EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 18.7.2012
COM(2012) 411 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL
On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
{SWD(2012) 232 final}

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL
On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
I. The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: Supporting Bulgaria in Justice
Reform, the Fight against Corruption and the Fight against Organised Crime
In the run-up to the accession of Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, it was agreed that further work
was needed in key areas to address shortcomings in judicial reform, the fight against
corruption, and tackling organised crime. This led to the establishment of a framework to
support Bulgaria and to monitor progress in these areas, the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism (CVM).1 Six benchmarks were established, covering the independence and
accountability of the judicial system, its transparency and efficiency; the pursuit of high-level
corruption, as well as corruption throughout the public sector; and the fight against organised
crime. The Decision set up regular reporting from the Commission, and provided that the
mechanism will continue until the objectives of the CVM are met and all six benchmarks are
satisfactorily fulfilled.2
Five years on, this report assesses whether the objectives of the CVM have been fulfilled.
This assessment is the fruit of analysis as set out in the technical report accompanying this
report, taking stock of what has been achieved so far and what remains to be accomplished. It
looks at the work of the past five years, the legislation and the instruments which have been
put in place and the results which have followed. Over this period, there have been times
when progress has accelerated; others when there have been setbacks. Cooperation has been
active at some stages, whereas at other times the CVM has been resented and resisted.
Overall, the Commission is convinced that the CVM has made a major contribution to reform
in Bulgaria. This report considers in particular the sustainability and irreversibility of the
reform process, including whether ownership is sufficiently embedded to maintain the
direction of reform.
Today's European Union is highly interdependent. The rule of law is one of the fundamental
values of the EU and there is a strong common interest in it which mirrors the interest of
Bulgarian public opinion in these issues.3 Eurobarometer polling has shown that 96% of
Bulgarians consider corruption and organised crime to be an important issue for their country,
and 92% have the same response over shortcomings in the judicial system. The same poll also

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Conclusions of the Council of Ministers, 17 October 2006 (13339/06); Commission Decision of
13/XII/2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to
address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and
organised crime, 13 December 2006 (C (2006) 6570 final)
It also provided for the possibility of a safeguard mechanism, which has not had to be invoked.
The Conclusions of the European Council of 28 and 29 June include a commitment by the EU within
the Compact for Growth and Jobs to tackle delays in judicial systems as part of the modernisation of
public administrations (European Council Conclusions 29 June 2012, page 8).

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concluded that 76% of Bulgarians considered that the EU should have a role in tackling these
issues.4
The CVM does not ask Bulgaria to achieve higher standards than exist in other Member
States. Its target is to help Bulgaria achieve standards comparable to other Member States, an
objective supported by 78% of Bulgarians.5 For the purpose of assessing what has been
achieved by Bulgaria since accession, the situation in other Member States is an important
factor. The Commission uses in this report points of reference and comparative indicators
where they are available.6 To compare progress in Bulgaria with the situation in other
Member States, the Commission also drew upon senior experts from key professions dealing
with these issues.7
Since 2007, the EU budget has made some €41m available to support judicial reform in
Bulgaria through the Structural Funds. By mid-2012, 25 projects for a budget of €13.6m have
been agreed in the areas of training, human resource development, capacity building and
technical assistance. At the same time, several Member States have supported Bulgaria with
bilateral projects in all areas of judicial reform including police reform, the fight against
corruption and the fight against organised crime.8
II. Analysis of progress under the CVM 2007-2012
The Commission's overall assessment of progress under the CVM since Bulgaria's accession
shows important progress in the basic legislative framework. At key moments, the Bulgarian
government has shown strong political will to achieve deep and lasting reform.The challenge
now is to fill some key strategic gaps, and to ensure effective implementation. The resolve in
Bulgarian society to deliver the reforms overseen by the CVM has been variable: a more
consistent implementation is needed to join together disparate actions. This more consistent
direction of reforms would be the best indicator of the sustainability and irreversibility of the
process.
Since 2007, Bulgaria has put in place a series of important legal and Constitutional reforms.
Though incomplete, these have set up important and sometimes innovative structures, in
particular to encourage specialisation in tackling the problems faced. Key institutions like the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and its inspectorate have taken up their functions. There has
been an important investment in the structures to fight organised crime leading to the creation
of specialised bodies at the level of the judiciary and police, as well as major steps to improve
the legal framework for asset forfeiture and successful cooperation with other Member States.
However, the potential of this framework has not yet been used to the full. The Supreme
Judicial Council has been given wide-ranging powers to manage and lead the judiciary. These
powers have not been used to govern the judicial profession effectively, on the basis of merit
and integrity, or to drive the consistency and independence of justice on which public
confidence depends.

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Flash Eurobarometer poll conducted by the Commission in Bulgaria in May 2012 (Flash Eurobarometer
351 "The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania" at:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm ).
Flash Eurobarometer 351
Points of reference include the work of the Council of Europe, the OECD and UN agencies.
Experts used in 2012included senior practitioners from France, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain,
Slovenia and the United Kingdom.
Technical report, page 36.

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There remains a lack of direction in policy which has held back progress. Many institutions
have taken useful steps. But the limited scale of these measures inside such institutions, and
the lack of a coordinated approach, suggests that questions remain about the direction of
reform. Over the five years of the CVM, different governments and Parliaments have given
different emphasis to these issues, and variable levels of commitment to results. An action
plan for the reform of the judiciary was adopted in 2010. Fundamental principles such as the
independence of the judiciary have not always been respected to the full. The lack of a
consistent trend means that the reform process has not built the momentum needed to become
an accepted part of Bulgaria's development.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that many important steps seem to have been taken
primarily as the result of external pressure. The CVM itself has been central to this process –
and is recognised as such by Bulgarian public opinion.9 It has helped to maintain the direction
of reform at moments of pressure and to encourage changes which require the courage to
challenge vested interests. The fact that external pressure is still necessary raises questions
about the sustainability and irreversibility of change.
Ownership and implementation are therefore the key elements in the fulfilment of the CVM
benchmarks. They determine the sustainability and irreversibility of reform. The appointment
and work of the new Supreme Judicial Council and of the new General Prosecutor will be one
of the indicators of the sustainability of reforms.
II.1 Judicial Reform 2007-2012
Benchmark 1: Adopt Constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the
independence and accountability of the judicial system
Benchmark 2: Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and
implementing a new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the
impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably
on the pre-trial phase
Benchmark 3: Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism,
accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results
annually

Upon accession, Bulgaria committed to increase the independence, accountability and
integrity of the judiciary and to ensure a more efficient, consistent and transparent judicial
process. Such comprehensive reform objectives required legislative changes, a reform of
judicial structures and staffing, and improvements to judicial procedures and judicial practice.
They also required some changes in attitude amongst magistrates, and other actors in the
judicial system. This combination implied an engagement by all powers of the state: by
Parliament, the executive and the judiciary, with the support of civil society.

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These conclusions are supported by public perception. 71% of respondents of a Flash Eurobarometer
poll conducted in Bulgaria believe that EU action through the CVM has had a positive impact in
addressing shortcomings in the judicial system . 67% share this view regarding corruption, and 65%
concerning organised crime. At the same time, a majority believes that the situation in these areas has
stayed the same or has deteriorated in the last five years. (Flash Eurobarometer 351).

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Since 2007, Bulgaria has put in place a number of important building blocks to deliver on its
commitments with the EU. The immediate aftermath of accession saw an important series of
steps, with Constitutional amendments, a new Judicial Systems Act (JSA), a new Civil
Procedure Code, new Administrative procedure code and amendments to the Penal Procedure
Code. The first year of accession also saw the creation of new judicial institutions. An
independent Judicial Inspectorate was created and a new Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) took
office, with wide-ranging responsibilities for the management of the judicial system.10 These
responsibilities included human resource management of the judiciary, including
appointments, promotions, appraisals and staff allocation. The Council was also given
disciplinary responsibility and therefore the task to safeguard the accountability and integrity
of the judiciary and to ensure that judicial practice meets high professional standards.11 With
these attributions, the Council became the main actor in implementing judicial reform.
Bulgaria has achieved results in implementing this new legal and institutional framework. For
the first time, independent controls of courts and prosecutors offices have been carried out,
recommendations regarding court management and judicial practice have been issued and a
more robust approach has been taken to disciplinary activity. In addition, Bulgaria has
improved procedural codes in all three branches of law and started to improve judicial
practice.
However, these efforts have not yet led to significant improvements in judicial accountability
and efficiency. Legal proceedings are often of an excessive duration.12 Disciplinary practice
shows inconsistencies, and in many important cases has either not been able to conclude, or
has not reached dissuasive results. Judicial appraisals, promotions and appointments are not
yet transparent and do not follow objective and merit-based criteria. There is as yet no
comprehensive human resources policy which can balance staff needs and workload.
Measures to improve judicial practice often appear superficial and have not yet had a concrete
effect on results in important cases. Questions remain about judicial independence.
Some of these weaknesses can be traced to failings in application of the law, but they also
reflect important structural, procedural and organisational weaknesses within the Supreme
Judicial Council and the prosecution. The upcoming elections to the Council this autumn, and
the election of a new General Prosecutor and of a new President of the Supreme Court of
Cassation, are crucial for Bulgaria to demonstrate its resolve to maintain the path of judicial
reform.
The potential exists to use the structures put in place for the judicial system to drive reform, to
address a lack of public confidence in the judiciary and to establish a system based on
effective and accountable governance. This could deliver a system with the right balance
between efficiency, accountability, integrity and independence. However, it requires a higher

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The Supreme Judicial Council is structured according to the Constitution (Technical Report page 4,
footnote 6).
The SJC is assisted in these areas by the Judicial Inspection, by court presidents and by the Bulgarian
judicial training institution, the National Institute for Justice.
Statistics of the ECHR show that Bulgaria counts the highest number of ECHR judgements among any
EU Member State which are pending execution. For a large majority, these judgements concern the
excessive length of criminal proceedings and the absence of an effective remedy. Other elements
include ineffective investigations and an excessive use of firearms by police. (Council of Europe:
Supervision of the Execution of Judgements and Decisions of the ECHR, Annual Report 2011 at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_annreport2011_en.pdf

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level of commitment by the Supreme Judicial Council and the prosecution, strong enough to
challenge well-rooted vested interests.
The engagement of civil society and professional associations of magistrates for judicial
reform is an important achievement since 2007. The Bulgarian authorities should make better
use of these resources, engage in more intense cooperation with foreign partners and bring all
key players together in a common commitment to reform.
Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary
Constitutional amendments of February 2007 set the framework for judicial independence in
Bulgaria. The Constitution gives the judicial system considerable managerial autonomy.
However, it also gives a strong role to political institutions - half the elected members of the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), and all judicial inspectors, are elected by Parliament13 – a
source of criticism by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.14 Lay judges can
have a decisive influence on decisions in court, but are nominated by local political forces.15
CVM reports have also pointed to the issue of merit-based appointments and appraisals.16
These concerns have been confirmed, as a number of key judicial appointments by Parliament
and by the SJC have lacked transparency and objectivity and have been marred by allegations
of political influence.17 Independence has also come in question following a series of direct
political criticisms of individual judges - the dismissal from the judiciary of the President of
the Union of Judges by the SJC raises concerns in this context.18 The Council has not taken
clear action to protect judicial independence in these cases. The overall impression is of a
failure to respect the separation of the powers of the state which has direct consequences for
public confidence in the judiciary.
The same Constitutional amendments of 2007 and the adoption of a revised Judicial Systems
Act in the same year also created the basis for a proper policy of integrity and accountability
for the judicial system. The immunity of magistrates was restricted to the execution of
professional duties and an independent judicial inspectorate was created. In 2009, Bulgaria
adopted an ethical code for the magistracy and created a central integrity committee within
the SJC19. Legal amendments in 2010 made integrity assessments a compulsory step in career

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The members of the Parliamentary quota of the SJC are elected by simple majority whereas inspectors
are elected by a majority of two-thirds.
See Technical Report page 5 and footnote 7.
See Technical Report page 18
Most recently, COM(2011)459 final, page 8.
The Commission's reports under the CVM of 20 July 2011 (COM(2011)459 final, page 4) and 8
February 2012 (COM(2012)57 final, page 2) raised concerns on the transparency and objectivity of
senior judicial nominations in this context (see Technical Report pages 6 and 14)
Following to accusations of influence and bias in organised crime cases by a member of government,
judges of Sofia City Court appealed to the SJC in February to protect judicial independence and
establish the facts in this case. The accused judge also filed a court case for slander. The judge has
subsequently been dismissed from the judiciary by the SJC on 12 July for delaying the motives in a
court case. This led to walk-outs and protests by several courts including by a large number of judges
from the Supreme Court of Cassation.
However, independent experts consulted by the Commission expressed concern at the lack of separation
of roles inside the Council (Technical Report page 13, footnote 49),

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development and promotion within the judiciary and set up local structures for integrity and
appraisal. The result was the first real disciplinary activity within the Bulgarian judiciary.20
Most of these disciplinary cases have been initiated by controls made by the inspectorate,
which started its operational activities in 2008. The inspectorate has also actively represented
its views on disciplinary issues within the SJC and was given the right to appeal disciplinary
decisions in 2009. It makes detailed recommendations to court presidents. The control activity
of the inspectorate represents a positive contribution to improving judicial discipline and
accountability as such activities had not existed before.21 At the same time, the work of the
inspectorate has not been directed at promoting solutions to the systematic shortcomings in
accountability and judicial practice. Examples include the absence of inspectorate
recommendations in areas like the random allocation system, or the correction of important
and systematic shortcomings in judicial practice.22
Disciplinary activity since 2007 shows a certain leniency and a reticence to address serious
cases, in particular in relation to integrity. Two emblematic cases of alleged trade in influence
amongst the judiciary were only pursued after major public pressure.23 Successful challenges
to disciplinary rulings in the Supreme Administrative Court point to weaknesses in the
jurisprudence of the Court, in the disciplinary procedures of the SJC or in law: such
shortcomings should be analysed and corrected. So too should the lack of criminal follow-up,
as the prosecution did not systematically investigate magistrates involved in these cases. This
links to the overall poor results of the judiciary in pursuing cases of corruption within its own
ranks.24
Overall, disciplinary jurisprudence itself has not been consistent. Bulgaria has also been
unable to properly introduce integrity into the system of judicial promotions and appraisals,
despite amendments to the Judicial Systems Act of 2010. Integrity verifications have been
formalistic and with little preventive effect, sometimes relying on NGOs to put relevant
information in the public domain. Various senior appointments during this period lacked
sufficient transparency and continue to be marred by accusations of political influence and
shortcomings in integrity.25 The inability of the judicial leadership to define and implement a

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There has been little disciplinary activity prior to 2007 and to the creation of an independent
inspectorate. Overall, the SJC determined 179 disciplinary cases between October 2007 and December
2011. The number of sanctions increased from 15 in 2008 and 24 in 2009 to 34 in 2010 and decreased
again to 13 in 2011.
The inspectorate carries out regular and ad-hoc controls of the management of local courts and
prosecutors offices, it followed up on complaints and also investigated particular issues such as case
delays. By 2011, the inspectorate had carried out a full assessment of all judicial districts.
See Technical Report, page 7.
All disciplinary sanctions have been cancelled in one of these two cases by the Supreme Administrative
Court. See Technical Report page 14-15.
This was highlighted in several CVM reports, including COM(2011)459final, page 4 and
COM(2012)57final, page 2-3.
Integrity issues were raised at the occasion of appointments of chairs to several senior courts, to the
Inspectorate of the SJC and regarding some members of the SJC. (Technical Report, page 6 and 14 and
COM(2011)459final, page 4.

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proper anti-corruption strategy26 alienated parts of the judiciary and can be seen to contribute
to the low-level of public trust in this area.27
Efficiency of the judicial process
The Supreme Judicial Council is responsible for the human resources policy of the judiciary.
This includes initial recruitment, the provision of training through the National Institute of
Justice, regular appraisals, promotions and appointments to senior judicial positions. Legal
amendments in 2010 gave the SJC the role of assessing workload, amending areas of
jurisdiction, reallocating resources and if necessary closing down courts. Consequently, the
Council has all relevant powers to properly manage human resources and judicial structures
for the benefit of judicial efficiency.
Looking back at the period since 2007, a number of difficulties can be highlighted in the way
the SJC has discharged its responsibilities in this area. First, the Council has been unable to
properly translate the objectives of the revised Judicial Systems Act into practice regarding
promotions. The system as it is practiced does not ensure a career development of magistrates
according to professional merit, as well as a proper consideration for issues of integrity.
Although new appraisal criteria were defined in the law, these have not been used to properly
reflect differences in performance.28 The weaknesses of the appraisal system also affect
promotion procedures, and have led to frequent challenges of promotion decisions in court.29
Promotions and initial recruitments did not follow a coherent and predictable schedule,30
based on an assessment of staff needs and on a strategy to satisfy them. Between 2009 and
2011, no promotion decisions were taken. The consequent high number of vacancies in some
courts was filled through secondments – a procedure outside the promotion system, reliant
solely on agreement between court presidents.31
There are important differences in workload between courts in Sofia and other courts in the
country.32 These workload disparities have led to serious delays in a number of courts,
particularly in issuing motivations of judicial decisions. These delays in publishing
motivations are a real hindrance for the efficiency of the judicial process. They also affect
judicial independence: as high workload in many courts often leads to delays in issuing
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For example, tackling shortcomings in the random allocation system of courts, where verification by the
inspectorate has so far not led to concrete corrective action (see Technical Report page 7 and page 19).
Bulgarians have the most negative perception regarding the prevalence of corruption in the judicial
sector of any Member State. In September 2011, 76% of all respondents in Bulgaria believed that
corruption is widespread within the judicial sector. This perception has however slightly improved since
2009. (Special Eurobarometer no. 374 on corruption perception in the EU published in February 2012)
See Technical Report page 13. For example, the SJC has acknowledged that appraisals carried out in
2011 marked 98% of all magistrates as "very good".
A promotion decision of the SJC was nullified by the Supreme Administrative Court in May as the
consideration of academic results of the candidate by the SJC in this context was considered
inappropriate.
See Technical Report page 13, footnote 46.
De facto, secondments equal promotions and mostly concern courts and prosecutors offices in Sofia. In
2011, the total number of seconded judges and prosecutors amounted to 265 compared to 294 positions
offered for promotion and transfer in the same year.
According to estimates by practitioners, workload at Sofia City Court is eight times higher than at other
courts of first instance, the situation at Sofia Regional Court is considered worse. Reallocations of
positions remained modest with 20 to 30 transfers on average by year (Technical report, page 14). No
decisions to close entire courts and reallocate staff have yet been taken.

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motivations, a large number of judges are in technical infraction. Professional associations
have raised concerns that this opens the door to subjective treatment, arguing that some of
their members have been sanctioned, while late motivations in other cases have been tolerated
by the judicial inspection.33
Other important conditions for a more efficient and consistent judicial process are efficient
procedures and professional practice among police, prosecution and courts. Since 2007,
Bulgaria has improved all three procedural codes, covering criminal, civil and administrative
law.34 As a result, this allowed the police to improve investigative practice and has facilitated
the use of evidence in court. It also allowed courts to appoint reserve defence counsels to
reduce the risk of delays and allowed the prosecution to appeal court decisions to send back
cases for further investigation. Bulgaria also started to work on a new Penal Code in 2010 as
the current Code is outdated and ill-suited to tackling many modern crimes, including
corruption, abuse of office and organised crime.35 Work on the Penal Code has proceeded at
an uneven pace and the initial target to submit a first draft for public discussion in early 2013
has been postponed.
Weaknesses in judicial and investigative practice, in particular in relation to cases involving
high-level corruption and serious organised crime, have been highlighted by the Commission
since 2008.36 Bulgaria initially responded to these concerns by introducing the monitoring of
a number of cases of public interest by the Supreme Judicial Council, through training
activities and with controls by the inspectorate to establish whether procedural rules had been
respected by judges. The reform of penal procedures in 2010 was also accompanied by a
structural re-organisation of police investigation, the extension of investigative tasks to a
much larger group of police officers, and the provision of training and equipment for this
purpose.
These measures contributed to the acceleration in court of some cases but had little effect on
the most important cases of high-level corruption and organised crime monitored by the
Commission. As a result of a detailed analysis of some key cases, the July 2011 CVM report
recommended a comprehensive analysis of organisational structures and judicial procedures
and the implementation of an action plan in cooperation with international experts and
monitored together with civil society.37 This was in particular directed at the need to see the
different institutions as part of a continuum, rather than separate bodies pursuing their own
strategies. In response, Bulgaria took a number of structural and organisational decisions
involving the prosecution and its cooperation with other key bodies. These measures have not
yet led to perceptible improvements in the results of police and the judiciary regarding cases
of high-level corruption and organised crime (see below). In addition, law enforcement
authorities and the judiciary have not yet engaged in a comprehensive and independent
assessment of the weaknesses of the existing structures and procedures. Consequently, the
potential impact of measures taken by Bulgaria in this context since last summer is yet to be
seen.

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A case cited in this context is summarised in footnote 18.
A new Civil Procedure Code was adopted in July 2007, the Administrative Procedure Code was
amended in 2007 and 2011 and the Penal Procedure Code was amended in 2010. See Technical Report
pages 10-12.
See Technical Report, page 9.
See Technical Report, page 16.
COM(2012)459final, page 8, recommendation f and g.

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In this context, it is important to stress the importance of judicial consistency. A recent
consultation within the judiciary exposed stark disagreement among judges on the conditions
for the application of preliminary detention of defendants in serious criminal cases.
Disagreement in such important areas raises substantial concerns, and points to shortcomings
in the pursuit of consistency by the judicial authorities, with the Supreme Court of Cassation
(SCC) the most important player in this area. A proactive strategy by the SCC to identify and
address inconsistent interpretation of the law in all relevant areas could bring major benefits,
in particular in support of Bulgaria's fight against organised crime and corruption.38 In
addition, Bulgaria has not yet achieved a full publication of court rulings and motivations in a
unified format.
Reform of the Judicial System
The shortcomings in accountability of the judiciary and in efficiency of the judicial process
must be linked to the key institutions that drive progress in this area, in particular the Supreme
Judicial Council and the prosecution. For these reasons, the Commission has recommended a
comprehensive reform of these institutions, assessing and improving organisational structures
and professional practice regarding serious criminal cases.39 Although some limited action has
been taken at the level of the prosecution,40 these recommendations are essentially still
pending.
The reform of the SJC has been in particular focus as the mandate of the current Council
draws to a close. This focus on the Council was intensified when two members resigned in
2011 in disappointment over the Council's incapacity to deliver tangible improvements in
judicial accountability and integrity, and shortcomings in transparency within its internal
organisation. In the election to replace these posts, a number of courts refused to be involved,
considering that the current Council had lost the legitimacy to represent the judiciary.
This debate led to reflections by the Ministry of Justice on reforming the elections to the
Council, and a variety of contributions from within the judiciary and civil society to promote
fundamental reform of the way the Council is organised and elected.41 Some of the concerns
raised in this context were confirmed by experts consulted by the Commission.42

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The SCC issued only five interpretative rulings concerning organised crime and corruption offences
between 2007 and 2011.
These recommendations were made by the Commission under points 1 and 3 on page 8 of the CVM
report adopted on 20 July 2011 (COM(2011)459).
For example, the prosecution created two new departments for combating financial crime and a
department for juvenile justice. Bulgaria still has to take measures to strengthen the internal
independence of prosecutors in order to ensure independent, objective and effective investigations. In
particular, Bulgaria needs to address the absence in Bulgarian law of sufficient guarantees for an
independent investigation into offences of which the Chief Public Prosecutor or other high-ranking
officials close to him may be suspected (ECHR 1108/02 Kolevi, judgment of 05/11/2009, final on
05/02/2010).
Proposals for a comprehensive reform of the SJC were made to the Minister of Justice in February 2012
by a coalition of the most important professional organisations and NGOs active in the area of judicial
reform. See Technical report page 16.
Experts notably highlighted the lack of formal separation within the Council between chapters of
prosecutors and judges. This issue has previously been underlined by opinions of the Council of
Europe's Venice Commission, as has the strong political role in the appointments.

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The elections to the new Council this autumn are an important opportunity to strengthen its
accountability and legitimacy among the judiciary and the public. They should be a starting
point for a more fundamental reform towards a Council better able to fulfil its Constitutional
role. For these reasons, the Commission recommended to the Bulgarian authorities that the
introduction of direct elections in the judicial chapter would be an important step to address
the shortcomings of the system today. Although the Bulgarian government endorsed direct
elections to the SJC in principle, it considered that this was impossible to organise properly
this autumn. Amendments to the Judicial Systems Act adopted in June include an important
step forward in the transparency of the upcoming election procedure, for both the
parliamentary and the judicial chapters. However, the judicial chapter will still be elected
through the indirect election model, so the SJC will have to wait another five years before
benefitting from recourse to direct elections.43 First reports suggest that though the
transparency requirements are proving a step forward in the process, postponing the use of
direct elections for this year has led to inconsistent procedures and a dominant role for Court
Presidents in the choice of delegates.
The upcoming elections still provide an opportunity to choose SJC members committed to a
more active role for the Council in its next mandate. Both Parliament and the judiciary can
focus their deliberations on criteria such as professional and educational qualification,
integrity and a vision for the future. Transparency should mean an opportunity for the
candidates to be scrutinised by civil society and Parliament and the judiciary should be ready
to be accountable for their choices.
To contribute to the success of the Council’s next mandate, it will be important to improve the
Council's structure, procedures and organisation. The new leadership of the Council can take
a fresh look at the role of the Council on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the
Council's current mandate. The ideas put forward by professional associations and civil
society at the beginning of this year can offer inspiration for the new Council. An early test
will be the upcoming elections of Prosecutor General and Chair of the Supreme Court of
Cassation. The new Council could choose to make the elections for these most important
judicial positions in the country emblematic of a new approach, with open and transparent
proceedings, clear criteria and a real competition.
II.2 Fight against Organised Crime 2007-2012
Benchmark 6: Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious
crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of
criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in
these areas
Upon accession, Bulgaria committed to demonstrate convincing results in the fight against
organised crime. This involves demonstrating the capacity of law enforcement authorities and
the judiciary to successfully investigate, prosecute and try important organised crime cases so
as to achieve effective dissuasiveness. Key issues include systematic asset seizures and
confiscation, the improvement of professional practice among police, prosecution and courts

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Candidacies will be published two months before the election date and public hearings of all candidates
will be organised to allow for public scrutiny. An indirect election with a doubled number of delegates
will be organised this autumn. Direct election is foreseen for the next Council elections in 2017.

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and the establishment of effective structures and efficient cooperation between police,
prosecution and other administrative authorities.
Activity against organised crime intensified in 2010 when police took a more active role, and
a number of long-overdue procedural and institutional reforms were carried out. These efforts
have led to a more solid institutional set-up, better procedures and won Bulgaria trust with
law enforcement authorities in other EU Member States.44 The resources devoted to police
investigations have seen significant increases.45 However, convincing results are still missing
at both the pre-trial and trial phases to tackle effectively this form of criminality. There are
still many unsolved and delayed cases in this area. Organised crime is still described by
independent observers as a fundamental challenge for the state and the society,46 a view
shared by public opinion.47
The institutional framework for the fight against organised crime has been adjusted several
times since 2007.48 There has been an overall trend towards more specialisation, more training
and more careful security vetting.49 Specialised joint teams for organised crime cases within
the prosecution were created at the level of five district courts in 2010, and in 2012 a new
specialised central prosecution office for organised crime and a new specialised court started
its work.50 This approach is in line with recommendations in successive CVM reports.51
These new specialised structures at the level of police, prosecution and court illustrate a
commitment to adapting structures to tackle organised crime. However, so far, they have not
yet been able to prove their effectiveness in the successful investigation, prosecution and trial
of important cases. With very few exceptions, the specialised court has decided so far only
minor cases as the underlying legislation does not allow the court to prioritise on the most
important cases.52 This is accentuated by the staffing constraints on both the prosecution and
the court. Another important weakness of the law is that it does not allow the court to pursue
corruption offences which are in reality often linked to organised crime. Together with the
general strengthening of penal procedures and the reform of police investigation, these new
structures and reforms are a clear demonstration of Bulgaria's interest to achieve a stepchange in the fight against organised crime.

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Europol has noted improvements in the cooperation of Bulgaria with law enforcement institutions in
other EU Member States which had led to various successful joint operations.
Police investigators have increased from 2000 in 2010 to 6000 in 2011 and should reach 8000 in total.
(SEC(2011)967final, page 18).
Europol considers organised crime in Bulgaria as unique in the EU to the extent that it exercises
considerable influence over the economy which is a platform to influence the political process and state
institutions. The annual turnover of the twelve most important organised crime activities in Bulgaria is
estimated at 1.8 BEUR or 4.8% of GDP annually. (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
2010-2011. Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia. April 2012, p.5) Europol also notes that the
number of cases initiated in Bulgaria, while on the rise, is still low compared to the scale of organised
crime.
96% of respondents in a Flash Eurobarometer conducted in Bulgaria in May 2012 considered organised
crime an important problem. (Flash Eurobarometer 351)
Technical Report page 31.
The overall strengthening of police investigation in 2010 has also had a positive effect on the capacity
of police in this area.
Technical Report page 32.
COM(2009)402final, page 7; COM(2010)400final, page 8; COM(2011)459final, page 9.
The definition of organised crime in the Bulgarian Penal Code is criminal offences committed by three
or more individuals.

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Better results in the forfeiture of assets are an important element to the dissuasiveness of the
fight against organised crime and also the fight against corruption. The first years after
accession saw little progress in this area, with few assets secured and forfeited in important
organised crime and high-level corruption cases. The year 2011 saw a significant increase in
the amounts of forfeited assets in Bulgaria and a more proactive and rigorous approach by the
asset forfeiture commission under a new director. His resignation in 2012,on the grounds of
insufficient political support, cast doubt on the sustainability of this improvement and pointed
to wider obstacles to effective asset forfeiture. 53
To improve effective asset forfeiture, a new asset forfeiture act was adopted by Parliament in
May.54 This law offers for the first time the possibility to confiscate illegal assets through a
procedure in civil courts which does not require a prior conviction, but can be launched upon
the initiation of judicial investigations for a number of serious crimes and upon certain
administrative infringements. With the adoption of this law, which required a particular effort
by the government in Parliament, Bulgaria responded positively to longstanding
recommendations by the international community and many Bulgarian practitioners. The
Commission and Member States provided encouragement and support for this approach.55
The law does not reflect all recommendations made by CVM reports in this context56 and
experts have highlighted other potential shortcomings.57 In order to allow the new asset
forfeiture act to achieve a real dissuasive effect, a systematic scrutiny of assets in all relevant
cases and better inter-institutional cooperation will be necessary. This will require that the
prosecution systematically associates the asset forfeiture commission, early enough during an
investigation to prevent the disappearance of assets. Administrative control authorities will
also have to set up close cooperation with the asset forfeiture commission to identify and
profile relevant cases, as the commission lacks ex-officio powers to act on its own initiative.
Consistency of court jurisprudence, in particular regarding the shift of the burden of proof
foreseen in the new law will be another important element to determine its effectiveness. It
will also be important to assure the independence and efficiency of the future asset forfeiture
commission which will be created under the new law, notably through the appointment of
competent and politically independent members in a transparent and objective process.58
Although Bulgaria invested considerably to improve the institutional and legal framework for
the fight against organised crime since 2010, results have been limited: Few important
organised crime cases have received sentences59 and there have been several acquittals in
important cases where evidence in public domain raised expectations of convictions.60 Serious
concerns must be raised regarding the poor results in uncovering contract killings: Of 33
contract killings monitored by the Commission since 2006, only four court cases have started,

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59
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Technical Report, page 34.
A Constitutional challenge was registered in the beginning of July.
After a first failure in Parliament in July 2011 and the Commission's recommendations to return to the
law in two consecutive CVM reports, several Member States ambassadors intervened publicly in
support of the law in May and the Commission advised on some aspects of the law.
Missing in particular are asset control of senior officials and politicians and an ex-officio right for the
asset forfeiture commission.
Technical Report, page 35.
Members of the new commission will be elected by Parliament, Government and the President.
Notable exceptions are the cases of Dimitar Zhelyazhkov, and Plamen Galev and Angel Hristov.
Since last July, four important cases have been finally acquitted by the Supreme Court of Cassation:
The case of the so-called "crocodile gang", the case of the "Margin brothers", the case of Ilian Varsanov
and the case of Dimitar Vuchev. Acquittals have furthermore been referenced in COM(2011)459final,
page 5.

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even if a number of investigations are still under way.61 A number of new contract killings
have taken place this year. In this context it is important to mention that the Commission
regularly receives complaints from Bulgarian citizens and foreign investors about judicial
inaction and alleged collusion with organised crime on local level.62 More progress can be
seen in areas linked to Bulgaria's cooperation with other Member States. This has led to a
number of steps to specifically address crimes with a cross-border dimension, such as
trafficking in drugs.63
The weak results overall in the follow-up to individual cases cannot be attributed to a specific
institution. Analysis shows that weaknesses are to be found at all stages of the investigative
and judicial process among police, prosecution and courts.64 Some of these weaknesses are of
systematic character, notably the fragmentation of investigations among several bodies and
shortcomings in cooperation, weaknesses in the use of evidence and specific shortcomings in
area like witness protection and economic and financial analysis.65 Bulgaria needs clear and
effective procedures and practices and better tools for cooperation66 to succeed in important
organised crime cases. A comprehensive and independent assessment of case failures, with
the support of EU partners, and corrective measures in the form of an action plan, seems the
clearest way to make progress.
Systemic failures in law enforcement were recently demonstrated after two prominent
convicts escaped enforcement of their prison sentence. The Bulgarian authorities failed to
apprehend some of the most senior criminals of the country after an announced verdict was
handed down by court. This must be seen as a major failure of the system.
II.3 Fight against Corruption 2007-2012
Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations b into
allegations of high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions
and on the publication of assets of high-level officials
Benchmark 5: Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at
the borders and within local government
Upon accession, the CVM set out how Bulgaria was expected to demonstrate better results in
the fight against corruption. This involved demonstrating the capacity of law enforcement
authorities and of the judiciary to successfully investigate, prosecute and try high-level
corruption cases and to investigate inexplicable wealth. Key tools include a system of asset
control for high-level public officials, measures to fight corruption in law enforcement,

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It is generally accepted that there have been some 150 or so contract killings over the last 10 years, very
few of which have been uncovered and sanctioned.
This concerns in particular the Black Sea region.
An important organised crime figure has been arrested in May and will be extradited for trial in another
EU Member State. A recent large seizure of drugs was the result of cooperation between Bulgaria,
several other Member States, and Europol.
See Technical Report page 30.
There is no information on assets secured or confiscated in relation to cases raised by the new
specialised prosecution office for organised crime. An important money laundering case has been
recently initiated concerning Plamen Galev and Angel Hristov.
Proposals made by experts on the basis of practice in other Member States have included regular
reporting by senior management in prosecution and police, and a central register for bank accounts to
facilitate financial investigation.

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prosecution, at borders and other parts of the public sector, and specific measures in the areas
of conflicts of interest and public procurement.
Since 2007, Bulgaria has developed a comprehensive administrative framework and
prevention measures to combat corruption. Risk assessment tools are available and specific
methodologies have been implemented for key areas such as asset declarations and conflict of
interest. Reforms among border police and customs have reduced corruption opportunities in
these areas. However, implementation has remained patchy. Setbacks have come in areas like
the 2009 amnesty act.67 In addition, the Commission's recommendation to turn the asset
verification system into an effective tool to detect illegal enrichment has not yet been
followed.68.
In their analysis of the Bulgarian anti-corruption framework, experts consulted by the
Commission highlighted some general weaknesses that inhibit progress in this area. Bulgaria
lacks independent institutions in the area of anti-corruption with the authority and the
obligation to make proposals and to drive action.69 This limits their freedom of action to
intervene in a pro-active way and to deliver independent monitoring. As a result, many
administrative activities in this area tend to be reactive and to focus on formal compliance
alone. The lack of sanctioning rights in some areas, and the absence of effective sanctions in
areas where these rights exist, is illustrative of how difficult it is for this action to gain
traction.70
In order to take a step change in its fight against corruption in the next period, Bulgaria should
consider establishing an independent body to coordinate and assist monitoring in this area. In
this context, it would also be appropriate to carry out an independent impact evaluation of
Bulgaria's national strategy for the fight against corruption and organised crime and to
establish a new strategy with clearer indicators and benchmarks of achievement on this basis.
The scale of concern about corruption in Bulgaria is substantial: 96% of Bulgarians perceive
corruption as an important problem and 68% consider the situation in this area unchanged or
worse than in 2007.71 Public perceptions will only change when determined action has been
seen to be taken in the fight against corruption.
High-level corruption
The response of the judiciary and law enforcement regarding cases of corruption and in
particular cases of high-level corruption involving senior government officials and politicians
has been a focus of the CVM since 2007. Bulgaria has developed specialisation in this area.
Further to recommendations by the Commission72, in 2009 Bulgaria created a joint team for
the investigation and prosecution of fraud with EU funds and strengthened its legal

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69
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The amnesty act of 2009 led to 458 discontinued cases including abuse of office and misuse of public
funds.
COM(2011)459 final, page 10.
Except for the National Audit Office, all authorities in this area are subordinated to the executive.
The National Audit Office and the Conflict of Interest Commission cannot sanction if cooperation is
refused. Inspectorates have the right to sanction non-compliance with corruption prevention rules but in
reality have not exercised this right.
Flash Eurobarometer 351 of July 2012.
In 2009, the Commission recommended Bulgaria to set-up specialised structures for prosecuting and
judging high-level corruption and organised crime cases. (COM(2009)402final, page7.

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framework.73 Some other high-level corruption cases were treated by joint teams focusing on
organised crime, which were created at the same time. Following further recommendations in
CVM reports74, in 2012 Bulgaria created a dedicated joint team to focus on high-level
corruption and reorganised the joint team on EU fraud, extending its remit to several other
areas of fraud with public funds.
The results of these specialised structures are mixed. Although the creation of the joint team
on EU fraud initially led to an increase in cases and court, case numbers decreased again in
201175 and the vast majority of these cases were of minor importance. In addition, the
Commission's analysis showed a large number of unexplained dismissals and unsuccessful
cases.76
The results of the judiciary regarding other corruption cases show a similar picture: Although
case numbers increased in 2009 and 2010, there was a significant drop in 2011.77 In addition,
there are very few high-level cases that reach court and many of those cases progress only
very slowly in trial, with a disproportionately high number of acquittals.78 Investigations into
alleged corruption and abuse of office by magistrates have received a particularly weak
response from the judiciary.79
In this context, particular concerns must be expressed as to continuous delays and
postponements at appeal court level in two emblematic cases regarding fraud with EU funds,
where long prison sentences were handed down by court in first instance in March and
October 2010. No satisfactory explanation has been found why the available procedural
possibilities to accelerate these emblematic cases have not been actively pursued by the
judiciary.80 The disappointing results at both the pre-trial and trial phases in the pursuit of
high-level corruption can be largely attributed to systematic weaknesses that affect judicial
efficiency in other areas – such as the legal framework, court jurisprudence, and the practice
of prosecution and administrative control authorities. They have been set out by the
Commission in 201181 and also find many echoes in an analysis carried out by the prosecution
services in 2012. The remedial measures implemented by the prosecution82 demonstrate an

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75

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79
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Amendments to the Penal Code in May 2008 allowed for the admittance in court of evidence provided
by the European Anti-Fraud Office OLAF.
COM(2011)459final, page 8-9.
Convictions in EU fraud cases rose from none in 2007 steadily to a high of 243 convictions in 2010 and
decreased again to 159 in 2011. All indictments for EU fraud registered in 2011 were discontinued as
criminal cases and turned into administrative infringements. (COM(2012)57final, page 6).
In its reports of July 2011 and February 2012, the Commission points to a large number of discontinued
cases where related aspects were prosecuted in another Member State (COM(2011)459final, page 6;
COM(2012)57final, page 6).
Newly initiated pre-trial investigations for corruption offences: 512 in 2007, 490 in 2008, 595 in 2009,
684 in 2010 and 522 in 2011.
Since the Commission's last analysis in July 2011, verdicts have been achieved in five high-level cases,
two of them final. Final convictions for prison sentences were pronounced in two cases concerning a
former Member of Parliament and a former director of a state-owned enterprise, the execution of one
sentence was suspended. During the same period, ten cases were acquitted involving three former
ministers, one former deputy minister and other senior officials, managers of state-owned enterprises
and businessmen.
See above page 7.
In both cases, a variety of delays mean that first instance convictions delivered in 2010 have barely
progressed in appeal. (Technical Report, page 20, footnote 80).
Technical CVM Report of 20 July 2011 (SEC(2011)967 final), page 12.
See Technical report page 16-17.

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increasing understanding within the judiciary that substantial change in professional practice
and organisation will be needed to improve the results of Bulgaria in the fight against highlevel corruption.
These measures should be embedded in an overall legal and institutional effort in Bulgaria to
improve the way corruption cases are brought to justice, as recommended under the CVM in
2011.83 This will require coordinated action in several areas. Firstly, Bulgaria should consider
legal amendments to facilitate the prosecution of corruption offences by the judiciary.84
Secondly, administrative control authorities should establish a pro-active attitude to identify
cases and effective means of cooperation with the judiciary. Thirdly, police investigators and
prosecutors need to develop the capacity to analyse complex economic and financial data.
Finally, the prosecution also needs to be able to properly plan and steer complex
investigations to successful closure and the court system needs to improve the ability of
judges to appreciate economic and financial evidence, align jurisprudence and encourage
dissuasive sanctions through cassation. In this context, it will be important to establish a close
operational cooperation between the specialised joint team against corruption and the
specialised prosecution office for organised crime.
Despite the various legal and procedural instruments developed to address high-level
corruption, the continuing difficulties of such cases in court raises questions about the
capacity and resolve of the judiciary. High-level corruption cases typically involve influential
public personalities; they are therefore a test for the capacity and independence of the
Bulgarian judicial system. As corruption and organised crime are often linked, detailed
financial investigations are an important part of any investigation in this area and of particular
importance to uncover links between organised crime and politics. These aspects have not
received appropriate attention in Bulgaria. It will also be important to work closely with the
asset forfeiture commission and other administrative control authorities in order to carry
through an efficient pursuit of high-level corruption cases with dissuasive results.
Corruption in public administration
The efforts of law enforcement institutions in the fight against corruption need to be
complemented by effective administrative action to identify transgressions of rules, to apply
sanctions and to develop preventive measures. Since 2007, Bulgaria has developed a
comprehensive administrative framework in this area. In particular, Bulgaria created a highlevel coordination body for the fight against corruption under the Council of Ministers to
supervise the implementation of Bulgaria's strategy and action plans in this area. Two new
administrative bodies were created in 2010, a commission for the prevention of conflicts of
interest, and a horizontal body to promote the fight against corruption. In addition,
administrative inspectorates in each branch of government activity have been tasked to
develop and monitor prevention activities and risk assessment tools and are also asked to
apply disciplinary sanctions if required. This framework is completed by the National Audit
office which is in charge of asset control of public officials.
With the help of this comprehensive administrative framework, Bulgaria has been able to
register a number of achievements in preventing and sanctioning corruption since 2007. Risk
83

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For this purpose, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria undertake a comprehensive audit of
judicial practice, procedures and organisation and establish a detailed action plan together with
international experts. (COM(2011)459 final, recommendations under points 3 and 6, pages 8-9)
See Technical report page 9.

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assessment tools and codes of ethics have been developed and implemented in most areas of
government, a system of regular declarations for conflict of interest, incompatibilities and
assets for public officials has been set up and some institutions such as customs, tax
authorities and border police carried out a structural reform, with particular attention to
integrity and corruption prevention.
However, there are also a number of important shortcomings which Bulgaria should correct in
order to make a step change in dissuading corruption and to improve the degree of trust
Bulgarians have in their state institutions. The system of asset control whereby the National
Audit Office collects and publishes asset declarations is a useful contribution to transparency,
but the verification of declarations falls short and the system offers no possibility to detect
illicit enrichment. Few cases of concrete follow-up of inconsistencies in declarations by other
authorities have been reported.85 The recommendation by the Commission to include asset
verification in the new law on asset forfeiture has not been followed.86 The fact that few of
these cases are ever investigated strongly suggests that there is a gap here, and part of the
administrative machine needs to have explicit responsibility for proactively pursuing illicit
enrichment.
Bulgaria adopted a law on conflicts of interest in 2009 and set up an administrative authority
to establish and sanction conflicts of interest.87 The establishment of a dedicated commission
to establish conflicts of interest and to suggest sanctions has led to an impressive increase of
public signals on conflicts of interest and a number of decisions, but so far only one case has
been finalised.88 The assessment of the Commission's first 15 months of operation shows a
new authority that has taken up its challenge and started work quickly, but which has not yet
been able to prove itself in convincing decisions in important cases.89 Questions must also be
raised regarding the effectiveness of the law on conflicts of interest. The Commission's
decisions can be appealed at two instances before the courts and any subsequent
administrative sanction can also be appealed at two instances. As a result of this cumbersome
two-tier procedure, the Commission has been able to issue altogether so far only five penal
orders.90 The Commission needs to demonstrate its ability to deliver sound judgement in

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Declarations are automatically checked by an IT programme against some other available data, such as
tax declarations, but there is no risk profiling, no access to banking data, no comparison to declarations
of previous years and therefore no possibility to follow-up on inexplicable wealth.
The Commission recommended Bulgaria to "adopt legislation providing for non-conviction based
confiscation and ex-officio verification of assets of senior officials, magistrates and politicians and
demonstrate a track record in this area" (COM(2011) 459 final, page 9)
Bulgaria adopted a law in 2009 and then established the Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment
of Conflict of Interest (CPACI) in 2011, after a suspension of EU funds in summer 2008 which was
motivated in particular by several cases of conflict of interest and a lack of protection of EU funds in
this area. (Technical Report, page 27; see also COM(2008)496final "Report on the Management of EU
Funds in Bulgaria").
See Technical Report page 27.
Recent cases which have been publicly questioned involve the previous chairman of the Asset
Forfeiture Commission and the former chairman and a former member of the Commission for
Consumer Protection.
Other weaknesses highlighted by experts notably include the inability to pursue anonymous signals and
to apply administrative sanctions in cases incorrect declarations are submitted (see Technical report
page 27).

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sensitive cases. Recommendations by the Commission to apply conflict of interest rules to
individual service contracts have not yet been followed.91
Bulgaria implements a methodology on corruption risk assessment across the executive under
the authority of the General Inspectorate of the Council of Ministers. This methodology can
be considered a useful tool for corruption prevention. However, its application is not
mandatory and the capacity of the General Inspectorate to follow up on implementation is
limited. In addition, corruption risk assessment is only mandatory for the executive branch92
and disciplinary sanctions have so far not been applied in cases where the requirements were
not respected. A new structure to assess corruption risks across the Bulgarian institutional
framework ("Borkor") is yet to become operational. To have added value, it would need to
become a strong central institution to coordinate the fight against corruption, with authority to
assess the plans of other institutions, to make a risk assessment of declarations on conflict of
interest, or to act as a secretariat for an independent monitoring process.
Public Procurement
Weaknesses in the implementation of Public Procurement legislation are an important source
of corruption. They also undermine the effective use of EU funds and, in a general sense, lead
to a lower quality in the delivery of public goods and the waste of public money. Audits and
assessment by various Commission services have identified substantial risks and
shortcomings in this area.
Since 2007, Bulgaria has made efforts to improve its legal framework and administrative
action regarding public procurement. Bulgaria reformed its public procurement-related
legislation with the aim to simplify the latter and to strengthen some administrative controls in
order to comply with recommendations by the Commission.93 The Public Financial
Inspections Agency (PFIA) and the Court of Auditors received powers to undertake ex-officio
checks and the requirement on the Public Procurement Agency (PPA) to check tenders before
they are published was extended. Efforts have been made to improve the expertise of the
judiciary, including through specialisation.
However, these efforts have not yet led to the expected results. The complaints received by
the Commission concerning the Bulgarian public procurement system continue to grow,94 and
there are clear cases of serious violations of EU procurement rules. Although additional staff
has been made available this year,95 the resources devoted to helping contracting authorities
are still insufficient. It will be important for Bulgaria to implement new control procedures
effectively. Giving the PPA right to perform ex-officio checks would send an important
message that a more pro-active risk-based approach is expected from all control bodies.
III. Next Steps

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(COM(2011)459 final, recommendation v, page 10) Individual service contracts are currently based on
the law on obligations and contracts and therefore escape labour legislation and its provisions on
conflict of interest and incompatibilities.
Corruption risk assessment is not compulsory for Parliament, the Judiciary, local self-government,
public agencies, public institutes and public utilities and funds.
COM(2011)459final, page 10.
In the area of public procurement, the Commission received 4 complaints over the course of 2008 and
2009 and 26 complaints over the course of 2010 and 2011.
The Public Procurement Agency has received 10 additional posts this year, mainly to carry-out
additional ex-ante control functions.

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The Commission's assessment shows the progress that Bulgaria has made in the five years
since its accession to the EU. The CVM has made a positive contribution to this progress. The
Commission considers that Bulgaria is on its way to attain the objectives of the CVM,
provided it steps up the reform process. Deepening reforms will need a stronger ownership of
reform, particularly in the leadership of the judiciary. It will also need a clear common
direction by the authorities, and a comprehensive approach to implementing change, joining
the work of different institutions together more effectively than in the past. This implies a
stronger effort to demonstrate, that integrity is valued and that corruption and organised crime
is effectively punished. The CVM should continue, in order to lend its support to these efforts
and to keep up the momentum of change towards a sustainable and irreversible reform
process – a process sufficiently strong that the external intervention of the CVM is no longer
needed.
The past five years have shown that Bulgaria can take major strides when the political
direction is clear. It has put many of the right tools in place. The next phase will be to use
these tools in order to drive and implement reform. This will bring closer the fulfilment of the
CVM requirements, as well as being a demonstration of commitment to the Bulgarian people.
All Member States have both obligations and opportunities within the area of freedom,
security and justice, and the Commission looks forward to Bulgaria completing the particular
process of the CVM and addressing these issues on the same basis as other Member States.
Recognising that Bulgaria now needs to implement what has been decided, avoiding any steps
backward and demonstrating a strong track record, the Commission has decided to make its
next assessment at the end of 2013.This will allow the time required to assess tangible results.
The Commission will also end the practice of issuing mid term stock taking reports. However,
the Commission will monitor progress closely over this period, with regular missions, as well
as frequent dialogue with the Bulgarian authorities and with other Member States.
IV. Recommendations
To maintain progress, the Commission invites Bulgaria to take action in the following areas,
on the basis of recommendations designed to help Bulgaria to focus its efforts in preparing for
the Commission's next assessment of progress under the CVM at the end of 2013.
1.

Reform of the judicial system
– Renew the Supreme Judicial Council with a mandate to undertake
fundamental reform.
– Establish and implement a medium-term human resource strategy for the
judiciary, based on an analysis of needs and workload, with the changes in the
structure of courts, recruitment and training.
– A new General Prosecutor should have a mandate to reform the prosecution in
structure, procedures and organisation on the basis of an independent
functional audit and in cooperation with external experts.
– Set a target for the completion of work on the new Penal Code, and for its
implementation.
– Ensure the open involvement of all significant NGOs and professional
organisations in defining and monitoring strategies for reform.

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2.

Independence, accountability and integrity of the judiciary
– Focus the work of the Inspectorate on integrity and judicial efficiency. Define
a single, effective system of random allocation of cases for use nationwide.
– Ensure that the election of the General Prosecutor gives an example of a
transparent, competitive process based on criteria of integrity and
effectiveness.
– Make transparency, objectivity and integrity the top priority in appraisals,
promotions, appointments and disciplinary decisions for the judiciary.

3.

Efficiency of the judicial process
– Establish a strategy for reducing the backlogs in publishing motivations for
cases and analyse how to remedy this problem.
– Close loopholes in the effective implementation of court decisions, such as
absconding to evade prison sentences or failure to apply financial sanctions
defined in court.
– Adopt a strategy to improve legal consistency, including a proactive strategy
by the Supreme Court of Cassation to identify and rule on areas of
disagreement.

4.

Fight against organised crime
– Ensure that the new Asset Forfeiture Commission is appointed on the grounds
of integrity, that other authorities, notably the prosecution, fully cooperate
with its work; and that the Supreme Court of Cassation rules swiftly to
preserve its authority if necessary;
– Carry out an independent analysis of case failures covering weaknesses in
both investigation and prosecution including witness protection, economic and
financial analysis, collection of evidence by police and cooperation between
the judiciary and the executive.
– On this basis, remedy shortcomings in structure, management, staffing,
training, cooperation and professional practice.

5.

Fight against corruption
– Use experience from past cases to improve the performance of police, the
prosecution and courts.
– Carry out an independent impact evaluation of Bulgaria's National AntiCorruption Strategy. Entrust a single institution with the task to coordinate the
fight against corruption, to assist and coordinate the efforts in different sectors,
report on the results of the anti-corruption strategy in all public bodies, and
support a new independent monitoring system involving civil society.

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– Amend the law on conflicts of interest to allow dissuasive sanctions to be
effectively applied. Revise the asset declaration and verification system
turning it into an effective instrument to detect illicit enrichment.

EN

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