DISCUSSION PAPER (16 JULY 2014)
“EU BATTLEGROUPS: USE THEM OR LOSE THEM”
SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE NETHERLANDS
TO THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY PARLIAMENT OF THE IPC CFSP/CSDP

Introduction
At the European Council in December 2013, Heads of State and Government, for the first
time after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, held a debate on the future of EU’s CSDP.
Referring to Europe’s rapidly evolving strategic and geopolitical environment in times of
constrained defence budgets, the Council stated that ‘the EU and its Member States must
exercise greater responsibilities in response to those challenges if they want to contribute to
maintaining peace and security through CSDP together with key partners such as the United
Nations and NATO.’1 The Heads of State and Government made a strong commitment with
regard to ‘the further development of a credible and effective CSDP, in accordance with the
Lisbon Treaty and the opportunities it offers.’2 They adopted a number of priority actions to
this end.
One of the priority actions concerns the readiness and deployment of the EU Battlegroups. In
Article 8 of its conclusions, the Council acknowledges the current shortcomings concerning
the deployment of these forces:
“The EU and its Member States need to be able to plan and deploy the right civilian
and military assets rapidly and effectively. The European Council emphasises the need to
improve the EU rapid response capabilities, including through more flexible and
deployable EU Battlegroups as Member States so decide.”
The European Council will recur to CDSP in its meeting in June 2015 to evaluate the concrete
progress on these matters.
Point of focus: The EU Battlegroups
In 1999 the EU decided to set up a rapid response force, whose deployment could prevent the
escalation of crises at an early stage. This rapid response force was intended to encourage
member states to transform their armed forces towards higher readiness and deployability.
Secondly, it would enable the EU to carry out crisis management operations independently
from NATO. Both objectives entailed closer defence cooperation between EU member states.
The concept of a rapid response force evolved into the establishment of the EU Battlegroups.
In principle, two Battlegroups – both with a personnel strength of 1,500 – have been on
standby to be deployed in military operations for the purpose of international crisis
management since 2007 (the standby roster is attached to this paper).
1

Conclusions of the European Council 19/20 December 2013, EUCO 217/13, paragraph 2.

2

Ibidem.

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According to the EU Battlegroup concept, a decision on the launch of an operation is taken by
the Council of the EU within 5 days of approval of the Crisis Management Concept.
Consequently, the aim is to have forces deployed on the ground within 5 to 10 days of the
launch decision. The EU Battlegroup concept implies that the Battlegroups will be made up of
assets and capabilities held at 5 to 10 days readiness.
In case of deployment, the forces must initially be sustainable for at least 30 days, which is
extendable to 120 days, if resupplied. After this time frame, an international follow-up
mission, e.g. enacted by the United Nations, might take over the tasks carried out by the EU
Battlegroups.
The EU Battlegroups are joint and combined formations. This implies that they are in general
composed of more than one armed service (joint), and that more than one nation contributes
to its composition (multinational) although mono-national Battlegroups have occurred as
well. In spite of their readiness, none of the EU Battlegroups has effectively been deployed so
far, which raises the urgent question whether or not the EU should continue with the
Battlegroups, or to put it differently: ‘Use them or lose them’. The intention of the
Netherlands is to use them.
Problem analysis: why the EU Battlegroups have not been used so far
Four factors hampering the deployability of the Battlegroups can be identified:
1) Varying security and defence strategies / lack of political will on a European level
Though a common Security Strategy is in place, and although member states do cooperate in
the framework of CSDP, each member state remains solely responsible for its own security
and defence policy priorities. Member states differ in their political and/ or military
appreciation of the need to intervene in international conflicts. The decision to launch and
deploy an EU Battlegroup requires a unanimous decision by the Council of the EU.
2) Shrinking defence budgets and shifts in focus
Secondly, most EU member states face a shrinking defence budget. Therefore they are
increasingly forced to 'pool and share' key military capabilities and training. To this end many
EU countries are making pragmatic bilateral and multilateral arrangements. This bottom-up
trend implies a shift in focus from the EU to the bilateral or multilateral level. Another
consequence of the shrinking defence budgets is that the decision of member states how to cut
and reform their defence is based on national priorities.
3) Divergent national decision making procedures
Thirdly, the effective deployment of the Battlegroups is subject to the approval by the
national decision making authorities of the member states providing military forces to the
Battlegroup. The political decision making procedures vary, depending on the nature of
constitutional requirements. In some member states, the government is entitled to decide
without parliamentary involvement. In other states, parliament is involved in other ways.
Extent of the involvement may vary depending on the specific information, consent or
decision procedures that apply nationally.
4) Financial burden
Another explanation is the financial burden related to deployment of the EU Battlegroups,
since the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle applies to participation in CFSP missions.
Basically, member states need to finance the operational costs of the deployment of their
armed forces and equipment during CSDP missions. Only a small portion of ‘common costs’
is covered by the CSDP budget of the EU or by the member states (according to the ‘Athena
mechanism’).
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Challenges for deployment: parliamentary decision making procedures
A number of political, financial and/or procedural factors can be distinguished in explaining
the non-deployment of the EU Battlegroups. This paper focusses on the procedural factor of
parliamentary decision making procedures (the 3rd factor in our problem analysis).
The deployment of the Battlegroups is subject to the approval by the national decision making
authorities of the member states providing military forces to the Battlegroup. The national
decision making procedures vary, depending on the nature of constitutional requirements. In
some member states, the government is entitled to decide without parliamentary involvement.
In other states, parliament is involved in various ways. The extent of parliamentary
involvement may vary depending on the specific information, consent or decision making
procedures that apply. The consequence of the often comprehensive national parliamentary
procedures regarding military deployment is that the requirement of the deployment of EU
Battlegroups within 5-10 days (after launch of an operation) is not being met.
The role of parliaments and the deployment of civilian and military forces under CSDP

The Dutch delegation addressed the issue of non-deployment of EU Battlegroups at several
occasions during the previous IPCs.
Last year the delegation of the Netherlands made an inquiry through the network of national
parliaments' representatives into the divergent national parliamentary procedures and the
various degrees of involvement of national parliaments. The results were submitted in a paper
at the IPC CFSP/CSDP in Vilnius (4-6 September 2013). It regards a preliminary overview
based on the contributions of 17 parliaments.
Furthermore, the issue of non-deployment of the Battlegroups has been discussed in a
workshop during the IPC in Athens (3-4 April 2014). Participants in the workshop were
invited to further elaborate, compare and share their experiences with regard to their decision
making procedures and practices and to exchange views on how these procedures relate to the
non-deployment of the EU Battlegroups. Amongst others, the following questions were raised
and addressed during the IPC in Athens:
- What are the key differences in national parliamentary decision making procedures and
practices, and what consequences do these have?
- What challenges do these procedures and practices pose for the timely deployment (within
5-10 days) of the EU Battlegroups?
- What opportunities can be identified to tune national parliamentary decision making
procedures to the assigned EU Battlegroup task?
At the end of the IPC, broad consensus was reached at the level of problem analysis. The IPC
acknowledged the importance of continuing and deepening the discussion on this matter in
the next IPC in Rome (6-7 November 2014). As it was agreed in conclusion number 17 of the
IPC Conclusions in Athens:
“[The Conference] takes note of the conclusions of the December European Council relating to
effective decision-making for CSDP and the rapid deployment of civilian and military assets,
including Battlegroups, and reiterates the call for their swift implementation; calls on the
Member States to address the serious gap whereby political decisions are made to launch
operations and are not backed up by the provision of civilian and military forces and capabilities;
notes the need to respect national constitutions and parliamentary procedures of certain Member
States prior to any decision to deploy military forces; welcomes the exchange of views on
parliamentary procedures and practices during this Conference; calls for further enhancement of
the cooperation among national Parliaments and the European Parliament, as budgetary
authorities and legislators, to explore options for addressing the capability shortfalls in European
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defence that takes into account the budgetary and financial realities as well as the need for a fair
system of burden-sharing; engages to ensure that in all our Member States the requirement of the
deployment of EU Battlegroups within 5 to 10 days can be met; commits to a further exchange of
views on this matter in order to explore the possible solutions to increase the effectiveness and
readiness of EU Battlegroups and welcomes the initiative to discuss this topic at the next IPC
CFSP/CSDP conference in Rome.”

Deepening the discussion: various scenarios concerning the future of EU Battlegroups
In order to deepen the discussion on the future of the Battlegroups, several scenarios can be
conceived. In this paper, four scenarios are touched upon (presented hereafter in order of the
level of cooperation). Of course, this list is not limitative and additional scenarios might be
put forward.
1. Permanent Structured Cooperation with preclearance
In this scenario, EU member states can, on a voluntary basis, declare their actual readiness to
deploy armed forces in case of urgency and upon decision by the Council of the EU. These
member states already give general preclearance to deployment before an international
emergency occurs or a European mission proposal is submitted. The level of cooperation and
integration on a long-term basis between these member states will increase considerably.
National and internal procedures might be adjusted or harmonised to speed up the formal
deployment decision making process. If the Council decides to launch an operation,
procedures can be concluded more swiftly. In addition, deployment does not depend on the
willingness of all EU member states any more. In fact, the feature of Permanent Structured
Cooperation in military matters, as introduced in article 42(6) of the (new) Treaty on the
European Union, might be suitable to facilitate this aim.
Moreover, a Solidarity Fund, covering the operational costs, might be taken into account in
order to share and lower the financial burden for individual Member States that are willing to
deploy the EU Battlegroups.
2. Training model with possibility of enhanced cooperation and certification
According to this scenario, the current EU Battle groups are remodelled into training and
certification pools; the main focus is on joint training and experimentation of operational
capabilities. Furthermore, joint training costs – e.g. planning, logistical services and
equipment – are reduced by better coordination and pooling of demand. Standardisation and
certification of EU Battlegroups by an independent organisation (such as the European
Defence Agency) would ensure consistent quality on a long term. Decision making
procedures concerning deployment remain nevertheless the sole responsibility of the
participating EU member states.
However, from these training and certification pools, a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ can
be assembled at the moment an international crisis occurs. Those member states would
enhance readiness in order to deploy their operational units to perform the required tasks they
have already trained for.
3. Continuation of current practice
By this scenario, the current de facto functioning of the EU Battle groups is merely continued.
The EU member states explicitly settle for training capacities with no intention to actual
deployment. Basically, the objectives of the EU Battlegroups are lowered and adjusted to the
current practice.
4. Termination of EU Battlegroups
The fourth and least demanding option is termination of the EU Battle groups. The rapid
response forces of the European Union, as conceived in 1999 and realised in 2007, will be
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abolished and disbanded, without having been deployed. The EU henceforth leans upon the
general (more time-consuming) procedures on CSDP missions and the commitments to these
missions by member states. For rapid response forces, the EU and its member states will from
now on be dependent on other international organisations, such as NATO.
Possible questions to be raised at the IPC in Rome
It is recommendable to structure the (extended) discussion on EU Battlegroups at the IPC in
Rome by a selection of questions. The Dutch delegation suggests the following,
comprehensive series of questions (subject to selection):

-

-

-

In which way and to what extent do national procedures and practices differ?
What consequences might these differences have (at a national level and EU level)?
What lessons and conclusions are to be learned from this comparison?
How can national procedures be coordinated to facilitate the rapid deployment of
EU Battlegroups?
Which scenario for the future of the EU Battlegroups do you suggest?
What opportunities and challenges do you expect?
What is the effect of the defence budget cuts in EU member states on (the
deployment of) the EU Battlegroups?
In which way does the NATO financing system serve as a good example for the EU?
What can we learn from NATO’s rapid response forces?
How can we improve cooperation between EU and NATO and enhance synergy?
To what extent is it (politically) feasible to mutualise the operational costs of
deployment of EU Battlegroups, for example by a Solidarity Fund, to be funded by
voluntary contributions of EU member states?
To what extent should (or might) member states that deliver contributions to the
same, multinational EU Battlegroups coordinate their national procedures?
To what extent can or should national parliamentary procedures be tuned to the
assigned EU Battlegroups task?
In what way should the national decision making procedures be taken into account
when the multiannual schedule of member states’ contributions to the EU
Battlegroups is drafted?
Do you perceive some sort of relationship between the rise of bilateral and
multilateral arrangements between EU Member States and the EU Battlegroups?
Would you support the idea to rename the EU Battlegroups as ‘EU Rapid Reaction
Force’ (abbreviated ‘ERF’), similar to the NRF (NATO Response Force)?

Attachments:
1)

The role of the Dutch Parliament in the decision-making process regarding
deployment of the armed forces
Source: Dutch Parliament

2)
Table outlining the availability of EU Battlegroups in 2005-2014
Sources: German Ministry of Defence, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Wikipedia

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1)

The role of the Dutch Parliament in the decision-making process regarding
deployment of the armed forces

The involvement of the Dutch Parliament (House of Representatives and Senate) in the
decision-making process regarding deployment of the armed forces is derived from article
100 of the Dutch Constitution (added in 2000). This article stipulates:
1. The Government shall inform the States General in advance if the armed forces are to be
deployed or made available to maintain or promote the international legal order. This shall
include the provision of humanitarian aid in the event of armed conflict.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if compelling reasons exist to prevent the
provision of information in advance. In this event, information shall be supplied as soon as
possible.
The "Review Framework" (Toetsingskader) has become the general instrument to assess the
government's intention to deploy the armed forces and structures the debate between
government and parliament on individual military operations. This Review Framework - a list
of particular political and military points of interest - was first introduced in 1995 and was
linked to Article 100 of the Constitution - after that article came into force. The Review
Framework is a flexible instrument as per individual mission, a decision will be made on
which elements of the framework should be addressed. In general, the review will include an
assessment of the political context of the conflict, the countries participating, the financial
means available, the feasibility of the mission, the risks, the expected duration of deployment
and the mandate of troops.
In a letter to Parliament, the government explains its decision along the lines of the Review
Framework, followed by parliamentary scrutiny (predominantly in the House of
Representatives). While parliamentary approval is not officially needed for deployments to
start or continue, in practice the government will always strive for broad political support in
the Parliament.

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2)

Table outlining the availability of EU Battlegroups in 2005-2014
Period – Year & Months
01-06

2005
07-12
01-06
2006
07-12
01-06
2007
07-12
01-06
2008
07-12
01-06
2009
07-12
01-06
2010
07-12
01-06
2011
07-12
01-06
2012
07-12
01-06
2013
07-12
01-06
2014
07-12

Participating countries (1 or 2 BGs per semester)
United Kingdom
France
Italy
None
France, Germany
Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal
France, Germany, Belgium
None
Germany, Netherlands, Finland
France, Belgium
Italy, Hungary, Slovenia
Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus (“HELBROC Battlegroup”)
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estionia, Ireland (“Nordic Battlegroup”)
Spain, Germany, Portugal
Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain
United Kingdom
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece
None
Czech Republic, Slovakia
France, Belgium, Luxemburg
Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia
United Kingdom, Netherlands
Italy, Romania, Turkey
Spain, France, Portugal
Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, Lithuania
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland (“Nordic Battlegroup”)
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus (“HELBROC Battlegroup”)
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy
France, Germany, Netherlands
None
Italy, Slovenia, Hungary
Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Macedonia
Poland, Germany, France (“Weimar Battlegroup”)
None
United Kingdom, Sweden
Belgium
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus (“HELBROC Battlegroup”)
None
Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Netherlands, Spain
None

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