IOB Evaluation
The Only Constant is Change
Evaluation of the Dutch contribution to transition
in the Arab region (2009-2013)

The Only Constant is Change | IOB Evaluation | no. 400 | The Only Constant is Change | IOB Evaluation | no. 400 | The Only Constant is Change | IOB E

IOB Evaluation

The Only Constant is Change
Evaluation of the Dutch contribution to transition
in the Arab region (2009-2013)

April 2015

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Preface

Preface
Four years after the Arab uprisings, 2015 offers a good opportunity for reflection. The Arab
region has witnessed turmoil and change, and the turbulent times are continuing. At the
start of a new year, the future seems inconclusive. The countries in transition across the
region are all to some extent marked by political strife, continuing protests and conflict,
inequality, high youth unemployment, poverty, tentative reforms and an uncertain political
future. What is happening in the Arab region is anything but clear, predictable and
unengaging. Hence an evaluation of the Dutch contribution to transition in the Arab region
2009-2013 (including support to democratisation, the rule of law and sustainable economic
growth) is all the more interesting. The support given by the Netherlands is an important
element of foreign policy in which the role of aid is significant.
As the evaluation entailed investigating more than one policy domain, IOB needed to adopt
an innovative way of thinking and working in order to produce a ‘hybrid’ evaluation.
Therefore, evaluation questions were investigated using triangulation and several
approaches, to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings. For example, besides classic
effectiveness measuring methods to gauge the effectiveness of individual aid projects,
MaxQDA software was used for the analysis of interviews and diplomatic cables. This
enabled a large volume of data to be collated and classified, and, more importantly, made it
easier to retrieve results relating to evaluation questions on foreign policy and diplomacy.
The report was prepared by IOB inspector Dr. Margret Verwijk with research assistance by
Ms. Elise Landowski and Dr. Jochen Stöger. Internal quality support was provided by Prof.
Ruerd Ruben, Mr. Bas Limonard and Mr. Frans van der Wel. An international reference group
provided useful feedback to the formulation of the Terms of Reference of this evaluation
and an earlier draft version of this report. The members of this group were Prof. Maurits
Berger (University of Leiden), Dr. Nikolaos van Dam (former diplomat and Middle East
scholar), Dr. Reinoud Leenders (King’s College London), Prof. Nadia Molenaers (University
of Antwerp), Mr. Chris Baaré (the Netherlands Enterprise Agency) and Mr. Ernesto Braam
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
IOB would like to thank the numerous interviewees and participants in focus group
discussions both at home and abroad, including staff interviewed at the Embassies of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands in Egypt, Libya and Morocco for generously availing their time
and sharing their thoughts. We hope that this evaluation report, which is based on in-depth
qualitative analysis, will help prepare Dutch policies and programmes for the years to come.
Our findings demonstrate that supporting Arab countries in transition requires presence,
patience and partnership.
The final responsibility for the content of this report rests with IOB.
Geert Geut
Acting Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

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The Only Constant is Change

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Contents

Contents
Preface		
List of figures, tables and boxes
Abbreviations
Summary and conclusions

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1

Introduction
1.1 Objective, scope and purpose of the evaluation
1.2 Research questions and methodology
1.3 Constraints and limitations
1.4 An overview of the report

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Countries in transition
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Challenges to transition
2.3 Actors and factors
2.4 Conclusions

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The Netherlands’ foreign policy
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Central government’s involvement in supporting transition
3.3 Connecting outcomes
3.4 Conclusions

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The bilateral approach
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The portfolio: a description and assessment
4.3 The bilateral programme at a glance
4.4 Conclusions

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The multilateral approach
5.1 The EU response to the Arab uprisings
5.2 The UN response to the Arab uprisings
5.3 Conclusions

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Diplomacy and principles
6.1 The role of diplomacy
6.2 Policy principles in practice
6.3 Conclusions

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The Only Constant is Change

Annexes
Annex 1
About IOB
Annex 2	Abridged Terms of Reference for this evaluation
Annex 3	Assessment of individual CSI, PSI and G2G projects
Annex 4
Selection of projects (bilateral aid)
Annex 5
Resources
Annex 6 	Code systems used (interviews and diplomatic cables)
Annex 7
References

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and
Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

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List of figures, tables and boxes

List of figures, tables and boxes
Figures
Figure 1	Mapping the pathways in support of the long-term goal of strengthening
security and stability by means of promoting transition in the Arab region
Figure 2 Share of total allocations per political party (2012)
Figure 3
Comparing EU financial support to Egypt prior to and after the Arab uprisings
Figure 4	Comparing EU financial support to Morocco prior to and after the Arab
uprisings
Figure 5	Insight into the number of diplomatic messages on ‘democratic transition’
in priority countries (2009-2013)
Tables
Table 1
Overview of research components
Table 2	Matra South programme allocations to the various programme
components (2012-2015)
Table 3	Private Sector Investment programme: allocations and disbursements
per country
Table 4
Overview of the number of G2G projects and expenditures in 2012 and 2013
Table 5	Overview of support to civil society: the number of projects in priority
countries incl. budget allocations and expenditures
Table 6	Support to Matra South initiatives (centralised budget): the number of
projects in priority countries incl. budget allocations and expenditures
Table 7	Overview of the number of participants in the training of young diplomats,
per country
Table 8	Overview of the number of participants in the civil servant training,
per country
Table 9	Overview of the number of projects and the budget committed
(in EUR thousand) to the various policy objectives in Arab countries
Table 10	EU financial support to Arab countries incl. amounts committed under
ENPI (in EUR million) for all Arab countries, and actual disbursements
to the Dutch priority countries
Table 11	Expenditures of a number of UN agencies in Arab priority countries
in 2009-2013, in USD thousand
Table 12	Detailed breakdown of UNDP expenditures in Arab priority countries in
2009-2013 by objectives, in USD thousand
Boxes
Box 1
Box 2
Box 3
Box 4
Box 5
Box 6
Box 7

On change in Morocco
On change in Libya
On actors hindering change in Egypt
On local priorities and the importance of presence
On the importance of a long-term view
Example of a PSI project in Morocco
A G2G project in Libya

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The Only Constant is Change

Box 8
Box 9
Box 10
Box 11
Box 12
Box 13

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Example of a CSI project in Egypt
On capacity building of political parties
On EU support in Arab countries in transition
On diplomacy
On conditionality
On coordination

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations
AA
Association Agreement
AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs (Adviesraad Internationale
Vraagstukken)
ALDE
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CBO
Community Based Organisations
CDA
Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl)
CSI
Civil Society Initiatives (Matra South programme component)
CSO
Civil Society Organisation
CU
ChristianUnion (ChristenUnie)
D66
Democrats 66
DAG
Donor Assistance Group
DAM	North Africa and Middle East Department (Directie Noord-Afrika en
Midden-Oosten)
DDE 	Sustainable Economic Development Department (Directie Duurzame
Economische Ontwikkeling)
DGGF
Dutch Good Growth Fund
DIE
European Integration Department (Directie Integratie Europa)
DMM 	Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights Department (Directie
Multilaterale Instellingen en Mensenrechten)
DSH 	Department of Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (Directie Stabiliteit en
Humanitaire Hulp)
DSO
Social Development Department (Directie Sociale Ontwikkeling)
DVB
Security Policy Department (Directie Veiligheidsbeleid)
EBRD
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC
European Commission
EIB
European Investment Bank
ENP
European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP
European Parliament
ESA 	Strategy Advice Unit (Eenheid Strategische Advisering)
EU
European Union
EKN
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
G2G 	Government-to-Government cooperation (Matra South programme
component)
GDP
Gross domestic product
GL
Green Party (Groen Links)
HGIS	Homogeneous Group for International Cooperation (Homogene Groep
Internationale Samenwerking)
IATI
International Aid Transparency Initiative
IFI
International Financial Institution
ILO
International Labour Organisation

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The Only Constant is Change

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IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluations Department (Inspectie
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie)
IMF
International Monetary Fund
LGBT
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
M&E
Monitoring & Evaluation
Matra	Refers to a subsidies programme intended to contribute to the process of
developing a democratic, pluriform state governed by the rule of law
(Maatschappelijke transformatie)
MENA
the Middle East and North Africa region
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Netherlands)
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF
Neighbourhood Investment Facility
ODA
Official Development Assistance
PvdA
Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
PvdD
Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren)
POGAR
Programme on Governance in the Arab Region
PP	Building the capacity of political organisations (Matra South programme
component)
PSOM	Programme for Cooperation with Emerging Markets (Programma
Samenwerking Opkomende Markten)
PSI
Private Sector Investment programme
RVO	Netherlands Enterprise Agency (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland)
SGP
Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij)
SPRING
Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth
UN
United Nations
VVD	People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie)

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Summary and conclusions

Summary and conclusions

The Dutch government responded to the uprisings in the Arab region of 2011 by setting itself
the goal of supporting transition. The Netherlands has pursued this goal bilaterally and
multilaterally, by combining financial aid and diplomacy. This evaluation discusses the policy
on supporting transition in the Arab region and its implementation by the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. It covers the period from 2009 to 2013, briefly describing the two years
preceding the wave of protests that swept through the various countries in the region and
describing in more detail the two years thereafter. It includes a study of the relevance,
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of individual projects supported by the Dutch
programme for democratic transition in the Arab region: the Matra South programme.
The report is based on six different studies; (1) an analysis of the Ministry’s expenditures to
meet the goal of supporting transition in the Arab region, more specifically in the priority
countries of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; (2) a comparison of the annual plans
and reports of Dutch embassies in Arab countries for 2009 and 2013; (3) a desk study by Ecorys
of the Matra South programme, to assess to what extent efforts have contributed to the process
of democratic transition in the Arab region at programme and project level; (4) a literature
review by Dr. Roel Meijer and Laila al-Zwaini of actors and factors supporting or hindering
democratic transition; (5) a narrative analysis of diplomatic correspondence between the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague and its embassies, including an exercise entailing
automated text-mining; and (6) qualitative field research in Egypt, Libya and Morocco. The
evaluation also drew on relevant evaluations by the IOB and others, scholarly and scientific
literature, longitudinal opinion surveys in Arab countries and relevant database statistics and
indexes. These were supplemented with available information on policy implementation.

Main findings
The findings are grouped into two categories: policy and implementation. Together they
respond to the evaluation questions posed in the Terms of Reference of this evaluation.
On policy, the evaluation concludes that:
1.	The Ministry rapidly developed its policy response towards the Arab region following the Arab uprisings
and changing circumstances.
The policy response was formulated in a relatively short time. It was influenced by relevant
reports from the Advisory Council for International Affairs (AIV), evaluations of particular
instruments in different contexts and discussions in Parliament. It reflects fundamental
values of human rights and democracy as well as economic and security interests in the Arab
region.
2.	However, the policy response did not take advantage of a growing evidence base of lessons learned in the
area of democracy assistance.
Efforts to reconstruct a theory of change at the level of policy objectives revealed important
assumptions and context-specific insights. The policy response was based on the underlying
assumption that Arab countries are moving away from authoritarian rule and can be

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The Only Constant is Change

considered as countries transitioning towards democracy. What happened in the aftermath
of the Arab uprisings clearly shows why this assumption was not correct. Knowledge about
how to achieve policy objectives was informed more by practical insights relating to policy
instruments than by theoretical insights about how to support countries in transition and
lessons learned from policy evaluations and/or knowledge of the Arab region. Although
similar factors contributed to the uprisings in countries such as Morocco, Libya, Tunisia,
Egypt and Jordan, these countries and their societies vary enormously in wealth, education,
traditions, population and institutions. As a result, transition processes are influenced by a
country’s context and may vary among countries. Moreover, promoting transition in the
Arab region is a long-term process that requires long-term commitment. The policy
response did not sufficiently incorporate either a country-specific understanding of the
challenges faced by Arab countries in transition or a long-term approach for dealing with
these challenges.

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3.	Bilateral aid and diplomacy are important in supporting the achievement of policy objectives and fostering
bilateral relationships.
The Ministry chose to combine bilateral and multilateral approaches to achieve its policy
objectives. The evaluation findings show that after the Arab uprisings, embassies succeeded
in offering timely and flexible bilateral support, especially to civil society organisations. In
contrast, multilateral organisations have elaborate programme planning cycles and took
time to adjust to changes on the ground. The EU was especially slow to respond, and its
actual expenditures in the priority countries proved to be much lower than planned and
committed. Moreover, not all multilateral organisations and programmes can be assumed
to automatically support the implementation of Dutch policy objectives and to foster
democracy and rule of law in the Arab region. Bilateral support also enabled embassies to
both maintain and enlarge their networks at country level.
4. Conditionality does not work and in-country demand for change is essential.
In both bilateral and multilateral EU aid a central concept has been the notion that more
political and financial support should be given to those Arab countries that implement
more reforms and become more democratic. Application of conditionality as a principle to
supporting countries in transition is hampered by a) the prevailing bilateral interests of EU
Member States and donors preventing consensus and a unified stand; b) substantial aid
flows to Arab countries in transition from, for example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, which reduce the leverage of other donors; and c) difficulties of
actually monitoring progress or regress in transition processes and of holding public
officials and institutions accountable. Moreover, transition processes need local
commitment and ownership. Foreign assistance can at best support transition.
On implementation, the evaluation concludes that:
5. The Ministry has managed to launch a relatively large portfolio of bilateral assistance despite clear staffing
constraints in The Hague and in embassies.
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, existing instruments such as the human rights fund
and the fund to advance to status of women proved very helpful for responding swiftly to

Summary and conclusions

emerging needs for relevant assistance. With the launch of the bilateral Matra South
programme throughout the Arab region, policy priorities (democratisation, strengthening the
rule of law and protecting human rights, economic growth) were made operational through a
raft of instruments. By mid-2014 approximately EUR 41 million had been committed according
to plan, to: a private sector investment programme, government-to-government cooperation,
civil society initiatives, training of civil servants and young diplomats, capacity building of
political organisations, and a scholarship programme. A myriad of actors are involved in the
implementation of the bilateral programme. Programme steering and monitoring of
programme implementation are hampered by staffing constraints.
6. The attainment of policy objectives at the level of the Matra South programme components cannot be
measured, but individual projects of three programme components score well on effectiveness.
Fragmentation of financial support is a concern, both in terms of the programme as a whole
and within individual programme components. This makes it difficult to achieve significant
results at the level of programme and policy objectives. Findings indicate that a). the relevance
of the programme for capacity building of political parties and organisations is low; b). the
private sector investment programme does not target priority countries sufficiently, and c).
the efficiency of the government-to-government programme is low. However, the individual
projects (in support of civil society as well as projects in the private sector investment
programme and the government-to-government programme) have reached or are likely to
reach their planned outputs and objectives and may be considered sufficiently effective.
7. The portfolio of bilateral assistance was not sufficiently targeted to the priority countries
	and to the policy objectives of democratisation and rule of law.
The majority of projects do target priority countries. However, their budget does not exceed
EUR 14 million, and the lion’s share of the budget has been allocated to regional projects or
to non-priority countries in support of the policy objective of economic growth. More than
half of the bilateral resources have been used by means of the private sector investment
programme linked to the third policy objective of supporting economic growth and
employment. Less budget has been committed to democratisation and little money has
been committed to rule of law and human rights. Governments in transition have benefited
little from bilateral assistance.

Issues for the future
• On policy: making use of evidence and the state of the art in democracy assistance to
further improve policy formulation. A policy in support of democratic transition will
make sense only if it can be kept up over the longer term. Assumptions need to be
checked, and not all policy principles can be applied to Arab countries in transition.
• On implementation: seeking coherence among bilateral instruments and between
bilateral and multilateral aid can further improve efforts to contribute to transition in the
Arab region. The balance in the type of funding channels and instruments used deserves
greater attention. Staffing levels need to correspond with policy ambitions.
To conclude, the only constant in the Arab region is change.

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1
Introduction

Introduction

This chapter presents succinct background information on this evaluation. It also describes
the main objective of the study, its scope, research questions and methods as well as its
limitations. The main considerations for this evaluation are:
• The Arab region has changed radically in a short time and is in transition. Since the start
of 2011 a number of Arab countries have been the scene of mass protests, socioeconomic
unrest and political instability.
• Changes have been made to the Netherlands’ foreign policy in response to the changing
situation in the region.
As a consequence, from a political, diplomatic and financial perspective it is desirable to
evaluate this changed policy and its implementation.

1.1

Objective, scope and purpose of the evaluation

This evaluation covers policy objective 2.5 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth ‘the
Ministry’) in which ‘promoting transition in priority areas’ is set out under the Dutch
Foreign Affairs policy article ‘Security and stability’ (Explanatory Memorandum 2014).
Transition is the process of change from one form, state, style or place to another. Neither
the policy memorandum ‘Transition in the Arab Region’, nor budgets and letters to
Parliament contain more detailed definitions of the concepts of transition, democratisation
or, for example, democratic transition. However, Parliamentary Papers indicate that the
government aims to support a sustainable transition in the Arab region that leads to:
• democratisation, especially fair and free elections;
• development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to
gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom,
protection of minorities and LGBT rights;
• economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting
employment.
Transition has different connotations, but as used in this report it refers to a transition or a
movement towards democracy. According to the Ministry, a democratic and stable Arab
region (and Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in particular) serves the Netherlands’
interests in the fields of security, trade, energy supplies and combating illegal migration.
Policy documents do present the motives underlying the policy but no clear theory behind it.
The evaluation covers the period from 2009 to 2013, and thus covers the two years preceding
the wave of protests that swept through various countries in the Arab region and the two
years thereafter. This made it possible to cover the changes in Dutch policy after 2011.
Priority was given to the five Arab countries mentioned above: Egypt, Jordan, Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia. Field research undertaken and referred to in this study focuses on
transition support given to Egypt, Libya and Morocco. These countries were chosen on the
basis of their relevance for policy, the scope they offer to study transition from a variety of

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The Only Constant is Change

perspectives, the scale of the resources deployed and their different political, historical and
institutional perspectives in the light of transition. The selection of countries illustrates the
different contexts in which both bilateral and multilateral support is provided in a variety of
ways. The emphasis of the study is on bilateral support that includes Matra South. Of
course, not all the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to promote
transition in the Arab region can be expressed in monetary terms. Factors other than
funding that play an important role in achieving the Netherlands’ policy objectives are
diplomatic efforts and political cooperation.

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The evaluation was included in the Ministry’s budget and the associated evaluation
programme. It was intended to be an evaluation into effectiveness to account to Parliament
for the policy it has pursued in the Arab region. The Matra South programme started in
2012, and was structured along the lines of the Matra programme for Central and Eastern
Europe.1 After an exploratory study, the evaluation was started during 2014 to coincide with
the process of deciding on whether to prolong the Matra South programme, which was
scheduled to end in 2015. To enable the evaluation to review as much Dutch policy
implementation as possible, the report was to be completed during the first quarter of 2015.
This report provides an assessment of the formulation and implementation of Dutch policy
and draws on local perspectives in the context of Arab countries in transition. It not only
accounts for results achieved so far but could also inform future policy formulation and
implementation.

1.2 Research questions and methodology
The central research question was how the Netherlands has contributed to promoting
democratic transition in the Arab region. Subsidiary questions were formulated to serve as
guidelines in evaluating the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of this contribution.
Below is an overview of relevant research components linking evaluation criteria and
evaluation questions, as well as the research method applied:

1

The Matra programme was launched in November 1993 and supported transitions to a pluralist and
democratic society, governed by the rule of law in Central Europe (then South-East and Eastern Europe)
following the revolutions in the 1980s.

Introduction

Table 1

Overview of research components

How has the Netherlands contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?
Subsidiary questions

Research components

Methods

On policy
1. Which problems or other
factors underlie Dutch
policy on transition in the
Arab region?

Review of the literature on
democracy aid.

Assessment of policy theory
and policy reconstruction
(sessions with staff in
The Hague and embassies
in Cairo, Tripoli and Rabat).

2.In developing the policy,
was attention given to
theoretical and practical
insights relating to
democratic transition?

Review and reflect on policy
theory.

Semi-structured interviews
with key informants.

Transcription of interviews.

Narrative analysis of
semi-structured interviews
on the basis of research
questions.

Review of the literature on
actors and factors supporting
or hindering democratic
transition.

MaxQDA qualitative analysis
of semi-structured interviews
incl. codes and memos for
interpretation.

Secondary data, including
archival records,
parliamentary papers,
Advisory Council on
International Affairs (AIV)
reports, scholarly literature
and relevant documents from
other actors and agencies.

Relevance
On policy implementation
3. To what extent have the
policy priorities been made
operational through
feasible measures and
appropriate instruments to
promote transition in the
Arab region?

A desk study of the Matra
South programme.
Review of the literature on
actors and factors supporting
or hindering democratic
transition.

A comparison of the annual
plans and reports of Dutch
embassies in Arab countries
for 2009 and 2013 incl. an
analysis of the Ministry’s
expenditures.

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The Only Constant is Change

Relevance

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4. How relevant were these
measures to the priorities?
To what extent are they a
logical extension of Dutch
policy, its stated ambitions
and the specific context in
Arab countries? Did they
take the following factors
into account?
a.	did the Netherlands
work with national and
local partners and take
account of their
priorities?
b.	did the Netherlands
work with other
international actors and,
in doing so, devote
attention to the
complementarity of
their political,
diplomatic and financial
efforts?

Transcription (incl. Arabic to
English translation) of
interviews.
MaxQDA qualitative analysis
of semi-structured interviews,
incl. codes and memos, for
interpretation.
Review and reflection on
policy implementation.

Tapping local knowledge
sources, semi-structured
interviews with key actors
and stakeholders in
Morocco, Egypt and Libya
(incl. observation and a few
focus groups).
Document analysis of
national strategies, policy
documents of other actors in
the region/countries
(strategies and interventions).
Narrative analysis of
semi-structured interviews
on the basis of research
questions.
Narrative analysis of
diplomatic correspondence
between the Ministry in The
Hague and its embassies.
Secondary data including
archival records, dossiers on
individual activities, reports
and documents from a variety
of actors and agencies.

Efficiency
5. How timely was the
Netherlands’ use of its
instruments and how much
synergy was there between
them?
6. How well did the
Netherlands work with
other partners and actors
at national and
international level?
7. What financial, political
and diplomatic resources
were deployed to
implement policy in the
period covered by this
evaluation?

A desk study of the Matra
South programme.
Transcription (incl. Arabic to
English translation) of
interviews.
MaxQDA qualitative analysis
of semi-structured interviews,
incl. codes and memos for
interpretation.
Review and reflection on
policy implementation.

Tapping local knowledge
sources, semi-structured
interviews with key actors
and stakeholders in
Morocco, Egypt and Libya.
Narrative analysis of semistructured interviews on the
basis of research questions.
Secondary data, including
archival records, dossiers on
individual activities, reports
and documents from a variety
of actors and agencies.

Introduction

Effectiveness
8. What were the effects of
policy implementation?

A desk study of the Matra
South programme.

9. To what extent was the
proposed policy actually
implemented?

Transcription (incl. Arabic to
English translation) of
interviews.

10. T
 o what extent did policy
implementation
contribute to transition in
selected priority
countries?

MaxQDA qualitative analysis
of semi-structured interviews
incl. codes and memos, for
interpretation.
Review and reflection on
policy implementation.

Tapping local knowledge
sources, semi-structured
interviews with key actors
and stakeholders in
Morocco, Egypt and Libya.
Narrative analysis of
semi-structured interviews
on the basis of research
questions.
Narrative analysis of
diplomatic correspondence
between the Ministry in The
Hague and its embassies.
Secondary data, including
archival records, dossiers on
individual activities, reports
and documents from a variety
of actors and agencies.
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As demonstrated in above table, the triangulation of both data and methods was pursued to
obtain more comprehensive data and insight, reveal inconsistencies and provide
verification and validity. Tapping local knowledge sources and undertaking semi-structured
interviews with a cross-section of Dutch and international policy makers and practitioners
as well as with Arab respondents representing the local authorities, civil society and private
sector provided key information in response to the evaluation questions. During 2014 IOB
conducted a series of just over 100 semi-structured interviews in the Netherlands, Belgium,
Egypt, Libya and Morocco (see Annex 5). With one or two exceptions, permission was
received to record the session digitally and interviews were transcribed and systematically
analysed for content. The narrative analysis of interviews (2726 codes) and of diplomatic
correspondence (1318 codes) was supported by the use of MaxQDA (qualitative data analysis)
software. The code systems used are presented in Annex 6.

1.3 Constraints and limitations
The political situation is in flux in the Arab countries that are the subject of this evaluation.
Faced with such a potentially explosive context, it is difficult to assess the role and
importance of internal and external actors and factors. In addition, in comparison with
other actors, the Netherlands is a relatively small player in Arab countries. Given the
problems in the region, it is not realistic to expect a significant impact of Dutch efforts on
the Ministry’s general and strategic policy objectives. Foreign policy goals set by the Ministry
are over-ambitious, and little attention is paid to the gap between the stated goals and their
realisation. Attribution is a problem because interventions make a relatively small

The Only Constant is Change

contribution while at the same time aiming to achieve significant changes that are dependent
on a large number of actors and factors. On the other hand there is a general willingness to
accept that projects in the areas of democratisation, strengthening the rule of law and human
rights are often complex human and institutional processes. Democratisation and
strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights are long-term political processes
in which changes are not linear but proceed in fits and starts. Furthermore, there is a
consensus that achieving progress in these areas requires a great deal of patience. As the
findings show, the results have to be seen in context, which makes it difficult to draw
general conclusions.
For a number of financial instruments (such as the Private Sector Investment programme
(PSI) and the Reconstruction Fund) it became clear during the preliminary study that no
programmes were being financed that would be completed before 2013 and whose results
would be apparent during the evaluation period. For this reason, the main questions of the
evaluation focus on the themes of democratisation and strengthening the rule of law,
rather than on the proposed support for economic growth. However, the PSI programme
will feature in Chapter 4 from a programme implementation point of view. At times, only
limited information was available on the progress of individual projects, and this limited
the insight achieved into the outputs and outcomes.
| 22 |

Even though on-the-spot research demands a cautious approach to logistical limitations,
insecurity and social and political polarisation, IOB managed to undertake independent
field research in Egypt (April 2014), Libya (May 2014) and Morocco (June 2014).

1.4 An overview of the report
The report is in six chapters. This chapter has provided background information on the
evaluation. Chapter 2 will situate the evaluation and provide an analysis of actors and
factors supporting or hindering democratic transition in the Arab priority countries. An
analysis of policy will feature in Chapter 3. That chapter aims at revealing the complex web
of activity that is thought to be necessary for goals to be achieved, and discusses
assumptions. Chapter 4 presents a description and assessment of bilateral instruments,
including an overview of Dutch expenditures on transition and the various policy
objectives. Chapter 5 will examine the multilateral response to the Arab uprisings. Last but
not least, Chapter 6 will shed light on the role of diplomacy in supporting transition, as well
as on the practical application of policy principles. Readers requiring only an overview of
the findings and conclusions of this evaluation will find a summary at the very beginning of
this report.

Introduction

| 23 |

2
Countries in transition

Evaluation highlights
•	Arab countries differ and country context matters.
• Change is happening.
•	Within countries there are actors and factors either supporting or hindering change.
•	At the heart of the Arab uprisings is the pursuit of a different relationship between
citizens and state.

Countries in transition

This chapter will introduce the priority countries, explain changes and challenges and
describe the factors and actors either promoting or hindering change in Arab countries in
transition. It will draw out some of the key findings from the literature review undertaken
by Dr. Roel Meijer and Laila al-Zwaini that is available online. The findings discussed here
are supported by the Matra South desk study and data from IOB field research and serve to
reflect on policy and programme choices made in countries in transition.

2.1 Introduction
The protests in Tunisia were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17
December 2010, and were followed by a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests
(both non-violent and violent), riots, and conflict in the Arab world. Although the Arab
uprisings were preceded in most if not all countries in the region by decades of protests and
strikes, protests and social unrest came to a head in 2011. In several Arab countries a call for
dignity (karama) was expressly made. In Egypt, calls for freedom (huriya) were mixed with
demands for bread (‘aish) and social justice (‘adala ijtima‘iya). In that country there had been
great inequality in economic and political opportunities and access to justice. In many
countries the protests briefly enjoyed mass appeal and brought together different groups in
society: secularists as well as moderate Muslims and Islamists, middle classes as well as the
poor, and political parties representing different ideologies. Depending on the country,
women joined men in protest, and Christians, Berbers and Salafists stood shoulder to
shoulder in protest. The uprisings led to the downfall of rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
Yemen. Government changes took place in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Lebanon, and the
Sudanese president2 and Iraqi Prime Minister announced that they would not seek
re-election. In other countries, such as Algeria and Morocco, concessions were made to
placate the protesters.
Box 1

On change in Morocco

If people are upset, they go onto the streets. It hasn’t changed the way things are.
The authorities in Morocco are quick to react: they are worried about the [protests
in the] streets, they don’t want dissatisfaction, they understood repression is not
the way to go, [the authorities wish to meet some demands and] give them
something…
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Morocco.

The year 2011 witnessed exceptional turmoil and protest by men and women of all ages
across the Arab region and in the five priority countries profiled in this evaluation: Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. These countries are very different from each other. In
terms of population, Egypt has 87 million people, Jordan 7 million, Libya a mere 6 million,

2

In April 2015, the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was still re-elected, extending his 25-year rule.

| 25 |

The Only Constant is Change

Tunisia 11 million and Morocco 33 million. 3 Two countries (Jordan and Morocco) are
monarchies, Tunisia and Egypt are republics, and Libya enjoyed a unique political structure
under Gadhafi. Libya’s oil reserves are the largest in Africa and its most important market is
Europe. Most of the world’s reserves of phosphate rock, which yields phosphorus for fertilizer
(phosphorus is scarce and a non-renewable resource) are located in Morocco, with Jordan also
being important. The EU is dependent on these countries for its imports of phosphate rock.
Egypt has gone from being a net exporter to a net importer of oil. Although the mining,
energy, tourism and manufacturing sectors of the Tunisian economy are important, and the
country has become increasingly middle class, over half of Tunisia’s labour force is engaged
in farming. In terms of religion, the majority of Muslims in the five priority countries are
Sunni Muslims. Egypt is the country in the region with a substantial Christian minority,
while Libya and Morocco are known for their ethnic minorities (Amazigh, Tebu, Touareq).
Jordan is home to a large number of Palestinian refugees and has been a host country to both
Iraqi and Syrian refugees. In addition to all the foregoing, the countries vary in geostrategic
significance in the context of a changing geostrategic regional order that cannot be ignored.

2.2 Challenges to transition
| 26 |

The uprisings have turned the spotlight on widespread political corruption, clientelism,
nepotism and fraudulent relationships between the public and private sectors. Prior to 2011,
the key anti-corruption indices 4 showed corruption levels to be very high in many countries
across the Arab region, in comparison to global averages. The five Arab priority countries
(Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) scored poorly in terms of their legal and
institutional frameworks in comparison to other parts of the world, in addition to their lack
of press freedom and of civil society space. Over time, ethnic and religious minorities had
become more conscious of their cultural, political and social rights and had also started to
express their grievances during the Arab uprisings. Various opinion polls showed that there
had long been widespread discontent among the people of Arab countries for a long time.5
A survey by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (2012) showed that most people
did not rate the general performance of their governments highly, with 60% saying they
were dissatisfied.
Although economic growth prior to 2011 was relatively high, wealth was concentrated in the
hands of the ruling elite, thereby deepening the differences between rich and poor and
giving rise to a growing sense of injustice. With the exception of Libya, the priority countries
underwent a statistically significant fall in real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, especially
in Egypt and Tunisia, in which a working class had emerged. Unemployment rates rose further.

3
4

5

See Wikipedia: list of countries by population. Website consulted on 25 December 2014.
Namely Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the Bertelsmann
Foundation’sTransformation Index, Global Integrity’s Report, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World
Survey, and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators.
For Arab public opinions surveys, see http://www.arabbarometer.org, http://gallup.com,
http://www.aaiusa.org/pages/opinion-polls and the Arab American Institute’s Zogby International Surveys.

Countries in transition

Entrepreneurs, for example those in Egypt, were tied to the regimes through patronage, and in
their respective countries they were more often the object of anger rather than being forces of
change. Unemployment among the young, and especially among graduates, was relatively
high (25-30 percent), with many of them joining the informal economy (Hanieh 2013).
Unemployment rates among young women were even higher than those among young men.
In all five countries the freedom of civil society organisations and especially non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) was curtailed by repressive NGO laws that imposed strict constraints
on their financial resources, personnel and activities. Besides imposing severe restrictions,
authoritarian states also co-opted NGOs. Consequently, in Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan,
professional organisations (such as the Lawyers’ syndicate, the Judges’ Club and the
Doctors’ Union) had nevertheless retained some autonomy and were important in
preparing the ground for the uprisings. Trade unions and workers also played a key role
during the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. In Libya, civil society hardly existed and had no
legal basis; it only started to emerge in 2004, after the reforms of Qadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam
had been implemented. In Libya and Jordan, another force to be reckoned with is tribalism.
Political parties, pluralism and parliamentary elections have both a past and a present in
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Each country has its own unique history of political
party development and multipartyism, or hizbiya. When revolution swept through Egypt in
1952 and nationalist leaders came to power not just in that country but also across the region,
political parties were abolished or tossed aside on the pretext of ideological motivations.
Political parties were depoliticised and quiescent. De facto single-party states developed in
some countries in which a small number of tolerated and powerless opposition parties stood
virtually no chance of winning elections. The total banning of political parties occurred only
in Libya: with brief interruptions, from 1951 through to the end of Muammar Qadhafi’s rule
in 2011. Qadhafi condemned parliaments ‘as misrepresentation of the people’ and political
parties as divisive and ‘the modern dictatorial instrument of governing’ (Pargeter 2012: 86).
One of his slogans was: ‘who forms a political party is a traitor’ (Langhi 2014: 201). In none of
the Arab countries did young Arabs engage in official party politics. The fall of the regimes
in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia unleashed a tsunami of political parties participating in elections.
In Tunisia, the number of political parties surpassed 100 and in Libya, as many as 142 new
political parties registered to compete in elections. Some of these parties existed only on paper.
What has emerged from recent scholarly work and the literature review is that the uprisings
grew from an uneasy amalgam of diverse and wide-ranging social, political and religious
elements: discontented educated youth, urban intelligentsias, blue- and white-collar
workers and professionals, dissatisfied tribes, religious communities, and rebellious
regions. These had stepped into the vacuum left behind by the co-opted political parties
and civil society, heralding the emergence of social protest movements in the Arab region
articulating a rights discourse, comparable to the movements that arose in Latin America in
the 1820s and in Europe in 1848 and 1989. However, today the historical and political
contexts, the mix and mobilisation of people, the framings of the issues such as dignity and
social justice, the level of foreign involvement, and the situation in the Arab countries are
very specific to each country.

| 27 |

The Only Constant is Change

Box 2

On change in Libya

Everything is different. The biggest thing is security and there is fear. The fear of the
unknown. Qadhafi was able to keep some kind of control. People used to be out till
2 am or 3 am in the morning and people are now rushing to get home before dark.
The security situation is a major change. Also the mentality: the lack of social
responsibility, lack of law… I come from a family that has supported the revolution
and continues to do so and I would not reverse this for anything. Libyans need to
go through a phase of transition towards civic responsibility and democracy; ours is
going to be a bit bloodier than most...
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Libya.

2.3 Actors and factors

| 28 |

The review of literature discussing actors and factors that are promoting or hindering
change in Arab priority countries revealed that youth played an important role in
demanding change during the uprisings. The initial demonstrators largely belonged to the
fringes of society. They had been most negatively affected by inequity, social rifts and
authoritarian rule. Those who were willing to go onto the streets during the Arab uprisings
were youth activists advocating change, members of youth sections of Islamist
organisations and sub-cultures, left-wing activists, young members of women’s
organisations, independent intellectuals and artists, members of unofficial or break-away
trade unions besides the lower echelons of the official trade unions, people living in poor
urban neighbourhoods, working in the informal economy, experiencing discrimination or
living a marginal life in rural and remote areas.
Many studies have identified the social and psychological characteristics that make today’s
young Arabs different from young Arabs of former generations. A perceived shift in their basic
orientations towards social economic justice and their political orientation towards activism
is attributed to more schooling and a greater sense of individuality and self-esteem, as well as
to their use of technology, social media and the internet. Social media played an important
role in the protests not only as a way to mobilise people but also as an alternative way of
free expression. After completing their education, young people expected a different life
and a higher standard of living than their parents, only to discover that these cannot be
achieved given social exclusion and economic marginalisation. The literature also notes the
activism of women, regardless of their political and ideological background. Young women
in particular featured prominently in the Arab uprisings. During the uprisings, mobilisation
spread to other sections of society, such as the middle classes (represented in civil society
organisations) and in some cases (such as in Tunisia) the elite. The uprisings were
characterised by cross-ideological, cross-class and interfaith alliances and coalitions.

Countries in transition

Box 3

On actors hindering change in Egypt

And business men, business tycoons actually. Are they drivers of change or do they
want to keep things the way they are? I believe they want to keep things the way
they are but with some minor improvements to make the picture beautiful.
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Egypt.

The field research and available knowledge both point to the following factors affecting
transition: authoritarian political systems that include a bargaining model that represses
opponents and rewards supporters, marginalisation, economic inequality and skewed
economic development, exclusionism, politicisation, sectarianism, clientelism, tribalism,
political co-opting of civil society organisations and political parties, and – last but not least
– external factors. In the Arab region powerful geostrategic and commercial interests are at
play. Over the last decade power has shifted within the Arab region: Egypt, Syria and Iraq are
no longer the geopolitical epicentres, and the influence of Gulf countries has grown.
Notably, the West (and the US in particular), have experienced a further declining appeal in
many Arab countries in the wake of post 9/11 policies, regime change in Iraq, the unresolved
question of Palestinian statehood, a time-limited military intervention in Libya and a
continuing crisis in Syria. This has left many Arabs questioning the sincerity of western
positions and policies and pointing out inconsistencies, assessing the interplay of values
and interests among foreign nations differently.

2.4 Conclusions
The struggle for civil, political and social equal rights and political accountability are seen as
a hallmark of the Arab uprisings. The most important factor that played a role in the Arab
uprisings was a growing critical consciousness of social exclusion that affected individuals
or communities and prevented them from participating fully in the economic, social, and
political life of their societies. The initial protesters included people working in the
informal economy and those living in poor urban neighbourhoods, youth activists from
different walks of life, members of highly marginalised groups in remote and rural areas,
critical members of trade unions and political organisations, and independent intellectuals.
The formation of alliances across ideologies, religions, class, gender, and place was central
to the Arab uprisings. The bedrock of these uprisings was formed from concepts and
notions of civil, political and social rights and citizenship (madaniya), no matter how vague.
The demand for dignity aimed at achieving a fundamentally different relationship between
citizens and the state. This is what the five Arab priority countries, Egypt, Jordan, Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia have in common.

| 29 |

3
The Netherlands’ foreign policy

Evaluation highlights
•	An effective programme-steering process is hampered by the myriad of actors
involved and the practice of informal coordination.
•	Staffing constraints: more work with fewer staff.
•	Policy has not been sufficiently based on evidence and lessons learned.
•	Promoting transition in the Arab region is a long-term process.

The Netherlands’ foreign policy

After briefly describing the policy focus towards Arab countries prior to 2011, this chapter
continues to explain and analyse current Dutch policy on supporting transition in the Arab
region. It also describes the actors involved and reconstructs the envisaged process of
change of policies and programmes following the Arab uprisings.

3.1 Introduction
Prior to the uprisings, the focus of Dutch embassies in the Arab region ranged from the
provision of development aid (in Yemen, Egypt and the Palestinian Territories) to
supporting trade and investment (for example, in Oman) besides general and consular
affairs (for example, in Tunisia). There were few existing programmes in the Arab region
supporting women’s rights, human rights and to some extent good governance. Data from
the Ministry’s management information systems shows that in 2009 the North Africa and
Middle East Department (DAM) was mainly engaged in a programme of small activities at
country level, with no single and specific corresponding objective related to the Ministry’s
budget. This changed following the Arab uprisings in 2011.
The investments made in transition following the Arab uprisings in 2011 have been justified
by the Ministry on the basis of the assertion that investments in transition (and more
particularly democratisation, the rule of law and human rights, and economic growth)
contribute to a democratic and stable Arab region focusing in particular on Egypt, Libya,
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.6 The underlying motivation is that a democratic and stable
region serves the Netherlands’ interests best in the fields of security, trade, energy supplies
and combating illegal migration. Consequently, in all countries that enjoy priority as
transition countries, with the exception of Egypt, financial assistance was increased after
the uprisings. In Egypt, the designated country budget was higher in 2009 than in 2013, as a
result of the aid relationship 7 being phased out. The number of delegated country budget
holders (including Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) was higher in 2013
than in 2009 as a result of the policy response developed in the aftermath of the Arab
uprisings. A comparison of the annual plans and reports of Dutch embassies in Arab
countries for 2009 and 2013 shows that they were increasingly seeking to contribute to the
policy objectives of greater security and stability.

6

7

The phrase “neighbouring Arab region” has been avoided since it does not make sense when applied
to five countries that are not geographically contiguous. The EU seeks to tie a range of Arab countries
to the south of the European territory of the EU to the Union and applies a European Neighbourhood
Policy. See Chapter 5.
Following a stronger focus of Dutch development aid on least developed and low income countries,
whereas Egypt qualified as a lower middle-income country on the DAC list of ODA recipients:
see www.oecd.org/dac/stats.

| 31 |

The Only Constant is Change

The policy response to the Arab uprisings was shaped by inputs provided by the Advisory
Council on International Affairs (AIV) 8 and policy interplay with the House of
Representatives, including questions and motions submitted by Members of Parliament.
It is set out in a plethora of policy documents. According to these documents, the selection
of priority countries in the Arab region (Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) is the
result of their geographical proximity, Dutch interests (relating to national security and
economy) and an estimation of their likelihood to change, including their ability to serve
as an example to the region as a whole (Explanatory Memorandum 2014: 17). However,
the rationale for selecting each priority country is not documented and it is not clear how
the likelihood of transition was estimated.
In pursuing its policy, the Ministry stated that it would apply the following principles:
• effective action through bilateral and multilateral channels;
• a demand-driven approach;
• intelligent conditionality;
• no new structures but a review of existing structures that use existing budgetary
instruments;
• effective national and international coordination.
| 32 |

3.2 Central government’s involvement in supporting
transition
Whereas good governance was dropped from the agenda for aid and trade, the promotion
of transition has assumed greater prominence in Dutch foreign policy over time, as can be
seen from the dedicated policy objective in the Dutch Foreign Affairs policy article of ‘Peace,
security and stability’9 (Explanatory Memorandum 2014). Below, a concise overview is
presented of the most relevant actors within the Ministry.
A key actor for the formulation of a response to the Arab uprisings and its implementation
is the North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM). DAM has umbrella responsibility
for transition expenditures, which includes being involved in allocating budgets to
16 embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and monitoring the results of the funded
activities. The embassies, in particular those in priority countries, are responsible for
the implementation of policies, including the implementation of the Matra South
programme.10 Matra South is the Dutch programme for democratic transition in the Arab
region and consists of the following components: a. civil society initiatives (CSI), b. private
sector investments (PSI) programme, c. building the capacity of political organisations (PP),
8

9

10

Advisory Council on International Affairs. (August) 2011. Reforms in the Arab Region: Prospects for Democracy
and the Rule of Law? Report no. 75. The Hague: AIV.
The previous policy article combined ‘greater security and stability, effective humanitarian assistance
and good governance’.
See Matra South brochure published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the MENA
Scholarship Programme.

The Netherlands’ foreign policy

and d. government-to- government cooperation (G2G), including training civil servants and
young diplomats. The implementation of the Matra South programme will be described in
greater detail in the next chapter.
DAM has an advisory role with regard to the implementation of policies through the
multilateral channel. The Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights Department (DMM)
provides unearmarked voluntary contributions to multilateral organisations and also, for
example, to the work of International Financial Institutions and the United Nations that
reaches every corner of the globe, including the Arab region. UN organisations work in
support of a variety of development objectives in Arab countries. Examples include
expanding food production, environmental protection, support to refugees, promoting
democracy, human rights and gender equality, and international health. Support to the
implementation of the EU European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 11 in a number of
countries 12 is the responsibility of the Europe Integration Department (DIE).
Reprioritisation of funds within existing central programmes to the Arab region required
collaboration between DAM, DMM, the Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid
(DSH), the social development department (DSO) and the Security Policy Department (DVB)
to promote gender equality, human rights and stability. Finally, DAM provided substantial
transition funds to the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) in support of
a PSI programme. However, an effective programme-steering process by DAM was
hampered by the fact that a myriad of actors, as described, were involved. Moreover, advice
is non-binding and coordination within the Ministry is mostly informal.
The mission network in the Arab region has not changed since 2009, with the exception of
the temporary closure of the embassies in Damascus and Libya for political and security
reasons (and the transfer of their staff posted from The Hague to Istanbul and Tunis
respectively). The number of positions at the embassies decreased between 2009 and 2013.
By the end of 2013, there was a total of 84 full-time jobs for staff posted from The Hague
(51 in policy and 33 in administrative positions) and 242.5 full-time jobs for local staff
(49.7 in policy and 192.8 in administrative positions) involved in implementing policy for
the Arab region. DAM had 26 full-time jobs (23 in policy and 3 in administrative positions).
However, work in the Arab region has increased rather than decreased, and a small number
of staff focus on the actual implementation of support dedicated to transition.

3.3 Connecting outcomes
Neither the policy memorandum ‘Transition in the Arab Region’, nor the budgets and
letters to Parliament contain more detailed definitions of the key concepts of transition,
democratisation or, for example, democratic transition. As described under 3.1, policy
documents do present the motives for the policy but provide no clear theory or framework
11
12

The ENP is in the first instance a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country.
Supporting Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and
Tunisia.

| 33 |

The Only Constant is Change

to underpin this policy. When referring to the policy article ‘security and stability’, the
Ministry expressed its intention as being to support a sustainable transition in the Arab
region that leads to:
• democratisation, especially fair and free elections;
• development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to
gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom,
protection of minorities and LGBT rights;
• economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting
employment.13
Based on sessions with staff members in The Hague and embassies in Cairo, Tripoli and
Rabat, and supported by the desk study of the Matra South programme and the review of
relevant documents and interviews, and interviews, the change process for all the
programmes taken together has been depicted graphically (Figure 1). It should be noted that
the representation of the change process is a mere articulation of a theory of change
through a collective and collaborative process and is not a panacea for supporting
democratic and economic transition in the Arab region. The relationship between the
programme as a whole and its individual components as illustrated in Figure 1 (see next
page).
| 34 |

Although sustainable transitions are determined by domestic factors, the graphic
representation clarifies what external support is provided by the Ministry for what purpose,
and what support should contribute to if properly implemented in a given situation or
context. It also assists reflection on what is plausible, doable and potentially testable.
Through its activities, the Ministry also aimed to strengthen relations between the
Netherlands and recipient Arab countries.14 This section will focus on thinking through
policy and evidence or what is plausible. The following chapter will concentrate on policy
implementation.

13

14

See Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 16 of 25 March 2011 and, for example, the Matra South programme
brochure.
See Matra South programme brochure.

Activities

Outputs

Outcomes

Specific
impacts

Impact

Figure 1

CSI projects

Capacity of civil
society strengthened
and public awareness
raised

Strengthened influence
of civil society on
government/political
activities and improved
government/political
responsiveness

PP Grants

Matra South
Initiatives
(centralised
budget)

Capacity of political
party organisations
strengthened

Improved quality of
elections, improved
political processes

Strengthened
democratisation
processes

Training of civil
servants

Capacity of the justice
sector strengthened
(e.g. staff trained,
procedures adopted)

G2G projects

Training of
diplomats

PSI Projects

(Innovative)
businesses
established and CSR,
gender and
environmental
corporate policies
implemented

MENA
scholarships

More and
stronger
relations build
between civil
servants/
diplomats/
political
parties of
priority
countries and
their Dutch
counterparts
in the
Netherlands

Strengthened
relationship between
the Netherlands and
the Arab countries
(focus priority
countries)

Quality of
available vocational
education improved,
job market
inefficiencies addressed

Increased and sustainable
productivity and
employment (especially
youth & women)

Sustainable economic
growth

Improved quality of public
policy, and of management
and delivery of public
service

Capacity of
government
institutions
strengthened (e.g.
staff trained,
procedures adopted)

Justice more inclusive, and
equitable, and of improved
quality

Strengthened rule of
law and the
protection of human
rights

Sustainable democratic, pluriform, states governed by the rule of law in the Arab region (focus priority countries)

Mapping the pathways in support of the long-term goal of strengthening security and stability by means of promoting transition in the Arab region.

The Netherlands’ foreign policy

| 35 |

The Only Constant is Change

Agreeing upon long-term outcomes proved to be relatively easy, in part because long-term
outcomes are part and parcel of the budget of the Ministry and are generally broad. The
long-term objective of security did prompt a discussion as to whose security and stability
was at stake, and in the case of Libya the outcome levels clearly first and foremost rested on
security and state-building. This finding is in accordance with the literature: Carothers
(1999) has pointed out that when a dictator falls, state-building should have the highest
priority and elections should follow only after basic authority and institutions have been
stabilised (or, in the case of Libya, established). Discussions in Tripoli clearly indicated that
the stated objectives (of democratisation, rule of law and economic growth) would not be
achieved unless a certain level of security and stability existed in the country. However,
state-building has not been an explicit aspect of Dutch foreign policy and assistance in the
Arab region.
Box 4

On local priorities and the importance of presence

Money is not the issue here. It is about capacity. There is plenty of money and
donors do not know what to do. It is all about engaging, involvement and
commitment.
We have learned lessons along the way and some of those lessons include the fact
that the best models here are where there is permanent in-country presence by the
international partner. Some organisations fly in and out … that does not work in Libya.

| 36 |

In Libya we start from scratch, from zero …
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Libya.

The idea of ‘supporting transition to strengthen security and stability’ (see Figure 1)
highlighted the importance of articulating assumptions and conditions, and why it is
expected that one set of outcomes will lead to another. It is a common perception that
democracies are more stable than authoritarian regimes (as reflected in the thinking that
democratic transition will lead to security and stability at the impact level). However,
participants in the various sessions were quick to point out that neither democratic
transition nor supporting such transition will automatically lead to security and stability,
and that they may in fact have a destabilising effect in and beyond countries in transition.
The sessions revealed that informed knowledge about how to produce stated outcomes and
impacts was primarily based on activity-level evaluations of Dutch democracy assistance in
Central and Eastern Europe15 and a Programme for Cooperation with emerging markets
(PSOM)16 plus common sense. Less important were academic knowledge about how to

15

16

Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie. 1999. Diamonds and Coals. Evaluation of the
Matra programme of assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, 1994-1997. The Hague: IOB.
Triodos Facet BV. 2010. Final Report Evaluation PSOM/PSI and MMF. Zeist: Triodos Facet.

The Netherlands’ foreign policy

support countries in transition and lessons from policy evaluations17 and/or knowledge of
the Arab region. Paying attention to growing socioeconomic imbalances was a key lesson
learned which also came up in discussing pathways of change. The IMF has acknowledged
that in retrospect it did not place enough emphasis in the past on the need to ensure equal
access to economic and employment opportunities in the Arab region (IMF 2014: 94). In the
discussions at country level that were instigated for the present evaluation, the importance
of education in fostering pluralism in Arab countries was mentioned. This key role for
education has also been described by scholars (Campante and Chan 2012, Muasher 2014:
123-141). There is strong evidence that education has an impact on creating economic
opportunities for individuals: it leads to increased employability, productivity and higher
income potential. It also has considerable nationwide macroeconomic effects.
Interestingly, in spite of a challenging internal socio-political environment and conflicts in
the Arab region, the Arab priority countries have broadly maintained macroeconomic
stability. At the same time, however, their economies are currently not delivering the
growth rates needed for a meaningful reduction in unemployment, in particular for women
and youth.
With regard to strengthening the rule of law, there is a striking lack of coherent and
systematic studies evaluating rule of law interventions in countries in transition. This is
especially true in the context of transition where the starting point may be challenging, as is
definitely the case in Libya. At the same time, in a country such as Egypt a deep mistrust and
lack of faith in the justice sector has developed. A recent literature review concludes that
‘the bulk of the research… is constituted of studies of an “observational descriptive” type
and design … less well suited to answering questions about the efficacy of particular rule of
law reforms or interventions that may have been sponsored either by domestic actors or
international donors’ (Roseveare 2013: 8). A fundamental problem is that the impact of
‘strengthened rule of law’ sought to be achieved is extremely complex and there is little
clarity on how best to proceed. A more fundamental point is that the rule of law doctrine
may mean very different things across varying legal traditions (e.g. common, civil and
Islamic law). The rule of law exists in Arab societies as a political touchstone, and
differences in the socio-political history of Arab countries shape local understandings and
implementation of the rule of law (Mendicoff 2006).

17

For example: IOB. 2011. Education Matters: Policy review of the Dutch contribution to basic education 1999-2009.
The Hague: IOB.

| 37 |

The Only Constant is Change

Box 5

On the importance of a long-term view

We are supporting the new principles of the constitution, the constitution has
very strong language …; it gives right to access to information, the right to petition,
the right to participate in the legislative process. The constitution is eye-opening,
they really set a high bar for themselves.
When you work on supporting constitutional reforms and supporting democratic
transitions, most of the work is not glamorous because the impact is not seen right
there. When you are supporting democratic processes it sometimes takes ten years
to be able to assess whether or not your efforts have results, because you can take
a horse to water but you cannot make it drink. You can develop the capacities of
the administration of the House of Representatives, you can train Members of
Parliament, you can hold meetings, send them to another country etc. etc., but if
there is no political will it will remain what it is. So it is a travail de longue haleine.
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Morocco.

| 38 |

Finally, transition processes are long-term and non-linear processes, requiring patience and
willingness to accept setbacks in addition to conflict and instability. Supporting democratic
transition is not at all like supporting an immunisation programme (Kumar 2012). It is
impossible to be certain that the creation of a modest bilateral programme for a period of
three years (2012-2015) in support of democratic transition and implementing it in a time of
rapid change has had any impact on the long-term outcomes stated. This understanding
should be reflected in the thinking through of the change process, the policy commitments
and the timelines for implementation: they must be long term and adaptive to changing
circumstances at country level.

3.4 Conclusions
The sessions with staff in The Hague and at embassies in Cairo, Tripoli and Rabat, combined
with the analysis of interview data revealed that the basic assumption was that Arab
countries moving away from authoritarian rule can be considered as countries transitioning
towards democracy. This assumption proved to be largely illusory and false. The findings
also confirm that pathways of change need to be tailored to each individual country’s
situation (its economy, sociocultural traditions, ethnic composition, political and
institutional development). The Arab priority countries differ enormously in these respects
and there is no easy fix for supporting their democratic and economic transitions.
A one-size-fits-all approach is problematic, as demonstrated by the mismatch between
the policy response and reality in Libya. Finally, a policy will only make sense if it can be
adhered to for the longer term.

The Netherlands’ foreign policy

| 39 |

4
The bilateral approach

Evaluation highlights
•	Centrally managed funds enabled embassies in Arab countries to adapt their
support flexibly.
•	The bilateral programme enabled embassies to both maintain and enlarge their
networks at country level.
•	The majority of projects target priority countries.
•	Little support is given to promoting the rule of law. Most of the budget is spent on
regional projects or non-priority countries and to support economic growth.
•	Much less support is given to governments in transition than to civil society.
•	The relevance of capacity building of political parties and organisations is low.
•	Individual CSI, G2G and PSI projects are sufficiently effective.

The bilateral approach

This chapter presents an overview of the Ministry’s bilateral portfolio and focuses on the
priority countries and the period following the Arab uprisings. It looks into the bilateral
instruments and expenditures, including their contribution to the achievement of policy
objectives listed earlier. Following a short introduction describing the overall design and
budgets of the bilateral programme, each programme component will be analysed in more
detail as implemented. This chapter will draw on some of the key findings from the desk
study undertaken by Ecorys that is available online. The findings are complemented and
supported by IOB field research and the literature review.

4.1 Introduction
In 2011, the Ministry decided to make EUR 7.7 million available by reprioritising funds of
existing central programmes towards the Arab region, to enable a rapid response to the
Arab uprisings. Existing centrally managed programmes included the fund for human
rights, the stability fund, the fund for women’s rights and the fund for development,
pluralism and participation. Interview findings and field research suggest that especially the
centrally managed funds for human rights, women’s rights and culture enabled embassy
staff in countries to adapt their support flexibly to the changing needs in countries in
transition.
It was decided to use two policy instruments for the envisaged transition support to the
region: the Matra programme and the Private Sector Investment programme (PSI). These
instruments were to address both the political and socioeconomic causes of the unrest in
the Arab region. The Matra programme was established in 1993 to support democracy and
promote active citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe. This programme had been a
relatively cost-effective and successful instrument to support political transition processes
and had already included a relatively small portfolio of projects in a number of Arab
countries prior to 2009 (IOB 1999). In line with recommendations by the Advisory Council
on International Affairs (AIV), it was therefore decided to create a similar programme for the
Arab region: the Matra18 South programme (AIV 2011: 13).

18

Field research demonstrated that the name of the programme ‘matra’ (an acronym of ‘maatschappelijke
transformatie’ in Dutch) means nothing to Arabic speakers, unlike Spain’s bilateral programme, which
is called ‘masar’, the Arabic word for ‘path’.

| 41 |

The Only Constant is Change

The Matra South programme was to support both state and civil society. It aimed at
contributing to the achievement of policy objectives (of economic growth, rule of law and
democratisation) through the following six programme components:
1. Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI);
2. Government-to-Government cooperation (G2G);
3. Capacity building of political parties (PP);
4. Training civil servants;
5. Training young diplomats; and
6. The MENA scholarship programme.
To compensate for the start-up time of new efforts in Arab countries an additional component
was created and implemented rapidly by DAM. It will be referred to hereafter as ‘support to
Matra South initiatives (centralised budget)’. Although most countries in the Arab region were
eligible for support under this programme, the Ministry decided to focus in particular on Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

| 42 |

The Private Sector Investment programme was established in 2009 and managed by the
Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) to stimulate sustainable economic
growth in countries. It aims to encourage Dutch and foreign entrepreneurs to establish
investment projects in countries in a joint venture company with local entrepreneurs. The idea
was to encourage investment projects that would not otherwise have been carried out because
of the high product and/or market risks. Yemen, the Palestinian Territories, Egypt, and Morocco,
were already PSI-eligible countries. However, in order to support transition in Arab countries,
DAM requested DDE to create and manage a specific sub-programme under PSI that increased
the number of non-ODA eligible countries in the Arab region. As a result, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan,
Syria and Tunisia were added to the list of eligible countries, whereas priority country Libya fell
by the wayside and was only added in 2014.19 As of July 2014, PSI closed for new applications,
because of the development of a new instrument called the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF).
Since 2012 onwards, the term ‘Matra South programme’ has been used to refer to both
instruments and all programme components providing support to the process of transition in
the Arab region. To finance this support, a total of EUR 45 million20 covering the years 2012, 2013,
2014 and 2015 was allocated from the ‘Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking’ (HGIS)
resources.21 Support has been provided to approximately 120 projects implemented in eight
countries22 and also to a number of regional projects (excluding the MENA scholarship
programme and the PP programme component). By mid-2014 approximately EUR 41 million
had been allocated, as shown in the following budgetary overview:

19

20

21

22

Rectification via the Government Gazette by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development
Cooperation, 28 February 2014, no. DDE-093/2014, with reference to PSI 2014.
‘The Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East, and More on the Netherlands’ Activities in
the Arab Region’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623-40.
A distinction is made within the HGIS between spending that meets the criteria for Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and other, non-ODA spending on international policy.
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen.

The bilateral approach

Table 2

Matra South programme allocations to the various programme components
(2012-2015)

Matra South programme component

Budget allocated in mill. EUR
(2012-2015)

PSI programme

14.9

Government-to-Government cooperation

5.2 23

Support to local CSI (decentralised budget)

6

Support to Matra South initiatives (centralised budget)

4.4

Training of civil servants

4.5

Training of young diplomats

1.6

Capacity building of political organisations 24

2

MENA scholarship programme

2.6

Total
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Netherlands Enterprise Agency.

41.2
23 24

| 43 |

4.2 The portfolio: a description and assessment
Data was collected and analysed at programme, programme component and project level
through a review of relevant documentation and interviews and augmented by findings
from field research. This section provides a description of the abovementioned programme
components and includes an assessment of individual PSI, CSI and G2G projects on the
basis of four criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability). Details
regarding the assessment of individual projects are provided in Annex 3 and include
corresponding evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators. It should be noted
that when assessing the implementation of projects, they were assigned a weight to take
account of the difficulty of achieving their objectives, given the highly complex and volatile
situation of the countries in transition. Full details on the selected projects and the
assessment of evaluation criteria are provided in the Ecorys substudy. Annex 4 provides
further details on the project selection and lists all the projects that were randomly selected.
The programme components to build the capacity of political parties (PP) and provide
scholarships and training programmes (for civil servants and young diplomats) were
analysed at the programme level only. For this reason a reflection on evaluation findings is
provided and not an assessment.

23

24

The desk study found significant levels of underspending at the Netherlands Enterprise Agency.
See the section ‘Government-to-Government programme’.
In 2012, the programme was administered by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013 this
responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

The Only Constant is Change

The Private Sector Investment programme
Description: The PSI programme is supported through DDE and implemented by the
Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). Projects are funded in the form of hardware
(equipment) and/or technical assistance (training, project management). Most of the
budget for the Arab region is allocated to the agriculture and industry sectors. The PSI
programme is divided into two components: PSI ‘Regular’, aimed at a long list of
developing countries, and PSI ‘Plus’. Following the uprisings, a PSI programme was
supported by adding few Arab countries, as a result of which PSI ‘Regular’ included Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia and PSI ‘Plus’ included Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian
Territories. Interestingly, Libya was only added to the list of PSI ‘Regular’ list in 2014, after
the security situation had been deteriorating for some time.
As a result of their incorporation into the PSI programme, in the aftermath of the uprisings
five additional Arab countries became eligible for PSI support. The criteria for project
selection remained practically the same as for projects in other countries. The only
difference was that now preference was expressed for project proposals focusing on
employment of youth and women and in partnership with local businesses owned by young
Arabs and female entrepreneurs.
| 44 |

The desk study found that DDE had at its disposal a budget of EUR 29 million25 for the Arab
region (2012-2014) including the contribution of EUR 14.9 by DAM in support of economic
growth in Arab countries in transition. Actual PSI expenditures totalled to a little over EUR
14 million by mid-2014. Approximately EUR 6.6 million (30%) was committed to four of the
five Arab priority countries between July 2012 and May 2014. Of these allocations to the
priority countries, less than 30% was disbursed:
Table 3 	Private Sector Investment programme:
allocations and disbursements per country
Country

Number of
projects

Budget allocated
(in mill. EUR)

Amount disbursed
(in mill. EUR)
2012 - May 2014

Egypt

1

0.7

0.3

Jordan

3

1.6

0.2

Morocco

5

3.6

1.1

Tunisia

1

0.7

0.4

Total

10

6.6

2

Source: Matra South desk study.

25

Based on DDE approval of annual plans RVO (2012-2014) and involving both ODA and non-ODA resources.

The bilateral approach

In total, 10 projects were implemented in the priority countries. The average sum allocated
to a project was approximately EUR 670,000 and the amount allocated to individual projects
ranged from approximately EUR 380,000 to EUR 750,000. More than half of the total
commitments were made to projects in Morocco (54%), followed by Jordan (24%) and Egypt
and Tunisia (both 11%). As explained earlier, Morocco and Egypt were already PSI-eligible
countries prior to the Arab uprisings, making the transfer of non-ODA funds from DAM to
DDE for the purpose of supporting economic growth and transition somewhat unnecessary
and questionable.
When the overall budget of EUR 29 million for the Arab region (2012-2014) was taken into
consideration the evaluation found that the lion’s share of PSI budget allocations (70%) had
been committed to projects in non-priority countries (the Palestinian Territories, Yemen,
Iraq and Algeria), with the Palestinian Territories receiving the largest share of allocations:
64% (EUR 10 million). It was envisaged that the 28 projects in Arab countries in total would
generate 764 basic level jobs, including 550 for women and 531 medium-high-level
positions of which 214 would be for women. In total 656 of the employed staff were
expected to be younger than 25 years. However, a recent IOB policy review of Dutch support
for private sector development during the period 2005-2012 found that there is little
information about achieving ultimate objectives, including poverty reduction (IOB 2014).
| 45 |

Assessment: Four projects were selected for the assessment of the Private Sector Investment
(PSI) programme. This selection accounts for 40% of the total value of project commitments
within PSI, and for 64% of the total disbursements. Individual projects were assessed in
terms of their relevance. The desk study found that projects were well-conceived given the
local situation and that they were relevant to the problems they were intended to address.
The objectives of the projects were clearly defined and the projects were likely to contribute
to the solution of the identified problems. Individual projects analysed were assessed as
being fairly efficient. All the projects are being managed efficiently and although some have
experienced some delays, these have been minor. The likelihood that the businesses would
continue was mostly assessed as reasonable. However, the demand for PSI in the priority
countries appears to be very low, with only 30% of budgets allocated to the priority
countries. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of individual PSI projects in the priority
countries that are still in the early phase of implementation. Apart from these projects,
individual PSI projects were assessed as being sufficiently effective (Matra South desk study
2014: 35). The following text box contains an example of one of the PSI projects assessed:

The Only Constant is Change

Box 6

Example of a PSI project in Morocco

This project provides support to a joint venture which planned to establish a
state-of-the-art modern greenhouse of 5 ha near Agadir for the cultivation of
tomatoes on the vine. Both partners are horticultural growers. The applicant is a
large tomato-on-the-vine grower in the Netherlands, who sees an opportunity to
provide their customers year-round with tomatoes on the vine for less energy cost.
The local partner grows green beans and sweet peppers near Agadir and wishes to
diversify production by adding tomatoes. The project is planned to set an example
for environmentally-friendly production methods in a modern greenhouse,
minimising the carbon footprint of tomato growing.

| 46 |

The joint venture has been established. The new greenhouse has been constructed
and 100 employees have been hired and trained. Additionally, a number of jobs
have been created for the company’s local suppliers. To date, about 500,000 kg of
produce has been produced, 70% of which is of good quality. At the start of the
production phase the project experienced some quality problems due to fungus
but these were resolved. The tomatoes have mostly been sold locally because of
the European import quotas and the low prices caused by the surplus of tomatoes
on the European market. Consequently the turnover is lower than expected. In the
beginning, the project experienced some delay because of the bureaucracy
surrounding the permits for the establishment of a joint venture. According to the
implementing partners the project is currently on course to achieve its planned
results. Nevertheless, turnover is currently lagging behind, due to the low price of
tomatoes in Europe. Both the PSI adviser and the Dutch partner have indicated
that they are firmly committed to ultimately achieving the stated objectives.
The project has contracted and trained more employees than planned, although
the total number of female employees (50) is less than planned. The production of
good quality tomatoes on the vine is lagging behind, as is revenue, due to the low
prices (and quota) in Europe. At this stage of it is not possible to demonstrate the
impact of the project (reducing unemployment among women and youth) and
possible spillover effects (in terms of income).
Source: Matra South desk study.

The programme and management costs of PSI (approximately 5% of the budget committed)
are considered to be reasonable.

The bilateral approach

Government-to-Government cooperation
Description: The idea of Government-to-Government cooperation was to provide support to
institutional reform and capacity building in the public sector in priority countries and to
strengthen government institutions. Government-to-Government project support of short
duration (3-12 months) was envisaged between the Dutch government and central
governments in relevant countries in the Arab region or between local governments.
Projects were to help facilitate economic development,26 create employment and
concomitantly strengthen the Netherlands’ position in the countries. RVO was contracted
by DAM and bore responsibility for the facilitation of the design and implementation of
projects, ranging from advising on the project proposals, finding suitable partners in the
Netherlands and administering the implementation of the projects, to collecting and
assessing the financial and narrative progress reports. Proposals for G2G projects were to be
submitted by government institutions from the Arab priority countries to the Royal
Netherlands Embassies or to the International Cooperation and Matchmaking Unit of RVO.
All G2G projects required prior approval of DAM. In practice, the promotion of the G2G
component in priority countries depended on the staff of embassies. G2G projects turned
out to be very diverse and ranged from, for example, the cooperation between ombudsmen
and the support to prison management, to assisting with the implementation of a road
safety strategy. Most projects offered an exchange of public knowledge, skills and
experience through, for example, workshops, technical assistance and institutional
analyses.
Approximately EUR 1.3 million has been allocated under the G2G component, and in the
course of 2012 and 2013 approximately 60% of these commitments were disbursed to
projects. Of the total amount allocated, 69% covers projects in priority countries. One G2G
project was implemented in a non-priority country (Iraq):27 it accounts for 31% of the total
commitments.28 Approximately EUR 890,000 has been allocated to G2G projects in priority
countries, of which more than half has been disbursed to G2G projects in Libya, Morocco and
Tunisia. The regional project mentioned in the overview below consisted of a fact-finding
mission that focused on incubators and ecosystems in Morocco and Tunisia. Egypt has not
yet benefited from any G2G project. The average budget allocated to a project is
approximately EUR 55,000: individual project allocations range from approximately EUR
13,000 to EUR 275,000. A large number of projects (7) include fact-finding or identification
missions; a further six projects focus on issues related to rule of law / human rights (6).
In total, 16 projects have been implemented in the priority countries.29 The table below
provides a breakdown of the number of G2G projects and resources allocated and disbursed:

26

27

28

29

See introduction to G2G cooperation at
http://www.government.nl/issues/matra/matra-south-programme-for- arab-countries.
The project in question focuses on cooperation between the Courts of Audit of the Netherlands and Iraq.
Total commitments for this project are EUR 399,679 and total disbursements EUR 319,744.
See desk study: this project of cooperation between the Court of Audit in the Netherlands and the
Board of Supreme Audit of Iraq involves technical assistance and has been included under the G2G
component for administrative reasons.
Identification/fact-finding missions and follow-up projects have been counted as one project.

| 47 |

The Only Constant is Change

Table 4
Country

Overview of the number of G2G projects and expenditures in 2012 and 2013
Number of projects

Budget allocated
(in EUR)

Amount disbursed
(in EUR)

Jordan

3

93,764

75,075

Libya

3

313,514

55,925

Morocco

3

264,965

158,245

Tunisia

6

191,718

141,761

Region

1

24,385

19,508

Total

16

888,346

450,514

Source: Matra South desk study.

Whereas the Ministry initially allocated an amount of EUR 5.2 million in support of G2G
cooperation (see table in section 4.1), by May 2014 RVO had been able to allocate an amount
of only approximately EUR 890,000 to G2G projects.

| 48 |

Assessment: Five projects were selected for the assessment of the G2G programme. This
selection accounts for 44% of the total value of project commitments within G2G, and for
60% of the total disbursements. The desk study found that individual projects were relevant
in general, with the exception of one project intended to improve road safety in Morocco.
It is unclear how this project contributes to the objectives of the Matra South programme.
The organisational set-up and under-expenditures of the G2G component have negatively
affected the management costs of the G2G programme, which can be considered to be high
(almost 30% of the commitments). Programme implementation has been slow for many
reasons. The desk study and field research revealed that promoting G2G cooperation
requires much time and effort. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the frequent change
of ministers and staff, coupled with insecurity in the priority countries, hampered the
identification of opportunities for cooperation. At the same time, the type of support G2G
provides is limited in terms of time and budgets when compared to the time and budgets of
other donor agencies. The interest and capacity of Dutch government institutions to
support their counterparts in the Arab region are also limited, with the exception of the G2G
project in Libya described in the following text box:

The bilateral approach

Box 7

A G2G project in Libya

Just after the revolution, serious human rights concerns regarding the situation in
prisons were raised, among others by Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch. On 6 March 2012, the Libyan Prime Minister issued a decree establishing a
committee specifically tasked to receive and investigate complaints of human
rights abuses in detention. The project was to assist in the development of a
general vision and mission of the Libyan prison service, including the training of
prison staff. As a result, 20 persons have been trained and special security suits
have been purchased for prison staff. The project was demand-driven and enjoyed
commitment from the Libyan prison service. The Dutch ambassador played a key
coordinating role in view of the complex relationship with the Libyan government
and with many other donors involved in the justice sector. The Dutch implementing
partner was prepared to follow up on project activities, irrespective of the security
risks. A follow-up programme is yet to be formulated. A deteriorating security
situation in Libya has hampered further cooperation.
Source: IOB field research and Matra South desk study.

Of the individual G2G projects that were part of the sample, three scored ‘fairly efficient’
and two scored ‘unsatisfactory’ due to their high costs of project implementation and
delays encountered. Factors negatively affecting the effectiveness of individual projects
consisted of their inability to bring about reform of any kind or to create a strong and
lasting relationship between governments. When comparing programme components it is
to be noted that little support has been provided to governments in transition.
Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI)
Description: The Dutch embassies in priority countries have been allocated specific budgets
under the Matra South programme to support projects of civil society organisations that can
contribute to the overall achievement of policy objectives stated. The embassies are
required to submit politically sensitive projects and projects above the threshold of EUR
150,000 to the North Africa and Middle East Department for approval.30
The CSI budget is allocated to a wide variety of projects that include support to business
development and the protection of human rights, and issues receiving emphasis from local
embassies (for example, workers’ rights in Egypt). The average amount allocated to a project
is approximately EUR 80,000; individual project allocations range from approximately EUR
2,000 to EUR 600,000. Under the CSI component, approximately EUR 3.9 million was
allocated and approximately 72% of the total amount allocated for CSI was disbursed in 2012
and 2013. In total, 48 projects have been implemented, with Tunisia having the most
projects and Egypt and Morocco the highest budget allocations. The table below provides
information about the number of projects, the total fund allocated and the expenditures
per country.
30

Internal memo DAM-795/2011 to the Minister dated October 3, 2011.

| 49 |

The Only Constant is Change

Table 5	Overview of support to civil society: the number of projects in priority countries
incl. budget allocations and expenditures
Country

Number of projects

Budget allocated
(in mill. EUR)

Amount disbursed
(in mill. EUR)
2012-2013

Egypt

6

1.5

1.2

Jordan

9

0.4

0.2

Libya

9

0.6

0.5

Morocco

7

1

0.5

Tunisia

17

0.4

0.4

Total

48

3.9

2.8

Source: Matra South desk study.

| 50 |

Support to Matra South Initiatives (centralised budget)
Another portfolio consisted of contributions to larger programmes implemented by a
mix of multilateral organisations and international NGOs that was managed by DAM.
The embassies were often requested to advise on the selection of the projects, but other
than that were hardly involved in selecting and overseeing the projects. Approximately
EUR 4.4 million was allocated and EUR 3 million was disbursed to projects financed from
the centralised Matra South budget. The budget was allocated to seven projects that focus
on youth employment and democratisation. The average budget allocated to a project
is approximately EUR 600,000; project allocations range between approximately
EUR 300,000 and EUR 900,000. The table below provides information about the number
of these centrally managed projects, total budget amounts allocated and expenditures.

The bilateral approach

Table 6 	Support to Matra South initiatives (centralised budget): the number of projects in
priority countries incl. budget allocations and expenditures
Country

Number of projects

Budget allocated
(in mill. EUR)

Amount disbursed
(in mill. EUR)
2012-2013

Egypt

2

1.3

0.8

Jordan

1

0.2

0.1

Tunisia

1

0.9

0.9

Region

3

2

1.2

Total

7

4.4

3

Source: Matra South desk study.

Assessment: Eleven projects31 were selected for the assessment of Civil Society Initiatives. This
selection accounts for 41% of the total value of project commitments within CSI, and for
46% of the total disbursements. On average, the efficiency at project level was found to be
satisfactory. The main reason that the CSI projects in particular have been efficiently
implemented is that in general, fairly professional organisations submitted proposals and
received financial support for implementation. At the same time, some delays in project
implementation have to be expected when operating in transition countries, given the
prevailing insecurity, political unrest and in-country funding restrictions for civil society
organisations. A couple of CSI projects scored a very high relevance due to the fact that in
line with findings documented in Chapter 2, their focus was on key actors and factors
supporting transition. The following text box provides an example of one such project in
Egypt:
Box 8

Example of a CSI project in Egypt

This project aims to strengthen practices of democracy, free elections, human
rights and accountability. It focuses on mobilising poor communities to become
active citizens and claim their civil, political and socio-economic rights in five
governorates in Upper Egypt. The project uses a grassroots model, which entails
working with and through local Community Based Organisations (CBOs). The
project implementation approach whereby use is made of CBOs and community
mobilisers has proven to be a very effective way for organising outreach and
awareness-raising activities among marginalised community members (women,
young people and the illiterate). In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, local
communities’ demands for knowledge about political processes and citizens’ rights
increased tremendously.

31

Three projects that are financed from the centralised budget and eight projects that are managed by
the embassies.

| 51 |

The Only Constant is Change

The activities implemented include:
•	Staff trained on issues of socio-political participation and a rights-based
approach to development;
•	26 trainers trained, using a curriculum on political participation and
socio-economic rights;
•	5 civil society networks are being formed at the governorate level for joint
campaigning and lobbying;
•	125 CBOs and NGOs trained on the right-based approach and Integrating
democratisation into their work;
•	375 community members trained on civic election observation;
•	15 CBOs organised awareness-raising meetings about the elections, reaching out
to 38,000 men and women in phase 1 (more than planned) and to 18,414 people
in phase 2;
•	375 young potential future politicians trained (instead of 125);
•	200 (instead of the planned 35) media representatives trained in political and
civic issues, context analysis and critical reporting;
•	700 young people trained in democratisation processes, political participation
and citizenship.
| 52 |

Realised outputs:
•	Capacity of local Egyptian NGOs and CBOs has strengthened in terms of increased
understanding of socio-political participation issues and the rights-based
approach to development. Furthermore, a beginning has been made in
developing CSO networks to foster joint action and knowledge sharing;
•	Various awareness-raising events and trainings have strengthened the
awareness of communities in the five governorates in Upper Egypt about
practising democracy, human rights, active citizenship and political participation;
•	Capacity of local media has been strengthened and young people have been
trained in political participation.
The project has proved to stimulate active citizenship by empowering local
communities and by supporting them to raise their voice and demand
accountability of public institutions. The following examples of outcomes were
given by the villagers during a focus group discussion:
•	Seheyl island villagers proudly explained how their increased knowledge about
election laws empowered them to obtain a ballot box on the island and
facilitated their increased participation in elections;
•	Villagers also managed to convince the local authorities of the need for a ferry
service, which resulted in a substantial decrease in costs of local transport and
goods purchased from Aswan.
Source: IOB field research in Aswan (Egypt) and Matra South desk study.

The bilateral approach

The demand-oriented approach is especially reflected in the programme component of CSI.
One project which scored less well in terms of the evaluation criteria was a regional project
implemented by the International Financial Corporation, aiming to increase the
employability of youth.
Support to training of diplomats and civil servants
Description: Under this component, junior diplomats from the priority countries have been
trained in the Netherlands on a number of subjects including democratisation, rule of law,
human rights and new forms of diplomacy such as economic diplomacy and public
diplomacy. The training is given by the Clingendael Institute. Clingendael sends the
invitation to the embassies concerned in The Hague, who in turn contact their Ministry for
potential candidates. Clingendael may contact the Netherlands Embassy for advice if there
are doubts about the experience or suitability of a suggested candidate.
Under the training of young diplomats’ component a total of approximately EUR 1.4 million
has been committed and by the end of 2013, 74% of the budget had been disbursed. The
table below provides an overview of the number of participants per country. In the last
training event, participants from Algeria and Yemen also participated. Over half of the
participants came from Morocco and Tunisia. The low number of Egyptian participants is
partly explained by the late start of government cooperation (this prevented Egyptian
participation in the training courses held at the end of 2012) and the application of
conditionality in 2013.
Table 7 	Overview of the number of participants in the training of young diplomats,
per country
Training | no.

Egypt

Jordan

Morocco

Libya

Tunisia

Other

Total

2012 (1)

-

1

5

2

5

-

13

2013 (2)

3

3

3

4

4

-

17

2013 (3)

4

3

4

-

4

-

15

2013 (4)

-

4

5

4

5

-

18

2014 (5)

4

3

4

2

5

2

20

Total

11

14

21

12

23

2

83

Source: Matra South desk study.

Various training courses on public policy, governance and rule of law have been offered in
the Netherlands to civil servants from the priority countries. DAM requested RVO to manage
this component too, and in turn RVO contracted several training suppliers32 to develop and
deliver the training. The Dutch embassies in the priority countries facilitated the application
32

The Hague Academy for Local Governance, the Center for International Legal Cooperation, the Asser
institute, Ecorys, The RijksAkademie and Wageningen University.

| 53 |

The Only Constant is Change

of participants through the dissemination of information on the courses, and advised on
the selection of participants.
The table below provides an overview of the training courses provided and the number of civil
servants trained per country in the period 2012-2014. Most participants came from Jordan and
Tunisia. As explained earlier, participants from Egypt could not participate in all courses.
Table 8

Overview of the number of participants in the civil servant training, per country

Training | no.

| 54 |

Egypt

Jordan

Morocco

Administration of
Justice (3)

Libya

Tunisia

Total

9

19

Legislation (3)

8

22

14

12

18

72

9

12

18

69

Water policy (2)

4

Social Affairs and
employment (2)

11

11

11

12

49

-

15

3

8

11

37

Public Finance
Management I

-

3

2

4

3

12

Public Finance
Management II

-

5

3

3

2

13

Local governance (2)

5

15

7

8

13

48

Food security

6

6

5

4

5

26

Total

32

96

54

62

82

326

Source: Matra South desk study.

Reflection on evaluation findings: The total amount allocated for the training courses developed
(on public finance management, administration of justice, social affairs and employment,
water management, legislation, food safety and local governance) amounts to
approximately EUR 3 million, of which 54% had been disbursed by the end of 2013.
The programme and management costs of the Clingendael diplomat training courses
(of EUR 8250 per participant) and training courses (10%) subcontracted by RVO are
considered reasonable. Certain training courses were perceived to be more useful than
others in terms of their relevance to the local context. For example, the course on water
policy was appreciated more by participants from Egypt than from Libya. The course on
social affairs and employment was perceived as somewhat unusual for its Dutch approach
and lack of context sensitivity. The course on public finance management was perceived
as helpful. The training of junior diplomats included follow-up contact with alumni, via,
for example, a Facebook page for network activities, discussions and support – including an
alumni workshop to be organised in Morocco. The sustainability of the results achieved
following training depends to a large extent on the degree to which the training results in
changes at the institutional level. However, no information is available, for example, on the
extent to which trainees have actually been able to use the skills and knowledge acquired
and the perceived benefits at the organisational level.

The bilateral approach

Capacity building of political parties (PP)
Description: Under this component, Dutch political parties can receive a subsidy by
submitting their proposal (or activity plans) for supporting political organisations in the
priority countries (in the Arab region as well as Eastern Europe) to the Ministry of Interior
and Kingdom relations (BZK).33 The maximum amount of funding that political parties can
apply for is based on their number of seats in Parliament. Following the Law on funding of
Political Parties, political parties are completely free in their country selection. Nevertheless
they are urged to allocate the subsidy to the priority countries. Every year, EUR 500,000 is
allocated to capacity building projects of political organisations34 amounting to a total
budget of EUR 2 million. In 2012, total PP commitments were EUR 480,036 of which 95%
was disbursed. The pie chart below shows the breakdown of the total budget allocations in
2012 per political party.
Figure 2

Share of total allocations per political party (2012)
5%
8%
25%

VVD
PvdA

10%

CDA
GL
D66

11%

CU
SGP
25%
16%

Source: Matra South desk study.

Most of the budget went to the Labour Party (PvdA), the People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD) and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). For 2013 (and 2014), no
overview could be provided, since from 2013 onwards the political parties received a single
allocation to support their programmes in both the Arab region and Eastern Europe.
However, given the rules relating to allocation, it is likely that the division of funds between
the parties has remained more or less the same, with the exception that since 2013 the Party
for the Animals (PvdD) has also requested funding. Even though political parties are
completely free in their country selection, various political parties indicated that in practice
about 90 to 95% is actually spent in the Arab region.
33

34

In 2012, the programme was managed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in 2013 this
responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
Source: interviews and document, The Dutch House of Representatives (2012), ‘Regels inzake de
subsidiëring en het toezicht op de financiën van politieke partijen (Wet financiering politieke partijen);
tweede nota van wijziging’, 32 752, nr. 9

| 55 |

The Only Constant is Change

The activities by the various political parties35 mostly included fact-finding missions and
training activities (e.g. campaigning, leadership, presentation skills, etc.) and also the
organisation of conferences and regional activities to build the capacity of political parties
and of individuals (e.g. journalists, Christians and students). Based on the six activity plans
and/or annual reports available, the desk study found that at least four parties are active in
Jordan, three in Morocco and two in Tunisia and Egypt, while some regional activities
(Lebanon) are also implemented. With regard to Libya, only fact-finding missions have
taken place.
Reflection on evaluation findings: Both the literature research and fieldwork point to political
sensitivities, as PP aid is perceived as helping certain political parties (Carothers 1999).
Support from the PP component lacked a multipartisan approach, and demand varied
between countries and also depended on the degree of political development in countries.
Moreover, PP did not always focus on actual political parties and support was somewhat
fragmented. At times, the emphasis on political ideology was considered problematic and
encounters were considered more useful to those providing rather than receiving support:
Box 9

On capacity building of political parties

There is little interest from both sides.

| 56 |

It is mostly about organising meetings, conferences and seminars. We [in the
Netherlands] learn more than they do.
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Egypt and Morocco.

It is likely that the fragmentation of the PP (capacity building of political organisations)
programme among eight different political parties also affects management costs and
reduces efficiency.
The MENA scholarship programme
Description: This scholarship programme (2013-2015) offers scholarships for short courses
in the Netherlands to professionals who are nationals of the following 10 Arab countries:
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria36 and Tunisia.
The programme aims to contribute to capacity building within a wide range of
governmental, non-governmental and private organisations and institutions. Each year
about 140 scholarships are available: these are distributed among the countries and
assigned to equal numbers of male and female applicants. In 2013 about EUR 1 million was
committed to in total 161 scholarships, including 30 scholarships for applicants from Tunisia
and 25 scholarships for applicants from Morocco, but none from Egypt, Jordan and Libya.

35

36

The evaluation team did not have access to all activity plans as not all parties provided the necessary
approval for disclosing the required information. Plans/annual reports were available for CDA, VVD,
PvdA, PvdD, SGP and CU.
The programme for Syria has been suspended.

The bilateral approach

Reflection on evaluation findings: The assumption of this scholarship programme is that
attending a higher education institution outside the country of origin creates benefits that
are different from those created by attending a domestic institution if at all available.
By enabling students to receive high quality education in the Netherlands, the MENA
scholarship programme may generate numerous benefits not only for individual participants
but also for the countries of origin more generally. However, the scholarships offered are
basically a one-off of limited duration, and the extent to which Arab countries realise the
societal benefits of international study depends on whether scholarship recipients return
to live and work in their countries after they complete the educational programme.
The programme also offers a wide range of courses covering engineering, law and public
administration, mathematics, commerce etc. As discussed in Chapter 3, education matters
and potentially meets local needs. However, relatively wealthy Arab countries may have less
need of support or be more interested in a different kind of collaboration.

4.3 The bilateral programme at a glance
The desk study revealed that at the beginning of the second quarter of 2014, EUR 36.1 million
of programme resources37 had been committed to support transition in a number of Arab
countries, for a total of 120 individual projects.38 The largest number of projects target
priority countries. However, their budget does not exceed EUR 14 million and the lion’s
share of the budget is allocated either to regional projects or to non-priority countries in
support of sustainable economic growth. The amount of budget committed to supporting
democratisation is approximately EUR 7.5 million, which is five times as much as the budget
committed to projects in the area of promoting rule of law, as demonstrated in the
following table:

37

38

Excluding resources utilised for the MENA scholarship programme and the programme for capacity
building of political parties.
Training courses are counted as one project in this overview.

| 57 |

The Only Constant is Change

Table 9	Overview of the number of projects and the budget committed (in EUR thousand)
to the various policy objectives in Arab countries
Policy
objective

Democratisation

Economic Growth

Rule of law

Total

Country

Budget
No.
Budget
No.
Budget
No.
Budget
No.
allocated projects allocated projects allocated projects allocated projects

Arab region

4.038

13

2.514

6

372

1

6.924

20

Egypt

1.921

4

1.511

5

149

1

3.581

10

Jordan

77

3

2.074

8

243

6

2.394

17

Libya

278

5

24

1

582

7

884

13

Morocco

315

4

4.421

11

96

2

4.832

17

Tunisia

502

20

1.701

5

-

-

2.203

25

Other Arab
countries39

400

1

14.901

17

-

-

15.301

18

7.531

50

27.146

53

1.442

17

36.119

120

Total

Source: Matra South desk study. 39

| 58 |

If the budget resources for the programme in support of political parties are included, then
in total EUR 9.5 million has been spent on activities focusing on strengthening democratic
processes. Projects in other Arab countries (Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Yemen)
account for 15% of the number of projects and 45% of the total budget. When analysing the
type of projects it was found that capacity building of individuals and organisations featured
most prominently, followed by projects on vocational training, awareness raising, lobby
and advocacy, as well as conferences and seminars; few research and cultural activities
featured in the projects.
The information available to analyse management costs for each bilateral programme
component proved to be limited. Many different stakeholders are involved in implementing
the programme, which raises doubts about the efficiency of the programme’s
organisational set-up and complicates the streamlining of the implementation of
programmes. DAM is responsible for policy formulation and overall management of the
Matra South programme. The management capacity is limited to one coordinator. The
day-to-day management and implementation of many of the components has been
contracted out to a plethora of external implementing agencies. The Dutch embassies in the
priority countries are also involved, either in a facilitating and advisory role (e.g. as is the
case for the G2G programme, the MENA scholarship programme and the training of civil
servants) or by directly providing bilateral support (e.g. CSI component). In general, the
embassies run thin on staffing for the implementation of the Matra South programme. The
implementation of many programme components depends not only on local level interest
but also on the capacity of embassies to promote, support and manage the programme
content. Based on workload and performance, it does not make sense for embassies to be
required to submit projects above the threshold of EUR 150,000 for headquarters’ approval.
39

Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Yemen.

The bilateral approach

4.4 Conclusions
The bilateral programme has offered timely and flexible funding in support of a range of
projects by key actors in countries in transition including youth, women, journalists and,
for example, trade unions. The programme has enabled embassies to maintain and enlarge
their networks at country level and gather knowledge effectively. However, the bilateral
programme has provided little support to governments in transition and has mainly
supported non-state actors. Balancing support for state and non-state actors in a purposeful
way deserves attention. The amount of budget committed to promoting rule of law in
countries in transition is small by comparison with the budgets supporting other policy
objectives. From a programme perspective, findings indicate that a) the relevance of the
programme for capacity building of political parties and organisations is low; b) the PSI
programme does not sufficiently target priority countries and c) the efficiency of the
Government-to-Government programme is poor.
On average, the selected projects (CSI, G2G and PSI) were given a satisfactory to very
satisfactory score for effectiveness, indicating that they are likely to reach their planned
outputs and objectives. However, it should be taken into account that this average score is
based on the scores assigned to thirteen of the twenty sample projects, of which only six
have ended. For the other seven projects, scores were assigned based on the available
information and an assessment of the likelihood that the planned results will be achieved.
On average, the sustainability of the selected projects (CSI, G2G and PSI) was found to be
satisfactory too. Again, it was difficult to assess this criterion, because most of the projects
selected are still ongoing. Whether the results achieved prove lasting also largely depends,
however, on the external context in which projects are implemented and the trained people
work. Given the volatile environment in many of the countries, the sustainability of the
results achieved cannot be guaranteed.
Fragmentation of financial support is a concern, both in terms of the programme as a whole
(including its organisation) and within individual programme components. This makes it
harder to achieve significant results. It was therefore not possible to measure the
attainment of programme and policy objectives beyond the level of projects.

| 59 |

5
The multilateral approach

Evaluation highlights
•	Multilateral expenditures increased in the Arab priority countries.
•	Not all multilateral programmes explicitly aim to foster democracy and rule of law.
•	EU response in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings: too little, too slow.
•	Dutch multilateral contributions made support to transition in Arab countries
appear larger.

The multilateral approach

The Ministry’s investment in the multilateral system is significant, and the Ministry also
considered its multilateral cooperation to play a role in responding to the Arab uprisings.
This chapter will provide an overview of the EU response and subsequently the UN response
to the Arab uprisings, given the substantial Dutch investments in the multilateral channels
shown40 below: 41 4243
Dutch contribution/period

Organisation/programme

EUR 200 million / 2011-2013

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with a
total budget of EUR 4 billion

EUR 40 million / 2011-2013

New financial EU resources, of which EUR 800
million can be allocated to Southern
neighbouring countries

EUR 290 million / 2011-2013 41

Loans to the Southern neighbouring region
through the European Investment Bank
totalling EUR 5.8 billion

Allocation not specified 42

World Bank, African Development Bank,
International Monetary Fund, European
Investment Bank

General contribution, allocation not specified

UNDP,43 OHCHR, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR,
etc.

Mediterranean Dialogue and partnership for
security, furthering G8 decisions and the
US-EU agreements promoting reforms in the
wider Middle East

NATO (Libya)

It will focus on EU and UN support aimed at Dutch priority countries both prior to and after
the Arab uprisings. The flow of financial resources will be examined, including the
objectives of programmes.
As discussed in Chapter 1, this evaluation focuses on bilateral support and no evaluation
research scrutinised individual EU and UN programmes or projects. The next chapter will
discuss the application of policy principles that include conditionality or the more-for-more
principle which was also intended to play a key role in the EU response towards individual
countries.
40

41

42

43

See the letter to the House of Representatives (Parliamentary Paper 32 623, no. 40) of 24 June 2011 on
the Netherlands’ activities in the Arab region.
For Egypt, for example, EUR 449 million was reserved, of which EUR 22 million was the Netherlands’
contribution (2011-2013).
By way of illustration, IBRD/IDA operations for 2013 amounted to USD 585.4 million in Egypt, USD 183.5
million in Algeria and USD 593.2 million in Morocco. International financial institutions focused in the
first instance on Tunisia (World Bank USD 1.5 billion, African Development Bank USD 500 million) and
Egypt (World Bank USD 4.5 billion, IMF USD 20 billion).
UNDP plays a role in the UN coordination of efforts and has drawn up a Strategy of Response to
Transformative Change Championed by Youth in the Arab Region. It focuses on improving governance
and economic development (especially on creating jobs for young people).

| 61 |

The Only Constant is Change

5.1 The EU response to the Arab uprisings
After the Council adopted its Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External
Relations in 2009, the EU expressed its intention to increase its efforts to support
democracy. The EU democracy support activities are based on Article 21 of the Treaty on
European Union: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which
it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter and international law’.44 The EU considers democracy to be the political system
that through proper mechanisms best allows people to enjoy their civil, political, social,
economic and cultural rights.45

| 62 |

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 with the overall objective
of creating a friendly neighbours programme and strengthening the prosperity, stability and
security of all concerned, given the enlargement of the EU. The ENP is chiefly a bilateral
policy between the EU and each partner country and has become the main vehicle for EU
funding in Arab countries. It is complemented by other regional and multilateral
cooperation initiatives formerly known as the Barcelona Process. Within the ENP the EU
offers 1646 countries, nine of which are Arab countries, ‘a privileged relationship, building
upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law,
good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development)’ (EU website).47
The ENP covers a broad range of issues: from employment and social policy, trade, industrial
and competition policy, to agriculture and rural development, climate change and
environment. These include energy security, transport, research and innovation, as well as
support to health, education, culture and youth. Fourteen countries have formalised their
contact with the EU in Association Agreements (AAs): the exceptions are Syria and Libya,
where either ratification or negotiations are pending. The European Commission provides
financial support in grant form to partners; the European Investment Bank and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development complement this support through loans.
The EU has mobilised a range of financial instruments to support the process of transition in
Arab partner countries but the bulk of the funding has been provided by the ENP Instrument
(ENPI). The EU response to the Arab uprisings also included new financial resources made
available from the end of 2011 and provided through the ENPI by means of the SPRING
programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) and regional
cooperation programmes. EU Delegations were also expected to work closely with partner
governments, EU Member States and international stakeholders to identify and support
initiatives for support under the SPRING programme.
44
45
46

47

See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL&from=en.
See http://eeas.europa.eu/democracy_support/index_en.htm.
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova,
Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
See http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm (last consulted on January 10, 2015).

The multilateral approach

The following table provides an overview of the resources committed to each Arab country
under the ENPI both prior to and after the Arab uprisings. It shows not only the amounts
committed under the ENPI, but also the actual disbursements to the Arab countries
prioritised by the Netherlands, i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. There are
notable differences between what has been committed and what has actually been
disbursed in the priority countries, especially since the Arab uprisings.
Table 10	EU financial support to Arab countries incl. amounts committed under ENPI
(in EUR million) for all Arab countries, and actual disbursements to the Dutch
priority countries
Country

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Total

Algeria
Amount committed

35.6

59

58

74

30

256.6

Egypt
Amount committed

140

192

92

250

47

721

Actual disbursements

151

106.2

39.1

93.2

28.2

417.7

Jordan
Amount committed

68

70

116

120 48

88 49

462

Actual disbursements

49

92

76.3

91.6

96

404.9

Lebanon
Amount committed

43

44

33

92 50

76

288

Libya
Amount committed

0

12

10

25

30

77

8

2.9

7.7

18.6

Actual disbursements
Morocco
Amount committed

145

158.9

166.6

207

334.9

1012.4

Actual disbursements

220.7

170.1

151.5

110.1

84.1

736.5

Palestinian Territories
Amount committed

352.6

367.9

413.7

224

313.7

1671.9

Syria
Amount committed

40

50

10

48.4

170

318.4

48 49 50

48

49
50

Not including special measures to support Syrian refugees in Jordan: EUR 20.85 million committed in
2013 and EUR 51.6 million in 2013; those commitments are included in the figures for Syria.
Ditto.
Not including special measures to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon: EUR 15 million committed in
2012 and EUR 67 million in 2013: these are included in the figures for Syria.

| 63 |

The Only Constant is Change

Tunisia
Amount committed

77

77

180

130

135

599

Actual disbursements

74.4

68.5

114.3

145.2

80.3

482.7

Total commitments

901.2

1030.8

1079.3

1170.4

1224.6

5406.3

Regional/interregional
cooperation South

99*

99.4

104.6

114.2*

118.2

535,4

1000.2

1130.2

1183.9

1284.6

1342.8

5941.7 51

Grand Total commitments

* Excluding amounts for the European Parliament (EP) preparatory actions (EUR 2 million in 2009 and EUR
1.5 million in 2012). 51
Source: European Commission http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/stats/statistical_annex_2014.pdf (as on
January 10, 2015).

| 64 |

In the case of Egypt, for example, in 2012 an amount of EUR 150 million was programmed,
an amount of EUR 250 million committed and an amount of EUR 93.2 million was disbursed
under the ENPI (including Neighbourhood Investment Facility payments). EU financial
support to Egypt and Libya experienced extreme underutilisation; Jordan and Tunisia fared
somewhat better. In Morocco, expenditures exceeded commitments prior to the Arab
uprising, with reported under-expenditures as of 2012. In all priority countries the total
expenditures are lower than the amounts committed over the period of five years from 2009
to 2013. Moreover, the ENPI expenditures recorded in the five priority countries also include
country interregional Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) payments.
The inaccessibility, bureaucratic slowness and inflexibility of EU instruments was lamented
by numerous interviewees and did not enable a rapid or pragmatic response of any kind in
Arab countries in transition:
Box 10

On EU support in Arab countries in transition

If we would have been able to react more quickly with some of our instruments…
It would have been much better … at least to have some part of the neighbourhood
programme which could react faster … I mean a month, not three years because
you are always behind the curve. We are too slow, we are just too slow. There is no
simple way out, the EU is what it is. We have a lot more to satisfy … Parliament is
more powerful.
Every country is so different. How can you apply these things across the board.
I know they do it, with good intentions. By the time you get through the bureaucracy
it has changed again… You have to swim in this turbulent sea, act pragmatically.
Source: Interviews Field Research.

51

Excluding ENPI cross-border cooperation.

The multilateral approach

At the same time, the objectives of the EU bilateral programme prior to and after 2011
remained more or less the same, as demonstrated below. When comparing the five
countries of Dutch focus, only in the case of Jordan was a substantial amount of actual
expenditures (34.1%) spent on supporting the country’s reforms to democracy, human
rights, media and justice in the period 2011-2013.
The pie charts below, comparing expenditures prior to and after the Arab uprisings and
corresponding objectives, show that most EU assistance in Egypt was oriented towards
sustainable development and not directly towards promoting democracy and the rule of law:
Figure 3

Comparing EU financial support to Egypt prior to and after the Arab uprisings

What EU financial support to Egypt was actually spent on prior to the Arab uprisings (2007-2010):

Support for reforms to
democracy, human rights and
justice is 6.7%
Developing competitiveness and
productivity of the Egyptian
economy is 44.8%
Ensuring sustainability of the
development process with better
management of human and
natural resources is 48.9%

What EU financial support to Egypt was actually spent on after the Arab uprisings (2011-2013):

Support for reforms to
democracy, human rights and
justice is 0%
Developing competitiveness and
productivity of the Egyptian
economy is 43.1%
Support for socioeconomic
reform and sustainable
development is 56.9%

| 65 |

The Only Constant is Change

In Morocco, the bilateral programme objectives in the period 2007-2010 remained similar
to those in 2011-2013. The pie charts below show that social sector expenditures remained
important throughout these years, expenditures for institutional support increased and
there was a slight increase in expenditures oriented towards governance and human rights
(from 1.1 % prior to 2011 to 7.8% post 2011):
Figure 4

Comparing EU financial support to Morocco prior to and after the Arab uprisings

What EU financial support to Morocco was actually spent on prior to the Arab uprisings (2007-2010):

Social sector is 44.6%
Governance, human rights is 1.1%
Institutional support is 12.5%
Economic sector is 35.1%

| 66 |

Environmental sector is 6.7%

What EU financial support to Morocco was actually spent on after the Arab uprisings (2011-2013):

Social sector is 33.9%
Governance, human rights is 7.8%
Institutional support is 43.6%
Economic sector is 10.3%
Environmental sector is 6.4%

The multilateral approach

Relations between the EU and Libya improved as of 2007-8 and initially EU assistance was
rendered to the Benghazi Action Plan on HIV/Aids. In 2010 the EU committed funds to migration
and an EU Delegation was opened in November 2011. A revised National Indicative Programme
2011-2013 was signed on 30 August 2012. Analysis of actual expenditures revealed notable
differences again between what was programmed, what was committed and what was disbursed.
In the case of Libya, for example, in 2012 an amount of EUR 25 million was programmed, an
amount of EUR 25 million was committed and an amount of EUR 2.9 million was disbursed.
In Libya, during the period 2011-2013, actual expenditures were oriented towards support to
the transition process (37%), improving the quality of human capital (29%), increasing the
sustainability of economic and social development (16.7%) and jointly addressing the
challenge of managing migration (16.7%). Libya received some EU aid through a number of
other instruments, including SPRING allocations and support under thematic instruments,
of which humanitarian aid was the largest in 2011 (EUR 80.5 million). In Tunisia, the
objectives of governance and justice as well as of employment and social protection utilised
far fewer resources than planned and the lion’s share of resources actually contributed to
business competitiveness (industry and services).
The issues of not adapting the priorities for EU financial assistance to changing realities on
the ground and doing little to promote democracy have been raised in a number of evaluation
reports and by a number of researchers (EC 2011, EC 2013, Lehne 2014 and Bicchi 2014).

5.2 The UN response to the Arab uprisings
A series of both controversial and influential UN reports52 on the Arab region between 2001
and 2005 highlighted a number of potential drivers of instability, including the lack of
freedom of speech and democratic participation. The Arab Human Development Reports
continued to discuss challenges to human security in the Arab countries and argued that
governments pursued state security instead, with the result that the region experienced
personal insecurity and ‘the world’s highest levels of unemployment, deep and contentious
patterns of exclusion, and, ultimately, strong calls from within for reform’ (Arab Human
Development Report 2009: v).53 Interestingly, governance used to be part and parcel of
UNDP’s regional programme for Arab states, including the Programme on Governance for
the Arab Region (POGAR). This programme rested on three pillars: a) rule of law; b)
parliaments; and c) knowledge management. It also engaged Arab governments on the
topic of anti-corruption at a regional scale (UNDP Evaluation Office 2013). Similar to the
early bilateral Matra support in Arab countries, UNDP terminated its regional Programme
on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR) in 2009, even though it had generated a
number of specialised projects.
52

53

The UNDP Arab Human Development Reports 2002-2005 were subtitled Creating Opportunities for Future
Generations, Building a Knowledge Society, Towards Freedom in the Arab World and Towards the Rise of Women in
the Arab World.
According to Amat Al Alim Alsoswa, then Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator,
Regional Director, Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Development Programme.

| 67 |

The Only Constant is Change

Considering the unearmarked voluntary contributions54 (mentioned above) by the Ministry
to UN agencies, an analysis of the UN system response to the Arab uprisings has to take into
account the multiplicity of the UN agencies involved, as well as the various focus areas and
different programme objectives. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, ILO and UNHCR are key
recipients in the context of the Arab uprisings and each agency has its own particular added
value. At country level, UN Country Teams representing the in-country agencies formulate a
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) together with governments,
as a collective multi-year programme of work. UNDAF documents covering the priority
countries55 demonstrate that prior to 2011 the areas of focus represented country-level
development challenges and the Millennium Declaration of 2000.
The following overview provides insight into the expenditures (2009-2013) by a large
number of UN agencies in the Arab priority countries:
56

Table 11	Expenditures of a number of UN 56 agencies in Arab priority countries in 2009-2013
in USD thousand

| 68 |

Country

UN
organisation

2009

2010

2012

2013

Libya

UNDP

4.376

4.416

656

12.858

11.145

33.450

0

0

12

1

0

12

DPA

n.a.

n.a.

13.929

38.883

47.051

99.863

UNSMIL

n.a.

n.a.

9.517

44.737

44.737

98.991

UNHCR

4.057

2.701

10.907

12.657

6.720

37.043

UNICEF

n.a

n.a.

n.a.

7

2.476

2.483

WHO

531

414

1.247

5.009

2.458

9.659

UNFPA

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

751

699

1.450

FAO

903

1.114

917

703

1.143

4.781

WFP

n.a.

n.a.

7.075

557

n.a.

7.632

Total

9.867

8.645

44.259

116.164

116.430

295.364

UNWOMEN

54

55
56

2011

Total
expenditures

The unearmarked financial contribution to specialised UN agencies will amount to approximately EUR
461 million in 2015 in total (UNDP receives EUR 41 million, UNFPA EUR 42 million, UNICEF EUR 50 million,
WFP EUR 40 million and UNHCR EUR 33 million). Response by the Minister for Foreign Trade and
Development Cooperation to questions asked during discussions on the budget, 19 November 2014.
There is no UNDAF document covering Libya.
For the purpose of comparison: IOB was informed that UNDP data on 2009 may differ from data shown
on the IATI site and UNHCR expenditures are based on UN System Accounting Standards (UNSAS).

The multilateral approach

Country

UN
organisation

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Egypt

UNDP

75.343

51.857

71.358

75.067

51.585

325.210

0

9

943

3.571

4.300

8.823

7.906

10.618

19.343

20.664

37.651

96.181

n.a.

1.714

1.879

4.497

7.056

15.146

UNICEF

10.549

7.019

7.953

6.251

8.206

39.979

FAO

4.344

2.613

1.930

967

1.587

11.441

WFP

5.350

9.349

10.262

10.821

12.496

48.279

WHO

5.934

1.758

3.240

2.332

5.416

18.681

UNFPA

3.128

3.220

3.534

2.970

2.391

15.243

Total

112.553

88.159

120.443

127.140

130.688

578.984

UNDP

6.564

3.411

4.075

6.096

9.761

29.907

UNWOMEN

7.223

8.621

2.106

3.383

3.258

24.592

UNRWA

103.949

114.824

111.237

133.154

136.977

600.141

UNHCR

40.765

30.895

27.204

85.759

234.034

418.657

n.a.

1.730

1.856

3.387

3.398

10.371

UNICEF

7.388

7.630

6.471

11.896

98.335

131.719

FAO

173

337

377

174

48

1.109

WFP

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

2.227

1.044

3.272

WHO

5.669

1.659

2.265

3.183

9.819

22.595

UNFPA

785

1.513

1.067

1.885

4.204

9.454

Total

172.516

170.620

156.659

251.144

500.878

1.251.817

UNDP

15.877

11.597

12.831

14.078

11.670

66.053

UNWOMEN

3.614

3.804

1.803

3.333

2.565

15.119

UNHCR

1.577

1.736

2.147

2.194

2.188

9.841

n.a.

708

929

654

1.276

3.567

UNICEF

4.624

3.996

4.526

3.400

4.137

20.683

WFP

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

98

26

124

FAO

949

834

962

229

219

3.193

UNWOMEN
UNHCR
ILO

Jordan

ILO

Morocco

ILO

Total
expenditures

| 69 |

The Only Constant is Change

Country

Tunisia

UN
organisation

2009

2010

2011

WHO

2.214

1.158

1.543

791

1.597

7.303

UNFPA

3.068

2.819

2.597

2.272

1.535

12.290

Total

31.923

26.652

27.338

27.049

25.212

138.174

UNDP

1.986

1.496

3.369

8.456

19.260

34.568

0

0

408

503

361

1.271

DPA

n.a.

n.a.

68

135

113

316

UNHCR

648

984

35.650

11.969

8.200

57.452

ILO

n.a.

199

362

1.388

358

2.307

FAO

604

521

290

649

930

2.994

UNICEF

1.362

1.146

3.415

1.623

1.635

9.181

WFP

n.a.

n.a.

401

845

586

1.833

WHO

1.565

743

1.863

1.238

1.356

6.765

UNFPA

684

573

948

739

636

3.580

Total

6.849

5.662

46.774

27.545

33.436

120.266

333.708

299.738

395.473

549.042

806.644

2.384.605

UNWOMEN

| 70 |

Grand total

2012

2013

Total
expenditures

Note: the totals have been calculated from the exact values, not from the rounded values shown in the table.

In general, total UN expenditures increased in the Arab priority countries following the Arab
uprisings, with Morocco and Tunisia receiving more support in 2011 than in 2013. However,
not all expenditures were directed at supporting good governance and not all agencies have
a corresponding mandate. For this reason, UNDP efforts in the Arab region were analysed in
more detail.

The multilateral approach

Table 12

Detailed breakdown of UNDP expenditures in Arab priority countries in 2009-2013
by objectives, in USD thousand

Country

UNDP objectives

Libya

2009

2010

Democratic governance

511

181

Environment &
sustainable development

2.391

Poverty reduction & MDG
achievement

2013

Total
expenditures

319 12.223 10.312

23.545

3.866

165

218

297

6.936

1.379

368

137

356

363

2.604

96

0

35

61

173

366

Total

4.376

4.416

656 12.858 11.145

33.450

Democratic governance

6.257

7.836

5.660

5.689

5.327

30.769

Environment &
sustainable development

3.577

2.567

2.508

2.674

3.311

14.636

Poverty reduction & MDG
achievement

62.862 39.742 60.998 53.226 33.711

250.538

Crisis prevention &
recovery

2.573

1.713

Other development
activities

75

0

Other development
activities

Egypt

Total
Jordan

2011

1.600

2012

1.827

1.030

8.742

592 11.651

8.206

20.524

75.343 51.857 71.358 75.067 51.585

325.210

Democratic governance

860

649

1.306

2.099

2.590

7.504

Environment &
sustainable development

464

331

1.068

2.141

4.713

8.716

Poverty reduction & MDG
achievement

779

811

708

998

1.506

4.802

Crisis prevention &
recovery

4.147

1.511

818

715

764

7.955

Other development
activities

314

109

175

142

189

929

6.564

3.411

4.075

6.096

9.761

29.907

Total

| 71 |

The Only Constant is Change

Country

UNDP objectives

Tunisia

Morocco

| 72 |

2009

2010

2011

Democratic governance

447

437

Environment & sustainable
development

796

Poverty reduction & MDG
achievement
Other development
activities

2013

Total
expenditures

123

2.726 10.940

14.674

859

873

2.146

3.304

7.977

100

0

9

30

9

147

644

200

2.365

3.554

5.007

11.770

Total

1.986

1.496

3.369

8.456 19.260

34.568

Democratic governance

8.794 11.585 12.647 13.732 10.195

56.953

Environment &
sustainable development

5.775

0

0

68

349

6.192

Poverty reduction & MDG
achievement

962

0

0

92

531

1.586

Other development
activities

346

12

184

185

595

1.322

15.877 11.597 12.831 14.078 11.670

66.053

Total
Grand total

2012

489.188

Note: the totals have been calculated from the exact values, not from the rounded values shown in the table.

The UNDP’s ‘Democratic governance’ expenditures 2009-2013 show that the expenditures
during this period were substantial, especially in Morocco, with little spent on other
objectives. Expenditures on democratic governance increased after 2011 in Libya, Jordan and
Tunisia. Throughout the period, expenditures generally increased in Libya, Jordan and
Tunisia, whereas Morocco and Egypt remained somewhat similar and decreased in 2013 in
comparison to earlier years. In Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, most programmes focus on other
goals and not so much on democratic governance. With the exception of Egypt, the
expenditures covering support to democratic governance increased in the Arab priority
countries after 2011. In the period 2009-2013, UNDP expenditures on democratic
governance amounted to 27% of UNDP’s total expenditures in the Arab priority countries.

The multilateral approach

5.3 Conclusions
Multilateral aid, particularly when delivered through the EU or the UN, potentially allows
for the efficient pooling of financial resources. Particularly in the face of budgetary
constraints, it potentially allows individual donors to still make a significant contribution
by pooling resources with others. Especially when the UN works on an agenda for
democratisation, this also suggests that democratisation matters worldwide and is not
exclusively the concern of EU Member States or of a particular country such as the
Netherlands. However, because of its elaborate programme planning cycles, multilateral aid
does require time to adjust to changes on the ground. The EU response in the aftermath of
the Arab uprisings has been especially criticised for using instruments which lack flexibility
in country-specific situations where change is ongoing.
In the period under review, multilateral expenditures increased in the Arab priority countries.
However, four years after the Arab uprisings the number of multilateral programmes that
explicitly aim at sustainable transitions in the Arab priority countries, and especially
support democratisation and the development of rule of law, remain few. Listing Dutch
investments in the multilateral channel made support to transition in Arab countries
appear much more substantial than is actually the case at the level of individual countries
and programmes. Not all multilateral organisations and programmes can be assumed to
automatically support the implementation of Dutch policy objectives.

| 73 |

6
Diplomacy and principles

Evaluation highlights
•	Diplomacy is an important instrument to support transition.
•	Delivering aid bilaterally or multilaterally is a key decision.
•	Conditionality does not work.
•	Coordination is limited.
•	Some existing bilateral instruments have worked better than others.
•	A prerequisite for success is demand for change.

Diplomacy and principles

This chapter will shed light on the role of diplomacy in supporting the bilateral programme
of democratic transition and the application of the policy principles stated as underpinning
the Dutch contribution to transition in the Arab region.

6.1 The role of diplomacy
Diplomacy is the act of dealing with other nations, usually through negotiation and
discussion. Most diplomacy occurs behind the scenes, as officials often meet privately to
discuss key issues. Diplomacy involves meetings and sending diplomatic messages, as well
as making public statements unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally about the relationship
between countries. Research on the role of diplomacy in supporting democratic transition
is limited. Trying to understand and monitor processes of change, assessing reactions
in-country, gauging the temperature and comparing notes are part and parcel of diplomacy.
To gain more insight into the use of diplomacy to promote democracy, rule of law and
economic growth in the five Arab priority countries, the content of diplomatic cables was
analysed.
Diplomatic messages are a source of information and provide insight into topics of special
interest and the implementation of policies at country level. Besides a fine-grained
qualitative analysis of 403 diplomatic cables described briefly in Chapter 1 (see also Annex 6)
an experimental pilot study was carried out with automated text-mining.57 This study
included the entire collection of diplomatic messages related to the five priority countries
(Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Jordan) through topic modelling58 and compared the
number of documents discussing democratic transition. Figure 5 shows that the Arab
uprisings and political turmoil were reflected from the end of 2010 by an increase in
references to the issue of democratic transition in line with the political flux in the priority
countries:

57

58

The word basket used for coding was: demonstration, union, unrest, protest, violence, revolution,
social movement, democracy, reform, political parties, Muslim brotherhood, change, transition,
democratisation, crisis.
Topic modelling provides a suite of algorithms to reveal hidden thematic structure in large collections
of texts.

| 75 |

The Only Constant is Change

Figure 5

Insight into the number of diplomatic messages on ‘democratic transition’ in priority
countries (2009-2013)

180
160

Number of diplomatic messages

140

100
80

Egypt (all messages)
Egypt (messages on
democratic transition)
Tunisia (all messages)

60

Tunisia (messages
on democratic transition)
Jordan (all messages)

40

Jordan (messages
on democratic transition)
Libya (all messsages)

20

Libya (messages on
democratic transition)
Morocco (all messages)

0

Morocco (messages
on democratic transition)

1/2
0
2/ 09
20
3/ 09
20
4/ 09
20
1/2 09
0
2/ 10
20
3/ 10
20
4/ 10
20
1/2 10
0
2/ 11
20
3/ 11
20
4/ 11
20
1/2 11
0
2/ 12
20
3/ 12
20
4/ 12
20
1/2 12
0
2/ 13
20
3/ 13
20
4/ 13
20
13

| 76 |

120

The qualitative MaxQDA analysis of diplomatic cables confirms a special interest in human
rights and gender equality already prior to the Arab uprisings. Aside from reporting on events,
messages discuss bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in relation to political pluriformity, the
monitoring of elections and promotion of human rights. Diplomatic efforts to monitor and
promote freedom of religion focus on Egypt, and related messages show a substantial increase
in 2011. Post 2011, diplomatic messages also increasingly report on LGBT rights, considered
sensitive in practically all Arab countries. Besides bilateral diplomacy in the area of human
rights, both diplomatic messages and field research also demonstrate the importance of
coalition building and multilateral EU diplomacy, especially in the area of human rights.
Diplomatic responses range from expressing concern about repeated use of excessive force
against demonstrators and human rights abuses, civil society space, and the destruction of
churches, to condemning acts of terrorism both bilaterally and multilaterally. Multilateral
responses consisted of joint declarations by UN member states as well as EU statements at
the level of the Human Rights Council.59 Post 2011, the issue of security gains prominence in
diplomatic cables. Messages also display growing attention to bilateral opportunities for
collaboration in priority areas, given the launch of the Matra South programme. Diplomatic
messages show a high and sustained political interest in Morocco in comparison to the
other Arab priority countries, with visits by a number of Dutch ministers from various
ministries. Visits by the Minister of Foreign Affairs focused on Jordan and Egypt, with visits
to Libya and Tunisia taking place after the uprisings.
59

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/hrc_en.htm.

Diplomacy and principles

Box 11

On diplomacy

I always try to combine our position with other EU positions. For instance, a
document criticising Egypt for oppressing demonstrations was signed by other
EU countries, Japan and the United States. Acting together is preferable.
Source: Interviews Field Research.

In the literature, multilateral diplomacy is often considered more rewarding for finding and
formulating solutions to global challenges which are transnational in nature and include
issues of human rights and security.
Diplomatic messages also provide anecdotal information on the Matra South programme,
the relevance of its components from a country-level perspective and discussions about
individual project proposals. Regarding the application of policy principles, diplomatic
messages discuss issues related to conditionality and coordination at country level.
The practical application of conditionality is most often discussed. Most problematic are
considered to be the absence of a unified stand among EU Member States because of their
varied political and economic interests and perspectives, and the lack of donor leverage due
to huge sums offered by the Gulf countries. Strong local resentment to the application of
conditionality are recorded in Egypt and Tunisia in particular. Coordination among donors
and international financial institutions in Arab priority countries is still developing, with
the exception of Egypt,where donor coordination was already in place prior to the Arab
uprisings.60 Efforts to coordinate donors are greatest in the area of human rights and are
linked to diplomacy.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Ministry stated that it would apply a number of principles in
pursuing its policy response to the Arab uprisings. The application of policy principles will
be discussed in more detail in the next section.

6.2 Policy principles in practice
This section will reflect on the application of principles in the context of supporting
transition in the Arab region. The Ministry’s overarching principles driving policy
implementation consisted of:
• effective action through bilateral and multilateral channels;
• a demand-driven approach;
• intelligent conditionality, based on policy objectives;
• no new structures but a review of existing structures using existing budgetary
instruments;
• effective national and international coordination.
60

A Donor Assistance Group (DAG) for Egypt was launched in the late 1990s as an initiative of the then UN
Resident Coordinator. It still exists.

| 77 |

The Only Constant is Change

Bilateral and multilateral channels
No single aid instrument can cover the broad range of policy objectives in support of
transition in all Arab countries. The Dutch policy objectives include democratisation,
development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, and economic growth.
Whether financial aid in support of these objectives is delivered bilaterally or multilaterally
is a key decision. Bilateral aid was more clearly oriented towards Dutch policy objectives and
has the potential to serve specific national interests in a way that multilateral aid cannot.
Dutch bilateral aid also proved to be rapid and flexible in its support to emerging
opportunities in priority countries (see Chapter 4). In contrast, the EU response with its
elaborate programme planning cycles took longer to adjust to changes in the Arab countries
studied (see Chapter 5).

| 78 |

On the other hand, when the UN works on an agenda for democratisation, this suggests
that democracy matters worldwide and is not exclusively the problem of a particular country
and an interested donor country. Multilateral aid also potentially allows for the efficient
pooling of financial resources. Particularly in the face of budgetary constraints, it allows
individual donors to still make a significant contribution through combining resources
with others. However, democracy assistance is not necessarily a significant and visible part
of the assistance provided by the EU and the UN, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. A policy
which introduces bilateral and multilateral channels for supporting democratic transition
in the Arab countries has to discuss and consider the balance between bilateral and
multilateral aid. It also needs to take into consideration the focus and performance of
multilateral programmes at country level.
A demand-driven approach
As described earlier, the demand-oriented approach is especially reflected in the
programme component of supporting CSI. Staff at embassies are in the best position to
judge local actors and factors and assess individual proposals and requests for support.
Evaluation findings demonstrate that in general, embassy staff managed to identify actors
and proposals for CSI support which oftentimes corresponded with the actors of change
identified in Chapter 2. Notably, bilateral support was pro-actively extended to strengthen
the trade union movement and investigative journalism in Egypt, support youth and the
rise of civil society in Libya, and support both transparency and human rights in Morocco.
Other Matra South programme components, for example the training of civil servants and
G2G assistance,61 were less demand-driven, as discussed in Chapter 4, and initiated either by
the Ministry or the RVO.
Conditionality
Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings the Ministry has strongly advocated the
importance of the application of conditionality. A central concept of both bilateral and EU
aid has been the idea of providing more political and financial support to those Arab
countries that implement more reforms and become more democratic, and providing less
political and financial support to those countries that are making less progress towards
61

Collaboration between Ombudsmen and Courts of Audit.

Diplomacy and principles

democracy. However, no strategy or policy has been developed on how to deal with a
transition government or de facto government and the Ministry has never defined or
elaborated the idea of an intelligent or smart application of conditionality.
An example of the mismatch between the aspirations related to conditionality and the
actual implementation of conditionality in practice is provided by Egypt, where it proved
cumbersome and not particularly effective to cancel and resume the Dutch exit strategy of
development projects.62 One cannot also simply hold individual government officials
accountable for a change of behaviour of governments. Moreover, strategic, economic and
other interests of bilateral donors and EU Member States compete with the objective of
supporting the development of democratic governance and consistent application of
conditionality. Furthermore, it is not easy to accurately monitor progress or regression in
the process of change. Nor should one overestimate the leverage of foreign assistance,
and especially of bilateral assistance. The incentives for recipient governments may be too
small given the assistance received from other parties, especially from the Gulf States.
Box 12

On conditionality

More for more is dead, more for more is not being applied … there has been little
conditionality. Egypt reacts very badly to negative conditionality. They say ‘why
conditions? You should help us’. The problem is that the EU is not consistent.
I do not think it works here very well… they receive 4 billion USD on a three-month
basis from Saudi Arabia: cash for oil… where is the carrot?
I do not think it would work here because you need someone who is in control of
things to attach a condition. What people sometimes overlook is that a programme
may not generate gains but losses. Holding the ground, not letting things slip
further is difficult enough … The biggest risk here is that people do not feel that
good things are happening, the disillusionment.
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Egypt and Libya.

Finally, the concept of conditionality has also not changed the way in which either the
Netherlands or the EU spends its money in, for example, Tunisia, which – unlike Egypt or
Algeria – seems to be persevering in its transition towards democratic governance. It should
also be noted that EU membership of neighbouring Arab countries is not on the cards and
EU leverage over Arab countries is significantly lower than over Central and Eastern European
countries where the application of conditionality also proved problematic. A regression
analysis of data from 36 countries has indicated that the effects of conditionality ‘become
weaker and inconsistent if the EU offers less than membership or association’.63 If a
62

63

Dutch cooperation with the Egyptian government was effectively suspended on 15 August 2013 after
the violent actions of the Egyptian army. This cooperation was resumed at the end of October 2013.
Schimmelfennig, Frank and Hanno Scholtz. 2008. ‘EU Democracy Promoting in the European
Neighbourhood’. In: European Union Politics, pp. 189-190.

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The Only Constant is Change

government does not want to reform, it will not change its mind simply because more or less
assistance is offered. The imposition of reforms may even create resentment, but longlasting political reform needs strong ownership. The literature on democratic transitions
and conditionality suggests that donors have very little influence on initiating policy reform.
Foreign assistance can at best support democratic transition, as it needs local commitment.
Existing instruments
A number of existing bilateral instruments, particularly the human rights fund and the fund
for advancing women, proved helpful in the provision of rapid and flexible assistance in a
number of priority countries following the Arab uprisings. The stability fund proved of less
value and importance. Evaluation findings show that there is no ‘one size fits all’ for
supporting Arab countries in transition. Some bilateral instruments used earlier in Central
and Eastern European countries proved helpful in Arab priority countries and include
support to CSI. At the same time, the demand for the existing PSI programme in the Arab
priority countries turned out to be very low, as detailed in Chapter 4.

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Coordination
All donors, including Arab donors,64 are increasingly recognising the importance of coordinating
their support. In the priority countries, in-country donor coordination and leadership
varies. Donor agencies in countries such as Egypt have a strong history of coordinating
development assistance, but this is not the case in the other Arab priority countries.
Box 13

On coordination

Following the revolution there was a rush of organisations to Libya but they do not
know what to do, there is a lack of coordination, lack of understanding.
Source: Interviews, Field Research in Libya.

Often, donors share information and collaborate on one or more specific programmes or
projects. At the same time, donor coordination is critically dependent on individual staff
members from different donor agencies. Over time, individual staff members of the Dutch
embassy in Cairo played key roles in the coordination of efforts to promote human rights
and advance the status of women. Given the current limited size of in-country bilateral
assistance and the limited human resources available at that embassy, coordination is
mostly informal and not necessarily organised around supporting transition and reform.

64

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are three of the largest official donors in the Gulf.

Diplomacy and principles

6.3 Conclusions
Evaluation findings indicate that democracy, human rights and security become key topics
when engaging diplomatically with Arab countries in transition. Understanding the
processes of change, assessing the reactions in-country and comparing notes become part
and parcel of diplomacy and clearly aim to complement financial assistance and support the
implementation of the Ministry’s policy objectives. Diplomacy is an important undertaking
for countries in transition and in the Arab region, given the prevailing political strife,
violent conflict and insecurity. Coalition building and multilateral diplomacy have proved
to be important to further the implementation of Dutch policy objectives in Arab priority
countries, especially in the area of human rights.
Looking back at the application of principles, this evaluation provides a reality check.
Whether support to democratisation, the rule of law and economic growth are delivered
bilaterally or multilaterally is a key decision: a decision that should be based on the
strategies and performance of multilateral organisations at country level and on how the
funding is actually used. Getting the mix of bilateral and multilateral aid right also entails
acknowledging that bilateral aid has the potential to nurture bilateral relations. Supporting
demand for change is essential and has worked well in conjunction with efforts to support
civil society. Conditionality has not worked and has proved to be truly problematic when
supporting Arab countries in transition. Coordination among donors at country level is
limited and mostly informal.
The implementation of support to Arab countries in the aftermath of the Arab uprising is
anything but easy, given the volatile and rapidly changing context. Studies show that good
implementation – especially of democracy assistance – is difficult (Carothers 1999: 218).
Evaluating the contribution of Dutch support to achieving Dutch policy objectives four
years after the Arab uprisings has also been difficult.

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Annexes

Annexes

Annex 1

About IOB

Objectives
The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight
into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the
independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous
Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and
implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade and
Development Cooperation to account to Parliament for policy and the allocation of resources.
In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end, efforts are made
to incorporate the findings of evaluations into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy cycle.
Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving the
formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of implemented
policies allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and focused.
Organisation and quality assurance
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations
it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under
investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for
each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from
within the Ministry and other stakeholders.
Programming of evaluations
IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a Ministry-wide evaluation
programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Ministry’s budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the
programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming
of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to
requests from Parliament and from the Ministry, or are selected because they are issues of
societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other
donors and development organisations.
Approach and methodology
Initially IOB’s activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for
Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive,
covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB’s reports have been
submitted to Parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and
a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 resulted in IOB’s remit being
extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has
extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through

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The Only Constant is Change

joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC
Network on Development Evaluation.
IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given
to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative
and qualitative methods are applied. lOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of
evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research
material relating to priority policy areas.

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Annexes

Annex 2	Abridged Terms of Reference for this
evaluation
1. Motivation and goal of the evaluation
This evaluation was included in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
associated evaluation programme as an ongoing impact study of ‘democratic transition in
the Arab region (Matra South)’. The Matra South programme started in 2012, and is
structured along the lines of the Matra programme for Central and Eastern Europe.
The evaluation is timed to coincide with the process of deciding on the possible extension
of the Matra South programme, which runs from 2012 to 2015. The evaluation will enable
the government to account to Parliament for the policy it has pursued and possible lessons
that have been learned in the process. To enable the evaluation to take account of as much
Dutch policy implementation as possible, – at DAM’s request – the IOB evaluation report is
to be completed in the first quarter of 2015.
The evaluation should provide insight into the design and implementation of the
Netherlands’ foreign policy in the Arab region, focusing specifically on the goal of
promoting transition. It covers the period from 2009 to 2013, covering the two years
preceding and the two years following the wave of protests that swept through various
countries in the region. That is not say that the Arab uprisings had no pre-history, or that no
attention was paid to supporting transition in the region before this period (Fernández and
Youngs 2005: 15-16).
Since early 2011, however, the Arab region has been the scene of mass protests,
socioeconomic unrest and political instability. The Dutch government responded to these
developments by setting itself the goal of supporting reforms in the region. The
Netherlands pursued this goal through financial, political and diplomatic efforts, both
multilaterally and bilaterally. European cooperation through, for example, the European
Neighbourhood Policy, is part of the Netherlands’ foreign policy in the region.
2. Regional policy emphases: Dutch policy in the Arab region
The Netherlands’ policy on the Arab region and specific Arab countries is outlined in:
• the budgets and annual reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a policy agenda
and a large number of thematic policy objectives;
• letters to the House of Representatives in which policy on the Arab region and/or Arab
countries is elaborated and specified in detail;
• letters to the House of Representatives which focus on the Arab region and/or specific
Arab countries.
The policy is also shaped using input from the Advisory Council on International Affairs
(AIV), debates in the House of Representatives, questions in Parliament and motions
submitted by Members of Parliament. Syria, Egypt and Tunisia in particular have been the
subject of specific letters to the House of Representatives.

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The Only Constant is Change

The specific regional policy examined by this evaluation is set out in the following policy
documents:
• Memorandum on ‘Transition in the Arab Region’, annex to Parliamentary Papers, House
of Representatives 2011, 32 623, no. 16;
• ‘The Situation in the Arab Region’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011,
32 623, no. 2;
• Report on the Foreign Affairs Council, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives
2011, 21 501-02, no. 1031;
• Report on the European Council (DIE-332/11 of 15 March 2011);
• ‘The Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East, and More on the Netherlands’
Activities in the Arab Region’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011,
32 623-40;
• ‘The Current Situation in the Countries of the Arab Region’, in response to a request from
the Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a response to the Amnesty
International report Year of Rebellion: The State of Human Rights in the Middle East and
North Africa, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2012, 32 623 no. 58; and
• ‘Developments in the Arab Region’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2013,
32 623, no. 88.
| 86 |

In addition, various policy letters on human rights and the modernisation of Dutch
diplomacy refer to policy dilemmas in the Arab region. According to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, a democratic and stable neighbouring region (and Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco
and Tunisia in particular) serves the Netherlands’ interests in the fields of security, trade,
energy supplies and combating illegal migration. The government states that it seeks
especially to invest in countries where there is the greatest likelihood of change and which
can act as an example to the region as a whole (Explanatory Memorandum 2014: 17).
Referring to the policy article ‘security and stability’, the government aims to support a
sustainable transition in the Arab region that leads to:
• democratisation, especially fair and free elections;
• development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to
gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom,
protection of minorities and LGBT rights;
• economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting
employment.
In pursuing this policy, the government applies the following principles:
• effective action through bilateral and multilateral channels;
• a demand-driven approach;
• intelligent conditionality, based on the three policy objectives listed above;
• no new structures but a review of existing structures using existing budgetary instruments;
• effective national and international coordination.

Annexes

3. Structure of the evaluation
The main question to be addressed in the evaluation is as follows: How has the Netherlands
contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?
The following 10 questions serve as guidelines in evaluating the relevance, efficiency and
effectiveness of this contribution and are presented in an evaluation matrix which also
explains data collection methods:

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The Only Constant is Change

Evaluation criteria

Evaluation questions

Context: period from January 2009 - December 2013

Description of problem context

The main question addressed in the evaluation is as follows:

Assessment of policy theory
(mini-sessions with staff in The
Hague / embassies in the case
study countries) and policy
reconstruction (parliamentary
papers, AIV reports, policy
documents, general dossiers,
internal Ministry
communications), literature
study on democratisation,
scholarly literature and
evaluations, interviews with key
actors and stakeholders.

How has the Netherlands’ foreign policy contributed to
promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?
The main considerations for this evaluation are:
a) The Arab region has changed radically in a short time and is
in transition. Since the start of 2011 a number of Arab
countries have been the scene of mass protests,
socioeconomic unrest and political instability.
b) Changes have been made to the Netherlands’ foreign policy
in response to the changing situation in the region. As a
consequence it is desirable, from a political, diplomatic and
financial perspective, to evaluate the policy and its
implementation.
| 88 |

Findings and sources

The evaluation programme for 2010 to 2015 included an
evaluation of democratic transition in the Arab region.
1.	What problems or other factors underlie Dutch policy on
transition in the Arab region?
2.	In developing the policy, was attention given to theoretical
and practical insights relating to democratic transition?

Indices (Bertelsmann Foun­
dation, Freedom House,
Reporters Without Borders,
Transparency Inter­national,
etc.), Arabstats, Arab Human
Development Reports, review
of documents (internet
research, Ministry, embassies).
Appropriate use of tables and
graphs. Overview of main
programmes and expenditures.

I. Relevance
3.	To what extent have the policy priorities (democratisation,
strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights,
economic growth) been made operational through feasible
measures and appropriate instruments to promote
transition in the Arab region?
4.	How relevant were these measures to the priorities? To what
extent are they a logical extension of Dutch policy, its stated
ambitions and the specific context in Arab countries? Did
they take the following factors into account?
· Did the Netherlands work with national and local partners
and take account of their priorities?
· Did the Netherlands cooperate with other inter­national
actors and, in doing so, devote attention to the
complementarity of their political, diplomatic and financial
efforts?

Parliamentary Papers, policy
documents, national strategies,
policy documents of other actors
in the region/countries
(strategies and interventions),
general dossiers and dossiers on
individual activities, literature
study, supplementary document
study of Matra South,
evaluations and academic
literature.
Country case studies on
Morocco, Egypt and Libya:
tapping local knowledge
sources, interviews with key
actors and stakeholders.

Annexes

Evaluation criteria

Evaluation questions

Findings and sources

II. Efficiency and III. Effectiveness - Did the Netherlands operate in a timely and efficient way?
How effective was the Netherlands in achieving results through interventions in the region?
II. Efficiency
5.	How timely was the Netherlands’ use of its instruments and
how much synergy was there between them?
6.	How did the Netherlands work with other partners and
actors at national and international level?
7.	What financial, political and diplomatic resources were
deployed to implement policy in the period covered by this
evaluation?

Supplementary document study
of Matra South, country case
studies of Morocco, Egypt and
Libya: tapping local knowledge
sources, interviews with key
actors and stakeholders,
document study, overviews of
expenditure, annual plans,
annual reports, Multi-annual
Strategic Plans.

III. Effectiveness
8.	What were the effects of policy implementation?
9.	To what extent was the proposed policy actually
implemented?
10. T
 o what extent did policy implementation contribute to
transition in selected priority countries?

Supplementary document study
of Matra South, country case
studies of Morocco, Egypt and
Libya: tapping local knowledge
sources, interviews with key
actors and stakeholders,
document study.

Lessons learned and concerns: what lessons can the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs learn
from the evaluation for future policy formulation and implementation?
Main findings

•	What are the main strong
points of the policy
formulated for the Arab
region and its
implementation?
•	What are the main weak
points of the policy
formulated for the Arab
region and its
implementation?

Concerns

•	What lessons can be
learned (from both positive
and negative findings) for
the formulation and
implementation of future
Dutch policy on the Arab
region/countries?

Available supplementary study
on Matra South, findings of
literature study, findings of
country case studies on
Morocco, Egypt and Libya
(comparison: actors/added
value of NL, coherence of
instruments, needs of country/
region, effects of
conditionality), evaluation
reports, document study,
interviews with key actors and
stakeholders, sharing and
discussing findings.

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The Only Constant is Change

The evaluation will involve a policy reconstruction and an assessment with the regional
department concerned (DAM). It will focus on the main themes listed above and will be
conducted through three country case studies: Egypt, Libya and Morocco. These countries
have been chosen on the basis of their relevance for policy, the scope they offer to study
themes in relation to each other, the scale of the resources deployed and their different
political, historical and institutional perspectives in the light of transition. This evaluation
should assess the formulation and implementation of Dutch policy from the perspective of
the local context and in the light of the political, diplomatic and financial efforts of other
actors and donors referred to in the policy documents, including the EU.
In addition, two supplementary studies will be conducted: a document study of the Matra
South programme and a literature study of support for democratisation. Relevant
evaluations by the IOB and others, scholarly and scientific literature, longitudinal opinion
surveys in Arab countries and relevant database statistics and indexes will also be used,
together with available information on policy implementation.

| 90 |

Annexes

Annex 3	Assessment of individual CSI, PSI
and G2G projects
Civil Society Initiatives programme: assessment of individual projects
Evaluation questions

Judgement criteria

Indicators

•	The main needs and
demands are adequately
identified and addressed
given the specific
governance and politicoeconomic context;
•	The project has been
aligned and harmonised
with those of the recipient
partners and other
development partners.

•	Existence of good quality
needs assessment;
•	Degree of ownership of
intervention as evidenced by
active involvement of the
beneficiary in formulation,
implementation etc.;
•	The assumptions of the ToC of
the project are realistic (given
the complexity and volatility
of the environment) and
sound;
•	Positive synergy with effects
of other initiatives.

Relevance
1 Was the project well-conceived
given the situation? Is it still
relevant to the original
problem it was intended to
address? (weight 50%)

2 To what extent does the
project contribute to the
objectives of the related
Matra South component and
to those of the programme as
a whole? (weight 50%)

•	The project complies with
the objectives of the
related Matra South
component and to those
of the programme as a
whole.

Match with objectives Matra
South programme
(component).

1 To what extent have the
project’s short- and/or
long-term objectives been
achieved or are likely to be
achieved? What are the
reasons for the state of
achievement? What supports
and barriers have affected
achievement? Are there
unanticipated positive or
negative consequences? Why
did they arise? (weight 50%)

•	Level of attainment of
outputs (compared to
estimates) and their
contribution to attaining
the intended project
effects;
•	Level of attainment of
project outcomes that
have been achieved
(compared to the
estimates).

•	Evidence of achievements and
contribution;
•	Evidence of unanticipated
positive or negative
consequences.

2 To what extent has the project
contributed to the achievement
of the objectives of the related
component of the Matra South
programme and to those of the
programme as a whole?
(weight 50%)

Actual or likely contribution
of the specific project
outcomes to the objectives
of the Matra South
programme and the related
component.

Evidence of project contribution
to the programme-specific
impacts.

Effectiveness

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The Only Constant is Change

Evaluation questions

Judgement criteria

Indicators

•	Extent to which the
activities have been
implemented according
to the time schedule
(weight 40%);
•	The costs of service,
including management
costs are reasonable in
relation to the type of
project, the outputs and
realised achievements
(weight 40%);
•	The implementation and
management
arrangements contribute
to the realisation of the
project objectives
(weight 20%).

•	Time planning: actual versus
planned if changes occur they
are substantiated;
•	Comparison of unit costs (per
beneficiary/participant/client
with costs of similar projects);
•	Comparison of project
resources consumed in
achievement of outcomes with
interventions with similar
goals in light of the degree of
outcome achievement and
context;
•	Quality and adequateness of
project planning, management
(administrative, financial and
human resources) and M&E.

1 What is the likelihood that the
achievements of the project
will be sustained and/or
processes of change will be
continued after the with­drawal of support? Is there an
enabling environment that
supports ongoing positive
impacts? Will impacts continue
to be realised?

•	Organisational or
institutional sustainability
(weight 50%);
•	The degree of absorption
of the achievements by the
local organisations/
institutions;
•	Extent to which changes
observed / results achieved
are likely to persist.

•	Existence of a sustainable
strategy, including exit
strategy;
•	Required organisational/
institutional capacity in place
(structures, staff, expertise,
etc.) exists / has been
developed.

To what extent is the project
implementing appropriate
strategies to help ensure
sustainability? Is an exit strategy
an integrated part of the
project? To what extent does
the project contribute to the
development of partners’
capacity, enabling sustainable
delivery after the project?

Financial continuity:
(weight 30%)
•	Availability of financial
resources needed to
ensure political
sustainability (weight 20%);
•	Existence of political basis
for the project theme and
continuity of approach.

•	Comparison of the financial
resources needed to ensure
the continuity of the results to
the financial capacity of local
structures.
•	Degree of coherence between
the project approach and
policies of the countries
(national and sub-national
levels)?
•	Degree of effective
collaboration with other
stakeholders (e.g. government
and other actors at national
and sub-national levels).

Efficiency
1 To what extent has the project
been delivered in a timely and
cost-effective manner? Do the
results achieved – in
qualitative and quantitative
terms – justify the resources
spent?

Sustainability
| 92 |

Annexes

Private Sector Investment programme: assessment of individual projects
Evaluation questions

Judgement criteria

Indicators

Was the project well-conceived
given the situation? Is it still
relevant to the original problem
it was intended to address?
(weight 50%)

•	Needs (innovative
business opportunities)
are adequately identified
and addressed given the
specific politico-economic
context.

•	Existence of good quality and
realistic business plan (given
the complexity and volatility of
the environment);
•	Degree of ownership of
intervention as evidenced by
active involvement of the local
counterpart in formulation,
implemen­tation etc.;
•	The assumptions of the ToC of
the project are realistic (given
the complexity and volatility of
the environment) and sound.

To what extent does the project
contribute to the objectives of
the related Matra South
component and to those of
the programme as a whole?
(weight 50%)

•	The project complies with
the objectives of the
related Matra South
component and to those
of the programme as a
whole.

Alignment of project with
objectives of Matra South
programme (or component)
(incl. contribution to youth
employment and female
entrepreneurship).

1 To what extent have the
project’s short- and/or
long-term objectives been
achieved or are likely to be
achieved? What are the
reasons for the state of
achievement? What supports
and barriers have affected
achievement? Are there
unanticipated positive or
negative consequences? Why
did they arise? (weight 50%)

•	Level of attainment of
outputs (compared to
estimates) and their
actual or likely
contribution to attaining
the intended project
outcomes.

•	Evidence of achievements (e.g.
established business, annual
turnover, number of (direct/
indirect/youth/female) net
(additional) jobs as well as
project suppliers/outgrowers,
numbers of high-level and lowlevel employees / suppliers/
outgrowers trained, percentage
of total project inputs/raw
materials from local suppliers
etc.);
•	Evidence of unanticipated
positive or negative
consequences.

2 To what extent has the project
contributed to the
achievement of the objectives
of the related component of
the Matra South programme
and to those of the
programme as a whole?
(weight 50%)

Actual or likely contribution
of the specific project
outcomes to the objectives
of the Matra South
programme and the related
component (sustainable
economic growth).

Evidence of actual or likely project
(or project spin-off) contribution
to sustainable economic growth
(e.g. expansion and catalysing
effect of (innovative) business(es),
improved job opportunities for
local population / suppliers /
outgrowers and increased local
attention for corporate social
responsibility, gender and
environmental business policies).

Relevance

Effectiveness

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The Only Constant is Change

Evaluation questions

Judgement criteria

Indicators

•	Extent to which the
activities have been
implemented according
to the time schedule
(weight 40%);
•	The costs of service,
including management
costs are reasonable in
relation to the type of
project, the outputs and
realised achievements
(weight 40%);
•	The implementation and
management
arrangements
contributeto the
realisation of the project
objectives (weight 20%).

•	Time planning: actual versus
planned: if changes occur they
are substantiated;
•	Comparison of unit costs (per
job created/ suppliers/
outgrowers) with costs of
similar projects;
•	Comparison of project
resources consumed in
achievement of outcomes with
interventions with similar goals
in light of the degree of
outcome achievement and
context;
•	Quality and adequateness of
PSI project management and
M&E.

Organisational or
institutional sustainability
(weight 50%)
•	The degree of absorption
of the achievements by
the local organisations/
institutions;
•	Extent to which changes
observed/ results
achieved are likely to
persist. Financial
continuity (weight 50%);
•	Availability of financial
resources needed to
ensure continuity.

•	Required organisational
capacity in place (staff,
expertise, technology etc.)
and commitment exists;
•	Trends/trajectory of earlier
comparable projects;
•	Financial prospects of
business(es).

Efficiency
To what extent has the project
been delivered in a timely and
cost-effective manner? Do the
results achieved – in qualitative
and quantitative terms – justify
the resources spent?

Sustainability
| 94 |

•	What is the likelihood the
achievements of the project
will be sustained and/or
processes of change be
continued after the
withdrawal of support? Is
there an enabling
environment that supports
ongoing positive impacts? Will
impacts continue to be
realised?
•	To what extent is the project
implementing appropriate
strategies to help ensure
sustainability? Is an exit
strategy an integrated part of
the project design? To what
extent does the project
contribute to the
development of partners’
capacity, enabling sustainable
delivery after the project?

Annexes

Government-to-Government cooperation programme: assessment of individual
projects
Evaluation questions

Judgement criteria

Indicators

1 Was the project wellconceived given the situation?
Is it still relevant to the
original problem it was
intended to address?
(weight 50%)

•	The main needs and
demands are adequately
identified and addressed
given the specific
governance and politicoeconomic context;
•	The project has been
aligned and harmonised
with efforts of the recipient
partners and other
development partners.

•	Existence of good quality
needs assessment /
involvement of beneficiary in
formulation;
•	Degree of ownership of
intervention, as evidenced by
active involvement of the
beneficiary in implementation
etc.;
•	The assumptions of the ToC of
the project are realistic (given
the complexity and volatility
of the environment) and
sound;
•	Positive synergy with effects
of other initiatives.

2 To what extent does the
project contribute to the
objectives of the related
Matra South component and
to those of the programme as
a whole? (weight 50%)

•	The project complies with
the objectives of the
related Matra South
component and to those
of the programme as a
whole.

Alignment with objectives of
Matra South programme (or
component)

1 To what extent have the
project’s short- and/or
long-term objectives been
achieved or are likely to be
achieved? What are the
reasons for the state of
achievement? What supports
and barriers have affected
achievement? Are there
unanticipated positive or
negative consequences? Why
did they arise? (weight 50%)

•	Level of attainment of
outputs (compared to
estimates) and their
contribution to attaining
the intended project
effects;
•	Level of attainment of
project outcomes that
have been achieved
(compared to the
estimates).

•	Evidence of achievements and
contribution (e.g. capacity
development, policy
improvement);
•	Evidence of unanticipated
positive or negative
consequences.

2 To what extent has the project
contributed to the
achievement of the objectives
of the related component of
the Matra South programme
and to those of the
programme as a whole?
(weight 50%)

Actual or likely contribution
of the specific project
outcomes to the objectives
of the Matra South
programme and the related
component.

•	Evidence of project
contribution to the
programme-specific impacts.

Relevance

Effectiveness

| 95 |

The Only Constant is Change

Evaluation questions

Judgement criteria

Indicators

•	Extent to which the
activities have been
implemented according to
the time schedule;
(weight 40%)
•	The costs of service,
including management
costs are reasonable in
relation to the type of
project, the outputs and
realised achievements;
(weight 40%)
•	The implementation and
management
arrangements contribute
to the realisation of the
project objectives.
(weight 20%)

•	Time planning: actual versus
planned: if changes occur they
are substantiated;
•	Comparison of project
resources consumed in
achievement of outputs/
outcomes with interventions
with similar goals in light of
the degree of outcome
achievement and context;
•	Quality and adequateness of
project planning,
management and M&E.

Organisational or
institutional sustainability:
(weight 50%)
•	The degree of absorption
of the achievements by the
local organisations/
institutions;
•	Extent to which changes
observed/results achieved
are likely to persist.

•	The level of integration of the
project in local structures and
processes;
•	Required organisational/
institutional capacity in place
(staff, expertise, etc.) exists/
has been developed;
•	Existence of a sustainable
strategy, including exit
strategy.
•	Degree of coherence between
the project approach and
policies of the countries
(national and sub-national
levels);
•	Degree of effective
collaboration with other
stakeholders (e.g. other
government actors, other
actors at national and
sub-national levels).

Efficiency
1 To what extent has the project
been delivered in a timely and
cost-effective manner? Do the
results achieved – in
qualitative and quantitative
terms – justify the resources
spent?

Sustainability
| 96 |

1 What is the likelihood the
achievements of the project
will be sustained and/or
processes of change be
continued after the
withdrawal of support? Is
there an enabling
environment that supports
ongoing positive impacts? Will
impacts continue to be
realised? To what extent is the
project implementing
appropriate strategies to help
ensure sustainability? Is an
exit strategy an integrated
part of the project design? To
what extent does the project
contribute to the
development of partners’
capacity, enabling sustainable
delivery after the project?

Political sustainability:
(weight 50%)
•	existence of political basis
for the project theme and
approach.

Annexes

Annex 4 Selection of projects (bilateral aid)
Selection projects under Civil Society Initiatives (CSI): Of the 55 projects, 11 (three financed from the
centralised budget and eight managed by the embassies) were selected. The centralised
budget projects were selected on the basis of a minimum disbursement rate (as a
percentage of total commitments) of 50%. The embassy projects were selected on the basis
of a monetary threshold of a minimum total project allocation of EUR 15,000 and a
minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. The number
of projects selected per country was based on the relative weight of each country in terms of
that country’s share in total disbursements. The following projects were randomly selected:
Country

Description

Implementation
period

Total
amount
allocated

Total
amount
disbursed
(2012-2013)

Centralised budget (in EUR million)
Egypt

Oxfam/Novib and Better Life/
democratisation*

2012-2014

1,320,471

821,379

Region:
Jordan,
Morocco,
Tunisia,
Egypt

IFC professional education

2012-2015

800,000

800,000

Region

Anna Lindh Foundation

2012-2014

300,000

200,000

Decentralised budget (in EUR million)
Egypt

Poverty eradication through employment

2012-2014

129,066

104,893

Egypt

Advocating and promoting Workers’
rights (APWR), Contract party: El
Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic
Development (MCSD)

2012-2013

299,008

299,008

Egypt

Entrepreneurship Education Programme,
by the District

2013-2014

267,204

141,054

Tunisia

Research into Salafism in the Arab region

2013-2014

45,378

43,253

Jordan

Visions centre – conference on the role of
citizenship in promoting the rule of law

01/11/201228/02/2013

25,858

23,921

Libya

Youth forum about Transi­tional Justice in
Benghazi, Tobruk and Sebha

2013

50,000

40,000

| 97 |

The Only Constant is Change

Country

Description

Implementation
period

Total
amount
allocated

Total
amount
disbursed
(2012-2013)

Morocco

Confédération Générale des Entreprises du
Maroc: small and medium enterprise
monitoring project

2013-2014

100,000

80,000

Morocco

CETIA – Centre Technique des Industries
Agroalimentaires: co-financing the
establishment of a laboratory for quality
control of food

2012-2013

77,678

77,677

3,414,663

2,631,185

Total in EUR

* This project is a combination of two projects registered individually by the Ministry of Foreign that cover a first
and a second phase of a single project; for this reason, the evaluators decided to present them as one project.

The above selection accounts for 41% of the total value of project allocations within the
CSI component, and for 46% of the total disbursements.
| 98 |

Selection of projects under Private Sector Investment (PSI): Based on the relative weight of each country
in terms of their share in total disbursements, the four projects randomly selected had disburse­ment rates higher than zero and together represented at least 45% of total disbursements:
Country

Description

Implementation
period

Total
amount
allocated

Total
amount
disbursed
(2012 May 2014)

Morocco

Pilot Carbon Footprint Project

2012-2015

750,000

337,500

Morocco

Fighting the housing deficit with modular
construction solutions in Morocco

2013-2015

721,100

324,495

Tunisia

Desert Joy, the tomato with taste from
Tunisia

2012-2015

748,250

433,985

Jordan

Breeding of disease-tolerant vegetable
seed

2013-2016

482,150

192,861

2,701,500

1,288,841

Total in EUR

The above selection accounts for 40% of the total value of project allocations within the PSI
component, and for 64% of the total disbursements.

Annexes

Selection projects under Government-to-Government (G2G): Five projects were selected from the
16 projects implemented under the G2G component. The selected projects had to be in a
mature state of implementation, be significant in monetary terms and together represent at
least 50% of total 2012-2013 disbursements. A monetary threshold of a minimum total
project allocation of EUR 20,000 was applied and a minimum disbursement rate (as a
percentage of total commitments) of 50%. Based on this strategy the following projects
were randomly selected:
Country

Description

Implementation
period

Total
amount
allocated

Total
amount
disbursed
(2012 May 2014)

Morocco

Improving Road Safety in Morocco

2013-2014

146,000

58,400

Morocco

Conseil national des droits de l’Homme:
Human Rights and prisons

2013

95,599

76,479

Tunisia

Training eight government officials of the
Ministry of Regional Development

2012

66,000

54,680

Jordan

Collaboration between Dutch and
Jordanian ombudsmen

2012-2013

65,186

63,822

Libya

Mission DJI/NHC on prison management

2012

20,000

18,148

392,785

271,529

Total in EUR

| 99 |

The above selection accounts for 44% of the total value of project commitments within the
G2G component, and for 60% of the total disbursements.

The Only Constant is Change

Annex 5 Resources

| 100 |

IOB field research
Egypt/Cairo (57 respondents)
• African Development Bank
• Arab Network for Media Support
• Art + Culture
• Better Life
• Brookings
• Center for Social and Economic Research
• Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs
• Egyptian Social Democratic Party
• Election monitor
• Embassy of Spain
• Embassy of Switzerland
• Embassy of the United States of America
• EU Delegation
• EU Parliament’s Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group
• Free Egyptians Party
• International Crisis Group
• Judge
• Lawyer
• Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development
• Ministry in charge of International Organizations
• Ministry of international cooperation
• Ministry of Manpower and Immigration
• National Council for Women, Ombudsman’s Office
• Nazra
• Nour party
• OxfamNovib
• Royal Netherlands Embassy
• Signet L.L.C.
• The Egyptian-Dutch Business Club
• The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights
• Trainees
• UNDP
• World Bank
• World Food Programme
• Youngsters
• Focus Group Discussions Aswan and Nubian Island Sahel: Oxfam Better Life incl.
participants representing local media and civil society organisations involved in election
monitoring, training, amplifying local voice

Annexes

Libya/Tripoli (32 respondents)
• Arete Foundation for Arts & Culture
• British Embassy
• Detention centres, Ministry of Justice
• Election monitor
• EU Delegation
• General National Congress
• Haskoning Libya
• International Management Group
• International Organization for Migration
• International Republican Institute
• Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Libyan Youth Movement
• Maan Nabneeha Movement
• Mayadin newspaper
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Royal Netherlands Embassy
• Spark Libya
• Trainees
• Tripoli FM
• UNDP
• UNESCO
• University of Tripoli
• Voice of Libyan Women
• Zagrit Seed Cooperation
Morocco/Rabat (45 respondents)
• Ambassade de Suisse
• Association des Femmes Chefs d’Entreprises du Maroc
• Association des Lauréat de l’Institut Supérieur de l’Administration
• Association pour la promotion de l’éducation et de la formation à l’étranger
• Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc
• Conseil des affaires Marocain-Néerlandais
• Entrepreneur
• February 20 movement
• Institut Néerlandais au Maroc – NIMAR
• Journalists
• Banque Africaine de Développement
• Chambre des représentants du parlement
• Commission des Affaires Etrangères
• Coopération espagnole
• Coopération Universitaire Nationale et Internationale
• Délégation de l’Union Européenne
• Centre Technique des industries agroalimentaire et la Fédération Nationale de l’Agroalimentaire
• Organisation Marocain des droits de l’homme et l’association justice Adela

| 101 |

The Only Constant is Change

• Parti d’Istiqlal
• Royal Netherlands Embassy
• Trainees
• Transparency Maroc
• UNDP
• USAID
• Westminster Foundation
• World Bank
• Focus Group Discussion El Jadida: Association des Femmes chefs d’Entreprises du Maroc (AFEM)

| 102 |

The EU and its Southern Neighbourhood, Brussels (6 respondents)
• Directorate General for development and cooperation – EuropeAid, European
Commission
• Division, Directorate North Africa, Middle East and Arabian Peninsula, EDEO
• European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(Bilateral South)
• European External Action Service (Afrique du Nord, Moyen Orient, Péninsule Arabique, Iran et Iraq)
• European Parliament
• Permanent Mission of the Netherlands
• Seminar Clingendael EU Southern Neighbourhood
The Hague (15 respondents)
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DAM, DDE, DMM, DIE, BPZ and DSO)
• Foundation Max van der Stoel
Substudies
Literature review
• Roel Meijer
• Laila al-Zwaini
Matra South Programme review (Ecorys)
• Sylvia I. Bergh
• Lydeke Schakel
• Lorijn de Boer
• Anja Willemsen
The Ecorys study interviewed 42 persons in total.
Experimental pilot study with automated text-mining
• Anna Alberts
Editor
• Joy Burrough

Annexes

Annex 6 	Code systems used
(interviews and diplomatic cables)
Fine-grained narrative analysis content of semi-structured IOB interviews in Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Brussels and The Hague (2014):
Code system

Number
of codes

Free coding

98

reference to text of special interest to
researcher

Image of the
Netherlands

143

illustrates image of NL in Arab countries

Use existing
funds

Description

refers to utilisation of existing funds in
response to Arab uprisings
stability fund and
fund political
pluriformity

7

refers to local perceptions about funds

funds for gender,
culture and
human rights

19

refers to local perceptions about funds
| 103 |

Transition
2009-2013

227

refers to perceived changes prior to and
after 2011 in Arab region

local priorities

121

refers to perceptions about local priorities

actors

177

refers to actors promoting or hindering
change

factors

272

refers to factors promoting or hindering
change

67

reference to policy article incl. local
perception actors/factors of change

friends

36

as perceived in country

foes

36

as perceived in country

97

refers to perceptions about corruption

Security &
stability

Corruption
Democratic
transition

reference to policy objective
democratisation

109

thematic focus of Ministry’s policy

rule of law

40

thematic focus of Ministry’s policy

protection of
human rights

115

elaboration of thematic focus

Modalities

to illustrate meaning of modalities in
local context
multilateral

21

views about multilateral channel

NATO

8

perceptions about NATO

IFI

36

perceptions about IFIs

The Only Constant is Change

Code system

Number
of codes
UN

67

perceptions about UN

EU

197

perceptions about EU

173

views about Dutch bilateral interventions

55

illustrates policy implementation at
country level

PP

18

views about PP component

CSI

35

views about CSI component

G2G

22

views about G2G component

scholarships

12

views about scholarship programme

training

48

views about training programmes

bilateral
Matra South
programme

Private
Sector

| 104 |

Illustrates policy implementation at
country level
economic growth,
employment

79

refers to thematic focus of Ministry’s
policy

PSI

37

views about PSI programme

Principles

Total

Description

as expressed in Ministry’s policy
conditionality

100

views about application of conditionality

coordination

47

views about international coordination
and cooperation

demand-driven

27

refers to requests by and proposals from
local or national partners

effectiveness

12

views about results achieved

what
works

78

refers to perceptions regarding effective
interventions

what
does
not
work

90

refers to perceptions regarding ineffective
interventions

2726

Annexes

Fine-grained narrative analysis of content of diplomatic correspondence from embassies in
priority countries of Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Libya (2009-2013):
Code system

Number
of codes

Free coding

28

reference to text of special interest
to researcher

Image of the
Netherlands

66

illustrates image of NL in Arab
countries

Security &
stability

34

reference to policy article

Democratic
transition

11

reference to policy objective

7

thematic focus of letter to
Ministry’s policy

free & fair
elections

21

elaboration of thematic focus

other

49

in relation to democratisation

43

thematic focus of letter to
Ministry’s policy

democratisation

rule of law
protection of
human Rights

Description

elaboration of thematic focus
media
freedom
incl.
internet

33

refers to aspect on human rights
agenda

rights of
women

66

refers to aspect on human rights
agenda

freedom of
religion

36

refers to aspect on human rights
agenda

LGBT
rights

10

refers to aspect on human rights
agenda

minority
rights

6

refers to aspect on human rights
agenda

other

132

refers to human rights in general
or other human rights

Type of
intervention

to differentiate between three
types of intervention
financial

85

refers to use of financial means

diplomatic

180

refers to interventions by Dutch
government officials

political

49

refers to interventions by political
leadership

| 105 |

The Only Constant is Change

Code system

Number
of codes

Modalities

to differentiate between bilateral
and multilateral cooperation in
Arab region
multilateral

bilateral

3

between Arab country and
number of organisations incl.
the Netherlands

NATO

4

by means of NATO incl.
the Netherlands

IFI

7

by means of IFI incl.
the Netherlands

UN

14

by means of UN incl.
the Netherlands

EU

116

by means of EU incl.
the Netherlands

155

between Arab country and
the Netherlands

Principles
| 106 |

Description

as expressed in Ministry’s policy
conditionality

25

refers to application of
conditionality

coordination

60

refers to international
coordination and cooperation

demand-driven

36

refers to requests by and
proposals from local or national
partners

effectiveness

20

refers to results achieved

Migration

Morocco

8

refers to ENP dimension

Trade

Egypt

14

refers to ENP dimension

Total

1318

Annexes

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Uilenreef, A. and E. Braam. 2013. Van de Berlijnse Muur naar het Tahrirplein: De Arabische Lente and
lessen uit Oost-Europa [From the Berlin Wall to Tahrir Square: The Arab Spring and Lessons
from Eastern Europe]. Internal document.
Vandewalle, D. 2012. A History of Modern Libya. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, M. 1964 [1947/1921]. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Wesselink, E. and R. Boschma. 2012. Overview of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Its
History, Structure and Implemented Policy Measures. SEARCH Working Paper WP1/04.
World Bank. 2012. Inclusion and Resilience: The Way Forward for Social Safety Nets in the Middle East and
North Africa. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

| 111 |

The Only Constant is Change

Evaluations
European Commission. 2010. Evaluation of European Commission’s Support to Egypt – Country Level
Evaluation. Vol. I: main report. Brussels: EC.
European Commission. 2011. A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EC
European Commission. 2013. Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to two European
Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South). Brussels: EC.
European Court of Auditors. 2013. EU Cooperation with Egypt in the Field of Governance.
Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union.
Grogan, F. 2014. External Evaluation of the Institutional Development Cooperation Project between the
Federal Board of Supreme Audit Iraq (FBSA) and The Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA) 2012-2014.
Independent Commission for Aid Impact. 2013. FCO and British Council Aid Responses to the Arab
Spring. Report 24. London: ICAI.
| 112 |

Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie. 1999. Diamonds and Coals. Evaluation
of the Matra programme of assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, 1994-1997. The Hague: IOB.
Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie. 2011. Education matters: Policy
review of the Dutch contribution to basic education 1999-2009. The Hague: IOB.
Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie. 2014. Op zoek naar focus en effectiviteit:
Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse inzet voor private sector ontwikkeling 2005-2012. The Hague: IOB.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 2012. Effective Statebuilding? A Review of Evaluations of
International Statebuilding Support in Fragile Contexts. Copenhagen.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 2013. Evaluation of Media Cooperation under the Danish
Arab Partnership Programme (2005-12). Copenhagen.
Triodos Facet BV. 2010. Evaluation PSOM/PSI and MMF. Zeist: Triodos Facet.
UNDP Evaluation Office. 2013. Evaluation of the regional programme for Arab States (2010-2013).
New York: UNDP.

Annexes

Policy documents
European Commission. 2011. A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern
Mediterranean. Brussels: European Commission.
Council of the European Union. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels: General
Secretariat of the Council.
Council of the European Union. 2004. EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the
Middle East. Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council.
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department. 2009. Evaluation Policy and Guidelines for
Evaluations. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including:
• Explanatory Memorandum to the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2014,
Parliamentary Paper 33 750V, no. 2.
• Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 2: The Situation in the Arab Region, 18 February 2011.
• Parliamentary Paper 21501-02 no. 1031: Report on the Foreign Affairs Council,
21 February 2011.
• Report on the European Council of 11 March 2011 (DIE-332/11 of 15 March 2011).
• Memorandum on ‘Transition in the Arab Region’ annexed to Parliamentary Paper 32623
no. 16 of 25 March 2011.
• Parliamentary Paper 32623-40: The Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East,
and More on the Netherlands’ Activities in the Arab Region, 24 June 2011.
• Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 58: The Current Situation in the Countries of the Arab
Region, 3
• February 2012, in response to a request from the Permanent Committee on Foreign
Affairs, with a response to the Amnesty International report Year of Rebellion: The State of
Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa.
• Brochure Programme Matra South: The Dutch programme for democratic transition in
the Arab region. April 2012.
• Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 88: Developments in the Arab Region, 22 March 2013.
• Parliamentary Paper 22112-1855: Cabinet appreciation European Neighbourhood Policy,
6 May 2014.

| 113 |

The Only Constant is Change

Websites
Arab Human Development Reports,
http://www.arab-hdr.org
Bertelsmann Transformation Index,
http://www.bti-project.org/bti-home
European neighbourhood policy,
http://enpi-programming.eu/
European External Action Service (EEAS),
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/index_en.htm
Freedom House,
www.freedomhouse.org
The Economist Intelligence Unit,
http://www.eiu.com
| 114 |

Transparency International,
http://transparency.org
World Bank,
http://data.worldbank.org
Other websites consulted are mentioned in the footnotes.

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
published 2011-2015

E valuation and study reports of the Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015
Evaluation reports published before 2011 can be found on the IOB website:
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations or www.iob-evaluatie.nl.
IOB
no.

Year

Report

ISBN

399

2015

Gender, peace and security: Evaluation of the
Netherlands and UN Security Council resolution 1325

978-90-5328-465-0

398

2014

Navigating a sea of interests: Policy evaluation of Dutch
foreign human rights policy 2008-2013

978-90-5328-460-5

397

2014

Riding the wave of sustainable commodity sourcing:
Review of the Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH
2008-2013

978-90-5328-464-3

396

2014

Access to Energy in Rwanda. Impact evaluation of
978-90-5328-463-6
activities supported by the Dutch Promoting Renewable
Energy Programme

395

2014

Strategie bij benadering. Nederlandse coalitievorming
en de multi-bi benadering in het kader van de
EU-besluitvorming (2008-2012)

978-90-5328-462-9

394

2014

Autonomy, partnership and beyond: A counterfactual
analysis of policy coherence for Ghana

978-90-5328-459-9

393

2014

Balanceren tussen koopmanschap en diplomatie.
Evaluatie van de Netherlands Business Support Offices
2008-2013

978-90-5328-458-2

392

2014

Good things come to those who make them happen:
Return on aid for Dutch exports

978-90-5328-456-8

391

2014

Useful patchwork: Direct Funding of Local NGOs by
Netherlands Embassies 2006-2012

978-90-5328-455-1

390

2014

Investeren in wereldburgerschap. Evaluatie van de
Nationale Commissie voor Internationale
Samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (NCDO)

978-90-5328-454-4

389

2014

Op zoek naar focus en effectiviteit. Beleidsdoorlichting
van de Nederlandse inzet voor Private Sector
Ontwikkeling 2005-2012

978-90-5328-451-3

388

2013

Impact evaluation of improved cooking stoves in
Burkina Faso: The impact of two activities supported by
the Promoting Renewable Energy Programme

978-90-5328-449-0

387

2013

Between Ambitions and Ambivalence: Mid-term
Evaluation SNV Programme 2007-2015

978-90-5328-448-3

386

2013

Evaluation issues in financing for development:
Analysing effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on
developing countries.

978-90-5328-447-6

385

2013

Economic diplomacy in practice: An evaluation of Dutch
economic diplomacy in Latin America

978-90-5328-446-9

| 115 |

The Only Constant is Change

| 116 |

IOB
no.

Year

Report

ISBN

384

2013

Achieving universal access to sexual and reproductive
health and rights: Synthesis of multilateral contribution
to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights
(2006-2012)

978-90-5328-445-2

383

2013

NGOs in action: A study of activities in sexual and
reproductive health and rights by Dutch NGOs

978-90-5328-444-5

382

2013

Buscando novas relações : Avaliação da política externa
dos Países Baixos para a América Latina. Informe
especial sobre o Brasil

978-90-5328-453-7

382

2013

En busca de nuevas relaciones: Evaluatión de la politica
exterior de los Paísos Bajos en América Latina.
Resumen del informe principal

978-90-5328-450-6

382

2013

Op zoek naar nieuwe verhoudingen. Evaluatie van het
Nederlandse buitenlandbeleid in Latijns-Amerika

978-90-5328-443-8

381

2013

Balancing Ideals with Practice: Policy evaluation of
Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health
and rights 2007-2012

978-90-5328-442-1

380

2013

Linking Relief and Development: More than old
solutions for old problems?

978-90-5328-441-4

379

2013

Investeren in stabiliteit. Het Nederlandse fragiele
statenbeleid doorgelicht

978-90-5328-440-7

378

2013

Public private partnerships in developing countries.
A systematic literature review

978-90-5328-439-1

377

2013

Corporate Social Responsibility: the role of public
policy. A systematic literature review of the effects of
government supported interventions on the corporate
social responsibility (CSR) behaviour of enterprises in
developing countries

978-90-5328-438-4

376

2013

Renewable Energy: Access and Impact. A systematic
literature review of the impact on livelihoods of
interventions providing access to renewable energy in
developing countries

978-90-5328-437-7

375

2013

The Netherlands and the European Development Fund
– Principles and practices. Evaluation of Dutch involve­ment in EU development cooperation (1998-2012)

978-90-5328-436-0

374

2013

Working with the World Bank. Evaluation of Dutch
World Bank policies and funding 2000-2011

978-90-5328-435-3

373

2012

Evaluation of Dutch support to human rights projects.
(2008-2011)

978-90-5328-433-9

372

2012

Relations, résultats et rendement. Évaluation de la
coopération au sein de l’Union Benelux du point de vue
des Pays-Bas

978-90-5328-434-6

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
published 2011-2015

IOB
no.

Year

Report

ISBN

372

2012

Relaties, resultaten en rendement. Evaluatie van de
Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands
perspectief

978-90-5328-431-5

371

2012

Convirtiendo un derecho en práctica. Evaluación de
impacto del programa del cáncer cérvico-uterino del
Centro de Mujeres lxchen en Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-432-2

371

2012

Turning a right into practice. Impact evaluation of the
Ixchen Centre for Women cervical cancer programme in
Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-429-2

370

2012

Equity, accountability and effectiveness in
decentralisation policies in Bolivia

978-90-5328-428-5

369

2012

Budgetsupport: Conditional results – Policy review
(2000-2011)

978-90-5328-427-8

369

2012

Begrotingssteun: Resultaten onder voorwaarden –
Doorlichting van een instrument (2000-2011)

978-90-5328-426-1

368

2012

Civil Society, Aid, and Development: A Cross-Country
Analysis

979-90-5328-425-4

367

2012

Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid –
Beleidsdoorlichting 2006-2010

979-90-5328-424-7

366

2012

Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the
Dutch Development Cooperation 1990-2011

978-90-5328-423-0

366

2012

Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen –
Beleidsdoorlichting van het OS-beleid 1990-2011

978-90-5328-422-3

365

2012

Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept –
De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch
Concept 2010

978-90-5328-421-6

364

2012

Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: Methoden en
Resultaten van onderzoek.

978-90-5328-420-9

363

2011

Improving food security: A systematic review of the
impact of interventions in agricultural production, value
chains, market regulation, and land security

978-90-5328-419-3

362

2011

Methodische kwaliteit van Programma-evaluaties in
het Medefinancieringsstelsel-I 2007-2010

978-90-5328-418-6

361

2011

Evaluatie van de Twinningfaciliteit Suriname-Nederland

978-90-5328-417-9

360

2011

More than Water: Impact evaluation of drinking water
supply and sanitation interventions in rural Mozambique

978-90-5328-414-8

359

2011

Regionaal en geïntegreerd beleid? Evaluatie van het
Nederlandse beleid met betrekking tot de Westelijke
Balkan 2004-2008

978-90-5328-416-2

358

2011

Assisting Earthquake victims: Evaluation of Dutch
Cooperating aid agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in
2010

978-90-5328-413-1

| 117 |

The Only Constant is Change

| 118 |

IOB
no.

Year

Report

ISBN

357

2011

Le risque d’effets éphémères: Évaluation d’impact des
programmes d’approvisionnement en eau potable et
d’assainissement au Bénin

978-90-5328-415-5

357

2011

The risk of vanishing effects: Impact Evaluation of
drinking water supply and sanitation programmes in
rural Benin

978-90-5328-412-4

356

2011

Between High Expectations and Reality: An evaluation
of budget support in Zambia

978-90-5328-411-7

355

2011

Lessons Learnt: Synthesis of literature on the impact
and effectiveness of investments in education

978-90-5328-410-0

354

2011

Leren van NGOs: Studie van de basic education
activiteiten van zes Nederlandse NGOs

978-90-5328-409-4

353

2011

Education matters: Policy review of the Dutch
contribution to basic education 1999-2009

978-90-5328-408-7

352

2011

Unfinished business: making a difference in basic
education. An evaluation of the impact of education
policies in Zambia and the role of budget support.

978-90-5328-407-0

351

2011

Confianza sin confines: Contribución holandesa a la
educación básica en Bolivia (2000-2009)

978-90-5328-406-3

350

2011

Unconditional Trust: Dutch support to basic education
in Bolivia (2000-2009)

978-90-5328-405-6

349

2011

The two-pronged approach Evaluation of Netherlands
Support to Primary Education in Bangladesh,
1999-2009

978-90-5328-404-9

348

2011

Schoon schip. En dan? Evaluatie van de
schuldverlichting aan de Democratische Republiek
Congo 2003-2010. (Verkorte Versie)

978-90-5328-403-2

347

2011

Table rase – et après? Évaluation de l’Allègement de la
Dette en République Démocratique du Congo
2003-2010

978-90-5328-402-5

346

2011

Vijf Jaar Top van Warschau. De Nederlandse inzet voor
versterking van de Raad van Europa

978-90-5328-401-8

345

2011

Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen.
Evaluatie van de Schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van
2005 tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. (Verkorte
Versie)

978-90-5328-398-1

344

2011

Intérêts communs – avantages communs. Évaluation
de l‘accord de 2005 relatif à l ‘allègement de la dette
entre le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Version Abrégée)

978-90-5328-399-8

343

2011

Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen.
Evaluatie van de schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van
2005 tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria.
(Samenvatting)

978-90-5328-397-4

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
published 2011-2015

IOB
no.

Year

Report

ISBN

342

2011

Intérêts communs – avantages communs. Évaluation
de l’accord de 2005 relatif à l’allègement de la dette
entre le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Sommaire)

978-90-5328-395-0

341

2011

Mutual Interests – mutual benefits. Evaluation of the
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and
Nigeria. (Summary report)

978-90-5328-394-3

340

2011

Mutual Interests – mutual benefits. Evaluation of the
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and
Nigeria. (Main report)

978-90-5328-393-6

338

2011

Consulaire Dienstverlening Doorgelicht 2007-2010

978-90-5328-400-1

337

2011

Evaluación de las actividades de las organizaciones
holandesas de cofinanciamiento activas en Nicaragua

336

2011

Facilitating Resourcefulness. Synthesis report of the
Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development

978-90-5328-392-9

335

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of the Netherlands Commission for
Environmental Assessment (NCEA)

978-90-5328-391-2

-

2011

Aiding the Peace. A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support
to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in
Southern Sudan 2005-2010

978-90-5328-389-9

333

2011

Evaluación de la cooperación holandesa con Nicaragua
2005-2008

978-90-5328-390-5

332

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of PSO

978-90-5328-388-2

331

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty
Democracy (NIMD)

978-90-5328-387-5

If you would like to receive a publication in printed form, please send an e-mail to IOB@minbuza.nl,
mentioning the title and IOB number.

| 119 |

| 120 |

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
Cover photo: Reporters | Morocco Protest. A woman calling for an end to corruption holds aloft
a banner in Arabic referring to a popular saying ‘when there is bribery, then there is no security’.
Chapter 2: Reporters | Morocco Protest.
Chapter 4: Reporters | Tunisia Elections.
Chapter 5: Hollandse Hoogte | Festive atmosphere during parliamentary elections in
Tunisia. Le Bardo, Tunisia, 26 October 2014.
Language editing: Joy Burrough, Unclogged English
Layout: OBT | The Hague
Print: OBT | The Hague
ISBN: 978-90-5328-467-4
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | April 2015

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of
the response of the Dutch government to the Arab
uprisings and its support to: a) democratisation;
b) development of the rule of law and protection
of human rights; and c) economic growth. The
Ministry and its embassies offered timely and
flexible funding in support of a range of projects
implemented by key actors in countries in
transition, including youth, women, journalists
and trade unions. However, less support was
provided to governments in transition than to
civil society.
The lion’s share of financial resources was used
to support economic growth. Far fewer resources
were spent on promoting the rule of law.

Fragmentation and targeting of bilateral support
are a concern, and not all multilateral efforts
explicitly aim to foster democracy. Conditionality
does not work and demand for change is essential.
The policy response needs to take advantage of
a growing evidence base of lessons learned in the
area of democracy assistance and should apply a
country-level perspective. Promoting transition is
a long-term process.
Findings show that the implementation of
support to Arab countries in the aftermath of the
Arab uprisings is far from easy because of the
volatile context.

Constant is Change | IOB Evaluation | no. 400 | The Only Constant is Change | IOB Evaluation | no. 400 | The Only Constant is Change | IOB Evaluation

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | April 2015
15BUZ84565|E