there are limits to its leverage’.29

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1.3

The ENP between 2011-2017:
from idealism to realism

In 2004, the newly conceived ENP was meant to be the EU’s ambitious political answer to
the ‘new’ security and terrorist challenges confronting the Union and its member states in
the post-9/11 era. The ENP would create a ring of well governed countries around the EU
– characterised by stability, peace and prosperity – that would constitute a buffer zone
between the Union and ‘the neighbours of the neighbours’. In practice, countries across
the neighbourhood experienced political and societal instability, and in the South the EU’s
model of state and society became increasingly challenged. The ENP itself was
implemented in a ‘eurocratic’ way, paying insufficient attention to political realities on the
ground throughout the neighbourhood.
The EU institutions recognised the weaknesses of the ENP and in an attempt to address
these, the policy was revised twice. The first revision in 2011 came about following civic
unrest in the Arab region. It breathes the spirit of idealism about, both, the opportunities
for democratisation in ENP countries, and the role that the EU may play to support deep
and sustainable democracy in the region. Factors such as the migration crisis, terrorism
and the rise of ISIL/Da’esh led the (especially Southern) neighbourhood to reconsider what
the EU should aim to achieve with the ENP. In combination with long-term expectations of
rapid population growth, climate change, and migration pressures,30 these factors made it
politically inconceivable for the EU not to provide a policy response to the changing
situation in the neighbourhood. The ENP’s second revision in 2015 took a more Realpolitik
line, emphasising the EU’s own (short-term) interest in stability and security in the
neighbourhood instead of the (long-term) objective of democratisation in ENP countries.
The period 2011-2017 did not only witness a new balance between stability and security on
the one hand and democratisation on the other, but also novel ways of implementing the
ENP (at least on paper). Compared to the 2011 review, the latest revision entails a more
pragmatic use of conditionality: the principle is no longer used as a guiding principle in
cases in which there is no political will to reform. To enact change in these cases, the EU
would invest more in engagement with civil society. The revision also underlines the need
for the Union to respond to the different characteristics of ENP countries, to better involve
ENP countries in the ENP, and to better take into account actors other than the EU. In
addition, the ENP was to be implemented more coherently, and the EU would find new
ways of working with ‘the neighbours of the neighbours’ who often have a direct effect on

neighbourhood states or societies. Amidst these changes, values were the constant factor:
the pursuance of the Union’s interests in stability would not be at the expense of the
promotion of its values.
From the literature we know that the ENP’s effectiveness in stimulating positive change in
ENP countries partly depends on the factors mentioned in previous paragraphs: the way in

Endnotes | 1
1

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

The ENP does not include the so-called pre-accession countries (Turkey and the Western Balkans
countries).
European Commission, 2003.
WRR, 2006: 175.
Euromesco, 2005; Youngs 2004; Joffé 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004 and 2005, cited in
WRR 2006: 176; Dempsey 2016.
Pierini, 2015.
Council of the European Union, 2003: 36.
Pierini, 2015.
Vimont, 2016.
TEU, Art. 8.
Ibid.
The High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and is one of the Vice-Presidents of the
European Commission; TEU, arts 18 and 27.
TEU, art. 27.
European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, 2011: 1.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.: 3.
Ibid.: 5.
Ibid.: 6.

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which the EU applied the principle of conditionality, the degree of policy coherence, the
level of ownership of the ENP in neighbourhood countries, and the role played in the
neighbourhood by external actors.31 Chapter 3 reviews the performance of the ENP on
each of these factors. Before this, chapter 2 will provide an overview of the activities
undertaken in the framework of the ENP.

20
21

22

23

24

25
26

27

28

29

30
31

Ibid.: 2-3.
UfM membership is composed of all EU member states, Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the
Palestinian Authority, Syria (suspended), Tunisia and Turkey. Libya is an observer.
The EaP involves the EU, its member states and six Eastern European Partners: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.
European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, 2014 and 2015.
European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, 2015.
Ibid.
The political impetus for deeper cooperation with ENP countries was also confirmed by the
European Agenda on Migration: European Council, 2015a and 2015b; Council of the European
Union, 2015; Valletta Summit 2015.
The ENI is laid down in Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, OJ L 77, 15.03.2014,
pp. 27-41.
All information from Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, OJ L 77, 15.03.2014, pp.
27-41.
European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, 2015: 2.
AIV, 2016: 44-45.
As also explained in the introduction to this policy review.

2 Instruments and implementation1
Chapter 1 has shown that the EU aimed to achieve the objectives of democratisation and stabilisation by offering
neighbourhood countries various incentives in exchange for political, judicial and economic reforms. The majority of these
ENP incentives relate to money, market access and mobility. The EU also offered other types of incentives, such as
migration and security instruments.2 This chapter focuses on describing those instruments most clearly aimed at
promoting stability, peace and prosperity in the EU’s neighbourhood,3 leaving aside instruments aimed at, for example,
promoting the EU’s energy security. Before this description, the chapter provides an overview of the agreements in place
between the EU and ENP countries.

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2.1 Agreements between the EU and
ENP countries

Table 1 EU-ENP country relations4
Country

Contractual relations with the EU

Action Plan / Partnership
or Strategic Priorities
AP (2006)

Azerbaijan

PCA (1999)
CEPA (signed 2017, provisional application 2018)
PCA (1999)

Belarus

PCA (frozen since 1997)

Georgia

PCA (1999)
AA (signed 2014, entered into force 2017)
PCA (1998)
AA (signed 2014, entered into force 2017)
PCA (1998)
AA (signed 2014, entered into force 2017)

While the ENP constitutes the overall policy framework for the implementation of the
instruments discussed in the following paragraphs, implementation is also guided by the
way in which bilateral relations between the EU and individual ENP countries are shaped.
Various types of agreements were developed over time, each of them including different
degrees of cooperation between the EU and individual ENP countries in a range of policy
areas. Some of these agreements preceded the establishment of the ENP, others were
designed following the introduction of the policy or as a follow-up to the ENP reviews. The
following agreements are in place:

Eastern Partners

• Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs; first concluded in the late 1990s). PCAs are
meant to support the economic and democratic development of signatory countries, for
example by helping them build a positive climate for business and foreign investments,
or fostering trade relations. Many PCAs also include provisions on cooperation in areas
such as culture, science and technology, administrative capacity, and civil society.
• Association Agreements (AAs; first signed in the year 2000). AAs are meant to foster closer
relationships between the EU and signatory countries in a range of areas, of which
primarily trade.
• In order to monitor country progress in relation to the cooperation objectives set in
PCAs and AAs, the EU concluded Action Plans (APs; existing since the establishment of the
ENP in 2004). Each action plan includes a country-specific reform agenda that entails
priorities for the next 3-5 years, the capacities and limitations of each partner, and the
EU’s interests.
• The relatively new instruments of Partnership Priorities (PPs; first agreed in 2015) and
Strategic Priorities (SPs; 2017). PPs and SPs specify a set of mutually agreed priorities for
cooperation. Their introduction should allow for more differentiation between ENP
countries than the previously existing set of instruments.
• The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA; first signed in 2017). Like the
PPs, CEPAs were introduced to respond to requests for more differentiated modalities
of cooperation.

Ukraine

Table 1 provides an overview of the agreements that were previously, and that are
currently in place with each of the ENP countries.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Armenia

Moldova

Southern partners
AA (2005)
Algeria

AP (2006)
PPs (2018)
AP (2006)
AP (2004)
AP (2004)

PPs (2017)

Egypt

AA (2004)

Israel

AA (2000)

Jordan

AA (2002)

Lebanon

AA (2006)

Libya

None

Morocco

AA (2000)
Statut avancé 2007
Interim AA (signed 1997)

AP (2004, 2013)

CA (1978)
AA (2005, pending ratification)
Cooperation with Syria suspended in 2011
AA (1998)

-

Palestinian
Territories
Syria

Tunisia

AP (2007)
PPs (2017)
AP (2004)
AP (2004)
PPs (2016)
AP (2006)
PPs (2016)
-

AP (2004, 2013)

AP (2004)
SPs (2018)

2.2 Money
One of the incentives that the EU offered to neighbouring countries is a broad array of
technical and financial assistance programmes, projects and other activities. The European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)5 was and is by far the largest financial instrument in the
ENP framework. In the period 2011-2017, it made up 71% of total EU expenditures in the
ENP countries. Next to the ENI, the EU provided support to ENP countries through other
instruments and programmes. Both the ENI and these other instruments and programmes
are discussed below.

2.2.1 The European Neighbourhood Instrument6
The ENI is financed from the EU’s budget and its budget ceiling is set by the EU’s
multiannual financial framework for a seven-year period. The 2007-2013 ENPI budget was
about EUR 13.4 billion, of which some EUR 10 billion was disbursed. The indicative ENI
budget for the 2014-2020 period is EUR 15.4 billion. This makes it the second largest EU
external instrument, representing 29.8% of the external instruments for the 2014-2020
budget.7 ENI support is in principle co-financed by the partner countries through public
funds, contributions from the beneficiaries or other sources.8
Support was provided either bilaterally, i.e. to one partner country; regionally, through
multi-country programmes which address challenges common to all or a number of
partner countries; or as cross-border cooperation programmes addressing cooperation
between one or more EU member states and one or more partner countries and/or the
Russian Federation.9 Regional instruments were either available to all ENP countries (for
instance the Umbrella Programme,10 the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, ERASMUS+,
and TAIEX & SIGMA), to the Eastern neighbours, or to the Southern neighbours. The
indicative regional budget for 2014-2017 was EUR 2.9 billion, of which EUR 1.9 billion for
ENI-wide programmes, EUR 511 million for ENP East and EUR 453 million for ENP South.
The budget for cross-border cooperation was EUR 306 million.11

Bilateral spending
Bilateral spending in the ENP countries followed specific objectives outlined in so-called
Single Support Frameworks (SSFs) for each country. The amount of financial support to
partner countries was based on their: a) needs – based on population and development

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

level; b) commitment to implementing political, economic and social reforms; c)
commitment to – and progress in – building deep and sustainable democracy;12 d)
partnership with the Union, including level of ambition in that regard; and e) absorption
capacity. The actual bilateral ENI funding in the period 2011-2016 is shown in table xx.13

Table 2 ENI expenditure to neighbourhood countries in EUR million14
Country
Armenia

2011
28

2012
26

2013
26

2014
28

2015
47

2016
61

Total
215

Azerbaijan

15

19

11

8

23

23

99

Belarus

1

10

11

15

17

24

77

Georgia

66

61

49

41

74

98

389

Moldova

79

56

67

95

42

91

363

Ukraine

22

66

139

313

68

207

815

Total bilateral East

212

236

236

499

271

271

1958

Algeria

43

29

36

32

33

41

214

Egypt

40

88

25

94

68

139

453

Israel

5

7

4

6

10

7

38

Jordan

76

91

96

60

102

155

581

Lebanon

14

29

64

67

70

47

291

Libya

8

3

9

12

6

7

45

Morocco

152

109

84

77

152

230

804
1658

Palestinian Territories

322

170

211

298

321

336

Syria

19

2

30

3

35

81

169

Tunisia

114

143

85

178

154

114

789

Total bilateral South

792

670

645

827

951

1157

5042

Grand total

1004

907

881

1326

1222

1661

7000

Source: European Commission, Annual reports on the implementation of the European Union’s instruments for
financing external actions in 2011 – 2016, see: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/annual-reports_en.

It becomes apparent that more than two-thirds (72%) of bilateral ENI spending in the
2011-2016 period went to the Southern neighbours. This can in part be explained by the
fact that there are ten Southern and only six Eastern partners. In addition, about one-third
of spending (32%) in the South was allocated to the Palestinian Territories. Furthermore,

there were huge differences in bilateral spending between partners, both in the South
and in the East, although differences amongst Southern partners were more extreme.
These differences can largely be explained by the criteria for bilateral spending mentioned
above.

the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSI) (2%),16 and the European Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (1%).17 The implementation of these
instruments varied strongly per country, as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2 Instruments implemented per country
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200

CFSP

DCI

ECHO

EIDHR

ENI/ENPI

IcSP/IFS

n

s

ba

ija

ru
la

er
Az

en

ia

Be

va

m
Ar

do

M

ol

gi

a

e
in

or
Ge

Uk

ra

ae

l

ya

Isr

ria

Lib

t

n

yp

ge
Al

Eg

no

co

ba
Le

a

oc

isi

or
M

th

ria

Tu
n

rd
Jo

Au
n
ia
tin
es
Pa
l

EU-financed projects in the neighbourhood were implemented by various parties,
including development organisations of the larger member states (e.g. Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)), private development
organisations (e.g. Oxfam or IOM) or multilateral organisations (e.g. UNDP). National
and local government authorities and societal actors are also involved.

an

0
.

ENI funding and other EU funds paid a variety of projects aimed at empowering
citizens, reinforcing civil society, and supporting local authorities.15 In the Southern
region, these projects aimed, for example, at increasing the financial independence of
village women in Egypt, making it possible for Tunisian students to spend time
studying in Europe, supporting Algerian entrepreneurs in achieving sustainable and
profitable production processes, contributing to reforms in the Libyan health care
sector, and helping to make the Moroccan justice system more accessible for children.
Projects in the Eastern region aimed, for instance, at improving education for children
in conflict-affected areas in Georgia and Ukraine, empowering socially and
economically disadvantaged young women in Armenia and Belarus, and helping
Moldovan municipalities reduce their CO2 emissions.

1800

Sy

Text box 4 Projects funded by ENI and other EU funds

NSI/INSC

Other

Source: European Commission, Annual reports on the implementation of the European Union’s instruments
for financing external actions 2011 – 2016, see: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/annual-reports_en

2.2.2 Other EU external instruments

2.2.3 Macro-financial assistance

Apart from the ENI, other EU instruments and programmes also provided support to the
neighbourhood region. Most significant was the European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), which accounted for 17% of EU funding to the
neighbourhood. Other instruments accounted for much smaller shares of funding. These
instruments are the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IScP) (3%),
interventions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) (3%), the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) (2%),

Another support instrument was macro-financial assistance (MFA). MFA consists of mostly
short-term, low-interest loans, or (sometimes) grants for countries experiencing a balance
of payment crisis. The goal of MFA is to restore a sustainable (external) financial situation,
while encouraging economic adjustments and structural reforms. MFA is conditional on
the existence of a non-precautionary credit arrangement with the IMF and a satisfactory
track-record of implementing IMF programme reforms. In the period 2011-2017, Armenia,
Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine received MFA. The amounts and
grounds for MFA differed per country, as illustrated in text box 5.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Text box 5 Examples of Macro-Financial Assistance18
Ukraine has been – by far – the largest recipient of MFA. In response to the crisis that
started in early 2014, EUR 3.4 b has been made available through three programmes of
low-interest loans. Jordan received EUR 180 m in 2014 to cope with economic shocks,
including the impact on its economy from the conflict in Syria. Later, EUR 200 m was
proposed in additional loans. Moldova received EUR 90 million in MFA grants to cope
with the consequences of the global financial crisis. Tunisia received a pledge of EUR
300 m to help it overcome the severe economic difficulties it faced during its economic
and political transition, which began in 2011. At the beginning of 2018, EUR 200 m had
been disbursed. In 2015, an additional EUR 500 m in loans was approved to support
Tunisia after the 2015 terrorist attacks which caused a decline in tourism.

2.2.4 EU budget support
Budget support entails actual financial transfers from the EU to the partners’ national
treasuries. The goal is to support reforms in macroeconomic and public finance policy as a
well as other mutually agreed sectors. The main objective is promoting democratic
governance and sustainable economic growth in a country – i.e. it was used to support
Egypt in dredging the Suez Canal. The Commission generally provides budget support in a
combination of fixed tranches linked to eligibility criteria.19 To give an indication of size: in
2015 the EU’s budget support disbursed in the ENP countries amounted to EUR 249.0 m in
the ENP-South and EUR 83.5 m in the ENP-East (which, together, amounted to 20.9% of
the total EU budget support disbursed worldwide).20

2.2.5 Special measures
During the 2011-2017 period Georgia, Israel, Libya, Moldova, the Palestinian Territories,
Syria and Ukraine received funding via so-called ‘special measures’. The exact objective of
special measures differs, as shown in text box 6.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Text box 6 Examples of special measures
In the Eastern region, Georgia and Moldova both received EUR 30 m from a special
measure in 2014 as part of incentive-based Umbrella funding.21 Ukraine received EUR
525 m in special measures over the course of 2014 and 2015 (EUR 123 m of which was a
redirection of money committed earlier) to provide financial assistance in the absence
of multiannual programming. The measures were aimed at supporting
decentralisation, stimulating the economy and state building.22 In the Southern
region, Israel received EUR 3.8 m in special measures supporting Twinning projects in
2015 and 2016.23 In 2012, when development assistance to Libya was temporarily
suspended, the country received EUR 25 m in funding for humanitarian aid and state
building in the post-2011 situation.24 Similarly, Syria received funding from two special
measures in 2015 to provide direct support to the affected population in Syria (via the
so-called Madad-fund) whilst not cooperating with the regime. The maximum total
budget consisted of EUR 222 m.

2.3 Market
The EU is the largest trading partner for most neighbouring countries. The Union offers
these countries economic integration, which means that the EU will progressively reduce
custom tariffs and abolish quotas, thus granting those partners who successfully carry out
the necessary reforms greater access to the internal market of the EU. There is a wide
variety in the depth and exact specification of trade relations between the EU and its
neighbours, which reflects the countries’ own ambitions with regard to broader
cooperation with the EU and membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The most far-reaching of these arrangements is the so-called Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area/Agreement (DCFTA). These extend further than normal trade agreements:
apart from trade liberalisation in all areas by lifting customs barriers and trade quotas,
they also involve the harmonisation of partners’ trade-related legislation with EU
standards and law. WTO membership is a precondition for entering DCFTA negotiations.25
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have a DCFTA in place as part of their Association
Agreement (AA). These DCFTAs were negotiated separately from the AAs. DCFTAs did not
apply to the other three EaP countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) or to the
Southern ENP states.

Trade relations with partner countries without a DCFTA were mostly structured via their
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) or (earlier generation) AAs. No PCA has
yet been concluded with Belarus, which is not a WTO member. The Trade and Cooperation
Agreement, concluded between the European Community and the Soviet Union in 1989,
remains the basis for EU-Belarus trade relations.
The exact specifications in these agreements vary. The AA with Morocco establishes a
relatively advanced Free Trade Area with tariff-free trade of industrial products, common
rules on intellectual property, and various programmes to help small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). In addition, Morocco has a liberalisation agreement regarding fisheries
and agricultural products.26 Morocco is also the first country to have started negotiations
on a DCFTA with the EU. Next to Morocco, negotiations on a DCFTA have been started with
Tunisia. Autonomous trade measures are also used by the EU. This is illustrated by the
EU’s preferential conditions for Tunisian olive oil after the 2015 terrorist attacks in
that country.27

2.4 Mobility
A third instrument used by the EU relates to mobility. The EU offered partner countries
various incentives, ranging from visa facilitation and visa liberalisation, to mobility
partnerships.
Visa liberalisation – i.e. the lifting of the requirement to obtain a ‘Schengen visa’ for short
stays of up to ninety days – is in place for Moldova since 2014, and for Georgia and Ukraine
since 2017. Visa liberalisation is the most far-reaching incentive for ENP countries in the
area of migration and mobility. A visa-free regime requires partners to implement a
so-called Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP), which includes benchmarks related to
document security, border management, migration and asylum, public order and security,
and external relations and fundamental rights. Visa liberalisation was not open to
Southern neighbours, except for Israel, which has a visa-free regime since 2001.
One step down from visa liberalisation lies ‘visa facilitation’. These agreements ease visa
requirements and facilitate the issuance of visas for short stays, often for specific target
groups. Visa facilitation agreements have been concluded with Armenia and Azerbaijan,
but not with Belarus or the Southern neighbours.28 In relation to the latter, an important

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

obstacle is that neither Belarus nor the Southern neighbours have concluded a
readmission agreement with the EU, which is a prerequisite for visa facilitation or
liberalisation. Such a readmission agreement aims to facilitate the return of people
residing irregularly in a member state to their country of origin or to a country of transit.
Mobility partnerships are a comprehensive framework for bilateral cooperation between
the EU and its partners in the areas of mobility, migration and asylum policy, which are
concluded in the framework of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
(GAMM).29 Mobility partnerships aim, amongst others, at: better organising legal
migration and fostering well-managed mobility; preventing irregular migration and
eradicating human trafficking; and promoting international protection of refugees.
Mobility partnerships are in place with all Eastern partners except for Ukraine; in the South
they exist with Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.30 In exchange for their cooperation, these
countries receive various types of support from the EU. The EU pushed for these
agreements in the period following the Arab Spring.
To address the migration crisis, the EU devised so-called compacts. Compacts include
mutual commitments in view of sustaining ENP countries’ resilience in light of the refugee
crisis. Like mobility partnerships, they bring together aid, trade, mobility and security
measures, which should be tailored to the characteristics of each partner country, whether
it is a country of origin, country of transit or a country hosting many displaced persons.31
Compacts have been added to the Partnership Priorities that the EU adopted with
Lebanon and Jordan. Via these PPs and the compacts, the EU offers assistance and market
access for certain economic sectors in these countries, in return for economic
opportunities and access to education for both, citizens and Syrian refugees.32

2.5 Security instruments
In addition to the ‘three Ms’, the EU employs various instruments in the area of security.
These instruments are the following:33
• Missions under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Civilian and border
assistance missions were undertaken in: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, the Palestinian
Territories and Libya. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova participated in CSDP missions/
operations with financial support from EU member states.

• Capacity development. This included: (a) trainings by the European Security and Defence
College in the area of CSDP, security sector reform, peacebuilding and protection of
civilians in ENP countries; (b) collaboration on hybrid threats; and (c) cooperation with
Southern partners on tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation, including the
adoption of counter-terrorism roadmaps and packages with Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan
and Israel.
• Support to reconciliation. The EU supported ongoing dialogues to achieve peaceful and
sustainable solutions to the conflicts affecting Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. For example, in Georgia, the EU co-chaired the Geneva International
Discussions for resolving the conflict, and it advocates for continued people-to-people
contacts throughout Georgia’s entire territory. The EU also held observer status for the
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. The EU Special Representative
(EUSR) for the South Caucasus supported the Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ efforts and
ongoing peacebuilding activities in eastern Ukraine, and demonstrated the EU’s interest
and stake in the peaceful resolution of this protracted conflict.
• Security sector reform. This included security sector reform projects in Tunisia, Lebanon,
Algeria and Moldova, and several projects in the area of Integrated Border Management
with Eastern partners. There is also cooperation on fighting organised crime, money
laundering, terrorism financing and cybercrime.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

2.6	A myriad of instruments
This chapter described the ENP toolbox. It contains numerous instruments that are
applied very differently across the neighbourhood. While the ENP provides the
overarching framework for the entire neighbourhood, the EU’s relations with each of the
neighbourhood regions and countries vary depending on the framework in place. This also
applies to the Union’s bilateral relations with each of the sixteen ENP countries. In
addition, the extent to which countries benefit from the various ENP instruments varies.
Implementation of financial assistance is scattered over numerous programmes and
actors. Individual member states also maintain their relations with ENP countries.
In the next chapter, we will examine key factors identified in the literature that influence
the ENP’s effectiveness.

Endnotes | 2
1

2

3

4

5

6
7

8

9
10
11
12

13

14

15
16
17

This chapter covers EU instruments implemented in ENP countries. The Dutch financial
contribution to the ENP and the Dutch positions on the instruments mentioned in this chapter
are outlined in Chapter 4.
Instruments (similar to those) used in the ENP framework are also used outside the
neighbourhood.
The EU also uses instruments in ENP countries that did not necessarily aim at promoting ENP
objectives.
Years shown indicate the moment of signature as well as entry into force, unless stated
otherwise.
The ENI was preceded by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which
was operational from 2007-2014. Despite some small differences the instruments are largely the
same. Other thematic and geographical instruments of the EU are also used in the region but only
to a very limited extent.
For a description of objectives and mechanisms, please refer to Chapter 1, text box 3.
Excluding the EUR 30.5 billon European Development Fund, which is financed outside the EU
budget and is, thus, not considered an EU external instrument.
Co-financing requirements may be waived in order to support the development of civil society
and non-state actors, especially small-scale civil society organisations. ENI regulation, Art. 4.
In line with ENI regulation, Art. 6.

18

See Chapter 1, text box 3.
European External Action Service and European Commission, no date a; no date b; and no date c.
Up until 2015 progress by partner countries was assessed by means of yearly ENP progress
reports.
The table does not include EU emergency aid that countries may have received, nor additional
funding via the ‘Umbrella-fund’ which annually allocated 10% of the available ENI funds to
neighbouring countries that had made the most progress towards a deep-rooted and sustainable
democracy, and in the implementation of agreed reform objectives.
Between 2011-2013 the Russian federation received roughly EUR 112 million per year under the
ENPI as well.
These project examples are taken from EU Neighbours, on euneighbours.eu.
Previously called the Nuclear Safety Instrument (NSI).
Rounded percentages. The remaining 1% belong to the category ‘other expenses’. For more
information see: https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/how-is-it-financed/index_en.htm.

29

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

19
20
21
22

23

24
25
26

27

28

30
31
32

33

https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/internationaleconomic-relations/macro-financial-assistance-mfa-non-eu-partner-countries_en.
See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/13967
European Commission, 2016a: 3-8.
European Commission, 2014a.
See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/
key-documents_en?field_file_country_tid[0]=130
See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/
key-documents_en?field_file_country_tid[0]=143
See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/libya_en
Van Berkum, 2014: 6-10.
The application of this agreement gave rise to legal disputes before the European Court of Justice
regarding its de facto application to the territory of the Western Sahara. The Court found that this
is not legally possible in light of the specific status of the Western Sahara under international law,
and in light of the principle of self-determination.
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, 2017: 15.
See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/
return-readmission_en
See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/
global-approach-to-migration
Ibid.
European Commission, 2016b.
Additionally, the EU has tried to manage migration flows and reduce the number of refugees
undertaking the crossing of the Mediterranean with funding from the EU Emergency Trust Fund
for Africa (EUTF). Libya has been the main beneficiary of these interventions. At the time of
writing, cooperation with Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria under the EUTF was being built up.
Furthermore, informal dialogues on migration had been agreed with Algeria and Egypt; see:
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, 2017.
This section is largely based on the instruments described in the EU’s 2017 report on the
implementation of the ENP review: European Commission and High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017.

3	Examining the factors influencing
ENP effectiveness
This chapter examines four key factors identified in the literature as contributing to the ENP’s
effectiveness. These are the ways in which conditionality functioned, EU policy coherence, ENP
ownership in neighbourhood countries, and the role of external actors.1 Together, these factors will
provide the framework for our assessment in chapter 4 of the Dutch contribution to the ENP.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

3.1

Conditionality

Conditionality is a key mechanism of the ENP. However, it is not a clear-cut concept based
on a widely-shared definition among policy-makers or scholars. During and after the Cold
War, political conditionally was usually defined as the threat employed by a donor country
or international institution to reduce or end assistance if the recipient did not meet
specific, minimal (governance) requirements or conditions.2 A crucial aspect of the kind of
conditionality employed by the ENP is that the EU and its ENP partners bilaterally
negotiate and monitor their joint agreements. The conditions usually relate to democracy
and the rule of law, and to regulations concerning the EU’s public policies, i.e. its acquis.
The EU may withhold rewards or take punitive actions (i.e. employ negative conditionality,
or ‘less for less’) if the target government rejects or fails to meet the conditions, whereas it
will offer rewards if the target government meets the conditions (positive conditionality or
‘more for more’).3 Generally, higher rewards are given in exchange for more demanding
reforms. In the case of conditionality under the ENP, full membership was not considered a
feasible reward option.
On paper, positive and negative conditionality were central to the 2011 ENP review. This
review stipulated a ‘take it or leave it’ approach, according to which the EU would offer
countries incentives that they either had to accept or could reject. The subsequent 2015
ENP review adopted a more pragmatic approach, acknowledging the need for
differentiation towards ENP countries, and putting less emphasis on strict conditionality if
countries lacked the political will to reform.

3.1.1 Domestic elites often resisted transformation
For ‘more for more’ to work, domestic political and economic elites in ENP countries have
to be prepared to engage in bilateral cooperation aimed at reforms.4 In practice, elites’
perceptions of the costs and benefits of reforms and incentives varied considerably across
time and regions. In Belarus and Azerbaijan, for instance, where political rights, horizontal
accountability, and free and fair elections have so far been absent and the ruling elites still
dominate the economy, there is no room for promoting reforms through EU conditionality.
Both Belarus and Armenia considered the absence of the ‘golden carrot’ of EU
membership to be a valid reason to prioritise their relationship with the Russian
Federation. As a result, the EU’s relations with these countries have generally been

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

difficult (Belarus) or ambivalent (Armenia). Ukraine, by contrast, gradually established a
functioning market economy after 2005, mainly because competing political elites have
been able to fight for access to economic rents.5

3.1.2 Financial assistance, market access and mobility
instruments were insufficiently attractive
With the absence of the membership perspective, the EU had to rely on other incentives to
persuade ENP countries to implement domestic reforms. It mainly offered money, market
access and mobility instruments (see Chapter 2), with mixed effects on reforms.
In the majority of ENP countries, the leverage of EU financial and technical assistance was
limited. Ukraine, Georgia, Tunisia and Morocco were among the countries receiving the
biggest amount of EU assistance, while Israel, Libya and Belarus lagged behind.6 Even for
big receivers, however, EU assistance was often limited in proportion to their national
government budgets. For example, ENI assistance to Georgia equalled 2-3% of the
government budget, while assistance to Azerbaijan merely amounted to 0.1%. The vast
amounts of financial support provided to ENP countries by other actors – often without
any conditions attached – further limited the EU’s leverage. In 2010, for instance, France
gave more bilateral financial aid to every country in the MENA region than the EU itself.7
Moreover, since the Arab Spring, both Tunisia and Egypt witnessed an increased inflow of
financial support from the Gulf states. The Saudi government’s financial assistance to
Egypt in the period 2011-2015 amounted to more than 13 billion US dollars. It has a keen
interest in stopping the expansion of democratically legitimised Islamic parties and
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in preserving Saudi economic interests in
Egypt, in containing Iran and Shiism, and in containing Qatar’s influence in the region.8
And while Morocco received 180 million dollars under the ENI in 2015, US assistance to
Morocco amounted to 70 million dollars in 2016 (22% of which in military aid) and the Gulf
countries pledged to give up to 5 billion dollars.9
The results of offering market access in exchange for reforms are mixed. For some countries,
such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the second-generation AAs and DCFTA agreements
provided incentives for reform. For others, this was not the case since these agreements
require substantial economic reforms and investments upfront, while their (immediate)
economic benefits are not guaranteed. Belarus and Armenia, for instance, chose to join

the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) launched by the Russian Federation in 2015, thereby
automatically excluding themselves from entering into a DCFTA agreement.10
Apart from Morocco and Tunisia, the Southern neighbours did not aim to conclude DCFTA
agreements, fearing their industries would not be able to compete on the EU market. The
EU in turn kept potentially powerful incentives – such as market access for agricultural
products from Southern neighbours – off the negotiating table to protect agricultural
producers in EU member states. This is generally seen as a missed opportunity.
Visa liberalisation served as one of the EU’s most transformative instruments, particularly in
the Eastern neighbourhood. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine considered it both attractive in
itself and valuable for establishing closer relations with the EU. As part of their visa
liberalisation action plans (VLAPs), these countries passed, amongst others, far-reaching
anti-discrimination laws. For the Southern partners, to whom visa liberalisation was not
on offer, visa facilitation did not prove an effective incentive for reform, since they rejected
agreements on return and readmission as a prerequisite for visa facilitation. By 2015, the
refugee crisis and growing concerns about possible additional migration and security
challenges brought the dialogue on visa facilitation to a virtual deadlock.11

3.1.3 The EU did not apply conditionality in a
consistent manner

fight against Islamic extremism – to step down, despite his increasingly violent
suppression of the opposition.15 All in all, then, the EU and its member states directed their
efforts mainly towards preventing negative spill-overs, such as immigration and terrorism.
The notion that countries were ‘too big to fail’ also led to inconsistencies in the EU’s
application of conditionality. Again, Egypt was a case in point. Given its population of 96
million people, many policy-makers saw this country as essential for regional as well as EU
internal stability. Therefore, assistance to Egypt was almost entirely exempted from any
EU conditionality. Thus, despite the Morsi government being overthrown and the killing of
hundreds of civilians by Egyptian security forces in 2013, only one EU programme of about
EUR 10 million (part of which had already been disbursed) was discontinued. Assistance to
the socio-economic sector and to civil society was continued because of concerns about
Egypt’s economic situation and the economic plight of the most vulnerable groups in
society.16
Even in countries that performed relatively well, such as Tunisia, the application of
conditionality proved challenging. The EU regarded Tunisia as a beacon of hope for
democratic transformation in the Arab region and as a potential ‘best case’ for the ENP – a
case that was ‘too good to fail’. Being well aware of this reputation, the Tunisian
authorities claimed a fittingly unique treatment involving more financial support and
leniency from the EU. However, this also resulted in complacency on the part of the
Tunisian government.17

For conditionality to be effective, it needs to be applied consistently, by using clear
benchmarks that countries need to meet to qualify for incentives (see text box 7). The EU
managed to do so in relation to Georgia and Ukraine; elsewhere, it either gave increased
benefits that were not justified by (sustained) progress, or it refrained from withholding
benefits when there were objective grounds for doing so.12 In these cases, the EU often
chose short-term stability, security and economic (and even reputational) interests to
prevail over the long-term goals of promoting democracy and human rights.13

The case of Moldova, which the EU initially considered to be a regional frontrunner,
illustrates the challenges posed by applying conditionality. Moldova’s seemingly proEuropean government received EU budget support. The EU was slow to suspend support
following a banking fraud scandal involving prominent politicians and business people. As
a result, Moldovan citizens’ trust in the EU had already crumbled, since they associated the
Union with support for corrupt local elites. It was only after suspending its budget support,
that the EU’s popularity increased again.18

Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in the MENA region, in most cases the EU did
not take a firm stance against authoritarian leaders, choosing a ‘wait and see’ approach
instead. It was only after Tunisia’s Ben Ali was ousted from office that the EU gave a
statement in support of the Tunisian people’s aspirations.14 The Union was also reluctant
to call upon Egypt’s leader Mubarak – generally considered the regional strongman in the

It is hard for the EU and its member states to ‘get it right’ in the neighbourhood. Whether
the EU has enough leverage to make conditionality work in a specific context, depends on
many domestic and international factors. Therefore, this is difficult to determine in
advance. For instance, while the EU may want to sanction underperforming countries,
doing so risks turning away ‘the unwilling’ that the EU needs for securing its own interests,

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as well as endangering existing reforms in countries willing and able to meet the EU’s
demands. Both with regard to ‘willing’ and ‘unwilling’ countries, it is difficult for the EU to
apply negative conditionality without directly damaging its own interests.
Positive conditionality under the Umbrella Programme and the ‘range mechanism’ (see
Chapter 1, text box 3) also has its limits. The Umbrella Programme has been perceived as
‘creating a reward mechanism mainly for ‘friendly governments’ that are willing to go
along a specific reform path, rather than offering an incentive to human rights and
democracy reforms in the whole Neighbourhood’.19 While it may have stimulated reforms
in certain cases,20 the Programme has been evaluated as having had limited impact on
overall reform processes.21 Similar findings apply to the ‘range mechanism’: according to
the Commission, ‘the mechanism has allowed extending the scope of reforms already
agreed but hardly incentivised partner countries for more or deeper reforms’.22

Like many national foreign policies, the EU’s ENP faces trade-offs when insisting on both,
preserving its interests, and exporting its values. The Treaty on European Union (TEU)
requires the Union to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, ‘founded
on the values of the Union’,23 and ‘to uphold and promote its values in all spheres of the
EU’s external relations’.24 EU institutions have a long tradition of routinely invoking the
language of values without being more specific on their objectives, priorities and
implementation paths in the various ENP partners.25 This in turn leads many external
policy observers and academics to condemn EU policies as being riddled with double
standards, ambiguity and incoherence (see text box 7).

Text box 7 Implementing the ENP: no clear benchmarks and lack of consistency
Prioritising (short-term) interests over values was facilitated by the ENP’s ambiguous
concepts, such as ‘deep democracy’, suggesting a common reference point based in
democratic values. ENP action plans – which lay down the reform objectives that
countries have to meet within a specific time frame – show that translating values into
concrete norms and reform paths is necessarily region-, country- and even contextspecific. This means that establishing a ‘democracy’ in, say, Tunisia, requires a different
route, sequencing and timing of reforms than in Georgia, for example. It also means that
norms and objectives have to be clear, unambiguous and coherent. This has often not
been the case. For example, the action plan for Georgia stipulated the country should
ensure ‘improved access to justice’, ‘strengthen the overall capacity of the customs
administration’, and ‘further reform efforts in the field of education to promote human
resources development’. As a result, it was difficult to judge progress in a meaningful and
objective way. In Ukraine, budget support conditions were also defined rather vaguely.26
In practice, there was ample room for political manoeuvring regarding the allocation of
additional funding (‘more for more’), or the partial or complete withdrawal of assistance
(‘less for less’). Decisions on additional funding were predominantly guided by positive

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conditionality, based on broad and rather superficial assessments of countries’ progress
towards democratic reforms and respect for human rights that left much room for
political debate among the member states and EU institutions. Negative conditionality
(‘less for less’) was even harder to apply than positive conditionality, since no ‘red lines’
with clear-cut criteria were established to determine whether governments had
overstepped a mark that justified withdrawing assistance. In all cases, it was hard for the
EU to motivate its decisions and to act consistently. This, in its turn, significantly
hindered both the credibility and the attractiveness of the ENP.27
The only area where benchmarks were present, was visa liberalisation. The VLAPs that
countries needed to implement in order to qualify for visa liberalisation contained clear
criteria for measuring compliance, allowing for the successful implementation of reforms
stipulated in the plans. However, member states still found room to dispute the
application of conditionality. In 2016, the Commission and the Council disagreed over
whether Georgia and Ukraine were ready for visa liberalisation, even though both
countries had met the VLAP benchmarks. This disagreement temporarily cast doubt on
their credibility and on the EU’s good intentions towards its neighbours.

All of this is not to say that conditionality will never lead to positive domestic change in
ENP countries/has never led to positive change in ENP countries. For instance, visa
liberalisation was only offered to countries when the applicable benchmarks were met
(see text box 7, above). And some ENP countries implemented technical measures in
exchange for budget support.28 It thus seems that conditionality can work, provided the
EU’s incentives and the reforms that it demands in return are sufficiently specific, ENP
countries are willing and able to implement these reforms, the EU’s incentives are
attractive to ENP countries, and EU member states remain committed to applying
conditionality.

3.2 Coherence
For the ENP to be coherent, its objectives and instruments should be mutually reinforcing;
member states’ policies towards ENP countries should be in line with the ENP; and EU
institutions should cooperate effectively and efficiently. The 2011 and 2015 ENP reviews
acknowledged the importance of implementing a coherent policy framework. However,
despite EU efforts undertaken to improve coherence, the ENP’s record on coherence
remains mixed.

3.2.1 ENP instruments were implemented coherently,
but wider policy integration was lacking
The EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood was weak with regard to horizontal
coherence. On the upside, evaluations of EU assistance programmes conclude that overall,
the mix of ENP instruments was implemented coherently. Compliance with programming
instructions, as well as efforts by headquarters and EU delegations to prevent overlap,
were found to contribute to coherence between ENI programmes and between different
geographic and thematic ENP instruments.29 Blending was found to be complementary to
other ENP instruments, especially to budget support.30 Still, there was room for
improvement. Operational linkages remained rather weak, both between ENP instruments
and between ENP instruments and other European financial instruments.31 Furthermore,
the complex set of bilateral agreements, communications, conclusions and declarations of
EU institutions that define the ENP policy framework reduced the ENP’s clarity and
visibility for partners and EU delegations.32

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Text box 8 Efficiency of financial and technical assistance
As mentioned in the introduction, this policy review synthesises the conclusions of
existing evaluation and audit reports on the efficiency of EU assistance programmes
implemented in ENP countries. The majority of such evaluations focus on the
cost-efficiency of operational processes. Evaluations have found that in terms of
administrative costs, ENI – which, as mentioned before, accounts for 71% of funding
to ENP countries – is relatively more cost-efficient compared to other instruments that
are implemented on a geographical basis.33 Moreover, in general, the ENI was found to
be well managed and its procedures and processes were found to provide for
adequate financial control and monitoring, and evaluation.34
On the down side, most procedures were sometimes found to be slow. Most
evaluations report on substantial delays in terms of programming. These delays are
partially explained by local circumstances, such as political instability or slow processes
regarding the signing of agreements.35 However, internal EU processes, such as the
lengthy EIDHR call for proposals procedure, also played a role.36 Devolution of
programming from Brussels to the EU delegations has helped to speed up aid delivery,
but its effect is constrained by limited numbers and high turnover of staff.37
To increase efficiency, the EU introduced the blending of ENP funds with other sources
of funding, as well as joint programming. Through blending, the EU helped to attract
additional funding for investments in the region, yet transaction costs were found to
be high. This was due to slow IFI procurement and management systems, as well as
cumbersome EU approval procedures.38 Moreover, increased coordination is
associated with increased operational costs. Joint programming has not proven to
reduce transaction costs, neither for the EU or its member states, nor for the partner
country involved. Nevertheless, evaluations found that the EU and member states
involved deemed these increased transaction costs to be worthwhile in view of the
benefits of increased coordination of assistance.39

ENP objectives, as well as ENP instruments and other EU (foreign policy) instruments, did
not mutually reinforce each other. Tensions existed between the ENP’s objectives of
promoting democracy and achieving stability. Coherence was especially hard to achieve in
relation to countries that were less stable, authoritarian, and less inclined to cooperate

closely with the EU (see paragraph 3.1). Moreover, in its approach to neighbourhood
countries, the EU did not consider ENP policy options and other foreign policy options in a
concerted manner. For example, while the EU may use security instruments – such as
sanctions, EU Special Representatives, and civilian and military missions – in the
neighbourhood, the ENP did not serve as the overarching policy framework ensuring that
these instruments were used in an integrated manner. Other instruments were also
implemented in the neighbourhood without regard for the ENP framework. Examples are
military operation EUNAVFOR/Sophia on the Mediterranean Sea and the EU’s assistance
package to tackle the root causes of migration. While the challenges posed by the refugee
and migrant crisis are not confined to neighbourhood countries, the ENP does not serve as
an overarching framework for the EU’s response to the entire region.40
In recognition of the need for a more integrated approach, the 2015 ENP review stated that
‘[t]he new ENP will seek to deploy the available instruments and resources in a more
coherent […] manner’.41 Efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to addressing
external conflicts and crises have been undertaken in recent years. Whether these could
also support coherence between the ENP and the wider EU foreign policy largely depends
on the willingness of member states and institutions to coordinate their actions. So far,
this has often been lacking. The next section looks into this issue in more detail.

3.2.2 Member states often failed to act in line
with the ENP
Vertical coherence – namely, convergence between the ENP and member state policies
– was weak. Member states hardly saw the strategic EU interest in the neighbourhood as a
common interest.42 A majority preferred to maintain bilateral relations with ENP countries
rather than use the umbrella of the ENP, particularly with respect to the Southern
neighbourhood.43 They have the right to do so, since member states have the prerogative
to implement their own foreign policies. However, in their policies they need to refrain
from jeopardising the EU’s objectives,44 and this is where problems have appeared.
Several member states maintained ‘special relations’ with ENP countries and pursued their
own, short-term national (security) interests,45 at the expense of the EU’s credibility on
human rights.46 For example, western governments such as France and Germany sought
closer cooperation with so-called ‘moderate’ Arab leaders in the fight against terrorism,
and became less critical of human rights abuses, particularly in Egypt, Syria and Libya.47

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Joint programming as a tool to increase coherence and ownership
The 2015 ENP review recognised the importance of improving vertical coherence. To this
end, the member states should be involved more in policy formation and implementation,
for example through joint programming. This is a form of coordination of financial and
technical assistance provided to countries or regions by the EU and individual member
states. It is not limited to ENP countries, but can be applied in all countries or regions of EU
development cooperation. The core elements of joint programming are a joint strategy
(which identifies priority areas of interventions); in-country division of labour (who does
what, and in which sectors?); and indicative allocations per sector and donor. While not a
new instrument as such, the 2015 ENP review stressed the need to step up joint
programming to increase the ENP’s coherence, its ownership in ENP countries, and the
engagement of EU member states.
In 2017 the Commission published an evaluation on joint programming during the period
2011-2015, covering all regions and countries of EU development cooperation.48 While
neither limited to, nor encompassing al, ENP countries (case studies included ENP
recipients Moldova and the Palestinian Territories), the observations included in this
evaluation are corroborated by IOB interviews on joint programming in the
neighbourhood. The findings below are limited to the effects of joint programming on
ownership (discussed in more detail in paragraph 3.3) and coherence. Overall, the findings
depict a mixed picture of its effectiveness in these fields.
The effects of joint programming on policy coherence were mixed. In some cases, the EU
and the member states agreed on joint roadmaps, joint analyses and joint responses.
Moldova and the Palestinian Territories constitute good examples. However, there were
many obstacles that prevented coherence. The coordinating role that EU delegations were
supposed to play depended on the enthusiasm and determination of the delegation staff,
however, capacity was often lacking. Moreover, not all member states were equally eager
to engage in joint programming. Some member states with ‘special relationships’ feared
the publication of ‘joint analyses’, while others were not ready to accept the EU-wide
division of labour or the joint EU response needed.49 Aligning planning cycles also proved
difficult. Member state programming cycles were linked to their own political and
bureaucratic cycles, and there was little willingness to adapt these to the planning cycles of
ENP countries. In the same vein, EU programming cycles were not fully aligned with the
planning cycles in the neighbourhood, as the EU’s Single Support Frameworks were
established for three years. Thus, in practice, joint programming was often highly formal,
uninspired, and cumbersome.

Joint programming contributed little to ENP ownership in neighbourhood countries. This
was due to the positive results being mostly limited to the EU and its member states,
doing little to stimulate ownership of the ENP in neighbourhood countries. Joint
programming contributed to a clearer view amongst the EU and the member states on
assistance provided by each of them in recipient countries and in some cases, the EU and
the member states reached a joint analysis on the challenges faced by such countries.
However, in general, these countries themselves did not benefit much from joint
programming because countries’ governments and civil societies were not sufficiently
involved in the process. Often, they were involved too late, at a stage when decisions on
joint programming had already been taken.
Staff at EU delegations and member state embassies argued this late involvement of ENP
countries was motivated by concerns about coherence. To avoid coming across as divided,
EU delegations and member state embassies first sought agreement amongst themselves
before involving ENP countries in the process. In this sense, there seems to be a trade-off
between ownership and coherence.
Not all recipient countries were equally eager to facilitate joint programming, partly
because it involved a lot of administrative capacity that was often absent. Even Georgia,
which initially adopted a leadership role in donor coordination, later abandoned this due
to capacity constraints. Moreover, some countries feared joint programming would result
in less funding or in providing the EU with too much political leverage.

3.2.3 EU institutions worked together rather well
Chapter 1 has outlined the responsibilities of the most important actors involved in the
ENP framework: the HR/VP, the EEAS (including the EU delegations), the European
Commission, and the member states (in the Council of Ministers and through embassies).
Working relations among these actors were good, although some improvements could be
possible and required for institutions to function coherently.

The HR/VP, the EEAS, and the European Commission
In 2009, Commission President Barroso transferred the responsibility for the ENP from the
RELEX Commissioner (whose role was to be merged with that of the new High

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Representative) to the Commissioner for Enlargement. This new Commissioner for
Enlargement and the Neighbourhood Policy had to rely on the ENP staff at the EEAS that
had been transferred from the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX).50
This collaboration was said to work well.51 The Commissioner and the HR/VP coordinated
their policies by organising joint meetings of their cabinets, sharing documents, and
preparing and signing new ENP documents together. However, the HR/VP was not given
much room to take on her role as First Vice President. After the Commissioners’ Group on
External Action (CGEA) was formed in 2010, HR/VP Ashton convened this group a number
of times, but each time she was side-lined by the Commission President, who insisted on
chairing the meeting.52 Under the Juncker Commission the CGEA met once a month. HR/
VP Mogherini was instructed to coordinate the CGEA.53 Meetings were prepared by the
EEAS policy planning unit and the Commission’s Secretariat-General. This ensured
constant political input into the Commission’s work.54
Although cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission in the ENP framework is
highly complex, it has proven to work rather well. Within the ENP, the EEAS collaborated
closely and continually with the Commission’s DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement
Negotiations (DG NEAR), and – depending on the issue at stake – with various sectoral
DGs, such as those on Energy (DG ENER), Home Affairs (DG HOME), and International
Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO). Such cooperation was needed, because while
the EEAS was in charge of negotiations on political association and security cooperation,
DG Trade was responsible for DCFTA negotiations. Moreover, in the area of sectoral
cooperation pertinent to the AAs, the EEAS had to rely extensively on the expertise of
different Commission DGs.
While day-to-day coordination worked rather well, relations between the Commission
and the EEAS still needed to be settled. Differences in perspectives occasionally resulted in
turf battles in which the Commission had the upper hand. The EEAS was relatively forward
leaning in relation to incentives granted to ENP countries; the line DGs tended to take a
more reserved position closer to the member states. This was the case, for example,
regarding visa liberalisation and the invitation of some southern member states to join the
Energy Community Treaty. While favoured by the EEAS, these initiatives were not
supported by the relevant Commission DGs.55 In both cases, the control exercised and the
checks applied by the Commission limited the discretion of the EEAS to act.

The member states in Brussels
A right balance has yet to be struck between Council oversight of the ENP process on the
one hand, and the room for manoeuvre in political dialogue with partner countries
allowed to the EEAS and the Commission on the other hand. Striking this balance requires
deepened mutual trust and better information sharing. Interviews revealed that the
distribution of information in general was an issue of contention between member states
and the EEAS/Commission. Many member states were uncomfortable with the lack of
(timely) information provided by the EEAS and the Commission, especially when
partnership priorities were negotiated with neighbouring countries. They noted the EEAS
and the Commission tended to table subjects that the latter had already discussed in detail
and felt insufficiently included in the process.
Member state representatives understood the need for flexibility and agreed that a
balance had to be struck between ‘getting things done’ and ‘involving the 28’. At the same
time, they stressed the importance of Council oversight, not only for reasons of control,
but also for strengthening coherence between the EU’s and their own policies. Despite
existing contentious issues, the member states were positive about working with the
EEAS, as it showed respect for their ‘red lines’.56

EU delegations and member states in ENP countries
Even though the delegations suffered from capacity limitations that sometimes made it
difficult for them to exercise their responsibilities and to ensure coherent policy,57 overall,
member state embassies were positive about the work of the EU delegations. Member
state representatives met regularly in the capitals of the neighbouring countries, for
example at meetings of EU Heads of Mission (HoM), deputy HoMs, and at the level of
sector-specific staff. These meetings were usually chaired by the EU delegation. During the
EU-HoMs meetings, which in most countries took place at least once a month, relevant
local participants were frequently invited. In most partner countries, EU-HoM’s
discussions focused on practical issues (such as participation in events) and information
sharing (for example on meetings held with local actors).58 Participants were hesitant to
share political analyses and raise strategic questions on the approach to be taken in
relation to a country. Various member state officials interviewed by IOB felt such debates
would duplicate Brussels discussions. This is a shame, because ambassadors generally
have a good understanding of local complexities, and their insights could provide valuable
input into the reports that EU delegations send to the EEAS, the Commission, and the
member states’ capitals. Such added value also derives from the fact that, when it comes

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to the change potential of the EU in the neighbourhood, embassies and EU delegations in
a particular neighbouring country are usually more on the same page than the actors
convened in Brussels. In this sense, the lack of open discussion is a missed opportunity for
better policy making. Reporting does usually take into account EU-HoM’s debates.59

3.3 The ENP lacked ownership in
ENP countries
On paper, (mutual) ownership was an important ENP feature. While the 2011 review
claimed that EU support would be differentiated according to the needs of each country
and the regional context, ownership acquired key importance in the 2015 review. This
emphasised that the EU would tailor its policy to the different ambitions, abilities and
interests of the neighbourhood countries. The different cooperation patterns that would
emerge, would lead to a greater sense of ownership on the part of these countries. This
should also be achieved by moving away from the traditional top-down approach. In
practice, however, the ENP continued to suffer from a lack of ownership. This was partly
due to fact that conditionality remained key to the ENP. It also partially stemmed from the
fact that EU values were not always widely shared by domestic populations. It was also
caused by a lack of differentiation across countries and regions, and an absence of genuine
EU partnerships with ENP countries.

3.3.1 EU transfer of democratic values and human
rights met opposition
ENP governments and societies have not all been open to the EU’s attempts to promote
its ‘model’ of liberal democracy and human rights. This is especially true for countries in
the Southern neighbourhood, where democratic and human rights such as freedom of
expression and religion, and the rights of women and minorities are often seen as
challenging existing traditional, religious or cultural values.60 Still, while the Arab uprisings
were partly ‘about people claiming democratic rights to emancipate themselves from the
traditional influence of the West, rather than trying to join it’,61 they were also about
citizens demanding far-reaching reforms, including more political freedoms.62
Unfortunately, the EU was initially not sufficiently adaptive to local understandings of

democratic citizenship. Its interventions often revealed a formalistic notion of democratic
rights that did not fit local circumstances.63 The result was a lack of ownership on the part
of civil society within the neighbourhood.

(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus). Regardless of their aspirations and levels of integration
with the EU, second-generation AAs and DCFTAs constituted the only models for ‘more
cooperation’ – reflecting a ‘take it or leave it’ approach.

Tensions between EU and local values were also visible in the Eastern neighbourhood.
Here, the major normative contender for the EU has been Russia, which perceives the EaP
as a threat to its own influence in the shared neighbourhood. For this reason, it promotes
a different set of national, cultural and religious values in this sphere of influence.64 All EaP
countries are to some extent susceptible to Russia’s influence, as is apparent from political
developments in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Still, these countries’ governments have
committed to implementing democratic reforms and wished for closer relations with the
EU. This does not apply to the Armenian, Belarussian and Azerbaijani governments.

Aware that the lack of differentiation led to limited ownership of the ENP in
neighbourhood countries, the EU introduced new models of cooperation to allow for more
differentiation after the ENP’s revision in 2015. To EaP countries not interested in
concluding second-generation AAs with the EU, the EU offered various other types of
agreements. The Union signed a CEPA with Armenia (2018); the European Council
endorsed PPs with Azerbaijan (2018), and these were being negotiated with Belarus. PPs
were also concluded with Jordan, Lebanon (2016), Algeria, and Egypt (2016), and SPs were
signed with Tunisia (2018). The discussions on such agreements involved exchanges
between the EU and partner countries on their respective interests and ambitions.
Reporting on countries’ progress towards agreed benchmarks, which previously happened
uniformly across countries, was also adapted. The new formats enabled the EU to revive
its previously stalled relationships with ENP states unwilling or unable to deepen
cooperation through second-generation AAs and DCFTA agreements. These included
fewer and more genuinely-shared policy priorities.

3.3.2 There was insufficient differentiation between
regions and countries
Whereas various EU documents (already before 2011) promised more differentiation, the
ENP was often implemented in a one-size-fits-all manner that did not take sufficient
account of the political sensitivities and the complex power dynamics within ENP countries
and dividing lines between nations.65 In the Southern neighbourhood, calls for tailormade approaches were made, especially in response to the Arab Spring. While Southern
ENP countries already had widely different political, economic and social systems even
before the revolutions, such differences only increased after the revolutionary
upheavals.66 The revival of sectarian politics, worsening Sunni-Shia relations, and security
spill-overs from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, for instance, affected these countries very
differently. These nuances and differences in the local contexts, however, were not
reflected in the EU’s approach to the region.
In the case of the Eastern neighbourhood, calls for differentiation derived, in particular,
from the diverse impact of the association agreements on domestic power structures and
dynamics, especially in politically sensitive areas. However, such divergences did not lead
to an EU approach that matched the local conditions, needs and motivations of individual
countries. The EU did not sufficiently differentiate between countries aspiring to closer
relations with the EU (namely, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and other countries

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3.3.3 The EU did not build real partnerships
with societies
The EU not only aimed to build partnerships with neighbourhood governments, but also
with neighbourhood societies. In the Southern region, the ‘bursts of civic energy in 2011
and 2012’ opened up possibilities for a more active role for citizens in public debates on
their conceptions of democracy, citizenship and human rights.67 This explains the EU’s
focus in the 2011 and 2015 ENP reviews on providing support to civil society. For the South,
however, the EU needed to reconceptualise its approach to civil society and to the growing
number of – mostly western-funded instead of grassroots – organisations in particular.
However, it did so on the basis of wrong assumptions. The Union largely framed the role
of civil society in political terms, thereby misrepresenting local perceptions on the social
and economic reform potential of civil society.68 In the EaP region, the EU failed to
implement a bottom-up, locally-driven approach to democratisation. Support for civil
society was limited and civil society organisations and other interest groups were not
sufficiently involved in discussions on ENP initiatives.

Text box 9 EU evaluations on ownership
According to evaluations commissioned by the European Commission and studies by
the European Court of Auditors, ENP government ownership helps the implementation
of reforms: programmes that were in line with the policy priorities of partner countries
were most effective in encouraging reform. One Commission evaluation argues the EU
effectively supported Tunisia in designing and financing its market liberalisation policy
when the Tunisian government demanded it.69 According to the evaluation, the EU
also effectively assisted Georgia in reforming its criminal justice sector in areas in
which the Georgian government supported such reforms (namely, juvenile justice,
public defence office, and legal aid services). The EU was not able to effectively push
reforms in areas that the government was less committed to (such as prison
conditions and independence of the judiciary).70 In North Africa, efforts towards
regional integration were ineffective as there was little interest in further integration in
the region.71
The signing of ENP action plans did not necessarily ensure ownership on the part of
ENP country governments. In Egypt for instance, little progress was made in the fields
of human rights and democracy as the EU policy priorities conflicted with the policy
priorities of the Egyptian government.72 Likewise, in the South Caucasus twinning was
initially not very effective as the partner countries were not committed to building up
the required capacity.73
Policy dialogue played an important role in the alignment of programme objectives to
country interests. The inclusiveness of the policy dialogue was particularly stressed for
ENI, and there are multiple examples showing that the EU has ensured the
participation of national authorities in the programming and follow-up of ENI
programmes. However, overall, the results of policy dialogue in terms of congruence
with partners’ needs and priorities were mixed: while they were good in Georgia and
Ukraine, they were sometimes difficult in Egypt, and weak in Belarus.74

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However, national governments could also limit civil society involvement. In Egypt, for
instance, the government enacted strict NGO laws, which made cooperation with such
organisations very difficult. The Azerbaijani government also hampered relations between
CSOs and foreign actors. As a result, societal concerns were not sufficiently taken into
account in the ENP’s implementation. This hindered its local ownership and the effective
implementation of ENP initiatives directed at social reforms.
Text box 9 presents findings on ownership included in EU evaluations.
Involvement of civil society in the programming and implementation stages has become a
standard process, but has met with some difficulties in practice. It proved challenging to
find umbrella organisations that could legitimately claim they represented civil society at
large; integrate government and CSO representatives in the dialogue on development
issues; and organise consultation in a structured, timely and informed way.75 Moreover,
there were doubts regarding the capacity of CSOs.76 Efforts to involve civil society in ENI
programming were more successful in some of the Eastern neighbours, where
governments are more open towards CSO involvement, than in most Southern
neighbours, especially in Algeria and Egypt, where governments were not supportive of
CSO involvement.77

3.4 External actors exerted considerable
influence on the neighbourhood
The EU was by no means the only active player in the Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood. Others provided considerable financial and technical support or
introduced alternative models of integration, thus challenging the EU’s leverage and
influence. At the same time, some actors – mainly the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ –
produced spill-over effects that affected neighbourhood countries. This was also
recognised in the 2015 ENP review, which announced the EU would begin to work together
differently with the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’.

Although Russia was by no means the only actor active in the eastern neighbourhood
region, its role is well-documented. In Russia, the EU and the ENP have mostly been
perceived as hindering further cooperation with ENP countries by trying to control what it
considers to be its sphere of influence.78 Therefore, Russia has actively tried to undermine
the EU’s policies vis-à-vis the EaP countries by creating alternative paths of integration, for
example through the EAEU. 79 It has also employed narratives focusing on the traditional
bonds and interdependencies with the EaP, and on the EU’s reportedly negative intentions
in the neighbourhood. And finally, it engaged – sometimes militarily –in EaP countries, by
annexing the Crimean Peninsula, through active engagement in the hostilities in
particularly in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, and though active support of
separatist forces in Gagauzia and Transnistria.80
To what extent has Russia impacted the various parts of the ENP? Some authors believe it
has successfully discredited further integration and cooperation with the EU. Russian
incentives are attractive to EaP countries, since they are not conditional on achieving
political reforms or advancing democratisation.81 In some cases, EaP countries yielded to
Russia’s pressure to engage in mutual integration, or to abstain from further cooperation
with the EU. The most prominent example was its successful pressure on former Ukraine
President Victor Yanukovych not to sign the negotiated EU-Ukraine AA.82
At the same time, however, some EaP countries do not see the Russian system as a model
to follow. Economic integration with the EU is considered to bring more structural benefits
to EaP countries in the long term, for example by lowering trade barriers, reducing
corruption, and improving competition and foreign direct investment.83 After the EU
introduced more differentiated forms of cooperation, several EaP countries have
strengthened relations with the EU (as discussed above). The EU often reinforces already
existing dynamics for democratisation.84 Citizens tend to trust the EU more than the
EAEU,85 but are unsure about the EU’s commitment to the region.86 Complicating the EU’s
approach to Russia is the lack of consensus among member states on how to deal with
Russia.
External actors also played a significant role in the Southern neighbourhood. The
‘neighbours of the neighbours’ are of strategic and geopolitical importance in this region.
Across the entire region of North Africa, high poverty rates, rising inequality and economic
stagnation have created migratory pressures and radicalisation, which influence the
socio-economic and political landscapes within southern ENP countries. The conflict in

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Mali, instability in Nigeria, the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and the increasing sectarian rift between Sunni and Shia affiliations at local and
national levels also produced negative spill-overs in ENP countries. Terrorist attacks in
countries such as Egypt and Tunisia had a crippling effect on tourism, which is an essential
economic sector in both countries. China, India and South Korea have expanded their
economic and trade interests in the region, mainly without trying to influence political
developments in the region. The Gulf states offer unconditional financial support to some
countries in the region, where they have large investments. Saudi Arabia is an influential
actor opposing political liberalisation in the region, providing large sums of money to
Egypt. Other North African countries also received considerable financial support from
actors other than the EU (see 3.1).

3.5 The ENP’s performance on key factors
was weak but is now improving
This chapter has examined four key factors influencing the ENP’s effectiveness:
conditionality, coherence, ownership, and the role played by external actors and factors in
the neighbourhood. EU incentives, which were part and parcel of conditionality, were
often insufficiently attractive to persuade ENP governments to initiate reforms. In several
countries, domestic political and economic elites expected to lose from such reforms.
These preferred to maintain the status quo by opting for cosmetic changes only. The EU
itself also frequently deviated from its policy that incentives were to be conditional on
governments’ effective implementation of reforms and on their compliance with EU
values. And while several ENP instruments were mutually reinforcing, wider policy
integration was lacking and several member states did little to support ENP coherence. In
addition, ENP ownership by neighbourhood governments and societies was limited. This
was due to the insufficient country differentiation and a top-down EU approach towards
ENP countries. Finally, external actors limited the EU’s leverage in the neighbourhood.
These findings do not apply equally across all countries; this chapter has shown that these
key factors played out differently across neighbourhood regions and ENP states. The
challenges are especially pertinent in countries with little interest in closer cooperation
with the EU.

Recent years have also witnessed several positive developments. The current ENP is more
grounded in the political realities of its partner countries than its predecessor. Firstly, the
EU has scaled down on rhetoric and has become both more pragmatic and sensitive to
partners’ aspirations. The EU’s intention to invest in veritable partnerships with
neighbourhood countries is a response to justified criticism that these countries were not
dealt with as equals. Secondly, the EU’s intention to strengthen cooperation with the
‘neighbours of the neighbours’ shows a greater awareness of the strategic role played by
other influential actors in the region. Thirdly, the EU’s response to the unprecedented

irregular migratory flows since 2015 has demonstrated its willingness and ability to employ
the ENP in a more flexible manner. A Migration Partnership Framework was created,
for which finances from the ENI were pooled with several other EU budget envelopes.
This Framework is strict on conditionality: cooperation on readmission and return of
migrants are considered ‘key tests’ of partnerships with third countries.87 Nonetheless,
it remains to be seen whether EU member states can also deliver on higher annual quota
for migration resettlement in their own countries, and on introducing meaningful human
rights impact assessments.

Endnotes | 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13

14
15
16
17
18
19

The chapter is largely based on the literature review commissioned by IOB: Kostanyan (ed.), 2017.
Koch, 2015: 97-108.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017.
See: Ademmer, Langbein and Börzel, 2018; Frear and Onopriychuk, 2019.
Langbein and Ademmer, 2019.
See Chapter 2.

20

Witney and Dworkin, 2012, in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 47.
Sons and Wiese, 2015: 26.
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019a.
Delcour and Kostanyan, 2014: 5.
Neuvonen, 2015, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 98.
Buscaneanu, 2012, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 27. On Moldova, see European Court of
Auditors, 2016b; on Egypt, see European Court of Auditors, 2013.
Note that the following examples on the EU’s position do not necessarily reflect the Dutch
position.
Schumacher, 2012, and Raik, 2012, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 48.
Raik, 2012, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 48.
Council of the European Union, 2013.
This appeared from IOB interviews with EU, member state, and local officials in Tunisia.
Montesano et al., 2016, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 21-22.
European Commission, 2017c: 51.

25

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

21
22
23
24

26
27
28
29
30
31

For instance in Georgia, Ukraine and Tunisia, which were the main beneficiaries of the Umbrella
Programme from 2014 to 2016; see: European Commission, 2017e: 10, 14.
Ibid., p. vii.
European Commission, 2017d.
TEU, art. 8.
TEU, arts 3(5) and 21.
In the 2011 ENP review, the EU institutions stipulated that the ‘new’ approach to the
neighbourhood must be based, amongst others on ‘a shared commitment to the universal values
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’. According to the 2015 review, the EU was to
pursue its interests in the area of stability ‘which include the promotion of universal values’. The
EU’s values are seen as elements of stability, since ‘[t]he EU’s own stability is built on democracy,
human rights and the rule of law’. This value-based approach is also laid down in the ENI
regulation, which stipulates that ENI funding should comply with the Union’s values of liberty,
democracy, and human rights and fundamental freedoms and with the principles of equality and
the rule of law (see Chapter 2).
European Court of Auditors, 2016c.
Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 28.
European Commission, 2017e: 24.
European Commission, 2017c.
European Commission, 2016c.
European Commission, 2017c.

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

58

59

Ibid.
IPA, DCI, EDF.
European Commission, 2017c.
European Court of Auditors, 2013.
European Commission, 2017b.
European Court of Auditors, 2011b.
European Commission, 2016c.
European Commission, 2017a.
And the ENP’s limited usefulness as a framework to tackle acute problems; see: Blockmans,
2017: 117.
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, 2015: 3.
Vimont, 2016.
Leigh, 2015; and Cohen-Hadria, 2016, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 74.
This follows from the principle of sincere cooperation, laid down in Art. 4(3) TEU.
Examples are included in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 75-78.
Witney and Dworkin, 2012; Biscop et al., 2012; Lehne, 2014, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 74.
Pierini, 2015.
European Commission, 2017a.
This finding also appears in European Commission, 2017e.
Blockmans, 2017: 124-125.

60

Helwig et al., 2013, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 127.
Blockmans and Russack, 2015: 7.
See: European Commission, 2014b; 2014c.
Blockmans, 2017: 127.
Sek, 2013, and Wouters et al., 2013, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 128-129.
Kostanyan, 2014, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 130.
European Court of Auditors, 2011b. According to European Court of Auditors, a coherent approach
towards migration was limited by the lack of capacity of the EU delegations on migration issues;
see: European Court of Auditors, 2016a.
Interestingly, in many capitals, the discussions amongst deputy HoMs were said to be more open
and animated than the discussions at HoMs meetings.
Although the EU delegations’ reports were accessible via the COREU system, not all Dutch
embassy staff interviewed were aware of the possibility to access them.

80

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

79

81
82
83
84
85

86
87

Leigh 2015, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 68.
Leonard, 2014, cited in ibid.
Youngs and Balfour, 2015.
Ibid.
Babayan, 2015, and Cooley, 2015, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 70.
Vimont, 2016.
Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 59.
Dempsey, 2016.
Boiten, 2015, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 66 (on CSOs in both the East and the South).
European Commission, 2014d; European Court of Auditors, 2017.
European Commission, 2015.
European Commission, 2017c.
Ibid.; European Court of Auditors, 2013.
European Court of Auditors, 2011a.
European Commission, 2017c.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Delcour and Kostanyan, 2014, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 104; Zagorski, 2011, and Sadowski,
2013, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 106.
Emerson and Kostanyan, 2013, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 104.
Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 114-116.
Meister 2013, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 107.
Delcour et al., 2015, cited in Kostanyan (ed.) 2017: 104.
Meister, 2013, in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 107.
Sasse, 2013, in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 112.
In a 2018 survey 61% of citizens tended to trust the EU as an institution (against 28% who tended
not to trust the EU), while 33% tended to trust the EAEU (against 43% who tended not to trust the
EAEU). From: European Union, 2018: 13.
Korosteleva, 2016, cited in Kostanyan (ed.), 2017: 114, and IOB’s visit to Georgia in particular.
Koenig, 2017.

Part II
The Netherlands and the ENP
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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

4 The Dutch contribution to the ENP
This chapter focuses on the contribution of the Netherlands to the ENP. It is informed by the analysis in Chapter 3 and
needs to be read in conjunction with that chapter. It examines the Dutch policy input with regard to four key factors
identified in the literature as influencing the ENP’s effectiveness: conditionality, coherence, ownership, and external
actors. Like other member states, the Netherlands had various forums and opportunities available to provide input into
the different phases of the policy-making process, including agenda-setting, policy formulation, implementation and
evaluation. The ENP revisions, contractual relations between the EU and ENP countries (shaped by AAs, PCAs, et cetera),
and ENP Action Plans were discussed within the several forums of the Council of the EU. The programming of ENI
assistance needed approval from the ENI committee (see Chapter 1, text box 2). Embassies played a role in local EU
cooperation on the ENP, including joint programming.
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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

We begin this chapter with a brief overview of the Dutch government’s general position on
the ENP (paragraph 4.1), followed by analysing how the government tried to influence the
ENP’s effectiveness by its policy stance on conditionality, coherence, ownership, and
external actors. The chapter also builds on the findings of two IOB evaluations on Matra
and Shiraka, the largest Dutch bilateral assistance programmes in neighbourhood
countries.1

4.1 The Netherlands generally supported
the ENP
Throughout the period 2011-2017, the Dutch government perceived the ENP in positive
terms. Firstly, it shared the ENP’s basic philosophy that through political association and
economic integration with the Union, the neighbourhood countries would implement
desirable reforms and adopt European values ​​and standards. Inclusive governance, a
‘healthy relationship’ between citizens and government, and economic stability with
respect for human rights were expected to result in better prospects for ENP citizens,
peace at the Union’s external borders, and greater opportunities for trade and prosperity.2
As such, the ENP was expected to bring mutual benefits to ENP countries and to the Union
and its member states. Secondly, the Dutch government saw the ENP as a crucial part of
the EU’s wider foreign policy aims and instruments, including trade, sectoral, CFSP and
development cooperation instruments, to be used for obtaining maximum political
coherence and leverage.3
Because of its geographical location, the Netherlands tends to be affected less directly by
developments in ENP countries than the EU’s more Southern and Eastern member states.
This explains why the Dutch government’s interest in the Eastern and Southern
neighbouring countries, along with other Western and Northern EU member states, was to
some extent event-driven. In the period 2011-2013, instability in the MENA region received
most attention. From the end of 2013, attention largely shifted to the crisis in Ukraine. This
country became the focal point of attention after flight MH17 was shot down above
Ukraine on 17 July 2014. It gained prominence once again around the time of the Dutch
advisory referendum on the Association Agreement with Ukraine, which was held on 6
April 2016. Following the migration crisis in 2015 and the conflicts in Libya and Syria, Dutch
attention soon returned to the MENA region.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

The Dutch government’s position on the ENP and its contribution to discussions on the
2011 and 2015 ENP revisions moved along with general thinking on the ENP, mainly
coinciding with the preferences of several larger member states, the European
Commission and the EEAS. Apart from providing input into Council debates, the
Netherlands actively contributed to reflections on the ENP by sharing non-papers and
position papers, as well as organising informal seminars in The Hague and Brussels. These
contributions were generally appreciated by other member states’ governments, who saw
the Dutch as vocal and constructive in EU discussions. The Netherlands was also known to
be critical: it emphasised the EU’s task of promoting democracy and human rights, it
advocated prudent spending and the strict application of conditionality. Moreover, it
insisted that the ENP should not be seen as a gateway to membership. These – and other
– aspects of the Dutch contribution to the ENP are discussed in more detail in the
remainder of this chapter.

4.2 The Netherlands was too firm on
conditionality
Chapter 3 has argued that the principle of conditionality did not succeed in stimulating
positive change across the board in ENP countries: success was context-specific and
depended, among other factors, on the openness of domestic economic and political
elites to reforms; the extent to which the EU’s incentives were appropriate for those in
power positions; the perceived attractiveness of incentives by ENP governments; and the
specificity of conditions attached to incentives. The fact that the EU applied conditionality
inconsistently limited its credibility and hampered policy effectiveness. Consistency was
difficult to achieve not only because the EU’s short-term interests in stability often
overruled its long-term interest in promoting democracy and human rights, but also
because the EU frequently did not translate such values into concrete norms and
conditions that ENP countries should observe in exchange for EU rewards. Overall, there
was increasing evidence that the effectiveness of conditionality in stimulating reforms
across the neighbourhood was limited (see paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2).
The Netherlands remained a hardliner on conditionality throughout 2011-2017 (see below).
It struggled to reconcile its principled approach with the complex policy realities on the
ground in different partner countries, with a worsening regional security environment and
with complex Dutch domestic political considerations.

4.2.1 A shift towards pragmatism – but conditionality
remains the cornerstone of Dutch policy thinking
The Dutch contribution to discussions on the ENP revisions in 2011 and 2015 shows a shift
on conditionality, suggesting a move away from a strict application of positive and
negative conditionality towards a more pragmatic approach. In practice, however,
conditionality and its effective application remained leitmotivs in Dutch policy thinking on
the ENP and in discussions in parliament.

The 2011 ENP review: an uncompromising stance
During the 2011 ENP review, the government was a firm proponent of strict conditionality.
This position was backed up by the Dutch House of Representatives, which, by way of a
motion, had asked the government to try and ensure that European support (with the
exception of emergency aid) was conditional on real efforts by neighbouring countries to
promote democracy and observe human rights.4 Instructions for Dutch negotiators in
Brussels sometimes referred to this motion.
During the negotiations on the review, the government advocated both positive and
negative conditionality.5 It argued that the latter should be applied as soon as countries’
performances deteriorated; when this occurred, the EU should be able to send a signal, for
example by cutting aid or freezing trade negotiations.6 With this so-called ‘intelligent
conditionality’, the Netherlands hoped to stimulate reforms in the neighbouring countries
(although exactly what was intelligent about this remained unclear). Moreover, it argued
that conditionality should not be limited to financial and technical assistance, and it called
upon the Commission and the HR/VP to ensure it was also applied to other instruments,
such as visa liberalisation and facilitation (see further below).7
While the 2011 ENP review stipulated that the EU apply both positive and negative
conditionality, the Dutch government did not see its preference for negative conditionality
materialise in the ENI Regulation that was negotiated in 2012-2013. Nor did its lobby to
include a clear and objective procedure for applying conditionality – based on criteria and
benchmarks for measuring progress – materialise into results.8 While several Central and
Northern European member states supported these proposals, the Southern member
states did not.9

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

The Netherlands did not leave the negotiation table completely empty handed. It
advocated a 40% bandwidth enabling the EU to reduce its initial country allocation by 20%
(for ‘bad performers’), or to increase it by 20% (for ‘good performers’). This met with
opposition from many member states in the Council and from the Commission. However,
after negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament (which, like the
Netherlands, advocated a 40% bandwidth), a 20% bandwidth (plus and minus 10%) was
included as a compromise. Thus, the eventual result did reflect the Dutch preference that
financial aid should be adapted depending on ENP countries’ performance.
The Dutch wish that funding decisions be based on the ENP countries’ performance on
political criteria – such as democratisation and respect for human rights – was partly met.
The government found supporters in some member states. However, many Southern
member states argued that the needs of ENP countries (based on, amongst others,
population size and gross national product) should be the primary factor. The ENI
regulation stipulates that both types of criteria must be used to take funding decisions,
and it thus partly meets the Dutch policy preference.

The 2015 ENP review: a more nuanced approach
Since 2013, the Dutch position on conditionality has become more nuanced. This has been
motivated by the government’s acknowledgement that in practice, the incentive-based
approach had limited success (see paragraph 3.1). Moreover, it recognised the EU’s
struggle with ‘less for less’: indeed, how should aid be reduced or withdrawn without this
leading to a ‘stop and go’ policy based on incidents?10 At the same time, the government
kept insisting on a more effective application of the ‘more for more’ principle.11 To this
end, it wanted the EU to closely monitor developments in ENP countries and to search for
‘the best way in which transition could be supported most effectively in each case’.12 This
latter phrase suggests that it did not have any specific proposals on how to achieve this in
practice.
In 2014, EU and national interests entered into the Dutch ENP discourse. Because the
situation in the neighbourhood had fundamentally changed since the onset of the Arab
Spring, the government saw stabilisation of the neighbourhood as its main policy
priority.13 It admitted that applying conditionality could not be absolute, suggesting this
‘always ought to be weighed against the objectives pursued and the European and Dutch

interests at stake’.14 However, the Dutch input to the 2015 ENP review showed the
government was reluctant to abandon conditionality. In discussions on the review, it
acknowledged that security, immigration and stability had become increasingly pressing
issues on the EU’s and national political agendas. Yet it also insisted that EU relations with
countries that were more committed to EU values would be more intensive than those
with less-committed countries.15 What this meant in practice for relations with individual
countries, was still left unspecified.
In June 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs formally requested the Dutch Advisory Council
on International Affairs (AIV) for guidance on support for Arab countries ‘if democratic
reforms fail to take place or the situation even regresses?’ It explicitly asked: ‘How can a
situation be avoided in which the Netherlands and EU, through conditionality, greatly
reduce their constructive influence with such countries, which can, after all, turn to other
donors who do not impose such conditionality?’16 The AIV argued in favour of an approach
that was principled on the nature of the objectives pursued, but more pragmatic on the
means to achieve these. It called upon the government and the EU to drop the ‘more for
more’ rule, but to continue implementing programmes aimed at promoting the rule of law
and democratisation. In its response to this advice,17 the government insisted that
incentives for reforms in the Arab countries were good and needed. It argued that ‘more
for more’ was instrumental, though it should not be applied too dogmatically. It also
admitted that negative conditionality could be counterproductive if it adversely affected
organisations that were actually committed to transitions.
In the end, the Dutch government was satisfied with the more pragmatic and realistic
approach of the 2015 ENP.18 It did note that the ENP failed to clarify how exactly the EU
should go about implementing the new pragmatism, despite some Dutch suggestions to
this end.19 For instance, the government had suggested linking economic reforms to
strengthening the rule of law, or linking reforms in the security sector to improving
democratic oversight (see also below).20
Thus, Dutch policy on the ENP gradually shifted towards more pragmatism in the period
2011-2017, however without ever abandoning negative conditionality. This position was
supported by parliament, which in 2011 filed a motion asking the government to insist on
applying conditionality in exchange for EU support to ENP countries.21 Parliamentarians
also regularly called for its application in cases of human rights violations, for instance in
Egypt22 and Morocco.23 In response, the government frequently stated it would address

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

human rights abuses in EU discussions on the neighbourhood.24 Moreover, in response to
the migrant and refugee crisis in 2015, conditionality again resurfaced as an important
mechanism in agreements aimed at halting illegal migration from Southern (ENP)
countries.25 In this context, continued adherence to conditionality remained the preferred
Dutch policy option.26
Whereas some Central and Northern member states broadly shared the Dutch principled
stance on conditionality, this did not apply to many of the member states geographically
closer to the Union’s Eastern or Southern borders. These were concerned that a strict
application of conditionality would push EaP states towards Russia or risk Southern ENP
states’ cooperation on migration. On some occasions this prompted the Netherlands to
adhere to conditionality even more strictly during the negotiations, for fear of watering
down this principle altogether.

4.2.2 The Dutch government insisted that conditions
were applied before offering incentives
Paragraph 3.1 has shown that even if domestic elites were open to transformation, the
incentives offered by the EU were not always attractive enough to persuade these elites to
(continue to) implement reforms. EU financial assistance was limited, especially compared
to assistance offered by other actors. Market access instruments offered by the EU would
only bring long-term benefits, and potentially impactful trade liberalisation instruments
for the Southern neighbours were kept off the table. The latter also applies to mobility
instruments and to visa liberalisation in particular. Because the ENP was designed to offer
an alternative to enlargement, an EU membership perspective was not on offer to EaP
countries. Thus, the Dutch position on incentives varied: while the Netherlands was
relatively generous on trade liberalisation measures, it held back on offering visa
liberalisation and was firmly against offering EaP countries a membership perspective.
Where relevant, it aimed to ensure that conditionality was applied.

A)	The Netherlands was opposed to offering a membership perspective
to EaP countries
While the ENP was designed to offer an alternative to enlargement, this did not prevent
several EaP states from expressing membership aspirations. The Netherlands had never
been in favour of offering (eastern) ENP countries a concrete EU-membership

perspective.27 The government repeatedly emphasised that the neighbourhood policy
neither constituted a prelude to EU membership nor offered a practical approach to the
theoretical membership perspective for Eastern neighbours derived from article 49 TEU.28
The main reasons for this stance were concerns about the impact of further enlargement
on the internal cohesion and functioning of the Union, as well as the lack of political and
public support for enlargement in the Netherlands itself and in many other member
states.29 The negative result of the ‘Ukraine referendum’ – in which over 61% of Dutch
voters rejected the Association Agreement that the EU had negotiated with Ukraine – aptly
illustrates this lack of support: the ‘no vote’ was partly motivated by fears of Ukraine
becoming an EU member.30 The government also argued that offering a membership
perspective would be at odds with the objective of maintaining constructive relations with
Russia.31 Finally, it did not want the EU to arouse false expectations amongst EaP
countries. In 2015, it repeated that EaP countries had no realistic membership
perspective.32
In line with the position outlined above, the Dutch government opposed explicit language
in EU or EU-EaP declarations on membership aspirations or prospects (see text box 10).
It was supported in this by the founding member states of the Union and by the Southern
member states. By contrast, most Central and Eastern European member states, as well as
some Northwest European member states, favoured an accession perspective for EaP
countries.

B)	The government supported a small rise in financial assistance, but was
strict on conditionality
The Dutch government was in favour of increasing expenses disbursed under the
European Neighbourhood Instrument. During the EU negotiations on EU external policy
spending for the period 2014-2020,41 it argued that overall spending on external relations
should be cut, for example by decreasing funding for the Instrument for Development
Cooperation (DCI) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).42 However, it
allowed expenses under the ENI to rise.43 Additional ENI expenses should not be paid by
extra member state funding, but by cutting funding for other programmes, such as
pre-accession assistance.44 Other instruments for which expenditures could be increased
were the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights (EIDHR).

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Text box 10 Dutch efforts to block references to membership perspectives
In the run-up to the Warsaw EaP Summit (29-30 September 2011), the discussion
focused on whether or not Article 49 TEU should be mentioned in the final declaration.
The Dutch drew up a non-paper with the Benelux partners,33 which strongly opposed
including the accession perspective in the ENP framework. They also worked together
with a relatively broad coalition in the Council against any reference to article 49 in the
Council conclusions.34 For the Netherlands and some other member states, the
phrase: a ‘European continent in which borders and barriers become less and less
relevant’, was anathema.35 Partly on the basis of a Dutch text proposal,36 the final text
spoke of ‘the objective of building a common area of ​​democracy, prosperity, stability
and increased interactions and exchanges’.37
In the run-up to the Vilnius EaP Summit (28-29 November 2013), the government
kept a keen eye on any wording in the final statement that would recognise
membership aspirations by the EaP countries. It aimed to ensure that the final
declaration did not deviate from the final declaration adopted in Warsaw.38 During the
negotiations, various partner countries lobbied to include a reference to article 49 TEU
alongside a reference to their ‘European aspirations’, but this was prevented by the
Netherlands, among others.39
Following the outcome of the Dutch ‘Ukraine referendum’, the government made
efforts to have the European Heads of State and Government adopt a statement
explaining certain aspects of the AA. The declaration that was eventually adopted,
spelled out that the AA did not grant Ukraine the status of ‘candidate country’. Nor
would there be any EU commitment to granting this in future.40

The government was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations on the 2014-2020
budget.45 Although the expenditure ceiling for external relations as a whole was increased
by 3%, this increase led to a much lower budget than that initially proposed by the
Commission.46 Moreover, the distribution of resources largely reflected the Dutch
priorities: the budgets for DCI and IPA were lowered (-11% and -0.5% respectively), and
more money was allocated to the ENI (+7%) and the IfS (+25%). The budget for EIDHR
remained virtually the same.47

The average share of the Dutch contribution to the EU budget (and, therefore, to the ENI
and its predecessor, the ENPI), was 5% (see table 3).

Table 3
Year

Dutch financial contribution attributable to ENI 2011-2016
ENI expenditure in EUR million

Dutch contribution (5%) in EUR million

2011

1 352

68

2012

2 359

118

2013

1 399

70

2014

1 620

81

2015

1 627

81

2016

2 140

107

The Dutch government’s position that more funding should be made available to ENP
countries testifies to the importance it attached to the ENP. In line with its insistence on
strictly applying conditionality, it took a vocal stance in the ENI (implementation)
committee, where it closely monitored whether conditionality and other principles laid
down in the relevant regulations were implemented effectively.48 It was also equally strict
on applying conditionality to Macro-Financial Assistance.49
In practice, the Dutch influence on the implementation of ENI assistance was limited.
Firstly, it did not find sufficient member states’ support for its position in the ENI
committee. Secondly, it was often not present at the initial stages of assistance
programming because the size of its bilateral assistance in ENI countries was relatively
small, and its expertise on issues such as ENI project implementation in several countries
was insufficient (see further below, paragraph 4.3).

C)	The government advocated market access
The Dutch government felt that trade relations with ENP countries should be strengthened
to mutual benefits.50 Trade agreements would not only strengthen trade relations, but
also provide the basis on which sustainable political transitions could take place. It
considered this argument to be particularly strong in relation to the MENA region, where
poor economic perspectives were thought to instil further radicalisation and unrest among
its populations.51 Chapter 2 has already shown that agreements with most MENA
countries, however, were limited in nature.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

In 2012, the Netherlands still saw opportunities for future cooperation based on the
European Economic Area (EEA) model, provided this was accompanied by an adequate
institutional framework, a favourable investment climate, and respect for the principles of
the rule of law in ENP countries.52 In practice, however, these ideas were too ambitious;
DCFTAs were the maximum that could be achieved in EU-ENP relations in the period
2011-2017. Therefore, the Dutch government wholeheartedly supported, both, the
negotiations on DCFTAs with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, and preparations for
negotiations with Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon. It suggested other trade initiatives be
implemented for countries that were not interested in DCFTAs.53 The government also
welcomed the fact that the 2015 ENP replaced the standard ‘trade liberalisation package’
with a package that included instruments for strengthening trade relations other than
through DCFTAs.54
The Netherlands also undertook efforts to increase market access for agricultural products
from ENP countries.55 For example, in 2011 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and his
German and British counterparts wrote a letter to the Commission and the HR/VP, in which
they proposed to increase market access for ENP countries, also by providing trade
concessions.56 They stated that market access was decisive for promoting democracy and
stability in neighbouring countries after the Arab Spring. This message was also put
forward by Dutch diplomats in relevant Council working groups.57 However – as paragraph
3.1 has already shown – market access for agricultural products was a contentious issue in
the Council. While the Dutch found support among a few Northwest European countries
and Central and Eastern European member states, the Southern member states
consistently blocked such initiatives.58 The Dutch also welcomed the temporary increase
in the olive oil quota for Tunisia.

D)	The government was reticent in granting mobility incentives, insisting
that strict conditions were met in advance
The Dutch government saw promoting mobility for ENP citizens, as well as controlling
regular and irregular migration, as central elements of the ENP. In practice, controlling
irregular migration was given priority under the ENP. The government was keen on
concluding EU return and readmission agreements with ENP countries, and it joined the
agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It was less keen on
granting ENP countries mobility benefits in return for such agreements.

Visa facilitation and liberalisation

Mobility partnerships

The government took a strict position on visa liberalisation and facilitation. It was not
unique in this stance, but it stood out thanks to its sharp wording and its insistence on
specific and detailed agreements.59 ENP countries should first conclude a readmission
agreement with the EU before becoming eligible for visa liberalisation or facilitation. The
government closely monitored the discussions in Council working groups to ensure that
this rule was observed. During negotiations on readmission agreements, it was reluctant
to refer to visa facilitation or visa liberalisation as a ‘reward’ for ENP countries’
cooperation. In line with the majority of member states in Council, it refused to grant
Southern ENP states visa liberalisation agreements; visa facilitation was its highest offer.60
The government did support negotiations on visa liberalisation for citizens from Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine.

EU member states are not obliged to engage in mobility partnerships concluded by the EU
with ENP countries. The Dutch government chose to stay out of some of these
partnerships, because the Ministry of Justice and Security expected active member state
support for capacity building in ENP countries to be too small to make a real difference.
The Dutch decisions on which partnership to join were based on a critical assessment of
(migration) relations with, and the situation in the individual countries. Eventually, the
Netherlands joined the partnerships with the EaP countries Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Armenia, and with the Southern ENP countries Morocco and Jordan. It has refrained from
joining the partnerships with Belarus, Moldova and Tunisia.

As soon as visa liberalisation processes were started, the Dutch government insisted that
quality should come before speed, and the visa liberalisation process should be carried out
with due regard to applicable rules, principles, and benchmarks.61 In line with this position,
the Netherlands played a leading role in efforts to include various checks and balances in
the visa liberalisation procedure. Several of the Dutch proposals were accepted in the
Council. This included the proposal that the Commission should use impact assessments
focusing on the broader consequences of visa liberalisation (in areas such as migration and
national security) as a basis for judging if this process should be continued. The Council
was given a greater say on whether a country could proceed to the next steps in the visa
liberalisation process – though not in the form of a legally binding decision, which the
Dutch initially lobbied for.
Finally, the Dutch preference for an emergency brake procedure was accepted by a
majority of member states. Initially, the procedure provided the EU with the option to
suspend visa freedom if the number of unfounded asylum applications from a visa-free
country were to increase, if the number of illegal immigrants in an EU member state
suddenly increased, or if cooperation on forced return were to stagnate. This procedure
was extended under the 2016 Dutch Council presidency. Following this extension, visa
liberalisation agreements can now be suspended if a country no longer meets any of the
relevant criteria. Member states, but also the Commission, may trigger this procedure.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Compacts
The Dutch government was in favour of linking migration and mobility agreements to
other dossiers, such as trade policy and development cooperation. Its ‘strategic country
approach’ provided the framework for its bilateral relations with third countries, especially
with countries of origin and transit. By granting or withholding a wide range of incentives,
countries were expected to cooperate on the return and readmission of migrants.62
However, the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) concluded that this
partnership approach did not work because of the high political and financial costs it
imposed on third countries.63
Nevertheless, at the EU level, the government promoted this model of cooperation with
third countries.64 In Council discussions, the Netherlands supported proposals to use a
wider range of instruments – for example trade liberalisation measures and development
aid – to tempt countries to cooperate.65 It also advocated sanctions if countries did not
cooperate.66 Although a number of (mainly Southern) member states supported
sanctions, it failed to obtain a Council majority.67 Eventually, the Council adopted
‘compacts’ as a model for cooperation with third countries on issues of return and
readmission (see Chapter 2). These involve a wider range of policy incentives, but they do
not include the possibility of imposing sanctions on countries that do not cooperate.
All in all, the Dutch government was reticent in granting mobility benefits to ENP
countries, and it aimed to ensure that countries complied with the relevant conditions
before benefiting from incentives. In the ENI committee and other relevant committees,
it closely monitored whether conditionality and other principles laid down in the
regulations were implemented effectively. It was also equally strict in applying

Paragraph 3.2 has shown that the ENP was criticised for lacking coherence. This will be
analysed in more detail below. We first address two types of coherence discussed earlier:
horizontal and vertical coherence. We then discuss institutional coherence among Dutch
actors relevant to the ENP.68

ENP’s appeal of a long-term development partnership, it still maintained that the EU
should be able to deploy military resources if necessary.74 It also suggested that the
Commission and the EEAS should explore opportunities to involve Southern
neighbourhood countries in CSDP missions in third countries, as had already been the case
for the Eastern neighbours (see Chapter 2.5).75 The Netherlands also supported the
ambitions of the Commission and the HR/VP to achieve greater complementarity with the
CFSP’s other policy areas.76 Both the search for complementarity and the idea that security
should be integrated into the ENP were widely supported in the Council, and they are
reflected in the 2015 ENP review document.77 However, since the member states failed to
agree on the degree of integration between ENP and CSDP, the reviewed ENP of 2015 still
leaves ample room for further integration (see Chapter 1).78 Thus, for several other
member states, the Dutch ideas went much too far.

4.3.1 The Netherlands supported integrating the ENP
into the CFSP/CSDP

4.3.2 The Netherlands’ bilateral approach was generally
in line with the ENP

Coherence between ENP objectives and between ENP instruments and other EU (foreign
policy) instruments was weak: there was no integrated approach to the neighbourhood
– according to which, ENP and non-ENP instruments would be implemented under the ‘EU
umbrella’. Moreover, the ENP was not integrated into the EU’s foreign policy towards the
region at large.

Section 3.5.2 has shown that the member states often did not act in line with the ENP: in
their bilateral relations with ENP countries, they often gave prominence to national
economic or security interests at the expense of the EU’s message on EU values. The
Netherlands, however, supported the ENP in a coherent manner.

conditionality to Macro-Financial Assistance. As a result, the government did not
contribute to making EU incentives more attractive to ENP countries.

4.3 The Netherlands supported ENP
coherence

The Netherlands provided constructive input into discussions on the ENP’s coherence,
focusing on three issues in particular. First, because of the EU’s strategic interest in security
in the neighbourhood region following the Arab Spring,69 the government took the view
that security should play a larger role in the ENP.70 Secondly, it argued that the ENP should
be integrated into the EU’s overall foreign policy.71 And finally, it favoured deploying all
instruments available to the EU in ENP countries on the basis of an overarching policy
strategy.72 Unilateral instruments – such as sanctions, EU Special Representative diplomatic
efforts, and civilian and military missions – did not have to become part of the ENP because
they were also employed outside the neighbourhood; but they did have to be used in an
integrated manner and as part of a clear overall EU political and security strategy.73
The government was clearly in favour of integrating the ENP and the CSDP. Whilst it
recognised that flexibility and excessively strong links with the CSDP could weaken the

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Dutch bilateral policy towards the neighbourhood region was largely based on thematic
policy frameworks rather than country-specific or regional policies; it was not until 2016
that policy frameworks for the Eastern and the Southern countries were introduced.79
Because of its largely thematic focus and its distribution over numerous funds and
programmes, Dutch bilateral assistance to the ENP countries was fragmented. With the
exception of Matra and Shiraka, it was not generally designed to complement the ENP,
although programmes generally did aim to contribute to achieving the ENP’s objectives of
security, stability and prosperity.80 In response to the changing security situation in the
neighbourhood after the Arab Spring, Dutch bilateral assistance increasingly tried to
address stability issues and their consequences. Expenditure on humanitarian assistance
and refugee shelter increased sharply, especially in Syria. The Netherlands also contributed
to conflict management operations in the South and the East. More information on Dutch
bilateral policy and assistance in general is available in Annex document on IOB’s website.
For Matra and Shiraka, please refer to box 11.

Text box 11 Dutch bilateral assistance in the neighbourhood: Matra and Shiraka81
The Netherlands implemented several bilateral assistance programmes in the
neighbourhood region. Between 2011 and 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ assistance
to the neighbourhood countries amounted to EUR 785 million, covering both official
development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA. Almost 80% was spent in the Middle East
(Syria, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon and Jordan). More details on Dutch bilateral
assistance in general are provided in Annex document on IOB’s website; this box focuses
on Matra and Shiraka, the only programmes aimed specifically at neighbouring
countries.82 Both are part of the Netherlands Fund on Regional Partnerships (NFRP).
Matra is implemented in the Eastern neighbourhood; Shiraka in Southern ENP countries.
Matra and Shiraka aim at supporting societal transformation in the neighbourhood
region. The programmes centre on capacity building and institutional strengthening of
CSOs and government institutions. In the southern region, Shiraka was also meant to
address socioeconomic issues. All eastern neighbourhood countries were eligible for
support from Matra.83 Support in the south focused on Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco
and Tunisia. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this focus would best serve
Dutch interests in the areas of security, trade, energy, and migration. The countries
selected are geographically close. The ministry considered they had the best prospects of
democratisation and stabilisation.
In 2015 IOB evaluated the effectiveness of Matra and Shiraka.84 Between 2008 and 2014,
EUR 44.3 million was disbursed for Matra. Following the Arab uprisings in 2011, EUR 7.7
million was made available to enable a rapid EU response to the region’s needs, by
reprioritising funds of existing central programmes implemented in the Arab region.
Between 2012-2015, EUR 45 million was allocated to Shiraka.
The IOB evaluations concluded that most projects achieved their short-term objectives
and could therefore be considered to have been effective at an output level. However,
their contribution to the long-term goals of democratisation, good governance and the
rule of law is likely to have been very small. This is explained by the programmes’ limited
budget and fragmented implementation, as well as the ‘transition-unfriendly’ context in
which these were implemented. Moreover, not all projects addressed the key challenges
faced in neighbourhood countries. Shiraka mainly supported non-state actors and
provided limited assistance to governments in transition. Besides, it was insufficiently

targeted to the priority countries in North Africa and to the policy objectives of
democratisation and the rule of law. The NFRP did better in the EaP countries; with its
focus on reforms in the areas of democratisation, strengthening the rule of law, and
developing the capacity of civil society and local government, Matra did address the key
challenges faced by these countries.
The programmes’ easy accessibility and flexibility gave an added value compared to EU
assistance. The high degree of freedom granted to embassies enabled them to adapt the
programmes to the needs and aspirations of neighbourhood countries. Moreover, due to
their small scale, relatively broad eligibility criteria, and lenient reporting requirements,
the programmes managed to reach small civil society organisations. As such, the
programmes stimulated local ownership.
Even though embassy involvement in the implementation of programmes was stronger
in the East than in the South, programme ownership on the part of the embassies was
generally high. The embassies were in charge of project implementation, which enabled
them to maintain and build up networks with societal actors, amongst which CSOs,
small- and medium-sized enterprises, government agencies, local government
institutions and parliament. This created not only ownership, but also programme
visibility of Dutch financial support within neighbourhood countries.
The IOB evaluations provided policy recommendations, most of which the minister
committed to implementing. The minister opted to sustain assistance in the
neighbourhood for a longer period of time, supporting the Arab region until 2025 and
the Eastern neighbourhood until 2020. Additionally, a more country-specific approach
was taken. Moreover, the minister committed to increasing staff capacity, both in The
Hague and at the embassies. Paragraph 4.3 shows that embassy capacity in some
countries has indeed been strengthened.
The aim of Shiraka was still to support durable transition leading to democratisation and
economic growth. While it thus retained its economic component, Shiraka would focus
more on creating the enabling conditions for economic growth by supporting economic
governance and relevant societal organisations. The various instruments available under
the programme would be applied in a more integrated fashion.

(Text box 11 continues on the next page)
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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

(Text box 11 - continuation)
The initial objectives of Matra were sustained. The minister stated Matra should
complement EU and international efforts in the region. Moreover, the minister
reaffirmed the need for the programme to be flexible, demand-driven and adaptable to
the characteristics of neighbourhood countries. One distinction was made from the
outset: within the group of eastern neighbourhood countries, the policy distinguished
between countries with and without an Association Agreement. With the former, Matra
would focus on stimulating reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and rule of

law. With the latter, it would focus on strengthening civil society. Finally, the minister
underlined that the programme should provide visibility to the embassies and support
the Dutch bilateral relations in the relevant countries by strengthening their informationand networking position.

Notwithstanding greater attention to stability, Dutch policy and Dutch assistance retained
their focus on democratisation, good governance, the rule of law and human rights,
private sector development, and trade promotion. Dutch embassies in neighbourhood
countries were vocal, visible and recognisable as promotors of EU values. Embassies were
particularly active on human rights. In Georgia, for instance, the embassy’s work
concentrated on gender issues, and in Tunisia the emphasis was on improving LGBT rights.
In Egypt, the member states were divided on how to address the human rights violations
committed by the Egyptian authorities, thereby hampering the EU delegation in
communicating a common position. The Dutch embassy, in the meantime, took a firm
stance in its bilateral dealings with local authorities, who considered the Netherlands as
‘hardly cooperative’ in comparison to other member states.

of its multi-annual strategic plans in 2013.85 In addition, the 2016 Council Conclusions on
Joint Programming – in which the member states reconfirmed their commitment to joint
programming – were adopted under the Dutch Council Presidency. They came about at the
initiative of the Netherlands and thanks to Dutch lobbying.

In Azerbaijan, too, the embassy was vocal when it came to human rights. It tried to strike a
delicate balance between staying true to promoting values and keeping friendly-enough
relations with the regime. Local EU and member state officials interviewed by IOB
appreciated the firm stance on human rights upheld by the Netherlands, although some
also suggested this position was sometimes counterproductive.

The Netherlands was in favour of joint programming, but Dutch embassies’
contributions were often modest
To improve the coherence of EU assistance and bilateral assistance, the Netherlands
advocated joint programming, provided this was done in a flexible and pragmatic manner
and was also open to non-EU states. The Netherlands indicated its willingness to take joint
programming into account in its own programming, and called upon its embassies in ENP
countries to coordinate with the EU and member states during the EU’s mid-term review

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Further details on Matra and Shiraka are provided in the Annex document on IOB’s
website.

Despite the government’s ambition to engage in joint programming, involvement of
Dutch embassies in this process in ENP countries was generally limited. This was partly
due to the fact that Dutch bilateral assistance in the neighbourhood was small compared
to that of other member states. With the exception of the Palestinian Territories, ENP
countries did not receive Dutch development assistance, and other types of bilateral
assistance were generally fragmented and (very) restricted in scope. As a result, embassies
had few staff and lacked in-depth thematic knowledge and insight into the
implementation of support on the ground. This hampered their role in joint programming,
especially in the Southern ENP countries, where several other member states still had
major development programmes. In the East, where member states in general had fewer
and smaller assistance programmes, the Netherlands was relatively better represented
with Matra, Shiraka and other Dutch assistance programmes.
Another factor hampering active involvement of Dutch embassies in joint programming
was that they were not all equally well-informed about or committed to joint
programming. In promoting joint programming, The Hague took a leading role. However,
many embassies wondered whether the benefits of joint programming outweighed the
burden it imposed on their limited staff capacity and financial means. Finally, the thematic
steering that characterises Dutch bilateral assistance raised doubts as to whether the
Netherlands was actually willing and able to give up several of its own programmes

for the sake of joint programming. Overall, in practice, the embassies were not able to take
a proactive role in contributing to joint programming.

4.3.3 Dutch institutional actors worked together
rather well
In chapter 3, the notion of institutional coherence applies to the working relations within
and among EU institutions and other actors. In the current paragraph, it is understood to
refer to the cooperation among the Dutch actors involved in ENP policy-making or
implementation: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) in The Hague, the Dutch Permanent
Representation in Brussels, the embassies, and sectoral ministries. We find that interministerial coordination worked well, that the extent of cooperation between BZ in The
Hague and embassies varied, and that intra-ministerial coordination could be improved.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague
BZ coordinated the Dutch policy contribution to the ENP. The external policy division of
the European Integration Department (DIE-EX) was responsible for drafting instructions
for the relevant Council working groups and for correspondence with the Dutch House of
Representatives. Two regional departments – the Europe department (DEU) and the North
Africa and Middle East department (DAM) – provided region-specific knowledge and
facilitated the embassies’ work in ENP countries. Depending on the issue at stake,
thematic departments – such as the International Trade Policy and Economic Governance
department (IMH) or the Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights Department
(DMM) – were involved as well. In 2012, the overall policy responsibility within the Ministry
was transferred from the Director-General for European Cooperation (DGES) to the
Director-General for Political Affairs (DGPZ). This reflected the more political nature
acquired by the ENP over time.
Cooperation between DIE-EX and the regional departments varied. Cooperation between
DIE-EX and DEU was facilitated by the fact that the six DEU countries were divided among
two or three country desk officers, which ensured a coherent policy input. Moreover, DEU
had a ‘Special Representative for EU-Russia relations and the Eastern Partnership’, who
had to ensure that the Dutch bilateral policy in relation to EaP countries corresponded to
the Dutch policy input for the ENP’s Eastern dimension. In practice, no significant
differences existed between the Dutch input in Brussels and the messages sent by
embassies in EaP countries.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Cooperation with DAM was more complicated because this department had one policy
officer for each of the Southern neighbouring countries, whose work was not focused on
ENP-related issues. Partly because of this, DAM’s input was mainly demand-driven.
Various staff members at the Ministry interviewed by IOB argued for DAM’s closer
involvement in ENP matters. DAM had a representational and coordinating role in the
ENP: a senior DAM officer represented the Netherlands at the UfM, was the National
Contact Point for Dutch participation in EU Twinning and TAIEX in all ENP countries,86 and
coordinated the Shiraka programme (see text box 11, above).

Diplomatic posts
The Permanent Representation (PermRep) of the Netherlands to the EU managed
relations with the EU institutions and coordinated ENP matters in Brussels. The
Netherlands had embassies in most Southern neighbourhood countries. Exceptions were
the Palestinian Territories, where it had a ‘Representation Office’ to the Palestinian
Authority, Libya and Syria. The embassies in Libya and Syria were evacuated in 2011 and
2012, respectively, due to the worsening security situation.87 In the EaP region, the
Netherlands had embassies in three out of six countries. The Netherlands was directly
represented in Azerbaijan,88 Georgia, and Ukraine. The embassy in Georgia was also
accredited for Armenia, and Belarus was covered by the embassy in Poland. Moldova was
initially covered by the embassy in Ukraine and, as of 2014, by the embassy in Romania.
Following a motion adopted by the Dutch House of Representatives in 2014, a number of
embassies in ‘the ring of instability’ were given extra staff (see the Annex document on
IOB’s website).89 The ‘Syria team’ in Turkey was expanded. For relations with the Eastern
countries, chargés d’affaires a.i. were posted in Belarus and Moldova. These investments
were also meant to increase Dutch involvement in EU cooperation on the ground.
Cooperation between the PermRep and BZ in The Hague was close. Cooperation on ENP
affairs between the Ministry in The Hague and the embassies was stronger in the East than
in the South, where the ENP was less of a guiding framework.

Other ministries
Various sectoral ministries were indirectly involved in the ENP, such as the ministries of
Security and Justice, of Economic Affairs, of Finance and of Education, Culture and Science.
The Ministry of General Affairs (namely, the Cabinet office) was mainly involved in
summits and dossiers with a national political dimension, such as the MH17 dossier and
the dossier on the ‘Ukraine referendum’.

Cooperation between BZ and these other ministries was informal and good. BZ was the
single ministry officially representing the Netherlands in Brussels and in neighbouring
countries. The other ministries approached Dutch relations with the neighbourhood
primarily from a sectoral perspective, while BZ approached these from a broader (geo)
political perspective. At times, sectoral ministries were more hesitant to engage with the
neighbours than BZ would have preferred. Such small differences in perspective on the
nature of engagements did not influence the coherence of the Dutch ENP contribution.

4.4 Dutch support for government ownership
of the ENP was inconsistent, but the
Netherlands did stimulate local civil
society ownership
Chapter 3 has shown that ENP ownership on the part of ENP governments and societies
was limited. Intentions to increase ownership did not materialise in practice. The ENP did
not differentiate sufficiently between regions and across countries, and it did not pay
sufficient attention to local needs, conditions and sentiments on democracy and human
rights. Nor did the EU build real partnerships with neighbourhood governments and
societies, wanting to impose its democratic values from the top down instead – values
that not all ENP countries have been willing or able to accept in the first place. Moreover,
despite its ambitions to increase support to civil society, the EU did not sufficiently invest
in civil society development.
The Dutch government recognised that the ENP suffered from a lack of ownership. Rather
than involving the EU and ENP governments as equal partners and allowing for
differentiation amongst countries, the ENP used a one-size-fits-all approach determined
and imposed by the EU. A more equal relationship was expected to positively impact ENP
governments’ willingness to cooperate on sensitive issues such as human rights and the
rule of law.90 The government was also in favour of better involvement in the ENP of civil
society and the private sector (especially SMEs) in ENP countries.91 Its concrete suggestions
to increase ownership (described below) had some positive results on societal ownership,
but their effects on government ownership were mixed.

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4.4.1 The Dutch insistence on values did not always
contribute to ownership
The Dutch insistence that the EU should promote its liberal democratic values in the
neighbourhood was not always helpful for increasing neighbourhood countries’
ownership of the ENP, since it sometimes clashed with local values, especially in the
Southern neighbourhood. The Dutch position was also insensitive to the (normative) role
played by other international actors (see Chapter 3.4).
The government expected the EU to be able to create an understanding among ENP
countries on the EU’s stance on interests and values. For this, the Union needed to seek
cooperation in areas in which individual neighbouring countries had the greatest needs
and to promote values in a ‘smart and flexible way’.92 The government suggested
promoting values ‘more intelligently’ by making cross-connections between policy
areas,93 for example by ‘mainstreaming’ human rights into assistance projects relating to
economic and security sector reforms. While still not very concrete and wide-ranging, this
approach did aim to address the issue of values in a more pragmatic, non-confrontational
way. This approach also followed the AIV’s advice on conducting a more pragmatic policy
of small steps towards the Southern neighbourhood.94

4.4.2 The Dutch plea for differentiation was positive,
but lacked precision
In discussions on the 2015 ENP review, the government acknowledged that the ENP had
not adequately responded to developments in ENP countries and had paid little attention
to the needs and aspirations of individual countries.95 While it felt that the ENP should
remain the overarching policy framework for the neighbourhood because its goals were
still relevant, it also argued for more differentiation between the Southern and the Eastern
region, as well as between ENP countries.96 This would allow the EU to be more
responsive to country differences and to changing circumstances in the neighbourhood.97
In the Dutch view, the EU first needed to acquire a better understanding of the interests of
individual neighbourhood countries and the extent to which they shared EU values, and
then shape cooperation accordingly.98 The Union should not impose aid on countries that

were not interested in cooperation; instead it should seek other ways to promote EU
values, for example by engaging first in functional cooperation in less sensitive areas such
as trade and infrastructure.99 The Dutch government also acknowledged that the
standardised national Action Plans that had guided relations between the EU and
individual ENP countries contained elements that were irrelevant to the latter and
sometimes provoked resistance, thereby hindering progress with reforms. Therefore, the
government argued in favour of abandoning standardised plans.100 However,
differentiation should not go so far as to relegate the principle of conditionality and
promoting values to second place; agreed reform objectives were to be non-negotiable,
and values, especially human rights, were to remain anchor points.101 What this meant in
practical terms, was left unspecified.
In an advice published in 2016, the AIV criticised the government’s lack of regard for the
different realities in North Africa. It argued that its rather general, abstract and principled
position limited policy effectiveness.102 While attractive to the domestic policy arena, the
Dutch stance risked bringing little improvement or even becoming counterproductive.103
Instead, the AIV called for a more pragmatic approach adapted to the different realities in
the region, including also adopting more focus and clearer priorities.

4.4.3 The Dutch focus on cooperation with local civil
society was positive
Apart from pleading for differentiation, the government also argued in favour of a
stronger partnership approach in the EU’s relations with ENP countries. By involving ENP
governments on a more equal footing, they would be more willing to cooperate in the
more sensitive areas of the ENP, such as human rights and the rule of law.104 Thus, a
partnership approach would serve the higher policy objective of ensuring countries’
compliance with EU values. The government also argued that greater involvement of civil
society and the private sector in ENP countries were important for improving the ENP’s
effectiveness.105 In practice, Dutch embassies cooperated with local CSOs in the
framework of bilateral assistance programmes, although – like other actors – they
sometimes faced constraints (see Chapter 3.3). They also tried hard to give CSOs a role in
the policy formulation process. These efforts were positive since they aimed at increasing
ownership.

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4.4.4 The Dutch insistence on increased Council control
contradicted its pleas for ownership
The Netherlands was strongly in favour of increasing Council control in the ENP’s
implementation. As demonstrated earlier, it actively lobbied for greater Council influence
on issues such as visa liberalisation, and insisted that the Council play an important role in
determining the EU’s interests and values prior to engaging in dialogue with ENP
governments. This reduced the extent to which ENP countries’ interests could be
accommodated in negotiations on association agendas and other issues, therefore
hindering the ENP’s ambition to increase ENP government ownership.
All in all, Dutch efforts at contributing to ownership produced limited effects. Importantly,
there existed tensions between these efforts on the one hand, and the government’s
insistence on increasing Council control over the ENP’s implementation on the other hand.
Since the government did not explicitly address these tensions, the extent of its
commitment to increasing ownership remained unclear.

4.5 Like most other EU actors, the Netherlands
initially overlooked the role of external
actors in the ENP
Chapter 3.4 has shown that the ENP was by no means the only game in town in
neighbourhood countries and that other actors challenged the leverage of the EU (for
instance because they offered considerable support to ENP countries) or produced spillovers affecting neighbourhood countries (for example, terrorism or migration). The EU
initially failed to take into consideration the precise extent to which external actors and
factors influenced the ENP. In the 2015 ENP review, it stated that it would begin to work
together with these actors.
Like the EU, the Netherlands initially overlooked the role played by external actors and
factors in the neighbourhood. The increasingly assertive foreign policy role played by
Russia in some of the Eastern ENP countries, as well as the refugee and migrant crisis
concerning the Southern neighbourhood, served as ‘wake-up calls’ not just for the EU,

but for the Netherlands as well. In discussions on the 2015 ENP review, the government
argued that the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ – as well as strategic actors such as the US,
China and Turkey – should be more involved in the ENP.106 The ENP should take into
consideration relations between these external actors on the one hand, and
neighbourhood countries on the other hand; the EU’s dialogue with external actors should
also focus more attention on the ENP so as to facilitate understanding and possibly
cooperation.107 Moreover, the government supported regional strategies (which had been
drafted for Iraq and Syria) and cooperation between the EU and other regional forums,
such as the Council of Europe, the African Union and the Arab League.108 These notions
were reflected in the 2015 ENP review, as Chapter 1 has shown. Still, neither the ENP review
nor the Dutch position indicates how coherence between the ENP and the EU’s approach
to the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ should be safeguarded.

4.6 The overall Dutch contribution to the ENP
was constructive, but on occasions
dogmatic and ambiguous
While Chapter 3 concluded that the ENP’s performance on key factors determining its
effectiveness was weak, the analysis in the current chapter demonstrates that the
Netherlands’ contribution to the ENP was overall constructive but at times dogmatic and
ambiguous. The Netherlands was convinced of the ENP’s rationale and added value for
promoting peace, prosperity and stability in the neighbourhood. Its position on the ENP
and its contribution to discussions on the 2011 and 2015 ENP revisions largely moved along
with general thinking on the ENP and largely coincided with the preferences of some of
the larger member states, the European Commission and the EEAS. The government was a
vocal and critical actor in the EU’s ENP discussions, insisting on strict application of
conditionality, emphasising the EU’s role in promoting democracy and human rights, and
advocating a prudent spending policy. It also insisted on withholding a concrete EU
membership perspective from EaP countries. It tabled constructive proposals to increase
policy effectiveness. However, some of its positions can be characterised as dogmatic and
ambiguous. These did not increase the ENP’s effectiveness in a positive direction.

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Conditionality
The Dutch stance on the ENP’s key concept of conditionality remained rather dogmatic.
Despite growing indications that conditionality was not generally effective in promoting
democratic reforms, the Netherlands continued to call for its application throughout the
period 2011-2017. The Dutch contributions to the policy discussions on the ENP’s revisions
in 2011 and 2015 suggest a move away from an uncompromising stance that both positive
and negative conditionality should remain part and parcel of the ENP’s toolbox, towards a
more pragmatic and realist approach, acknowledging that applying conditionality should
be weighed against other European and Dutch interests at stake in the EU’s changing
security environment. However, how this approach should be operationalised in concrete
situations, was left ambiguous. As a result, conditionality and its effective application
remained leitmotivs of Dutch policy thinking.
The government proposed several measures supporting strict and consistent application
of conditionality, some of which were accepted by the member states in the Council. For
example, the Council accepted the government’s proposal inviting the Commission to use
general impact assessments to judge whether the visa liberalisation process should be
continued. It also accepted the Dutch proposal to adopt an emergency brake procedure
allowing the EU to suspend visa freedom if certain criteria were no longer met. The
government did not find sufficient support for its proposals to introduce a more objective
and transparent procedure for measuring ENP countries’ progress on reforms.
On many occasions, Dutch parliamentarians insisted the government use conditionality to
promote democratic and human rights reforms. They filed motions for the general
application of conditionality in exchange for support to ENP countries, and also demanded
that negative conditionality be applied in reaction to human rights violations, for instance
in Egypt and Morocco. The government usually responded by promising to address such
human rights abuses in the EU’s discussions on the neighbourhood. After 2015,
conditionality also began to play a more important role in politically sensitive debates in
parliament and within the government coalition on stopping illegal migration from
Southern (ENP) countries. As a result, continued adherence to conditionality remained the
preferred Dutch policy option.

The Netherlands was often also less generous than many other member states in terms of
granting EU incentives to ENP countries, partly because of its position on conditionality,
and partly because of its unwillingness to grant visa liberalisation to Southern
neighbourhood countries. During the EU negotiations on EU external policy spending for
the period 2014-2020, the government agreed to a small rise in EU financial assistance in
exchange for further reforms in ENP countries. More so than other member states, the
Netherlands also routinely advocated trade liberalisation. This was attractive to some of
the Eastern neighbourhood countries, but not to many of the Southern neighbours, who
feared competition from EU producers. The Dutch supported the EU in insisting that ENP
countries conclude readmission agreements before being granted visa facilitation or
liberalisation. However, this limited the attractiveness of visa facilitation to Southern
countries. Finally, the Netherlands also successfully blocked proposals for offering Eastern
ENP countries a concrete membership perspective, which some member states considered
a stimulus for further reforms.

Coherence
The Netherlands contributed rather positively to the ENP’s coherence, which this policy
review has analysed on three different levels. The Dutch government supported the
coherence of ENP instruments and other foreign policy instruments. The government was
in favour of integrating security in the ENP, insisting the ENP be part and parcel of the EU’s
overall foreign policy, and argued in favour of deploying the entire range of EU
instruments available, based on an overarching policy strategy. The government also
supported integrating the ENP and the CFSP/CSDP. These are constructive positions. At the
same time, these were unlikely to be effective without addressing the underlying causes of
the EU’s lack of foreign policy coherence, such as unwillingness among member states to
coordinate their national foreign and security policies at the EU level. Moreover, some
proposals were insufficiently operationalised.
Like all other member states, the Netherlands maintained bilateral relations with ENP
countries. In the Eastern neighbourhood, the ENP was more of a guiding framework for
the government’s bilateral policy with ENP countries than in the South. Bilaterally, the
Netherlands acted largely in line with EU policy on the neighbourhood. Compared to other
embassies, Dutch embassies were particularly vocal on democratisation and human rights.

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Dutch bilateral assistance to neighbourhood countries was rather fragmented and not
generally designed to complement the ENP, although programmes did aim to contribute
to security, stability and prosperity. Matra and Shiraka, the only programmes specifically
targeted at the neighbourhood region, were explicitly aimed at complementing the ENP.
Their values-based approach was in line with the ENP, and their easy accessibility and
flexibility gave these programmes added value. The programmes’ limited budget and
fragmented implementation, however, restricted their effectiveness across the
neighbourhood. This was especially the case in Southern neighbourhood countries, where
the context was generally less conducive to democratisation than in EaP countries.
To increase coherence of both EU and member state assistance programming, the
government successfully advocated joint programming; Council conclusions confirming
member state’s commitment to joint programming were adopted under the Dutch Council
Presidency. However, because of the limited size of bilateral assistance to ENP countries,
Dutch embassies often lacked the capacity to meet the government’s ambition to play a
proactive role in joint programming, particularly in Southern neighbourhood countries.
Moreover, it was unclear as to whether the Netherlands was ready to engage in a division
of labour between the EU and its member states. Thus, while supporting joint
programming on paper, Dutch support remained limited in practice.
Finally, Dutch institutional actors worked together rather well. Inter-ministerial
coordination in The Hague was informal and good; the sometimes-different positions held
by other ministries on the nature of Dutch engagement with ENP countries did not
influence the coherence of the Dutch contribution to the ENP. Cooperation between the
Permanent Representation in Brussels and the Ministry in The Hague was close.
Cooperation on ENP affairs between the Ministry and the embassies was stronger in the
East than in the South, where the ENP was less of a guiding framework for embassies.
Finally, intra-ministerial coordination could be improved.

Ownership
The Dutch position on ownership of the ENP in the neighbourhood was inconsistent.
Firstly, the Dutch insistence that the EU should promote its values in the neighbourhood
was sometimes insensitive to local sentiments, which were not always positive about EU

values, especially in the South. Secondly, the government’s attempts to increase Council
control over the ENP’s implementation hindered the ENP’s ambition to increase ENP
government ownership. Since these tensions were not mentioned explicitly in government
documents, the extent of the government’s commitment to increasing ownership remains
unclear.
The Dutch government’s focus on cooperating with local civil society contributed to
enhanced ownership. Dutch embassies engaged with local CSOs in the framework of
bilateral assistance programmes, even though they sometimes faced constraints. The
government’s support for more differentiation between countries and regions was also
constructive.

External actors
While the ENP was by no means the only game in town in neighbourhood countries,
EU member states – including the Netherlands – initially overlooked the role played by
external actors and factors in the neighbourhood. The increasingly assertive foreign policy
role played by Russia in some of the Eastern ENP countries, as well as the refugee and
migrant crisis in the Southern neighbourhood, served as ‘wake-up calls’. In discussions on
the 2015 ENP review, the Dutch government argued that ‘the neighbours of the
neighbours’ and other actors should become more involved in ENP matters. However,
how this could be achieved, was not spelled out.

Endnotes | 4
1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

IOB, 2015a; 2015b. Information about other types of Dutch bilateral assistance to the
neighbourhood can be found in the Annex document on IOB’s website.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 4; 2013b: 5; 2017.

16

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011a; 2012c; 2013b; 2014; 2015b. In addition, the government
consistently noted that the ENP was partly aimed at policy areas of shared or exclusive EU
competence, such as trade, (short-term) visa, and development cooperation.
House of Representatives, 2011.
E.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012c: 6
Ibid.
Ibid.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013b: 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 5.
Ibid.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015d: 5.

19

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17
18

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27
28
29
30

AIV, 2014.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015a.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015d: 4.
Ibid.: 3.
Ibid.: 4.
House of Representatives, 2011.
House of Representatives, 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c.
House of Representatives, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c.
Ibid.
House of Representatives, 2015; 2018; Dutch Senate 2018.
The notion that positive and negative conditionality are guiding principles in the area of
migration appears e.g. from the government agreement of the current government coalition
(VVD, CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie, 2017: 52).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012c; 2013b; 2015b; 2015d; 2017.
See e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a: 3-4 and interviews.
Jacobs et al., 2016.

31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47
48
49

50
51
52

53
54
55
56
57
58

‘Excluding exclusive relations has become all the more relevant in the run-up to, but especially
after, the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, after which several Eastern neighbourhood
countries de facto found themselves faced with a choice between ‘East’ and ‘West’. The cabinet
finds that the neighbourhood policy needs to create bridges, not dividing lines. This is one of the
reasons why the Eastern Partnership is an independent trajectory and not an antechamber to EU
membership’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 5).
Dutch Senate, 2015.
Benelux, 2011: 2.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
Council of the European Union, 2011.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013c.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013d.
European Council, 2016.
These negotiations are part of the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011a; 2012a.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a: 18.
Ibid.: 7.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013a.
While the Commission proposed a budget accounting for more than EUR 70 billion, the
eventually agreed budget accounted for EUR 58.7 billion.

59

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013a.
Ibid.: 5.
See e.g. the government’s response to parliamentary questions on EU support to Ukraine (House
of Representatives, 2017).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012c: 7.
House of Representatives, 2016: 8.
The EEA currently governs relations between the EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012c: 7).
See e.g. Benelux, 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012c: 7; 2013b: 4; 2015b: 5.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015d: 5.
See e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012c: 7.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011b.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.

73

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60
61
62
63
64

65
66
67
68

69

70
71
72

74

75
76
77

78
79

80

Since the obligation for partner countries to take over all migrants who travelled to the EU
through their country made it difficult to conclude readmission agreements with (especially the
Southern) ENP countries, the Commission wanted to loosen this obligation. The Netherlands was
able to accept this, but commented that doing away with this clause could only apply to countries
at a great geographical distance from the EU, and which were not considered important transit
countries - in short, not to the ENP countries (BZ diplomatic telegram system).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011a: 5.
Ibidem.
Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, 2015: 4.
Ibid.: 8.
Positive and negative conditionality also remain guidance principles for the current Dutch
government; see: VVD, CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie, 2017: 52.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
Ibid.
Ibid.
It thus deviates from the subject covered in Chapter 3.5.3, which discusses institutional coherence
amongst EU actors.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 3; 2015b: 9. In one of its publications, the Advisory Council on
International Affairs (AIV) called the year 2015 a ‘watershed moment’ (AIV, 2015: 5).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b: 3.
Ibid.: 6-7.
Ibid.: 15.
Ibid.
This appeared from a seminar on the relationship between the ENP and the CFSP/CSDP, organised
by the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels on 15 July 2015.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015b: 15.
Ibid.: 15-16.
European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, 2015: 14.
Ibid.
This concerned a strategy paper on the Arab region drafted by the North Africa and Middle East
Department (DAM), and a policy memorandum on the EaP countries drafted by the Europe
Department (DEU); see Annex document on IOB’s website.
At least as far as these targeted EaP countries; Matra was also targeted at the pre-accession
countries.

81

82

83
84
85
86

87

88
89

Until 2016, these programmes were named ‘Matra East’ and ‘Matra South’, respectively. With the
establishment of the Netherlands Fund for Regional Partnerships (NFRP) in 2016 – which covers
both programmes – ‘Matra South’ was renamed ‘Shiraka’ and ‘Matra East’ was integrated into
the programme ‘Matra for European cooperation’ targeting both, the EaP countries, and the
pre-accession countries. In this policy review IOB uses ‘Shiraka’ and ‘Matra’.
Matra and Shiraka also cover the pre-accession countries in the Western Balkans, Turkey, and
non-ENP countries in the MENA region, amongst which Iran and Yemen.
Azerbaijan became eligible only in 2010.
IOB, 2015a; 2015b.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a: 25.
Twinning and TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) are EU instruments for
institutional cooperation between member states and partner country governments. TAIEX
consists of short-running activities (seminars, workshops), Twinning is longer term; a member
state civil servant is typically placed in a partner country’s administration for 1 to 1.5 years. Both
instruments are available for ENP as well as pre-accession countries.
Libya was then covered from Tunisia; in 2013 a special envoy for Syria was formed for contacts
with the Syrian opposition – this was placed at the Netherlands Consulate General in Istanbul
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).
This only formally via an embassy since 2013.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015c.

90
91
92
93
94

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b: 7.
Ibid.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015d: 4.
AIV, 2016: 49-50; similar AIV, 2014. In its 2016 advice, the AIV also argued that in case of serious
human rights violations, cooperation should not continue as if these violations had not taken
place.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b: 2.
Ibid.: 8.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.: 9
Ibid.: 8.
BZ diplomatic telegram system.
AIV, 2016: 50.
Ibid.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b: 7.
Ibid.
Ibid.: 16.
Ibid.
Ibid.: 17.

5	Beleidsopties in geval van significant minder
of meer middelen (-/+ 20%)
Alle beleidsdoorlichtingen die vanaf 2015 worden opgesteld, moeten volgens de Regeling periodiek evaluatieonderzoek (RPE)
een of meer zogenaamde 20%-besparingsvarianten bevatten: een beschrijving van beleidsopties voor het geval er significant
minder middelen beschikbaar zijn. Optioneel kunnen beleidsopties worden besproken voor het geval er meer middelen
beschikbaar zouden zijn.
Dit hoofdstuk gaat in op beleidsopties in het geval van minder middelen voor het European Neighbourhood Instrument
(paragraaf 5.1) en beleidsopties in het geval van besparingen op danwel intensiveringen voor het Nederlands Fonds voor
Regionale Partnerschappen (NFRP) Matra en Shiraka (paragraaf 5.2). Dit hoofdstuk is opgesteld door beleidsdirecties van
het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. IOB draagt hiervoor geen verantwoordelijkheid.
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5.1 Beleidsopties voor begrotingsartikel 3.1
In de begroting van Buitenlandse Zaken zijn geen middelen gereserveerd voor het
Europees Nabuurschapsinstrument (ENI) of andere externe EU-instrumenten die (mede) in
de ENB-landen worden ingezet. De Nederlandse toerekening voor het Europees
Nabuurschapsbeleid vindt plaats via de algemene EU-afdrachten, die opgenomen zijn
onder beleidsartikel 3.1 van de BZ-begroting. Het lopende Meerjarig Financieel Kader
(MFK) van de Unie voor de periode 2014-2020 omvat alle EU (beleids-)uitgaven; de
externe instrumenten maken hier onderdeel van uit. Op basis van de verdeling tussen de
lidstaten van de afdrachten onder het lopende MFK kan 5,2% van de EU-uitgaven voor de
externe instrumenten aan Nederland worden toegerekend.
Hoewel de Unie meerdere instrumenten hanteert waarmee steun aan
nabuurschapslanden wordt geboden, is het European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) het
enige EU-instrument dat daarvoor specifiek in het leven is geroepen. Verreweg het
grootste deel van steun aan de regio verloopt via het ENI. Binnen het lopende MFK is er
EUR 15.4 mld voor beschikbaar. De committeringen zijn min of meer gelijkmatig over de 7
jaren van het MFK verdeeld. De onderhandelingen voor het volgende MFK zijn gaande,
dientengevolge is de hoogte van de EU-uitgaven voor externe instrumenten over de
periode 2021-2027 nog niet bekend.
De EU-afdrachten zijn één van de verplichtingen van het lidmaatschap van de Unie.
Zodoende is de budgetflexibiliteit beperkt onder beleidsartikel 3.1. De afdrachten van
Nederland zijn daarnaast niet gekoppeld aan specifieke beleidsuitgaven van de Unie.
Nederland kan niet eenzijdig besluiten het totale budget voor ENB-instrumenten te
verlagen. Nederland kan evenmin eigenstandig (voorstellen voor) specifieke budgetten
voor projecten en programma’s in de nabuurschapslanden aanpassen in het ENI-comité,
waar besluitvorming omtrent de invulling van het ENI plaatsvindt. Niettemin wordt ten
behoeve van de evaluatie in deze paragraaf geschetst welke keuzes Nederland in haar
beleidsinzet zou kunnen maken in het theoretische geval onder het huidige MFK het totale
ENB budget met 20% zou worden gekort. Een dergelijke maatregel zou Nederland
ongeveer EUR 160 mln aan besparingen opleveren. Immers, Nederland draagt 5,2% bij aan
het ENI. Dit bedrag staat gelijk aan EUR 800 miljoen, 20 procent hiervan is EUR 160
miljoen.

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De aanbevelingen uit deze IOB-beleidsdoorlichting zijn vooral strategisch van aard en zien
bijvoorbeeld op aanpassing van de politieke inzet, efficiënter gebruik van netwerken en
het vergroten van de effectiviteit van het EU-optreden. Opvolging van deze aanbevelingen
leidt derhalve niet logischerwijs tot verlaging of verhoging van de beschikbare
ENB-middelen.

5.1.1 Geografische en thematische korting
Bij een verlaging van het ENB-budget zou Nederland scherper kunnen sturen op de
Nederlandse geografische en thematische prioriteiten. De uitgangspunten van de
partnerschappen met de verschillende nabuurschapslanden (vastgelegd in o.a. Partnership
Priorities en Association Agendas) lopen zeer uiteen als resultaat van de herziening van het
ENB in 2015 toen meer ruimte werd ingebouwd voor differentiatie in de relaties met de
nabuurschapslanden. Voordien werd meer een ‘one size fits all’-benadering voor de gehele
regio gehanteerd.
Binnen het ENB onderhoudt Nederland met een aantal landen nauwere banden dan met
andere. Voor prioritaire nabuurschapslanden heeft Nederland thematische speerpunten
geïdentificeerd. In de relatie met de meeste van deze landen is rechtsstaatontwikkeling
een belangrijke pijler. Veel van de overige speerpunten zijn landenspecifiek. Zo zet
Nederland in de relatie met de meeste zuidelijke nabuurschapslanden zwaar in op de
thema’s water, klimaat en energie. In de oostelijke nabuurschapsregio ligt de nadruk
vooral op persvrijheid, anti-corruptie maatregelen en economische ontwikkeling.
Een eerste optie bij een -20 % scenario is dat Nederland pleit voor een korting op de
thema’s die niet onder de Nederlandse speerpunten vallen in de voor Nederland prioritaire
landen. Voor de niet-prioritaire landen zou de korting evenredig kunnen worden verdeeld
over alle thema’s die zijn overeengekomen in de Partnershapsprioriteiten,
Associatieagenda’s en overige verbanden. In dit scenario zou bijvoorbeeld op de thema’s
democratie, rechtsstaat en anti-corruptie in Oekraïne en rechtsstaat, migratie en private
sector ontwikkeling in Tunesië niet worden gekort. Voor al het overige zou de korting
evenredig verdeeld worden over de resterende thema’s in deze prioritaire landen, en over
alle thema’s in de overige nabuurschapslanden.

Een dergelijk scenario heeft als voordeel dat de Nederlandse prioriteiten in termen van
landen en thema’s herkenbaar blijven. Een korting die niet verbonden is aan onvoldoende
voortgang op de gezamenlijke bepaalde hervormingsagenda zou echter op gespannen
voet staan met het uitgangspunt van conditionaliteit, en mogelijk de toewijding van zowel
de regering als het maatschappelijk middenveld in deze landen om de prioriteiten te
verwezenlijken ondermijnen. Over deze optie zou voorts naar verwachting geen
overeenstemming mogelijk zijn daar andere lidstaten andere focuslanden en -thema’s
hanteren.

5.1.2 Koppelen aan kernwaarden
Een andere optie is de beschikbare middelen sterker te koppelen aan de kernwaarden van
de Unie. Met de Partnership Priorities onderschrijven de EU en de partnerlanden het
bijzondere belang van universele waarden als (participatieve) democratie en fundamentele
rechten alsook van de bevordering en bescherming daarvan. De mate waarin
overeenstemming kan worden gevonden over deze waarden tussen de Unie en het
partnerland bepaalt mede de omvang van de financiële steun van de Unie voor het
partnerland. Er kan ervoor worden gekozen om de 20% korting vooral neer te laten slaan
in die partnerlanden waarmee de waardenovereenstemming het kleinst is. De middelen
voor landen waarmee de kernwaarden in sterkere mate worden gedeeld blijven in dit
scenario onaangetast.
Het tegenovergestelde zou ook kunnen worden bepleit. Zo zou in de relatie met
nabuurschapslanden waarmee intensieve samenwerking op het gebied van democratie en
rechtstaat geen gegeven is, vooral nadruk kunnen worden gelegd op economische
samenwerking. Dat zou betekenen dat de 20% besparing zou worden gezocht in
democratie- en rechtsstaatprojecten. Uiteindelijk kan hiermee mogelijk een gelijkwaardige
basis worden gecreëerd opdat er in een later stadium openingen ontstaan om
waardeverschillen te overbruggen.
Het directe gevolg van deze maatregel is dat er minder aandacht komt voor democratie en
de rechtsstaat in landen waar deze waarden al minder hoog aangeschreven staan. Burgers
en organisaties in deze landen die op de Unie rekenen bij het bevorderen van een
democratische rechtsstaat, zullen worden verzwakt en zullen zich wellicht minder op
Europa als waardengemeenschap oriënteren.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

5.1.3 Algemene korting
Tot slot kan ervoor gekozen worden de bijdrage per nabuurlandland en per thema
evenredig met 20% te korten. Een dergelijk scenario heeft als voordeel dat de maatregel
overzichtelijk en niet-discriminerend is. Wel betekent dit uiteraard dat er minder, en
minder omvangrijke, programma’s en projecten kunnen worden uitgevoerd. Dit kan
gevolgen hebben voor de output en de outcome van het nabuurschapsbeleid op voor
Nederland belangrijke thema’s als democratie, rechtsstaat, migratie, veiligheid en milieu,
al laten de precieze consequenties zich moeilijk voorspellen.

Appreciatie van de besparingsmaatregel
Een korting van 20% op het totale budget van het ENI is in de praktijk lastig realiseerbaar.
Het ENI en de andere externe instrumenten van de Unie, waarmee invulling wordt
gegeven aan het Nabuurschapsbeleid, komen uit de algemene en verplichte
EU-afdrachten. Nederland kan noch de hoogte van die afdrachten, noch het gedeelte
daarvan dat naar het Europees Nabuurschapsbeleid gaat, zelfstandig beïnvloeden. In het
kader van de huidige MFK-onderhandelingen is Nederland voorstander van het inbedden
van het ENI in het op te richten Neighbourhood, Development and International
Cooperation Instrument. Over het beschikbare budget wordt momenteel nog gesproken.
In algemene zin pleit Nederland voor een uitgavenplafond van 1% van het EU-27 bruto
nationaal inkomen en een eerlijkere verdeling van de afdrachten. Mocht een korting van
20% op het ENI-budget worden doorgevoerd onder het huidige MFK gaat de voorkeur
ernaar uit deze recht evenredig over alle landen en thema’s door te voeren,
overeenkomstig de hierboven beschreven optie 3. Deze optie is – zoals hierboven gesteld
- overzichtelijk en niet-discriminerend, en tast bovendien het principe van conditionaliteit
niet aan. Bovendien is dit van de drie geschetste scenario’s de meest haalbare, gelet op de
overeenstemming die hieromtrent met andere lidstaten gevonden moet worden.

5.2 Beleidsopties voor begrotingsartikel 2.5
In deze paragraaf worden enkele beleidsopties toegelicht bij een significante afname
(20%) in middelen voor het Nederlands Fonds voor Regionale Partnerschappen (NFRP).
Daarvoor zal allereerst de grondslag worden vastgesteld voor de 20% korting. Ook wordt
een scenario uitgewerkt voor een 20% verhoging van de beschikbare middelen.

Het Matra-programma en het Shiraka-programma maken beiden deel uit van het NFRP,
dat werd ingesteld n.a.v. de motie Servaes/Ten Broeke (34300 V, nr. 26). Geografisch gezien
richt het NFRP zich op de gehele ‘ring van instabiliteit’ rond de EU.

Een besparing of intensivering met 20% omvat de volgende bedragen en is gebaseerd op
de in tabel 1 vermelde inzet in ENB-landen.

Tabel 2 Overzicht financiële omvang besparing/intensivering ENB deel NFRP
De geografische inzet van Matra is tweeledig. Twee derde van het budget is gericht op de
EU pre-accessieregio (Westelijke Balkan + Turkije). Een derde deel wordt ingezet in de
Oostelijk Partnerschap (OP) regio, de Europese tak van het Europees Nabuurschapsbeleid
(ENB).
Het Shiraka-programma wordt ingezet in de hele Arabische regio en Iran, maar het accent
ligt op die landen binnen de MENA-regio die onder het ENB vallen. De inzet in de ENBlanden kan van jaar tot jaar verschillen en ligt rond de 90% van het totale Shiraka-budget
Als grondslag voor een 20% korting worden de bedragen genomen die in of voor ENBlanden worden aangewend, omdat de beleidsdoorlichting betrekking heeft op die groep
landen. De inzet van Matra in de preaccessie-landen en de 10% inzet van het Shirakaprogramma buiten de ENB regio worden dus niet meegenomen in de grondslag.
Bij de berekening van de grondslag wordt gebruik gemaakt van de in de ontwerpbegroting
2019 opgenomen bedragen, waarin de eerdere verhoging van het NFRP-budget,
doorgevoerd in de 1e suppletoire begroting 2018, is bestendigd. De Tweede Kamer is over
die verhoging geïnformeerd in een brief van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van 9 juli
2018 (kenmerk: minbuza-2018.753829).
Budgettair gaat het dit jaar en de komende jaren om de volgende bedragen:

EUR 1.000
NFRP-Matra

2018
788

2019
788

2020
788

2021
788

2022
788

NFRP-Shiraka

2.964

2.964

2.964

2.964

2.964

Totaal

3.752

3.752

3.752

3.752

3.752

Bij een besparing met 20% op het ENB-deel van het NFRP programma ligt een beperking
van het aantal landen waarop wordt ingezet niet voor de hand. De ENB-component van
het NFRP richt zich op de gehele ring van instabiliteit. Het verminderen van het aantal
doellanden zou zodoende leiden tot een ‘breuk’ in de ring. Dit laat onverlet dat de
intensiteit van de inzet in de verschillende landen kan variëren. Deze is afhankelijk van de
lokale situatie en perspectieven voor het bereiken van de doelstellingen van het NFRPprogramma. Een 20% besparing zou ingevuld kunnen worden door differentiatie van die
intensiteit. Zo zou sterker kunnen worden ingezet op landen met goede perspectieven
voor transitie. Anderzijds zou het ook denkbaar zijn dat juist wordt ingezet op die landen
waar het proces dreigt te stagneren. Bij het toekennen van budgetten op zowel centraal
als decentraal niveau wordt deze afweging altijd gemaakt.
Gelet op de wens een ‘breuk’ in de ring te voorkomen is een vermindering van 20% across
the board een geschiktere optie. In dit scenario blijft de groep doellanden intact voor zowel
de OP regio als de Shiraka regio, maar wordt het voor de regio’s beschikbare bedrag met
20% verlaagd. Er kan op een tweetal manieren invulling worden gegeven aan dit scenario:

Tabel 1 Overzicht artikel 2.5 budgetten Matra en Shiraka – ontwerpbegroting 2019
2.5 Bevordering van transitie
in prioritaire gebieden
Bedragen in EUR 1.000

2018

NFRP Matra

11.822

Waarvan in ENB-landen

3.940
16.464

NFRP-Shiraka
Waarvan in ENB-landen

14.818
28.286

Totaal NFRP
Totaal NFRP in ENB-landen

| 72 |

2019

18.758

2020

11.822
3.940
16.464
14.818
28.268
18.758

2021

11.822
3.940
16.464
14.818
28.268
18.758

1. het verlagen van het budget voor alle programmaonderdelen met 20%;
2.	het gericht en beleidsmatig onderbouwd verlagen van het budget voor een of meerdere
specifieke programmaonderdelen.

2022

11.822
3.940
16.464
14.818
28.268
18.758

11.822
3.940
16.464
14.818
28.268
18.758

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Binnen het NFRP staat de veranderende relatie tussen burger en overheid centraal, met
oog voor groeiende inspraak voor de burger en meer aandacht voor een overheid die
verantwoording aflegt aan de burger. Voor het realiseren van deze transitiedoelstelling is
de NFRP inzet dan ook tweeledig en gericht op blijvende veranderingen in 1) de positie van
de burger (veelal d.m.v. kleinschalige ambassadeprojecten i.s.m. het lokale

maatschappelijke middenveld) en 2) in de relatie tussen burger en overheid (d.m.v.
technische assistentie van NL [semi-]overheidsinstanties ). Het NFRP richt zich daarom
zowel op burgers als op overheden. Inzet op burgers zonder inzet op de overheid is niet
effectief. Anderzijds heeft ook inzet op alleen de overheid weinig effect. Inzet op beide
doelgroepen is complementair. In deze inzet zit een beleidsmatig weloverwogen
evenwicht. Besparing op slechts een van beide zou leiden tot een verstoring van dat
evenwicht, wat minder wenselijk is. Voor beide programma’s geldt dan ook dat, in het
geval van een onverhoopte korting van 20%, de voorkeur uitgaat naar verlagen van de
budgetten van specifieke programmaonderdelen waarbij de balans intact blijft.
Voor Matra-OP kan dit gerealiseerd worden door een van de volgende maatregelen te
nemen:

Maatregel 1

Tabel 3 20% korting NFRP Matra door niet opnieuw inzetten vrijvallende middelen Visegrád
fonds, wijziging in miljoenen

| 73 |

Er is gezocht naar mogelijkheden die het programma zo min mogelijk te schaden. De
beleidsdoorlichting stelt vast dat de samenwerking met het Visegrád fonds niet heeft
geleid tot de verwachte netwerkmogelijkheden voor de ambassades in de OP landen.
Bovendien stelt de Directie Europa vast dat de constructie waarin het Visegrád fonds als
tussenpersoon fungeert, leidt tot verminderd zicht op de effectiviteit en doelmatigheid
van de gefinancierde projecten. In aanloop naar het aflopen van de overeenkomst met
het Internationaal Visegrád Fonds per 1 september 2018 is dan ook besloten de bijdrage
niet te verlengen. Daardoor valt per jaar EUR 1,0 mln. vrij. In 2019 zijn deze middelen al
gecommiteerd voor technische assistentie gericht op overheidsinstanties in de
doellanden. Per 2020 bestaat echter de mogelijkheid EUR 0,8 mln. van het bedrag niet
opnieuw in te zetten waardoor een jaarlijkse besparing van EUR 0,8 mln. wordt
gerealiseerd.

Financiële gevolgen

Het grotendeels niet opnieuw inzetten van de middelen die vrijvallen door het niet
verlengen van de bijdrage aan het International Visegrád Fund for Eastern Partnership (IVF4EaP)
programme per 1 september 2018. Deze maatregel kan vanaf 2020 worden gerealiseerd
gelet op al vastliggende verplichtingen in 2019.

Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen
Niet opnieuw ingezette vrijvallende middelen
Visegrád fonds
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen na besparing

Onderbouwing

2019
3,9
0

2020
3,9
-0,8

2021
3,9
-0,8

2022
3,9
-0,8

3,9

3,1

3,1

3,1

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Het grotendeels niet opnieuw inzetten van de jaarlijkse bijdrage à EUR 1 mln. leidt tot een
verlaging van de Matra-OP uitgaven met 20% per 2020.

Beleidsmatige gevolgen
Deze zijn beperkt. In dit scenario worden de middelen die vrijkomen door de beëindiging
van de samenwerking met het Visegrád fonds niet opnieuw aangewend. De Nederlandse
financiële inzet in de OP-regio zal daardoor afnemen. Tegelijkertijd blijkt uit de
beleidsdoorlichting en bevindingen van de regio-directie en het postennetwerk dat de
zichtbaarheid d.m.v. het IVF4EaP programma beperkt was. Het niet aanwenden van de
vrijgekomen middelen gaat dan ook gepaard met hernieuwde aandacht voor de
Nederland inzet in de OP regio via de activiteiten vanuit zowel centrale middelen als vanuit
de gedelegeerde middelen van het postennetwerk die bijdragen aan meer zichtbaarheid
en een versterkt lokaal netwerk dan de beëindigde samenwerking met het Visegrád fonds.

Maatregel 2

Beleidsmatige gevolgen

Het in gelijke mate verminderen van de beschikbare middelen voor centrale projecten
voor overheidsondersteuning en decentrale projecten voor ondersteuning van het
maatschappelijk middenveld.

Tabel 4	20% korting NFRP Matra door besparing op ondersteuning overheden en maatschappelijk middenveld, wijziging in miljoenen
Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen
Besparing centrale projecten
overheidsondersteuning
Besparing decentrale projecten maatschappelijk
middenveld
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen na besparing

2019
3,9
-0,3

2020
3,9
-0,3

2021
3,9
-0,3

2022
3,9
-0,3

-0,5

-0,5

-0,5

-0,5

3,1

3,1

3,1

3,1

Onderbouwing
De kracht van het Matra-OP programma zit in de combinatie van grote, centraal
gecoördineerde twinning projecten (die vaak leiden tot langdurige samenwerkingsrelaties
tussen Nederlandse organisaties en instanties in de doellanden, zo blijkt uit de
beleidsdoorlichting) en decentrale ambassadeprojecten die in de beleidsdoorlichting
positief beoordeeld worden vanwege de flexibiliteit en toegankelijkheid op lokaal niveau.
Beide programmaonderdelen moeten dan ook behouden blijven. Het is echter wel
mogelijk om de budgetten voor beide onderdelen in gelijke mate te verlagen waardoor
zowel een blijvende evenwichtige focus op burger en overheid, als een verlaging van het
Matra-OP budget geraliseerd kan worden.

Een beperktere inzet op zowel overheidsondersteuning als de ontwikkeling van het
maatschappelijk middenveld zal leiden tot een verminderde impact van het Matra-OP
programma als geheel en een verzwakking van het lokale netwerk van het postennet in de
OP regio. De inzet van het instrument Matra draagt immers bij aan de positie van
Nederland (via de posten) als gesprekspartner voor zowel het maatschappelijk middenveld
als de overheid in de doellanden.
Voor Shiraka valt een 20% besparing te realiseren door de volgende maatregelen:

Maatregel 1
Een deel van het Shiraka-programma wordt uitgevoerd door ambassades. Daarbij gaat
het vooral om ondersteuning van lokale maatschappelijke initiatieven. In 2018 is hiervoor
EUR 5 mln. naar ambassades gedelegeerd. Voor 2019 en 2020 zijn de te delegeren
bedragen respectievelijk EUR 7 en 9 mln. Door verlaging van de gedelegeerde budgetten
tot 5 mln. in 2019 en 6 mln. in 2020 en volgende jaren kan in 2019 EUR 2 mln. worden
bespaard en vanaf 2020 EUR 3 mln.

Tabel 5 20% korting NFRP Shiraka door minder toename gedelegeerde budgetten posten,
wijziging in miljoenen
Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Shiraka in ENB-landen
Gedelegeerde budgetten posten: voorgenomen
verhoging grotendeels schrappen
Bedrag NFRP-Shiraka in ENB-landen na besparing

2019
14,8
-2,0

2020
14,8
-3,0

2021
14,8
-3,0

2022
14,8
-3,0

12,8

11,8

11,8

11,8

Financiële gevolgen
Een korting op centraal gecoördineerde twinning projecten met een bedrag van EUR
310.000 (20% van het voor dit programmaonderdeel beschikbaar budget) gecombineerd
met een korting van EUR 480.000 (20% van het voor dit programmaonderdeel
beschikbaar budget) op het budget voor decentrale ambassadeprojecten leidt tot een
vermindering van het totale Matra-OP budget met 20%.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Onderbouwing
De beleidsdoorlichting bevat geen concrete aangrijpingspunten voor het verlagen van het
Shiraka-budget. Gezocht is daarom naar mogelijkheden die het programma zo min
mogelijk schaden. Bij de gedelegeerde budgetten van de ambassades bestaat de meeste
flexibiliteit, omdat daaruit in het algemeen kortlopende activiteiten worden gefinancierd.

Financiele gevolgen

Financiële gevolgen

Met deze maatregel kan vanaf 2020 een besparing met 20% worden gerealiseerd.

Met deze maatregel kan vanaf 2020 een besparing met 20% worden gerealiseerd.

Beleidsmatige gevolgen

Beleidsmatige gevolgen

De beoogde sterkere inzet op het transitieproces op lokaal niveau door ondersteuning van
lokale maatschappelijke initiatieven en decentrale overheden kan niet worden uitgevoerd,
waar de beleidsdoorlichting positief is over gedelegeerde steun en benadrukt dat de
beschikbare budgetten beperkt zijn.

De beoogde sterkere inzet op het transitieproces op lokaal niveau kan niet volledig
worden uitgevoerd, waar de beleidsdoorlichting positief is over gedelegeerde steun en
benadrukt dat de beschikbare budgetten beperkt zijn. Daarnaast zullen er met het
stopzetten van het MENA-beurzenprogramma per jaar niet langer 150 bursalen naar
Nederland worden uitgenodigd. Het beurzenprogramma beoogt bij te dragen aan
capaciteitsontwikkeling in de doellanden en aan een positieve beeldvorming over
Nederland.

Maatregel 2
Het met EUR 2 mln. verlagen van gedelegeerde budgetten van ambassades (zie ook
maatregel 1) in combinatie met het stopzetten van het MENA-beurzenprogramma.
Hiermee kan al vanaf 2019 EUR 3 mln. worden bespaard.

Tabel 6 20% korting NFRP Shiraka door minder toename gedelegeerde budgetten posten in
combinatie met stopzetten MENA-beurzenprogramma, wijziging in miljoenen
Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Shiraka in ENB-landen
Gedelegeerde budgetten posten: voorgenomen
verhoging grotendeels schrappen
MENA-beurzenprogramma stopzetten
Bedrag NFRP-Shiraka in ENB-landen na besparing

2019
14,8
-2,0

2020
14,8
-2,0

2021
14,8
-2,0

2022
14,8
-2,0

-0,5
12,3

-1,0
11,8

-1,0
11,8

-1,0
11,8

Onderbouwing
In plaats van de vorige maatregel zou het mogelijk zijn minder te korten op de
gedelegeerde budgetten van de ambassades. Om dat te compenseren zal dan een ander
onderdeel van het programma moeten worden verminderd of stopgezet. Dat zou dan het
MENA-beurzenprogramma zijn, waarvoor jaarlijks EUR 1 mln. beschikbaar is. Het lopende
contract daarvoor eindigt per medio 2019.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Een verhoging van het budget van het NFRP maakt het mogelijk de impact te vergroten.
Daarom is ook een +20% variant opgenomen. De absorptiecapaciteit daarvoor in de
doellanden is zeker voldoende, al verschilt deze van land tot land. De behoeften aan
ondersteuning op verschillende niveau’s en thema’s zijn groot. Zowel voor NFRP-Matra als
voor NFRP-Shiraka geldt dat het relatief bescheiden programma’s zijn die in een
aanzienlijk aantal landen worden ingezet waarbij de vraag om financiering van
hervormingsprojecten nadrukkelijk groter is dan het beschikbare budget. Dit blijkt uit het
aantal aanvragen voor zowel de centrale (voornamelijk Nederlandse NGO’s) als de
decentrale middelen (ter ondersteuning van lokale NGO’s).
Gelet op de conclusies uit de beleidsdoorlichting van het Matra-OP programma zou bij een
verhoging van het budget met 20% in de OP regio ingezet worden op een van de volgende
scenario’s:

Maatregel 1
Gelijkmatig ophogen van zowel het centrale budget voor twinning projecten als het
decentrale ambassadebudget voor kleinschalige projecten i.s.m. lokale partners uit het
maatschappelijk middenveld;

Tabel 7 20% intensivering NFRP Matra door extra centrale en decentrale projecten, wijziging
in miljoenen
Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen
Centrale projecten overheidsondersteuning
Decentrale projecten maatschappelijk
middenveld
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen na
intensivering

2019
3,9
+0,2
+0,6

2020
3,9
+0,2
+0,6

2021
3,9
+0,2
+0,6

2022
3,9
+0,2
+0,6

4,7

4,7

4,7

4,7

Onderbouwing
Beide programmaonderdelen worden in de beleidsdoorlichting positief beoordeeld op
hun effectiviteit op projectniveau. Ook werd de doelmatigheid goed beoordeeld met de
kanttekening dat voldoende uitvoeringscapaciteit op zowel het departement als op de
posten aandacht verdient. Door extra in te zetten op beide programmaonderdelen zet het
Matra-OP programma extra middelen in daar waar de kern van het overkoepelende
NFRP-programma ligt: Vanuit de Nederlandse expertise op het gebied van democratie, rechtsstaat en
mensenrechten bijdragen aan de maatschappelijke transformatie die moet leiden tot een duurzame en
stabiele relatie tussen burger en overheid, met als additioneel oogmerk het investeren in de bilaterale
relatie met deze landen en in de partners van de toekomst. Een gelijkmatige verhoging van beide
programmaonderdelen zorgt ervoor dat de weloverwogen verhouding tussen inzet op de
ontwikkeling van het maatschappelijk middenveld en het ondersteunen van overheden
behouden blijft.

Financiële gevolgen
Een ophoging van het centraal gecoördineerde twinning projecten met een bedrag van
EUR 200.000 (25% van het voor dit programmaonderdeel beschikbaar budget)
gecombineerd met een ophoging met EUR 600.000 (25% van het voor dit
programmaonderdeel beschikbaar budget) van het budget voor decentrale
ambassadeprojecten leidt tot een toename van het totale Matra-OP budget met 20%.

Maatregel 2
Het jaarlijks beschikbaar stellen van een centraal beheerd budget voor middelgrote
projecten die op flexibele wijze, zonder het uitzetten van een tender gefinancierd kunnen
worden.

Tabel 8 20% intensivering NFRP Matra door opzetten faciliteit voor middelgrote projecten,
wijziging in miljoenen
Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen
Nieuwe faciliteit voor middelgrote projecten
Bedrag NFRP-Matra in ENB-landen na
intensivering

2019
3,9
+0,8
4,7

2020
3,9
+0,8
4,7

2021
3,9
+0,8
4,7

2022
3,9
+0,8
4,7

Onderbouwing
De budgetten voor centrale projecten t.b.v. technische assistentie van Nederlandse (semi-)
overheidsinstanties aan lokale overheidsinstanties, gefaciliteerd door ervaren Nederlandse
projectuitvoerders, worden meerjarig gecommitteerd. Hiermee wordt invulling gegeven
aan het beperken van de arbeidsintensiviteit (waargenomen in de beleidsdoorlichting) van
het Matra-OP programma. Tegelijkertijd zorgt volledige meerjarige committering ervoor
dat er weinig ruimte overblijft voor het ad hoc inspelen op lokale ontwikkelingen. Dit
terwijl de flexibiliteit van het Matra-OP programma juist positief uitgelicht is in de
beleidsdoorlichting.
Door jaarlijks een bescheiden, flexibel inzetbaar bedrag beschikbaar te stellen voor door
Nederlandse projectorganisaties uitgevoerde technische assistentie projecten wordt
invulling gegeven aan de wens van een financieringsinstrument waarmee op korte termijn
ook op Matra-OP centraal niveau ingespeeld kan worden op de actualiteit in de
doellanden.

Financiële gevolgen
Beleidsmatige gevolgen
Een grotere inzet op beide programmaonderdelen vergroot het bereik en de impact van
het Matra-OP programma als geheel en draagt bij aan een versteviging van het lokale
netwerk van het postennet in de OP regio.

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The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Het beschikbaar stellen van een budget van EUR 800.000 voor flexibel in te zetten centrale
projecten resulteert in een toename van het Matra-OP budget met 20%.

Beleidsmatige gevolgen

Onderbouwing

Het creëren van een flexibel inzetbaar programmaonderdeel voor centraal gecoördineerde
financiering zorgt er voor dat de Directie Europa i.s.m. het postennet op een flexibele en
ad hoc manier middelen kan inzetten voor interventies t.a.v. acute lokale ontwikkelingen.
Dit draagt bij aan de beleidsrelevantie van het programma en verstevigt de positie van NL
in de doellanden als land dat nauw betrokken is bij de ontwikkeling van de regio.

De beleidsdoorlichting geeft aan dat door de beperkte omvang van de programma’s ook
de impact klein is. Door zowel de op overheden als op de burger gerichte componenten te
verhogen kan de impact worden vergroot. In verband met de uitvoeringscapaciteit van de
betrokken ambassades zal een dergelijke maatregel gefaseerd moeten worden ingevoerd.

Financiële gevolgen
Voor de Shiraka-regio zou op de volgende optie kunnen worden ingezet:

Toename van het Shiraka-budget met 10% in 2019 en 20% in 2020.

Beleidsmatige gevolgen

Maatregel 1
Het gefaseerd verhogen van de gedelegeerde budgetten van ambassades in combinatie
met de verhoging van het budget voor op overheden gerichte activiteiten, beide met EUR
0,75 mln. in 2019 en nog eens EUR 0,75 mln. in 2020.

Een grotere inzet op maatschappelijke initiatieven in de doellanden, waardoor de impact
toeneemt. Daarnaast, en in evenwicht daarmee, ook een sterkere impact bij
kennisoverdracht aan overheden, waardoor meer kritische massa wordt verkregen.
Daarnaast kan Nederland een sterkere speler worden op het gebied van donorcoördinatie
en versterkt de positie van Nederland in de betrokken landen.

Tabel 9 20% intensivering NFRP Shiraka door extra centrale en decentrale projecten,
wijziging in miljoenen

NFRP Politieke Partijen Programma

Programmaonderdeel
Bedrag NFRP-Shiraka in ENB-landen
Centrale projecten overheidsondersteuning
Gedelegeerde budgetten posten: verhoging
Bedrag NFRP-Shiraka in ENB-landen na
intensivering

| 77 |

2019
14,8
+0,75
+0,75
16,3

2020
14,8
+1,5
+1,5
17,8

2021
14,8
+1,5
+1,5
17,8

2022
14,8
+1,5
+1,5
17,8

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Tot slot heeft een vermindering van NFRP-middelen voor de ENB-regio ook een direct
effect op het beschikbare budget voor het NFRP Politieke Partijen Programma. Dit is het
gevolg van de directe koppeling van het NFRP Politieke Partijen Programma aan het
gehele NFRP-budget.

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• http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/how-is-it-financed/index_en.htm
• https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/
international-economic-relations/macro-financial-assistance-mfa-non-eu-partner-countries_en
• https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/
key-documents_en?field_file_country_tid[0]=130
• https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/
key-documents_en?field_file_country_tid[0]=143
• https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/libya_en

European Court of Auditors (2016c), EU assistance to Ukraine, Special Report No. 32/2016,
Luxembourg.

• https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/
return-readmission_en

European Court of Auditors (2017), EU Assistance to Tunisia, Special report No. 3/2017,
Luxembourg.

• https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/
global-approach-to-migration

European External Action Service and European Commission (no date a), Programming of
the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2020, Regional East Strategy Paper
(2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017).

• https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/13967

| 83 |

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

• www.euneighbours.eu

Annex 2	Evaluation and study reports of the Policy
and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
published 2012-2019
The reports below can be downloaded from the IOB website: English.iob-evaluatie.nl.
Reports published before 2012 can be found on the archive of the IOB website: http://archief.iob-evaluatie.nl/en.html.
IOB no.
435

Year
2019

433

2019

431

2019

430

2019

429

2019

428

2019

427
427

| 84 |

2018
2018

Report
Diversiteit en samenhang. Beleidsdoorlichting
‘Consulaire dienstverlening en uitdragen
Nederlandse waarden’
Mind the governance gap, map the chain:
Evaluation of the Dutch government’s policy on
international responsible business conduct (20112018)
Strategieën voor partners: balanceren tussen
complementariteit en autonomie. Evaluatie van het
functioneren van strategische partnerschappen
tussen het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en
maatschappelijke organisaties
De burger centraal? Consulaire dienstverlening in
beweging 2011-2018
Smalle marges van economische diplomatie. ‘What
you see is not always what you get.’ Effectevaluatie
economische diplomatie 2010-2018
Less Pretension, More Realism: An evaluation of the
Reconstruction Programme (2012-2015), the
Strategic Partnerships in Chronic Crisis Programme
(2014-2016) and the Addressing Root Causes
Tender Process
Development and migration – Literature study
Ontwikkeling en migratie – Literatuurstudie

ISBN
978-90-5146-058-2

IOB no.
426

Year
2018

978-90-5146-057-5

425

2019

424

2018

423

2018

422

2018

422

2018

421

2018

420

2017

419

2017

418

2017

978-90-5328-999-0

978-90-5146-055-1
978-90-5328-999-0

978-90-5146-056-8

978-90-5328-502-2
978-90-5328-502-2

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Report
Monitoring and Evaluating Mainstreamed
Adaptation to Climate Change: A synthesis study on
climate change in development cooperation
The Dutch contribution to the European
Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017
Laveren met een vaste koers. Beleidsdoorlichting
non-proliferatie, wapenbeheersing en
exportcontrole van strategische goederen
Review of the monitoring systems of three projects
in Syria: AJACS, White Helmets and NLA
Transition and inclusive development in SubSaharan Africa: An Analysis of poverty and inequality
in the context of transition
Transitie en inclusieve ontwikkeling in Sub-Sahara
Afrika. Een analyse van armoede en ongelijkheid in
de context van transitie
Nederland als gastland voor internationale
organisaties – Evaluatie
Better Ways of Trading: Evaluation of Technical
Assistance for Trade Policy and Regulations
Food for thought: Review of Dutch food security
policy 2012-2016
Policy review of Dutch development aid policy for
improved water management, 2006-2016

ISBN
978-90-5328-499-5

978-90-5146-059-9
978-90-5328-500-8

978-90-5328-498-8
978-90-5328-501-5

978-90-5328-497-1

978-90-5328-494-0
978-90-5328-495-7
978-90-5328-496-4

IOB no.
417

Year
2017

417

2017

416

2017

415

2016

414

2016

413
413
412

2016
2016
2016

411

2016

410

2015

409

2015

408

2015

407

2015

406

2015

406

2015

405

2015

404

2015

| 85 |

Report
Policy review of Dutch cooperation with UN
development agencies
Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse
samenwerking met de ontwikkelingsorganisaties
van de Verenigde Naties
Shifting Interests, Changing Relations, Support
Under Pressure: Policy review of Dutch support to
Southern civil society development
The gaps left behind: An evaluation of the impact of
ending aid
Voorkomen is beter dan genezen. Nederland en de
WHO (2011-2015)
Policy Review Public Diplomacy 2010-2014
Beleidsdoorlichting publieksdiplomatie 2010-2014
How to break the vicious cycle: Evaluation of Dutch
development cooperation in the Palestinian
Territories 2008-2014
Cultuur als kans. Beleidsdoorlichting van het
internationaal cultuurbeleid 2009-2014
Vreedzame geschillenbeslechting en het tegengaan
van straffeloosheid. Beleidsdoorlichting
internationale rechtsorde
Evaluation of the Matra Programme in the Eastern
Partnership countries 2008-2014
Aided Trade: An evaluation of the Centre for the
Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries
(2005-2012)
Opening doors and unlocking potential: Key lessons
from an evaluation of support for Policy Influencing,
Lobbying and Advocacy (PILA)
Policy Review of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance,
2009-2014
Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse
humanitaire hulp 2009-2014
Gender sense & sensitivity: Policy evaluation on
women’s rights and gender equality (2007-2014)
Renewable energy: Policy review on the Dutch
contribution to renewable energy and development.
Summary report

ISBN
978-90-5328-493-3

IOB no.
404

Year
2015

403

2015

402

2015

401

2015

978-90-5328-492-6

978-90-5328-489-6

978-90-5328-484-1
978-90-5328-482-7
400

2015

978-90-5328-491-9
978-90-5328-487-2
978-90-5328-483-4

399

2015

978-90-5328-480-3

398

2014

978-90-5328-478-0

397

2014

978-90-5328-475-9

396

2014

395

2014

395

2014

394

2014

393

2014

978-90-5328-477-3

978-90-5328-474-2

978-90-5328-481-0
978-90-5328-473-5
978-90-5328-471-1
978-90-5328-476-6

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Report
Met hernieuwde energie. Beleidsdoorlichting van de
Nederlandse bijdrage aan hernieuwbare energie en
ontwikkeling
Premises and promises: A study of the premises
underlying the Dutch policy for women’s rights and
gender equality
Work in Progress: Evaluation of the ORET
Programme: Investing in Public Infrastructure in
Developing Countries
Evaluation of the MDG3 Fund: ‘Investing in Equality’
(2008-2011)
The Only Constant is Change: Evaluation of the
Dutch contribution to transition in the Arab region
(2009-2013)
Gender, peace and security: Evaluation of the
Netherlands and UN Security Council resolution
1325
Navigating a sea of interests: Policy evaluation of
Dutch foreign human rights policy 2008-2013
Riding the wave of sustainable commodity sourcing:
Review of the Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH 20082013
Access to Energy in Rwanda. Impact evaluation of
activities supported by the Dutch Promoting
Renewable Energy Programme
A strategic approach? Dutch coalition-building and
the ‘multi-bi approach’ in the context of EU
decision-making (2008-2012). Summary, main
findings and issues for consideration
Strategie bij benadering. Nederlandse
coalitievorming en de multi-bi benadering in het
kader van de EU-besluitvorming (2008-2012)
Autonomy, partnership and beyond: A
counterfactual analysis of policy coherence for
Ghana
Balanceren tussen koopmanschap en diplomatie.
Evaluatie van de Netherlands Business Support
Offices 2008-2013

ISBN
978-90-5328-472-8

978-90-5328-469-8

978-90-5328-470-4

978-90-5328-468-1
978-90-5328-467-4

978-90-5328-465-0

978-90-5328-460-5
978-90-5328-464-3

978-90-5328-463-6

978-90-5328-462-9

978-90-5328-462-9

978-90-5328-459-9

978-90-5328-458-2

IOB no.
392

Year
2014

391

2014

390

2014

389

2014

389

2014

388

2013

388

2013

387

2013

386

2013

385

2013

384

2013

383

2013

382

2013

382

2013

| 86 |

Report
Good things come to those who make them
happen: Return on aid for Dutch exports
Useful patchwork: Direct Funding of Local NGOs by
Netherlands Embassies 2006-2012
Investeren in wereldburgerschap. Evaluatie van de
Nationale Commissie voor Internationale
Samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (NCDO)
In search of focus and effectiveness: Policy review of
Dutch support for private sector development
2005-2012 (extensive summary)
Op zoek naar focus en effectiviteit.
Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse inzet voor
Private Sector Ontwikkeling 2005-2012
Évaluation d’impact des foyers améliorés au Burkina
Faso : Étude de l’impact de deux activités
bénéficiant du soutien du Programme de promotion
des énergies renouvelables
Impact evaluation of improved cooking stoves in
Burkina Faso: The impact of two activities supported
by the Promoting Renewable Energy Programme
Between Ambitions and Ambivalence: Mid-term
Evaluation SNV Programme 2007-2015
Evaluation issues in financing for development:
Analysing effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on
developing countries.
Economic diplomacy in practice: An evaluation of
Dutch economic diplomacy in Latin America
Achieving universal access to sexual and
reproductive health and rights: Synthesis of
multilateral contribution to advancing sexual and
reproductive health and rights (2006-2012)
NGOs in action: A study of activities in sexual and
reproductive health and rights by Dutch NGOs
Buscando novas relações : Avaliação da política
externa dos Países Baixos para a América Latina.
Informe especial sobre o Brasil
En busca de nuevas relaciones: Evaluatión de la
politica exterior de los Paísos Bajos en América
Latina. Resumen del informe principal

ISBN
978-90-5328-456-8

IOB no.
382

Year
2013

381

2013

380

2013

379

2013

378

2013

377

2013

376

2013

375

2013

978-90-5328-446-9

374

2013

978-90-5328-445-2

373

2012

372

2012

978-90-5328-453-7

372

2012

978-90-5328-450-6

372

2012

978-90-5328-455-1
978-90-5328-454-4

978-90-5328-461-2

978-90-5328-451-3

978-90-5328-452-0

978-90-5328-449-0

978-90-5328-448-3
978-90-5328-447-6

978-90-5328-444-5

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Report
Op zoek naar nieuwe verhoudingen. Evaluatie van
het Nederlandse buitenlandbeleid in LatijnsAmerika
Balancing Ideals with Practice: Policy evaluation of
Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive
health and rights 2007-2012
Linking Relief and Development: More than old
solutions for old problems?
Investeren in stabiliteit. Het Nederlandse fragiele
statenbeleid doorgelicht
Public private partnerships in developing countries.
A systematic literature review
Corporate Social Responsibility: the role of public
policy. A systematic literature review of the effects
of government supported interventions on the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviour of
enterprises in developing countries
Renewable Energy: Access and Impact. A systematic
literature review of the impact on livelihoods of
interventions providing access to renewable energy
in developing countries
The Netherlands and the European Development
Fund – Principles and practices. Evaluation of Dutch
involvement in EU development cooperation (19982012)
Working with the World Bank. Evaluation of Dutch
World Bank policies and funding 2000-2011
Evaluation of Dutch support to human rights
projects. (2008-2011)
Beziehungen, Ergebnisse und Ertrag: Evaluierung
der Zusammenarbeit in der Benelux-Union aus
niederländischer Perspektive. Haupterkentnisse und
Anregungen
Relations, résultats et rendement. Évaluation de la
coopération au sein de l’Union Benelux du point de
vue des Pays-Bas
Relaties, resultaten en rendement. Evaluatie van de
Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands
perspectief

ISBN
978-90-5328-443-8

978-90-5328-442-1

978-90-5328-441-4
978-90-5328-440-7
978-90-5328-439-1
978-90-5328-438-4

978-90-5328-437-7

978-90-5328-436-0

978-90-5328-435-3
978-90-5328-433-9
978-90-5328-431-5

978-90-5328-434-6

978-90-5328-431-5

IOB no.
371

Year
2012

371

2012

370

2012

369

2012

369

2012

368

2012

367

2012

366

2012

366

2012

365

2012

364

2012

| 87 |

Report
Convirtiendo un derecho en práctica. Evaluación de
impacto del programa del cáncer cérvico-uterino del
Centro de Mujeres lxchen en Nicaragua (2005-2009)
Turning a right into practice. Impact evaluation of
the Ixchen Centre for Women cervical cancer
programme in Nicaragua (2005-2009)
Equity, accountability and effectiveness in
decentralisation policies in Bolivia
Budget support: Conditional results – Review of an
instrument (2000-2011)
Begrotingssteun: Resultaten onder voorwaarden
– Doorlichting van een instrument (2000-2011)
Civil Society, Aid, and Development: A CrossCountry Analysis
Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid
– Beleidsdoorlichting 2006-2010
Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the
Dutch Development Cooperation 1990-2011
Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen –
Beleidsdoorlichting van het
OS-beleid 1990-2011
Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept
– De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch
Concept 2010
Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie:
Methoden en Resultaten van onderzoek.

ISBN
978-90-5328-432-2

978-90-5328-429-2

978-90-5328-428-5
978-90-5328-427-8
978-90-5328-426-1
979-90-5328-425-4
979-90-5328-424-7
978-90-5328-423-0
978-90-5328-422-3

978-90-5328-421-6

978-90-5328-420-9

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
english.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
Photo credits:
• Photo cover: Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia (Shutterstock).
• Photo Main findings and recommendations: Egyptians voting on constitutional
amendments, Cairo, Egypt, 20 April 2019 (Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Introduction: Boulevard Flame, Baku, Azerbaijan (Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Part I: Protesters at Independence Square, renamed ‘EuroMaidan’, Kyiv, Ukraine,
4 December 2013 (Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Chapter 1: Sign at Tbilisi international airport, Georgia (unknown).
• Photo Chapter 2: Eastern Partnership Summit, Brussels, Belgium, 24 November 2017
(Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Chapter 3: European Parliament building, Brussels, Belgium (Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Part II: Presidential elections, Kyiv, Ukraine, 21 April 2019 (Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Chapter 4: Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel, Dutch Prime Minister Mark
Rutte and Luxembourg Prime Minister Xavier Bettel, sit at a meeting with Tunisia’s
President Beji Caid Essebsi during their joint Benelux PM visit, Tunis, Tunisia,
5 December 2016 (Hollandse Hoogte).
• Photo Chapter 5: Euro notes (Hollandse Hoogte).
Layout: Optima Forma bv commissioned by Xerox/OBT | The Hague
Print: Xerox/OBT | The Hague
ISBN: 978-90-5146-059-9
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | September 2019

| 88 |

The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017

| The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017 | IOB Evaluation No. 425 | The Dutch contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2017 | IOB Evaluation No. 425 | The Dutch contribu

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
english.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | September 2019