Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal

2

Vergaderjaar 2015–2016

34 225

Toekomst van de Nederlandse onderzeedienst

Nr. 14

VERSLAG VAN EEN RONDETAFELGESPREK
Vastgesteld 26 april 2016
De vaste commissie voor Defensie heeft op 16 maart 2016 in het kader
van een rondetafelgesprek experts gehoord over:
– de brief van de Minister van Defensie d.d. 11 juni 2015 houdende de
visie op de toekomst van de onderzeedienst (Kamerstuk 34 225, nr. 1).
Daarbij werden eveneens betrokken:
– position paper dated 11 March 2016 by S. Williams on behalf
of Clarion Events;
– position paper dated 11 March 2016 by Mr Buchner on behalf
of MARIN, Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN);
– position paper dated 11 March 2016 by Försvarets materielverk (FMV);
– position paper dated 11 March 2016 by Mr Hank Ort on behalf
of NATO Science and Technology Organization Centre for
Maritime Research and Experimentation;
– position paper dated 11 March 2016 by Mr Bjorn Olav Knutsen
on behalf of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
(FFI);
– position paper dated 11 March 2016 by Mr Henning Faltin on
behalf of the German Ministry of Defence;
– position paper dated 15 March 2016 by Mr Jeroen de Jonge on
behalf of TNO;
– position paper dated 15 March by Mr Simeon Wezeman on
behalf of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI).
Van dit rondetafelgesprek brengt de commissie bijgaand geredigeerd
woordelijk verslag uit.
De voorzitter van de commissie,
Ten Broeke
De griffier van de commissie,
Van Leiden

kst-34225-14
ISSN 0921 - 7371
’s-Gravenhage 2016

Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2015–2016, 34 225, nr. 14

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Voorzitter: Maij
Griffier: Van Eck
Aanwezig zijn negen leden der Kamer, te weten: Belhaj, Ten Broeke,
Jasper van Dijk, Eijsink, Houwers, Knops, Maij, De Roon en Vuijk.
Gehoord worden:
Part 1: Strategic developments
(12.15 – 13.15 hours)
Mr. Reyn: Ministry of Defence (NL)
Mr. Colijn: Clingendael
Part 2: Military strategic developments
(13.25 – 14.55 hours)
Mr. Wezeman: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Rear
admiral (ret) Williams: Clarion
Rear admiral (ret) Ort: NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation
Mr. De Jonge: Organization for applied nature-scientific research (TNO)
Part 3: International cooperation and development submarines
worldwide
(15.05 – 16.30 hours)
Captain Faltin: Germany: Ministry of Defence and Chairman Conventional
Submarine Round Table
Mr. Knutsen: Norway: Forsvarets Forskningsinstituut (FFI)
Rear admiral Olsson: Sweden: Försvarets materielverk (FMV)
Mr. Buchner: Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN)
Aanvang 12.20 uur.
Part 1: Strategic developments
Mr Reyn: Ministry of Defence (NL)
Mr Colijn: Clingendael
The Chairperson: Goedemiddag allemaal. Ik heet de diverse sprekers, de
collega’s, de andere mensen in de zaal en de mensen die deze bijeenkomst elders volgen van harte welkom. Wij voeren een rondetafelgesprek
over de toekomst van de onderzeedienst. Wij hebben vandaag een vol
programma dat drie onderdelen heeft. Het eerste onderdeel gaat over
strategische ontwikkelingen, het tweede onderdeel gaat over de militairstrategische ontwikkelingen en het derde onderdeel gaat over de
internationale samenwerking op dit gebied.
Ik schakel zo meteen over naar het Engels. Dat is misschien een beetje
curieus omdat de eerste twee sprekers de Nederlandse nationaliteit en het
Nederlands als moedertaal hebben, maar er zijn vandaag erg veel
woordvoerders die Engels spreken. Zij komen in het tweede deel aan het
woord, maar ook zij hebben belangstelling voor hetgeen door de eerste
twee sprekers wordt gezegd.
I also wish to extend a warm welcome to our guests whose native
language is not Dutch. Today’s meeting will be in English because the
majority of the speakers in the second and third group use the English
language and I would like to enable them to listen to the introductions in
the first round and reflect on those introductions in their own speech.
I am pleased to welcome two speakers in the first round, Mr Reyn from
the Ministry of Defence and Mr Colijn from the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael.
I give the floor to the first speaker, Mr Colijn.

Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2015–2016, 34 225, nr. 14

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Mr Colijn: I would like to express my thanks for the opportunity to inform
you on this subject. I offer my apology for not handing out my presentation on paper, but I will leave a copy for your kind perusal should
anyone be interested.
My first basic but inevitable remark is that the world is a dangerous place.
Over the last five to ten years, it is has even become more dangerous.
This is not so much reflected in the slightly rising number of conflicts,
which are mostly land-based and not between rival nations but between
cross-border groups or groups on one side of the border. The majority of
these violent conflicts revolve around political power, or a dominant
ideology, if you like, rather than around territory or resources. Whatever
the cause, they do exist and there is a growing trend to deepen the
security level, which we will talk about.
The severely increased insecurity firstly follows from the changing world
order. We are heading towards a multipolar world. There are new kids on
the block. Old revisionist powers are trying to reassert their influence and
resist their becoming marginal. Secondly, the number of fragile states or
non-states is slightly growing thus giving way to non-state actors like
pirates and maritime terror groups turning the lack of governance or the
lack of control or coastal control to their advantage. Unfortunately, there is
a breakdown in essential security governance in the world. Thirdly, very
fundamental technology developments might alter the traditionally stable
balance between the so-called defensive and offensive weapons, between
small and large countries, between state and non-state actors and
between the logic of deterrence and the logic of actual use of force.
Projected on today’s theme of submarines, or sea power if you like, all
these developments first warrant a very careful analyses: what contributes
to security and what alternative means would poorly or, for that matter,
more effectively serve the public good? In this context, the word «replacement» concerning any weapon might be the most misleading word, for
all the systemic conditions of the best system available since 1990 – 25
years ago – will not automatically be present for the follow-up system in,
say, 2030, by which time conditions may have changed completely. I do
not say submarines are worthless in the future because surely they are
not, but nowadays submarines are not simply to be «replaced» by
submarines, or aircraft by aircraft or missiles by missiles.
Let me tell you what I mean. Today, to some extent manned aircraft can
be replaced by drones, by unmanned aircraft; surface ships can be
replaced by unmanned maritime vehicles; air defence systems can be
suppressed using advanced cyber systems instead of missiles and
aircraft; earth-based intelligence can be gathered by space-based systems
and so on. In short, there is no logic in a one-on-one replacement.
I return to the subject of submarines. «Trends in technology are favorable
to the submarine as against the surface ship». This may sound great to
the submarine guys, but hold on a minute! This is a quotation from the
article «The Future of the submarine» published in a Foreign Affairs
magazine in 1959. At that time, submarines had a bright future. Its main
functions were nuclear deterrence, protecting or attacking merchant
vessels, laying mines, searching for and attacking enemy submarines and
even transporting military cargo. Hunting Soviet submarines was
considered to be essential because 78% of the urban population of Europe
was within the range of the unseen Soviet submarine-based missiles. It
was the only way the Soviets could launch a surprise attack on Europe. All
other available means were too visible and therefore too vulnerable. The
reasons for having a viable submarine force then were completely
different from the reasons today.
In the 1980s, of course, nobody talked about this kind of threat anymore.
The threat from long-ranged and medium-ranged missiles based on the
land had become much more urgent. Nobody thought of the submarines»
potential cargo function anymore but submarines were still seen as a

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cost-effective instrument for sea lane protection. I call to mind that
nowadays collecting intelligence that others cannot, operating in shallow
waters very near to coastlines and enabling Special Operations Forces
(SOF) to carry out raids on nearby strips of land are the very arguments in
favour of Dutch submarines. Those two functions were never mentioned
30 years ago, let alone in the 1959-article «The Future of the Submarine».
So things are changing. Again, by bringing this to mind I do not imply
these two functions are unimportant or even constructed. It only
highlights that in this respect automatic replacement is not simply logical.
These arguments and the fact that, as stated in my opening sentence, the
world has become a more dangerous place simply dictate that one should
analyse threats time and time again and think of the best ways to respond
to them and not fall into the trap of an automatic one-on-one replacement,
because 2030 will not be 1959 or 1995.
The Russian submarine fleet has returned to the North Atlantic and the
inner waters of Europe, near the Baltic States and Sweden. In the words of
NATO commanders: «There is more activity than we have seen since the
Cold War». One new observation is that the Russians are interested in
undersea fibre optic cables, so protection against their tapping or even
destroying underwater communication lines might be a new strategic
priority. It must be considered.
Do we have the most cost-effective means to counter this capability in a
right way? Is having a new set of diesel-electric submarines, which are
able to put some Special Operations Forces ashore in Somalia and
intercept communications from drug barons, terrorists or warlords in
faraway countries, the answer? Loitering in Scottish waters where
nowadays the British nuclear Trident missile finds itself spied on by
Russian submarines, Dutch submarines prove themselves very useful
indeed. The real question, however, is what will happen to this British
nuclear deterrent. Is it in NATO’s interest to maintain it and subsequently
help us protect it?
One of the more or less deliberate but remarkable decisions made by both
the US and British Navy is that they have opted for nuclear submarines
rather than conventional ones. I would say this makes us much appreciated training partners for their navies because we could simulate the
silent attacks on their navies the Russian kilo-class submarines are
nowadays able to carry out. But is this the most cost-effective way to
perform this function now or in 2040? And to what extent is our or, for that
matter, your freedom of decision defined by this type of division of labour
within the alliance? I need only mention last-year’s report by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the very recent report
by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) in which it is
indicated that both unmanned subdrones or unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) are cheap
alternatives that pose a very real threat to any type of future submarine. I
am aware, however, that this is outside the scope of this part of the
meeting.
By the way, as a sparring partner we play a very useful and honourable
role in training other navies indeed. On the other hand, the US feels that
using active sonar is the only way of detecting quiet conventional
submarines, but with a view to the protection of wildlife such as dolphins
and whales it is not allowed to use active sonar near the West Coast. So
what about this role in training?
Once again, I am certainly not denying the deteriorating security
environment or the return of the threat of late posed by the Russian
submarine passing the GIUK gap, the gap between Greenland, Iceland
and the United Kingdom. Certainly, this has to be addressed somehow.
Right now, forty-odd countries in the world possess more than 400
diesel-electric submarines, which in itself warrants discussion: why
wouldn’t we? Most of them are popular and their number in the contested

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sea areas of this world, such as the South China Sea, is rising. Most
submarines are Russian e.g. the Russian kilo-class submarine. China’s
song-class submarines are tracking US Navy ships operating near Taiwan
and Japan and could for instance easily threaten the Kitty Hawk aircraft
carrier, as was recently the case. According to admiral Walsh, commander
of the US Pacific fleet, in that region of the world now more than 140
diesel-electric submarines threaten the critical choke points. Do we have
to be present in that area and if so, are we willing to do so, rendering it
unavoidable that the US Navy shifts more assets from the Atlantic fleet to
the Pacific? Do we want to fill the gap? Do we think about that? And if yes,
do we have a stake in that competition? Answering this question
cautiously I would say yes. That would also be my response to the more
general question whether we need submarines in 2025, but it really would
be all too easy to consider replacement as being logical. We had a
submarine fleet in the past, we have one now, so we will have one in the
future? There is no logic in that. We have to weigh our options each and
every time. We will have to face threats, in this regard threats in 2030. We
are dealing with three different generations of one system bearing the
same name, submarine, and we have operated and will operate in three
completely different contexts.
The Chairperson: Thank you very much Mr Colijn.
I would like to give the floor to Mr Reyn of the Dutch Ministry of Defence.
Mr Reyn: Thank you very much. Although the slides I show you are in
Dutch, I will use the English language.
I would like to identify briefly the most important strategic developments
and relate them to the submarine force.
First, we need to realize that the geopolitical rivalry between the major
powers in the world has considerably grown over the last couple of years
both globally and regionally. Of course, we have to take into account that
Russia is a less predictable country with an anti-Western and anti-NATO
stance. In terms of spheres of influence the Russia of president Putin has a
geopolitical view; it is a revisionist power. Its military doctrine gives a
tactical and operational role to nuclear weapons. Russia surprises us time
and time again. It is clear that, as a result, the emphasis on collective
defence in the European Union and in particular within NATO has
increased. The Dutch Cabinet has also highlighted the increased importance of collective defence and of both nuclear and conventional
deterrence.
From a geopolitical perspective we should look at the growing potential
for conflict in East Asia and South-east Asia as well. This concerns the
relationship between China and Japan. In recent years for instance, there
has been a focus on the Senkaku Islands. In this respect, we should think
of the inherently unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula as well. The
situation in the South China Sea concerning the Paracel Islands and
Spratly Islands, however, attracts the most attention. The latter is of
importance to Europe and the Netherlands because it affects sea lines of
communication. Talking about the geopolitical situation we should also
think about for instance the situation the Middle East as countries have
geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Relationships with the Middle
East and parts of South Asia deteriorated in the recent past. Obviously,
geopolitics is an important aspect of strategic consideration when
thinking about the added value of a submarine force.
Secondly, we need to take account of the likelihood of a continued conflict
and instability in the south of Europe, the southeast of Europe, the Middle
East and North Africa. Many aspects that play a role in that region make it
likely that both conflict and instability will remain part of the security
image, resulting in a continued threat of terrorism and probably ongoing

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migration flows. Even though we have been able to subdue piracy to an
important extent there is still a possibility that piracy will return.
The third strategic development I would like to mention concerns new
technological possibilities and developments like miniaturization,
robotization and the possibility to operate systems from a certain
distance. Thinking about the future submarine capability we have to take
these technological developments into account and try and make good
use of it as much as we can. During the session we had this morning we
talked about this as well. It is important that we understand that the future
submarine has to have an adaptable capability. We cannot have an
unchangeable capability for a period of 30 years. We need to make sure
that we have an adaptable platform. It is still unlikely that certain
technological limitations will be resolved. This morning, Mr Ammerlaan
already talked about the fact that for instance the medium of water still
imposes limitations for technological solutions. We certainly need to
consider options such as combining the platform with a drone or an
underwater vehicle.
I am zooming in now on the maritime perspective. Geopolitical rivalry has
already resulted in a growth in military capabilities around the world, in
particular in the regions I have just mentioned. Large nations focus their
efforts on the maritime domain and purchase for instance new submarines or a service fleet. Competition in the field of using sea line communications is increasing, not only in the South China Sea but also in de
Persian Gulf, some part of the Indian Ocean and the Suez region. Using
open seas for your own benefit, to find energy resources or for fishing, is
also gaining in popularity. In short, the pressure on the maritime domain
is growing and fuelled by the sharpened geopolitical relationships in the
world.
I also want to mention the impact of climate change and the opening up
of new lines of communication in the Arctic region. A couple of years ago,
the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael wrote a
report on this subject. Of course, this is a long-term affair, but it is still
within the realm of the replacement of the submarine force. From the
Dutch perspective, this is likely to be a new area of interest. We should
take heed of the possibility that countries that surround the Arctic will
increase their maritime presence in the Arctic region. It may be a new
operational area which we need to take into consideration.
Mr Colijn already gave some examples of the proliferation of the
submarine force. It is obvious that more countries invest in submarine
capability. From a Dutch perspective Russia and China but also regional
powers are of interest. We need to understand that since the end of the
Cold War the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the Dutch armed
forces have been reduced significantly. This means that we now rely on
our current submarine capability to cope with the submarine threat. The
Netherlands has divested itself of many other capabilities such as the P-3
Orion aircraft and a number of frigates.
From the preparation of this meeting I know our visitors are interested in
the five strategic questions stated in the Dutch future policy survey report
– in Dutch: de Verkenningen – which was published in 2010. This report
ended with the following five strategic questions that are considered to be
relevant for the submarines file. 1. What will be the military contribution
of the Netherlands in the international context? 2. What kind of defence
efforts do we need in view of the security context? 3. Which balance
should we strike between on the one hand protecting and defending our
own territory and NATO territory and on the other hand dealing with the
source of security threats in the form of expeditions? 4. What should be
the contribution of the armed forces to the security of the society within
our national borders? 5. To what extent can we afford to be dependent on
other countries? Of these five questions I think four are really relevant to
this file. The fourth question might be the least relevant. I would like to

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respond to those questions by addressing what we feel are the three most
important strategic challenges in the years ahead. These are the three
challenges the Dutch Minister of Defence outlined in her recent letter to
the Dutch parliament. I also want to talk about the kind of contribution the
submarine force can make.
The first challenge is to remain safe in Europe and the Netherlands within
the changed security context. This is not only about protecting our
territory but also about protecting our civilization, and not only about the
Netherlands or NATO but also about the Caribbean. At the moment, the
Dutch submarine force provides an important capability in this context. It
provides escalation dominance and contributes to conventional deterrence. Within the Dutch armed forces it is the most important
anti-submarine warfare capability. We need the capability to protect our
service fleet. Therefore, it is clear that this capability is of vital importance
for collective defence and the defence of the Dutch interests in the
Caribbean.
The second challenge lies in the field of the so-called flow security. The
economic welfare and economic well-being of the Netherlands depend on
the Netherlands being the hub of physical and virtual flows. Furthermore,
the Netherlands is a big maritime nation with harbours in Rotterdam and
Amsterdam and becoming more and more the digital gateway to Europe.
From both perspectives the submarine capability contributes to flow
security by keeping sea lines of communication secure and protecting
them against state and non-state threats. Mr Colijn already talked about
the security of sea fibre cables. As you can see, this is a part of flow
security as well. The position of the Netherlands as a digital hub in the
world also depends on those sea fibre cables being secure. From that
perspective, the submarine force contributes to the idea of flow security to
a large extent.
The third and last challenge is the strategic assignment to promote
stability around Europe and in the Caribbean. After all, failing to do so
would confront us with the consequences of instability. In this field the
submarine force makes an important contribution to intervention
operations too. This morning we talked about the contribution of the
submarine force to the operations in the Balkans in 1990s, embargo
operations and area and sea denials. The submarine force also conducts
special operations such as the special operations that might be necessary
should Dutch people be held hostage in an area of instability. In a
situation like that the submarine force could help achieve a solution.
In all three strategic assignments the intelligence task of the submarine
force is of the utmost importance.
The Chairperson: I would like to express my thanks to Mr Colijn and Mr
Reyn for their thorough introductions.
We have approximately half an hour for questions and answers. I would
ask my esteemed colleagues to pose only one question per person in the
first round. Should there be more time, we can opt for a second question.
Ms Belhaj (D66): I have many questions but I will focus on the aspect of
innovation and the remarks made by Mr Colijn. The submarines could be
ready in 2025. To what extent do technical developments and innovation
make it necessary for us to invest in defence equipment other than
submarines now?
Mr Jasper van Dijk (SP): Thank you, Mr Colijn and Mr Reyn, for your
introduction. I would like to pose a question to Mr Colijn about the
process of decision-making in this project. After all, it is a big project and
there is a lot of money involved. It has always been said that in the
process of decision-making concerning the Joint Strike Fighter there have
been gaps in the flow of information to parliament. There were a lot of

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questions. What lessons can be learned from this process and what
should parliament do to receive as much information as possible in order
to be able to come to a wise decision on this subject?
Mr Knops (CDA): I have a question on the position of the Netherlands
within the bigger picture of NATO. Why should particularly the Netherlands obtain submarines? How do these submarines fit into the bigger
picture of international cooperation, performing and sharing tasks,
specialization and so on, seeing that the Netherlands could only afford a
relatively small number of submarines?
Mr Vuijk (VVD): I would like to thank Mr Colijn and Mr Reyn for their
helpful contributions. I have a question about the protection of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, particularly in the Caribbean. How is the
Caribbean being protected? What will be the response if Venezuela
becomes a serious threat? Will there be a response from NATO or is this a
problem that we should solve? Do we need a comprehensive fleet
containing service vessels and submarines or is it for example possible to
deploy submarines belonging to other countries?
Ms Eijsink (PvdA): Thank you, Mr Colijn and Mr Reyn for your contribution. As already stated, the submarine is one of the important weapon
platforms that can collect crucial information for both the political and
military decision-making process that cannot be obtained in any other
way. Do submarine services have a future in the span of global strategy
and the European foreign defence strategy, which I hope will be made
clear by Ms Mogherini in June this year? My colleague Mr Knops
mentioned it already, but how does this relate to NATO planning
capabilities? Are submarine services needed? Do they have a future?
Mr Houwers (Houwers): I express my thanks to Mr Colijn en Mr Reyn for
their contributions. I would like to ask Mr Colijn a question. He feels
«replacement» is a misleading term because underwater vessels may not
be replaced at all. What would be the main reason to buy and deploy
submarines instead of unmanned vehicles over the next ten to twenty
years?
The Chairperson: Or maybe an unmanned submarine. You never know.
I would kindly ask Mr Colijn and Mr Reyn to answer the questions.
Mr Colijn: Please, allow me to use both the English and the Dutch
language in this respect because it may be too difficult for me to explain
some of the details in English.
Laat ik beginnen met de vraag naar de logische vervanging, the logic of
replacement. Deze logica is in zekere zin misleidend. Overigens werd
gevraagd naar de komende tien of twintig jaar, maar de onderzeeboten
die wij gaan aanschaffen, zullen vermoedelijk niet eerder dan in 2025
instromen. So the challenge is to predict the threats made from 2025
onwards. Dat is de uitdaging. Welke bedreigingen zullen er dan zijn? Ik
denk dat er dan nog steeds een heel goede reden is om zoiets als een
onderzeeboot te hebben. De vraag is alleen wat voor soort. I do not deny
the fact that threats are increasing; so far, this has remained undisputed.
Mijn voornaamste advies vandaag is: probeer flexibel te denken, probeer
vooruit te denken, denk niet automatisch aan de functies waarvoor de
onderzeeboten op dit moment heel erg nodig en gunstig zijn. Of je moet
de bedreigingen die zich in 2030 voordoen met grote zekerheid kunnen
noemen, of je moet kiezen voor een systeem dat zodanig kan worden
aangepast dat je in 2030 een andere functie aan dit platform kunt geven.
Daar gaat het om. This is a hell of a job. Bij het opstellen van de Verkenningen in 2010 was het al bijna onmogelijk om rekening te houden met

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scenario’s die nu actueel zijn. Wij mochten het helemaal niet over de euro
en dergelijke hebben en wij mochten het al helemaal niet over
Griekenland hebben. Deze scenario’s waren onvoorspelbaar; zij werden
althans onvoorspelbaar verklaard. Toch werden zij bittere werkelijkheid.
Het is dus heel erg moeilijk om te bepalen wat wij precies nodig zullen
hebben.
De situatie op de Middellandse Zee, de demografische ontwikkelingen in
Noord-Afrika, de migratiedruk en de toename van mensensmokkel maken
het bijna zeker dat je onderzeeboten nodig hebt om de havens aan de kust
van de Middellandse Zee, in dit geval de Noord-Afrikaanse kust, goed in
de gaten te houden. Ik zou er in ieder geval mijn geld op zetten. Om te
achterhalen of het kosteneffectief is om dat te doen met onderzeeboten of
dat dit moet gebeuren via een andere arbeidsverdeling of met andere
systemen, moet je nu heel veel investeren in kennis daarover, zodat je
weet wat je kunt doen en of je dat misschien samen moet doen met de
Italianen of Fransen.
Waarom zouden wij investeren in onderzeeboten die de noordelijke
shipping lanes – misschien gooi ik de steen in de vijver – goed kunnen
bewaken als nog niet duidelijk is hoe belangrijk die sea lanes of shipping
lanes zullen worden? Het is ook niet gezegd dat wij dat misschien met
onze onderzeeboten het beste kunnen doen. Feit is dat Nederland zich in
een niche bevindt en goed is in onderzeeboten die heel stil zijn. Daarvan
zijn er overigens heel veel in de wereld. Zeker 30 of 40 marines hebben
stille onderzeeërs, maar die kunnen niet zo ver varen als de Nederlandse
onderzeeboten. Dat is op dit moment het unieke van de Nederlandse
onderzeeboten. Is die niche werkelijk nodig? Of moeten wij inderdaad
terug naar de Koude Oorlog en de open ruimte, the gap, tussen
Groenland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk zien te beschermen? Heeft dat een
hogere prioriteit dan het beschermen van een chokepoint in de Grote
Oceaan dat op het ogenblik door de Amerikanen wordt aangewezen, of
van één van de 140 chokepoints die door de Chinese en Russische
onderzeeërs in de gaten worden gehouden? Of moeten wij een heel
andere soort arbeidsverdeling realiseren, waarbij wij die open ruimte, the
gap, voor onze rekening nemen?
Ik zal het nog iets breder trekken. Zelfs in Noorwegen en in GrootBrittannië wordt op dit ogenblik serieus nagedacht over het herinvoeren
van een marine luchtvaartdienst. Het afschaffen van P-3 Orions is voor
ons meen ik onomkeerbaar, maar zij hebben dat niet onomkeerbaar
verklaard omdat zij vinden dat deze middelen nodig zijn voor het bewaken
van deze gap: dat kunnen wij beter met vliegend materieel doen, of in
ieder geval met een andere mix. Zij willen zich niet vastleggen op de,
misschien niet minder adequate, onderzeeboten. Wij moeten bereid zijn
om dat soort afwegingen te maken en tot de conclusie te komen dat wij
deze functies ofwel samen met andere landen ofwel met andere systemen
moeten gaan vervullen.
Nogmaals, ik heb geen twijfel over het feit dat er meer bedreigingen zijn.
Ik onderschrijf de analyse van Sebastiaan Reyn wat dat betreft helemaal.
Het is echter erg moeilijk om te voorspellen dat wij bijvoorbeeld zes of
vier onderzeeërs nodig hebben van het type Walrus 2.0 om adequaat op
deze bedreigingen te kunnen reageren.
Ik ga nog even in op de Caraïben. Dat is nog een steen in de vijver; daar
ben ik mij heel wel van bewust. Het heeft iets onnatuurlijks dat wij over
onderzeeërs beschikken om taken ver weg, aan de andere kant van de
Atlantische Oceaan, te kunnen uitvoeren. De Amerikanen voeren nu
misschien met enige tegenzin taken uit in de buurt van Europa. Wij
zouden tegen hen kunnen zeggen dat wij die taken van hen overnemen
als zij de Caraïben voor hun rekening nemen. Ik heb dat ook in de
Verkenningen gezegd. Om andere redenen is dat toen volkomen
onbespreekbaar verklaard, maar goed, af en toe moet je out of the box
denken. Misschien is dit idee in de Caraïben niet al te populair, maar het is

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raar dat wij over een onderzeeër zouden moeten beschikken die een lange
afstand door de oceaan kan afleggen alleen maar om een eventuele
onderzeebotendreiging vanuit Venezuela tegen te gaan, terwijl de
Amerikanen met ons zouden kunnen ruilen en deze taak zouden kunnen
overnemen.
Misschien is het volgende anekdotisch, maar het is wel waar: het is
natuurlijk vreemd dat wij ons druk maken over dit soort dingen terwijl wij
een jaar of tien geleden hebben geprobeerd onderzeeboten aan Venezuela
te verkopen. Wij zouden ons dan moeten verdedigen tegen de onderzeeboten die wij zelf aan Venezuela hebben verkocht. Misschien is dit
interessanter voor de mensen van Buitenlandse Zaken die hier in de zaal
zitten dan voor de mensen van de marine.
Mr Reyn: Ms Belhaj asked a question about innovation. I agree
completely with what Mr Colijn has said: no replacement can ever be
automatic. That is why we said this morning that all options need to be
open. For the same reason I focused in my presentation on the extent to
which a submarine capability can address the strategic challenges we
might face in the future rather than on the capabilities of the current force.
When we think about this future capability, it is essential that we take the
potential of technological developments into account as much as we can.
We clearly have an interest in doing so. By using this potential the
submarine force might be able to exert the same operational effect while
having a smaller crew. It seems highly improbable, however, that by the
time of 2025 of 2030 a manned capability can be replaced by an
unmanned capability. At least, that is what my technical expertise tells
me. Therefore, we are still considering whether to replace the current
manned capability with a manned submarine capability. However, the
capability itself can include many innovative elements.
Mr Knops asked why the Netherlands should have submarines. I had
hoped to answer part of this question by focussing on these strategic
challenges from a Dutch perspective. Of course, we want to contribute to
the collective NATO defence but we also have an interest in the
Caribbean. I particularly do not agree with Mr Colijn’s remark that we can
divest ourselves of the responsibility for the protection of this part of our
territory, because it is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This is the
flow-security part of the story. We also have a genuine interest in
safeguarding or protecting maritime trade flows and digital flows. I feel a
country like the Netherlands, which is orientated toward maritime trade
flows and flow security, should clearly have a submarine capability.
Mr Vuyk asked about Venezuela. Are we on our own or can we count on
NATO? The Caribbean is not part of NATO territory, which means that
article 5 does not apply to the region of the Caribbean. We do cooperate,
however, with many countries in this region, particularly with the United
States. If there was a conflict with Venezuela, we would highly depend on
the willingness of other countries and particularly the United States to
support us. So we would not be on our own, but we do have a responsibility for this region and it is difficult to divest ourselves of it.
Ms Eijsink talked about the EU global strategy. She asked to what extent
the submarine capability fits in with that strategy. We still have to learn
what this strategy will be, but I feel that we should not only think about
the EU global strategy but also about NATO requirements. From NATO
perspective, the requirement is clearly present. Seeing that the world is
becoming increasingly multipolar and geopolitical rivalry is sharpening,
both the European Union and Europe need to ensure that they are players
rather than pawns in the world. From a military perspective too we ought
to be serious about this, which means that a European nation should have
a credible and capable military force. A submarine force should be part of
that.

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Mr De Roon (PVV): Voorzitter, ik heb een punt van orde. Het spijt mij
overigens dat ik wat later ben binnengekomen, maar dat komt doordat ik
moest deelnemen aan een plenaire behandeling van een wetsontwerp.
Ik constateer dat Nederlanders nu met elkaar in het Engels spreken. Ik heb
begrepen dat u dat van tevoren hebt aangekondigd, dat daarom gevraagd
is en dat aanwezige leden zich daar niet tegen hebben verzet, maar ik blijf
het onwenselijk vinden. Hiermee worden mensen die wel Engels maar
geen Nederlands spreken gefaciliteerd, maar Nederlanders die geen
Engels spreken, hebben op dit moment het nakijken. Zij kunnen het
verhaal van de heer Reyn niet volgen. Ik wil u vragen om die mensen
alsnog tegemoet te komen, bijvoorbeeld door te zorgen voor een goede
vertaling van het betoog van de heer Reyn naar de Nederlandse taal en
deze op de website van de Kamer te plaatsen of anderszins toegankelijk te
maken voor het Nederlandse publiek dat geen Engels spreekt.
The Chairperson: Ik denk dat dit een goede suggestie is. Tegelijkertijd
merk ik op dat in de procedurevergadering is besproken dat in de diverse
panels Engelstalige mensen zitten en dat de leden van tevoren hebben
afgesproken dat er Engels gesproken zou worden. Ik begrijp dat de heer
De Roon daar een punt van maakt. Wij hebben nu nog tien tot twaalf
minuten om vragen te stellen aan de heren Reyn en Colijn. Ik stel voor dat
wij dat doen en dat wij hierover verder spreken in de pauze tussen de
wisseling van de panels.
Mr De Roon (PVV): Voorzitter, mag ik nog even reageren op wat u zegt? U
hebt inderdaad gelijk: dit is in de procedurevergadering afgesproken. Dat
moest gewoon omdat wij nu eenmaal buitenlandse gasten hebben die
geen Nederlands spreken. Wij hebben niet het geld om alles wat wordt
gezegd simultaan te laten tolken. Maar als Nederlanders tegen Nederlanders spreken, dan moet het Nederlands toch de voertaal kunnen zijn in
plaats van het Engels?
The Chairperson: Nogmaals, ik begrijp dat u dat zegt. Een van de twee
sprekers heeft zijn presentatie op ons verzoek in het Engels voorbereid. Ik
vond het wel zo beleefd om hem niet ter plekke te vragen om zijn
presentatie te gaan vertalen.
We now have a second round of questions.
Mr De Roon (PVV): Nu heb ik toch weer een punt van orde, want nu gaat
u de vergadering van een Nederlandse Kamercommissie in het Engels
voorzitten. Dat is toch belachelijk?
Ms Belhaj (D66): Het gebeurt niet vaak dat D66 het eens is met de PVV
over zulk soort onderwerpen, maar het kan wel degelijk. Ik ben zelf relatief
nieuw in deze commissie en ik was dus ook een beetje verrast door het
besluit dat ik alles wat ik had voorbereid in het Engels moest doen. Ik zal
mijn vragen vervolgen in het Nederlands omdat ik dat zelf prettig vind en
omdat ik het belangrijk vind dat ik de vragen nauwkeurig kan stellen.
Misschien kan ik op die manier trendsetter zijn, en dat nog wel met mijn
afkomst.
The Chairperson: Ik ben ondervoorzitter van deze commissie. Deze
afspraak is door de leden zelf gemaakt. Ik heb dit zo meegekregen. Ik vind
het dus ongemakkelijk dat u mij op deze manier zo neerzet. Ik vind het
prima dat wij hierover een discussie hebben, maar ik vind het eigenlijk
ook vervelend, want wij hebben twee gasten wier tijd wij nu aan het
verbruiken zijn.
Mr Vuijk (VVD): Zoals het nu gaat, roept deze discussie zichzelf op. De
Kamerleden kunnen zich niet goed herinneren of het op die manier is

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afgesproken. In het begin van de vergadering hebben wij daar al even
over gesproken. Het is toen geen formeel punt geworden, maar nu wordt
het dat wel. Wij zullen het morgen in de procedurevergadering aan de
orde stellen, in het Nederlands, maar ook bij de leden is er verwarring en
ongemak. Wij verkeerden in de veronderstelling dat in ieder geval dit deel
van de bijeenkomst gewoon in het Nederlands zou plaatsvinden.
The Chairperson: Dank u wel. Dan geef ik nu het woord aan mevrouw
Belhaj voor het stellen van haar vraag in de tweede ronde. Helaas hebben
wij daar nu nog maar acht minuten voor.
Ms Belhaj (D66): Voorzitter. Ik wil het ook wel in het Marokkaans doen,
maar dan wordt het nog ingewikkelder.
Ik heb nog een aanvullende vraag over het verkrijgen van inlichtingen. In
welke mate is het vergaren van inlichtingen met behulp van onderzeeboten dé manier om inlichtingen te vergaren? Vanochtend heb ik ook
gevraagd of daarvan een goede indicatie kon worden gegeven. Hierop is
echter geen percentage van het geheel genoemd. Ik stel de vraag daarom
nog een keer aan de heer Colijn. In welke mate is de onderzeeboot in dit
opzicht belangrijk? Hoeveel procent van het totaal aan inlichtingen wordt
door Nederland met behulp van onderzeeboten verworven?
Mr Jasper van Dijk (SP): In de eerste termijn heb ik gevraagd of de heer
Colijn ons advies kon geven over het traject rond de aanschaf en de
besluitvorming. Dat is een complex proces. Hoe kan het parlement dat het
beste doen? In de Volkskrant van vandaag wordt verwezen naar Cape,
onderdeel van het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Defensie. Dat is een
onafhankelijk adviesorgaan dat dit soort besluiten op de snijtafel legt.
Zouden wij daarvoor een Nederlandse variant kunnen bedenken? Kan de
heer Colijn ons zeggen wat hij deze commissie aanbeveelt over de
aanschaf van de onderzeeërs? Daar staat een enorm bedrag voor,
namelijk 2,5 tot 4 miljard euro. Zegt hij «doe het wel» of zegt hij «doe het
niet»?
The Chairperson: Ik heb in elk geval geconstateerd dat de vraag in het
Engels korter geformuleerd kan worden.
Mr Knops (CDA): Mr Colijn already brought to mind that the so-called
replacement project is not really a replacement project, but I wonder how
this project matches the study the navy carried out in 2005 or, for that
matter, matches any future study by the navy. The navy has several
projects in mind but we have only one budget, which means we can only
opt for one of the projects. Would Mr Reyn be so kind as to reflect on that?
Mr De Roon (PVV): Voorzitter, ik heb weer een punt van orde. Het spijt me
dat ik u daarmee moet lastigvallen, maar wij hebben net besproken dat
het wenselijk is dat hier in het Nederlands wordt gesproken. Uiteraard
kiest de heer Knops zijn eigen woorden, maar hij bepaalt nu ook zelf in
welke taal hij spreekt. Ik vind dat u als voorzitter daartegen moet
optreden. U zou er bij de woordvoerders van de Kamer op moeten
aandringen dat zij tegen andere Nederlanders Nederlands spreken. Dat er
mensen in de zaal zitten of elders meeluisteren die alleen het Engels
machtig zijn, is dan jammer, maar het gaat hier om Nederland en
Nederlandse burgers moeten dit kunnen volgen.
The Chairperson: In dit deel van de vergadering val ik in voor de vaste
voorzitter. Ik herhaal dat de leden zelf hebben afgesproken dat op deze
bijeenkomst Engels zou worden gesproken. Ik houd mij aan de afspraken
die zijn gemaakt. Een van de twee mensen die voor deze bijeenkomst zijn
uitgenodigd, heeft zijn hele presentatie in het Engels voorbereid. Wij

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hebben mensen gevraagd om hun bijdrage op een bepaalde manier voor
te bereiden. Ik vind het dan beleefd om hen die bijdrage dan ook zo te
laten leveren. Ik begrijp dat u hiervan een punt van orde maakt. U kwam
later binnen. Dat is prima. Ik heb u de gelegenheid daartoe gegeven. Ik
vind het alleen ongemakkelijk dat u nu alle tijd die wij aan de inhoud
kunnen besteden, opsoupeert voor uw punt van orde terwijl wij in de
eerste ronde prima met elkaar overweg konden.
Mr De Roon (PVV): Dat komt doordat het onder uw regie op dit punt
steeds mis blijft gaan. Helaas.
The Chairperson: Het is uw mening dat het misgaat. Dat heb ik van de
collega’s nog niet gehoord.
Mr Knops (CDA): Misschien mag ik nog een ding zeggen. Ik wil de heer
De Roon wel even helpen. Hij denkt natuurlijk dat niemand Engels spreekt,
maar ik denk dat dit niet het geval is. Wij hebben hierover een afspraak
gemaakt toen de heer De Roon er niet was. Het is prima dat hij andere
debatten bijwoont en andere prioriteiten heeft; dat is zijn keuze. Wij
hebben een afspraak gemaakt. Wij komen daar morgen in de procedurevergadering op terug. Ik heb mij alleen maar aan die afspraak gehouden.
Ik zal morgen in de procedurevergadering zeggen wat ik van die afspraak
vind, maar wij hebben die net wel gemaakt. Ik steun de voorzitter dus op
dit punt.
Mr Vuijk (VVD): I continue in English.
The US was mentioned as a partner but the US has only nuclear capabilities. Let us assume we are forced to protect our interests in the
Caribbean by military means. Would we have to use our own submarines
or can we ask partners for help?
Ms Eijsink (PvdA): I would like to thank Mr Colijn and Mr Reyn for their
answers. Mr Colijn said submarines do have a future. In what way,
however, is a subject of discussion as it is still unknown what threats we
have to face in 2025 or 2030.
I would like to come back to the global strategy. We have been discussing
smart defence, pooling and sharing, for years. I would like to deepen the
discussion on this subject. What does this mean for the NATO capability
planning system and for submarines and what does it mean for the global
strategy? Presently, the Netherlands is discussing the future of its
submarine services. What does this mean to the High Representative?
What are we going to do with mutual capabilities? After all these years of
discussion I would say that is crucial. You can only choose for one of the
submarines and there is only one budget.
Mr Houwers (Houwers): Ik zal het in het Nederland doen omdat ik toch
het makkelijkst in mijn moedertaal spreek.
Ik herhaal mijn vraag aan de heer Colijn. Je kunt de onderzeedienst
verschillende taken geven, maar is er één taak waarvoor je de onderzeeboot echt nodig hebt omdat die niet door onbemande vaartuigen of
anderszins kan worden vervuld? Kan de heer Colijn één taak noemen, een
hoofdreden, waarvoor je echt een onderzeeboot van dit type nodig hebt?
The Chairperson: Ik heet de heer De Roon van de PVV welkom in dit
gezelschap. Ik geef ook hem de gelegenheid een vraag te stellen.
Mr De Roon (PVV): Dank u, voorzitter. Zoals gezegd, moest ik de
behandeling van een wetsvoorstel in de plenaire zaal bijwonen. Daardoor
heb ik de wijze betogen van de heren Colijn en Reyn niet kunnen volgen.
Mijn assistent heeft dat wel gedaan. Gelukkig spreekt hij goed Engels, dus

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ik ga van hem nog horen wat hier allemaal gezegd is. Ik kan op dit
moment dus niet met vragen reageren op hetgeen deze heren hebben
gezegd. Ik laat het daarbij, maar ik dank hen voor hun bijdrage. Ik zal die
graag en met belangstelling nalezen.
The Chairperson: We komen eigenlijk al twee minuten tekort, maar laat
ik beide heren nog vijf minuten de gelegenheid geven om kort te
reflecteren op de vragen die in de tweede ronde zijn gesteld.
Mr Colijn: Ik meng mij uiteraard niet in het conflict over Engels of
Nederlands. Hecht dus geen betekenis aan het feit dat ik in het Nederlands
begin. Het besluitvormingsproces staat niet op de agenda van deze sessie,
maar er is naar gevraagd, dus ik moet daarop antwoorden. Wat wij
kunnen leren van de JSF is dat het proces in het begin van de jaren
negentig al begonnen is, maar dat wij nu pas beginnen door te krijgen wat
het toestel werkelijk zal kunnen en wat het niet zal kunnen. Gisteravond
las ik dat iemand uit Amerika die het kan weten en die betrokken is bij het
proces, zegt: wij hebben eigenlijk toch drie verschillende vliegtuigen en
niet één vliegtuig. En dat terwijl dat laatste een van de hoofdredenen was
om de JSF te ontwikkelen, namelijk als een gemeenschappelijk vliegtuig
voor drie serviceonderdelen. Maar hij zegt: daar stappen wij vanaf. Dat zal
ook de les zijn bij een groot project als submarines. In het algemeen is het
heel tragisch dat in de civiele wereld – als je dat onderscheid nog mag
maken – de grote technologische revoluties zich met een frequentie van
een jaar of tien à vijftien voordoen, terwijl je in de militaire wereld met
systemen werkt die 30, 40, 50 jaar meegaan. Dat kun je bijna niet
bijhouden. Wij zijn steeds meer afhankelijk van die revoluties in de civiele
wereld. Een eenvoudige rekensom leert dat je eigenlijk altijd achter de
feiten aanloopt met grote militaire projecten. Het is de kunst om zodanige
platforms te ontwerpen dat daarin misschien wel drie keer in hun lifetime
de laatste revolutionaire civiele ontwikkelingen kunnen worden geïncorporeerd. Ze moeten dus bijna drie keer «van leven veranderen»
gedurende de technische levensduur. Dat is erg moeilijk en ik kom niet
verder dan vast te stellen dat de Kamer in staat moet zijn om zover vooruit
te kijken. Dat geldt voor ons als denktanks natuurlijk ook wel, maar u moet
geen genoegen nemen met een antwoord in de trant van: wij gaan
binnenkort een submarine aanschaffen die 30 à 40 jaar «fixed» is en
helemaal op zijn taak berekend zal zijn voor de dan geformuleerde taken.
Ik had natuurlijk in de eerste ronde al moeten antwoorden op de vraag
over de global strategy. Nee, ik zou mij geen enkele illusie maken. De
global strategy, die overigens geen security strategy mag heten, zal
absoluut niet afdalen tot het niveau van «dit of dat wapensysteem, zoals
de submarines, zullen wij nodig hebben». Er zal wel iets in staan over de
noodzaak om de zuidflank van Europa te beschermen. In de eerste ronde
heb ik al gezegd dat daarin een rol voor submarines is weggelegd. Dat zijn
echter coastal submarines, die goed in het Middellandse Zee-bekken
kunnen opereren. Daar heb je niet per se een ocean-going type voor
nodig. Dat is dan misschien meteen een antwoord op de vraag «noem in
ieder geval één taak die submarines over 20 of 30 jaar nog zullen moeten
kunnen uitvoeren». Welnu, in dat soort wateren, zoals de Middellandse
Zee, zullen zij in staat moeten zijn om taken uit te voeren in verband met
mensensmokkel, migratie en grensbewaking. Ik vind het wel jammer dat
de vraagsteller maar naar één taak vroeg, want ik kan er misschien wel
twee of drie noemen. Ik denk dat ze ook een belangrijke rol kunnen spelen
bij het afgrendelen van havens in de naleving van embargo’s. Het
sanctiewapen is sinds de jaren negentig ongeveer zes keer zo vaak
toegepast en ik verwacht helemaal niet dat daar een einde aan komt.
Daarom zullen submarines voor die taak, niet voor de strikt verdedigende
taak, nog steeds een grote rol blijven spelen. Ik heb nog een aantal vragen

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niet beantwoord, maar de tweeënhalve minuut heb ik waarschijnlijk al
gebruikt.
Mr Reyn: I will speak in English, so we will balance each other out. What
percentage of the intelligence is provided by the submarine force? As Mr
Bindt explained this morning, you cannot express this in percentages. It is
important, however, to understand that the intelligence provided by the
submarine capability is a specific type of intelligence, about specific
subjects, which cannot be provided by other capabilities. It is an important
and unique source of intelligence, that can also be shared with allies, and
the quid pro quo dynamic then takes effect.
Mr Vuyk asked about the Caribbean interests. Do we need our own
capabilities? I would say yes, even though we depend on the support of
the United States when it comes to a military conflict in that region. We
have a responsibility to protect our own territory; the Dutch Caribbean is
part of the Netherlands. Therefore, I would say that we also need
capabilities under water, given the tasks of the armed forces and the
Ministry of Defence, to protect our interests. But this is obviously a
political question.
Ms Eijsink asked about the EU’s global strategy. I agree with what Mr
Colijn said about that. She also talked about pooling. International
cooperation can be achieved in this area. Pooling is a lot more difficult,
because we are talking about a strategic capability that is also used for
intelligence purposes. Pooling of this capability, like AWACS for instance
in the NATO context, would be more complicated.
Mr Knops referred to the «Marinestudie» from some time ago. From our
perspective the submarine capability needs to remain an integrated part
of the maritime capability. It is part of it and it is difficult to separate it.
The Chairperson: Thank you very much for your explanation. This
concludes part 1 of our round table talks. We will now continue with part
2.
Part 2: Military strategic development
Mr. Wezeman: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Rear admiral (ret) Williams: Clarion
Rear admiral (ret) Ort: NATO Centre for Maritime Research and
Experimentation
Mr De Jonge: Organization for applied nature-scientific research
(TNO)
The Chairperson: Welcome to the second session of these round table
talks. I give the floor to our invited guests to make a brief statement in
advance. At some point we will have to suspend the hearing for voting in
the plenary sitting.
Mr Wezeman: Thank you, madam Chairperson. I was going to say it is a
bit weird. I am sitting here for the first time in this parliament, I am Dutch
and I speak English. But I am not going to change that. I have done this
work for many years and even if I started in Dutch, I would continue in
English after three minutes. As a concession I will present a Dutch version
of the notes I made in advance.
Basically, I was asked to answer two questions. The first question is: who
is doing what on submarines and why? Secondly, I was asked to comment
on the letter to parliament about the vision on the future of the Dutch
submarines.
Who is doing what? The answer to that question is rather simple. It is very
factual: many countries in the world have submarines. More countries are
requiring submarines. New developments in submarine technology have
already been mentioned. That is one of the reasons why countries are

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again interested in submarines. You could say that there is a sort of
renaissance. Submarines have gained much more endurance with
air-independent propulsion. That keeps them under water for more than
two weeks if necessary. There are new sensors and new weapons. New
torpedoes and new missiles, including land-attack missiles, are becoming
quite common. A submarine nowadays, if it hides, let us say somewhere
off Spakenburg, could hit every place in the Netherlands with its weapons
without any problem. That is quite a significant change as compared to
twenty years ago or even ten years ago.
New countries having an interest in submarines are popping up,
especially in East Asia. Vietnam recently introduced submarines. The
Philippines is talking about submarines. Bangladesh recently introduced
submarines and Myanmar is interested in them. Several countries that
have submarines are looking at expanding their submarine forces.
Australia is doubling theirs. South Korea is looking at expanding its
submarine force. The Japanese have decided to buy more submarines
than the one per year they already did. They have a very significant
submarine force and are currently increasing it.
The question why is much more difficult to answer. Most countries do not
work like West-European countries, including the Netherlands. They may
be democracies, but democracy is not always functioning. Defence policy
is not discussed in parliament and certainly not in politics. Any discussion
about details like what to acquire and why to acquire it, is often
completely lacking. In the Netherlands, we get at least a nice set of papers
about defence from the government. What is the security situation of the
Netherlands? How is that being filled in? We have a parliament that can
discuss that.
Sometimes it is obvious why countries have submarines. In East Asia
there is a very clear threat. Countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and
Indonesia see a very clear threat. Of course, if one of your neighbouring
countries, China, says «this is our maritime territory, there is no
discussion about it» and then moves in with a large naval force which is
becoming ever more advanced and bigger, you have to react and you buy
submarines. That is the underdog weapon. It is an access-denial and
area-denial weapon of an extreme capability. One Vietnamese submarine,
lurking around somewhere in the South Chinese Sea will cause a major
headache to the Chinese for any operations that may hamper Vietnamese
interests in the area. That is a very obvious reason for a submarine to be
acquired.
In some of the other areas it is a bit less clear. In South Asia, India and
Pakistan have quite large submarine forces; both are looking at expanding
their forces. But the «why» is less clear here. In Pakistan there is not really
discussion about it and the same is true for India. Most countries in South
America have submarines. These are mostly old submarines and some
countries are looking for new submarines. Brazil just bought five new
submarines, including a nuclear-powered one, without giving a clear
indication of what they need it for. What is the threat to Brazil for which it
needs submarines? The one thing they mention is protection of its
economic zone, oil platform protection for instance. To be honest, in Brazil
there are some people who laugh about that, saying «why do you need a
submarine for that?» Of course, you can use a submarine for that, but
there are many other options which are a lot more cost-effective and more
flexible.
Why would the Netherlands want to have submarines and does that make
sense? In the vision documents three steps are taken. First of all, the
general security issue is mentioned. It was talked about in the first
session. I can agree with that. If you want submarines, where are you
going to acquire them? Cooperation has been mentioned. It is obvious
that we cannot do it on our own, so we have to buy the submarines
somewhere else or we have to cooperate in the development, purchase

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and use of them. Japan could be interesting, together with the Australians. These countries are looking into building submarines of exactly the
type and size as those of the Netherlands.
The main issue is the reason why the Netherlands should have submarines. In my paper I am mentioning severe weaknesses. I mentioned many
reasons why submarines are useful. With all of them you can more or less
agree. The question is, however: are submarines the most effective way of
solving the issues at stake? In a perfect world you have millions of euros
to spend on defence and still have enough money for all the other things,
but that does not work that way, of course. You have to set priorities. The
question to answer is: are the tasks that we foresee for submarines
priorities for the Netherlands? Are there other, more cost-effective and
flexible means? Just to mention one task: the defence of the Caribbean. I
would say that submarines are the least effective in defending the
Caribbean against Venezuela. Venezuela is not going to invade Aruba,
even if they sometimes say that they want to do something like that.
There is not only the US, but also the OAS, the Organization of American
States. Then we have the UN, not to speak of other institutions. It would
be a bit weird considering Venezuela as a clear threat, when at the same
time supplying this country, not with the submarines we try to sell them,
but with the electronic equipment for their tall surface ships as well as
with the landing craft with which the Venezuelan marines would then
probably land in Aruba.
In the end, the question is: what does the Netherlands want? What task
does it see for itself with regard to the security issue? What tools does it
need to carry out this task? What can the Netherlands afford? What are
the real priorities? How do submarines fit in? To be honest, considering
most of the aspects I would say: submarines are not really top priority. It
is good to have a discussion about the question where submarines fit in
with the priorities when it comes to the tools the Netherlands need to fulfil
the various tasks as they are prioritised.
Mr Williams: Thank you very much, madam Chairperson. By force of
circumstance I have to give my comments in English. I will confine myself
to five basic points which you are probing around in the questions that
you sent us. The first question is about the utility of military force. Why do
you have military force? You have military force to change behaviour or to
make an informed decision. It is both of those factors. You are trying to
change behaviour either by deterrence, persuasion or dissuasion. This
combination factor means that you are seeking the most cost-effective
platform, to give you those three elements in one bundle. I am a submariner by trade, but I left my submarine career behind me and worked at
the strategic level. I would still contend that the submarine does give you
those three elements in one bundle quite effectively. It is discreet, it has
the ability to change behaviour in a very dramatic way and it gives you
complete discretion in terms of the collection of intelligence to informed
decisions. We can programme that in questions.
The second point which I made in my submission to you was: as you
consider the future, that future is about 50 years ahead. Your programme
will start delivering in about ten years. The whole life could be anything
between 30 and 40 years beyond that. The platform is just one part of it. It
is the outside wrapper. Therefore, you have to probe around the adaptability of the sensors and the human element that you are going to plan
into that platform.
The third point which I would stress is the difference between science fact
and science fiction and the difference between science, basic science and
technology. We are all very familiar with the transformative effect of
modern technology. But the facts are that the world in which we live is
constrained by the physical laws of time and space and the basic laws of
physics, which make sea water impermeable to electromagnetic radiation.

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Immense amounts of money were expended on both sides during the
cold war to come up with different solutions. We emerged from that long
period of huge endeavour with the acoustics as the only mechanism that
really works in water. That has certain constraints and it constraints the
size of the body that you can use and the type of platform you can use to
actually deliver effect. So we can probe around the effects of introducing
unmanned vehicles and robotics into this space, but ultimately I believe
we have to come back to a basic discussion: physics as opposed to
technology.
The fourth point I want to make, is one of numbers. In 1990 there were
862 submarines operating across the world. 2015, the last time a sort of
census was done, there were about 512, which is quite a big drop. The
largest part of that drop is in the Euro-Atlantic area, by about 40%. The
shift of balance is going to the Asian area, where there is a huge growth.
There, the number went up by 30%. Most of that is in the convention area.
There is a complete re-bouncing of effect into the Asia-Pacific region.
However, what has gone in the Euro-Atlantic region are the smaller
coastal submarines. They have been replaced by much more effective and
more modern platforms, principally produced by France and Germany.
The last point I want to make is on the resource that the Netherlands
actually has and that you have already invested in over a very long period.
Fighting power is made up of three components. The first is the physical
element, which is the platform. That is what we all look at. Then there is a
moral component, which is actually based in the society. The third
element is the conceptual element; knowledge. Once lost, it is almost
impossible to recover. You have invested a huge amount of human capital
and effort in a programme up to date. As you consider this decision, that
human capital is immensely valuable across the alliance. In the 29 nations
of NATO we have to look at the marathon powers and the capable
marathon powers, of which the Netherlands is one, and those with a
high-end capability and those with other capabilities. The Netherlands has
a highly technical society and a high-end capability and makes an
immense contribution in that regard. That human capital is part of your
debate. I would suggest that you consider this programme going forward.
This is probably not a 20- or 30-year programme. Your are probably
talking about 50 years in terms of legacy.
Mr Ort: Thank you very much, madam Chairperson. I have been looking
into the subject of this round table talk from my experience as a naval
officer. The last position as such I held in the maritime command in
Northwood as chief of staff. Currently I am the director of the NATO
Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation. When preparing for
this round table I asked myself three main questions. Why would the
Netherlands need submarines? What makes submarines so attractive?
How do manned submarines fit into an appreciation of the future, which
indeed lies probably fifty years ahead?
Why would the Netherlands need submarines? I have read the vision that
is on the table today. I think it is very well worded. There are definitely
challenges to the Euro-Atlantic security and challenges to international
law and order. There are also quite a lot of crises and conflicts to the East
and South of NATO’s territory and to Europe in this case. On top of that,
there is increasing global interdependency of our economies, which is
essential for an open economy as the Netherlands. We are very much
dependent on the security of sea lines and the safety of our harbours for
the majority of our trade. Last, but not unimportant, we see an increase in
security challenges in the maritime areas, like the Arctic, where economic
interests are heavily contested. If you look at those interests from a Dutch
perspective, it makes sense for the Netherlands to operate a robust navy.
The submarine is an excellent element of that.

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I now come to the second question, namely what makes submarines so
attractive. Not only are submarines very effective, they are also very
cost-effective. Let me explain why I think that this is the case. It is
primarily because of the versatility of the platform. I mention the
following characteristics: endurance, flexibility of the payload and the fact
that submarines can operate covertly. Submarines cannot only collect
intelligence, but also analyse it. As was pointed out by previous speakers:
it is the ASW-platform of choice, because it operates in the same medium
as the opponent. Therefore, it has the advantage in the detection. These
characteristics give the submarine a very powerful force protection
potential and a big potential in area denial. In my last job as chief of staff
in Northwood I operated the Dutch submarine off the coast of Somalia in
counter-piracy. We have seen a proven effectiveness even in that area.
These characteristics give the submarine a combination of specific
capabilities which is unique: maritime striking power, the intelligence
potential, the possibility to operate with special forces and the possibility
to exercise strategic influence. Whilst it may be true that, if you consider
any of these elements on their own, the submarine might not be the only
choice or even the most cost-effective choice, it is the combination of
these elements that is truly unique. That is what gives the submarine its
huge attractiveness.
The third and last question: what about the future? There are two
elements here to consider. The first is the increasing transparency of the
ocean. The other is the increased use of autonomous systems. Just a few
words on transparency: small platforms with a low signature will always
be very difficult to detect. I completely agree with what admiral Williams
explained. If you look at the pure physics that we are dealing with in the
underwater domain, then you will not see any fast solutions anytime
soon. Even if you factor in a capability that has not yet been developed,
you will still have the statistical challenge of these vast ocean areas. It will
require huge economic resources, even with those new means, to find
small submarines. Whilst it is an old recurrent claim that we would see
transparency soon, that is nowhere near in practice.
As to the autonomy: If you asked me what the main reason is why we will
continue to need manned systems, rather than completely autonomous
systems, I would say that you need a man in the loop, to be able to react
adaptively and flexibly to changes in the circumstances. That is the main
argument, but there are other arguments. An unmanned system, which
would be able to exercise the full combination of capabilities that I eluded
to before, is so extremely complex to create that this is still science fiction.
Even if it could be done, technically, we would still face a huge challenge,
which is moral, ethical and legal. Take for instance the discussions about
the unmanned car, the Google-car. A lot of money has been spent on that
because of the huge commercial interests that are at stake. It is a huge
challenge. Most nations still do not have the legislation to allow such cars
to operate. We would face similar problems in the maritime.
Mr De Jonge: Thank you very much, madam Chairperson. The challenge
is time here. I am very glad that I can build on some arguments that were
put forward earlier, especially by admiral Williams, about knowledge as a
conceptual element of any capability. Military capabilities are more about
knowledge than about hardware. I know that we are talking about
hardware here today, but knowledge is a strategic military capability
which is crucial in all phases of the lifecycle of military capabilities. It is
indispensable in naval shipbuilding, which in our case is often done
nationally, which is a strategic choice. The so-called triple helix, or
ecosystem in the new speak, builds, maintains and shares a strategic
knowledge base. The knowledge base enables the MoD to have the latest
innovation and knowledge inserted in each new ship design at the lowest
possible cost. The Dutch Underwater Knowledge Centre (DUKC), part of

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the NIDV, is the custodian of this knowledge base for submarines. It
comprises all the knowledge that was built up with the Walrus-class
submarine over the last 25 years. However, some knowledge was also lost
since the last Walrus-class submarine was put to sea. The actual detailed
design of the submarine is a very complex matter, which is no longer
available in the Netherlands as hands-on experience in all its facets.
However, the strategic knowledge base that is available, is indispensable
to build, maintain and upgrade expeditionary submarines in the Netherlands in a strong international partnership that is based on sharing
knowledge. It provides jobs and technology and turnover throughout the
30 (or more) -year lifecycle of the new submarine. Moreover, we need this
knowledge base to build the next generation submarine capability in 2055,
when I will be old and grey.
TNO is a valued partner for naval shipbuilding programmes, because of
its continuous and broad naval R&D-programmes, its objective scientific
assessment and its understanding of the Royal Netherlands Navy
throughout the full lifecycle of all its capabilities, including submarines.
Therefore, TNO is ready to assist the MoD in the objective cost-benefit
analysis, mentioned by Mr Reyn earlier, of the possible international
submarine partnerships. In the longer run and in close coordination with
the MoD, TNO is also able to engage in concept development and that is
another important element of your future capability, together with the
industry. This ensures the long-term strategic knowledge base and makes
sure it preserves and even improves.
This will not only improve the safety, affordability, and the quality of
critical mission elements that make up the Dutch expeditionary
submarine, but it also improves the competitive edge of our national
shipbuilding industry within an international submarine partnership for
the future.
Chairperson: Ten Broeke
The chairperson: There is now room for asking questions. I first give the
floor to Ms Belhaj.
Ms Belhaj (D66): My point relates to the remark you made that the
Netherlands is in a sense able to have all the right institutions for
innovation. On the other hand I can understand that we do not have
enough knowledge to realise such an important development.
Mr Knops (CDA): My first question is to Mr Wezeman. He made a lot of
critical remarks about the vision of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. They
were a bit contradictory to the other introductions. I would like Mr
Wezeman to comment on the introductions of the three retired navy
officers.
This is my second question: to what extent will the Dutch submarines be
seen by our NATO-allies as a serious contribution to the NATO-based
protection of the freedom of our territory? To what extent is this a unique
capability that we should purchase?
Mr Vuijk (VVD): Thank you very much for your interesting contributions. I
have a question for Mr Williams, Mr Ort and maybe Mr De Jonge. Could
you please elaborate a bit more on the topic of ocean-going submarines?
Are those important or not? Some of you mentioned the fact that 30 or 40
navies use the same sort of silent conventional submarines. You did not
mention the ocean-going ones. Most submarines are coastal ones. What
is the importance of ocean-going submarines for NATO? Do other navies
have this ocean-going capacity, within or outside NATO? Do we know
something about that?

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Ms Eijsink (PvdA): Thank you very much for the papers you sent us and
for your introductions. My question is about the adaptability of the
system. As we all know, threats are unforeseeable. Mr De Jonge referred
to the fact that the civil systems in technology are more durable in ten
years than the military systems. How can platforms be made adaptable?
That is what Mr Colijn already talked about. The purchase of military
weapon systems is decided on here in parliament, in a political way. Mr
De Jonge emphasized the importance of knowledge. How can we, in the
political field, handle that through the years? This has to do with the
budget as well. It is hard to allocate a budget for five, ten or fifteen years.
We have been through that, I can assure you.
Mr Houwers (Houwers): Thank you for your contributions. Some of these
were critical. That is good, because it makes us think about things. We
have to make choices. Flexibility is very important. Mr Williams talked
about systems being «future-proof» and said that flexibility is very
important. Could you explain a bit more about what you mean by
flexibility? Once you have a design, how can you assure it remains
flexible?
Mr De Roon (PVV): First of all I would like to thank the four gentlemen for
their excellent presentation and their excellent papers, which help us
streamline our thoughts on the topic of the replacement of our submarine
force. In particular, I would like to mention that I most appreciated one
particular remark in the paper of Mr Williams – but I think it was also
stressed by some of the other speakers – that one of the more important
assets is that we have well-trained and operationally experienced people.
Once we put away with that, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to
ever rebuild it again. I think we should all be very aware of that.
I have two questions, one to Mr Ort. You mentioned in your paper that
Russian submarines have made a major jump in technological performance, with capabilities we have not seen before, which are not mirrored
by the West. Could you explain which capabilities they now have that we
do not have, but should have or even surpass?
My other question is to Mr De Jonge. You said that the combination of the
three Dutch knowledge institutes TNO, Marin and NLR, the triple helix,
allows our Ministry of Defence to integrate advanced allied weapon
systems into technology and Dutch design, against relatively low
investment and lifecycle cost, compared to foreign designs. My question
is whether that is a fact or wishful thinking. If it is a fact, could you please
give an explanation why we accept it as a fact?
Mr Ort: I will combine some questions, like we all will, and see where that
will get us.
I wrote it in my paper, but I did not mention it in my introduction: the
current contribution of the Dutch submarine service to the submarine
capability of NATO is highly appreciated by NATO, partly because it is
complementary to the nuclear capability that is fielded by some of the
other big maritime nations. This appreciation provides the Netherlands
with a seat at the table where decisions are made about certain operations
and where missions are being prepared.
Another set of questions relates to the future and the potential of using
unmanned platforms. Technologically speaking, this is something of a
more distant future. What would the future look like? I see a future of
heterogeneous networks, in which we have a combination of all the
means that are available. This will definitely consist of some of the
unmanned systems, because they are cheap. It will never be the full
solution. We will also need manned systems. I already talked about the
man in the loop. I see a future where the submarine could provide a

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logical platform, act as a mothership if you like, to utilize autonomous
sensors and autonomous vehicles.
That leads us to the question about adaptability. Something we might
want to consider is the possibility of a more gradual development. The
fact that we replace a complete capability after a lifecycle of 30 or 40
years, is not very conducive to keeping the capability up to date. Some
other nations replace a capability by a relatively smaller number of
platforms, but they do that more often.
The other manner in which we can prepare for adaptability is to build into
the design provisions for a modular approach. That is related to the
argument about size. Size gives you several things. It gives you expeditionary range and it gives you the opportunity to adjust the trim of the
platform so you can operate globally without logistic support, and operate
in any environment, no matter what the temperatures and the degree of
salinity are. So size is also related to adaptability. I think I will leave it at
that.
Mr Williams: I think I will just pick up on the theme, because there are
two questions around adaptability and flexibility which Hank Ort just
talked about. Also it was asked what the difference is between oceangoing and coastal, what the emphasis is and why that is important. If I
could just fish in my pocket for my prop: this iPhone is a very good
example of something that is not very flexible or very adaptable, and
deliberately so. I wonder if anybody in the room has got an iPhone 3G S,
still. No. No-one still wants an iPhone 3, because it will not operate on IOS
9. It just will not. So when you are thinking about a platform that is going
to last 40 years, you have to design it in such a way that it can keep up
with some of the technological developments.
How are you going to handle basic elements in the platform – power
distribution, cooling – in different environments? The temperature of the
water for example has an enormous effect because of marine growth. If
you do not operate in this environment, these are things you would not
even think about. You actually have to specifically design the systems to
backflush in tropical waters, in order to prevent marine growth. Otherwise
the cooling system will not work and if the cooling system does not work,
none of your fancy electronics work. So adaptability and flexibility in
design come down to understanding the environmental factors and good
engineering, to provide a series of ports and sockets which will allow you
to go forward.
At its most fundamental end, it is about protocols. The fact that these
things do work, that they are so wonderful and that they rule our lives, is
due to the protocols that people have designed into them. They are an
open architecture that everybody can assimilate. So as you specify what
type of platform you are building, if you specify it down to the particular
type of equipment you need and the particular type of architecture, that
will lock you in forever, in terms of legacy. In that case, you cannot adapt
it for the future. So the whole emphasis as we go forward is on open
architectures and different designs.
Look at the basic wrapper of the platform. The basic engineering is
hydrodynamic performance or propulsion performance. That has to be
built with a long-term view, but the internal design of the platform has to
be sufficiently adaptable so it can keep pace with some of the new
technology in terms of sensors and weapon developments. After all, to
reverse engineering is highly expensive and very difficult to do. I suppose
all of us here probably served in platforms that were very old, some
dating back 25 or 30 years, in which we tried to insert new technology, but
really found that very difficult to do, because of its nature. You can design
that out at this stage. I think that people increasingly will, but that requires
clever thinking.

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One of those clever-thinking parts is the difference between ocean-going
and coastal. You can take a very small submarine to sea for a very long
time. The German U-boats of the Second World War were actually very
small platforms, compared to the platforms of today. The crew lived in
very awful conditions, but had long endurance, simply because that was
the way that they operated. They were not very effective. They were
ineffective in today’s terms. If you are going to build an ocean-going
platform, it has to have endurance and that is a design feature that you
build in.
Why do you want them ocean-going? Because you have interests that
demand that you have an ocean-going capability, for instance. That may
be because you have territories which are global. I guess the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom share that. We have dependent territories that
are global and therefore there is a need to provide physical securities.
That is part of that. There is also a need in terms of freedom of navigation.
I am conscious we are in The Hague here, the home of Grotius, in terms of
Mare Librum. The freedom of navigation, the freedom of the seas is a
fundamental tenet for all of us, as part of the trading network, but you
cannot defend the freedom of navigation close to your own coast. That is
actually a task that you have to try and enforce, in various ways, through
presence or not. That is how some countries can operate. They can have
deniable presence on a global stage. It depends on what is driving your
interest and what is driving your output, the need for your requirement.
I think I should leave it there, because otherwise I take up too much time.
The Chairperson: That leads us back to the innovation?
Mr De Jonge: I like the example that admiral Williams used of the
iPhone, because there is a really good comparison with submarines,
namely the battery life. The life of a submariner depends for a great deal
on the battery life of the submarine, so that is one of the innovation areas
that we should really take a good look at. It is actually one of the areas in
which the Netherlands is very capable, although you would not expect
that. We have very good technology in the Netherlands and very good
knowledge about how to cope with the energy mechanism on a
constrained platform such as a submarine.
There are more areas that I did not mention in my presentation here, but
they are mentioned in my paper, which describes the inherent Dutch
knowledge base of which TNO is a part, but that is built up around
companies, but also around the navy itself and the maintenance people
who work on the Walrus-class in operation now.
I will now address the question Mr De Roon asked about the weapon
system integration. Are we still capable of such an integration? Is there an
example of such integration? There are many examples out there,
including the Walrus-class submarines, which integrate a US-torpedo
system into a Dutch-designed platform, which is quite something. There
are other examples as well, for instance on the surface fleet. As one of
very few countries, the Netherlands is, based on its inherent knowledge
base, allowed by the US to carry specific US-weapon systems operated by
a Dutch-designed radar. This is almost «cursing in the American church»,
as we Dutch would put it. So we are talking about American missiles,
controlled by Dutch radar. That says something about the knowledge, but
also about the measure of trust placed in the Dutch knowledge base that
allows us to do that. It allows us to be almost as effective as US-weapons
or weapon platforms are – I am not being very modest now – for half the
cost and ten years earlier. That is the Dutch knowledge base.
The importance of ocean-going submarines has already been addressed
by admiral Williams. One important point to make is that the design and
the size of a submarine are only a result of the requirements imposed on
the platform. These requirements greatly define not only the size, but also

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the form of the submarine. What you want to do with it, defines the form.
That also goes for an iPhone, by the way. An ocean-going submarine
places very heavy demands on exactly those concepts that the community
around the Walrus-class has built its knowledge on. That is the safety
concept, and that safety concept – I have not heard that before – is a very
important factor. If you operate a coastal submarine over 4.000 m of water
and something goes wrong and you depend on the bottom as one of your
safety aspects, that bottom is not there. You have to think about that and
that demands a lot of knowledge. In the structural design and the acoustic
signatures are perhaps the most important aspects, as so eloquently
mentioned before in the presentations. One of the tasks of the submarine
is to gather intelligence and it is better to do that while nobody else can
measure your acoustic signatures. So that knowledge is also resident in
the Netherlands and also defines one of the characteristics of the Walrus
and its successor.
I will conclude with a question of Ms Belhaj and Ms Eijsink about
adaptability. I think that adaptability is one of the most crucial questions
for you. I thought of something while I was jotting down the question: it is
not a once-in-a-lifetime, but a once-in-a-lifecycle-opportunity, if you want,
to make a decision about acquiring a submarine. A submarine is not only
a hull, but the hull does need to be defined very properly. The adaptability
lies in the way in which you design a submarine, in how you design
adaptability into the submarine itself. So that means that after all we have
heard today, the Dutch submarine design is specific to what we want to
do with that submarine. Our knowledge needs to be inserted in any
design we choose, and that is a matter to be addressed at a later stage.
That is not something to be decided on now, but after the B-phase, the
decision on which design to choose and which partner to choose, has to
be fed with that knowledge, which is resident in the Netherlands
submarine community, of which we are merely a part, but that knowledge
needs to be inserted into the design in order to ensure that the adaptability you all want so badly is inserted in that submarine design. That is
one thing that needs to be addressed in any strategy for the near future.
Mr Ort: Before I pass on the mike to Mr Wezeman, there was one question
by Mr Houwers that I did not answer yet. It was about the Russian
submarine development. The quote in my paper was actually a quote
from commander Johnston, who is currently commander maritime
command in Northwood, so those were not my own words. Secondly, it is
a bit difficult to go into the details of something that is in essence
classified, but I can say that what is of concern to NATO in its decisionmaking, is the fact that the Russian submarine building programmes have
all been revived. There is a lot of development and construction going on.
It is about platforms that become more silent than their predecessors and
the most varying aspect is related to the weapons that these platforms
can carry. You may have heard or read the news about much bigger
nuclear torpedoes that can be used at a longer range. As Mr Colijn
pointed out in the first round, there is some saber-rattling involved in the
claim that these weapons might be used in a tactical way. So if you add all
of that up, it goes to show why it is extremely relevant for NATO to have
the appropriate means to counter that development. For that purpose, a
submarine is a good choice of platform.
Mr Wezeman, maybe you can now comment on the earlier interventions.
Mr Wezeman: Let me start by saying that submarines are mighty fine
weapons. That is, by the way, a quote about tanks, but still, submarines
are great weapons. Especially when you look at area denial and access
denial in the maritime sphere, submarines are probably the best weapon
you can think of, certainly for smaller states. They are stealthy, they are
hidden and they give surface forces a major headache. Look at the
enormous amount of effort the British put in 1992 into trying to find this

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one Argentinian, not even very advanced submarine with not very
advanced weaponry, that was probably somewhere around there. That
was a major issue and that submarine being there or not being there
made a hell of a difference for the British naval forces. The Vietnamese
are buying these things. One or two submarines are somewhere in the
South China Sea and the Chinese have no idea where they are, but they
do know that they are probably there. They can pop up and they can reach
anything within a range of 100 km, from wherever they might be. It is a
very cheap solution for area denial and maritime access denial.
The question is another one. When I read the vision paper, the list of
reasons given there for the acquisition of new submarines made me
wonder if there are no other alternatives that are more flexible and more
cost-effective. I am not saying that alternatives would save you money on
defence, but you could spend that money on defence somewhere else. If
you say that you need submarines for the defence of the Dutch territories
in the Caribbean or of territories for which the Netherlands are responsible in the Caribbean, then I think you are way off. Venezuela is not going
to invade, there are other means and if you really want to do something
there, then it should probably be a couple of marines on a surface ship,
not even a very expensive one. It is a deterrence, at best.
Submarines also have a serious intelligence gathering function, but are
there no other means? Are aircrafts not more flexible and much more
mobile? You can have them here today and there tomorrow. Try to do that
with a submarine. These are questions you will have to ask. The gathering
of intelligence in general is a very secretive business. You will have to ask
the Dutch intelligence services how they think about the different means
of gathering intelligence and where submarines stand in that. Ask them if
what they get from submarines, if they get anything at all, is something
they cannot get from somewhere else.
The issue of enforcing arms embargos has been mentioned. To be honest:
that is rubbish, even if I do not want to use that word. Arms embargos are
enforced with legal means, by law enforcement agencies, by policy, by
political pressure and by intelligence which is very much for customs and
the legal means, the law enforcement. The military play a role in
gathering that intelligence, but arms embargos are not really enforced
with military means by the Netherlands. Certainly there are ships around
to check what is going to Iran or what is going to Yemen, but is the
Netherlands involved in that? Does the Netherlands want to be involved in
that? Look at the problems you will get from it. One ship, a Spanish ship,
stopped a North Korean ship carrying scud missiles to Yemen. That led to
a major diplomatic problem. Does the Netherlands want to be involved in
that?
Mr Knops (CDA): On the one hand, you are saying that submarines are
very cost-effective. On the other hand you are saying: maybe they are too
expensive.
Mr Wezeman: I am saying that they are cost-effective for certain roles,
and for other roles they are not. The list of roles given in the vision paper
contains exactly those roles about which I have serious doubts as to the
cost-effectiveness of using submarines to do the task. Submarines are
cost-effective for roles of which I wonder whether the Netherlands intends
to play them. Is the Netherlands going to be seriously involved in access
denial, in area denial? Is the Netherlands going to be seriously involved in
the protection of sea lines of communication in East Asia? That is the big
question. That is, of course, also a matter of political priorities. What does
the Netherlands want with its submarines? What does it want with its
security and defence policies and how do submarines fit in that? Are there
no other means that fit into it much better?

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Mr Ort: I would like to remind the delegates of something I mentioned in
my intervention. If you unpick the list of potential tasks, then it is indeed in
some cases possible to build the argument that maybe submarines are
not the only solution, or maybe not even the most cost-effective solution,
but what we are looking at is choosing a weapon system that will have the
flexibility to cover a unique range of tasks. That is an important argument
to keep in mind. The second element is that it is easy to suggest that there
could be alternatives, but in many cases these alternatives are not
available now. So they would require quite a costly investment as well.
The Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) were already mentioned. If you talk
about intelligence gathering, we often refer to satellites. Well, the
Netherlands does not operate its own satellites. So that would need to be
taken into account. I would like to give Simon Williams the floor shortly to
say something about embargos.
The Chairperson: He has already indicated that to me, so if you leave
that to me, I can keep the order here a little bit. Rear admiral Williams,
make it a short intervention please, because I would also like to have the
members pose a few extra questions if necessary. I do need to remind you
of the clock ticking away: we have about ten minutes left for this session.
Mr Williams: Just briefly: the question is not whether a submarine can
complete an arms embargo. Of course it cannot. It is a contributory. Can
you contribute? There was a question about national versus NATO. How is
the conundrum resolved if the Netherlands» government wishes to
employ a Dutch submariner on a national task versus a NATO-task. That is
something that happens almost every single day. Throughout NATO,
forces are chopped to national or under a NATO-umbrella. That is part of
the whole process within the alliance. The essence of it is: can you
contribute? Can that platform make a contribution? Because none of us
can do any of this alone. The only two nations on earth that have the
military power to do things on their own, are still the Russians and the
United States of America. The rest of us, only in very limited circumstances, in very defined national circumstances, have the combat power to
be able to do things on our own. The rest of it is about which contribution
is going to make a difference, how much that contribution buys you in
terms of political power and in terms of your ability to work as part of the
alliance.
The Chairperson: I would like to go back to Mr Wezeman, so he can
continue to answer. When I said ten minutes, I was referring to the time
we have left to answer this set of questions. We will then do another
round of questions.
Mr Wezeman: I agree that some of the things you can contribute are a
bonus effect in a way. But that is true for other assets also. If you have a
frigate, that also has a bonus effect. You do not mean to use it to enforce
arms embargos, but it is probably better to do it that way. It depends on
the list. What does the Netherlands want with its maritime forces, with its
security forces? Which tasks does the Netherlands want to do and can do?
Wherein does the Netherlands want to be involved? And then, what are
the tools needed for that? You then make a priority list of these tasks and
you find out which tools there are. From among these tools you have to
choose. Which tools can we afford? Which tools are the most flexible for
our needs? Not for the needs of others, but for our needs. You can of
course link that to some of the needs of our allies. After all, we are in an
alliance, either in NATO or in the EU, but in the end we set our own
priorities in what we can do and what we want to do and how the tools fit
in that.

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One of the things the Netherlands is very strong in, is peace-keeping
under a UN-mandate. But then there are always problems. If the UN starts
screaming for helicopters in the DRC, which they do, nobody responds
positively. Everybody in NATO says: our helicopters are too busy, we
cannot afford helicopters, even though we know that for the Netherlands,
that kind of peace-keeping is a priority and that kind of prevention of
conflict and killing is a priority. So again, it is a matter of setting priorities
and the Netherlands making up its mind.
The Chairperson: Are these your answers, gentlemen, to the questions?
Then I would like to go back to the MPs for another round of questions.
Ms Belhaj (D66): It is getting more difficult. The feeling I have is that
when you are in a decision-making process and you ask people to name
reasons why a submarine would be a good thing for the Netherlands, you
will end up having 1.000 arguments in favour of having submarines. Can
the Netherlands really focus on the submarine? After all, if we do
purchase a submarine, that will have consequences for other parts of
defence. It could also mean that you end up having a stronger urge for
more submarine ships. That could also be a consequence. I still do not
have a really clear answer to my earlier question: in which way can the
Netherlands really focus, so as to make things work, but also to remain a
serious partner in all kinds of international relations? That question has
not been answered yet.
My second question concerns the decision-making process as well. The
United States have organized in their own defence organisation the
escape concept, in which they have a high officer, a director, who can say
something about the cost assessment. He can advise without any
negative consequences. My second question is: in which way do you think
it would be good for the Netherlands to also integrate such an institution
to prevent debates like the ones we had about the JSF?
Mr Knops (CDA): To create a happy ending, I would like to comment
again on what Mr Wezeman said. He was rather critical about the vision of
the Ministry of Defence. He said he missed some extra arguments in the
letter, rather than saying: submarines do not have added value. Is that
correct? If so, I understand him and we might have a nice debate with our
Minister after this meeting about whether or not the proper arguments
were used in the vision paper. Did I understand him correctly?
Mr Vuijk (VVD): I have another question about the ocean-going capability.
What are the consequences if you want it? We talked about silent and
coastal. We talked about silent and ocean-going. What are the consequences thereof? To be more precise: what are the consequences for the
size, for the quality of the hull, for the engine for example? What are the
consequences for the crew? Do we need more or less people? What are
the consequences for supplies, for the fuel, for the weapon systems? I am
just making a few suggestions. Maybe you could elaborate on the
consequences of choosing an ocean-going capability.
My second question for Mr De Jonge is about employment issues. What
is the position of the Dutch industry? How many people are involved if we
go for this capability? What are the positions of the universities and the
knowledge institutions? Maybe you can elaborate on the importance of
that decision for our economy and for our people.
Ms Eijsink (PvdA): Thank you for your answers. My question is for Mr
Wezeman. If I heard you correctly, Mr Wezeman, you were talking about a
set of priorities. We discussed earlier that there are unknown threats and
unforeseeable threats. We also learned through the years that capabilities
are needed when they are demanded. So could you please comment on

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that? We talked about the adaptability of systems in five, ten, fifteen years.
We should not neglect the adaptability of politicians by then or over the
years. How would you relate to that? You are from a well-known institute,
SIPRI in Stockholm, Sweden, and you are better informed than all of us; I
know some of your reports about this. Could you reflect a little bit on this
or otherwise send us your reports about this, because up north, where
you live, there are all these problems concerning submarines, and the
Nordics have different aims for that as well? I am just looking for your
priorities, because I cannot connect them to some of your reports, if I may
say so.
Mr Houwers (Houwers): I have a question for Mr De Jonge. In the
position paper he sent us, he wrote about close international cooperation
and also about an industrial partner. What is more important: choosing an
industrial partner at the beginning of the process or choosing other
countries to cooperate with? After all, one choice may well turn out to be
a problem for the other.
Mr De Roon (PVV): It is mentioned in the vision paper of the Dutch
Ministry of Defence that technological developments will make it possible
to operate new submarines with smaller crews. That is, however, not
specified with any numbers, nor is there an explanation given. I wonder if
one or more of the gentlemen present could give us some more insight in
such an idea. What kind of technological development are we talking
about? How much reduction could be reached? I believe we currently
have a crew of 50 people. I would appreciate it if someone could say some
more about that.
Mr Ort: I start with Ms Belhaj’s question about the ability to focus.
Currently the vision for the Dutch armed forces that I am aware of, is that
we are still aiming at balanced armed forces. So far, we have never
suggested that we should choose one service over another or one
weapon system instead of an important weapon system of one of the
other services. If we look specifically at the navy, I stick to my original
argument that within a robust navy, which is very sensible for a nation as
the Netherlands to maintain. The submarine would fit very well into such
a robust maritime service.
To have independent advice in the process of decision-making generally
seems a very good idea. Round tables like this should already meet part
of that desire. Maybe Mr De Jonge can say something about that from the
perspective of a knowledge institute.
On the subject of getting back to the idea of ocean-going capabilities and
the consequences, also in relation to the possibility of having a smaller
crew: it is difficult to give definitive answers to those questions, because
we are now at the start of the process. We are defining the requirements
and ultimately those requirements will be decisive for what that technically means for the platform. Very generally speaking, however, I already
mentioned that a larger hull size gives you more flexibility, specifically
with the payload, but also with creating provisions for potential future
systems that could be operated from the submarine. Maybe Mr De Jonge
can comment on that in more detail and also answer the question about
industrial partners. Can I give the floor to you?
Mr De Jonge: That is up to the chairman.
The Chairperson: I will intervene if I disagree.
Mr De Jonge: I trust you on that, Mr chairman. I learn quickly; I work for
TNO.

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Coming back to the focus on submarines, a question of Ms Belhaj, I would
like to add a few things to what admiral Ort already said. Beneficial effects
of investing in a submarine are not only limited to the submarine, because
the technology that is used in the new submarine design is also beneficial
for other parts of the Netherlands» navy. For example, like captain
Ammerlaan already indicated this morning, the command and control
system that is used for the future submarine is almost identical to the
ones used on other navy ships. So the lessons you learn about crew,
design and manning concepts that are integrated into this very innovative
design, are also applicable to other parts of the navy. Perhaps the general
lessons learned about crew sizing, manning and team work that are
inserted into that command and control system, are also applicable to
other parts of the armed forces.
Another aspect which may lie outside of the defence realm, but is also
important, is the energy concept that is going to be used on the
submarine. It is an ongoing process. As I said earlier, battery concepts are
improving almost within the year. We need to conceive the submarine in
an intelligent way. We need to design it in such a way that, in ten years»
time, we can include new battery concepts that will lengthen the time that
a submarine can remain undetected in the water. There are lives at stake
here. If we can extend that time by improving our battery capability, we
are less dependent on other technologies such as air-independent
propulsion, however important these may be in the years to come. So it is
a matter of betting on two horses instead of just one. That it also very
good.
Ms Belhaj (D66): Let me give you a concrete example of what I am talking
about. We are talking about developing television sets here, but we will
need computers in the future. That means you need different knowledge.
Having knowledge about building a television set, which is an old thing, is
different from having knowledge about building a computer. So when you
talk about developments in a submarine, that is not the type of
development or the innovation that I am talking about. My question is: are
we building television sets or are we really thinking about building
computers?
Mr De Jonge: I think what you are hinting at, is whether we are building
a submarine, whereas in 20 years» time it will turn out that we need
something completely different. With the knowledge we have now – and
that is of course supporting the decision to be made after the B-phase by
the Minister of Defence and the politicians – it suffices to say that it is safe
to assume that the submarine will play an important role for decades to
come, because of the unique capabilities it offers. Water is impenetrable,
we cannot change the nature of the laws of physics. That means that if
you want to be in control of the weapon that you are going to fire at
somebody that needs to be fired at, you want to leave that in the hands of
a trusted human being who has a great deal of knowledge and
experience, which is your submarine commander. If you operate an
unmanned system, you cannot control that anymore after you lost
communication because they jammed you, who are you going to trust?
What are the consequences for employment? I mentioned in my paper
that by building on the already existing knowledge in the Netherlands, in
universities, in knowledge institutes, in the industry, but also in the Royal
Netherlands Navy, we created sort of an ecosystem about that submarine
knowledge which will enable us to maintain the submarine in-house for
the next 40 years. That is important. What does that mean for
employment? It means that the very specialized skills we will gain thanks
to having that capability in the Netherlands, will have to be built up and
maintained from low technical readiness levels up to the levels of people
who can be employed on board of a submarine. So yes, of course that

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means jobs, but it also means the building of knowledge in that
ecosystem. That has an inherent effect on the employment within Dutch
society as a whole. After all, innovation is good for business. It is good for
the well-being of our society. I will leave it at that, because I do not work
for the industry.
Mr Houwers asked a question about partnerships which is an interesting
one. Partnerships are multi-facetted. If you look at partnerships, you will
hardly ever see partners being on an equal footing. Someone always
benefits from someone else. The best partnership is the one in which each
partner benefits equally. However, you have to look at it on four different
levels. It is government-to-government cooperation, knowledge-toknowledge – these are institutions such as ours working together –
military-to-military – they need to work together with the same strategy
and the same strategic culture – and of course industry-to-industry
cooperation. All of these forms of cooperation are different. In determining which choice is the best, I think you should, in your cost-benefit
analysis, not only focus on the thing you are buying, but on the strategic
partnerships you are after. That is how you make sure that the knowledge
internationally available is concentrated in a design that is suitable for the
Netherlands. You should do that, rather than buying something that at the
end of the day will prove not to be what you want. That is why focussing
on the knowledge part of it, like I stressed, is important in assessing the
international partnerships.
Finally Mr De Roon asked about technological developments and crew
reduction. The Netherlands is one of the countries that have proven very
efficiently that in our naval systems which is what I am responsible for in
our R & D, we can crew our ships with less people with lower costs
obviously, and yet provide the same output with the same ships. Already
in the past we sailed ships with 200 people doing tasks that the US used
600 people for. I do not know why. Perhaps they had cleaner ships, but it
is the efficiency and the effectiveness of the platform that we take into
account in knowledge institutes, together with the Royal Netherlands
Navy to determine exactly how many people we need for each task and
how we combine them in an effective way. That is the manning and
automation concept that is at the heart of the integration of everything on
board naval ships and also on board submarines. Perhaps you can tell by
the expression on my face that I am proud of that knowledge. It is crucial
to be able to build navy ships in the Netherlands that are not only
cost-effective, but also effective. I think I leave it at that.
The Chairperson: There were a few questions left for Mr Wezeman.
Mr Wezeman: There was a question by Mr Knops. When I read the list
and look at the arguments, I find them weak. There are other things in
which I find submarines to be strong, but these are missing from the list.
The question is whether that happened by accident or whether it was
done on purpose. Is it because the Netherlands does not want to do those
things? Or is it because it was assumed that these things apply automatically? Was the thought: everybody knows that? I do not know. I can only
go by what is in the document as being the arguments in favour.
Then the question about capabilities, adaptability. We do not know what
the future holds and we will never know that. There are certain things that
are given, that are sort of standard. There will always be a flow of goods
across the maritime sphere. Ships will always play a major role in
transport and there will always be ways of interfering with that. There will
always be countries that somehow, directly or indirectly, may interfere
with that. That is to the detriment of a country like the Netherlands, which
lives off trade. However, how that is done, what exactly we have to defend
ourselves against, we do not know. There are a couple of solutions for
that. One solution is that you build cheaply. You find a new threat, a new

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challenge, you throw away the old one and buy a completely new one.
The other solution is using the hammer, the sledgehammer. No matter
what the threat is, you throw a nuclear bomb on it. Of course that is not
something the Netherlands wants to do. The third solution is that you go
for technology development. You build silver bullets, a couple of them.
When trouble starts, you have a fully developed technology and all you
have to do, is build it. Well, «all you have to do, is build it» is easier said
than done.
The one thing is: build your weapons so that they can be adapted to new,
not terribly different threats. Give them space. They need to be big, they
need to be spacious, they need to be roomy. You have to design them in
such a way that you can plug in something new. There has to be space for
that. You will end up with a big submarine, because you can put a new
weapon in it, you can put some new sensors in it. Within a smaller
submarine, you may not have the space to do so. The same is true for
ships. The same is true for basically everything. If you make something
small, there is no space to add an additional sensor, to add additional
power to power the sensor et cetera. We have to work from that, but we
do not know what is going to happen in the future, what can happen in 20
or 30 years from now. We build our weapons for 30 or 40 years. We do not
know who or what is going to be our enemy by then. If in 1985 you would
have said that the Soviet Union would cease to exist, it would not be our
enemy anymore and nuclear weapons would be the least of our worries,
people would have laughed at you and said: no, no, that is impossible.
Five years later the Soviet Union collapsed and ten years later we started
fighting with terrorists, who are now seen as our main threat. We do not
know.
Lastly I would like to comment on the question posed by D66 about the
issues of control, costs and technologies and the whole process. The US
have different ways of doing that. It is a big country with big organizations. There is the Congressional Research Service, for example, there is
Congress itself with its hearings, under oath et cetera. There is the US
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the equivalent of our Rekenkamer, which would also do certain parts of these things. And yes, it is a
good idea to do that. It helps parliament. We cannot expect parliamentarians to know all the ins and outs about all the things they decide about.
They need the experts to help and this is one way to do it. There are other
ways to organize that and they may be even better. That is the way
democracy works and that makes the Dutch democracy and the European
democracy stronger. As I said in the beginning: in many countries,
defence policy is not on the table of parliament, not even in democracies.
It is very important that it be there.
The Chairperson: Thank you for reminding us how that works. Maybe
some of the other members of the panel would like to respond. We have
another five to ten minutes left.
Mr Ort: I would like to comment on the question Ms Belhaj asked about
whether we are designing television sets or computers. My centre in La
Spezia was specifically created to think about the future and to come up
with good solutions for capability gaps. We have moved beyond the
computer. We are now looking at networks. It is all about information. It is
all about getting the information, collecting it, analysing the data. So big
data analysis becomes a very important element in that. As I explained
before, new and possibly cheaper developments in the area of
autonomous systems will definitely become a part of the network of the
future. It is, however, my conviction that even if you look 20 or 30 years
ahead, we cannot do without the man in the loop. Of course there are
different ways of organizing that, but a really very good way to do it is to

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have, as part of that network, a manned submarine where that human
element can be part of the total network.
Ms Belhaj (D66): How do you know that it is not possible to have
unmanned submarines? After all, one could say: we can go to the moon
without a person being inside the rocket. There are cars without a driver.
So why is it not possible to have unmanned submarines and how do you
know that now?
Mr Ort: If I used the word «impossible», then I made a mistake, because
you are right to point out that nothing is impossible. The question is how
much money you make available for that development and it is a matter
of time. We often make the mistake of expecting too much in the very
short term and too little in the longer term, so that is a well-known
phenomenon to me. I did not mean to say that it is impossible, but it is my
current judgement that in the timeframe we are talking about, we will not
develop a capability that would be complex enough to cover the complete
range of tasks we are currently discussing, while at the same time making
sure that such capability would be up to the moral and legal challenges
involved in putting it out in the water.
Mr Williams: It may be helpful to try and illustrate what the technical
challenge is in terms of replicating the capability with an unmanned
platform. What you are envisaging is something with an artificial
intelligence that is capable of making probabilistic judgements based on
very scant information, because that is what the underwater environment
is like to operate in. It is very imperfect in terms of the levels of knowledge
that you work through and it requires a lot of human... I try to avoid the
word «intuition», but it almost requires intuition. There is a lot of skill that
you develop because of years of training and practice. You literally stack
the dots to find the other submarine or whatever it is that you are
involved in. To try and replicate that in a machine will be extremely
difficult, because we have managed to engineer out a lot of the
high-frequency noises that will make a platform detectable. A
high-frequency noise does not travel very far in water. So the way that we
detect things at long range in water, is that we have to step down the
frequency range. As you step down the frequency range, physically the
arrays that you use get bigger, so they are a kilometre long.
An object that size requires a great deal of power to drag it through the
water and power the sensor and power the machinery that is at the other
end of it. So we are envisaging machines operating in the most hostile
environment that we know. The difference between space and the
underwater environment is that space is a vacuum, where you concentrate on keeping the air in, at low pressure. So technically, it is a
challenge. Under water the pressure doubles every ten metres. And then
there is sea water. I do not know if any of you own boats, but I have made
the mistake of buying one recently and when you own a boat, you
discover that when you put the word «marine» in front of it, it doubles the
cost. The reason is that seawater is such a hostile environment. It rots
everything.
So we have a corrosive environment that changes with pressure and
temperature in the most radical way over very short distances. So the
engineering challenge is really fundamental. It is completely different to
launching a space rocket. We understood the physics. The ballistics we
understood. H.G. Wells and others who wrote science fiction well
understood how to write the story of a man going to the moon. We knew
the physics, we knew we could solve the problem. It was a question of the
chemistry and the technology to come up with the trajectory to make it
work. When we go underwater, it is a different environment. We have to
think of the size of the bodies. If you think about putting in huge numbers

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of drones, think of the loss of the MH370 in the Southern Ocean: we still
have not found it. It is quite a big thing, but we cannot find it. It is a really,
really difficult environment.
The Chairperson: On that note I would like to thank all of you for your
expertise, for your excellent presentations and for the time you spent with
us. This is certainly not the last time we will be discussing this, but it is at
least an opening.
Part 3: International cooperation and development submarines
worldwide
Captain Faltin: Germany: Ministry of Defence and Chairman
Conventional Submarine Round Table
Mr Knutsen: Norway: Forsvarets Forskningsinstituut (FFI)
Rear admiral Olsson: Sweden: Försvarets materielverk (FMV)
Mr Buchner: Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN)
The Chairperson: Welcome everyone to our third and last session of this
hearing of the standing committee on Defence. We are welcoming captain
Faltin, Mr Knutsen, rear admiral Olsson and Mr Buchner. You are all
granted five minutes for your presentation. We have already received
position papers from you and I would like you to confine yourselves to
complementary remarks which add to the documents received. Everyone
present was able to read your papers and they were also made available
to the public.
Please, captain Faltin, if I may give you the floor for your five minutes.
Mr Faltin: Mr Chairman. Distinguished Members of Parliament, first of all
thank you very much for having me here. I sit here wearing two hats
today. One of them is national: I am in the German Ministry of Defence in
charge of future naval plans and strategies. My other role is multinational,
I am chairing a group called Conventional Submarine Round Table, which
brings together NATO and submarine-running countries in the European
Union, with the aim to exploit synergies. As I am an active duty officer, I
am committed to mainly two things in the planner community. First of all
that is the capability to get the best equipment possible for the German
armed forces, and secondly to do that in a meaningful manner when it
comes to resources and especially tax payers» money. I would like to
address these two points briefly: the operational aspect and the economic
aspect.
For the operational aspect, I am now wearing my German hat. You have
heard about the security situation. You are aware of the security situation.
Collective defence has been reborn, has risen again. With that comes for
the maritime domain a set of tasks that need to be reinvestigated, such as
sea control, sea denial, anti-access area denial – we heard that earlier.
That comes of course with capabilities. We are in line with the
NATO-requirements, the NATO-expectations for Germany when we say:
anti-submarine warfare is of the utmost importance for us in Germany. It
is a dedicated NATO-target for Germany and we have derived the right
means for that. One of these means is of course submarines, which are
perfect assets to conduct anti-submarine warfare.
To underline the deduction that submarines are an asset of choice, we
have on the political level decided that the underwater platforms,
submarines, are and will be a German key technology, which is supported
by the German Minister of Defence when it comes to the aspect of
maintaining this capability for the future of our armed forces. It may also
be of interest to you in this regard that we will back-up the decision that
this is a key national technology, with the intent to enhance and increase
our number of submarines. At the moment we look at two by midterm, so
in the end of the next decade or maybe 2030, 2031. We intend to raise the

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number of our conventional submarines. At the moment we are in the
process of introducing that into the budget and to propose it, via the
chain, to parliament.
As for the other aspect, the economic aspect, I would like to switch briefly
to my multinational hat. What are we doing in the Conventional
Submarine Round Table? We bring together, as I said, NATO-countries in
Europe that run conventional submarines, including the Netherlands, and
we aim at exploiting synergies in several fields. One is operations. That is
always there. Another one is the search for technology. We look at
education and training and of course we look at in-service support.
This round table was formed in 2014. We normally meet twice a year. We
have a set of working groups and we came up with a lot of quite
interesting quick wins, I would say. But there is more. The round table
does not look at procurement. That is something we all agree on, so we
do not foster procurement in this round table. However, within the
working group of in-service support, there is a lesson and this lesson is:
we could be better if we were to operate on the basis of one identical
European platform, or at least on the basis of common components. I do
not push this in this round table. I push it with my national hat on. As you
are aware, we have spoken about it. The government-to-government talks
and the military-to-military talks are the venue for this. We speak
particularly to the Norwegian side. We also speak to the Dutch side on
that subject. The key thing now is to transform PowerPoint slides into
more.
We met the Norwegians on a couple of occasions to speak about
functional requirements. We have aligned our functional requirements on
a working level, but it is not approved yet. We had a discussion about
money, the synergy question. If you align functional requirements and
want to gain from that, the catch is that you have to be able and willing to
reach a compromise on functional requirements.
We heard in the last panel that you should purchase what is best for your
country. If that is too expensive, that is an issue. A rough estimate for
procurement is 20% savings on costs. For in-service support I do not have
a number yet. We are working on that.
Both Norway and Germany are having preliminary talks with the
Netherlands on this issue. We have some good examples: the Karel
Doorman signature just recently. In Germany we have the Centre for Ship
Signature Management. We have other things which run well. Maybe we
can come together on a submarine issue. We would like that. We would
be happy to discuss functional requirements on a government-togovernment basis.
I have the yellow card here. The first point on that is: Germany keeps its
submarine service and will increase the number of submarines. The
second point is that we aim for a multinational effort, both to cut costs
and to support our key national technology. Certainly we look for partners
such as the Netherlands.
The Chairperson: Thank you, captain. We invented the orange card here.
You can easily remember that, because it is our national colour.
Mr Knutsen: Mr Chairperson. Thank you for inviting me to talk about
such an important issue.
As the vision on the future of the Netherlands submarine service
underlines, the Netherlands and Norway are strategic partners. For years
there has been Dutch-Norwegian cooperation in numerous areas,
including the area of submarines. The vision underlines that submarine
cooperation with Norway seems to offer good prospects for further
intensification, but Norway is aiming for a smaller sized submarine,
approximately 2,000, 2,200 tonnes, which is less suited for expeditionary
deployment and integrated cooperations with maritime task groups.

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The aim of my intervention today as an independent researcher is to
pinpoint the challenges we might face in a Dutch-Norwegian cooperation
on submarines, but also to emphasize the advantages for such a deep
cooperation on such an important topic as new submarines for the two
countries» navies. Clearly, the Netherlands and Norway share a common
security policy history. We are both founding fathers of NATO and even
though Norway is not an EU-member, Norway is the country outside the
EU that has taken part in most CSDP-related missions and operations
since the CSDP’s initiation in 2003. Hence, the EU’s future is also
Norway’s future, which is important to emphasize in the context of the EU
presidency’s current preparation of a EU white book on defence.
Nevertheless, the Netherlands and Norway have different strategic
cultures. The Netherlands» strategic culture is expeditionary, as underlined in the Dutch Defence Doctrine from 2013. This doctrine states that
there are three aims for the Netherlands» defence: 1. protection of
national and allied territory, 2. promotion of international law and stability,
3. support of civil authorities. This list, however, is not hierarchical. These
tasks are equal and must be executable at all times. Hence, it states that
national and international tasks are equally important. This explains why
the defence structure is light and mobile.
When discussing with whom you are going to cooperate, strategic culture
is an important point of departure. But what is strategic culture? How can
we define it, both for analytical and political purposes? We can define
strategic culture as the shared beliefs, norms and ideas that generate
specific expectations about the state’s preferences in security and defence
policy. In this context Norway’s strategic culture is clearly more homeland
oriented, as also underlined in the report Unified effort, a new foundation
for Norway’s defence, which was issued in April of last year. Norway was
a latecomer in defence transformation. The substantial changes in recent
defence policies that started in 2000 and 2001, were mainly a result of
changed demands from NATO and the need for defence reform.
Especially the US influenced the Norwegian defence reform efforts.
Despite the differences in the strategic culture of our two nations, we are
both Atlantic oriented nations. Therefore NATO should be the fundamental institution for our security. Notwithstanding the differences in
strategic culture, the Netherlands and Norway share many values and
approaches to international security and cooperation. The first one is the
maritime commercial tradition. The second one is the internationalist
idealist foreign policy conduct. Both countries aim at gaining more
leadership, which for Norway has meant a policy of peace and reconciliation. This policy is also directed towards Norway’s open economy that
very much depends on an open and global economy.
A driving force behind Norway’s defence reform efforts has been the
intention to avoid political and military marginalization in NATO.
Therefore, the extent to which Norwegian security concerns are dealt with
depends upon the allies» willingness to regard them as urgent. Hence,
reform of the Norwegian armed forces towards internalization was
regarded as a prerequisite for territorial defence. There was also the need
for interoperability with allies, to underline the need for continued allied
solidarity in NATO.
In the report I have written, which is the foundation for today’s presentation, I do not only compare differences in strategic culture between the
Netherlands and Norway. I also look into other factors like geographic
proximity and interests, symmetries and asymmetries in the DutchNorwegian relationship, trust and solidarity between the parties and the
degree of level playing field for the defence industry. Not only strategic
culture but also these factors must be taken into consideration when we
study the possibility of a close Dutch-Norwegian cooperation on new
submarines.

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The point I make in my report is that trust and solidarity between the
Netherlands and Norway is an extremely important factor. It is the only
factor that has the ability to counterweigh differences in strategic culture.
A successful implementation of the 2013 Dutch-Norwegian memorandum
of understanding on defence materiel cooperation presupposes a high
degree of trust between the countries. In a changing European security
situation, where we are witnessing a rebirth of the collective defence
commitments in NATO and where European states again focus on
symmetrical conflicts, trust and solidarity between them is a precondition
for a viable European security order.
Trust is therefore the key factor that determines whether joint projects are
successful.
The Chairperson: Mr Knutsen, I trust you are almost finished. Otherwise
we will run out of time.
Mr Knutsen: Okay. Can I make this last point?
The Chairperson: You can finish your point. No problem. Go ahead.
Mr Knutsen: Trust is the most important factor that has the ability to
counterweigh differences in strategic culture.
I stop there. Thank you very much.
The Chairperson: Thank you very much, Mr Knutsen. I now give the floor
to rear admiral Olsson.
Mr Olsson: Mr Chairperson. Thank you for inviting me. I am very
honoured to be here and to be able to share the Swedish experience in
this field. My background is that I have been a director for naval procurements in Sweden for the last twelve years.
This year, Sweden made all the decisions concerning the next generation
of submarines, A26, including the procurement strategy, which ended in
2014 with the government and parliament declaring the underwater areas
a national security interest. Before that Sweden was bound to lose nearly
its whole underwater capability. Believe me when I say that I fully
understand what is in front of you, the complexity of the questions and
answers.
Sweden has had submarines for over a hundred years. The submarine is a
unique capability if you have control over the design and the signature.
Sweden has the sovereign capability to design, develop, construct and
maintain submarines. We have developed a model that effectively
minimizes risk and allows us to procure submarines at a low cost. We do
not allow development inside the project. We have an independent study
outside the project. When we know something is mature, we put it into
the programme.
For example, when we developed the Stirling AIP (air-independent
propulsion) system we first put it in a test section and worked with that for
many years. Instead of putting it in the Gotland-class submarine, which
was in ongoing production, we put it in an older submarine to demonstrate it. The first time we built the Gotland was in the nineties. That was
when we put it into the design, because we knew it was mature. It is one
way to handle risks.
When it comes to cost effectiveness, we are fully transparent about the
costs during the whole process. So we know exactly how much it takes to
design and procure a fin for example. So we can follow the industry and
know exactly what it costs in the end.
Sweden is currently in the construction phase of an A26 submarine and in
the middle of an upgrade of the Gotland. This project will secure the
submarine enterprise for a number of years. However, in the long run it is

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a challenge for Sweden to fully fill this enterprise. Therefore, we are
looking for a few strategic partners. We will not go out and sell submarines. We will have some partners to share.
This is where I come back to the strategic partnership. We have great
respect for the Dutch submarine service. The Walrus-class set a worldclass benchmark for new submarine programmes. The experience gained
with the Walrus-class must be an important factor in the development of a
new submarine. This is the way we do it in Sweden. We call it performance based design. We take little steps forward each next generation of
submarines and we build small series of submarines, so we know that the
development is evolutionary and not revolutionary. We do it outside the
programme.
The submarine’s most important characteristic is to remain undetected.
Being in control of your signature allows you to develop a highly capable
underwater capability. Only by using national knowledge and capabilities
when specifying and procuring a product, you get a product that you
cannot acquire on the market. Submarines on the market are optimized
for commercial purposes. We were able to build a submarine just for
Sweden, like the US and the UK. Then you have to have a series of eight
to ten submarines, so you can build a new submarine every second year.
Otherwise all the skills and competencies are not used until the next
submarine is built, which is very expensive. That is one of the reasons
that we need to have long term programmes. Today, the A26 is funded as
a national programme. It should be for the long run: twenty years along
the road. That is important.
The Swedish experience with international cooperation is that it is a
challenge. Cooperation is less challenging if you have common objectives, a common culture and a similar work approach. Our cooperation
with the Netherlands, for instance when procuring an auxiliary ship, has
proven to go very well. It has been fruitful for both countries. We had
another experience with the Netherlands in 2014. We started up a centre
of expertise between TNO and FMV. We closely share our work in various
developments. One example is submarine design, where we had people
of TNO working together with us.
If a strategic partnership is established, there is a possibility for cooperation on research and development, training, education, maintenance
and upgrades, that could reduce lifecycle costs and improve capabilities
even more. I know that Sweden and The Netherlands have different
operational needs. We will therefore have different submarines. The
submarines, however, could share the same DNA and have many
communalities in subsystems and competencies. That means that you can
even share blue and white collar within the industry and have distributed
production. So you do not have to do everything in one country.
The Chairperson: Tack så mycket, rear admiral Olsson. Now for the final
word in this session, I give the floor to Mr Buchner.
Mr Buchner: Mr Chairperson. When I was invited for this round table, an
inspiring quote from our former prime Minister and submarine
commander Piet de Jong flashed through my mind: «For some the coast
is the end of the land, for others the beginning of the world.» In Dutch it
sounds better: «Voor sommigen is de kust het einde van het land, voor
anderen het begin van de wereld.» The Netherlands still is a maritime
nation. It should not live with its back towards the sea. It has a strong
maritime sector. It should also be open to cooperation with international
partners for the development and operation of effective, affordable and
adaptive submarines.
To illustrate that submarines are complex boats, I took this small model of
the desk of one of my research colleagues. This is BB1. It is a research
submarine developed as part of the Submarine Hydrodynamics Working

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Group that MARIN (Maritiem Research Instituut Nederland) is leading. It
includes Australia, Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and
the US. A submarine has to perform complex tasks. It should be able to
sail at the surface stably on waves. But it should also be able to sail
underwater close to the seabed undetected. Small details in the hull, in
the rudders or in the sail can affect the behaviour significantly. That
means that expertise and experience in all phases of the development and
use of submarines are important.
In my view it is therefore important to make use of the strong maritime
knowledge base in the Netherlands in this field. This knowledge is
available in all strings of the triple helix: navy, industry and research.
International cooperation is important to strengthen this knowledge base
and to fill the gaps that are identified. This cooperation should, however,
not lead away from the goal of effective and affordable submarines, for
instance by trying to fit too many requirements of different partners into
one design. As indicated before, a submarine is too complex to overload it
with too many requirements. Basically it will sink.
Through transparent public-private cooperation in the concept stage and
early involvement of an international partner the functional and technical
requirements can be translated in a focused concept design. This prevents
surprises and cost overruns at a later stage and assures manageable
lifetime costs. Active involvement of the Dutch maritime sector in all
phases of the project also stimulates maritime innovation and assures
high level maritime employment in the Netherlands. As an independent
research institute MARIN is willing to assist in the development of these
effective, affordable and adaptable submarines, and to work with
international partners.
The Chairperson: Thank you for your presentations. Now we will go to
our Members of Parliament for their questions.
Ms Belhaj (D66): Your countries made the really important decision to
focus on submarines. To what extent and in which way did this have
consequences for other investments in defence materiel?
Mr Knops (CDA): After listening to your introductions I have a question
about the possibility of working together on such a complex thing as a
submarine. How realistic is it to put together all the requirements of the
separate countries? Would decorating the Christmas tree with so many
balls not bring about its collapse? To what extent is there a limit to our
working together? How easy or how difficult is it?
I would like to ask Mr Knutsen a question. He talked about strategic
culture, which is necessary for working together. I would like to remind
him that we purchased the F-35 together. What kind of strategic culture
you use in Norway is not essential to us. It is a weapon platform. You can
use it. Whether you fly it smoothly, fast or whatever is up to you. It is a
platform. Maybe you can elaborate on what you mean exactly by strategic
culture. Is it not the case that only the requirements and the capacity of
the platform are essential?
Mr Vuijk (VVD): Thank you for your most interesting contributions. My
first question is directed to Mr Olsson. You told us about the development
of submarines in international cooperation. What are the possibilities of
working together with all these different countries?
This morning we heard a lot about difficulties. Can you elaborate on the
chances of success of international cooperation? We heard that it is very
difficult for the different countries. They are in different phases. They have
different cultures. They have different industries. There are national
interests at stake. Maybe you can tell us something about your position.

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My second question is directed at Mr Faltin. You told us about the
importance of a submarine as a European platform. What countries
should or could be a member of a consortium with this purpose? This
question is annex to my question for Mr Olsson.
We have more projects like this one, for example the NH90 helicopter.
What are the lessons learned from that platform? What lessons can we
use to set up a platform for the development and construction of a
submarine?
Ms Eijsink (PvdA): Thank you all for the (written) information shared with
us. First I would like to ask you to elaborate a little on the involvement of
your parliament in replacing weapon systems. What is your experience
with that? I am not talking about the parliament but about your
experience.
Mr Faltin has sent us a lot of information about close cooperation. Thank
you. I am talking about the round table. It might indeed be very difficult to
find a way to work together, due to different cultures, different ways of
working, different MODs (Ministries of Defence) – do not forget that –
different ways of looking into the replacement of weapon systems. What
positive things could we learn from one another? In the information you
sent to us, Mr Faltin, you also elaborate on the different responsibilities
within the different workshops. I think it is very keen to do that, because
for every field, like research and development and in-service support,
another country is responsible. Could you help us with that?
That brings me to my third and last question. I am looking for a particular
kind of structure. We have our own structure, which we call Defence
Materiel Process. You are probably familiar with that. We are also looking
for a structure to relate all the information. It seems to me that in your
proposal of a round table and working groups there is a kind of structure
to share information in a positive way.
Mr Houwers (Houwers): Thank you very much for your contribution.
They all point in the same direction: some kind of cooperation. That
brings me to the first question for Mr Faltin. You mentioned that six
countries work together, but Sweden is not one of them. Is there a special
reason for it? If you work together I wonder: why not since 2014?
The second question is for all of you. Is there a difference in what we need
or what we think we need? Sweden said in 2014 that submarines are of
national security interest. I think your submarines operate nearer to the
coast, but maybe you have heard in other parts of this round table that we
are looking for a submarine that can sail across the ocean.
The Chairperson: Thank you, Mr Houwers. I would like to inform you all
that Mr De Roon has excused himself because he has obligations
somewhere else.
Mr Faltin: Mr Chairperson. The first question was what projects have
been delayed, postponed or cancelled. I can provide a very clear answer.
The money needed for our German submarine will be available in the
second half of the next decade and early 2030s. We had a nice project
there, our Joint Support Ship, which we have cancelled. Instead with the
Karel Doorman we have signed up for another form of cooperation: an
operational cooperation. We will not buy these ships, although we clearly
need them. A lot of nations in NATO and the European Union have them.
We decided there is probably another need, in this case the need for
submarines. That is a one-on-one answer. There is a second aspect to
that. As you are aware, ships are big projects in the maritime world. They
are always very big. You either cancel one or you keep them, and then you
work with smaller projects. That is what we really do. Projects under 25

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million euros are postponed, and the sum makes it. But in this specific
case it is the Joint Support Ship.
Question number two is what the limits of multinational cooperation are. I
sensed that question number three and maybe four also touch upon that.
It depends. If you have time you can go to one of the organizations like
the European Defence Agency. If you do not have time or it is very difficult
to agree on the requirements, then a number of two or maybe three
nations is the right way to go. I used the example of Norway. We sat down
with Norway. Working out an agreement between our nations, which have
a similar way of employing submarines, was a very difficult process, but
we were successful. I doubt that we would have been successful if we had
started with six or seven nations initially. So you have to start somewhere.
From this experience I have learned that you have to start small.
There was the question of how different countries can work together.
What countries do you want to work with? Is it only culture that matters?
My experience from the round table tells me: yes and no. Our cooperation
with Italy is very fruitful. Our in-service support with Italy based on an
MoU is perfect, because we have similar components and platforms. The
work mentality is rejuvenating. It adds a lot of value. I do not want to say
more about that, apart from the fact that it is really good.
There was a question regarding our round table. Yes, we have chosen the
structure of working groups with clear responsibilities. These responsibilities were chosen by the nations, basically. It was more like a voluntary
contribution. Participating in these kind of groups is based on a coalition
of the willing. That is how it works. We have a communality with
in-service support with Italy – Portugal wants to be in there; Germany is in
there – because we have this need to cooperate. We really have synergy,
we save money.
The other thing is operations. Norway has the lead in it, because it also
runs similar working groups in NATO for example. So they bring in their
capacity. We would not have been successful if we had not done two
things: organize it like this and avoid procurement in this area. Now, I am
a planner. I work front end. I am not an armaments guy.
There was a question about industries. Yes, of course, everybody can
agree that one European platform is perfect. Every national armaments
director might say so, but then there is the question of industries, which I
agree with. Each country has its interests. These interests can be sorted
out by industry-to-industry agreements. But I work for the government. It
is not up to me to tell the industry how to do it.
Sweden. In 2014 we sent out letters to some countries and some countries
raised interest. Again, this is a coalition of the willing. I served under a
Swedish colonel in the European Union Military Staff. I am very familiar
with Swedish people and I like them. It is open. At the moment that is how
it is. We also have discussed contributions from other countries, such as
Canada. It is not a European country, but it has tremendous expertise.
Actually, during the last briefing we discussed including other nations. It is
a staffing process. It is a political process. Someone said that the
Ministries are involved in that. They are not always fast. That topic is on
the table in the next meeting. It also depends on the nations. If they want
to join, that is an option, but if they do not want to join, they do not ask
me. So we have a fruitful cooperation. And two, maybe three countries
could work out their operational requirements. I hope I have answered all
questions.
Mr Knutsen: Thank you very much for the good questions raised. The
question of the F-35 versus submarines is very important. I see your point
clearly. However, I am not a practitioner. I am an academician. You must
take that caveat into consideration. In this regard it is important to
emphasize that there are two problems in European defence cooperation
today: differences in strategic culture and differences in the level of trust

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between nations. Those are the most important impediments to a closer
European defence cooperation. What we see when we discuss submarines in this regard, is that differences in strategic culture in fact translate
into different requirements for the submarines. The Dutch, due to their
expeditionary strategic culture, will go for a much larger submarine than
the Norwegians. The difference is approximately 50%. So the acquisition
of the F-35 and the acquisition of new submarines are not fully comparable in my view, even though, as you rightly point out, they are both
platforms that can carry weapons.
The other question I would like to answer is the question about the
involvement of parliament. That is a very interesting question. The
Norwegian government will soon present its white paper to the
parliament. That will be an extremely important political document for us,
because when the Norwegian chief of defence delivered his recommendation on 1 October 2015 he stated very clearly that if Norwegian
politicians are not willing to allocate sufficient resources to the Norwegian
defence project, we will see a slow and uncoordinated reduction of the
Norwegian defence capabilities. But as you know oil and gas prices have
deteriorated considerably, there is a migration crisis and the possibilities
for Norway to prioritize resources for defence are very limited. So one of
the most important tasks Norwegian parliamentarians have in the coming
months is to define the future direction of Norwegian defence cooperation. My main point is that shrinking budgets will open up more
vulnerabilities, and that the need for international cooperation must be
taken more into account.
I will stop here. I hope I have somewhat answered your question in a
proper way.
The Chairperson: I see nodding heads. That is a good sign, I would say.
Mr Olsson: What are the consequences for other services, for other areas
of national security interest, someone asked. What influence do the fighter
jets have on the underwater domain? Of course they had an impact on
other armed services. Maybe we do not buy as many tanks as we had
hoped at the beginning. On the other hand, the underwater domain is
more important for Sweden, with the Baltic Sea and all that. So it is one of
these. Some programmes have been delayed, but since last year we have
a bigger budget for the armed forces. Much of that was dedicated to the
underwater domain.
Is it complex to put a submarine together? Yes. It is very complex if you
compare it with other systems. Our design philosophy is to build the
system outside the section. Putting the section inside the submarine after
we have tested it, seems to be a very good way to handle risks and to
minimize problems when you put a submarine together. But it is very
complex if you compare it to fighter jets or other things.
How can we work together? First of all you must have a very long and
trusting relationship, and a strong government-to-government link. You
must have control over your IPR (intellectual property rights). Those kind
of submarines are owned by the Swedish government. You must find a
good balance to be able to work together, both in R & D and in the
industry work load. Both countries must trust each other, as they depend
on each other.
The replacement of weapon systems is incorporated in our modular
design philosophy. For example, the Swedish A26 model was designed to
go on from 2000. It is designed to be a balanced submarine up to 2006.
We can put in a section that is more enduring, that has vertical launch
missiles or that houses a normal sized crew. We do not know what the
future looks like. Another thing is making a submarine a little bigger. Steel
is cheap, so to say. When you operate in the Baltic Sea, you would like to
have a small submarine, but in bigger submarines it is easier to properly

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replace systems. Another thing that we tested, designed and put into the
A26 is a big megatube of flexible payload which is 1.5 metres wide, in
which we can have an underwater system or a special operations team of
up to twelve divers. So it is built for what the future brings.
I do not know if I should answer the question about the round table, but I
can say something about it. In my opinion it is more like a user club for
nations with HDW submarines, apart from the Netherlands. I was told in
2014: Andreas, you know what is happening; we cannot invite you at the
moment. Maybe I will be invited later.
The last thing was the operation. I have told you about our design
philosophy. Whatever you read in the paper about Australia’s decision
and so on, even the former Australian Defence Minister says that Australia
has the most powerful conventional submarine. They operate Collinsclass submarines until 2035 at least. It is upscaled along the same design
philosophy as we have done with the Gotland. We have operated the
Gotland both in the Mediterranean and in San Diego. So it even works in
shallow oceans.
The Chairperson: Thank you, Mr Olsson. I do not think Mr Buchner were
asked any specific questions but some questions were asked in general, to
all panel members. So I still would like to give you the floor.
Mr Buchner: That was also my observation. I think I can at least answer
the questions of Mr Knops and Mr Vuijk about the platform. We should all
realize that international cooperation does not mean that everybody has
the same boats. That is very important to realize, as in many other fields
cooperation is possible. I want to point out the aspect of research and
knowledge, which was discussed extensively in the previous session. In
that field there is a lot of international cooperation, which really helps.
It is also important to realize that you can cooperate in different tasks. We
talked about the different niches of submarines today. We have a specific
class here now and maybe in the future. For different tasks you need to
have complementary submarines rather than the same system. Of course
the use of subsystems and similar weapons is a possibility for cooperation. Joint training of the crews and joint maintenance are already a
fact. I sense that we agree that international cooperation is not putting all
requirements in one ship but cooperating in the things that are useful.
The Chairperson: Thank you, Mr Buchner. Are there any more questions
from the Members of Parliament?
Mr Vuijk (VVD): I would like to ask Mr Buchner a question about the
importance of developing a new submarine. How important is it for your
own institute and how important is it for the Dutch knowledge industry,
for example the universities? I would like to remind you of the programme
that comes with the F-35. There is an agreement with Lockheed Martin
about a few internships from the universities. Is this also a possibility for
the development of submarines? We did not do that the last 30 years. So
this will be a new field. What is the future of this?
Mr Knops (CDA): In previous sessions it was mentioned that building
submarines is partly connecting components, also to prevent submarines
from becoming very old-fashioned quickly. In this way they try to make it
adaptive. Is it possible for countries to work together on a component
level: the battery, the hull, the propulsion et cetera? Would you say that
the all-in-one concept is not the best proposition, but that cooperation in
parts is possible?
Ms Belhaj (D66): I have two more questions. The first is about the
financial aspects. I heard interesting things about trust when you work

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together, when you cooperate. To which extent do you have your own risk
analyses regarding financial aspects, considering you have the same
budget difficulties? How much money do you need to reserve percentagewise on submarine projects, because they are so complex, in relation to
countries with which you work together?
The second question is: what is the optimal amount of submarines? Mr
Olsson said that you need at least four submarines, but if you had endless
money, what would be the optimal situation, also pennywise when you
are investing?
Ms Eijsink (PvdA): Today, all experts seem to say that close cooperation
with partners in design, construction, maintenance and deployment of
submarines offers advantages and increases the possibilities of enhancing
operational readiness levels and sustainability. It seems to me that we all
very much agree on that. But the next question is: is there any way to take
the first step together, the first step being design? It seems to me that
every country is strong on a different level: either in design, construction
or maintenance. Could you elaborate on that, please?
My second question is about the Conventional Submarine Round Table.
That is very much focused on knowledge, knowledge, knowledge. That is
what Mr De Jonge from TNO said earlier this afternoon. It is food for
thought, as you mentioned, Mr Faltin. To me the most important thing
that you mentioned was that it is affording procurement. It creates a kind
of secure environment in which six countries can work closely together on
a certain level. What can we learn from that?
Mr Houwers (Houwers): Building and designing a submarine is not a
goal in itself. It is part of the idea that we have tasks in defence for which
we can use submarines. Is there in your countries, is there in your mind, is
there in the past or perhaps now a discussion about alternatives for
building a submarine, unmanned things? And why do you chose to
cooperate in building a submarine?
Mr Faltin: I start with the question about risk analysis. I am not a budget
expert. We normally put something like 20% in our plans. When we put
the budget together, we normally consider 10% to 20% as a reserve in
case it goes up. Sometimes it is not enough, to be honest. That is my
observation of what is done when the budget is put together.
What is the optimal amount of ships? I would agree that a batch of four
ships is optimal if you want to have one ship operational at all times. That
is the rule of thumb, which I grew up with. I have not heard anything else
yet. Submarines need a lot of maintenance. So we stick to that number.
Out of four submarines we generate one operational submarine.
I would like to throw in a number from the Conventional Submarine
Round Table. One of the slides states it: in Europe there are 55
NATO-submarines. That is a lot. How do you organize that? I personally
believe that the Conventional Submarine Round Table is not a user club of
any industry. I reject that. That would be a show-stopper for some nations
within this format. This format is not aimed at and cannot move forward
with armaments. However, it can provide a basis. If you sit at the table
and someone talks very similar to you, of course you approach that
person, because we exchange ideas on how to maintain capabilities, to
avoid the word «replacement». How can we maintain capabilities? What
do we do in the field of underwater systems? So of course you approach
someone if you see similar ideas. Can we get together? Can we talk about
requirements? I agree that setting up requirements is not an idea in itself,
but it is of course the starting point. You have to start somewhere.
Personally, in the future I would always start with the requirements and I
would always start early. There is always a chance that things develop
differently. We have a project at the European Defence Agency that is

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called Maritime Mine Counter Measures. We might say goodbye because
we have different ideas, a different geography and different operational
requirements. Or we might stick together and take the next step.
Are there alternatives to submarines? I think so. Autonomous Underwater
Vehicles could be used for forced protection or transporting underwater,
maritime or civilian. For that not so complex systems with a very narrow
set of tasks or only one task could be used. We have a study going on on
that subject but we do not have it in the budget right now. We have other
unmanned vehicles in the budget but not Underwater Autonomous
Vehicles. We are looking into that. At the end of the next decade maybe
we will procure something. We look closely at EDA, because it has put a
huge amount of work into that and it will do more.
I would like to add something to what was said earlier about complex
unmanned systems. I was a commanding officer a couple of times.
Something was always broken, small things, big things, which means you
need personnel. I was commanding officer on old systems but also on
new systems, very new ships, such as the corvette K130. Always
something was broken. I doubt that could have been fixed by an
automatic or robotic system. So personally, I sing the song of manned
underwater systems once it gets more complex.
Mr Knutsen: The first question was about components. In the area of
submarine combat systems both the Netherlands and Norway have
decades of experience. On such components Dutch-Norwegian cooperation is possible. For example, Norwegian defence company Kongsberg
Defence Systems and Aerospace have delivered combat management
systems and passive sonar processing systems for Norwegian submarines and also for export. In the Netherlands, as you know, combat
systems are developed and produced within the Defence Materiel
Organisation (DMO). It also delivers close combat system solutions for
Dutch submarines and surface vessels. The Netherlands Organisation for
Applied Scientific Research (TNO) is an important subsupplier for DMO
within combat system development.
So the sharing of combat system deliverables between the two countries»
defence suppliers may in this regard also be a challenge in a future
submarine cooperation programme between our countries. So the
component level is important in this regard.
Ms Belhaj asked a question about risk analysis concerning funds for new
submarines. You also asked how many submarines one needs. This is a
very important question. I can only speculate. I cannot give you a fully
reliable answer. Today Norway has six ULA-class submarines. Previously,
in the 60s and 70s, we had fifteen Kobben-class submarines. So we
reduced their number by almost a third. My strictly personal view is that
six submarines are needed for future capabilities. If you look at Norway’s
geography, you see that it has huge economic interests in the north. So
six submarines, I would say, the same number as today.
The other questions are also important, but I feel that I am not in a
position to answer them in a proper way.
Mr Olsson: The first question was about economic and financial risks. In
the Swedish model the armed forces, FMV, together with our research
institute have the lead in the study or pre-design phase. Then a design
contract is put to the industry. Normally that takes around two years.
During that time we decide what kind of subsystem will be fitted in the
submarine. After two years, when we have the design, comes the phase
of the construction contract. Then we always like to have a fixed price.
Then you do not need any risk money, but you have to have some. But
this is the normal way in which we do business in Sweden when we buy
submarines.

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How many submarines? I said eight to ten. Then we could be independent
and build our own submarines: one submarine every second year.
That is also a bit of an answer to the other question about the design in
different steps. Of course you can do the study and the design, but I think
you need to have the people who made the design to be responsible for
the last moment when you put the submarine together and test its design.
However, you can do that in cooperation. You can build a port anywhere
else in the world and put it together there, but when you design
something as important as a submarine, you want a proven design in the
end. But you can do it together.
There was a question about the development of our own submarine. Yes, I
think it is important. You must have control over the costs and the
lifecycle. If you buy a submarine from the shelf, it will have a midlife
upgrade fifteen years from now or smaller upgrades in-between. Then
you go back to the industry and have to pay what it costs to upgrade it. To
have control over the costs is one reason why I think it is important that
you have the competence to upgrade in your own country. You also have
control over your signature if you have your own submarine. You do not
want anybody else to know something about your signature, apart from
your strategic partner maybe.
Can you work together on different levels? Yes, of course you can work on
subsystems together. You can work together in the whole area.
Will there be unmanned systems in the future? Yes, I think they will come
but not in the near future. Our design, the A26, is built to operate lots of
unmanned systems from the submarine. It is one of the reasons why we
have smaller series of submarines. Although it might be cheaper to buy
six submarines at once instead of two, you can take smaller evolutionary
steps with each submarine. If it happens to be a game-changer, you can
change it and do something else. You still have the competence, the
people who can design unmanned underwater vehicles. So it is just a
question of automation.
Mr Buchner: Mr Chairperson. I start with Mr Vuijk’s question about the
possibilities for knowledge development. The knowledge development
possibilities that come with this type of projects are important, but it is
also very important to realize that at the moment we have to use
knowledge that has been developed over the last ten years. I am happy
that the Dutch Ministry of Defence has invested quite a lot in this
knowledge over the last ten years. For instance, almost ten years ago, it
allowed us to develop a free-sailing submarine model in our facilities to
support the maintenance and use of the Walrus-class submarines, but that
knowledge puts us on the same level as the US, the UK, France and
Canada. Those are the only countries that have such a model. The
foresight at that moment to develop that type of technology gives the
Netherlands a knowledge position that enables us to work together in all
types of cooperation. That also gives us additional opportunities. Mr De
Jonge already mentioned things like hybrid systems. Development of
battery types is very important for the Dutch maritime industry but also
for other industries like the motor industry. Having a free-sailing
submarine in our facilities and computer models allows us to be involved
in the development of autonomous vessels, because they look a bit like
submarines. But I will come back to that issue. It is important to invest
early. The Ministry of Defence has done that. It gives us opportunities for
the future and creates a lot of work in the Dutch maritime industry.
On a component level I think there are areas where we do not have the
knowledge in the Netherlands at the moment, for instance in the area of
air-independent propulsion. That is typically an area in which we definitely
have to work together, because it is very important for the future
capabilities of our submarines.

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Ms Eijsink talked about doing the design together. Yes, you can do the
design together based on the same philosophy and knowledge, but this
does not mean by definition that it has to be the final outcome. But if you
use the same knowledge and methodologies you can still have an
effective design process.
Then there was the point of Mr Houwers, which I completely understand.
Unmanned systems are very important. They will play an important role,
but they should play a role operated from the platform of a service ship or
a submarine. Having power to go from A to B is still a problem, even if
you have very good batteries. Having something under water is very
different from having something in the air. Communication through radio
signals is very important. To give you an idea, we have a model like this of
five metres long in a swimming pool at MARIN. It is already difficult to
communicate 100 m under water using a radio signal. So it is a big
challenge. As rear admiral Ort pointed out: we have been struggling with
that for many decades. The other issue is that if you want bring a weapon
somewhere, you need to have the capacity to carry its weight.
The most important issue, which rear admiral Ort also mentioned, is the
moral ethical issue of having an autonomous system. We think that
having the man in the loop is extremely important. With that I come back
to the training of human factors, which is a very important issue now and
for the years to come in the operation.
The Chairperson: Thank you, Mr Buchner. Are there any more questions?
Ms Eijsink (PvdA): Could we be informed by you or your MOD about the
working groups in which parties work closely together? Can you share
that information with our parliament? Do you share that with your own
parliament? What is open information? We are also in a learning process.
Any help is welcome.
Mr Faltin: Instead of answering yes or no, I will take that back and check
it. At the moment I do not see a problem with that, but as far as the round
table goes, I need to speak with the other nations. The same applies to the
bilateral thing. Sorry.
The Chairperson: Would anyone else on your side of the panel like to
make some final comments? No. We had a long day of discussions and
hearings. No fun intended but we dove into the matter quite deeply. Now
we have surfaced I hope that it has contributed to our knowledge. We will
have a debate with our Minister of Defence next week.
I would like to thank all of you for coming over. I hope you have a nice
stay in the Netherlands. Thank you very much for sharing your knowledge
with us and for your answers to all the questions of the Members of
Parliament.
I would like to thank everybody who was here today, all those who have a
stake in this matter and all those who are simply interested. It is a big
thing. Parliament is doing its utmost to be as open as possible about the
decisions that are going to be taken. The matter is important to us and I
hope this was proved in the briefings and hearings you witnessed today.
With these final remarks I would like to conclude. I wish you all a very
good day.
Sluiting 16.45 uur.

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