The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out independent
assessments of the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and
consistency of Dutch foreign policy. It thus provides
accountability concerning the results of policy, as well as
information to enhance policy.
The quality of the IOB’s assessments is guaranteed by
means of systematic and transparent procedures.

IOB Evaluation Newsletter
# 13 12

All IOB evaluations are in the public domain and are
brought to the notice of parliament. The IOB also seeks to
make evaluations accessible to the Dutch public and to
partners in the countries concerned. Reports can be freely
obtained and a summary of the most important findings is
published in the form of the IOB Evaluation Newsletter.
IOB Evaluation # 387 (November 2013)
Between
Ambitions and Ambivalence:
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Mid-term
Evaluation
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Programme
2007-2015
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Downloadable
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www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
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www.iob-evaluatie.nl
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070 348 56xxx

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Ambivalence in cooperation between
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV | Evaluation Newsletter
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# 13 12 | Ambivalence in cooperation between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV | Evaluation Newslette
Mid

Concerns
The evaluation raises a number of questions. Does the Ministry
want to use the grant award between now and 2015 for long-term
capacity building? And, by extension, will Dutch embassies then
formulate their grant awards to ensure ownership by local
organisations, as well as the responsibility that ownership entails,
delegating SNV to a background advisory role?
SNV currently strives to achieve poverty reduction in three sectors
and to build capacity. These goals can only be pursued through
different approaches, each with their own culture. How can SNV
satisfy the very different demands of these two approaches?
IOB’s findings on effectiveness and sustainability may be grounds
for further critical scrutiny of SNV’s intended results. Special
attention should be given to the question of how SNV will be able to
report to the Ministry on the results achieved when the grant period
ends in 2015.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV Netherlands

IOB recently conducted a mid-term evaluation of the

Development Organisation (established in 1965) have

SNV programme for the years 2007-2011. This period

always had close ties. The Ministry awarded SNV a

was characterized by contentions due to ambivalent

grant of €795 million for the 2007-2015 period, or

policy choices made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

nearly €90 million a year. This was later reduced to

of the Netherlands regarding SNV’s autonomy to

€676 million, of which SNV has spent €436 million

determine its own future. The contention was

between 2007 and 2011. The Ministry had two

resolved only in 2011 when SNV was given a free rein

reasons for this unusually long funding arrangement.

to raise additional income. These are some of IOB's

First, it intended Dutch embassies and SNV to work

principal conclusions in its report Between Ambitions and

together in Dutch partner countries, increasing the

Ambivalence: Mid-term Evaluation SNV Programme

effectiveness of bilateral aid at local level. Second,

2007-2015.

it wanted the capacity of local advisers to be
strengthened so that they could, in time, take over
Published by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands | www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations | www.iob-evaluatie.nl
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | December 2013 | ISSN: 2214-6407 | 14BUZ622507|E

from SNV.

SNV’s grant application for 2007-2015 contained ambitious goals,
conveyed in statements such as ‘SNV is dedicated to a society in
which all people enjoy the freedom to pursue their own sustainable
development’ and ‘SNV’s strategy is to develop the capacity of actors
at different levels so that they can take measures aimed at
sustainable development and poverty reduction themselves’. SNV
defines ‘capacity’ as the ability of a human system (individuals,
organisations, networks of actors, or sectors) to perform, sustain
itself and self-renew in changing social circumstances. SNV focuses
particularly on building the capacity of organisations and
partnerships at provincial and district level. This choice is relevant,
as donors rarely pay attention to capacity development at that level.

SNV has been successful in getting programmes up and running at
village level at relatively short notice. These have helped improve
access to and use of products and basic services, such as water and
sanitary facilities, agricultural extension, seed stock and small-scale
biogas plants. However, poorer people, like marginal farmers (male
and female), often benefit less from SNV programmes. In Benin for
instance, families couldn’t or didn’t want to pay for clean drinking
water. In Ethiopia farmers couldn’t afford to cut down their old fruit
trees in order to plant new ones, and in Tanzania, men sidelined
women in a sunflower-growing project as soon as it started making
a profit.

In the evaluation period SNV was active in 36 countries in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Since 2011 it has focused on
three (sub) sectors: agriculture – value chains; renewable energy
– biogas digesters; and water, sanitation and hygiene (WaSH).

In many cases, prospects for sustaining these positive results are
inadequate, due in part to the complex environment in which the
local organisations concerned operate, but certainly also due to
their lack of capacity.

Figure 2 The analytical framework for capacity development:
SNV’s clients as open systems

Figure 1 SNV’s expenditures by region, 2007-2011
40

risk. Second, SNV has not been consistent in the operationalisation
of its capacity development strategy that integrates its ambitious
poverty reduction and capacity development objectives. Third, SNV
focuses on eliminating bottlenecks for programme implementation
while neglecting other, more structural shortcomings that could
hamper operations in the long run. Finally, SNV often lacks an exit
strategy that it has agreed with its clients. Some of these characteristics are reinforced by donors’ increasing preference for supporting
projects with fast, visible results. According to IOB, this is part of a
broader trend in the world of donors which signifies a return to
separate project financing. This approach was abandoned after 2000
precisely because of lack of sustainable results.
Reporting – The Ministry was critical of SNV’s reports on results
throughout the 2007-2011 period. Several of SNV’s annual reports
were initially rejected on the grounds that they did not provide
sufficient information on the results achieved, so that the Ministry
could not establish if it was funding success or failure. SNV set aside
only 0.2% of its total budget for evaluation. In a 2011 study, IOB
assessed SNV’s project monitoring and evaluation as unsatisfactory.
It is therefore uncertain if and how SNV may have learned lessons
based on tried and true practices. Even now, it remains to be shown
that the changes made since 2011 will yield the desired reporting
information.

Expenditures (EUR million)

The Ministry and SNV

25
20

The Ministry had two reasons for concluding a long-term funding
arrangement with SNV.

15
10
5
0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Year (Total)
West and Central Africa
East and Southern Africa

Latin America
Asia

Balkans

Source: SNV database.

The years scrutinised in this evaluation were turbulent ones for SNV.
The organisation made tremendous internal changes to get ready
for future challenges. The Ministry has always been SNV’s main
financier, but its grant will end in 2015. SNV will still be eligible for
grants for programmes or projects that it runs for the Dutch
embassies and the theme-based departments in The Hague.
IOB’s evaluation focused, in particular, on the SNV approach and
the results of its activities. To what extent has SNV succeeded in
building local organisations’ capacity and services? To what extent
have the poor gained better access to basic services? To answer these
questions, IOB examined 12 programmes in four countries (Benin,
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam).

Most SNV clients (ranging from associations to provincial/district
authorities) have strengthened their capacity in some areas, such as
providing better services or sustaining their relationship with
stakeholders. But these improvements risk being undone by the
failure to address structural weaknesses in the organisations. SNV
gives little attention to learn organisations how to remain relevant or
what is required to achieve their objectives in changing contexts. The
interests of the poor are often insufficiently represented.
Various characteristics of the SNV approach explain the uncertain
prospects for sustainable results. First, SNV’s dual objective of
strengthening the capacity of its clients on the one hand and taking
responsibility for impact on the other hand puts local ownership at

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Year

35
30

Figure 3 Budget allocations to SNV services, 2007-2015

Budget allocations

Results

Complementarity – First, it intended Dutch embassies and SNV to
work together in Dutch partner countries, with SNV sharing its
knowledge and insights with Dutch embassies, thereby increasing
the likelihood that Dutch bilateral aid would make a greater
contribution to development at local level. In actual fact, however,
the Ministry and SNV never systematically fleshed out this idea of
complementarity and it therefore yielded little result. While
knowledge was shared on an ad hoc basis at SNV’s initiative, it often
depended on personal ties between embassy and SNV staff.

Capacity development through SNV advisors
Capacity development through
local capacity builders
Advocacy

Knowledge brokering
Establishment local capacity
development funds

Source: Subsidy application SNV 2007-2015 (May 2006).

SNV’s financing – IOB observes that the Ministry’s policy choices
indicate ongoing tension about how much financial and policyrelated autonomy SNV should have. The issue was partly addressed
in 2008 when the MFA allowed SNV more space to raise additional
funds, and was only resolved in 2011 when SNV was given a free rein
to raise additional income. SNV has made considerable use of its
new status. Since 2012, it has been increasingly successful in
obtaining revenue from other donors through project and
programme financing. Clearly, SNV is an attractive partner because
of its proven ability to launch programmes in a short space of time,
its preference for initiatives that are new to a locality, and its ability
to link up different parties. SNV staff members are dedicated and
encourage foreign and local advisers to work together. SNV
generally has good contacts with other donors and developing
country governments. It has strong networks and knows which
sectors offer economic opportunities.

Figure 4 SNV’s income from the MFA and other donors, 2009-2011
100%
90%
80%
70%

Local advisers – Second, the Ministry counted on SNV to strengthen
local organisations to the point that they could take over its role as
adviser on capacity building. In 2011, SNV outsourced 41% of its
advice days to local advisers. While the latter did, as a result, acquire
more knowledge and skills and become better known, they did not
become independent, professional consultants for organisational
and institutional development. SNV did not adapt its strategy to
favour local partners but continued to operate as an advisory
organisation with its own remit. For SNV, outsourcing work to local
organisations is a way of achieving economies of scale and
improving its efficiency.

60%
Income

Background

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2009
Income DGIS

Source: SNV database.

2010
Income 3rd parties

Plan 2011

2011

Plan 2012