JOINT CONVENTION
Supplement Questions and Answers
The Netherlands 3rd national report 2009

Joint Convention
Questions Posted To Netherlands in 2009
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
1
Australia
General
Section L Page 102
Question/ Is the 100 year package life a regulatory requirement or an
Comment operational decision of the licensee?
Answer
COVRA has the statutory aim to implement the Dutch national
policy on radioactive waste and spent fuel. As mentioned on
page 15 of the national report, this policy stipulates storage of
the waste for a period of 100 years. For this reason, the 100
year package life was used as an operational design feature for
the operations at the COVRA facilities. The requirement was
also used as a design feature for the storage facility itself.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
2
Denmark
General
Question/ During decommissioning of nuclear facilities a large amount of
Comment material may be expected to be cleared without restrictions and
a competent clearance function is needed in order to assure
compliance with the given clearance levels. However,
compliance with clearance levels is usually based on complex
measurement programmes and statistical tests in order to
ensure a high probability of correct clearance of materials. It is
therefore important to ensure the necessary competence of the
clearance function. For instance: The clearance function (lab,
procedures and personnel) could be accredited by an
independent institution, with reference to an international
standard such as e.g. the EN ISO/IEC 17025:2005 (General
requirements for the competence of testing and calibration
laboratories) and special emphasis on particular functions such
as measurements on surface contaminated objects or objects
with a radioactive content.

Answer

Please describe how the necessary competence of the clearance
function is ensured and how the clearance levels were
determined.
Until now, there is little experience with clearance, as only a few
nuclear facilities were (partly) decommissioned: The BARN
research reactor in Wageningen, the KSTR reactor in Arnhem
and parts of the NPP Dodewaard. In all these cases, the
competence of the clearance function was a proposal of the
licensee, based on the clearance levels in the Radiation
Protection Decree, and validated and approved by the
Regulatory Body. These proposals encompassed measurement
procedures as well as quality assurance systems. To ensure that
the approved methods and systems were applied by the
licensee, on site inspections were carried out on a regular basis
by the VROM inspectorate.Currently, decommissioning
regulation is under development, including requirements on

Q.No
3

clearance.
Country
Ireland

Article
General

Ref. in National Report
Page 13 of the Section A
(Introduction)
Question/ It is noted that all the Dodewaard NPP spent fuel has been
Comment transferred to Sellafield, UK for reprocessing and that the
separated plutonium will be transferred to AREVA for MOX fuel
fabrication. Could Netherlands explain the basis for deciding to
send the separated plutonium to France instead of keeping it on
site at Sellafield where MOX fuel can also be fabricated?
Answer

Sending the separated plutonium to France was a commercial
decision of the operator of the Dodewaard NPP, as, according to
Dutch legislation, these decisions are up to the operator. The
plutonium was sold to be reused in MOX-fuel in NPP’s.Other
than commercial reasons, no special reason is known not to
choose for MOX-fuel fabrication at Sellafield.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
4
Ireland
General
Page 121 in Annex 2 Inventory
of radioac
Question/ Can the Netherlands provide some information regarding the
Comment “mobile waste processing facilities” and how such facilities are
treated under the Dutch regulatory system (e.g., type of
licence, considerations for issuing licence, conditions of use,
etc.)?
Answer

A mobile waste processing unit to immobilize liquid waste (by
cementation) is shared between the NPP Borssele and COVRA.
The unit is contained in a standard 20-feet container. The unit is
operated within the radiological controlled area of the NPP or
COVRA. Under the Dutch regulatory system, this installation is
treated as any other immobile installation, meaning that
COVRA, as well as the NPP Borssele, require a license for it.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
5
France
Article 4
G.4(ii) - p. 66-67 / H.11(ii) - p.
84
Question/ These sections of the report are more focused on the reuse of
Comment the fissile materials (U and Pu) than the minimization of
radwaste.
In the Netherlands' existing nuclear facilities involved in the
spent fuel or radwaste management, could Netherlands indicate
if any arrangement has been defined to reduce as much as
possible the waste resulting from those operations?
Do the Dutch authorities issue any requirement or define any
target concerning the minimization of radwaste?
Answer
First of all, and in accordance with the Basic Safety Standards,
Dutch regulation requires that the use of radioactive material
shall be justified, meaning that they should be used only if
there is no reasonable non-radioactive alternative available.
Furthermore, according to the Dutch Radiation Protection

Decree, a licensee in possession of radioactive material is
obliged to minimise the generation of radioactive waste. The
licensee is in principle free to choose its measures to achieve
this. An example of such a measure is the preferred use of
radionuclides with short decaytimes, allowing for a rapid decay
below the exemption levels.In the case of materials (not
declared as waste) containing radionuclides of natural origin
with activity concentrations below ten times the exemption
levels, Dutch legislation leaves the possibility to reuse these
materials as far as reasonably practical. These materials can for
instance be mixed with conventional bulk materials for the use
in public works and infrastructure.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
6
France
Article 5
G.5 - p. 71
Question/ Some spent fuel is kept in storage in the Borssele NPP's fuel
Comment pool, waiting for transport to the reprocessing plant. Since
2006, no transport could have been carried out, as a new
bilateral agreement will have to be concluded between the
concerned states.
Could Netherlands specify the estimated delay before the
possible saturation of the Borssele NPP's fuel pool?
Compared with risks from a negative conclusion for the bilateral
agreement, what are the other options foreseen by the Borssele
NPP's operator and the Dutch authorities' requirements ?
Answer
Conservative calculations show that the capacity of the Borssele
NPP’s fuel pool is sufficient for spent fuel generation until 2014,
respecting a recommended reserve storage capacity for
unloading the reactor when needed.The bilateral agreement was
recently signed by the Dutch and the French governments. The
next and final step is approval by the Dutch Parliament, which is
expected in 2009. After this approval the operator can apply for
a transport license, and resume transports of spent fuel.In the
unfortunate case no bilateral agreement could be concluded,
the preferred option is to license and build a new building at the
COVRA-site dedicated to the storage of irradiated spent fuel
assemblies. Because of the time required to license and build
such a facility, temporary dry storage in appropriate containers
will probably be necessary.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
7
United States of
Article 5
Section G 5, Page 71
America
Question/ This report indicates the current policy in the Netherlands with
Comment regard to spent fuel management of the NPP’s is not to use full
capacity of the available storage pool for on site storage of
spent fuel. During the last two years spent fuel from NPP’s has
been stored on site and not transported for reprocessing due to
a new bilateral agreement. What arrangements are in place to
manage spent fuel until a new bilateral agreement is
implemented?
Answer
As the Borssele NPP is the only (operational) NPP in the

Netherlands, and the operator of the Borssele NPP is the only
organisation that has chosen the option of reprocessing of spent
fuel, this issue only concerns the Borssele NPP.Until a new
bilateral agreement is in force, the spent fuel will be stored in
the storage pool of the Borssele NPP. Conservative calculations
show that the capacity is sufficient for spent fuel generation
until 2014, respecting a recommended reserve storage capacity
for unloading the reactor-core when needed.The bilateral
agreement with France is expected to be concluded in 2009.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
8
Croatia
Article 8
page 79
Question/ In the table 14 there is a scheme with all steps given for
Comment Environmental Impact Assessment procedure in the
Netherlands. For some steps time limits are clearly indicated.
How much time did it take to conduct the whole EIA procedure,
from inception memorandum till evaluation, for COVRA facility?
And in which steps the presumed allocated time was
underestimated and what were the main reasons for that?
Answer
The procedure of the EIA as detailed in Table 14 was developed
after the license application process for the COVRA facility.The
license application process of HABOG-facility started in 1994
followed all steps listed in table 14. This process took seven
years from inception memorandum until the enforcement of the
final license, which is much longer than usual. The most
important reasons for the delay were the extensive public
participation, extension of the scope of the initial project (to
also include the storage of spent fuel elements from research
reactors), and two appeals in the main proceedings. In 1994 the
procedure formally started, after a year of preparation, with the
publication of the inception memorandum. The memorandum
was approved by the Regulatory Body in the beginning of 1996.
The Environmental Impact Statement was published later that
year. Finally, after appeals in 1996 (leading to annulment of the
license) and 1999, the final HABOG-license became definitive in
2001.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
9
Bulgaria
Article 9
p. 81
Question/ Would you provide examples of operational safety limits and
Comment conditions (apart from radiological ones) for the interim storage
XBOG for storage of SNF and RAW.
Answer
Examples of operational safety limits are conventional safety
measures like the availability of emergency power-supply,
noise-limits, standard crane operational requirements.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
10
Spain
Article 9
Page 82 Point 9 (iv)
Question/ Capacity of COVRA´s HLW facility
Comment Considering that the operational life of Borsselle NPP was
extended until 2033 in 2006, whilst its initial operational period
was only foreseen until 2015, is there any specific plan already
envisaged to enlarge the storage capacity of the COVRA's High

Level Waste facility?
Answer
The operator of the Borssele NPP has concluded a reprocessing
contract for all the spent fuel generated until 2015, and the
capacity of the COVRA HLW facility is sufficient for all the
returned HLW under this contract.For the spent fuel generated
after 2015, the operator of the Borssele NPP will have to decide
on its back-end strategy. In case the operator will continue
reprocessing, a modular extension of COVRA’s HABOG facility
will be sufficient. However, in case the operator chooses for
direct disposal, a new building will have to be designed, as the
HABOG is not suitable for storage of spent fuel assemblies.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
11
France
Article 12 H.12(i) - p. 85
Question/ In this section, it is indicated that the only existing radwaste
Comment management facilities are the COVRA radwaste treatment and
storage facilities. However NORM materials with radioactivity
concentrations in excess of the exemption limits are stored at
some sites of raw materials processing industries (Section
B.32.1(iv) of the report). These NORM materials storage
facilities should be taken into account to illustrate the report of
the Netherlands.
Answer
It is important to note that the stored NORM materials on the
sites of raw material processing industries are not considered as
waste. It concerns for instance bulk materials like Uranium or
Thorium-bearing ores or Zircone-oxides, for which some future
use is foreseen. Generally speaking, the activity concentrations
of these materials are above the exemption limits, but below
ten times the exemption-limits, which implies that a notification
to the authorities is sufficient. If the activity concentrations
exceed ten times the exemption levels, a license is required.
In case NORM material is declared as waste, and the activity
concentration exceeds the exemption levels ten times or more,
it is sent to COVRA. Examples of this kind of waste are Po-or
Pb- bearing waste from high temperature phosphorusproduction.
In case NORM material is declared as waste, and the activity
concentration levels are less than ten times the exemption
levels, it can be disposed of at two dedicated disposal sites for
hazardous materials. An examples of this kind of waste are
sludges.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
12
Germany
Article 12 p. 85; Sec. H
Question/ Under Section G (p. 71), it is described that an evaluation of the
Comment actual safety level of the spent fuel management facility in the
High-level Waste Treatment and Storage Building (HABOG) at
Borssele has to be performed every five years. Do these
evaluations have to be performed for the waste management
facilities in the HABOG facility as well? If so, what kinds of
assessments have to be performed within theses evaluations?
Answer
Yes, the evaluations are performed for the whole COVRA

facility, including the HABOG facility. All procedural, operational
and administrative aspects are evaluated.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
13
Spain
Article 12 Page 85 Point 12 (ii)
Question/ Management of waste resulting from past practices.
Comment COVRA will have to face in the future the management of waste
currently stored at Peten resulting from past practices. Which
entities are responsible for financing its management and how
will this be done?
Answer
The Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten,
the owner of this waste, will have to pay for all management
costs, including the commissioning, operation and
decommissioning of the necessary hot cell facility at the Petten
site, where the waste will be conditioned and repacked before
transportation to COVRA. Regarding costs for storage and final
disposal, these have been paid to COVRA already before
construction of the HABOG-facility.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
14
France
Article 16 H.16(v) - p. 92
Question/ The radionuclide content of the radwaste delivered to COVRA is
Comment declared and assured by the radwaste producer.
Could Netherlands indicate if COVRA performs any control
before (inspections at the producer) or during (measurements
on line) the acceptance of the radwaste in its facilities?
Answer
As transferral of the waste to COVRA includes transferral of all
liabilities, COVRA performs dose rate measurements before
transport on site (there is a relation between dose rate and
waste tariff). Furthermore, before processing the waste, random
sampling of liquid waste is carried out.In the case that during
conditioning the characteristics of the waste turn out to deviate
from those provided by the waste producer, COVRA may have
to apply of additional processing steps. According to COVRA’s
acceptance conditions, the waste producer will then be charged
for all additional costs, creating an incentive for providing the
correct data.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
15
Croatia
Article 19 page 31
Question/ It is stated that formally adopted Nuclear Safety Rules (NVRs)
Comment for spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities did
not exist at the time your Report has been issued. Are these
two NRVs now in the status that they have passed the review
process or the Safety Authority relies on the generic IAEA
Safety Standard Series documents as reference material?
Answer
Apparently this has been a mistake in the Dutch National
Reports of 2005 and 2008. Only NVR’s for reactors (NPP’s and
Research Reactors) exist or are under development.COVRA is
and will be the only spent fuel and waste management facility in
the Netherlands. Therefore, it is of no added value to develop
general legislation for spent fuel and waste management

facilities. All (additional) legal requirements will be implemented
in the COVRA license.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
16
Spain
Article 19 Page 31 Point 19.2 (i) b
Question/ NVR development.
Comment According to the Report, formally adopted NVRs (nuclear safety
rules based on the requirements and safety guides in the IAEA
Safety Standard Series) for spent fuel and radioactive waste
management facilities do not exist yet. The text also says that
draft NVRs are under development: one on predisposal
management of radioactive waste and the other on
decommissioning of NPPs. Could the Netherlands provide
further information about the situation of these rules?
Answer
Apparently this has been a mistake in the Dutch National
Reports of 2005 and 2008. Only NVR’s for reactors (NPP’s and
Research Reactors) exist or are under development.COVRA is
and will be the only spent fuel and waste management facility in
the Netherlands. Therefore, it is of no added value to develop
general legislation for spent fuel and waste management
facilities. All (additional) legal requirements will be implemented
in the COVRA license.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
17
Spain
Article 19 Page 34 Point 19.2 (ii)
Question/ Licensing procedure
Comment
Could the Netherlands give more details on what steps are
being taken to "reduce the number of authorities involved in
order to streamline the licensing procedures and reduce the
administrative burden"?
Answer
The proposal for a revision of the Nuclear Energy Act, which is
still in the phase of parliamentary discussion, aims to reduce
the number of ministers involved in issuing licenses for nuclear
facilities, practices, work activities and transport of nuclear or
radioactive material from six to one. In this new licensing
regime, the Minister of Housing, Spatial planning and the
Environment will be competent to decide on its own on these
licenses.It is envisaged that the revision will be in force in the
beginning of 2010.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
18
Germany
Article 22 p. 46; Sec. F
Question/ The Borssele NPP is the main producer of spent fuel, and HAW
Comment contributions to the waste management fund depend very much
on the operating time of this NPP. Are the calculations for the
fund, presented under Articles 22 ii and 9 vii (p. 83), based on
an extended operating time until 2033? Which are the plans to
ensure the adequacy of the fund in case of earlier termination of
operation of the Borssele NPP or of relevant changes on the
financial markets with considerable influence on real interest
rates within the discounting period of 130 years?
Does the current financial crisis change the Netherlands point of

view about the safety of such funds?
Answer
All costs associated with the conditioning, storage and final
disposal of the waste generated until 2013 have been paid for
by the industry. The contributions to the fund for waste
generated after 2013 have still to be negotiated between
COVRA and the Borssele NPP. As the industry pays in advance,
earlier termination of operation of the Borssele NPP will have no
influence on the adequacy of the fund.Regarding the interest
rates, a difference between the assumed and the real interest
rate can lead to problems on the long term. To prevent these
problems, every 5 year the capital growth - based on real
interest rates - is evaluated. In case of inadequate fund-growth
the fees for waste are adjusted. There is no retrospective
adjustment of fees paid.Regarding the safety of the funds, the
money is stored at an account at the Ministry of Finance, which
is guaranteed by the state.The financial crisis certainly is a
warning to be prudent with estimations. On the other hand, a
period of 130 years will always be long in comparison with the
duration of events such as an economic crisis. In practice this
means that there will be enough time to repair.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
19
Spain
Article 23 Pag 48, page 66 and page 93
Question/ The radioactive residues from reprocessing activities in UK and
Comment France will in due time be returned to the Netherlands and
stored in the HABOG facility at COVRA. For Borssele NPP a total
of 140 vitrified waste canisters have been returned at the end of
2008, whereas for Dodewaard NPP the return of all HLW is
planned for 2009.
The acceptance criteria for radioactive waste and storage
procedures are only mentioned as part of the Quality Manual
(under the information given within the Article 23 corresponding
to Quality Assurance). On the other hand, Section I on
Transboundary Movement, doesn’t include information on the
preparation of the returned process, and neither on the
acceptance criteria and procedure.
Could you please briefly extend the information on the
acceptance criteria for vitrified reprocessing wastes?. Could the
Netherlands provide additional information about the process
that was carried out for the vitrified waste canisters returned
during 2008? Was there regular interaction between the
reprocessing organisation and COVRA or the NPP (spent fuel
owner) to deal with the acceptance criteria and the conditions
for the shipments?
Answer
The specifications of the vitrified waste residues from
reprocessing activities were drawn by the reprocessing facilities,
and approved by the operators of the NPP’s and the Regulatory
Body. These specifications were used – among other things - as
input for design and licensing of COVRA’s HLW-facility. These
specifications include guaranteed parameters for contamination
and radiation levels, heatload and chemical composition.Before
shipment from reprocessing site to COVRA, all relevant data and

product files are provided and checked, compliance with
transport regulation is assured, and the canisters are 100%
witnessed by COVRA and the NPP-operator. Upon arrival at the
COVRA-site a second check is performed.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
20
Croatia
Article 24 page 52
Question/ From the table 9 it is obvious that collective dose at the High
Comment Flux Reactor in year 2006 (246.6 mSv) is significantly higher
compared with doses for other years in presented eight years
period (2000-2007). What is the reason for that? And what is
the background for the increasing trend of collective dose in last
three years?
Answer
A few reasons can be identified. For instance, in 2006, the heat
exchanger needed to be repaired, which caused a significant
contribution. Also other modifications to the primary system
were carried out in this year. An additional reason is that there
was an increase in new operators, who had to be trained “onthe-job”, leading to higher collective doses.General reasons for
the increasing trend in the collective dose are the increase of
Mo-99 production and the increase in workforce. Furthermore,
as was mentioned on page 15 of the national report, in the
years 2005-2007 a lot of irradiated fuel elements were shipped
to COVRA and to the USA.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
21
Ireland
Article 24 Page 53 in subsection
“Protection of the
Question/ The report states that “a source limit amounting to one tenth of
Comment the annual effective dose limit for the public (1 mSv) has been
set for any practice or facility”. Can Netherlands explain the
basis for using this particular factor?
Answer
To assure that the annual effective dose limit of 1 mSv
(implementation of the 96/29/Euratom directive) for an
individual member of the public is not exceeded, the regulatory
system applies one tenth of this limit as a source-limit for
licensing individual practices or facilities, to be measured or
calculated at the border of the facility.The reason for this is that
an individual licensee cannot be held responsible for the
exposure caused by other practices or facilities. Therefore, a
tenth of the cumulative dose-limit of 1 mSv is allocated to every
individual licensee as a source-limit. This is based on the
assumption that, by applying these source-limits, it is very
unlikely that for an individual member of the public the 1 mSv
limit will be exceeded due to exposure by all sources together in
a single year.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
22
Korea, Republic of Article 24 p.50 (F)
Question/ 1. What kinds of radiation work permits (RWPs) are issued for
Comment radiation workers of Category A and B, respectively?
2. Table 7 shows most of workers' individual doses are below 6

Answer

mSv. Are there any ALARA review programs for works expected
to exceed the dose constraint of 6 mSv for Category A workers?
1. Apart from a valid radiation passport, no special work permits
are necessary for radiation workers. According to the directive
90/641/Euratom, Dutch legislation obliges a licenseholder who
hires a radiological worker to ask for the radiation passport, and
to respect the annual dose-constraints of 20 mSv for A-workers,
and 6 mSv for B-workers. No further distinction is made
between A-workers and B-workers. The VROM-inspectorate is
responsible for surveillance.As mentioned on page 50 in the
National Report, dose summaries of all dosimetry services,
including those of foreign workers, are made available to the
National Dose Registration and Information System (NDRIS).
Foreign workers have not exceeded the 6 mSv the last years.

2. There are no special ALARA review programmes for workers
expected to exceed the 6 mSv dose constraint. However, some
licenseholders have the policy not to hire workers with more
than 10 mSv in their radiological passport.As shown in table 7
on page 50 of the National Report, in practice, the number of
workers with a dose higher than 6 mSv is very low.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
23
United States of
Article 24 Section 24.2, Page 55-56
America
Question/ Figure 4a on page 55 shows airborne discharges from COVRA of
Comment H-3 and C-14 in 2007 that were an order of magnitude higher
than the previous 3 years although remaining below the
authorized discharge limit. Figure 4b on page 56 shows COVRA
alpha emissions in water on a similar trend. What has
contributed to these discharge "spikes" in 2007 and have any
corrective measures been implemented?
Answer
The higher H-3 and C-14 emissions in 2007 were a result of the
management and conditioning of the overvoltage protection
devices of radar-installations.The higher alpha-emissions can be
explained by the fact that in 2007 there was a temporary
increase in the supply of alpha-bearing waste.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
24
Croatia
Article 25 page 59
Question/ In chapter "Off-site emergency provisions" you say that another
Comment main objective was improvement of the organization and the
means to inform the public and the media in case of nuclear
emergency.
Can you, please, explain in more details this system.
Answer
Two issues had to be improved:
1. Flexibility of the assessment organization
2. Integration of Nuclear Emergency Management in the
(existing) emergency management structure.
1. Flexibility
The so-called ‘National Nuclear Assessment Team’ was formed,

existing of two Back offices and a Front office. In the backoffices ‘Health’ and ‘Radiological Information’ several specialised
institutes are represented such as for instance the Royal Dutch
Weather Service. The back-offices are responsible for
production of Situation Reports on the radiological situation as
well as forecasts of the development of the accident. Based on
intervention-levels (urgent) protective actions are suggested.
The Back Offices are in duty-service 24/7, and its size can be
upgraded in case of an emergency.
The Front-office consists of senior/management level
representatives of the Regulatory Body, with potential backup
from other governmental bodies like the Ministries of Health,
Agriculture, Labor etc when needed. The Front-office will assess
the situation, based on the information provided by the Back
Offices and information from local authorities, and prepare
strategic decisions. The ultimate decision-making is on the
national level by a Ministerial Policy-Team.
2. Integration
In general, in the Netherlands the mayor is responsible for
safety and emergency management on the municipal level. In
case of severe situations, responsibilities are escalated to a
higher level. Nuclear emergencies with potential off-site effects
will be co-ordinated on the national level as explained
above.The different authorities will have to work together in
such a way that efficient and effective information-exchange
and decision-making is ensured. Therefore, the chair of the
‘National Nuclear Assessment Team’ will be in close contact with
local or regional authorities as well as with national authorities.
The national authorities will take strategic decisions and deal
with the general public information. Operational (e.g. traffic
management measures) and tactical (e.g. timing of iodine
distribution) decisions will be taken on the local or regional level
respectively. To ensure proper communication, co-operation
and information exchange, exercises are essential.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
25
Spain
Article 25 Page 60 Point 25.1
Question/ Emergency drill.
Comment
A national full-scale exercise was held on May 25th 2005.
Could the Netherlands provide some findings of the lessons
learnt from this exercise that could be useful for other countries
in their planning of emergencies?
The NPK (National Nuclear Emergency Plan) organisation has
currently been revitalised. One of the objectives was the
improvement of the organisation and means of informing the
public and media in case of a nuclear emergency. Could the
Netherlands provide more detailed information about these
improvements?
Answer
The findings of the exercise are related to its main objective
(the improvement of the organisation and means of informing

the public). In general, the exercise proved that the new system
of nuclear emergency management worked well, although
things can be improved further. An English version of the report
of the exercise with lessons learned is available on request.
Some of the follow-up issues implemented or under
construction are:
- The development of a new National Response plan for Nuclear
and Radiological Accidents (draft version available);
- Improvement of the structure and cohesion of the
preparation- and response- phase documentation. The
documents will be made available in a ‘database management
structure’, to be shared with the various organisations involved;
- Development of a nuclear emergency module in the existing
information-management systems to facilitate decision making
by the Front-office and the Ministerial Policy-Team;
- Integration of the monitoring and measuring policy of the
various organisations involved;
- A public information-strategy for nuclear emergencies was
developed. The public information will be co-ordinated on the
national level, assisting local and regional authorities.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
26
Croatia
Article 26 page 62
Question/ For the Dodewaard NPP the postponed dismantling after a
Comment waiting period of 40 years was selected by operator as a
decommissioning strategy. Is this a final decision on the
strategy of decommissioning? Or the operator can still
reconsider this decision and shorten the waiting period or
proceed to direct dismantling at current moment?
Answer
The owner of the Dodewaard NPP applied for a license for a safe
enclosure state for a period of 40 years. This license was issued
in 2005, under the condition that the owner shall commence
dismantling in 2045. The owner will have to apply for a
dismantling license in due time.
In the case that the owner would consider to commence
dismantling activities earlier than 2045, he will have to apply for
a new license, substituting the current safe enclosure license.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
27
Korea, Republic of Article 26 p.64 (F.26(iv))
Question/ Section F.26(i) states that the safe enclosure period for the NPP
Comment Dodewaard is scheduled to last 40 years.

Answer

What kind of information will be reserved for safe
dismantlement of the NPP Dodewaard, which will be dismantled
after 40-year-long safe closure period?
The Dodewaard Inventory System (DIS) contains all known
radiological data and other information provided by employees
familiar with the operation of the reactor. The Dodewaard
record keeping system, of which the DIS is an important part,
appeared as a good practice example in an IAEA document on

Long Term Preservation of Information for Decommissioning
Projects (Technical Report Series, nr 467, august 2008).
Information stored in DIS encompasses information on
contaminated or activated parts and hot spots in the plant as
well as technical information on the plant and its components.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
28
Spain
Article 26 Page 64 Point 26 (iv) Record
keeping
Question/ In the preparatory phase to the safe enclosure, the licensee of
Comment NPP Dodewaard completed the establishment of Dodewaard
Inventory System (DIS). The objective of DIS is to describe in
detail all relevant radiological data in the controlled zone of the
NPP in a database. This database is designed both for present
decommissioning activities leading to the safe enclosure, as well
as for future dismantling operations.
It is envisaged that COVRA will become responsible for the shut
down of Dodeward NPP in 40 years. How will COVRA preserve
the availability of expertise, knowledge and documentation
needed for dismantling, as well as financial resources at the
time of carrying out the decommissioning? Is there any
arrangement or agreement regarding to it? Is there any similar
requirement or practice for the operational Borssele NPP in
order to facilitate its future decommissioning? As the operator is
responsible for all aspects of decommissioning, and COVRA is
responsible for the treatment and storage of all kinds of
radioactive waste, including the associated with
decommissioning, could the Netherlands explain the share of
responsibilities between Dodewaard NPP's operator and COVRA
during the safe enclosure period? Is it supported by an
agreement or legislation?
Answer
COVRA will have to take care of the conditioning and storage of
all the radioactive waste and spent fuel in the Netherlands until
final disposal after 100 years. Therefore, COVRA will have to
preserve the necessary (operational) knowledge and expertise
in the nuclear field. Though, the preservation of knowledge
during a waiting period of 40 years remains a challenge, even
without a transfer of the safe enclosure of the Dodewaard NPP
to COVRA. Therefore much attention is paid to good record
keeping. The Dodewaard Inventory System (DIS) contains all
known radiological data and other information provided by
employees familiar with the operation of the reactor. The
Dodewaard record keeping system, of which the DIS is an
important part, appeared as a good practice in an IAEA
document on Long Term Preservation of Information for
Decommissioning Projects (Technical Report Series, nr 467,
august 2008).
In the case of the Borssele NPP, preservation of knowledge is
less complicated, as the NPP will be dismantled directly after
shut down. Furthermore, Dutch legislation requires that the
operator keeps records and documentation during operation.
During the 40 years safe enclosure period all the responsibilities

remain with the operator of the Dodewaard NPP. After this,
COVRA is envisaged to take over all liabilities, to dismantle the
NPP, to condition and store the waste, and to take care of final
disposal. Upon transferral of liabilities a lump sum is transferred
from the operator to COVRA to cover all the associated costs. It
is likely to be supplemented with a sum to cover conceivable
risks associated with cost estimates over a long period of time.
This will in due time have to be concluded in a (legal)
agreement between COVRA and the operator.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
29
United States of
Article 26 Section 26, Page 61
America
Question/ Details are given on the decommissioning activities and
Comment requirements for both Borssele NPP and Dodewaard NPP.
General decommissioning requirements for all nuclear sites are
not explicitly stated. Please provide clarification on the types of
nuclear sites to which decommissioning regulations apply.
Answer
Currently, most of the decommissioning regulation for nuclear
installations is incorporated in the license conditions for the
individual nuclear installations. Only a few general requirements
have been implemented in formal legislation, regarding the
obligation of a decommissioning license.
However, specific regulation on decommissioning is under
development and expected to be in force in 2010. This
regulation will apply to all nuclear installations, and will be
based on the WENRA-recommendations for decommissioning.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
30
Croatia
Article 28 page 95
Question/ Regarding issues of detecting enhanced radiation levels with
Comment portal detectors, you state that there are no radiation monitors
at points of entry at the borders of the Netherlands, except at
the container terminals in the Rotterdam harbour.
Do you plan to cover some of the border passes with radiation
monitors in the future?
Answer
Currently, portal monitors are installed at container terminals of
the Rotterdam harbour. In airports handheld radiation monitors
are available. There are no plans for future portal monitors.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
31
United States of
Article 28 Section E, Page 95-96
America
Question/ The report indicates there are no radiation monitors at the
Comment borders to detect orphan sources. To avoid the inadvertent
importation of radioactive sources, are there any future plans
for radiation monitoring at the borders?
Answer
Currently, portal monitors are installed at container terminals of
the Rotterdam harbour. In airports handheld radiation monitors
are available. There are no plans for future portal monitors.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
32
Australia
Article 32 Section B page 17

Question/ Is it envisaged that final, irreversible closure of the disposal
Comment facility will occur at some time?
Assuming that reversibility requires active management by
future generations to maintain access to the repository, how
does the policy of retrievability take into account the
requirement of no burden on future generations?
Answer
According to the 1993 position paper, a disposal facility for
radioactive waste and spent fuel should be designed in such a
way that each step in the process from design to commissioning
of the facility is reversible. This implies that retrievability is
intended to remain after closure, leaving the possibility to future
generations to apply other management techniques, if they
would become available.
The issue of reversibility does imply an (extra) burden for future
generations compared to a situation of an irreversible disposal
facility, as closure of the disposal facility, though reversible, is
still foreseen.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
33
France
Article 32 B.32.1(iii) - p. 15-16
Question/ The Netherlands' policy on radwaste management is based on a
Comment report that was presented to parliament by the government in
1984. Netherlands chose to store the radwaste in buildings for a
period of at least 100 years. During this time period, the deep
geological disposal facility will be defined, constructed and
commissioned. Since this decision, Netherlands postponed the
closure of the Borssele NPP to 2033 (additional 30 years of
operation) and in 2008, a owner-partner of the Borssele NPP
announced that it would built a second unit at Borssele (1,000
to 1,600 MWe).
Could Netherlands indicate if these decisions will have an impact
on the Netherlands' radwaste centralised storage facilities
(COVRA site), more widely, on the Netherlands' policy on
radwaste management?
Answer
The postponed closure of the Borssele NPP will imply an extra
30 years of waste and spent fuel generation, for which
additional capacity at COVRA will have to be built, and for which
extra capacity in the future disposal facility will have to be
reserved. The owner of the Borssele NPP will have to pay for the
extra costs.
Until today, in the Netherlands no license application for a new
NPP was received. In the case a new NPP would be built in the
Netherlands, corresponding additional storage and disposal
capacity will have to be accounted for. The COVRA-site allows
for these expansions, as it was originally designed for a much
larger nuclear programme.
Basically, above-mentioned developments will have no impact
on the national policy on radioactive waste and spent fuel.
However, as was mentioned on page 16 of the National Report,

the additional 30 years of waste generation, as well as an
additional 30 years of cost contribution to the disposal fund may
mean that within a shorter period than 100 years a repository
could become economically feasible.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
34
France
Article 32 B.32.1(iv) - p. 20
Question/ In Netherlands, NORM materials with radioactivity
Comment concentrations in excess of the exemption limits are stored at
some sites of raw materials processing industries (the quantities
are estimated to amount to about 50,000 tonnes).
Could Netherlands specify regulatory requirements and
industrial practices for NORM materials storage facilities ?
What are the paths considered to dispose of NORM materials
with radioactivity concentration in excess of the exemption
limits in the long-term?
Answer
It is important to note that the stored NORM materials on the
sites of raw material processing industries are not considered as
waste. It concerns for instance bulk materials like Uranium or
Thorium-bearing ores or Zircone-oxides, for which some future
use is foreseen. Generally speaking, the activity concentrations
of these materials are above the exemption limits, but below
ten times the exemption-limits, which implies that a notification
to the authorities is sufficient. If the activity concentrations
exceed ten times the exemption levels, a license is required.
For these sites national radiation protection legislation applies.
Examples of requirements are radiation protection measures for
workers, dose constraints on the borders of the facilities and
appropriate training.
In case NORM material is declared as waste, and the activity
concentration exceeds the exemption levels ten times or more,
it is sent to COVRA. Examples of this kind of waste are Po-or
Pb- bearing waste from high temperature phosphorusproduction.
In case NORM material is declared as waste, and the activity
concentration levels are less than ten times the exemption
levels, it can be disposed of at two dedicated disposal sites for
hazardous materials. Examples of this kind of waste are
sludges.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
35
Germany
Article 32 p. 16; Sec. B
Question/ The Netherlands’ policy on radioactive waste management has
Comment foreseen a long-term storage of at least 100 years. How will the
availability of qualified staff be ensured for later actions after a
waste storage time of 100 years? How will the preservation of
the information on the stored waste and its history be ensured?
Answer
Ensuring the availability of qualified staff through the years
always is a challenge in countries with a small nuclear
programme. As COVRA is the only organisation in the
Netherlands licensed to manage and store radioactive waste
and spent fuel, it will have to preserve at least a minimum of

qualified staff for the foreseen storage period of 100 years.
Additional expertise could be hired from abroad.
The preservation of information on the stored waste and its
history is ensured by technical means: All data is preserved in a
double archive, using both digital as well as conventional paper
data storage. A distinction is made between the short-term
archives (0 - 15 years) and the long-term archives (more than
15 years). For the long-term archive additional measures are
taken. Paper information carriers are printed on certified
durable paper with special ink and stored at two locations in
conditioned rooms, together with digital information carriers.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
36
Germany
Article 32 p. 17; Sec. B
Question/ Starting from page 17, some thoughts about disposal in the
Comment Netherlands are developed.
It is stated that in your concept the retrieval of the waste
always should be possible. Does this include the time after the
closure of a repository?
General thoughts about the possibility of a disposal facility are
presented. Would it be the plan to dispose of all kinds of waste
in only one facility?
Answer
According to the 1993 position paper, a disposal facility for
radioactive waste and spent fuel should be designed in such a
way that each step in the process from design to commissioning
of the facility is reversible. This implies that retrievability is
intended to remain after closure.
Regarding the second question, it should be realized that the
production (rate) of radioactive waste in the Netherlands is very
low. The only way to make a deep underground disposal facility
economically feasible is to dispose of all the radioactive waste,
ranging from VLLW to heat-generating HLW, in this repository.
The position paper also stated that an underground disposal
facility could as well serve as a repository for highly toxic
wastes, other than radioactive waste.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
37
Germany
Article 32 p. 17; Sec. B
Question/ It shortly is described that LLW and ILW is cemented.
Comment Experiences with German waste products show corrosion
problems after a few decades. Are there special measures taken
in conditioning with a view to 100 years of storage?
Answer
Yes. First of all, the 100 years storage period was used as a
design condition.
To prevent corrosion problems various measures are applied,
among which the most important are:
- the galvanisation and painting of the waste drums,
- the lowered air humidity in the storage building, which is
monitored and kept around 60%,
- the ratio cement/waste of at least 1/1. The layer of at least
five centimetres of cement has a relatively high pH, which

reduces drum corrosion.
Furthermore, the physical distribution and the horizontal
alignment of the drums in the stacks storage allow for easy
inspection. The waste packages are standardised and limited in
size - packages with a final volume of 200 litres or 1000 litres
are used – in order to ease later handling and allow simple
repair and reshuffling in case of degradation.
Further details of experiences can be found in annex II of the
IAEA (draft) document “The Long Term Storage of Radioactive
Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel. Safety and Policy
Considerations”.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
38
Ireland
Article 32 Page 19
Question/ It is noted that the Netherlands uses both terms “NORM” and
Comment “TENORM” in their report. Is a distinction made from a
regulatory point of view?
Answer
No, in fact there is no distinction between TENORM and NORM
material in Dutch legislation.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
39
Ireland
Article 32 Page 19, first paragraph in
subsection “
Question/ It is noted that Netherlands uses the exemption levels as
Comment specified in Table 1 of the Euratom Basic Safety Standards for
wastes from ores –and other raw materials- generated in
processing. It is recognised that these exemption levels only
apply to “practices” as defined in this same document. Are
(TE)NORM industries classified as practices in the Netherlands?
Answer
No, handling material with radionuclides of natural origin, used
for other reasons than for its radioactive properties is
considered as a work activity. The same reasoning applies for
handling radioactive waste containing radionuclides of natural
origin that is generated in processing industries.
In Dutch legislation no distinction is made between
radionuclides of natural and artificial origin: the exemption
levels as specified the Dutch Radiation Protection Decree apply
for both work activities and practices. Please note, however,
that for a few radionuclides these exemption levels differ from
the levels as defined in Table 1 of the European Basic Safety
Standards.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
40
Ireland
Article 32 Page 19, first paragraph in
subsection “
Question/ It is noted that a licence is required under the Dutch regulatory
Comment regime in case the exemption levels as specified in Table 1 of
the Euratom Basic Safety Standards are exceeded by a factor of
10. Can Netherlands explain the basis for using this particular
factor?
Answer
The factor of 10 is only applied for work activities. Below ten

times the exemption level, a notification to the authorities is
deemed sufficient, based on the relatively low dose rates,
compared to background levels. For work activities with
activities and activity concentrations exceeding ten times the
exemption level a license is required.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
41
Ireland
Article 32 Page 19, first paragraph in
subsection “
Question/ It is noted that a licence is required under the Dutch regulatory
Comment regime in case the exemption levels as specified in Table 1 of
the Euratom Basic Safety Standards are exceeded by a factor of
10, but that below this – but above the exemption levels - a
notification to the authorities is sufficient. Has any such a
licence been issued or notification to the authorities by a
(TE)NORM industry taken place in the Netherlands?
Answer
Notifications are received regular basis. Until now, more than 20
of these licenses have been issued to raw material-processing
facilities, producing (TE)NORM.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
42
Ireland
Article 32 Page 19, first paragraph in
subsection “
Question/ It is noted that a licence is required under the Dutch regulatory
Comment regime in case the exemption levels as specified in Table 1 of
the Euratom Basic Safety Standards are exceeded by a factor of
10, but that below this – but above the exemption levels - a
notification to the authorities is sufficient. It is well known that
depending on the composition of the feed/raw material, large
variations over time can arise in the waste produced. Is there a
monitoring programme in place in the Netherlands to verify that
activity concentrations and/or total activities in (TE)NORM
wastes produced are kept below the required levels?
Answer
A ‘positive’ list was drawn of raw material-processing facilities in
the Netherlands whose work activities may exceed the
exemption levels. An example of such a facility is a high
temperature phosphorus production plant. These facilities are
obliged to monitor their materials and processes on a regular
basis, under supervision of the VROM-Inspectorate on behalf of
the Regulatory Body.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
43
Ireland
Article 32 Page 20, second paragraph
Question/ It is noted that “NORM materials with radioactivity
Comment concentrations in excess of the exemption limits are stored at
some sites of raw materials processing industries. The
quantities are estimated to amount to about 50,000 tonnes”.
Could Netherlands give more information about the type of
NORM materials and the number of sites concerned?
Answer
It is important to note that the stored NORM materials on the
sites of raw material processing industries are not considered as
waste. Nowadays there are some 10 processing sites in the

Netherlands, processing for instance bulk materials like Uranium
or Thorium-bearing ores or Zircone-oxides, for which some
future use is foreseen. Generally speaking, the activity
concentrations of these materials are above the exemption
limits, but below ten times the exemption-limits, which implies
that a notification to the authorities is sufficient. If the activity
concentrations exceed ten times the exemption levels, a license
is required.
For these sites national radiation protection legislation applies.
Examples of requirements are radiation protection measures for
workers, dose constraints on the borders of the facilities and
appropriate training.
In case NORM material is declared as waste, and the activity
concentration exceeds the exemption levels ten times or more,
it is sent to COVRA. Examples of this kind of waste are Po-or
Pb- bearing waste from high temperature phosphorusproduction.
In case NORM material is declared as waste, and the activity
concentration levels are less than ten times the exemption
levels, it can be disposed of at two dedicated disposal sites for
hazardous materials. Examples of this kind of waste are
sludges.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
44
Romania
Article 32 page 38/138
Question/ Please provide us more information on the minimization of
Comment radioactive waste.
Answer
First of all, and in accordance with the Basic Safety Standards,
Dutch regulation requires that the use of radioactive material
shall be justified, meaning that they should be used only if
there is no reasonable non-radioactive alternative available.
Furthermore, according to the Dutch Radiation Protection
Decree, a licensee in possession of radioactive material is
obliged to minimise the generation of radioactive waste. The
licensee is in principle free to choose its measures to achieve
this. An example of such a measure is the preferred use of
radionuclides with short decaytimes, allowing for a rapid decay
below the exemption levels.In the case of materials (not
declared as waste) containing radionuclides of natural origin
with activity concentrations below ten times the exemption
levels, Dutch legislation leaves the possibility to reuse these
materials as far as reasonably practical. These materials can for
instance be mixed with conventional bulk materials for the use
in public works and infrastructure.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
45
Spain
Article 32 Page 24 Point 32.2 (iii)
Question/ U3O8 storage.
Comment
COVRA stores depleted uranium in the form of U3O8 at Borssele
facility. This waste might be retrieved and converted into fuel
should future prices of uranium make it profitable. On the

contrary, if prices don´t rise significantly, ¿is it foreseen its
management as a radioactive waste?
Has its funding been provisioned by the generator of this waste?
Answer
All waste producers contribute to the fund, even if they produce
only short-lived, low-level waste or if there might be a future
application for the waste. Contributions to the fund are
calculated per unit volume (m3) and are different for HLW and
LILW. Two-thirds of the costs of a future repository are charged
to the HLW and one-third to the LILW.
The situation for depleted uranium is not different. In the fee for
U3O8 is included the LILW contribution to the waste fund.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
46
Spain
Article 32 Pages 12 and 14
Question/ Spent fuel management practices from NPPs
Comment It is mentioned that since 2006 no transports of spent fuel have
been carried out from Borssele NPP to AREVA (France) for
reprocessing. The reason is that a new bilateral agreement
must have been concluded between France and Netherlands
due to new French legislation. Could the Netherlands provide
some information about the status of this future agreement and
when it is envisaged to be approved?
It is also mentioned that "Regular transports ensure that the
fuel pool inventory is kept to a practical minimum, as required
by the plant operating license". How could this delay in the
transports affect this requisite and the operating license of the
plant? Has the operator established a contingency plan if the
transports are delayed for more than expected?
Answer
The bilateral agreement was recently signed by the Dutch and
the French governments. The next and final step is approval by
the Dutch Parliament, which is expected before the summer
2009. After this approval the operator can apply for a transport
license, and resume transports of spent fuel, probably before
the end of 2009.
To keep the source term for a potential radiological incident as
low as possible, a practical minimum pool inventory is
preferred. This is used as an inspection rule, but is not explicitly
required by the operating license, as was incorrectly mentioned
in the national report.
As a conservative calculation estimates the pool capacity to be
sufficient until 2014, there is no need for a contingency plan.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
47
Spain
Article 32 Pages 17 and 18 Point 32.1
Question/ In 1993 the Government adopted and presented to the
Comment Parliament a position paper on the long-term underground
disposal of radioactive and other highly toxic wastes. This forms
the basis for further development of a national radioactive
waste management disposal policy, which now requires that any
underground disposal facility be designed in such a way that
each step of the process is reversible. This means that retrieval
of waste, if deemed necessary for whatever reason, would

always be possible.
Because the Netherlands has adopted the strategy of storage in
dedicated surface facilities for at least 100 years, there is no
immediate urgency to select a specific disposal site. However,
further research is required to resolve outstanding issues, to
preserve the expertise and knowledge, and to be prepared for
site selection in case of any change to the current timetable, for
example any arising from future European requirements .
On the other hand the CORA committee recommended further
studies regarding some safety issues, to carry out co-operation
with other countries (particularly on joint projects in
underground laboratories), to pay attention to the requirements
for monitoring of retrievable repositories etc.

Answer

Since the Netherlands has adopted the strategy of storage in
surface facilities for at least 100 years, there is no immediate
urgency to select a specific disposal site. However, as
recognised in the Report some actions should be taken
regarding further research, to preserve expertise and
knowledge etc. Which actions are expected to be carried out
and when?. As mentioned in the Report, although the
Parliament has agreed with the proposed research programme,
it has not started yet, due to lack of funds, as – in the opinion
of the Dutch Government – the industry should pay for a
substantial part of the costs. Doesn’t it mean that there is not
an established financing system to comply with the
responsibilities of present generation regarding future
generations? Could you please clarify and give a more extended
information about the financing system?
The issue here is that, on the one hand, the waste producers
(including the nuclear industry) have to pay all costs associated
with the management, storage and disposal of the radioactive
waste and spent fuel. This includes the development and
construction of a disposal facility. There is a clear financing
system: the money required to develop and construct a
repository is collected in a capital growth fund and will become
available after the storage period of 100 years, leaving only the
construction of the disposal itself as a task for the future.
On the other hand, the policy in the Netherlands is based on a
step-wise decision process in which all decisions are taken to
ensure safe disposal in a repository, but without excluding
alternative solutions in the future. The outcome of this process
should not be influenced by waste producers. Therefore, costs
of the decision-making process whether to build a repository
and where, to continue storage, or to use possible alternative
future solutions for the radioactive waste are not necessarily to
be financed by the nuclear industry alone. The government and
other waste producers also have responsibilities. Similar
reasons hold for the preservation of knowledge and research for
a geological disposal facility, in particular when the government

introduces additional design features, such as retrievability.
After publication of the National report in 2008, COVRA and the
Nuclear Research and consultancy Group (NRG) have
formulated a proposal for a follow-up research programme for a
national disposal facility, addressing both technical and nontechnical aspects. The industry decided to provide a substantial
part of the costs of this programme. However, as the current
government postponed all decisions regarding nuclear power to
a next government, a decision regarding co-financing by the
government will be not taken before 2011.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
48
United States of
Article 32 Section 32.1(iv), Page 20
America
Question/ A dedicated hot cell facility is planned to condition and
Comment repackage high-level waste from four decades of nuclear
research. The license application and EIA were submitted to the
competent authorities in 2007 and a license was expected by
the end of 2008. What is the status of this license application?
What regulatory issues were raised on the application and how
were they resolved? Please provide an update during the
national presentation at the May 2009 meeting.
Answer
The license for the hot cell facility has been issued in 2008,
there were no appeals against the issuing of the license.
According to the license, all the high level waste present in the
Waste Storage Facility (WSF) will have to be offered for storage
to COVRA as soon as possible, with a maximum of eight years
after commissioning of the facility.
Construction of the facility is envisaged to start in 2009, first
operations are expected in the end of 2010.
Q.No
Country
Article
Ref. in National Report
49
United States of
Article 32 Section 32.1(iii), Page 13
America
Question/ Historical high-level waste at the Petten site will be repackaged
Comment and shipped to COVRA. A license application for the repackaging
facility was submitted in 2007, and a license is expected in
2008. Has such a license been issued? Please describe during
your national report presentation in May 2009 any lesssons
learned in licensing this facility.
Answer
The license for the hot cell facility has been issued in 2008,
there were no appeals against the issuing of the license.
According to the license, all the high level waste present in the
Waste Storage Facility (WSF) will have to be offered for storage
to COVRA as soon as possible, with a maximum of eight years
after commissioning of the facility.
Construction of the facility is envisaged to start in 2009, first
operations are expected in the end of 2010.