POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED IN 2022
195 SESA 22 E | 21 November 2022

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONFRONTING RUSSIA’S THREAT
DECLARATION 473

1

STANDING WITH UKRAINE
DECLARATION 474

4

STRENGTHENING THE CYBER RESILIENCE OF ALLIED SOCIETIES
RESOLUTION 475

7

SUPPORTING NATO’S POST-MADRID SUMMIT DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE INITIATIVES

9

RESOLUTION 476
THE CORRUPTION-SECURITY NEXUS
RESOLUTION 477

12

RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES
RESOLUTION 478

15

NATO POST-MADRID SUMMIT: FIT FOR PURPOSE IN THE NEW STRATEGIC ERA
RESOLUTION 479

18

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY –NATO’S AGENDA
RESOLUTION 480

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CONFRONTING RUSSIA’S THREAT
DECLARATION 473*
The Assembly,
1.
Condemning, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of
choice against Ukraine and the horrific war crimes for which it must be held accountable;
2.
Underlining that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014 and other recent aggressive
actions, rhetoric and ultimatums fit into a pattern of persistent violations of its international
commitments and systematic attempts to undermine democracies, to upend the European security
order and to destroy the international rules-based order;
3.
Condemning Russia’s ongoing illegal occupation of parts of the territory of Ukraine, Georgia
and the Republic of Moldova, the systematic human rights violations in occupied territories and the
persistent efforts to destabilise these countries and derail their European and/or Euro-Atlantic
integration;
4.
Stressing that Russia’s aggressive actions, grounded in revisionist policies and backed by
extensive military modernisation, constitute the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic
security;
5.
Recognising that Russia’s renewed, full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created a new strategic
reality which NATO Allies confront;
6.
Stressing that Russia’s recent actions confirm the relevance and timeliness of the Assembly’s
two key priorities for NATO’s new Strategic Concept – reaffirming the Alliance’s shared democratic
values and core principles and adapting NATO to a radically altered security environment;
7.
Stating unequivocally that Russia has turned its back on the core principles of the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act;
8.

Reaffirming that NATO, as a defensive alliance, is not seeking confrontation with Russia;

9.
Declaring absolute the NATO Allies’ commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and
making clear that Allies will take all necessary measures to deter and defend every inch of NATO
territory and across the entire spectrum of Russia’s threats to transatlantic security;
10. Acknowledging that, while NATO has consistently affirmed its openness to meaningful
dialogue, Russia’s own actions currently make such dialogue impossible;
11. Cognisant of Russia’s growing military co-operation with China and troubled by the 2022
Russia-China Joint Statement, in which the countries challenge the rules-based international order
and where China, for the first time, echoes Russian opposition to the right of all nations to choose
their own path;
12. Welcoming the submission by Finland and Sweden of their application to join the Alliance,
and denouncing the threats directed against those NATO partners;

*

Adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Monday 30 May 2022.

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13. Applauding the unity and resolve of Allies and their key partners, including NATO’s primary
partner the European Union, in the face of Russian aggression, the practical and political support
provided to Ukraine and other partners and the swift and necessary measures taken by the Alliance
to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture;
14. Aware of the multiplication of cyber threats and disinformation operations for political purposes
carried out by Russia;
15. Stressing that continued Allied unity and resolve, guided by shared democratic values, is
fundamental to meeting Russia’s threats;
16.

URGES Allied Heads of State and Government when they meet in Madrid:

a.

to reaffirm all aspects of their support for Ukraine, its independence and territorial integrity in
the face of Russia’s war, as recommended in the Assembly’s declaration 474 on
Standing With Ukraine;

b.

to clearly identify Russia’s malign revisionism and aggressive actions as the most immediate
and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security in NATO’s new Strategic Concept;

c.

to continue to significantly strengthen and adapt the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture
across the full spectrum of military power, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear,
conventional and missile defence capabilities;

d.

to swiftly move to a “forward defence” posture, especially through the permanent deployment
of troops and equipment along NATO’s Eastern flank, improving command and control
structures and increasing military preparedness;

e.

to reaffirm and meet the 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety and to enshrine
the 2%/20% guidelines of the Pledge as a minimum commitment for the long term;

f.

to refine concepts for deterring and defending below the Article 5 threshold, through a
combination of political and military tools;

g.

to step up efforts to decisively and forcefully tackle Russia’s cyber threats and their
consequences, including disinformation;

h.

to assess and address the implications of Russia-China co-operation for Euro-Atlantic security;

i.

to keep channels for diplomacy, de-confliction, de-escalation and arms control open with
Russia to avoid unintended escalation, misunderstanding or miscalculation;

j.

to support one another in bolstering transatlantic energy security and independence by
diversifying energy sources, considering new routes and phasing out coal, gas, oil and uranium
imports from Russia;

k.

to ensure effective information exchange on potential further Russian aggressive actions
beyond Ukraine and its attempts to expand its influence in key regions, from the Black Sea to
the Western Balkans and the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood, including through
mercenaries like the Wagner Group;

l.

to step up political and practical, including military, support for other NATO aspirants and
partners subject to Russian pressure and attempted intimidation, especially Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;

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m.

to reaffirm the Open Door policy which no third country can veto**;

n.

to continue working closely with the European Union and other key partners in addressing
Russia’s threat;

o.

to place shared democratic values at the heart of NATO’s response to Russia’s threats,
including through the establishment, within NATO, of a Democratic Resilience Centre to serve
as a resource and a clearinghouse of best practices and cross-fertilisation on democratic
benchmarks available to member, partner and aspirant states.

_______________

**

i.e. prevent or challenge

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STANDING WITH UKRAINE
DECLARATION 474*
The Assembly,

1.

Standing firmly with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people;

2.
Condemning in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of
choice against Ukraine – the gravest aggression in Europe since World War II – and reaffirming its
unwavering support for Ukraine’s democracy, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3.
Reaffirming that the forcible occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories by Russia
constitute an illegal and unjustifiable aggression, which violates fundamental principles of
international law;
4.
Rejecting Russia’s efforts to legitimise the illegal occupation and annexation of territory
through illegitimate referenda and elections;
5.
Determined to hold accountable the Russian regime, its accomplices in the Belarusian regime
and all other actors who have committed war crimes and bear responsibility for the deaths, suffering
and destruction;
6.
Strongly condemning the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, including attacks against civilian populations and civilian infrastructure, the targeting of maternity
wards, hospitals, residential buildings, theatres, kindergartens, schools and buildings used as
temporary shelters for refugees, as well as the use of prohibited weapons, including cluster bombs,
which violates international obligations and rules and as such must be stopped immediately;
7.
Deeply concerned about the increased risks faced by the most vulnerable groups in times of
conflict, in particular women and children, including the risk of sexual violence and human trafficking;
8.
Conveying its profound respect and admiration for the remarkable bravery of the
Armed Forces and security services of Ukraine and of volunteers, for the unity and resolve of the
Ukrainian people as well as for the Ukrainian authorities’ outstanding leadership in the face of this
brutal aggression;
9.
Recognising that, with its aggression against Ukraine, Russia seeks to crush Ukraine’s
democracy, intimidate other sovereign and democratic countries and, by extension, undermine the
values that are fundamental to NATO and the entire democratic, civilised and peaceful world;
10. Warning the Russian regime that its policy and practices, including murder, torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, rape and sexual assaults, severe physical injury to civilians, deliberate military
attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, destruction of property, and attacks on
hospitals, among others, which aim at removing by violent and terror-inspiring means the Ukrainian
civilian population from certain geographic areas, constitute war crimes;
11. Stressing that Putin’s war of choice against Ukraine, unacceptable aggressive rhetoric against
and ultimatums to NATO Allies and partners – including the implicit threat of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear escalation – confirm that Russia’s actions represent today the gravest
security threat to Europe’s security and fit into a pattern of systematic attempts to undermine the
rules-based international order;
*

Adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Monday 30 May 2022.

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12. Convinced that these actions mark a turning point and create a new strategic reality which
NATO Allies and partners must adjust to immediately and for the long term;
13. Affirming that it will never recognise Russia’s illegal claims in Ukraine nor any attempt by
Russia to create illegitimate alternative administrative structures in Ukraine and reaffirming its full
support for Ukraine’s democratically elected government and parliament;
14. Applauding the unity of Allies and their key partners, including NATO’s primary partner the
European Union, in the face of Russian aggression, the practical and political support provided to
Ukraine and the swift and necessary measures taken by the Alliance to strengthen its deterrence
and defence posture;
15. Resolved to help bolster democracy in Allied and partner nations – more specifically among
those partners at risk as a result of Russian activities – and continue to defend the fundamental
principles of the rules-based international order, including the right of all nations to choose their own
path;
16. Reaffirming its steadfast support for the path towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration,
which the Ukrainian people have chosen and is anchored in Ukraine’s Constitution;
17. Grateful for the support for Ukraine which many citizens around the world have expressed,
including those who face harsh censorship and repression;
18.

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a.

to continue building a strong global coalition to support Ukraine with all possible assistance
and to increase pressure on Russia to cease all military and hybrid operations and immediately
withdraw its troops from Ukraine;

b.

to maintain and increase massive, crippling and sustained sanctions for however long it takes
until Russia reverses its illegal actions and withdraws all of its troops from all Ukraine’s territory
within its internationally recognised borders, including enlarging the list of sanctioned oligarchs
and officials connected with the Russian regime as well as their families, propagandists and
state media and the phasing out of coal, gas, oil and uranium imports from Russia;

c.

to increase substantially the level of intelligence sharing and the supply of military equipment,
particularly anti-aircraft, artillery, ammunition, anti-missile, and anti-ship systems, which
Ukraine urgently needs to defend itself against Russian aggression;

d.

to provide, in close cooperation with relevant international partners, further emergency
humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and to step up support to Ukrainian refugees both within
and outside of Ukraine;

e.

to provide substantial short- and long-term financial and material assistance to Ukraine;

f.

to continue and strengthen NATO’s assistance for Ukraine’s security and defence sector and
cooperation with the Ukrainian armed forces;

g.

to agree on the next steps in support of Ukraine’s NATO integration path;

h.

to demand that Russia unblocks exit routes for Ukrainian grain exports to avoid further
devastating consequences on global food security;

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i.

to expel Russian diplomats engaged in hostile activities, including spreading hate speech,
disinformation and fuelling the conflict;

j.

to support the initiatives aimed at establishing accountability of the Russian Federation under
international law, international human rights law and international criminal law, notably the
investigations launched by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the
European Union Member States, as well as the establishment of a special ad hoc international
criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine and
bringing the perpetrators to justice;

k.

to hold the Belarusian dictatorship accountable for its support of and role in Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine and to maintain and increase massive, crippling and sustained economic sanctions
against the Belarusian regime;

l.

to continue making it very clear to Russia that the international community will never recognise
the illegal and illegitimate occupation and annexation of Crimea, the “independence” of the
so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s
territorial waters nor any attempt by Russia to create illegitimate alternative administrative
structures in Ukraine;

m.

to continue to press Russia to engage constructively in credible talks with Ukraine to achieve
concrete results, starting with a sustainable ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of its troops
from Ukrainian territory that fully respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine;

n.

to reiterate that Ukraine decides its own future and that no decision about Ukraine will be
taken without Ukraine;

o.

to continue seeking ways to engage with Russian civil society, both in Russia and abroad,
supporting all initiatives aimed at resisting the Kremlin’s aggressive policies;

p.

to remain vigilant and ensure effective information exchange on potential further Russian
aggressive actions beyond Ukraine;

q.

to swiftly move to a “forward defence” posture, including the permanent deployment of a
significant number of troops and equipment along NATO’s Eastern flank, ensuring the
capability and readiness to defend every inch of NATO territory;

r.

to step up political and practical, including military, support for other NATO aspirants and
partners subject to Russian pressure and attempted intimidation;

s.

in the revised NATO Strategic Concept, to clearly identify Russia’s revisionism and aggressive
actions as the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security and respond by
moving to “forward defence”, adjusting adequately NATO’s posture, NATO’s defence plans,
especially on the front line of NATO’s Eastern Flank, command and control structure and
military preparedness while placing shared democratic values at the heart of NATO’s response
to today’s challenges, including through the establishment, within NATO, of a
Democratic Resilience Centre.

_______________

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STRENGTHENING THE CYBER RESILIENCE OF ALLIED SOCIETIES*
RESOLUTION 475
The Assembly,
1.
Acknowledging the essential contribution of digital technologies to the functioning,
well-being, cohesion and security of Allied societies;
2.
Concerned about the growth, sophistication and increasingly destabilising impact of
malicious cyber activities targeting all sectors, including public services, private companies and
democratic institutions;
3.
Commending efforts made in recent years by Allies and NATO to enhance their capacity to
prevent, deter and counter malicious cyber activities; and welcoming the emphasis on combatting
the latter and commitments made in NATO's new Strategic Concept;
4.
Alarmed by the aggressive and irresponsible behaviour of authoritarian states in cyberspace;
and concerned by the multiplication and diversification of malicious non-state cyber actors, their
objectives and their techniques;
5.
Strongly denouncing the unacceptable proliferation of malicious cyber activities against
critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine before and during Russia's new illegal and unprovoked
invasion of the country, and recognising the importance of Allied support to Ukrainian authorities in
thwarting them;
6.
Reaffirming that Allies have a duty to maintain and strengthen their national cyber resilience
and that NATO can provide support in this regard, notably through the Cyber Defence Pledge;
7.
Stressing that NATO has recognised cyberspace as an operational domain; and reiterating
the possibility for the North Atlantic Council to decide, on a case-by-case basis, when a cyber-attack
would lead to the invocation of Article 5;
8.
Reaffirming the crucial role of partnerships in combatting cyber threats that defy borders,
and welcoming the extensive and effective cooperation between NATO and the European Union
(EU) in this area;
9.
Recalling that enhancing the cyber security of Allied societies cannot be achieved at the cost
of undermining the democratic freedoms, rights and principles that underpin them;
10.
Noting that the international community has recognised the applicability of international law
in cyberspace, and reiterating the Alliance's commitment to its observance in order to promote a
free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace;

*

Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 21 November 2022

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11.
URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and, where
appropriate, NATO bodies:
a.

to swiftly implement agreed-on common policies, notably the Cyber Defence Pledge, the
Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy and the new Strategic Concept;

b.

to enhance cyber deterrence and defence capabilities:
i.
by being transparent about their action doctrines;
ii.
by consolidating their ability to quickly and effectively coordinate their responses, in
particular concerning attribution, to cyber activities while respecting Allies’ national
competence ;
iii.
by reserving the right to voluntarily adopt joint measures against perpetrators of cyber
operations below the threshold at which they would be considered armed attacks
warranting a military response;
iv.
by taking action and developing cyber capabilities – including, at the national level,
offensive capabilities – and greater interoperability to enable Allies to impose significant
costs on perpetrators for their malicious cyber activities;

c.

to deepen understanding of cyber threats, intelligence sharing and research, for example
through the creation of dedicated applications for the general public, and to invest in network
security in order to better prepare for and thwart malicious cyber activities;

d.

to strengthen national policies and legal frameworks for combatting cyber threats and to
continue working towards the development and implementation of international standards for
responsible behaviour in cyberspace;

e.

to intensify cooperation with relevant international organisations, notably the EU, partner
countries, industry and academia, in particular by consolidating the exchange of information
and best practices;

f.

to raise awareness among all societal actors of their individual role in collective cyber
resilience; to deepen collaboration with all private sector actors; and to strengthen civil-military
cooperation in the cyber domain;

g.

to maintain and increase support for partner countries facing cyber risks, in particular Ukraine,
in order to counteract the irresponsible malicious cyber activities against the latter in the
context of Russia’s escalating war of aggression ;

h.

to pursue and strengthen the regular organisation of exercises and training involving all the
actors concerned, aimed at identifying their cyber vulnerabilities and testing and developing
their individual and collective capacity to react to and recover from malicious cyber activities;

i.

to ensure that parliaments, civil society and the public have all the information and means
necessary to monitor measures aimed at enhancing cyber security to make sure that these do
not infringe on democratic values or individual rights.

_______________

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SUPPORTING NATO’S POST-MADRID SUMMIT DETERRENCE AND
DEFENCE INITIATIVES*
RESOLUTION 476
The Assembly,
1.
Denouncing in the strongest possible terms Russia’s brutal and unprovoked full-scale war of
aggression against Ukraine, demonstrating it is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’
security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
2.
Commending Ukraine’s continued valiant and just self-defence, as enshrined in the
UN Charter, against Russia’s aggression to protect its people, its sovereign territorial rights and
democracy;
3.
Welcoming the demonstration of Allied unity and the far-reaching decisions taken at the 2022
Madrid Summit, which lay the groundwork for a fundamental shift in NATO’s baseline deterrence
and defence posture;
4.
Convinced NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a solid roadmap to adapt the Alliance to
meet the threats and challenges of an increasingly complex security environment, in defence of
Allies’ common values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
5.
Praising the continued, significant, and vital Allied and partner military, economic, political,
and humanitarian support to Ukraine;
6.
Alarmed by the Russian government’s reckless nuclear rhetoric directed at NATO Allies,
reflecting a pattern of aggressive brinkmanship to disrupt Euro-Atlantic support for Ukraine’s just
self-defence against Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on its territory;
7.
Recognising that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, remains the most significant
asymmetrical threat to Allied and partner security and stability, and supportive of Allied leaders’
strong recommitment to work with NATO’s unique and essential partner, the EU, as well as with
other partners, particularly in the Middle East, across the Sahel, and in the Horn of Africa, to fight
terrorism and respond to shared threats and challenges;
8.
Concerned about Afghanistan’s potential to re-emerge as a haven for terrorism under the
current Taliban leadership;
9.
Troubled by China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies, which challenge Allied interests,
security, and values;
10. Concerned about the erosion of frameworks for arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation, Russia’s irresponsible nuclear brinkmanship, Russia and China’s expansion of
their nuclear arsenals, and Iran and North Korea’s continued development of their nuclear and
missile programmes; all of which are negatively impacting strategic stability;
11. Acknowledging that malign actors, both state and non-state, increasingly seek to disrupt and
degrade Allied institutions, infrastructure, economies, and societies in cyberspace;

*

Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 21 November 2022

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12. Recalling that NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of
nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complimented by space and cyber
capabilities;
13. Welcoming the significant steps taken since 2014 to adapt NATO’s deterrence and defence,
and recognising they must be built upon to meet the security challenges facing the Alliance today;
14. Encouraged by Allies’ decision to commit to a modern forward defence posture via the
reinforcement of NATO’s forward presence, a significantly strengthened force model for
multi-domain, high-readiness follow-on forces, the prepositioning of equipment, and enhanced
command and control, particularly along NATO’s eastern flank, to guarantee the security of all Allied
populations and territory;
15. Stressing that NATO’s actions are defensive and designed not to provoke, but rather prevent
conflict;
16. Recognising the need for Allies, working in close cooperation with the EU, to increase the
resilience of their national critical infrastructures, particularly the energy and communications
networks upon which our economies, governments, and societies depend;
17. Endorsing the Allies’ call for each member state to develop national goals and implementation
plans to increase collective resilience within the Alliance, which is critical to NATO’s core tasks;
18. Underscoring that NATO’s strength and resilience is grounded in a foundational commitment
to democratic values and institutions, as articulated in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which states
that Allies will “safeguard our freedom and democracy” and reinforce “our shared democratic values”;
and recognising that the new Strategic Concept specifically identifies, for the first time, authoritarian
actors as a challenge to “our interests, values and democratic way of life”;
19. Praising Allied leaders’ endorsement of NATO’s 2022 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy, which commits the Alliance to have the capabilities needed to
counter WMD proliferation as well as operate effectively and prevail in any environment;
20. Supporting the establishment of a multinational Innovation Fund, to bring together
governments, the private sector, and academia to complement the Defence Innovation Accelerator
of the North Atlantic (DIANA) and bolster Allies’ technological edge;
21. Determined to maintain defence investment momentum, building upon the 2014 Defence
Investment Pledge, to underwrite and sustain the initiatives necessary to implement NATO’s new
baseline deterrence and defence posture;

22.

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a.

to work collectively and diligently to ensure the prompt and effective implementation of the new
decisions taken at the Madrid Summit to reinforce NATO’s new baseline deterrence and
defence posture;

b.

to promptly and fully implement the modernisation of the NATO Force Structure, thereby
boosting the Alliance’s overall presence on the eastern flank, while maintaining a 360-degree
approach;

c.

to persist with and build upon the political and practical support to Ukraine as it defends its
sovereignty and territorial integrity, including via the enhanced Comprehensive Assistance
Package for Ukraine;

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d.

to implement, in a timely fashion, the “Tailored Support Measures” adopted at the June 2022
Summit for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, which will further
enhance their defence capabilities and resilience;

e.

to state clearly that the Russian Federation under the current regime, whose forces are
launching indiscriminate attacks, and deliberately and systematically targeting civilian objects
and critical infrastructure in Ukraine, acts as a state that supports and perpetrates terrorism
and war crimes;

f.

to carry forward the political unity and will demonstrated at the June 2022 Summit, to commit
the financing and resources necessary, using the benchmark 2% of GDP as a minimum
investment level to adapt the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture, and to increase their
annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures on equipment, including
related research and development, to meet the challenges of a more contested global security
order;

g.

to implement national plans, in line with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and seeking
maximum synergy with the EU, to increase national and collective resilience, especially to
guarantee the security of critical energy and cyber networks, essential supply chains, and
government and civil services;

h.

to operationalise the commitment to shared democratic values, reaffirmed in the new Strategic
Concept, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters
to serve as a resource to propound democratic values and protect the institutions that keep
Allied democracies strong;

i.

to channel the power and potential of Alliance-wide initiatives, such as the Defence Innovation
Fund and DIANA, to support defence innovation, enhance Allies’ technological edge and
contribute to the development and adaption of dual-use emerging technologies to today’s
critical security and defence challenges;

j.

to continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist
groups, including by enhancing cooperation with the EU and other partners;

k.

to pursue strategic risk reduction in an increasingly complex international security environment
through dialogue;

l.

to continue to take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and
security of NATO’s nuclear mission;

m.

to fully support the commitments made in the 2022 CBRN Defence Policy and remain vigilant
to the CBRN threat posed by Russia, and other state or non-state actors;

n.

to continue to boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which Allied
collective defence and security depends;

o.

to work together responsibly, as Allies and with like-minded partners, to address the systemic
challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to
guarantee the defence and security of Allies.
_______________

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THE CORRUPTION-SECURITY NEXUS*
RESOLUTION 477
The Assembly,
23. Noting that corruption appears to be a catalyst for conflict, undermines state institutions and,
as expressed in NATO’s 2021 Brussels Summit’s Communique, puts national security at risk by
marginalising civil society, enabling terrorist and transnational criminal networks to finance their
operations, and forging links among corrupt political elites, organised criminal groups and
intelligence operatives from rival states;
24. Lamenting that corruption erodes democratic governance by weakening election integrity and
civil participation in the life of the state while undercutting investment, raising risk premia, driving
young people into exile and reducing economic potential by allocating resources based on opaque
connections rather than merits, thus disproportionately harming the most vulnerable populations in
society;
25. Acknowledging that in Afghanistan, endemic corruption contributed to the erosion of state
legitimacy, was a factor in state failure, led to the disbandment of its army, and significantly
exacerbated that country’s fragility, all of which, among others, opened the door for the Taliban’s
return to power;
26. Stressing the importance of strong and independent judiciaries, journalists, and other civil
society actors in exposing corruption and in holding corrupt actors to account;
27. Recognising that Russia has used corruption as a tool of hybrid warfare and curried favour
with certain actors dedicating to weakening the state, undermining democratic governance, and
countering Euro-Atlantic aspirations;
28. Noting, however, that although Ukraine long struggled with corruption, reforms since 2014
helped its society establish stronger anti-corruption norms that have enhanced its resilience;
29. Aware that a kleptocratic Russian state not only deploys corruption internationally but also
wields it against the Russian people;
30. Warning that China’s opaque business practices, which have disastrous consequences for
human rights, evade democratic scrutiny, often produce debt traps, undermine governance, and
empower corrupt officials whose interests diverge significantly from those of society at large;
31. Acknowledging that cryptocurrencies have become a widely used vehicle for the transfer of
value for illegal purposes and for the laundering of money garnered through criminal and corrupt
practices;
32. Lamenting that Western property markets have become a particularly important vehicle for
laundering the proceeds of those who have acquired wealth through corrupt means;
33. Noting that increasingly extensive international sanctions against Russia following its attacks
on Ukraine, including: asset seizures targeting those close to the regime; preventing Russian banks
from using the SWIFT financial messaging system; enhanced efforts to prevent Russian money
laundering and asset acquisitions in the West; and restrictions on Russia’s energy sector, which
itself is an agent of massive corruption, mark a radical change in that they not only represent a
*

Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 21 November 2022

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response to the Russian security threat but also enhance the capacity of allied governments to
counter the illicit flow of money acquired through and disbursed for corrupt practices;
34. Applauding intensified allied national efforts like the Biden Administration’s U.S. Strategy on
Countering Corruption, which have highlighted the security risks posed by corruption and taken
important steps to counter it, as well as the vitally important role played by international organisations
like the European Union, the OECD, the World Bank and the Financial Action Task Force in
promoting legal and operational anti-corruption strategies;
35. Welcoming NATO’s ongoing commitment to the Building Integrity program, an anti-corruption
effort premised on the notion that corruption in the defence and security sectors poses serious
challenges to peace and stability;
36. Recognising that anti-corruption measures in the security sector can serve as a model for
broader efforts as demonstrated by the reform of the Georgian police in the early years after the
Rose Revolution which subsequently inspired a series of other important reforms;
37. Saluting the strong reaffirmation in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, of the Alliance’s
commitment to shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law and
the recognition that these values must stand at the centre of NATO’s response to today’s challenges;
38.

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

p.

to encourage all Allies and partners to consider the national security dimension of corruption
and to address these in a more coordinated and systematic manner;

q.

to engage in a collective effort to insulate Allies, partners, and the democratic world more
generally from the nefarious influence of corruption, including its most malign forms as when
authoritarian states like Russia deploy it to subvert democracy, weaken democratic alliances
and advance their own anti-democratic agenda;

r.

to find ways to restrict or outlaw the use of funding from designated rival countries and their
financial institutions to underwrite election campaigns;

s.

to increase support for the vital role played by NGOs, a free media, and civil society
organisations in demanding transparency, integrity, and democratic accountability of state
institutions;

t.

to reinforce NATO’s Building Integrity program, which aims to foster resilience needed to
counter corruption in defence and security institutions in both allied and partner countries;

u.

to encourage states to adopt anti-kleptocracy legislation that aims to close legal loopholes
facilitating money laundering, to take active steps to implement sanctions and find ways to
identify the legitimate ownership of property, and to encourage the development of stronger
legal instruments to freeze and seize assets if they are found to result from corruption;

v.

to draw lessons from NATO’s experience in Afghanistan to help inform any future NATO
operations;

w.

to address gaps in Western property markets that allow corrupt officials and oligarchs to
launder dirty money by purchasing properties through offshore shell companies;

x.

to empower anti-corruption efforts carried out by a range of international organisations,
including the OECD’s Convention on Anti-Bribery and its Anti-Corruption and Integrity
program, the Financial Action Task Force’s work on terrorist financing and parallel efforts by
the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations;

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y.

to monitor developments in cryptocurrency markets and continue efforts to make
cryptocurrency transactions significantly less anonymous and easier to trace, thereby reducing
the potential for these digital currencies to be used as tender for illegal activity;

z.

to operationalise the Alliance’s commitment to shared democratic values in the new Strategic
Concept by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve
as a resource and clearinghouse of best practices available to members and partners upon
request.
_______________

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RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES AND
RESPONSES*
RESOLUTION 478

The Assembly,
39. Reaffirming its declaration, Standing with Ukraine, adopted at Spring session in Vilnius
(Lithuania) in May 2022, which conveys full solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s illegal and
catastrophic war on Ukraine;
40. Appalled by the wanton violence and massive destruction resulting from Russia’s war of
aggression;
41. Condemning in the strongest terms Russia’s use of torture and summary executions and its
utterly reckless targeting of civilian and economic infrastructure, including housing, grain silos,
energy plants, powerlines and other facilities needed to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian
population, all of which constitute horrific violations of international humanitarian law;
42. Honouring the heroic sacrifices undertaken by the Ukrainian people to defend their homeland
and, by extension, the democratic community of nations;
43. Dismayed that Russia’s war on Ukraine has not only compelled millions of civilians to flee
from their homes but is also having a profound impact on Ukraine’s economy, which will likely
contract by 35% in 2022 alone;
44. Concerned that Russia’s illegal war has had global economic consequences, driven up prices
and slowed growth while striking international energy, food, commodities, consumer goods, and
equities markets—developments which have undermined growth in allied countries;
45. Lamenting that the developing world has been struck particularly hard by this war-driven
shock and that rising food prices could trigger hunger, poverty, grave instability, a humanitarian crisis
and mass migration events;
46. Applauding Allied and partner nations’ steadfast support for Ukraine and clear refusal to
recognise any of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate claims on Ukrainian territory, including Crimea;
47. Welcoming decisions taken by Allied governments to apply an ever-broadening array of
sanctions that aim both to weaken the Russian war machine and to target those close to Putin’s
regime including individuals who have promoted the war and propagated lies that the regime has
employed to justify it;
48. Stressing that sanctions have weakened Russia’s economy but that high energy prices have
so far limited the costs to it;
49. Endorsing the commitment made by most Allied governments to reduce or eliminate imports
of Russian energy, which constitutes the most important source of financing for the Russian military
and the corrupt leaders who have used that military for such nefarious purposes;
50.

*

Welcoming solidarity and cooperation among Allies in finding alternatives sources of energy;

Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 21 November 2022

15

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51. Asserting that any attacks on Allied critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure,
would be met with a strong and united response;
52. Noting that the decision taken by the EU and the G7 to impose a cap on the price paid for
Russian oil will limit the revenues that country can generate from this key export;
53. Emphasising that reducing and ultimately eliminating Russian energy from the allied energy
mix demands a broad-based strategy aiming not only to diversify the energy supply, but also to
hasten the coming of a greener more sustainable energy future that, in due course, will enhance
security and well-being;
54. Condemning the decision of OPEC Plus to reduce oil supplies at a dangerous moment of
global economic uncertainty;
55. Recognising the importance and increasing effectiveness of Allied and partner financial
sanctions against Russia, including banning Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system;
freezing the assets of those individuals and institutions directly responsible for the war or for
financing it; and denying key services like insurance to Russian traders;
56. Observing that given the importance of western technology in virtually all military systems,
the decision to restrict Russian access to these technologies will impede the capacity of its military
to operate on the battlefield;

57.

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO
partners:

a.

to hold Russian leaders accountable for any war crimes that they have committed, including
through the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression;

b.

to provide the Ukrainian government with all the means necessary to defend its people and its
vital infrastructure against Russia’s wanton bombing and ground campaign;

c.

to increase military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support to Ukraine,
including by accelerating deliveries of the weapons that Ukraine needs to protect itself and to
restore its territorial integrity, and to sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to
prevail;

d.

to sustain critical humanitarian aid to the Ukrainian victims of this war both in Ukraine and
beyond;

e.

to continue to strengthen sanctions on Russia both to further undermine its capacity to wage
war on the European continent and to impose daunting costs on its leadership and the
economic forces that underwrite it;

f.

to do everything possible to avoid purchasing Russian energy and to understand this sacrifice
not only as an act of solidarity with Ukraine, but also as a long-term security investment;

g.

to forge a trans-Atlantic approach engaging all Allies and the EU to overcome the immediate
energy supply crisis and to plan for a long-term secure and sustainable energy future premised
on diversifying energy supplies, rapidly adopting greener and more sustainable sources of
energy and increasing energy efficiency;

h.

to make the protection of critical civil infrastructure a central strategic priority in light of Russia’s
willingness to attack fundamental economic assets;

16

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i.

to launch a concerted planning effort for a comprehensive aid programme akin to the Marshall
Plan for the reconstruction of a more prosperous Ukraine firmly anchored to the liberal
democratic family of nations—a project that Russia itself should ultimately help fund given its
responsibility for the terrible and costly damage it has inflicted;

j.

to recognise that this reconstruction will demand sustained financial and political support from
the international community and to begin to outline in close consultation with Ukraine, the EU,
and key international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF a strategy for
financing Ukraine’s economic rebirth;

k.

to continue active support for Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;

l.

to support developing countries as they cope with the economic fallout from this war, including
rising food, goods, energy and commodity prices and soaring interest rates, all of which
disproportionally strike poor indebted countries.

_______________

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NATO POST-MADRID SUMMIT: FIT FOR PURPOSE IN THE NEW
STRATEGIC ERA*
RESOLUTION 479

The Assembly,
1.
Recognising that the Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace and that the global security
environment has deteriorated rapidly, particularly since the Russian regime launched an unjustified
and brutal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine;
2.
Applauding the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept at the transformative Madrid
Summit on 29-30 June 2022, charting the way forward for the Alliance in the face of the greatest
security threat since the Second World War and demonstrating transatlantic unity and cohesion of
purpose, as well as the adoption of other milestone decisions throughout 2022 in order to keep
NATO fit for purpose in confronting the full range of contemporary security challenges;
3.
Welcoming the strong alignment between the Strategic Concept and its own contribution and
recommendations, particularly the recommitment to shared democratic values, the reaffirmation of
the indispensable transatlantic bond, as well as the strengthened Allied defence and deterrence and
reaffirmation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as the bedrock of Allied collective defence;
4.
Condemning in the strongest terms Russia’s continuing escalation of the horrific war against
the Ukrainian nation, including the despicable attacks deliberately targeting civilians and
infrastructure that amount to acts of terror against the population and constitute war crimes;
5.
Stressing that Russia currently represents the most significant and direct threat to
Euro-Atlantic security;
6.
Emphasising that Russia’s illegal and cynical attempts to annex parts of the Ukrainian territory
will never be recognised or accepted by the international community, as the vote in the
UN General Assembly on 12 October 2022 clearly demonstrates;
7.
Reaffirming its steadfast support for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine
as well as Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;
8.
Paying tribute to the brave people of Ukraine, its armed forces and democratically elected
institutions, and reiterating the need for steadfast Allied solidarity with Ukraine as it defends its
independence and holds the frontline of the democratic world, at the price of immense suffering and
the ultimate sacrifice;
9.
Welcoming the strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine and the
commitment by NATO to help Ukraine transition to modern equipment, boost interoperability and
bolster further Ukraine’s defence and security institutions, and applauding the crucial military,
economic and humanitarian assistance that individual Allies and partners are providing Ukraine to
help it defend itself against aggression;
10. Noting that the People’s Republic of China is a strategic competitor and poses multiple and
systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values; saluting the growing
convergence of European and North American policies and perspectives on China;
*

Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 21 November 2022

18

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11. Aware of the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on economic, humanitarian and security
conditions in developing countries;
12. Supporting fully the fundamental shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and the
transformation of NATO’s force structure towards enhanced forward defence and a significant
increase in high readiness forces;
13. Emphasising the importance for NATO to remain committed to a 360-degree approach to
security and to retain a focus on countering the evolving threat of terrorism and addressing other
challenges, including instability in the South, cyber attacks and hybrid operations, the security
implications of climate change, irregular migration, human trafficking, threats to energy security, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced military technology;
14. Welcoming wholeheartedly the invitation for Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance, which
has been ratified by nearly all member-state parliaments, and which would strengthen the EuroAtlantic security as a whole, and reiterating its unwavering support to NATO’s Open Door Policy
and the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
15. Valuing highly the increased level of cooperation between NATO and the European Union as
well as like-minded partners across the globe, united by shared democratic values and a strong
commitment to protect the rules-based international order;
16. Stressing the need for the Alliance to maintain capabilities and expertise in crisis
management, fully embracing lessons learned from previous missions, including NATO’s 20
year-long mission in Afghanistan;
17. Deeply concerned about Russia’s continuing violation of arms control obligations and the
erosion of global arms control and non-proliferation regimes, and condemning Russia’s reckless
and unacceptable nuclear sabre-rattling;
18.

Welcoming the emphasis on fostering resilience throughout the new Strategic Concept;

19.

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a.

to fully and promptly implement decisions taken at the Madrid Summit in regard to all three
core tasks, prioritising the reinforcement and modernisation of the NATO Force Structure and
strengthening forward defences, including by ensuring the adequate deployment of land, air,
maritime, unmanned and artillery assets in the frontline Allied nations;

b.

to finalise as soon as possible the ratification of Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to the North
Atlantic Alliance;

c.

to make clear that, given Russia’s flagrant and repeated violations of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, the document, with its provisions limiting forward deployment of NATO forces,
is now null and void;

d.

to fully deliver on their commitments under the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge and to
continue the adaptation of Allies’ defence capabilities ;

e.

to increase military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support to Ukraine,
including by accelerating deliveries of the weapons that Ukraine needs to protect itself and to
restore its territorial integrity, and to sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to
prevail, while ensuring traceability of the weapons delivered;

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f.

to recognise fully the value that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration would add to Allied
collective defence, to continue active support for Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic
institutions and to agree on the next steps towards Ukraine’s NATO membership, which the
Ukrainian people have chosen and is anchored in Ukraine’s Constitution;

g.

to support the work of the International Crimea Platform, including its Parliamentary Summit
as a tool to consolidate inter-parliamentary efforts aimed at de-occupation of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol;

h.

to take collective action towards the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the
crime of aggression committed by Russia with its war against Ukraine as well as to impose an
obligation to make full reparation of damage loss or injury under international compensation
mechanism;

i.

to state clearly that the Russian state under the current regime is a terrorist one;

j.

to operationalise the commitment to shared democratic values, reaffirmed in the new Strategic
Concept, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters
to serve as a resource to propound democratic values and protect the institutions that keep
Allied democracies strong;

k.

to ensure that combatting terrorism in all its forms remains a top priority for the Alliance and to
continue investing in prevention, protection and denial measures as well as enhancing
capacity-building cooperation with partners, especially in the south;

l.

to strengthen NATO as a political institution and to make full use of NATO as the main platform
for consultations among Allies on all aspects of Euro-Atlantic defence and security;

m.

to build on the Strategic Concept by developing a common Allied response to the increasing
assertiveness of China, including through robust safeguards regarding third party investments
in strategic sectors, in close cooperation with other allies as well as partners; including by
reducing strategic dependencies and working with partners of the Alliance, starting with the
EU and including those, new and existing Indo-Pacific partners to address shared security
interests amplified by China’s systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security and attempts to
subvert the rules-based international order, while continuing to seek opportunities for
constructive dialogue with Beijing, such as on addressing climate change, military
transparency and arms control;

n.

to continue developing political and practical cooperation with the EU – NATO’s unique and
essential partner – across the board, while promoting the inclusive engagement of non-EU
Allies in the Union’s defence-related projects;

o.

to step up support to vulnerable partners Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the Republic
of Moldova to help build their integrity and resilience, develop capabilities and uphold their
political independence, and to continue supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina;

p.

to keep the security developments in the Black Sea region under close review and support
Allied and partner countries in the region in preserving peace, security and stability in the area,
including through the development of cooperation in maritime security, freedom of navigation,
economic, tourism and commercial ties;

q.

to enhance NATO partnerships with like-minded partners, including in the Indo-Pacific, as well
as with regions on NATO’s southern flank where instability directly impacts Euro-Atlantic
security;

r.

to continue to use NATO as a platform to coordinate arms control policies taking into account
the prevailing security environment and effective deterrence and defence;

20

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s.

to preserve the ability to operate out of area, especially in the broader Euro-Atlantic area,
including in the Mediterranean and the Balkans; to take into account lessons learned from
NATO’s past missions in order to better define the parameters of NATO’s engagement and to
set clear, achievable and realistic goals, benchmarks and timelines;

t.

to foster resilience as a comprehensive whole-of-society approach as the first line of
deterrence and defence and to meet the robust baseline requirements across the Alliance;

u.

to ensure an adequate level of investments in technological innovation to maintain NATO’s
technological edge and to support NATO’s ground-breaking initiatives the Defence Innovation
Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund;

v.

to increase outreach efforts to Allied and partner populations, particularly young people, about
NATO and the unique transatlantic bond to help reverse the onslaught of authoritarian
narratives;

w.

to sustain the momentum in carrying forward the Women, Peace and Security agenda;

x.

to support NATO’s objective of being the world’s leading organisation when it comes to
understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.

_______________

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CLIMATE
CHANGE
NATO’S AGENDA*
RESOLUTION 480

AND

INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY –

The Assembly,
1.
Recalling the Assembly’s efforts since the 1980s to better understand and address climate
change and its profound security implications and, in particular, Resolution 427 (2015), which
acknowledged that climate change-related risks are significant threat multipliers;
2.
Concerned that climate change presents a real and growing international security challenge
and noting that the new Strategic Concept recognises climate change as “a crisis and threat
multiplier” that exacerbates existing security challenges all over the globe;
3.
Stressing that extreme weather already poses a grave risk to Allied military operations and
bases as well as to soldiers’ health, military equipment and critical infrastructure and
acknowledging that the frequency and intensity of extreme weather is increasing;
4.
Recognising that climate change will require our militaries to assist more frequently in disaster
relief and that the demands on our military forces to provide assistance will grow further;
5.
Noting that a changing climate will alter our security environment and that it will have the
potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations;
6.
Acknowledging that the defence sector remains the single largest consumer of hydrocarbons
in the world and that military operations and exercises consume large amounts of fossil fuels;
7.
Stressing that energy independence from third countries such as Russia would
enhance Allies' ability to carry out military operations and exercises;
8.
Recognising that extreme weather phenomena caused by human-induced climate change
are already having a profound impact on our environment, our economies, infrastructure, and social
systems and highlighting the short-term impact that these events have on critical infrastructure and
local communities including through temporary displacement;
9.
Worried that climate change is likely to create instability throughout the world, which could
lead to state failure and violent conflicts in fragile countries, and that the combined effects of
instability and climate change are likely to amplify migration movements in coming years;
10. Encouraged by the fact that Allies adopted a Climate Change and Security Action Plan in
2021 which operationalises NATO’s Climate Change and Security Agenda and stressing that NATO
Heads of State and Government committed to integrate climate change and human security across
the Alliance’s core task;
11. Welcoming that NATO presented its first annual Climate Change and Security Impact
Assessment (CCSIA) at the 2022 Madrid Summit which increases awareness of the impact of
climate change on NATO’s strategic environment, Allied installations and assets, missions and
multidomain operations as well as resilience and civil preparedness;

*

Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 21 November 2022

22

195 SESA 22 E

12. Emphasising the importance of finding technological solutions to adapt to and mitigate the
effects of climate change;
13. Noting the important work NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO), including
the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE), is conducting in this field;
14. Recalling the work carried out by other international organisations such as the UN, the EU
and the OSCE on climate change and security issues;
15. Welcoming Canada’s decision to establish a NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of
Excellence (CCASCOE), which has been accredited by NATO at the 2022 Madrid Summit;
16. Strongly endorsing NATO’s goals to reduce military emissions and “green” the armed forces
which will help the Alliance to mitigate climate change and make the militaries more self-sufficient
and able to carry out their missions;
17. Noting that the climate change policy of the Alliance must not weaken member states’ abilities
to perform their core tasks of collective deterrence and defence;
18.

URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a.

to increase investments to strengthen the energy efficiency of Allied militaries and their
adaptation to the changing climate;

b.

to operationalise NATO’s response to reduce vulnerabilities by updating its seven baseline
requirements for national resilience to better reflect the impact of climate change on security;

c.

to conduct frequent surveys of Allied civilian and military critical infrastructure to assess their
current and future ability to withstand predictable as well as irregular, extreme weather events
and organise frequent stress tests and exercises to improve their resilience;

d.

to adopt a whole-of-society approach to the civil and military security challenge posed by
climate change and bolster their communication efforts to develop awareness of the impact of
climate change on Allied civil and military security;

e.

to integrate climate change considerations as a cross cutting issue into all government
budgets, projects, activities and initiatives with the objective to foster climate change resilience
and preparedness;

f.

to maintain Allies’ support for multilateral efforts, in particular those of the European Union,
aiming to find global and comprehensive solutions to climate change challenges;

g.

to harness the potential of science and technology to support climate action by encouraging
research on innovative and novel applications, particularly in support of climate change
adaptation;

h.

to boost investments into research and development of climate-neutral technologies, in
particular climate-neutral fuels and propulsion systems, to further strengthen military
effectiveness of Allied forces;

i.

to evaluate how to strengthen the NATO STO’s resources to help advance technological
solutions and more generally, to allocate adequate human and financial resources to initiatives
aiming to contribute to a better understanding of climate change;

j.

to increase NATO’s study and early warning capacities with regards to fragile governance
through the creation of a Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO Headquarters to prevent that
climate change-related extreme weather events lead to social unrest and political instability,
which could corrode the social and democratic cohesion, values, and institutions of our nations;

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k.

to strengthen NATO’s and Allies’ toolbox providing strategic foresight in order to monitor the
impact of climate change on the political, economic and social stability of countries in the
vicinity of the Alliance.

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