Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence
Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on
the Common Security and Defence Policy

Brussels, 15 October 2013
"I would say there are three cases for security and defence. The first is political, and it
concerns fulfilling Europe's ambitions on the world stage. The second is operational:
ensuring that Europe has the right military capabilities to be able to act. And the third is
economic: here it's about jobs, innovation and growth".
HRVP / Head of the Agency speech at the European Defence Agency (EDA) annual conference, Brussels 21 March 2013

I. The strategic context
The debate on capabilities, military or civilian, needs to flow from an understanding
of the strategic context, building on the solid basis of the 2003 European Security
Strategy and its 2008 implementation report. This first part of my report sets out the
strategic context, puts forward priorities, and assesses the state of play of Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) against this overall background, in accordance
with the tasking by the European Council in December 2012.
Europe's strategic environment today is marked by increased regional and global
volatility, emerging security challenges, the US rebalancing towards the AsiaPacific and the impact of the financial crisis.
The world as a whole faces increased volatility, complexity and uncertainty. A
multipolar and interconnected international system is changing the nature of power.
The distinction between internal and external security is breaking down. Complex
layers of governance and new patterns of interdependence empower new players and
give rise to new challenges. As a result, state power is becoming more fragile. Among
the drivers for this are: changing demographics and population growth, embedded
inequalities, and new technologies.
Intra-state conflict, with the potential to transcend national boundaries, has become
more commonplace. This is particularly true in the EU's neighbourhood, where, in
particular to the south, the Arab uprisings while full of promise have also led to
increased instability and conflict. To the east, frozen conflicts remain, the most recent
outbreak of open conflict having occurred in August 2008. In the Western Balkans,
and in spite of remarkable progress over the last decades including the recent
breakthrough in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, unfinished business
remains. Increasingly also the "neighbours of the neighbours" are being affected, e.g.
in the Sahel or in the Horn of Africa, two regions where the Union is conducting five
crisis management missions.
In addition to long-standing threats – proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, failed states, regional conflict and organized crime - there are also new
security threats, such as cyber attacks, as well as new risks such as the consequences
of climate change, and increased competition for energy, water and other resources
both at a national and international level.
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To address these challenges, the transatlantic relationship remains essential. The
renewed emphasis by the US on the Asia-Pacific region is a logical consequence of
geostrategic developments. It also means that Europe must assume greater
responsibility for its own security and that of its neighbourhood. European
citizens and the international community will judge Europe first on how it performs in
the neighbourhood.
Recent military operations have demonstrated that Europeans lack some of the
necessary capabilities, in particular in terms of strategic enablers such as air-to-air
refuelling, strategic airlift, intelligence and surveillance. In addition, the financial
crisis continues to squeeze defence budgets while elsewhere defence spending is
increasing. According to a recent report by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, global defence spending is shifting "from the West to the rest"1.
Europe needs to develop the full range of its instruments, including its security
and defence posture, in the light of its interests and these geostrategic
developments.
At the same time, the European defence market is also feeling the effects of the
financial crisis. Europe’s defence industries are not only important for our security, by
providing capabilities for our armed forces, but also for jobs, growth and innovation.
Yet, the European defence market remains fragmented in terms of demand and
supply. The question is whether this is sustainable in view of today’s economic and
budgetary realities.
In sum, Europe faces rising security challenges within a changing strategic context
while the financial crisis is increasingly affecting its security and defence capability.
These developments warrant a strategic debate among Heads of State and
Government.
Such a debate at the top level must set priorities. I wish from the outset to set out my
view on priorities:
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The Union must be able to act decisively through CSDP as a security
provider, in partnership when possible but autonomously when necessary, in
its neighbourhood, including through direct intervention. Strategic autonomy
must materialize first in the EU's neighbourhood.

-

The Union must be able to protect its interests and project its values by
contributing to international security, helping to prevent and resolve
crises and including through projecting power. The EU's call for an
international order based on rule of law and its support for effective
multilateralism need to be backed up by credible civilian and military
capabilities of the right type, when required.

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The ability to engage with partners is crucial in any crisis. The EU must
build regional and bilateral partnerships to be able to both cooperate in crisis

1

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013 Yearbook "Armaments, disarmament
and international security".
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management and help build the capacity of partner organisations and third
states.
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In a context of increased volatility and new threats, there is a particular need to
improve the ability to engage rapidly. Drawing as necessary on military
capabilities, the EU should be able to engage all 5 environments (land, air,
maritime, space and cyber). In addition to our traditional yet increasing
dependence on security at sea, we have become increasingly dependent on
space assets – indispensable in today’s operations - and on the ability to
operate in cyberspace.

-

The comprehensive approach – the use of the various instruments at the
disposal of the Union in a strategically coherent and effective manner - must
also apply to capability development, to make best use of scarce resources.

We need to place CSDP within this overall context, and against these priorities.
There have been many positive achievements during the 15 years since St. Malo and
the Cologne European Council. The EU has created structures, procedures, decisionmaking bodies for CSDP and has acquired considerable operational experience,
having deployed close to 30 missions and operations in three continents. It has
developed partnerships with the UN, NATO and the African Union. Following the
Treaty of Lisbon, the ambition to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen
international security" has become an explicit objective of the Union (article 21 TEU).
The Union is currently deploying, through CSDP, more than 7,000 civilian and
military personnel. More importantly, the engagement of our men and women in the
field is producing results: the EU's maritime operation ATALANTA has drastically
reduced the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and security in Somalia has
greatly improved thanks to the training provided by EUTM Somalia to 3,000 Somali
recruits and the EU funding of AMISOM. EUPOL Afghanistan has trained up to
5,000 Afghan police officers, and EULEX Kosovo plays a key role in accompanying
implementation of the recent Belgrade-Pristina agreement. In the Sahel, the Union is
deploying a military mission (EUTM Mali) and a civilian mission (EUCAP Niger
Sahel), both of which contribute to stabilizing the region. The impact of CSDP has
raised interest among many partners (the US, Asia, Middle-East,…). In short, the EU
is becoming an effective security provider, and is increasingly being recognized
as such.
But CSDP also faces challenges: there is no agreed long-term vision on the future of
CSDP. Decision-making on new operations or missions is often cumbersome and
long. And securing Member States’ commitment to supporting missions and
operations, especially when it comes to accepting risk and costs, can be challenging,
resulting in force generation difficulties. CSDP also faces recurrent capability
shortfalls, either due to a lack of commitment or because the capabilities are not
available, as well as various legal and financial constraints resulting in difficulties to
act rapidly.
Recent trends include:

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-

CSDP is becoming part of a wider, more comprehensive approach, i.e. part
of a strategically coherent use of EU instruments.

-

A tendency towards capacity-building missions in support of conflict
prevention, crisis management, or post conflict management: indirect action to
complement direct action.

-

CSDP is increasingly an integral part of bilateral relationships with third
countries and with international and/or regional organisations. Concrete
cooperation has resulted in an increased number of security and defence
dialogues with partners.

The combination of expanding security challenges and contracting financial resources
points toward growing interdependence within the Union to effectively provide
security for its citizens, now and in the long term. No Member State alone can face all
of the security challenges; nor do they have to. Doing more in common, to cooperate
and coordinate more, is increasingly essential.
And in this context, there is a need to address the question of overall defence budgets,
imbalances in defence spending across Member States (including between investment
in personnel and equipment), as well as capability gaps and duplication among
Member States.
The peace and security of Europe has always been a prerequisite for its economic
welfare; we now need to avoid Europe’s economic difficulties affecting its
capacity to deal with security and defence challenges. For the EU to live up to its
role as security provider means that European citizens and the international
community need to be able to trust and rely on the EU to deliver when the situation
demands. We must move from discussion to delivery.
The following paragraphs contain suggestions and proposals to that effect.
***
II. Proposals and actions to strengthen CSDP
Cluster 1: Increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP
1. Further develop the comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis
management and stabilisation
The Union has at its disposal many external relations policies and tools - spanning
diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development and humanitarian aid, as
well as the external dimension of EU internal policies - to deliver the end result that
Member States and the international community seek. This is the EU's main strength
at the international level. To better communicate this approach, work on a Joint (High
Representative/Commission) Communication on the Comprehensive Approach is in
hand. It can build on successful concrete examples, e.g. in the Horn of Africa or the
Sahel.

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CSDP crisis management instruments pursue short-term objectives, whereas
development instruments are by nature oriented to the long term. Whilst objectives
and decision-making procedures are different, this allows for natural synergies and
complementarities enabled by an early and intense dialogue between the respective
players, and a better alignment is needed.
More concretely, the revised Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures were
endorsed by PSC at the end of June. They aim at streamlining the CSDP decisionmaking procedures, whilst at the same time ensuring joined-up EU action principally
by using shared awareness and joint analysis across the EU, thereby establishing
synergies and complementarity from the outset. Individual tools can then deliver
within their own decision-making processes the activity required to reach the shared
objective. In addition, a proposal for a revised Exercise Policy will be put forward in
the autumn.
A joined-up approach will enhance the overall impact and deliver enduring results. A
number of regional or thematic strategies are in place or under development to
ensure such an approach, in addition to the existing Horn of Africa and Sahel strategic
frameworks. This is also valid for the Western Balkans, which are moving closer to
the EU, and where a variety of EU tools and instruments is being used.
Way forward:
- put forward a Joint Communication on the EU Comprehensive Approach, a policy
document to lock in progress achieved and provide the basis for further concrete
work;
- endorse and give renewed impetus to the EU Comprehensive Approach;
- strengthen further a regional perspective and ensure close cooperation and
alignment between the different CSDP missions and operations in a region (Sahel,
Horn of Africa, Western Balkans), as well as political/development activities to
increase their impact, effectiveness and visibility;
- continue elaborating or updating regional security strategies (for instance as
regards the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea; Afghanistan/Pakistan);
- strengthen further the EU's engagement with the Western Balkans and its overall
coherence.
2. Working with partners
The European Union is firmly committed to working in close collaboration with
partners: working with partners is an integral part of a comprehensive approach; the
Common Security and Defence Policy is an open project. Partnerships can build
upon the knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities of our partners, while also
drawing them closer to the EU.
The UN, NATO and the AU
The UN stands at the apex of the international system. The long standing and unique
co-operation between the EU and the United Nations spans many areas, and is
particularly vital when it comes to crisis management. At the operational level,
cooperation with the UN is dense and fruitful. Recent theatres include Mali, where a
joint assessment team examined the needs for supporting the Malian police and

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counter-terrorism, and Libya, where the EU cooperates closely with UNSMIL. The
considerable experience gained in working together in different theatres is
accompanied by a regular high level dialogue. In addition, work on the EU-UN Plan
of Action to enhance CSDP support to UN peace keeping is being carried forward, to
further maximize the potential of the EU-UN relationship.
Strong, coherent and mutually reinforcing cooperation between the EU and
NATO remains as important as ever. There are regular meetings between the High
Representative and the NATO Secretary General. Staff to staff contacts and
reciprocal briefings at all levels facilitate and support that high-level dialogue and
cooperation. Operating side by side in a number of theatres, the EU and NATO share
an interest in jointly delivering effect. In developing capabilities, we remain
committed to ensuring mutual reinforcement and complementarity, fully recognising
that the Member States who are also NATO Allies have a single set of forces. In this
regard, capability development within the Union will also serve to strengthen the
Alliance. Taking stock of earlier EU suggestions to help further improving relations,
we should continue to strive to remove remaining impediments for formal
cooperation, including with regard to the exchange of documents, and consider jointly
addressing new security threats.
Progress was made on the three dimensions of the peace and security partnership
between the EU and the African Union: strengthening the political dialogue, making
the African peace and security architecture (APSA) fully operational and providing
predictable funding for the AU’s peacekeeping operations. In light of the EU's
reaffirmed commitment to enabling partners, further impetus could be given at the
occasion of the EU-Africa summit in April 2014.
Participation in CSDP missions and operations
Non-EU NATO Allies and candidate countries are among the most active
contributors to CSDP activities and good cooperation continues in various fora and
informal gatherings as well as bilaterally. In addition, the European Union has signed
an increasing number of Framework Participation Agreements with third countries, to
facilitate and foster their participation in CSDP missions and operations. Twelve
such agreements are in force, two more are ready for signature (Australia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina) and for three countries (South Korea, Chile, Georgia) negotiations have
reached an advanced stage. In addition, and following a decision by the PSC, the
Union regularly invites third countries to participate to specific CSDP missions and
operations, with partners providing key assets, expertise and knowledge.
Security and defence dialogues
Many active dialogues in the field of CSDP have been developed with countries and
organisations beyond the signatories of an FPA. CSDP is systematically raised in the
EU's political dialogue with third parties as well as in relevant counterterrorism
dialogues. Such dialogues with partners in the neighbourhood in particular could also
address security and law enforcement sector reform and democratic control over the
armed forces. The newly created Panel on CSDP of the Eastern Partnership (EaP)
opens new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and EaP
countries.
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One size does, however, not fit all: a tailor-made approach is of benefit in better
adapting such cooperation to the EU's and partners' respective expectations and
interests.
Building the capacity of partners
The support to capacity-building of local and regional partners, for instance in
Niger, Mali and Somalia or through actions in support of the Africa Peace and
Security Architecture (such as AMANI Africa etc) is becoming a core capability. We
should support partners - individual countries and regional organisations - to
increasingly take the responsibility for preventing crises and managing them on their
own.
The EU is already well engaged in supporting regional or sub-regional organisations.
Building on the lessons learned from Somalia and Mali, we need to improve our
ability to engage directly with the countries concerned. Training national security
forces - which represent the essential building block of any regional or sub-regional
force - is a key element of building the African peace and security architecture. This
might imply developing tools similar to those at our disposal to support the African
Union and the sub-regional organisations.
Further efforts should aim at better synchronising and coordinating the use of
different instruments, fully recognising the nexus between security and development
and enhancing our collective ability - the EU and its Member States - not only to train
and advice but also to equip partners. Today, the EU can train but often it cannot
equip. In this context there are lessons to be learned from the experience with
bilateral support through the Member States, clearing house mechanisms, trust funds
and project cells in missions.
Way forward:
- continue to develop the partnerships with the UN and NATO focusing on stronger
complementarity, cooperation and coordination;
- further encourage and facilitate contributing partners' support to CSDP, with a
focus on non-EU European NATO Allies, strategic partners and the partners from the
EU's neighbourhood;
- operationalize the Panel on CSDP under the Eastern Partnership taking into
account the results of the upcoming EaP Vilnius Summit;
- explore the use of available instruments to assist in progress towards international
standards of transparency and accountability of security and defence institutions of
partner countries;
- focus increasingly on concrete deliverables in the dialogue with partners,
recognising their specificities, sensitivities and possible added value;.
- address capacity building of partners from a more holistic and comprehensive
angle, including the specific "train and equip" challenge;
- reinforce the peace and security partnership with the African Union and continue
strong support to the African Peace and Security Architecture, notably through the
support provided to the AMANI cycle of military and civilian exercises;
- search for complementarities and synergies between CSDP operations and other
community instruments with a view to developing an EU comprehensive strategy;
- agree that appropriate instruments (concept, organisation, funding) be developed to
engage in supporting national security services.

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3. Respond to upcoming security challenges (‘networked security’)
The importance of networks in today's globalized world cannot be overestimated.
Satellite navigation; communications and imagery, the ubiquity of computers, access
to energy: these affect the daily life of citizens. Accordingly, the security of space
and cyber networks is crucial for modern societies, as is energy security.
Progress in these various areas is unequal, but they are being addressed:
A joint Commission-High Representative Cyber Security Strategy has been
published and endorsed by the Council. The strategy emphasizes achieving EU-wide
cyber resilience by protecting critical information systems and fostering cooperation
between the public and private sector, as well as civilian and defence authorities. It
recommends focusing on enhanced EU-wide cooperation to improve the resilience of
critical cyber assets, as well as on training, education, technologies, crisis
management procedures, cyber exercises and the industry and market dimension. To
implement its objectives, the EU could develop a Cyber Defence Policy Framework,
focusing on capability development, training education and exercises. Additionally,
Member States have agreed the EU Concept for Cyberdefence in EU-led military
operations.
The EU and its Member States need to protect their space assets (e.g. Galileo). As the
EU role in space evolves, so too will the security and CFSP dimensions of the
European space policy. Space must be considered in all its aspects, encompassing
technology, innovation and industrial policy, and must ensure strong civil-military
coordination. The EU continues strongly to promote a Code of Conduct for outer
space activities.
Energy security is a key objective of the EU energy policy. Foreign Ministers have
been discussing how foreign policy can support EU energy security. The European
Defence Agency and the EU Military Staff are addressing this further as regards
capability development aspects as well as measures to improve energy efficiency by
the military.
Way forward:
- recognize the importance of cyber and space networks and energy security for
European security;
- ensure that cyber infrastructure becomes more secure and resilient within critical
infrastructure in the EU. To increase the resilience of the communication and
information systems supporting Member States' defence and national security
interests, cyber defence capability development should concentrate on detection,
response and recovery from sophisticated cyber threats.
- consider developing an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, defining also the
division of tasks between the Member States and CSDP structures to (1) promote the
development of EU cyber defence capabilities, research and technologies with the
EDA Cyber Defence Roadmap; (2) protect networks supporting CSDP institutions,
missions & operations; (3) improve Cyber Defence Training Education & Exercise
opportunities for the Member States; (4) strengthen cooperation with NATO, other
international organisations, the private sector and academia to ensure effective

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defence capabilities; (5) develop early warning and response mechanisms and to seek
synergies between civilian and defence actors in Europe in responding to cyber
threats.
- take the necessary steps to ensure the integrity, availability and security of space
systems. The EU will play its part in establishing the European Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) capability, based on assets from Member States and in cooperation
with partners. The EU needs to prepare for its role in space-related crisis
management to be able to address threats to its space assets;
- further incorporate energy security into foreign policy considerations.
- call for increasing energy efficiency and environmental responsibility in CSDP
missions and operations.
4. Increase our ability to address maritime and border challenges
Europe's maritime security is an integral part of its overall security. It is a crucial
domain. Modern economies depend heavily on open sea lanes and the freedom to
navigate (90% of European trade is by sea): strategic stockpiles are now based at sea,
across the globe, on route from supplier to customer. In the near future, new sea lanes
could open up with important geostrategic implications. The Arctic in particular will
require increasing attention in terms of maritime safety, surveillance and
environmental protection.
The EU has strategic maritime security interests around the globe and needs to be
able to safeguard them against significant maritime risks and threats - ranging from
illegal migration, drug trafficking, smuggling of goods and illegal fishing to terrorism
maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea as well as territorial maritime disputes and
acts of aggression or armed conflict between states.
To be a credible and effective partner, the EU needs a strategic, coherent, functional
and cost-effective approach to maritime security. We can build on the successes of
EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the EU's first naval operation, and on a
significant number of other maritime security related EU initiatives to internal and
external capacity building. The purpose of a European Union Maritime Security
Strategy is to bind all these together.
Border security is an integral part of the EU's security. Terrorism, weapons
dissemination, illicit trafficking (drugs and humans in particular), illegal immigration
and organized crime affect the direct interests of the EU's Member States. It is
therefore in the EU's interest to help build the capacities of third States to control
their own territory, manage flows of people and goods and address their respective
security challenges, while also fostering economic prosperity.
The EU has a variety of suitable instruments at its disposal in this regard: Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument, FRONTEX, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), as well as other
EU external cooperation instruments. The most recently established mission –
EUBAM Libya – is the first CSDP mission fully devoted to border management.
There would be merit in developing a more joined-up approach to capacity building
of Third States and regions. The first objective could be to facilitate, starting e.g. in
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the Sahel, EU support for the financing of infrastructures and equipment for border
management forces, and improve and better coordinate the advisory and training
actions.
Way forward:
- put forward a joint HR/Commission Joint Communication containing elements for
an EU Maritime Security Strategy on maritime security and build upon it to foster
concrete progress in the areas of joint awareness and collective response;
- develop a joined-up EU approach to helping Third States and regions better manage
their borders (e.g. in the Sahel).
5. Allow for the deployment of the right assets, timely and effectively on the
whole spectrum of crisis management operations
The world faces increased volatility, complexity and uncertainty. Hence the ever
increasing strategic value of rapid response: the Union needs to be able to swiftly
assess crises and mobilize its various instruments; speedy assessment and deployment
can make the difference.
Rapid deployment of civilian CSDP missions
Over the past few months a broad consensus has emerged on the need to further
improve the planning, conduct and support of civilian CSDP missions, and in
particular to expedite their deployment.
A roadmap has been established to tackle shortcomings in the setting up of civilian
CSDP missions, concerning inter alia financial rules, logistics, and staff selection. It
puts forward proposals concerning ownership, political buy-in, sustainability,
rapidity of deployment, financing, and mission support. Work on these various
strands needs to be taken forward between now and December, and further impetus
may be required at the level of the European Council.
Meeting the logistic needs of new civilian CSDP missions, in particular during startup, will be further facilitated by the permanent CSDP Warehouse that became
operational in June 2013. The Warehouse has the capacity to store strategic equipment
primarily for the effective rapid deployment of 200 personnel into the area of
operation of a newly-launched mission within 30 days of the approval of the Crisis
Management Concept by the Political and Security Committee. The Warehouse was
used for providing equipment to EUBAM Libya. There has been progress in the
creation of dedicated instruments and tools (e.g. goalkeeper software) to improve the
recruitment and training of civilian personnel for CSDP. As regards mission
support, a feasibility study on the creation of a shared services centre has been
launched.
The revision of the Crisis Management Procedures should allow improved access to
funding for civilian CSDP missions, and thus facilitate quicker deployment. This
would mean an earlier presence of the core team in the theatre of operations. The
Head of Mission should also be appointed at an earlier stage and thus be fully
involved in the build-up of the mission. In the interests of the more efficient operation
of civilian CSDP missions, there is also scope to review relevant provisions in the
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Financial Regulation and as regards procurement rules (as also set out in the EEAS
review).
Military rapid response
With regard to military rapid response, the case for highly capable and interoperable
forces, available at very short notice for EU operations, is stronger than ever.
Within the broader area of rapid response, Battlegroups continue to be the flagship
military tool. At their April meeting this year, Defence Ministers highlighted the
need to improve the effective employment of the EU Battlegroups (EU BGs) and
their operational relevance. EU BGs have been and are still instrumental for helping
reinforce the interoperability and effectiveness of Member States' military forces, but
they have yet to be deployed.
Work is under way to increase the Battlegroups' usability in the field, while
maintaining the level of ambition and sticking to the common commitment of all
Member States to the sole military capabilities on stand-by for possible EU rapid
response operations. While efforts should intensify to mitigate the persistent gaps in
the EU BG roster, a number of avenues are being considered to make BGs more
usable. With discussions still on-going, these include:
-

developing Battlegroups' "modularity" would allow incorporating the modules
provided by the Member States most interested in a given crisis, avoiding a too
rigid and prescribed composition of the EU BGs, and allowing for more
proportionate contributions according to Member States' means.

-

enhancing further the "exercises" and "certification" dimension of EU BGs
would lead to greater interoperability, readiness and operational effectiveness of
Member States' forces. Efforts to seek synergies with NATO - notably in the
context of its Connected Forces Initiative – should allow ensuring coherence and
mutual reinforcement.

-

improving advanced planning on the most likely crisis scenarios requiring the
use of an EU rapid reaction

The future of the EUBGs is but one part of the wide Rapid Response concept that
provides capabilities fit for all environments either in support of a land based response
or separately utilising the advantages of either European Air or Maritime capabilities
or both. The challenge of Rapid Response is the need to adapt to a range of scenarios
– this means flexibility and adaptability.
In addition, there would be value in further developing its rapid response toolbox.
This would reinforce our ability to react to the wide range of possible crises rapidly,
but also flexibly, mobilising the required capabilities possibly in combination with
other instruments including civilian ones. This could include the means to assess
crises and possible responses by the development of structured civil-military rapid
reaction assessment teams.

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In parallel, cost sharing or common funding, while being sensitive issues, must be
addressed to foster Member States' involvement and help find consensus on EU BGs
or other Rapid response assets' deployment.
Crisis management structures
The effectiveness of EU security and defence policies also relates to appropriate
structures and processes. The revised Crisis Management Procedures have further
improved the fast track procedure. The present CSDP system raises a number of
questions in terms of the positioning and reporting lines of the relevant EEAS
departments in relation to the HR/VP and relations with other parts of the EEAS and
the speed and effectiveness of decision-making, in particular in crisis situations.
While the debate on structures is part of the overall discussion on CSDP, concrete
progress is to be taken forward in the context of the EEAS review.
The Lisbon Treaty
There is an unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of rapid deployment.
The Treaty provides for a Start-Up Fund made up of Member States' contributions for
CSDP tasks which are not, or cannot be, charged to the Union budget. However, so
far there appears to be no consensus on creating such a Fund.
Secondly, Article 44 opens up the possibility for the Council to entrust the
implementation of a task to a group of Member States that are willing and have the
necessary capability for such a task. This article could be used in the context of rapid
reaction, when consensus exists, and a group of Member States is willing to provide
capabilities and take action on behalf of the Union. This offers benefits in terms of
flexibility and speed of action. Its application would be ad hoc, when a situation
arises, but its potential scope of application should be further explored with the
Member States. In a way, the case of Mali, with one Member State deploying quickly
with others providing niche support such as strategic transport, prefigured such an
approach.
Way forward:
- implement the roadmap on rapid deployment of civilian missions, for stocktaking in
December and further impetus if required; consider reviewing the financial
regulation as applying to civilian CSDP;
-Ministers to endorse in November a new approach to the EU’s military Rapid
Response, including the Battlegroups;
- discuss with Member States their willingness to address the issue of an increase of
common funding areas of application and enhanced Member State support for CSDP
missions and operations;
- consider improvements in terms of structures and processes in the context of the
EEAS review;
- consider the relevant Lisbon Treaty articles, in particular article 44 TEU.
6. Increase the focus on conflict prevention and post conflict management
Conflict is cyclical. 90% of violent conflicts occur in places that have previous
experience in the past thirty years. It is therefore often difficult to neatly sequence
conflict prevention and peace-building actions. In this regard, however, all CSDP

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missions and operations may be seen as directly or indirectly contributing to conflict
prevention, and some have this objective at the core of their mandate.
More generally, conflict analysis is a key requirement for exploring options available
to the EU for prevention, crisis management and peace-building, on the basis of a
shared understanding of the causes and dynamics of violent conflict. Furthermore, an
early warning system is also being developed to analyse short- and long-term risks
of violent conflict more generally and identify early response options. This system has
already been piloted in the Sahel region and is about to be rolled-out further. Finally,
the crisis preparedness component of the Instrument for Stability continues to fund the
training of civilian and police experts to participate in stabilization missions.
With regard to post-conflict management, conflict sensitive programming is
essential in order to ensure that, to the extent possible, EU actions avoid negative
impacts and maximise positive impacts on conflict dynamics, thereby contributing to
conflict prevention, peace building and long-term sustainable development.
A joined-up approach, including through joint efforts or joint programming of EU
assistance with EU Member States has the potential to further strengthen the EU's
impact and its contribution to conflict prevention and sustainable development. In
joint programming EU and its Member States (and possibly other donors) conduct a
joint analysis of the country situation leading to a joint response strategy and a
division or labour across sectors. In addition, indicative multi-annual allocations will
be provided. In more than 40 countries joint programming is now taken forward,
including in more than 10 fragile states. It is worth noting that in the global context
so-called "New Deal country compacts" are developed (Somalia a very recent
example) which have much in common with joint programming. How the two
processes could feed into each other should be further explored.
Way forward:
- extend the use of conflict analysis, continue to build a culture of conflict sensitivity
across the EU system;
- build on lessons-learned with regard to joint programming and New Deal country
compacts.
7. Improve CSDP visibility
It is important to communicate to the public at large that security and defence
"matters" now, and that it will matter to their future prosperity, even if our citizens
do not necessarily see an immediate external security threat. Heads of State and
Government are uniquely placed to pass this message to a wider public, and we
should not miss that occasion.
Preparations for the European Council discussion have already provided an
opportunity to raise the visibility of CSDP in general. The EEAS, in collaboration
with the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, is working on a
specific communication campaign. This needs to be linked to the communication
efforts of the Member States. However, a further analysis of our target audiences,
messages and tools is necessary to improve CSDP's visibility in a sustainable way. A

13

targeted Eurobarometer survey on Security and Defence could contribute to this
analysis.
We also need further to promote a common security and defence policy culture. In
this context, the European Security and Defence College is currently being placed
on a new footing, to strengthen a common culture in CSDP and promote training
initiatives.
Training and education is a long term essential investment that Member States can
make in support of CSDP. The future generation should have the opportunity to train
throughout their respective careers with a view to enhancing efficiency in operating
together. Indeed, promoting the way ahead by developing the networking model or
the integration of international activities in national programmes or consideration of
the development of improved curricula will all assist in this challenge. A revision of
the EU policy for CSDP-related training and education is a possible step to federate
accordingly the initiative.
The EU Institute for Security Studies contributes to further develop a common
European security culture by enriching the strategic debate, providing analyses and
fora for discussion2.
Way forward:
- express a strong commitment to CSDP and to fully grasp the occasion to
communicate to wider public on "security and defence matters"; a specific website
will be developed for the EC in December, with a web-documentary,
- further develop measures to improve CSDP visibility, including: using individual
missions and operations as the main "flagships" of CSDP at the earliest possible
stage, demonstrating how they benefit EU citizens; enhance the network of CSDP
communicators, including at Member State level; modernise the CSDP website;
- promote interaction and cooperation between national education and training
actors, building on the experience with "military Erasmus";
***
Cluster 2: Enhance the development of capabilities
8. Allow for systematic and more long term European defence cooperation
Cooperation in the area of military capability development has become essential to the
maintenance of capabilities and to the success of CSDP. Cooperation allows
Member States to develop, acquire, operate and maintain capabilities together,
making best use of potential economies of scale and to enhance military effectiveness.
Pooling & Sharing was launched to address this, and good progress has been
achieved. Through intensive staff-to-staff contacts, including between EDA and
NATO’s ACT, there has been close and intensive cooperation with NATO to ensure
complementarity and mutual reinforcement with the Smart Defence initiative and
2

See for instance: "Enabling the future. European military capabilities 2013-2025: challenges and avenues",
EUISS, May 2013.

14

more broadly with capability development within NATO. Indeed, the strategic context
and the impact of the financial crisis have made even more compelling the case for
de-confliction on capability development.
A strong impulse is required at European Council level, both to embed Pooling &
Sharing in Member States’ defence planning and decision-making processes, and to
deliver key capabilities through major cooperative projects.
In line with the Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing, there is scope for greater
transparency between Member States, including on potential budget cuts, national
defence strategies or “White Books” and national defence procurement and
modernisation plans. This would facilitate the identification of capability gaps and/or
duplications.
Member States should be encouraged to share their future capability plans in order
to address current and future shortfalls. Few Member States will be able to address
such shortfalls alone: pooled/shared solutions would allow them to acquire
capabilities that would be out of reach individually. The future threats and challenges
are such that some convergence of defence capability plans will be required if
Member States are to be able to collectively to meet the challenges of the future.
The Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing aims at mainstreaming Pooling &
Sharing in Member States’ planning and decision-making processes. Its
implementation will be supported by an annual assessment to Defence Ministers
comprising: an analysis of the capability situation in Europe; progress achieved;
obstacles; and the impact of defence cuts and possible solutions. The Capability
Development Plan (CDP) – a tool endorsed by the EDA Steering Board to assess
future threats, identify the capabilities required, prioritize and support the
identification of collaborative opportunities – supports and guides capability planners.
But the Code of Conduct and the CDP will both require the commitment of Member
States if substantive progress is to be achieved.
Rationalisation of demand to reduce the number of variants within collaborative
programmes would generate significant economies and improve operational
interoperability. In particular, there should be a greater push for harmonised
requirements. This would reduce the number of variants of the same type of
equipment, maximise economies of scale, enhance interoperability, and facilitate
cooperation for the whole life-cycle of the capability, which would in turn generate
additional economies, efficiencies and improved interoperability (the in-service phase
of a major system accounts for around two-thirds of its total through-life cost).
In order to make cooperation more systematic, the European Council should also
decide on incentives for defence cooperation in Europe for collaborative projects,
including of a fiscal nature such as VAT exemption. Protecting cooperative projects
and initiatives from budget cuts would act as a real incentive. Innovative
financing arrangements (Private Finance Initiative or Public Private Partnerships)
should also be considered.
In addition to addressing current shortfalls, Member States should engage in a
reflection on the major capability enablers: Air to Air Refuelling, Intelligence

15

Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Satellite Communications. Enablers in the
maritime and land domains could also be identified.
In this context, a revision of the CDP is on-going. This, together with the review of
the Headline Goal process and the updated Force Catalogue would form the basis to
assess shortfalls and map the capability landscape of the future. This will assess
longer-term trends and capability requirements, and contribute to the identification of
priorities and collaborative opportunities.
Systematic and long-term defence cooperation could be supported by a strategic level
Defence Roadmap, approved by the European Council, and underpinned by agreed
priorities and milestones. It could also pave the way for closer synergies with the
Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), in order to support a
seamless approach to capabilities through the whole life-cycle.
Finally, the Treaty provides for an opportunity for an enhanced form of cooperation
through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). While there have been
initial exploratory discussions in 2009 and 2010 on the implementation of PESCO, the
appetite to move forward remains limited at this stage.
Way forward:
- promote convergence of Member States’ defence plans through increased
transparency and information sharing;
- encourage the incorporation of pooling and sharing into national defence plans and
maximise the utility of the Capability Development Plan to support Pooling &
Sharing;
- harmonize requirements and extend throughout the whole life-cycle;
- commit to extend cooperation in support activities, such as logistics and training;
- promote a strategic Defence Roadmap for systematic and long term defence
cooperation, setting out specific targets and timelines;
- reinforce synergies between EDA and OCCAR;
- decide on incentives for defence cooperation in Europe, including of a fiscal nature
(VAT). Ring-fence cooperative projects from budget cuts. Explore innovative
financing arrangements (PFI/PPP);
- discuss with Member States their willingness to make full use of the Lisbon
provisions on Permanent Structured Cooperation.
9. Focus on delivering key capabilities
Member States’ commitment is now required to cooperative projects in Air to Air
Refuelling, Satellite Communication, Remotely Piloted Air Systems and Cyber
Defence.
In Air to Air Refuelling (AAR), the objective is to improve European operational
capacity and reduce dependency on the USA. The key deliverable could be the
multinational acquisition of multirole tanker transport aircraft, foreseen for
2020. This would also include cooperation in the areas of aircraft-basing, training and
logistics support. In the meantime, short and mid-term solutions are being pursued
with a view to increasing interoperability and maximizing the use of existing assets.

16

Taken together, these inter-related work-strands will considerably enhance Europe’s
AAR capability.
Pioneer Projects have been promoted to develop capabilities that have both
military and civil applications. They are designed to harness synergies in the
military and civil domains; maximise dual-use technologies; generate economies of
scale; and extend the comprehensive approach into the area of capabilities
development. Ministers have endorsed proposals to prepare three such projects, in the
areas of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Governmental Satellite Communications
(SATCOM) and Cyber Defence. Airlift is another capability with military and civil
applications and where greater synergies would be possible.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) are very likely to constitute a key
capability for the future. They offer a broad spectrum of capabilities that can
contribute to various aspects of EU-led military and civilian operations. In the civil
domain they would provide surveillance inter alia in the following areas: border
control and management; key infrastructure; disasters; environment; and agriculture.
In the military sphere they have demonstrated their operational capacities, including
for surveillance and information gathering. There are important political and industrial
implications that will need to be addressed.
The objective is to promote a European approach for developing this key future
capability. RPAS are a concrete example of a European comprehensive approach
applied to capabilities: while being closely linked to Single European Sky, the
development of RPAS can benefit from the various EU instruments and actors
(regulation, technologies needed for air insertion and anti-collision, certification).
While promoting common employment for the short term solution, there is also an
urgent need to prepare a program for the next generation of Medium Altitude Long
Endurance (MALE) RPAS. Such a program will be strongly supported by the
development of enabling technologies and other activities (regulation, certification,
standardization) undertaken under civil initiatives, in particular by the European
Commission. Horizon 2020 could contribute to the MALE program through
development for air insertion and anti-collision under its security dimension, with a
potential for surveillance payloads. There is scope for a public private partnership
between the Commission, EDA, Member States and industry to develop this
capability.
Governmental SATCOM offers the potential for a genuine dual-use cooperative
European approach respecting national sovereignty. Member States’ military satellite
communication assets are currently fragmented in five nationally-owned
constellations comprising a total of twelve satellites, whose operational life is
expected to end between 2018 and 2025. The objective is the development of a future
dual civil-military capability by 2025 via a user-driven approach based on a detailed
roadmap. It will require exploitation of the synergies with R&D programmes being
performed at a European level and exploration of opportunities for innovative
governance and procurement schemes to ensure synergies with the Commission’s
possible action.
In addition to the above mentioned pioneer projects, further efforts are needed to
enhance access to Satellite High Resolution Imagery - a timely and precise source of

17

information essential for the EU’s effective decision-making and for supporting
CSDP missions/operations. In particular, facilitating access to Member States'
governmental imagery will increase the EU Satellite Centre's capacity. In parallel,
taking advantage of the dual nature of Space, the use of Copernicus (a Commissionfunded programme to respond to European policy makers' growing need to rapidly
access geospatial information) in support of CSDP should be further explored. This
could provide EU missions with the less sensitive products.
As regards Cyber Defence, the objective is to establish a comprehensive and
cooperative European approach. EDA activities, based on the recently adopted cyber
strategy, focus on realistic deliverables within its remit and expertise: training and
exercises, protection of headquarters, and Cyber Defence Research Agenda (focusing
on dual use technologies).
A number of EU policies have implications for defence and require interaction
between the Commission and the defence community. This is especially the case for
Single European Sky (SES), which will have an impact on defence in financial and
operational terms and where the objective of the defence community is to ensure that
its views and interests are taken into account. Member States will continue to be
supported as the SES develops.
Way forward:
- commit to specific cooperative projects: AAR, RPAS, Cyber and Satellite
communications; agree and implement roadmaps;
- commit to further developing the EU's access to high resolution imagery;
- consider tasking further work on SESAR, airlift;
10. Facilitate synergies between bilateral, sub-regional, European and
multilateral initiatives
The development of capabilities through cooperation has become essential. But it is
not necessarily straightforward. Member States have made progress in improving
capabilities through defence cooperation, be it through multinational frameworks such
as the EU's Pooling & Sharing or NATO’s Smart Defence, and/or in clusters at the
bilateral and regional, and indeed functional, levels. Regional or thematic
cooperation offers perhaps the best prospect for coordination/cooperation and sharing
of reform processes. It may also yield faster results than initiatives at 28. Importantly,
these capabilities developed in regional or thematic groups can be used at the
European level (e.g. operations).
Wherever a cooperative approach is pursued – multi-nationally, regionally, bilaterally
or functionally - there is a need for coherence to avoid unnecessary duplication and/or
gaps. Moreover, whilst some capabilities can successfully be delivered through a
regional approach, others cannot: AAR, Space and RPAS being cases in point. And
issues such as interoperability or standardisation or certification require a broader
approach. Coherence could be enhanced by linking the regional and the European
levels, which would also allow smaller Member States and regional groupings to plug
into wider EU policies and industrial interests.

18

The Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing provides for the EDA to act as a
framework for coordination and transparency between regional clusters - as well as
individual Member States - as a means to enhance and facilitate synergies and identify
best practices. The first annual assessment of its implementation will be presented to
ministers in November. EDA’s "à la carte" approach, which allows for interested
groupings of Member States to work together, also offers a light and flexible model
for capability development, as well as for sharing best practice and lessons learned,
and improving standardisation, interoperability and through-life support.
One particular cooperative model that merits further examination is the European
Airlift Transport Command (EATC), the blueprint of which could be extended to
other types of capability such as AAR or Sealift.
Sharing of Lessons Identified (LI) and best practices associated with on-going
national defence reform activities could facilitate future regional cooperation in the
domains of e.g. new capability development projects, joint HQs and forces, jointly
developed doctrine fostering greater inter-operability, shared logistics and
maintenance facilities, training and education establishments.
Way forward:
- in line with the Code of Conduct, EDA to provide an overarching framework for
these clusters, to facilitate coordination, enhance transparency, and share lessons
learned;
- consider extending the European Airlift Transport Command (EATC) model to other
areas.
11. Civilian capabilities
The majority of CSDP missions are of a civilian nature. Generating civilian
capabilities remains a priority, as well as a challenge, due notably to the shortages of
personnel in specialised profiles.
In the multifaceted civilian area, political awareness and commitments by the many
national ministerial stakeholders involved are essential. The EU continues to support
Member States' central role in improving and streamlining national mechanisms and
procedures to recruit specialised civilian personnel for CSDP.
Some positive steps were taken, for instance: the increasing number of Member States
with a national strategy or equivalent to foster national capacity building for CSDP
missions; and progress made in establishing national budget lines for civilian crisis
management.
The implementation of the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan
agreed last year usefully helps Member States' address gaps and ensure that the
required capabilities will be available, whilst aiming at the most efficient use of scarce
resources. A number of concrete activities are underway:
First of all, the on-going mapping of Member States' niche capabilities provides a
picture of national units and/or specialised teams' readiness for CSDP deployment.
Furthermore, we continue to engage the European Gendarmerie Force. Their

19

participation in the exploratory mission to Mali has been effective. A formal
declaration is expected by the end of this year, which will facilitate appropriate
support when rapid deployment of robust policing assets is at stake.
As internal and external security aspects are increasingly interlinked, we continue
to strengthen ties between CSDP and the area of Freedom/Security/Justice so as to
foster a greater understanding of respective objectives and ensure mutual benefits
(including Rule of Law capabilities provided to CSDP missions). Exchange of
information needs to continue to stimulate the political awareness and allow for
identifying added value and avoiding overlap.
In terms of concrete work, we are encouraging the greater involvement of EU
Agencies (EUROPOL, FRONTEX) in CSDP missions and EU external relations in
general to benefit from their high expertise. The close association of FRONTEX in
the planning and launching of the civilian mission EUBAM Libya is a recent example
of this co-operation. Additionally, based on the successful experience of
EUFNAVFOR ATALANTA with the circulation of data collected via Interpol's
channels, we are exploring the possibility for a cooperation agreement with the latter
organisation for CSDP operations and missions.
Way forward:
- call for renewed efforts in generating civilian capabilities for CSDP;
- continue work on strengthening the ties between CSDP and FSJ and explore ways to
enhance support of EU Agencies and Interpol to CSDP.
***
Cluster 3: Strengthening Europe’s defence industry
The European Commission published a Communication on "Towards a more
competitive and efficient defence and security sector" on 24 July. The
Communication highlights a set of measures to reinforce the EDTIB and is
complementary to the actions outlined in the following cluster.
12. Making a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive EDTIB a
reality
A strong, healthy and globally competitive European Defence and Technological
Industrial Base (EDTIB) is a prerequisite for developing and sustaining defence
capabilities and securing the strategic autonomy of Europe. It is also an invaluable
part of Europe's wider economy. In 2011 Europe’s Aerospace and Defence Industries
generated a turnover of €172 Billion and 734,000 direct jobs, and invested €16 Billion
in R&D.
Declining defence budgets, combined with the fragmentation of European demand
and supply requirements jeopardise the sustainability of this industry.
The concerted effort of all stakeholders (Member States, industry and the European
Institutions) is required to safeguard the future of Europe’s defence industrial base.
This is particularly important for Member States whose investment decisions in

20

defence R&T, demonstrators and programmes shape the industry’s future. Without
substantive and strengthened cooperation at European level, including through
programmes, there will not be an EDTIB in the future.
Apart from a few notable exceptions, no European government alone can launch
major new programmes: the necessary investments are too high and the national
markets are too small. With defence budgets under pressure, further market-driven
industrial restructuring and consolidation is inevitable. The evolution of Europe’s
defence supply chain needs to be monitored at European level in order to maintain
and develop the key industrial skills and competences necessary to meet future
military capabilities. Having established the key skills at risk, there is a need to link
available funding to the education providers (both civil and military). To achieve this
it is proposed to create a strong, dynamic and coordinated "Defence Skills Network"
between the key stakeholders.
The whole defence supply chain is of importance: from the prime contractor
supplying systems-of-systems, through the range of intermediate suppliers to Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are increasing in importance as a source
of innovation and act as key enablers for competitiveness, even more so when part
of a cluster. The EDA Steering Board in March endorsed an SME Action Plan, which
will promote synergies across the whole European supply chain, with a particular
focus on dual-use activities. Commission support will be crucial in these joint
initiatives. Feedback from the Member States on the interim report has shown a keen
interest in enhancing support to SMEs.
EDA is developing, in close cooperation with its Member States and the European
Commission, a market monitoring mechanism to provide objective data on the
entire European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), which will support the
consideration of additional measures and initiatives to promote the global
competiveness of the EDEM. Active support and contributions from all stakeholders
will be essential to ensure the pertinence, comprehensiveness and efficiency of this
initiative.
Security of Supply is intrinsically linked to an effective EDTIB as it underpins
successful collaboration and operational autonomy. In view of this Member States are
working with EDA on concrete measures to increase both short- and long-term
Security of Supply, whether related to supply chains, European non-dependencies,
raw materials, or investments in key industrial and technological capabilities.
Commission work to optimise the use of the Intra-Community Transfer Directive
2009/43/EC will also support in this respect. In addition, there is scope for the
Commission to assist Member States in exploiting the possibilities offered by the
Defence and Security Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC).
Member States are also looking at ways to enhance their political commitment by
strengthening the Framework Agreement on Security of Supply adopted by the EDA
Steering Board in 2006 to assist and expedite each other’s defence requirements,
involve industry in this work and exchange information on existing national
regulations on control of strategic assets. This enhanced political commitment,
supported by the EDA acting as a clearing house, would be an important step forward.

21

Member States are working with EDA on tangible measures in the areas of
standardisation, military airworthiness and certification. This will benefit
governments and industry alike by reducing the costs of testing for certification, as
well as promoting mutual acceptance of results, and supporting interoperability. A
closer and stronger support by the EU Standardisation Agencies to Military
standardisation activities would generate efficiencies and synergies. While military
airworthiness remains a national prerogative, there would be benefits in harmonising
airworthiness standards based on achievements to-date and maximising synergies
between EDA and EASA, starting with certification of RPAS. A continuous political
commitment is required to make a step change in this domain.
Standardisation and the mutual recognition of processes and results are key
enablers for making Pooling & Sharing a reality. In 2008 EDA received a ministerial
mandate for the development of military airworthiness regulation requirements,
and significant progress has been achieved. By working together, the military
community could develop a coordinated European approach similar to that in the
civilian aviation safety sector.
Way forward:
- encourage further efforts to strengthen the EDTIB, to ensure that it is able not only
to meet the equipment requirements of Member States and their security of supply and
freedom of action, but also remains globally healthy and competitive and stimulates
jobs, innovation and growth;
- recognize the role of SMEs in the defence supply chain; enhance support to SMEs;
- encourage further efforts to enhance and broaden support arrangements on security
of supply, and encourage further progress on standards, including hybrid standards,
certification and military airworthiness.
- incentivise the European defence industry to become more competitive globally
including by undertaking collaborative programmes/procurement as a first choice
solution with clear deadlines and commitments (e.g. on RPAS).
13. Stimulate synergies between civilian and defence R&T
From 2007 to 2011, defence Research & Development expenditure decreased by
more than 18% and Research & Technology (R&T) by more than 20%. Moreover
defence R&T is fragmented across Member States (more than 85% is still national):
pooling resources would generate economies of scale. Strong investment is needed if
Europe is to retain its R&T expertise.
Building on the list of Critical Defence Technologies elaborated in the EDA
framework, the technologies that need to be developed at the European level for
defence, space, and the civil sector should be identified on a systematic basis to
underpin long-term planning of European R&T. It will also ensure that Europe is
addressing the challenge of technology non-dependence at the strategic level. On this
basis:
- Member States should be encouraged to commit to multi-annual investment in
defence R&T through cooperation;

22

-

the content and modalities of the Preparatory Action on CSDP Research
should be prepared together between the European Commission, EDA and the
Member States;

-

if Member States so wish, a ‘Critical Defence Technology’ funding
programme by Member States could be launched to fund defence technology
research that matches the Commission’s proposed Preparatory Action on
CSDP research. This joint initiative could allow for preparing the next
generation of capabilities. It could fund projects that apply a multi-disciplinary
approach through technology research. With a substantial budget for 20142020, the fund could lay the basis to develop innovative technologies that
address current and future operational needs for the armed forces.

Because technology is increasingly dual-use in nature, there is considerable potential
for synergies between civil and defence research. The European Framework
Cooperation, which coordinates and complements security and defence research work
between the Commission, ESA and EDA, has proved its worth. These synergies
should be exploited in a more systematic manner under the Horizon 2020 Research
Programme.
The pre-commercial procurement scheme can provide a way forward for the
development of mature technologies: pooling civil and military requirements for
technologies that are needed both for defence and civil applications can lead to the
procurement of common prototypes. Joint procurement would enhance interoperability
and common standards. This is an area where co-funding between security and
defence research can yield promising results.
A comprehensive research strategy could exploit synergies between national dualuse programmes and European research, in areas such as RPAS, cyber security, space,
maritime security, green energy and for the key enabling technologies. As requested
by EU Ministers of Defence in April 2013, this should lead to a more cooperative and
integrated approach in support of Research and Technology. Among the options to
consider are: access to EU instruments for dual-use research activities (Horizon 2020,
in particular the Programme on Key Enabling Technologies, and European Structural
Funds); jointly funded R&T activities on the basis of the article 185 TFEU; and
public-private partnership via the establishment of a joint undertaking on the basis of
article 187 TFEU.
Since defence R&T carries risk due to uncertainty on the return of investment,
innovative funding solutions should be explored for attracting private funding.
This approach should not be an excuse to reduce defence budget allocations, but rather
to focus budget efforts toward the Critical Defence Technologies that need to be
maintained and developed at the European level, and to maximise the impact of
investment.
Way forward:
- encourage Member States to commit to the necessary levels of investment in R&T to
support the capabilities of the future, and to do so increasingly through cooperation
where this provides benefit. This could be further enhanced through joint research

23

programmes with the European Commission through common funding with Member
States; and/or Pre-commercial procurement and joint undertakings that leverage
public-private funding.
- endorse a comprehensive research strategy to exploit synergies between national
dual-use programmes and European research.
- consider how to stimulate innovative funding solutions for stimulating private
funding in defence R&T.
- launch a ‘Critical Defence Technology’ programme to fund Technology research for
2014-2020, that matches the Commission CSDP research.
- support a Preparatory Action from the Commission on CSDP-related Research,
seeking synergies with national research programmes.
***

24

III. The way forward
"The strategic, military and economic cases for defence are, for me, quite clear. What
we need to make sure we have got is political will from the very top".
HRVP / Head of the Agency Speech at the EDA annual conference, Brussels 21 March 2013

On the basis of a common understanding of the strategic context, the December
European Council offers the opportunity to provide strategic direction for the
further development of CSDP and defence cooperation in Europe in accordance
with the Lisbon Treaty. The discussion on the interim report has shown strong
support for a more regular reappraisal of security and defence issues by the Heads
of State and Government.
Three elements are of particular importance:
-

first, there is a need for concrete deliverables by December. This needs to
materialize first through commitments to capability projects. The Council of 18
and 19 November and the EDA Steering Board provide an opportunity for such
commitments;

-

second, task further development in particular areas;

-

and third, a robust follow-up process is required, to monitor progress, sustain
momentum, and provide renewed impetus.

As part of the follow-up process, and if Member States so wish, work could start on
more clearly defining the strategic role of the EU in view of the evolving context and
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
On the basis of the preceding chapters, what follows are elements resulting from the
preparatory work which could be considered by the Heads of State and Government:
-

express a strong commitment to defence cooperation in Europe to further
enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy;

-

fully grasp the occasion to communicate to the wider public that "security and
defence matter";

-

endorse and give renewed impetus to a strategically coherent and effective use of
EU instruments through the comprehensive approach;

-

continue developing the partnerships with the UN and NATO focusing on
stronger complementarity, co-operation and coordination;

-

further encourage and facilitate contributing partners' support to CSDP:
partners enable the EU, and the EU enables partners. Agree to develop appropriate
instruments to engage in supporting the national security services of EU partners
(transparency, accountability and capacity building);

25

-

emphasize the critical importance to European security of cyber and space
networks and energy security; support the development of an EU Cyber Defence
Policy Framework;

-

support work towards a maritime security strategy; call for a more
comprehensive approach to help Third States and regions better manage their
borders;

-

call for further improvements in rapid response: rapid civ-mil assessment;
rapid deployment of civilian missions including its financial aspects; endorse a
new approach to EU’s rapid response assets including the Battlegroups; explore
the use of article 44 TEU;

-

promote greater convergence of defence planning of EU Member States
(transparency, information sharing);

-

encourage the incorporation of pooling and sharing into national defence
planning;

-

harmonize requirements covering the whole life-cycle;

-

call for the development of a strategic Defence Roadmap for systematic and
long term defence cooperation, setting out specific targets and timelines;

-

decide on incentives for defence cooperation in Europe, including of a fiscal
nature (e.g. VAT); ring-fence cooperative projects from budget cuts;

-

explore innovative financing arrangements (PFI/PPP);

-

commit to specific capability projects: AAR, RPAS, Cyber and Satellite
communications; implement roadmaps; and consider tasking work to be done on
other key capabilities such as air transport and satellite high resolution imagery;

-

renew efforts in generating civilian capabilities for CSDP and pursue efforts to
strengthen the ties between CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ);

-

encourage further efforts to strengthen the EDTIB, to ensure that it is able to
meet the equipment requirements of Member States, remain globally competitive
and stimulate jobs, innovation and growth;

-

recognize the role of SMEs in the defence supply chain; enhance support to
SMEs;

-

encourage further efforts to enhance and broaden support arrangements on
security of supply, and encourage further progress on hybrid standards,
certification and military airworthiness;

-

incentivise the European defence industry to become more competitive
globally, including by undertaking collaborative programmes/procurement as a
first choice solution;

26

-

encourage Member States to commit to the necessary levels of investment in
R&T to support the capabilities of the future, and to do so increasingly through
cooperation. This could be further enhanced through joint research programmes
with the European Commission through common funding with Member States;
and/or Pre-commercial procurement and joint undertakings that leverage publicprivate funding;

-

endorse a comprehensive research strategy to exploit synergies between national
dual-use programmes and European research.

-

decide on innovative funding solutions for stimulating private funding in defence
R&T;

-

support a Preparatory Action from the Commission on CSDP-related Research,
seeking synergies with national research programmes;

-

agree on a robust follow-up process, to monitor progress, sustain momentum and
provide renewed impetus at regular intervals, on the basis of input from the High
Representative / Head of the Agency;

-

consider launching a European defence reporting initiative to synchronise
budget planning cycles and set convergence benchmarks, a "European semester on
defence" in all but name.

27