FACULTEIT DER RECHTSGELEERDHEID
Instituut voor Informatierecht

Minister Plasterk
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken

Korte Spinhuissteeg 3
1012 CG Amsterdam
Tel: 020-5253406
Fax: 020-5253033
E-mail:
o.l.vandaalen@uva.nl

Betreft: reactie op consultatie concept-wetsvoorstel WIV

Geachte minister Plasterk,
Deze zomer heeft het Instituut voor Informatierecht van de Universiteit van Amsterdam een rapport
over toezicht op- en transparantie rond veiligheids- en inlichtingendiensten gepubliceerd. Het rapport,
Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services, bevat een analyse van
jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens en het Hof van Justitie van de
Europese Unie over dit onderwerp.1 Op basis van die analyse formuleren de auteurs in het rapport tien
standaarden.
Graag maken wij in deze brief van de gelegenheid gebruik om de conclusies van dit rapport toe te
passen op het concept-wetsvoorstel voor een nieuwe WIV dat de regering ter consultatie heeft
aangeboden.
Tien standaarden voor toezicht en transparantie
De tien standaarden in het rapport zijn onder te verdelen in standaarden op het gebied van toezicht en
standaarden op het gebied van transparantie. Hieronder zijn de standaarden enigszins samengevat en
herschikt: in het rapport is een uitgebreidere toelichting te vinden.
Op het gebied van toezicht wordt allereerst geconcludeerd dat dit 'volledig' moet zijn. Dat wil zeggen
dat (i) parlement, de rechterlijke macht en een gespecialiseerde commissie allemaal een rol in het
toezicht moeten spelen, (ii) het toezicht voorafgaand, doorlopend en na afloop moet plaatsvinden en
(iii) de toezichtsorganen rechtmatigheid en effectiviteit moeten kunnen toetsen.
1

Het rapport is te vinden op de website van het Instituut voor Informatierecht:
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1591. Daarnaast is het bijgevoegd als bijlage bij deze reactie op de
consultatie.
UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

Hiermee hangt samen dat toezicht op de diensten onafhankelijk moet zijn. Toezicht door de
rechterlijke macht is de beste manier om onafhankelijkheid te waarborgen en heeft daarom de
voorkeur.
Niet alleen moet toezicht onafhankelijk zijn: het moet ook plaatsvinden voorafgaand aan de
uitoefening van bevoegdheden. Het risico op misbruik is hoog, terwijl misbruik schadelijke gevolgen
kan hebben. Daarom is voorafgaand (rechterlijk) toezicht op uitoefening van de bevoegdheden van de
diensten essentieel.
Bovendien moeten toezichtslichamen een maatregel onrechtmatig kunnen verklaren en
herstelmaatregelen kunnen bevelen. Waar mogelijk moet bij dit toezicht het beginsel van hoor en
wederhoor worden toegepast, bijvoorbeeld door aanwijzing van een advocaat die het publiek belang of
individuele belangen behartigt. Het toezicht moet zich uitstrekken tot alle stadia van de
inlichtingencyclus en toezichtslichamen moeten tot slot voldoende middelen, mensen en informatie
hebben om effectief toezicht te houden.
Op het gebied van transparantie wordt het begrip 'gelaagde transparantie' geïntroduceerd. Dit betekent
dat (i) het betrokken individu, toezichtslichamen en 'civil society' moet worden geïnformeerd, (ii) er
een voldoende niveau van openheid over inlichtingenactiviten wordt gegeven voorafgaand, tijdens en
na die activiteiten, en (iii) dat gradaties van openheid worden gehanteerd, afhankelijk van de
informatie en de ontvanger. Hiermee samenhangend moeten toezichtslichamen, civil society en
individuen ook toegang kunnen krijgen tot deze informatie. Tot slot moeten ondernemingen en andere
privé-rechtspersonen geaggregeerde informatie over gegevensvorderingen kunnen publiceren en meer
gedetailleerde informatie hierover kunnen delen met toezichtslichamen.
Het concept-wetsvoorstel voldoet niet aan deze standaarden
Omdat het concept-wetsvoorstel waarschijnlijk zal veranderen beperken we ons in eerste instantie tot
enkele hoofdpunten.
De belangrijkste observatie is dat onafhankelijk (bij voorkeur rechterlijk), voorafgaand toezicht op de
uitoefening van bevoegdheden vrijwel geheel ontbreekt. Alleen de uitoefening van bijzondere
bevoegdheden tegen journalisten (art. 24 lid 4) en het openen van brieven en zendingen (art. 29) is
onderworpen aan voorafgaand toezicht door de rechtbank Den Haag. Voor de uitoefening van de
meeste andere bevoegdheden is toestemming van de minister of het hoofd van de dienst nodig, en voor
de uitoefening van sommige bevoegdheden is zelfs dat niet nodig.
Voorafgaand toezicht staat overigens niet haaks op de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, omdat dit
toezicht 'negatief' is: het kan alleen maar leiden tot het blokkeren van de uitoefening van een bepaalde
bevoegdheid. Het past daarom bij de rechtsstatelijke uitgangspunten die Nederland omarmt, en in het
bijzonder bij de scheiding der machten.

UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

Het toezicht door de CTIVD is ondertussen beperkt. Dit vindt in het concept-wetsvoorstel slechts
achteraf plaats, en behelst slechts een toetsing van de rechtmatigheid. Ook als de voorgestelde
heroverwegingsplicht van toepassing zou zijn, kan de minister na heroverweging alsnog besluiten een
bevoegdheid te blijven toepassen. Bovendien worden leden van de CTIVD bij koninklijk besluit (op
voordracht van de Tweede Kamer) benoemd, zodat de regering een zekere invloed heeft op deze
aanstellingen.
Het voorstel tot introductie van een 'klokkenluidersregeling' kan een gebrek aan toezicht niet
compenseren. Toezicht is immers erop gericht te waarborgen dat de diensten de wet naleven, terwijl
een klokkenluidersregeling alleen geschikt is voor die situaties waarin de wet niet nageleefd blijkt te
worden en toezicht faalt. Ook de klachtenregeling kan niet voorkomen dat een misstand plaatsvindt.
In het concept-wetsvoorstel wordt verder de rol van het parlement bij het toezicht vrijwel niet
vormgegeven. Nu komt dit voor een belangrijk deel omdat de regering het parlement hierin terecht het
voortouw laat nemen. De wet zal aan het parlement echter wel de ruimte moeten bieden om effectief
toezicht uit te oefenen, onder meer door de regering te verplichten de parlementaire
toezichtscommissie volledig te informeren. Die plicht ontbreekt nu.
Daarnaast wordt in het wetsvoorstel niet gewaarborgd dat toezichtslichamen voldoende financiële en
andere middelen hebben om hun taken uit te oefenen.
Ook verduidelijkt het concept-wetsvoorstel niet dat het publiceren van geaggregeerde statistieken door
private partijen over de uitoefening van bevoegdheden door de diensten toegestaan is.
Conclusie: het concept-wetsvoorstel voldoet niet aan de standaarden
Kortom: het huidige wetsvoorstel voldoet in ieder geval niet aan een aantal belangrijke, in het rapport
geformuleerde standaarden. Deze standaarden zijn niet vrijblijvend: het zijn aanbevelingen gebaseerd
op grondrechtelijke verplichtingen. Wij adviseren dan ook het hele wetsvoorstel stevig te herzien,
zodat het in lijn is met de verplichtingen van Nederland en de best practices op dit vlak.
Mocht u behoefte hebben aan een nadere toelichting, dan zijn wij daarvoor graag beschikbaar.
Hoogachtend,
Ot van Daalen

Nico van Eijk

UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

IViR (Institute for Information Law)

Ten standards for oversight and
transparency of national intelligence
services

Ten standards for
oversight and transparency
of national intelligence
services

Sarah Eskens
Ot van Daalen
Nico van Eijk
Institute for Information Law

Institute for Information Law (IViR, University of Amsterdam), 2015
This project has been carried out in full compliance with the Declaration
of Scientific Independence of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences. Funding included a grant from Google.

Institute for Information Law
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
http://www.ivir.nl

i

Executive summary
The main goal of this report is to contribute to the policy debate on surveillance
by intelligence services from the perspective of oversight and transparency.
Both are considered essential for devising checks and balances in which human
rights are respected.

By offering this concise list of ten standards, we intend to provide practical
guidance for those who seek further input for discussions, policymaking and
the review of existing legislation. These standards are based on our analysis
and interpretation of relevant jurisprudence, literature and selected policy
documents.

Standard 1:

Intelligence services need to be subject to oversight that is complete.
This means it should be complete in terms of a) the oversight body: the
government, parliament, the judiciary, and a specialised (non-parliamentary,
independent) commission should all play a role in oversight; b) the moment
of oversight: prior oversight, ongoing oversight, and after-the-fact oversight,
and c) the mandate of oversight bodies: reviews of lawfulness and effectiveness.

Standard 2:

Oversight should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle.
Surveillance involves different stages, including the collection, storage,
selection and analysis of data. As all these stages amount to an interference
with the right to privacy, these separate stages should be subject to oversight.

Standard 3:

Oversight of the intelligence services should be independent.
In this context, this means independence from the intelligence services and
the government. Judicial oversight offers the best guarantees of independence.
Therefore, it is preferable to involve the judiciary in the oversight on secret
surveillance and data collection.

Standard 4:

Oversight should take place prior to the imposition of a measure.
In the field of secret surveillance of communications, especially by means of
sophisticated technologies now associated with untargeted surveillance,
the risk of abuse is high, and abuse can have harmful consequences not only
for individual rights but also for democratic society as a whole. Therefore,
prior independent oversight on the application of surveillance and collection
powers is essential.

ii

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Standard 5: 	Oversight bodies should be able to declare a measure unlawful and provide
for redress.
Prior and ongoing oversight bodies for intelligence services should have the
power to prevent or end a measure imposed by intelligence services, and
oversight bodies should have the power to declare a measure unlawful after
the fact and provide for redress.
Standard 6:

Oversight should incorporate the adversary principle.
The ‘adversary principle’ is a basic rule of law principle. Where secrecy is
necessary, this can be implemented by the appointment of a special advocate
who defends the public interest (or the interest of affected individuals). As a
result, some form of adversarial proceedings would be introduced without
the secrecy of measures to be imposed being jeopardised.

Standard 7: 	Oversight bodies should have sufficient resources to perform effective oversight.
This standard includes the attribution of the necessary equipment and staff,
resources in terms of information and technical expertise. This also contributes
to their independence from the intelligence services and the government.
Standard 8: 	Intelligence services and their oversight bodies should provide layered
transparency.
This means that: a) the individual concerned, the oversight bodies, and civil
society are informed; b) there is an adequate level of openness about
intelligence activities prior to, during and after the fact; and c) notification,
aggregate statistics, working methods, classified and detailed information
about operations, and general information about what will remain secret
under all circumstances is provided.
Standard 9: 	Oversight bodies, civil society and individuals should be able to receive and
access information about surveillance.
This standard more or less mirrors the previous one. Clear legislation on
receiving and access to information about surveillance must provide a framework
for oversight and supports public scrutiny of the surveillance powers.
Standard 10:	Companies and other private legal entities should be able to publish aggregate
information on surveillance orders they receive.
Organisations should be able to disclose aggregate information publicly about
orders they receive directing them to provide information to the government.
They should be able to make more detailed/confidential information available
to oversight bodies.

iii

iv

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

v

Table of Contents
Executive Summary								i
Preface									vii
1.

Introduction and methodology					1

2.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

A few words on the terminology used in this report		
5
Intelligence services							5
Secret surveillance and data collection				
6
Individual surveillance and general programmes of surveillance 6
Oversight, control and transparency					
7

3.
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4 	

Oversight of intelligence services					
9
Interference with human rights					
9
The margin of appreciation						12
Adequate and effective guarantees against abuse			
14
Judicial, parliamentary, and independent oversight			
15
Prior judicial oversight					16
Alternatives to prior judicial oversight			
16
The body issuing authorisations				19
-	After-the-fact oversight on the authorisation and the
20
		
overall performance of the system				
Prior and after-the-fact opportunities for the individual 21
3.5
Independence of the authorities carrying out surveillance		
22
3.6
Powers for effective oversight					24
4.
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

Transparency of intelligence services				
27
The regulation of intelligence services				
27
Notification								29
Access of oversight bodies to information				
30
Positive obligations under the right to privacy			
31
A right to access information						
33

5.

Analysis and conclusions						35

Appendix
Jurisprudence and publications						42

vi

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

vii

Preface
The Snowden revelations have sparked unprecedented interest in the activities
of intelligence services. Technological developments have made sophisticated
surveillance technologies more accessible to governments across the globe,
whereas the Snowden revelations demonstrated the impact of these technologies.
Partly as a consequence of these developments, policymakers are reviewing the
national legal framework for the activities of these services, not only to expand
but also to curtail surveillance powers.
The main goal of this report is to contribute to the policy debate on surveillance
by intelligence services from the perspective of oversight and transparency.
Both are considered essential for devising checks and balances with which human
rights are respected.
By offering a first concise list of standards, we intend to provide practical
guidance for those who seek further input for discussions, policymaking and
the review of existing legislation.
The research was conducted by a team of the Institute for Information Law
(IViR, University of Amsterdam) consisting of Sarah Eskens, Ot van Daalen and
Nico van Eijk.

Amsterdam, July 2015

1

1.	Introduction and
methodology
Revelations about the working methods of national intelligence services, most
notably through the documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, have raised
substantial legal and policy questions. These services can be – and in fact have
been – engaged in activities that go beyond their legal mandate. Snowden’s
leaks provide clear evidence of this. This has sparked a highly significant debate
on the powers and the practice of intelligence services. In fact, momentum is
growing for reform of intelligence service legislation, both in Europe and the
United States.1
The issue of accountability is a central theme in these discussions. Effective
accountability requires a carefully crafted system of checks and balances,
allowing for monitoring the exercise of powers and serious measures to
address the issue of overstepping legislative boundaries. Oversight and
transparency are crucial elements in such system of checks and balances.
Oversight ensures compliance with the law and can provide remedies in case
intelligence services overstep legal boundaries. Transparency mechanisms
support effective oversight and democratic control.
For oversight to be credible, it needs to meet the highest possible democratic
standards, such as the guarantees and safeguards that are embedded in
constitutions and instruments of international law. In a European context,
norms for oversight of intelligence services have been developed in the past
decades in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) based
on the European Convention on Human Rights as signed by the Member States
of the Council of Europe, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
addressing the fundamental rights as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.
In this report, we provide a first concise list of standards for oversight and
transparency of European intelligence services, focusing on interception of
electronic communications, especially using the sophisticated technologies now
associated with untargeted surveillance. In existing works addressing oversight
of intelligence services, good governance is taken as a reference

1	The enactment of the USA Freedom Act (2 June 2015) replacing the so-called Patriot Act is a first
example.

2

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

point,2 political rules are set out,3 or new, relevant cases decided by the ECtHR
and the CJEU are predated.4 In this report, a human rights perspective is used,
legal recommendations are made, and recent developments in jurisprudence are
taken into account. Our report is guided by the following research question:
‘What are recommendable standards for oversight and transparency of
intelligence services, in particular for intercepting electronic communications,
as following from the human right to respect for privacy and freedom of
expression?’
In order to answer this question, we first analyse case law of the European Court
of Human Rights. There have been many cases before the Court on the topic of
secret surveillance and data collection by intelligence services, but only in a few
of them the Court devoted substantive attention to oversight and transparency.
In this report, we single out the leading cases.
The Court has not had the chance to review the sophisticated untargeted
surveillance made possible by technological advances and also applied in the
past decade, as partly revealed by Snowden. There are some cases on the Court’s
docket which touch on this particular issue, but these have not been decided
yet. It is safe to say, however, that the existing case law on targeted and
untargeted communications surveillance by the Court already provides for
minimum standards. And as surveillance has become more sophisticated and
allows for monitoring more persons since then, the infringement on human
rights has become even more significant.
Our recommendations are partly based on this premise, and the Court will
probably also impose higher standards on, or restrict untargeted surveillance
carried out with these new technologies.
One particular sign that courts are adopting higher standards for these practices
is the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union on data
retention.5 The European Union has no competence on national security, since it
is stated in Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) that “national
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” Nevertheless,
2	H. Born and A. Wills (eds.), Overseeing intelligence services: A toolkit, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 2012.
3	
Report on the democratic oversight of the security services, adopted by the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Venice, 1-2 June 2007; see also the Update of
the 2007 report on the democratic oversight of the security services and report on the democratic
oversight of signals intelligence agencies, adopted by the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), Venice, 20-21 March 2015.
4	I. Cameron, National security and the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague: Kluwer
Law International 2000.
5

See Digital Rights Ireland.

3

the CJEU has given an important judgment related to (secret) law enforcement
measures, which is also relevant for our purposes. Furthermore, the fact that the
European Union has no competence on national security does not mean that
case law of the CJEU is irrelevant. The CJEU held that “the mere fact that a
decision concerns State security cannot result in European Union law being
inapplicable.”6 The European Parliament also “strongly rejects the notion that
all issues related to mass surveillance programs are purely a matter of national
security and therefore the sole competence of Member States.”7 Thus, we also
analyse relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU.
In addition, we look into a selection of policy documents, issued by European
and US institutions (see appendix). Furthermore, an extensive amount of
comments, articles, studies and academic papers has been consulted in
preparation of this report. Given the nature of the report and to enhance its
readability, we have refrained from including detailed footnotes. Instead, a
non-exhaustive list of recommended literature can be found in the appendices.
Decisions are referred to by their abbreviated case name in the footnotes.
The application and case numbers can be found in the appendix.
The topic of the report is oversight and transparency of intelligence services,
in particular focusing on the interception of electronic communications in
bulk. We acknowledge that the activities of intelligence services also raise
other questions. For example, the preliminary question of the necessity of
powers of surveillance (including bulk surveillance) is not discussed in this
report but remains equally important, as lack of necessity (and consequently
proportionality and subsidiarity) cannot be compensated by better oversight
and transparency. Nor do we focus on other contexts where similar methods
are used, and where oversight and transparency are equally relevant, such as
surveillance in the context of law enforcement and social security. Nonetheless,
it is to be expected that most of the analyses and conclusions in this report will
be useful when applied to these other environments.
Lastly, it should be noted that the terminology used to describe the field of
intelligence services is quite specific and differs somewhat per discipline.
We have explained our use of the terminology in the next chapter.
This report concludes with practical guidance for policymakers, in particular
those who are in the process of reviewing their national statutes. The ongoing
revision of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv 2002) could be
6

European Commission v. Italian Republic, § 45; ZZ v. Secretary of State, § 38.

7	European Parliament, Report on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various
Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 21 February 2014 (2013/2188(INI)), p. 23.

4

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

one of the first occasions in Europe where our recommendations can be taken
into consideration and tested. As we aim to provide for practical guidance and
keep the report concise, we limit our findings to ten standards that we consider
the most important ones.

5

2. A few words on the terminology
used in this report
As noted in the introduction, we draw heavily on
jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights and
to a lesser extent by the Court of Justice of the European
Union in this report. In the past few decades, the ECtHR has
used recurring terms to describe concepts relating to
intelligence services, thus suggesting it gives a certain
meaning to them. However, it actually defines these concepts
only very rarely, and no uniform definitions are provided in
the literature either. It is therefore useful to provide
definitions of the actors and actions that are relevant to the
topic of oversight and transparency. In doing so, we take a
functional approach in this report, without aiming to provide
exhaustive definitions.

2.1 Intelligence services
A concept central to the topic of this report is that of ‘intelligence service’.
This term at least covers all government agencies that collect, process, analyse,
and disseminate electronic communications and other types of data for national
security purposes.
On a national level, a division is often made between a general, or civil intelligence
service and a military intelligence service. It is also customary to have a separate
foreign intelligence service and a service for national intelligence. The latter
might be called ‘security service’. Intelligence for national security and
law enforcement purposes is usually gathered by different agencies. Many
governments have also set up a specialist intelligence service that is solely
responsible for gathering signals intelligence (SIGINT), which refers to the
interception of radio and cable-bound communications and of signals not
directly used in communications, such as signals from radar or weapon systems.
In some countries, the intelligence services are part of, or integrated in law
enforcement. In those countries, the intelligence services might therefore also
possess general law enforcement powers. Additionally, the activities of
intelligence services might not be restricted to ‘national security’ in a strict
sense and include other domains.

6

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Where we use the term ‘intelligence service’ in the discussion of case law,
it can refer to all sorts of agencies as discussed in this paragraph. Nevertheless,
our analysis and the formulated standards in particular address oversight
for intelligence services that intercept electronic communications on national
territories as part of more general programmes of surveillance (see
paragraph 2.3).

2.2 Secret surveillance and data collection
A recurring concept in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights is ‘secret surveillance’. The Court characterises this as “measures of
surveillance the existence of which remains unknown to the persons being
controlled.”8 In the Court’s case law, ‘secret surveillance’ for example concerns
tapping telephone conversations or ‘metering’ incoming and outgoing phone
calls.9 With the term ‘data collection’ we refer to the collection and storage
of data by intelligence services, without the need for them to resort to secret
measures, or without interfering with the secrecy of communications.
For example, open-source intelligence (OSINT) is derived from information in the
public domain, such as social media profiles, newspapers, and academic journals.
Intelligence services also collect information by requesting (bulk) data from
public and private entities, such as telecom providers, social services, and
financial institutions. Naturally, secret data collection is a form of secret
surveillance, but using both terms is useful to preserve some nuance in the
discussion of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

2.3 Individual surveillance and general programmes of surveillance
In the case law of the Court, a distinction is made between ‘individual
surveillance’ and ‘general programmes of surveillance’. The Klass case and the
majority of cases afterwards concerned individual surveillance, which is the
surveillance of specific persons. This is also denoted as ‘targeted surveillance’.
On the other hand, ‘more general programmes of surveillance’ are programmes
for bulk interception of the content of telecommunications and metadata.
In German law and the literature, this is denoted with ‘strategic surveillance’,
but the Court uses the term ‘strategic monitoring’. Strictly speaking, bulk
interception is not the same as untargeted surveillance, since one could collect
data in bulk of a (very broadly defined) target, for instance ‘all inhabitants of
the Netherlands’. We use ‘individual’ and ‘targeted’, versus ‘strategic’, ‘bulk’
and ‘untargeted’ interchangeably.

8

Klass, § 36.

9

See for example Klass and Malone.

7

To date, the Court discussed strategic surveillance only twice, in the Weber and
Saravia case and in the Liberty case. Two more cases on this issue are pending
before the Court: Big Brother Watch v. the United Kingdom revolves around
strategic surveillance by GCHQ revealed by Edward Snowden, and in Zakharov v.
Russia the applicant complains of unrestricted interception of all telephone
communications by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) without prior
judicial authorisation.10 Furthermore, the Hungarian Eötvös Károly Institute has
announced it will turn to the European Court of Human Rights now that the
Hungarian Constitutional Court rejected their complaint about the Act on the
Police. This Act allows secret surveillance and data collection based on a
ministerial order, without a court warrant.

2.4 Oversight, control and transparency
In this report, we use a broad definition of the term ‘oversight’ to include the
various ways of holding the intelligence services accountable before the public
and the government: internal oversight by the responsible minister, parliamentary
oversight, judicial oversight and external independent oversight. Oversight can
focus on specific instances in which measures are implemented against a
particular target, on bulk interception of electronic communications, or on the
overall functioning of a system of secret surveillance and data collection.
We recognise the fact that third parties, including civil society and companies,
are or can be involved in exercising oversight to some extent. Including them in
this report would broaden the scope too much, although we address their role
in the part on transparency.
We also use the term ‘control’, which should be distinguished from ‘oversight’.
‘Control’ is usually associated with the executive branch, and it includes the
power to manage and direct an intelligence service. It is performed by the
intelligence service over itself and/or by the responsible minister (including his
staff). The entity exercising control could also exercise internal oversight.
Although it is important that control and internal oversight processes are in
place, they cannot be considered to be substitutes for external and independent
oversight.
Oversight can be applied at three moments: when the surveillance is first
ordered and authorised, while it is being carried out, and after it has been
terminated. The European Court of Human Rights makes this distinction in the
context of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention.11 In this report, we refer to these
moments of intervention with ‘prior’ oversight, ‘ongoing’ oversight, and oversight
‘after the fact’ respectively. In this context, prior oversight means that a minister,
10

Zakharov v. Russia, 47143/06, lodged on 20 October 2006.

11

With regard to Article 8 see Klass, § 55, and with regard to Article 13 see Ekimdzhiev, § 99.

8

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

judge, or independent body approves the use of surveillance against an
individual, although the use of a method itself can also be subject to oversight,
in addition to its application. It is highly uncommon that parliamentary
committees perform prior oversight. Ongoing intervention allows for the
suspension of surveillance if it is no longer necessary, or if it is performed in
violation of the law. Oversight after the fact refers to the possibility of having
certain practices declared (un)lawful, and to provide for remedies. It could focus
on whether authorisations have been granted lawfully (formalities and
substantive requirements), whether the measures have been implemented
properly, and/or the overall functioning of the system. The term ‘oversight
powers’ denotes the institutional competences and legal powers that oversight
bodies are equipped with in order to perform their task. For example, an
independent oversight commission can be entrusted to oversee certain aspects
of the work of intelligence services, and to do so it can be empowered
to request specific information from intelligence agencies.
Finally, we use a broad concept of ‘transparency’ in this report. In the context of
the current debate, what first comes to mind are the transparency reports issued
by telecommunication providers and companies delivering ‘over-the-top’
Internet services. Such reports are a tool to give the public some insight in the
scope of secret surveillance and data collection and allow for a further
assessment of the lawfulness and effectiveness of measures. However, it should
be acknowledged that transparency, i.e. openness, is important at multiple
levels and in different relations, for instance at the level of the judiciary, or in
the relation between intelligence services and parliamentary oversight
committees or forms of independent oversight. All of these institutions can
contribute to transparency by reports, hearings and investigations. We will use
this meaning of transparency in the report.

9

3. Oversight of intelligence services
In this report, we focus on oversight of the intelligence
services in the context of the European Convention of
Human Rights (the ‘Convention’) and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’).
In this chapter, we analyse the relevant rights and
jurisprudence regarding oversight in a thematic way.
Transparency is discussed in the next chapter.

3.1 Interference with human rights

Privacy and data protection in conjunction with the right to an effective remedy
are the most relevant human rights issues related to the topic of this report.
However, other rights, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of
assembly and association, can be affected too.
The right to privacy is set out in Article 8, first paragraph, of the Convention and
Article 7 of the Charter. For those articles to apply, it should be established first
that there is an interference with (or in the case of the Charter, limitation of)
the right to privacy. For the sake of completeness, we first have to discuss under
what circumstances such interference occurs.
The performance of secret surveillance and data collection, but also the mere
existence of legislation providing for such powers, results in an interference with
Article 8 of the Convention according to the European Court of Human Rights.12
The Court reads a right to data protection into the right to privacy. It finds that
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data relating to an individual’s
private life amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the
Convention.13 It is irrelevant for the Court whether this concerns sensitive
information, whether the applicants have been inconvenienced as a result of
the use of the data, or whether the information has ever been consulted by a
third party.14 In fact, the Court established that the dissemination of data to and
their use by other authorities constitutes a further separate interference.15
Similarly, the Court of Justice of the European Union found that the obligation
to retain data relating to a person’s private life and to his communications
12

Klass, § 47; Malone, § 64; Weber and Saravia, § 78.

13

Leander, § 48; Amann, § 65; Rotaru, § 43.

14

Amann, § 68-70.

15

Weber and Saravia, § 79.

10

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

constitutes in itself an interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 7 of
the Charter.16 It also found that access of the competent national authorities to
the data constitutes a further interference with this right.17 Such retention and
access constitutes the processing of personal data and is therefore also subject
to the right to protection of personal data, which is protected by Article 8 of the
Charter as a separate fundamental right.18 Like the ECtHR, the CJEU found that
it does not matter whether the information is sensitive or whether the persons
concerned have been inconvenienced in any way.19 In any case, in so far as the
Charter contains rights that correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention,
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by
the Convention.20 The European Court of Human Rights takes the view that
even public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is
systematically or permanently collected and stored in files held by the national
authorities. This is the case in particular where the information concerns a
person’s distant past.21 It is exactly for this reason “that files gathered by security
services on a particular individual fall within the scope of Article 8 [of the
Convention], even where the information has not been gathered by any
intrusive or covert method.”22 It is also for this reason that we distinguish
between ‘secret surveillance’ and ‘data collection’ (see above).
Once we have established that most surveillance and data collection by
intelligence services will give rise to an interference, the next step is to see if the
interference is justified. According to Article 8, second paragraph, of the
Convention, any interference by public authorities with exercising the right to
privacy should be a) in accordance with the law; b) in pursuit of a legitimate aim
(e.g. national security); and c) necessary in a democratic society for the pursuit of
this aim. We will refer to ‘in accordance with the law’ as the ‘legality’ or
‘lawfulness’ requirement in line with literature on this topic. The requirement of
a legitimate aim is more of a formal character, since the Court hardly ever
doubts that an interference is in the interest of national security or law
enforcement.23 The Court will consider an interference to be ‘necessary in a
democratic society’, if it answers a pressing social need, is proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, and if the reasons adduced by the government to justify
it are relevant and sufficient.24 The necessity requirement often boils down to a
16

Digital Rights Ireland, § 34.

17

Digital Rights Ireland, § 35.

18

Digital Rights Ireland, § 36.

19

Österreichischer Rundfunk, § 75; Digital Rights Ireland, § 33.

20

Article 53(3) Charter.

21

Rotaru, § 43; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, § 187.

22

P.G. and J.H., § 57.

23	Nevertheless, in the more recent cases of Iordachi and Others v. Moldova and Ekimdzhiev, the Court
is a bit more wary of the use of the term ‘national security’ in domestic law.
24

Handyside, 48-50; Gillow, § 55; Leander, § 58. See also S. and Marper, § 101.

11

proportionality analysis. In the Court’s approach, the existence of oversight
normally is assessed under the heading of legality, whereas the functioning of
such oversight is a question of necessity.25 However, where the Court concludes
that interference is not in accordance with the law, it will not proceed to
examine aim and necessity.26 It turns out that in the majority of cases, secret
surveillance or data collection was not ‘in accordance with the law’, due to
unclear surveillance powers or a simple lack of regulation.
The Charter provides for a general limitation clause that resembles the logic of
the limitation clauses in the Convention. Article 52, first paragraph, provides
that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the
Charter must: a) be provided for by law; b) genuinely meet objectives of general
interest or the need to protect the rights of others; c) be necessary (subject to
the principle of proportionality); and d) respect the essence of the rights and
freedom recognised by the Charter. Just like the ECtHR, the Court of Justice of
the European Union has accepted without much discussion that measures
introduced to fight international terrorism satisfied an objective of general
interest.27 Furthermore, the CJEU determined that the competent national
authority has the task of proving that national security would in fact be
compromised: “There is no presumption that the reasons invoked by a national
authority exist and are valid.”28
As noted, secret surveillance and data collection also affect the right to an
effective remedy. Under Article 13 of the Convention, the right to an effective
(domestic) remedy for the violation of a Convention right is established:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated,
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority [...].” This right is also
recognised in Article 47 of the Charter. In the context of immigration cases, the
European Court of Human Rights stated that, given the overlap between the
procedural safeguards under Articles 8 and 13, the former should be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the latter.29 It appears that the same holds true for
Articles 8 and 13 in the context of secret surveillance and data collection.

25	Cameron 2005, p. 221. However, in at least two cases the Court also verified whether shortcomings in a legal system (such as a lack of formal oversight) had an impact on the actual operation of
the system of secret surveillance. If statistical information showed that the system of secret surveillance was overused, the Court reasoned that this might in part be due to the shortcomings in the
law, with the effect that interference had not been ‘in accordance with the law.’ See Ekimdzhiev,
§ 92-93 and Iordachi & Others v. Moldova, § 52-53.
26	See among others Malone, § 82; Hewitt and Harman, § 42; Nimmo, § 41; Huvig, § 36; Kruslin,
§ 37; R.V. and Others, § 47; Kopp, § 76; Valenzuela Contreras, § 62; Amann, § 81; Rotaru, § 62;
P.G. and J.H., § 63; Perry, § 49; Copland, § 48; Ekimdzhiev, § 93; Khan, § 28; Liberty, § 69-70;
Iordachi, § 53.
27	See for example Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, § 363; Al-Aqsa v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2012:711, § 123; Digital Rights Ireland,
§ 42-44.
28

ZZ v. Secretary of State, § 61.

29	I.R. and G.T. v. the United Kingdom (adm.), § 62. In Lambert v. France, the Court considered the
lack of an ‘effective’ remedy to challenge telephone tapping a violation of Article 8 (§ 31-40).

12

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

3.2 The margin of appreciation
Traditionally, the European Court of Human Rights has accorded states a fairly
wide margin of appreciation in the context of national security.30 It fits in with
the doctrine of the Court that this margin can be reduced, for example when
the Court sees growing consensus between Member States on a particular topic or
certain changes in society. In the S. and Marper case, the applicants complained
that the permanent storage of their fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA
profiles in a police database was a violation of their right to privacy. The Court
considered that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance
for the right to respect for private and family life. Under reference to the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108), the Court stated that domestic
law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any use of personal data
that would be a violation of the right to privacy.31 The Court found the need
for safeguards even greater where the personal data undergo automatic
processing, especially when such data are used for police purposes (§ 103),32
and it noted strong consensus among the Convention parties to balance the
competing public and individual interests carefully. Furthermore, the Court
observed that “the protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention would
be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the
criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing
the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important
private-life interests.” These factors narrowed the margin of appreciation left to
the respondent state (§ 112).33 As to the facts of the case, the Court concluded
that the respondent state had failed to strike a fair balance and that there had
been a violation of Article 8 (§ 125-126).
The position of the Court was more recently confirmed by sweeping
considerations on technological developments and oversight in M.M. v. the
United Kingdom. In this case, the Court further develops the line of reasoning
set out in the S. and Marper case. The applicant received a caution for child
abduction, and the government refused to delete it from the police records
after the retention time had lapsed. She complained in Strasbourg about the
retention and disclosure of her caution data, in particular about the fact that it
would be retained for life. The Court recalled previous surveillance cases and
30	Klass, § 59; Leander, § 59; L. v. Norway (adm.); Esbester v. the United Kingdom (adm.); Christie v.
the United Kingdom (adm.); Segerstedt-Wiberg, § 88; Weber and Saravia, § 106.
31	The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data was drawn up within the Council of Europe and opened for signature in Strasbourg on
28 January 1981 (Convention 108). It was supplemented with the Additional Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows, opened for signature in Strasbourg
on 8 November 2001 (Convention 181).
32

See also Digital Rights Ireland, § 55.

33	See Klass, § 48, in which the Court took note of the technical advances made in the means of
espionage and surveillance, and Khelili v. Switzerland, § 62.

13

considered “it essential, in the context of the recording and communication of
criminal record data as in telephone tapping, secret surveillance and cover
intelligence-gathering, to have clear, detailed rules […]. There are various crucial
stages at which data protection issues under Article 8 of the Convention may
arise, including during collection, storage, use and communication of data.
At each stage, appropriate and adequate safeguards which reflect the principles
elaborated in applicable data protection instruments and prevent arbitrary and
disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights must be in place” (§ 195).
It added that “the greater the scope of the recording system, and thus the
greater the amount and sensitivity of data held and available for disclosure,
the more important the content of the safeguards to be applied at the various
crucial stages in the subsequent processing of the data” (§ 200).
Another factor that militates in favour of a small margin of appreciation is when
interference is particularly far-reaching. In the case of Bernh Larsen Holding AS
and Others v. Norway for example, a Norwegian tax office obtained all existing
documents on a server, regardless of their relevance for tax assessment purposes
(§ 159 and 163), and in M.K. v. France data was retained for twenty-five years
(§ 42-43).
Finally, it can be argued that the state’s margin of appreciation also depends
on the risk or actual evidence of abuse or arbitrary use of surveillance powers.
In the admissibility decision of Remmers and Hamer v. the Netherlands, the
Commission considered that “as regards the compatibility of rules on secret
surveillance with Article 8, the Court has accepted that the possibility of
improper action by a negligent official can never be completely ruled out
whatever the system. Relevant for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention
are the likelihood of such action and the safeguards provided to protect against
it” [emphasis added]. In the absence of any evidence or indication that the
actual practice followed is otherwise, the Court will assume that the intelligence
services comply with the law.34
In its recent judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, the reasoning of the CJEU
confirmed much of the case law of the ECtHR of prior decades in the field of
surveillance, even though the disputed measure related to law enforcement.
The judgment was given in joint cases of requests for a preliminary ruling from
Ireland and Austria. Essentially, the referring courts were asking the CJEU to
examine the validity of the Data Retention Directive – under which telecom
providers are held to store traffic data in bulk for a period of 6 to 24 months –
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.

34

Klass, § 59; also see Esbester (adm.), p. 11; Kennedy, § 168.

14

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Echoing the ECtHR considerations on the margin of appreciation, the CJEU
found that the discretion of EU legislature was limited, because of the extent
and the seriousness of interference resulting from the disputed Directive (§ 48).
In this respect, it was a relevant factor that the Directive covered, “in a generalised
manner, all persons and all means of electronic communications as well as
traffic data, without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in
the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime” (§ 57).
Now that the stage has been set, we need to know which standards for
oversight can be derived from the Court’s jurisprudence.

3.3 Adequate and effective guarantees against abuse
The recurring central theme in all relevant case law is that powers of secret
surveillance should be accompanied with adequate and effective guarantees
against abuse of these powers. Oversight is one of the elements required to
prevent such abuse, according to the Court.
The Court establishes the ‘adequate and effective guarantee’ criterion in the
Klass case, one of its very first surveillance cases. Five German citizens
complained that the Act on Restrictions on the Secrecy of the Mail, Post and
Telecommunications of 1968 (the ‘G 10’) on phone interception interfered with
their right to private life and correspondence. The Court found that the mere
existence of the legislation itself constituted interference (§ 41). In assessing
whether this interference was justified by the terms of Article 8, second
paragraph, the Court considered that powers of secret surveillance of citizens
are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for
safeguarding the democratic institutions (§ 42).35 The Court of Justice of the
European Union also takes the view that limitations to the right to respect for
private life should be strictly necessary.36 Notwithstanding the respondent state’s
margin of appreciation (§ 49), the ECtHR stated that “whatever system of secret
surveillance is adopted, there [must] exist adequate and effective guarantees
against abuse” (§ 50). In the Klass case and a couple of subsequent cases, the
Court considered the ‘adequate and effective guarantees’ criterion in the
context of the necessity requirement.37 In later cases, the Court tended to
examine such guarantees as part of the legality requirement.38

35

See also Rotaru, § 47, Segerstedt-Wiberg, § 88; Volokhy, § 43; Kennedy, §153; Dragojević, § 84.

36

Digital Rights Ireland, § 52. See also CJEU IPI, § 39.

37	Klass, § 48-49; Leander, § 60; L. v. Norway (adm.), § 2; Esbester v. the United Kingdom (adm.);
Hewitt and Harman v. the United Kingdom (adm.); Lambert, § 31; Weber and Saravia (adm.),
§ 106; Kennedy, § 153.
38

Ekimdzhiev, § 77; Uzun, § 63; Sefilyan v. Armenia, §127.

15

However, most recently the Court appeared to apply this test again under the
necessity requirement. In Dragojević v. Croatia, the Court stated that this
criterion “in particular bears significance as to the question whether an
interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ […], since powers to instruct
secret surveillance of citizens are only tolerated under Article 8 to the extent
that they are strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions” (§ 84).
If the Court examines oversight of secret surveillance under the necessity
heading, it will determine whether the procedures for supervising the ordering
and implementation of the surveillance measures are such as to keep the
interference to what is ‘necessary in a democratic society.’39 For that matter,
the fact that “the values of a democratic society must be followed as faithfully
in the supervisory procedures if the bounds of necessity, within the meaning of
Article 8, second paragraph, are not to be exceeded” is used as a guiding
principle. In this connection, the Court consistently refers to the rule of law as
being one of the fundamental values of a democratic society.40 The question to
be answered is then how the supervisory procedures can follow the values of a
democratic society faithfully.

3.4 Judicial, parliamentary, and independent oversight
One important factor relates to the bodies performing oversight. Another
important factor relates to the moment oversight is performed. The European
Court of Human Rights takes a holistic approach to this topic. In the Klass case,
the Court stated that the ‘adequate and effective guarantees against abuse’
criterion of Article 8 of the Convention depends on the type of surveillance at
issue, the requirements for a surveillance order, the authorities competent to
authorise, carry out, and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy
provided for by the national law (§ 50).41 In its assessment, the Court adds up all
the guarantees, safeguards, and remedies as provided for by the national legal
system, before issuing a final determination on the system’s compatibility with
the Convention.42 However, as the following sections show, the Court finds
certain forms of oversight preferable and other forms even unacceptable in the
light of this assessment.

39

Klass, § 54; Lambert, § 31; Kvasnica, § 80; Kennedy, § 154; Dragojević, § 84.

40	Klass, § 55; Lambert, § 31; Rotaru, § 59; Brinks v. the Netherlands (adm.), § 1; Volokhy, § 52;
Kvasnica, § 80; Kennedy, § 154; Dragojević, § 84.
41	See also Mersch and Others v. Luxembourg (adm.); L. v. Norway (adm.); Ekimdzhiev, § 77; Weber
and Saravia, § 106; Kennedy, § 153; Uzun, § 63; Shimovolos, § 68; Sefilyan, § 127;
Dragojević, § 84.
42

See also Cameron 2000, pp. 126-127.

16

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Prior judicial oversight
Without any doubt, the Court considers it ‘desirable’ to entrust oversight on
secret surveillance to a judge. In the Klass case, dated 1978, the Court had
already considered: “ In a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual
cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a
whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge”
(§ 56).43 The Court tied this consideration to the principle of the rule of law.
This principle implies that an interference by the national authorities should be
subject to ‘effective control’. Such oversight should normally be assured by the
judiciary, at least in the last resort, because judicial oversight provides the best
guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure (§ 55).44

Alternatives to prior judicial oversight
In the Klass case, the Court accepted the exclusion of prior and ongoing judicial
oversight, on the condition that “the [supervisory] procedures established
themselves provide adequate and equivalent guarantees safeguarding the
individual’s rights” (§ 55). The German system satisfied this criterion. It
encompassed internal control, parliamentary oversight, independent oversight,
and a complaint procedure before an independent body. Only a Federal
Minister or the highest authority of one of the Länder could order surveillance
measures. The minister was bound to provide the independent G 10 Commission
(G 10-Komission) every month with an account of the measures he had ordered,
before such measures were actually implemented. He could however, order the
execution of the measure before having informed the Commission if there was
a risk that a delay might frustrate the purpose of the measure. This meant
that except in urgent cases, the minister obtained prior approval of the
Commission. Furthermore, an official qualified for judicial office supervised the
implementation of the measures ordered.45 The Parliamentary Supervisory Board
(Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, PKGr) performed after-the-fact oversight.
The competent minister had to report to the Board on the application of the
G 10 at least once every six months, which enabled the Board to oversee the
overall performance of the system.46 The Court noted that the Parliamentary
Supervisory Board and the G 10 Commission enjoyed sufficient independence
of the authorities carrying out the surveillance, and were vested with sufficient
powers and competences to exercise effective and continuous oversight.
In particular, the Court noted that “the democratic character [was] reflected in
the balanced membership of the Parliamentary Board,” since the opposition
43

See also Kennedy, § 167; Telegraaf and Others v. the Netherlands, § 98.

44

See also Brinks v. the Netherlands (adm.), § 1; Rotaru, § 59; Volokhy, § 52.

45	One could object that the ‘qualification to hold judicial office’ does not ensure independence. At
least, in the context of Article 6 the Court has a narrower notion of when a court or tribunal is
‘independent’. See Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 21722/11.
46

Klass, § 18-21, 23 and § 56; Weber and Saravia, § 20-21, 24-25, 55-58, and 115.

17

was represented. Lastly, the Court noted that an individual who believed to be
under surveillance himself had the right of complaining to the G 10 Commission,
and – when such complaint was without success – of having recourse to the
Constitutional Court. Having regard to this, the Court concluded that the
exclusion of prior and ongoing judicial oversight did not exceed the limits of
“what may be deemed necessary in a democratic society” (§ 56).47 In coming to
this conclusion, it attached particular weight to the independence it assumed
the supervisory bodies enjoyed.
The Court again endorsed this system in 2006, about three decades later. In the
admissibility decision of Weber and Saravia v. Germany, two German citizens
complained that the amended G 10 Act violated their right to respect for
privacy. They alleged that the scope of the Federal Intelligence Service’s power
(Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) to carry out strategic surveillance under the
amended G 10 Act was far too wide (§ 111). Again the Court asked whether
there were ‘adequate and effective guarantees against abuse’ in place (§ 106).
The Court observed that the system of oversight approved in the Klass case
essentially remained the same, and it saw no reason to reach a different
conclusion about it in the present case (§ 117). The Weber and Saravia case thus
shows that the Court imposes the same standards of oversight for targeted and
strategic surveillance.
In Leander v. Sweden, a case that followed soon after the Klass case, there is
another example of a system in which ‘adequate and effective guarantees
against abuse’ were in place (§ 60), even though prior judicial oversight was
lacking in the Swedish system at that time. Mr Leander was rejected for a
government job after he had failed a personnel screening procedure. In
Sweden, a special police service was responsible for the prevention and
detection of offences against national security, and they had intelligence powers
for these purposes. The security department (the Security Police) within the
National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen) kept a secret police register in which it
could enter information necessary for the special police service. The National
Police Board released information concerning Mr Leander kept in the secret
police register to the government, for use in the personnel screening procedure.
The Swedish system made no mention of judicial oversight, yet it did provide for
internal control by the Minister of Justice, parliamentary oversight, independent
oversight, and possibilities to file complaints before an independent body.
The Court attached particular importance to the presence of parliamentarians
on the National Police Board and noted that this group included members of
the opposition. In the view of the Court, the parliamentarians’ direct and
regular oversight with regard to the most important aspect of the register –
47	As regards after-the-fact judicial oversight, this is a matter of subsequent notification and will be
discussed in the chapter on transparency.

18

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

the release of information – provided a major safeguard against abuse (§ 65).48
In addition, the Court noted that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Justice (riksdagens justitieutskott) regularly scrutinised the activities of the
Security Police, and that the Parliamentary Ombudsman (justitieombudsmännen)
performed oversight (§ 65). Furthermore, the Chancellor of Justice
(justitiekanslerns), a traditional Swedish institute, was tasked to supervise the
public authorities and their employees in order to ensure that they exercise their
powers in compliance with the law (see § 36). The Court acknowledged that in
some matters the Chancellor was not independent of the government. However,
the Court observed that the Swedish Parliament (riksdag) had given the
Chancellor his mandate to supervise the functioning of the personnel screening
system, so that in practice, he did act independently of the government (§ 65).
Lastly, the Court noted that the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman could receive and examine complaints from individuals (§ 36 and
38). The Court concluded that the Swedish system for security vetting met the
requirements of Article 8, second paragraph (§ 67).49
As in the Klass case and the Weber and Saravia case, the Court again had to
assess the Swedish system about three decades later and reached the same
conclusion. In the case of Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, five Swedish
nationals requested access to their records contained in the secret police register.
A few applicants had their request refused and other applicants were allowed
to inspect some records. Together they complained in Strasbourg about both
the continued storage and the refusal to provide full access to their records.
After the Leander case, the Records Board (Registernämnden) had replaced the
National Police Board to monitor compliance with the Police Data Act, and the
independent Data Inspection Board (Datainspektionen) had been introduced to
monitor compliance with the more general Personal Data Act. The latter was
competent to receive complaints from individuals (§ 63), and in order to carry
out its oversight function it had access to the personal data that was being
processed, to additional information, and to the premises where the processing
took place (§ 64). Having regard to this, and to its findings in the Leander case,
the Court deemed it established that the system met the requirement of Article
8, second paragraph (§ 103).50 More recently, in Kennedy v. the United Kingdom,
the Court concluded that the British system for secret surveillance, contained
‘adequate and effective guarantees against abuse’ (§ 153). Mr Kennedy
complained that the British regimen to intercept internal communications on
a targeted basis, established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
48	‘Direct and regular’ refers to the fact that the parliamentarians participated in all decisions regarding whether or not information should be released, and that each of them was vested with a right
of veto (see the next few paragraphs). See also Klass, § 56; by contrast see Ekimdzhiev, § 87.
49	Nevertheless, Cameron points out that those oversight bodies approved by the Court were later
shown to be ineffective; Cameron 2000, pp. 229-234.
50

Note that the Swedish oversight system was recently renewed in line with current oversight trends.

19

2000 (RIPA), did not comply with Article 8, second paragraph, of the Convention.
As in the Klass case, the applicant could claim to be a victim of interference for
the mere fact that RIPA existed (§ 124-129). Of course, the Court took into
account the type of surveillance at issue (§ 160), the procedures for a surveillance
order (§ 159-164), and the oversight mechanisms. As regards oversight of the
RIPA regime, the Court observed that apart from internal control by ministers,
the Interception of Communications Commissioner as well as the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal (IPT) exercised after-the-fact oversight. The Commissioner
oversaw the overall functioning of the surveillance system and the authorisation
of interception orders in specific cases. The Court noted that the Commissioner
was independent of the executive and the legislature and held or had held a
high judicial office (§ 166). Furthermore, the Court was impressed by the role of
the IPT.51 The Court highlighted the “extensive jurisdiction of the IPT to examine
any complaint of unlawful interception.” Any person who suspected that his
communications had been or were being intercepted could apply to the
tribunal. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the IPT did not depend on notification,
and the Court marked this as an advantage over the German system. The Court
emphasised that the IPT was an independent and impartial body, which had
adopted its own rules of procedure. The members of the tribunal had to hold,
or had previously held, high judicial offices or had to be experienced lawyers
(§ 167). Having regard to the procedures as well as to the safeguards offered by
the supervision of the Commissioner and the review of the IPT, the Court
concluded that interference was justified under Article 8, second paragraph
(§ 169).52

The body issuing authorisations
It is also without any doubt that “the body issuing authorizations for
interception should be independent and that there must be either judicial
[oversight] or [oversight] by an independent body over the issuing body’s
activity,” as the Court stressed in Iordachi and Others v. Moldova (§ 40). This
statement refers to Dumitru Popescu v. Romania (No. 2). A public prosecutor had
ordered the Romanian intelligence services to intercept Mr Popescu’s telephone
conversations. After the applicant had been arrested, he was found guilty in
particular on the basis of this material. Mr Popescu complained in Strasbourg
that he had been convicted on the basis of unlawful evidence. In its assessment
under Article 8, the Court noted that authorisation of the telephone tapping
51	Note that many commentators are highly critical of the IPT. In its ruling of 5 December 2014 for example, it rejected complaints against TEMPORA, finding this programme not to be in contravention
of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.
52	See also Esbester v. the United Kingdom (adm.) and Christie v. the United Kingdom (adm.), in which
the Commission found oversight by the IPT in combination with the Commissioner to be sufficient.
Nevertheless, in the latter the Commission did note that “the possibility of review by a court of
involvement of Parliamentarians in supervision would furnish additional independent safeguards to
the system” (see p. 15).

20

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

had been left to the power of the public prosecutor, a body known not to be
independent of the Romanian executive branch (§ 70-71).53 In a previous case
against Romania, the Court had already found that the decisions of the public
prosecutor could not be challenged before an independent and impartial
judicial body, yet only before the hierarchically higher superior prosecutor (§ 72).
Therefore, authorisation for telephone tapping was not subject to prior
oversight by a judge or other independent body, either at their own initiative
or after a complaint of the person concerned (§ 73).

	After-the-fact oversight on the authorisation and the overall performance
of the system
In the Dumitru Popescu case, the Court noted that there was no meaningful
after-the-fact judicial oversight on the authorisation process (§ 74), because the
law made it impossible for the Romanian court hearing the criminal charges
against Mr Popescu to review the validity of the authorisation given by the
prosecutor. This court had thus limited itself to reviewing compliance with
the formalities for the actual interception (§ 76). In view of the Court, the
theoretical possibility for an individual to complain before a parliamentary
committee could not make up for the lack of prior and after-the-fact judicial
oversight on the authorisation procedure, since the person concerned had not
been notified of the surveillance, and the parliamentary committee was not
competent anyway to sanction unlawful surveillance (§ 77).54 There had been
a violation of Article 8.55 The Court also holds the opinion that there has to be
independent ongoing or after-the-fact oversight on the overall functioning of
a system of secret surveillance and data collection. In Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria,
the applicants complained about the Bulgarian Special Surveillance Means Act
(SSMA), referring to Article 8 of the Convention. They alleged it gave the
intelligence services a broad power to use secret surveillance, and it failed to
provide ‘adequate and effective guarantees against abuse’. The Court found
that prior oversight on the authorisation procedure provided sufficient
safeguards (§ 84). However, the Court was not content with the oversight for
the later stages. It noted that the SSMA did not provide for ongoing or afterthe-fact oversight by an independent body that verified whether the
intelligence services in fact complied with the warrants for authorising the use
of surveillance, whether they faithfully reproduced the original data in the
written record, or whether the original data was in fact destroyed if the law
provided for this. On the contrary, these activities were all carried out by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (§ 85). The Court further noted that the overall
control over the system of secret surveillance was also entrusted solely to the
responsible minister, not to independent bodies (§ 87). The Court concluded that
there had been a violation of Article 8.
53

See also Uzun, § 72.

54

See also Association ‘21 December 1989’ and Others v. Romania, § 120.

55

See also Bălteanu v. Romania, § 42-46.

21

Finally, the CJEU denounced that under the Directive access by the national
authorities to the data retained was “not made dependent on a prior review
carried out by a court of by an independent administrative body” (§ 62).
This comment has already found its way to national jurisprudence.

Prior and after-the-fact opportunities for the individual
The Court’s case law on the right to an effective remedy in particular stresses the
fact that individual rights protection requires independent oversight after the
fact on the lawfulness of measures of secret surveillance and data collection
applied to an individual. Such oversight can exist in a complaint procedure.
In the Klass case, the very fact that individuals believing themselves to be under
surveillance had the opportunity of complaining to the G 10 Commission and to
the Constitutional Court and that they had recourse to various courts once they
had been notified, ensured that the system satisfied the requirements of Article
13 of the Convention (§ 70-72). Similarly, in the Leander case the facts that
individuals could complain before the Chancellor of Justice and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, that there was parliamentary oversight on
individual cases, and that the entire Cabinet of the Government had looked into
Mr Leander’s complaints, were sufficient evidence that Article 13 had been
complied with – although none of these remedies would be ‘effective’ on their
own (§ 81-84). In the Ekimdzhiev case, the Court denounced that as a result of
a lack of notification, “those concerned [were] unable to seek any redress in
respect of the use of secret surveillance measures against them’ [§ 101].
Moreover, the Bulgarian government had not provided its citizens with any
information on remedies that could become available to the persons concerned
(§ 102).
What is more, the Ekimdzhiev case signals that the Court is progressing towards
an adversary principle for prior oversight proceedings. The Court found it
obvious that when surveillance is ordered and while it is under way, i.e. when
prior and ongoing oversight takes place, notification of the persons concerned
is not possible, since such notification would jeopardise national security.
The Court held that the persons concerned were therefore of necessity deprived
of the possibility to challenge specific measures ordered or implemented against
them. However, the Court considered that “this does not mean it is altogether
impossible to provide a limited remedy – for instance, one where the
proceedings are secret and where no reasons are given, and the persons
concerned are not apprised whether they have in fact been monitored – even at
this stage.” As an example the Court referred to the Klass case, where
individuals believing themselves to be under surveillance could file a complaint
(§ 100). The Court concluded that Article 13 had been violated.

22

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

In the context of deportation cases for the purpose of protecting national
security, the Court reads the right to ‘some form of adversarial proceedings’ into
Article 8 of the Convention. The case of Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria concerned a father
of two who was deported from Bulgarian territory on national security grounds.
Under Bulgarian law, an order concerning a matter of national security was not
subject to judicial review. The father and his children complained that there had
been arbitrary interference with their right to respect for their family life
contrary to Article 8 of the Convention. The Court recalled classic surveillance
cases such as the Klass, Amann, and Rotaru cases (§ 119) in that there must be
safeguards to ensure that the discretion left to the executive is exercised in
accordance with the law and without abuse (§ 122). Furthermore, the Court
inferred from the cases mentioned that “even where national security is at
stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society
require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to
some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent
to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence, if need be with
appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information” (§ 123).
This meant that the individual had to be able to challenge the government’s
assertion that national security is at stake, and that the independent body had
to be able to review the government’s interpretation of ‘national security’
(§ 124). The Court noted that under Bulgarian law the Ministry of the Interior
was empowered to issue deportation orders without following any form of
adversarial procedure, without giving any reasons, and without any possibility
for appeal to an independent authority, and concluded there had been a
violation of Article 8 (§ 128).

3.5 Independence of the authorities carrying out surveillance
Regardless of the particular organisation of oversight, one thing that becomes
clear from the jurisprudence on the right to privacy is that there should be at least
some form of ‘independent’ oversight on the lawfulness of the surveillance.
To determine whether a body is independent, the European Court of Human
Rights examines how the body exercises its functions, whether it acts upon its
own rules, how its members are appointed, or if its independence is guaranteed
in any other way.
For the purpose of Article 8 of the Convention, ‘independent’ oversight means
independence of the intelligence services and the executive branch. In the Klass
and Weber and Saravia cases, the Court noted that the G 10 commissioners were
completely independent in the exercise of their functions and could not be
subject to instructions. Furthermore, the Commission drew up its own rules of
procedure. Additionally, the members of the Parliamentary Board were
appointed by parliament itself in proportion to the parliamentary groupings,

23

the opposition being represented on the Board.56 The Court concluded that the
Parliamentary Board and the G 10 Commission were independent of the
authorities that carried out the surveillance (§ 56), and it found no breach of
Article 8 (§ 60). Similarly, in the Kennedy case the Court expressly noted that the
Interception of Communications Commissioner was independent of the
executive and the legislature (§ 166), and it emphasised that the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal was an independent and impartial body, which had adopted its
own rules of procedure (§ 167). Another way to ensure independent oversight is
by a way of a constitutional provision. In the Segerstedt-Wiberg case, the Court
observed that the independence of the Records Board and the Data Inspection
Board was guaranteed, inter alia, by the Swedish Constitution, which provided
that neither Parliament nor the government could interfere with the manner in
which the Boards oversaw particular cases (§ 62-63; see also Leander, § 36).
By contrast, in the Dumitru Popesco case the Court recalled that the Romanian
Minister of Justice supervised all the members of the general prosecutor’s
department. Since the public prosecutor – who oversaw telephone tapping –
acted as a member of this department, it was not independent of the executive
branch (§ 70-71). The Court found a violation of Article 8.57 In Commission v.
Germany, the Court of Justice of the European Union established that “in
relation to a public body, the term ‘independence’ normally means a status
which ensures that the body concerned can act completely freely, without
taking any instructions or being put under any pressure” (§ 18). It involves the
lack of any instructions relating to the performance of their duties, so
‘independence’ does not concern exclusively the relationship between the
supervisory authorities and the bodies subject to this supervision (§ 19 and 28).
In Commission v. Austria, the CJEU added that ‘functional independence’, where
the respective party is not bound by instructions in the performance of its duties,
is not by itself sufficient to protect a supervisory authority from all external
influence (§ 42).58 For instance, the attribution of the necessary equipment and
staff to supervisory authorities must not prevent them from acting independently
(§ 58), and, at least in the context of the Data Protection Directive, the supervisory
authorities and their decisions should remain above all suspicion of political
partiality (§ 52).

56

Klass, § 21; Weber and Saravia, § 117.

57	See also Iordachi, § 40; Uzun, § 72; Ekimdzhiev; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom. Khan v. the
United Kingdom confirms that ‘independence’ means the same for the purposes of Article 13
(§ 45). See also M.M. v. the United Kingdom, § 206, where the Court stresses the importance of
independent review of a decision to retain or disclose data.
58

See also Commission v. Hungary, § 51.

24

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

3.6 Powers for effective oversight
The cases discussed above (Klass, Weber and Saravia, Leander, SegerstedtWiberg and Kennedy) contain clues on the particular powers an oversight body
should have in the light of the Convention.
Most importantly, it can be induced from the Court’s case law on Article 8 of the
Convention that prior and ongoing oversight bodies should have the power to
prevent or end a surveillance measure and to order the removal of personal
data. As noted earlier, in the Klass case the Court attached importance to
the fact that the Parliamentary Supervisory Board and the G 10 Commission
were vested with sufficient powers to exercise effective oversight (§ 56).
This conclusion was based on the fact that if the G 10 Commission declared any
measures to be illegal or unnecessary, the Minister had to ‘terminate’ them
immediately (§ 21 and 53). Similarly, in the Leander case the Court highlighted
that each Member of Parliament on the Swedish National Police Board was
vested with a right of veto, the exercise of which automatically prevented the
Board from releasing information to the Swedish government (§ 65). The Court
explicitly re-approved both systems thirty years later in Weber and Saravia and
Segerstedt-Wiberg respectively (under Article 8, but, as will be set out below,
Segerstedt-Wiberg did not survive scrutiny under Article 13). In the Kennedy
case, the Court endorsed the fact that the IPT could, inter alia, quash any
interception order, cancel a surveillance warrant and require the destruction
of any records obtained under a surveillance warrant (§ 80 and 167).59
Finally, in S. and Marper the Court disapproved of the fact that an acquitted
individual had only limited possibilities to have the data removed from the
national database or the materials destroyed (§ 119). Not only does the right to
privacy require that authorities tasked with oversight are actually in a position
to do something about surveillance measures. According to the Court, it also
follows from the right to an effective remedy, protected by Article 13 of the
Convention, that oversight bodies should be able to issue legally binding
decisions against intelligence services. In the view of the Court in the Klass case,
the ‘authority’ referred to in Article 13 is not necessarily a judicial authority in
the strict sense; the main question is whether the powers are actually effective:
“The powers and procedural guarantees an authority possesses, are relevant
in determining whether the remedy […] is effective” (§ 67).60
Meanwhile, the Court is mindful of limits to oversight potentially present in the
context of national security: “An ‘effective remedy’ under Article 13 must mean
a remedy that is as effective as can be having regard to the restricted scope for
recourse inherent in any system of secret surveillance” (§ 69). Building on these
59

See also Mersch and Others, p. 118.

60

Klass, § 67; Leander, § 77; Segerstedt-Wiberg, § 117.

25

considerations, the Court noted in the Leander case that the main weakness of
the oversight afforded by the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor
of Justice was that both lacked the power to render a legally binding decision.
However, the Court observed that the opinions of the Ombudsman and the
Chancellor commanded by tradition great respect in Swedish society and were
usually followed in practice (§ 82; see also § 37-38). The Court also found it
important that the Parliamentary members of the Swedish National Police Board
considered each case where release of information was requested, in respect
of which each of them was vested with a right of veto (§ 82; see also § 65). In the
end, the Court concluded there was no violation of Article 13 (§ 84).
However, the Swedish system that was approved in the Leander case was
considered a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in the case of SegerstedtWiberg. This development in the case law can be explained by the fact that the
principles of data protection had found their way into the Convention. In the
Segerstedt-Wiberg case, the applicants complained that no effective remedy
existed and in particular that they could not have their files destroyed. The
Court noted that the Records Board had no competence to order the
destruction of files or the erasure or rectification of information kept in the files.
In addition, the Court found it unproven that the Data Inspection Board, which
in theory had the power to order a processor to stop processing the information
other than for storage, functioned effectively in practice (§ 120). Individuals
furthermore had no direct access to any legal remedy as regards the erasure
of the information that had been released to them. In the view of the Court,
these shortcomings were not set off by any possibilities for the applicants to
seek compensation, so the system was not consistent with Article 13 (§ 121).

26

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

27

4.	Transparency of intelligence
services
The European Court of Human Rights recognises the fact
that for an individual to exercise his or her right to privacy
and freedom of expression, a certain degree of transparency
is essential, even though the Court hardly ever explicitly
mentions the term ‘transparency’ as such in its decisions on
secret surveillance and data collection. In several instances,
however, the Court points to the lack of ‘public scrutiny’ of
interference with the right to privacy. This notion captures
the importance of transparency. In addition, case law
regarding the legality requirement of Article 8 underlines the
need for transparency, notwithstanding the fact that the
Court is not insensitive to the argument that publication of
information about secret surveillance might reveal the
working methods and fields of operation of the intelligence
services and even possibly identify their agents.61

4.1 The regulation of intelligence services
From the requirement that any interference with the right to privacy should be
‘in accordance with the law’ it follows that the scope of powers of secret
surveillance and data collection should be transparent. The Strasbourg Court
established this in Malone v. the United Kingdom. Mr. Malone complained that
the police tapped and metered his telephone. With respect to the foreseeability
condition that is contained in the legality requirement, the Court held that this
could not mean that an individual should be able to foresee exactly when the
authorities will use secret surveillance against him. Nevertheless, the Court
found the law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an indication as to the
circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are
empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and the collection of
the data (§ 67).62 Moreover, the Court determined that, since the implementation
of secret surveillance is not open to ‘public scrutiny’, it should be the law – as
opposed to accompanying administrative practice – that indicates the scope of
powers, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference
(§ 68).63
61

See for example Klass, § 55.

62	See also Weber and Saravia, § 93; Ekimdzhiev, § 75; Uzun, § 61; Telegraaf Media, § 90. ‘… and the
collection of data’ was added only recently in Shimovolos v. Russia, § 68.
63	See also Halford, § 49; Kopp, § 64; Copland, § 45; Huvig, § 29; Kruslin, § 30; Remmers and

28

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Parallel to this, the CJEU held that EU legislation for the retention of data
should lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of
the measure and impose minimum safeguards so that the persons concerned are
protected against the risk of abuse and against unlawful access and use of this
data. 64 This condition was further worked out in Liberty and Others v. the
United Kingdom. Liberty and two other civil liberties organisations complained
that the existence of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA),
which provided for strategic monitoring of external communications, interfered
with their right to privacy. The applicants contended that the law was not
foreseeable, as the examination, use, storage, dissemination, and destruction
of intercepted data were regulated in secret ‘arrangements’ (§ 45 and 60).
In response, the government argued that publication of these procedures might
damage the efficacy of the surveillance or give rise to a security risk (§ 68).
First of all, the Court did not consider there was any ground to apply different
principles concerning the accessibility and clarity of the rules governing
individual and general surveillance (§ 63). Moreover, the Court observed that
in Germany details about such procedures for strategic surveillance were public.
For that matter, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) in the United Kingdom
had also made public details about the rules to be observed for interception
warrants. In the view of the Court, those examples suggested that “it is possible
for a State to make public certain details about the operations of a scheme
of external surveillance without compromising national security” (§ 68).
The strategic surveillance had not been in accordance with the law (§ 69).
Statute law should indicate the procedures as well as existing mechanisms of
oversight on secret surveillance and data collection. In Shimovolos v. Russia,
the applicant complained with reference to Article 8 about the registration of
his name in a so-called Russian ‘Surveillance Database’ (Сторожевой контроль)
and the collection of personal data about him by the police. This database was
linked to the databases of Russian railway and airline companies, so that
whenever any of the persons listed bought a train or airplane ticket an
automatic notification was sent to the police. In its assessment of the legality
requirement, the Court recalled the Liberty case and added that statute law
should also set out which authorities would be competent to permit, carry out
and supervise the possible surveillance measures, and the kind of remedy
provided for by national law (§ 68). In this case, a ministerial order governed the
creation and maintenance of the Surveillance Database as well as the procedure
for its operation. This order was not published and was not accessible to the
public. The Court denounced that as a result, neither the procedures nor the
existing controls and guarantees against abuse were open to public scrutiny
(§ 69). It concluded that interference had not been in accordance with the law.65
Hamers v. the Netherlands (adm.), p. 13; Weber and Saravia, § 94; S. and Marper, § 95; Telegraaf
Media, § 90.
64

Digital Rights Ireland, § 54.

65

See also Ekimdzhiev, § 88; Hadzhiev, § 45-47; Savovi v. Bulgaria, § 56-59.

29

4.2 Notification
Transparency is a means to ensure accountability to the public at large, but in
the context of secret surveillance and data collection it is also important for the
reasons set out in the current and the next section. To begin with, an individual
cannot challenge retrospectively the legality of the measures taken against him
before a court, unless he is notified of the surveillance once the measure has
ended, or otherwise learns of it (for example by a leak). Lack of notification thus
hinders after-the-fact oversight, and has been discussed incidentally in the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights in this context. The Court of Justice
of the European Union has pointed out another disadvantage of not notifying
(or not allowing third parties to notify), namely that this “is likely to generate in
the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the
subject of constant surveillance.”66 First in the Klass case and then in the Weber
and Saravia case, the Court inferred from the necessity requirement the
condition that “as soon as notification can be carried out without jeopardising
the purpose of the restriction after the termination of the surveillance measure,
information should […] be provided to the persons concerned.”67 In both cases,
German law indeed provided for this, and this rendered after-the-fact judicial
oversight possible. As the Klass case concerned individual surveillance and the
Weber and Saravia case concerned general programmes of surveillance, it is
apparent that the Court does not set different notification requirements for
both types of surveillance. Furthermore, in the Weber and Saravia case the Court
also approvingly noted that the Federal Constitutional Court prevented the duty
of notification from being circumvented (namely, if data was destroyed within
three months without notification, this was only justified where the data had
not been used before), and that the independent G 10 Commission had the
power to decide whether an individual being monitored had to be notified.
This all contributed to keeping interference resulting from the surveillance within
the limits of what was necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of protecting
national security (§ 136).The Court also reads a notification condition into the
right to an effective remedy. In principle, the Court finds that a lack of notification
to the person concerned does not, of itself, entail a breach of Article 13.68
Nevertheless, in the case of Association for European Integration and Human
Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria the Court found a violation of Article 13, since
Bulgarian law did not provide for notification at any point in time and under
any circumstances. The Bulgarian Special Surveillance Means Act of 1997 (SSMA)
provided that all persons who came across information about intelligence
activities were under a duty not to disclose it. On the basis of this, the Bulgarian
Supreme Administrative Court held that the refusal to provide information to a
66

Digital Rights Ireland, § 37.

67

Klass, § 58; Weber and Saravia, § 135. See also Mersch and Others v. Luxembourg (adm.).

68	Klass, § 69. See also Leander, § 78; Mersch and Others (adm.). It should be noted that in making its
decision the Court took into account the existence of a system of proper oversight.

30

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

person on whether surveillance had been used against him was legitimate
(§ 49). Furthermore, the Protection of Classified Information Act of 2002 (PICA)
labelled information about special means of surveillance and intelligence
obtained thereby as a state secret. Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative
Court held that a refusal to inform a person of surveillance against him had
been properly denied, because this information was a state secret (§ 50). Taking
note of all this, the Court considered that Bulgarian law did not provide for
notification of the persons concerned at any point in time and under any
circumstances (§ 101) and concluded that Article 13 (§ 103) had been violated.69

4.3 Access of oversight bodies to information
Effective oversight requires that the oversight bodies themselves have access to
relevant information, including information about specific operations and the
personal data that is being processed.
The systems of secret surveillance and data collection in Germany, Sweden and
the United Kingdom all guaranteed that the competent oversight bodies had
access to information. As appears from the Klass and Weber and Saravia cases,
the responsible minister for the intelligence services was bound by law to report
on the application of the G 10 Act to the Parliamentary Board at least once
every six months, and to provide the G 10 Commission every month with an
account of the measures he had ordered.70 Furthermore, a person who had
unsuccessfully complained to the G 10 Commission could apply to the
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court could request the Government
to supply it with information or to produce documents. The authorities were
bound to comply with such a request even if the information asked for was secret.
It was then for the Constitutional Court to decide whether the information could
be used in the complaint procedure.71
In order to carry out their oversight functions, the Swedish National Police
Board/Records Board, the Chancellor of Justice, and the Parliamentary
Ombudsman were entitled to have access to all files or other documents kept by
the intelligence services. The services, as well as their employees, had to provide
the oversight bodies with such information and reports as they requested. The
Swedish Parliamentary Committee on Justice informed itself by holding hearings
with spokesmen of the National Police Board and its Security Department as
well as by regular visits. Members of the Committee had full access to the

69	The Court saw no reason to hold otherwise in Hadzhiev v. Bulgaria, § 53-56. For a similar case see
Volokhy v. Ukraine.
70

Klass, § 53; Weber and Saravia, § 24 and 25.

71

Klass, § 23.

31

registers during their visits.72 The Data Inspection Board was entitled to have
access to the personal data being processed, to receive additional information
pertaining to the processing of personal data and to access the premises where
the processing took place.73
In the Kennedy case, the Court expressly endorsed the mechanism by which the
British oversight bodies were provided with information. First of all, the Court
considered it ‘particularly important’ that it was prescribed by law that
intelligence services are to keep detailed records of interception warrants for
which they had applied (§ 165). This ensured that the information needed by
the oversight bodies would be available in the first place. With regard to this,
the Court noted that both the Interception of Communications Commissioner
and the IPT had access to all relevant documents, including closed materials,
and that all of those involved in intelligence activities had a duty to disclose to
them any material they required (§ 166-167). In sum, those involved in carrying
out secret surveillance had retention duties and those tasked with oversight
had transparency entitlements. As to the facts of the case, the Court found the
surveillance complained of justified (§ 169).74
By contrast, in the Ekimdzhiev case the Court noted that the Bulgarian Special
Surveillance Means Act of 1997 (SSMA) made no provision for acquainting the
overseeing judge with the results of the surveillance (§ 85).75 This made his
supervisory role irrelevant.

4.4 Positive obligations under the right to privacy
A right to access to information held by the government can be derived from
the right to respect for private life and family life. This first represents the
Court’s view that transparency contributes to the realisation of the individual’s
right to privacy. For example, in Rotaru v. Romania the Court held that storing
personal information by a public authority, the use of it and the refusal to
disclose this information to the person concerned amounted to interference
with the right to respect for private life (§ 46).76 A stronger right to access to
information can be found in cases where the government failed to ensure full
access to files and was therefore in breach of a positive obligation flowing from
the right to privacy. In the case of Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, the applicant
72

Leander, § 36, 38, and 40; Segerstedt-Wiberg § 62,

73

Segerstedt-Wiberg, § 64.

74	See also L. v. Norway (adm.), in which the Court stressed multiple times that there was oversight by
an independent Control Committee which could request all information necessary. See also Amann
and Rotaru.
75	See also Iordachi and Others v. Moldavia, § 47, where the Court disapproved of the fact that
Moldovan law made no provision for acquainting the overseeing judge with the results of the
surveillance.
76

See also Halford; Lambert; Amann; Brinks v. the Netherlands, § 1; Telegraaf Media.

32

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

had been in the care of the Liverpool City Council in his youth. The local
authority had kept confidential records concerning him and his care. Mr Gaskin
claimed that the continuing lack of access to the whole of his case file held by
the City Council was in breach of his right to respect for his private and family
life under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court considered that, “as in the
Leander case,” there was a file concerning details of Mr Gaskin’s personal
history, which he had no opportunity of examining in its entirety. Accordingly,
the Court found that the United Kingdom had not interfered with the
applicant’s private or family life but that it had “failed to act” by refusing him
complete access to his case records (§ 41). The Court therefore examined
whether the government was in breach of a positive obligation flowing from
Article 8.
In the proportionality requirement in Article 8, second paragraph, it is stipulated
that an independent authority decides whether access to personal records has to
be granted. In the Gaskin case, the Court had regard to the “fair balance that
has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the
interests of the individual” to determine whether a positive obligation existed
(§ 42). In the Court’s opinion, persons in the situation of the applicant had an
interest in receiving the information necessary to know and to understand their
childhood and early development. On the other hand, the Court considered that
confidentiality of public records could be necessary for the efficacy of the system
and for the protection of the contributors to the files. In this respect, the Court
found that the British system, which made access to records dependent on the
contributor’s consent, could in principle be compatible with the positive
obligations under Article 8. However, the Court found that such a system will
only be in conformity with the principle of proportionality if it provides that an
independent authority finally decides whether access has to be granted (§ 49).77
No such procedure was available, so there had been a breach of Article 8.
Positive obligations under Article 8 also arise with regard to records created by
intelligence services. In Haralambie v. Romania, the applicant alleged a violation
of his right to privacy, because he was not granted access to the file made on
him by the former intelligence services. The Court pointed out the relation
between the issue and Convention 108 (§ 77).78 The Court found the
administrative procedure to access files ineffective, mainly because of unjustified
delays (§ 90-95). In the light of this, the Court found that the respondent state
had not fulfilled its positive obligation to provide an effective and accessible
procedure enabling the applicant to have access to all information (§ 96).

77

See also M.G. v. the United Kingdom, § 30.

78

See also Amann, § 65; Rotaru, § 43.

33

4.5 A right to access information
In certain circumstances, citizens or legal entities can invoke a right to access
information such as secret surveillance statistics, or information about unlawful
activities of intelligence services.
To begin with, the Court has taken steps towards the recognition of a right of
access to information contained in the right to freedom of expression, and it
determined that both natural persons and legal entities could invoke such a
right. The (non-surveillance) case of Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary
gave the initial impetus. In this case, the Hungarian government had denied to
provide the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union access to information of public
interest. The association complained that the government’s denial had
constituted an infringement of its right to receive information of public interest,
which was in breach of the right to freedom of expression. On the question
whether there had been any interference, the Court recalled that it had
consistently held that the public has a right to receive information of general
interest, which is protected as part of press freedom (§ 26). However, the Court
found that the creation of forums for public debate was not limited to the press,
one of society’s ‘public watchdogs’. It stated that an association could be
characterised as a ‘social watchdog’, where its activities are an essential element
of informed public debate. Therefore, the activities of the Civil Liberties Union
warranted similar Convention protection to that afforded to the press (§ 27).
The Court then fully recognised a right of access to information in Youth
Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia. Referring to Article 10 of the Convention,
Youth Initiative for Human Rights complained that the intelligence agency of
Serbia had refused to provide certain information, even though a body set up to
ensure observance of the Freedom of Information Act 2004 had ordered that
the information be made available to the applicant. In its assessment, the Court
stated that “the notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ embraces a right of
access to information” (§ 20).
In particular, Youth Initiative for Human Rights requested factual information
about how many people had been subjected to electronic surveillance by the
Serbian intelligence agency in 2005, and the Court found they had a right of
access to this information. Referring to the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért case,
the Court considered that the applicant NGO “was obviously involved in the
legitimate gathering of information of public interest” (§ 24). In this case, there
had been a violation of Article 10, since the reluctance of the intelligence
agency to comply with the order to make the information available was in
defiance of domestic law and tantamount to arbitrariness (§ 26). Finally, the
Court found, with reference to Article 46 of the Convention (binding force and
implementation), that the best execution of its judgment would have been to
secure that the intelligence agency of Serbia did provide the applicant with the
information requested (§ 32).

34

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

The Court listed factors to determine the necessity of disclosing information
about arbitrary interference and abuses by intelligence services. The applicant in
Bucur and Toma v. Romania worked in the telephone interception department
of a military unit of the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS). He was suspended
for the fact that he gave a press conference disclosing that there were
irregularities in the intelligence work and that a large number of journalists,
politicians, and businessmen were tapped. The applicant complained in
Strasbourg that his criminal conviction had interfered with his right to freedom
of expression, in particular his right to impart information. The main issue
before the Court was whether this interference was necessary in a democratic
society. The Court recalled the factors regarding the protection of whistleblowers who work in the public service, and found them useful for the case in
hand: i) whether or not the applicant had other means of imparting the
information; ii) the public interest value of the information; iii) the authenticity
of the information; iv) the damage done to the public authority as a result of
the disclosure; and v) the good faith of the applicant (§ 93).
As to the second factor, the Court considered that the information disclosed had
public interest. The interception of telephone communications was particularly
important in a society that had known close surveillance by the intelligence
services during the communist regime. Moreover, the Court considered that civil
society was directly affected by the information disclosed, since anyone’s
telephone calls might be intercepted (§ 101). The information the applicant
disclosed related to abuses committed by high-ranking state officials and
affected the democratic foundations of the state. For the Court there was no
doubt that these were very important issues for the political debate in a
democratic society, in which public opinion had a legitimate interest (§ 103). In
this case, interference with its right to freedom of expression was not necessary
in a democratic society.

35

5. Analysis and conclusions
In the previous two chapters, we have analysed European
jurisprudence to develop recommendable standards for
oversight and transparency of intelligence services following
from the human rights to respect for privacy and freedom of
expression.
Below, we list ten recommendable standards for oversight and
transparency of intelligence services, especially in the context
of communication interception using the sophisticated
technologies now associated with untargeted surveillance.
We base these on the jurisprudence (footnotes provide links
to relevant paragraphs of the analysis in Chapter 3),
our interpretation of it (including what can be regarded as
best practices), and our expectations about the direction
future case law might take. In order to substantiate our
recommendations further, we draw from a selection of reports
and soft law measures that have been issued in Europe and
the United States.
These standards should be read in combination – one would
not work without the other. For example, independence
in oversight (Standard 3) will only be effective if oversight is
supported by adequate resources (Standard 7).

Standard 1:

Intelligence services need to be subject to oversight that is complete.
This means it should be complete in terms of:79
a)	the oversight body: the government, parliament, the judiciary, and
a specialised (non-parliamentary, independent) commission should all
play a role in oversight;
b) 	the moment of oversight: prior oversight, ongoing oversight,
a nd oversight after the fact;
c) 	the oversight bodies’ mandate: review of lawfulness and effectiveness.

79	See Chapter 2 and Venice Commission 2007, § 70 and 72, and the Report on the US NSA surveillance programme,
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, for the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and
Home Affairs (LIBE), 21 February 2014 (LIBE 2014). Virtually all findings in this report are reflected in the European
Parliament’s Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various
Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs, § 21 and 75. We only refer to the former separately where needed.

36

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Disclosures in the media have demonstrated that there is a need for enhanced
oversight,80 even in countries where oversight appears to be quite comprehensive.
The overall blend of oversight mechanisms for national intelligence services is
important.81 In the end, oversight encompassing all of the above elements is
essential to ensure that adequate and effective guarantees against abuse and
arbitrary use of secret surveillance and data collection powers are in place.82
We deduct from the jurisprudence that both lawfulness and effectiveness are
elements that can be addressed by the courts. Non-effective intrusive measures
can fail the proportionality test.

Standard 2:

Oversight should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle.
Surveillance involves different stages, including the collection, storage, selection
and analysis of data. As all these stages amount to interference with the right to
privacy, these separate stages should be subject to oversight to a certain degree.
In practice, this means that not only the collection and selection of surveillance
measures should be subject to prior independent oversight, but also the analysis
itself.

Standard 3:

Oversight of the intelligence services should be independent.
In this context, this means independence of the intelligence services and the
government.83 Judicial oversight offers the best guarantees of independence.84
Therefore, it is preferable to entrust oversight on secret surveillance and data
collection to a judge, as is already the case in certain jurisdictions.85 However,
the independence of judicial-like bodies is not a given. For example, public
prosecutors in most political systems cannot be regarded as independent of the
government. Similarly, government ministers cannot provide for independent
oversight, since they are part of the government that is also the tasking body
and the customer of the intelligence services. The fact that some courts in the
past ‘rubber-stamped’ decisions or take quite long in making a decision is not
an argument against judicial oversight as such. This merely underlines that
adequate resources are essential to guarantee the independence and
effectiveness of oversight bodies (see Standard 7).

80	See Chapter 1 and Mass surveillance, report for the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 18 March 2015 (Report on mass surveillance), § 114, Resolution 2045(2015),
Mass surveillance, text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 21 April 2015, § 13, and the Resolution of
12 March 2014, § 9.
81	See Section 3.5, and the Report on the democratic oversight of the security services, adopted by the Council of
Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Venice, 12 June 2007 (Venice
Commission 2007), § 79. All findings in this report are reinforced in the Update of the 2007 report on the democratic oversight of the security services and report on the democratic oversight of signals intelligence agencies, 2021
March 2015 (Venice Commission 2015). We only refer to the latter separately where it contains additions
to the original report.
82

See Section 3.3 and Venice Commission 2007, § 76.

83

See Section 3.5, Venice Commission 2007, § 110 and 205; and Resolution of 12 March 2014, § 79.

84

See Section 3.4.

85	Venice Commission 2007, § 204, Report on mass surveillance, § 113 and 116, Resolution 2045(2015), § 19.2,
and Resolution of 12 March 2014, § 21.

37

The independence of a specialised commission can be guaranteed by having
its members appointed by parliament using an open and transparent selection
and nomination procedure, where the voting power should not depend on
parliamentary size. Furthermore, a standing parliamentary committee specialised
in intelligence services can also be regarded as independent if its members
represent the ruling parties as well as the opposition, and the member’s voting
power does not depend on its parliamentary size. The dismissal procedure
should also guarantee independence. Preferably, national law or the national
constitution should provide that specialised commissions and parliamentary
committees cannot be subject to instructions from the government.
There is some overlap between oversight by parliamentary committees and
specialised (parliamentary-appointed) commissions, in the sense that both are
‘independent’ and democratically legitimised. Nevertheless, there are advantages
in having both of them. A parliamentary committee is in a better position to
defend itself vis-à-vis parliament as a whole and the public, whereas a specialised
commission allows for greater expertise in oversight.86
To summarise: independence is reflected in several elements, including:
a) transparent and objective procedures for the nomination of people,
b) no governmental interference with the activities and decisions of the
institution performing the oversight, c) effective powers (see Standards 4 and 5)
and d) resources and budgetary independence (see Standard 7).

Standard 4:

Oversight should take place prior to the imposition of a measure.
In the field of secret surveillance of communications, especially using the
sophisticated technologies now associated with untargeted surveillance, the risk
of abuse is high, and abuse can have harmful consequences not only for individual
rights but also for democratic society as a whole. Therefore, prior (independent)
oversight for the application of surveillance and collection powers is essential.87
Furthermore, the transfer of personal data to third countries requires prior
consent by the competent supervisory authority.88 As an alternative to prior
judicial oversight, a system of ministerial orders combined with prior oversight
by an independent, specialised commission, after-the-fact oversight on the
overall functioning of the system of surveillance by a parliamentary committee,
and the possibility for individuals to complain before an independent body
could also be compliant (see Standard 6).89 In such a system, effective oversight
will only exist if the body performing prior oversight has adequate powers (see
the next Standard).

86

Venice Commission 2007, § 232.

87

Venice Commission 2007, § 204, and Resolution of 12 March 2014, § 12 and 75.

88

Resolution of 12 March 2014, § 13.

89

See Section 3.4.

38

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

It should be noted that prior oversight is not at odds with ministerial
responsibility: in a system of prior oversight, the minister gives an order for
surveillance, and the oversight body merely has the power to block this order.
Where – due to unprecedented and exceptional circumstances – it is not possible
to wait for a decision by the oversight body because of the urgent nature of the
order, the order should be subject to oversight as soon as possible. In addition,
the oversight body should have sufficient resources to handle orders quickly
(see Standard 7). Political responsibility and optimising the protection of
fundamental rights are different topics.

Standard 5: 	Oversight bodies should be able to declare a measure unlawful and provide for
redress.
Prior and ongoing oversight bodies for intelligence services should have the
power to prevent or end a measure imposed by intelligence services, and
oversight bodies should have the power to declare a measure unlawful after the
fact. In all cases, the oversight body should have the power to order the removal
of personal data.90 Obviously, oversight powers will only be effective if combined
with the power to take legally binding decisions which also provide for redress
of the unlawfulness of a measure. Given the gravity of such decisions, the
minister should simultaneously have the power to appeal against these before
a court. Initial orders to conduct surveillance should contain sufficient reasoning
to allow oversight bodies and appellate courts to evaluate the lawfulness of a
measure.

Standard 6:

Oversight should incorporate the adversary principle.
Where there is no prior judicial oversight, only oversight mechanisms that
included a complaint procedure survived the Court’s scrutiny under Article 8 of
the Convention. In such a complaint procedure, the individual concerned can
challenge the lawfulness of measures of secret surveillance and data collection
directed against him after the fact. In recent case law, the Court also considered
that it should be possible to provide for a prior remedy, for instance one where
the proceedings are secret. In such considerations, the notion of ‘some form of
adversary proceedings’ is implicit. Moreover, there is some overlap between the
Court’s interpretation of Article 8 in cases about secret surveillance and data
collection for the purpose of national security, and cases about deportation for
the purpose of national security. In the context of the latter, the Court expressly
requires ‘some form of adversarial proceedings’.

90

See Section 3.5.

39

This could mean involving a special advocate who defends the public interest
(or the interest of affected individuals). This would introduce some form of
adversarial proceedings without jeopardising the secrecy of measures to be
imposed. Where the surveillance is more general in nature, the special advocate
would rather take on the role of an expert for the court, in order to allow courts
to be in a better position to weigh the interests of the intelligence services
against the interests of the public not being subject to surveillance. Where the
surveillance is more targeted, the special advocate would defend the rights of
the individuals affected. In its 2007 report, the Venice Commission was critical
of special advocates,91 but in its 2015 update of the report it argues for the
involvement of privacy advocates as regards searching data obtained by
strategic surveillance.92 One of the most important recommendations of the
United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is in fact the
establishment of special advocates before the FISA Court.93

Standard 7: 	Oversight bodies should have sufficient resources to perform effective
oversight.
This includes the attribution of the necessary equipment and staff, resources in
terms of information (see Standard 8) and technical expertise.94 This contributes
to them being independent of the intelligence services and the government
(see Standard 3), and it is critical for oversight bodies to function effectively in
practice. Without access to sufficient resources, oversight bodies cannot fulfil
their mandate in a meaningful way.95 As the technological sophistication of
intelligence services will only increase, oversight will become more complicated,
and it is to be expected that a commensurate increase in resources for oversight
bodies will be necessary.

Standard 8: 	Intelligence services and their oversight bodies should provide layered
transparency.
This means that:
a) 	the individual concerned, the oversight bodies, and civil society are
informed;
b) 	there is an adequate level of openness about intelligence activities prior
to, and after the fact;
91

Venice Commission 2007, § 215-216.

92

Venice Commission 2015, § 17.

93	Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 23 January 2014
(PCLOB 215 report), p. 185. The Board made similar findings in its Report on the surveillance program operated
pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2 July 2014 (PCLOB 702 report).
94

See Section 3.5.

95	Report on mass surveillance, § 101, Venice Commission 2007, § 20-21, 165 and 231, and Resolution of 12 March
2014, § 76 and 79.

40

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

c) 	notification, aggregate statistics, working methods, classified and
detailed information about operations, and general information about
what will remain secret under all circumstances is provided.
Such an approach to transparency is essential to ensure that individuals can
exercise their rights effectively, that oversight bodies can perform their tasks
effectively, and that the public can hold their political representatives
accountable. In sum, transparency contributes to oversight. States should not
wait for leaks and unauthorised disclosures but instead ensure that everyone
involved can access and receive the information necessary to perform the
oversight related to their role, at a relevant time. A layered structure of
transparency should be put in place. Such a structure would make the
provisioning of information dependent on the level of confidentiality and/or
aggregation. Such a layered system should be based on policies clearly laid
down, rather than on arbitrary and unilateral decision-making.

Standard 9: 	Oversight bodies, civil society and individuals should be able to receive and
access information about surveillance.
This standard more or less mirrors the previous one. From the requirement that
all interference with the right to privacy should be ‘in accordance with the law’,
which includes the foreseeability condition, it follows that statute law should
indicate the procedures for the use, dissemination, and destruction of intercepted
data, as well as existing oversight mechanisms for secret surveillance and data
collection. Clear legislation provides a framework for oversight and supports
public scrutiny of the surveillance powers.96 In fact, experience in some countries
in Europe and the United States has demonstrated it is possible to disclose
information about the collection, analysis, and dissemination of personal data
without damage to national security.97 Oversight bodies should have a right to
access all (classified) information relevant for their task.98 In support of this,
intelligence services – and others involved in the value chain, i.e. including
ministers/governmental bodies – should be obliged to keep detailed records
and to disclose to oversight bodies any material requested.99 Where an oversight
body is competent to assess the effectiveness of intelligence services in executing
government policy, access to operational details is necessary.100 An oversight
body of which the functions include reviewing questions of legality,
effectiveness and respect for human rights will require access to even more

96

Venice Commission 2015, § 98.

97

PCLOB 215 report, p. 196.

98

Resolution 2045(2015), § 19.2.

99

Resolution of 12 March 2014, § 79.

100

Venice Commission 2007, § 160.

41

specific information.101 Furthermore, the publication of aggregate interception
warrant numbers provides insight into the working methods of the intelligence
services and supports public confidence in the judicial oversight mechanisms.102
Publication of aggregated notification and non-notification figures also
supports oversight by civil society.103 Individual notification should be carried out
as soon as possible without jeopardising the purpose of the surveillance. This
enables the individual to challenge any measure directed against him. Where an
individual requests access to his intelligence file, an independent authority
should finally decide whether access has to be granted.

Standard 10: 	Companies and other private legal entities involved in national surveillance
should be able to impart information about their involvement.
Sharing information on the functioning of the intelligence services while not
jeopardising operations is necessary to support robust oversight by civil society.
This means that organisations should be able to disclose publicly general
information about orders they receive directing them to provide information to
the government. Such information might disclose the number of orders that
providers have received, the broad categories of information produced, and the
number of users whose information has been produced.104 It also allows for
the verification of information made available by the intelligence agencies.
Organisations should further be able to make more detailed and possibly
confidential information available to oversight bodies.

101

Venice Commission 2007 report, § 163.

102

Resolution 2049(2015), § 7, and PCLOB 215 report, pp. 199-200.

103

Venice Commission 2015 report, § 137.

104	See also the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies,
Report and Recommendations: Liberty and security in a changing world, 12 December 2013 (President’s Review
Group 2013), and PCLOB 215 report, p. 204.

42

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

Jurisprudence and publications		
Jurisprudence
CJEU 20 May 2003, C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/0 (Österreichischer Rundfunk)
CJEU 3 September 2008, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P (Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v Council and Commission)
CJEU 15 December 2009, C-387/05 (European Commission v. Italian Republic)
CJEU 9 March 2010, C-518/07 (Commission v. Germany)
CJEU 15 November 2012, C-539/10 P (Al-Aqsa v. Council)
CJEU 7 November 2014, C-473/12 (IPI)
CJEU 4 June 2013, C-300/11 (ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department)
CJEU 8 April 2014, C288/12 (Commission v. Hungary)
CJEU 8 April 2014, C-293/12 (Digital Rights Ireland)
ECtHR 7 December 1976, Application no. 5491/71 (Handyside v. the United 		
Kingdom)
ECtHR 6 September 1978, Application no. 5029/71 (Klass and Others v. Germany)
ECtHR 2 August 1984, Application no. 8691/79 (Malone v. the United Kingdom)		
Admissibility decision of the Commission 1985 (Mersch and Others v. 		
Luxembourg)
ECtHR 24 November 1986, Application no. 9063/80 (Gillow v. the United 			
Kingdom)
ECtHR 26 March 1987, Application no. 9248/81 (Leander v. Sweden)
Report of the Commission 9 May 1989, Application no. 12175/86 (Hewitt and 		
Harman v. the United Kingdom)
Report of the Commission 9 May 1989, Application no. 12327/86 (Nimmo v. the 		
United Kingdom)
ECtHR 7 July 1989, Application no. 10454/83 (Gaskin v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 24 April 1990, Application no. 11105/84 (Huvig v. France)
ECtHR 24 April 1990, Application no. 11801/85 (Kruslin v. France)
Admissibility decision of the Commission 8 June 1990, Application no. 13564/88 		
(L. v. Norway)
Report of the Commission 3 December 1991, Application no. 14084/88, 14085/88,
14086/88, 14087/88, 14088/88, 14109/88, 14173/88, 14195/88, 14196/88 and 		
14197/88 (R.V. and Others v. the Netherlands)Admissibility decision of the
Commission 2 April 1993, Application no. 18601/91 (Esbester v. the United Kingdom)
Admissibility decision of the Commission 27 June 1994, Application no. 31482/93
(Christie v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 25 June 1997, Application no. 20605/92 (Halford v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 25 March 1998, Application no. 13/1997/79/1000 (Kopp v. Switzerland)
ECtHR 24 August 1998, Application no. 88/1997/872/1084 (Lambert v. France)
Admissibility decision of the Commission 18 May 1998,
Application no. 29839/96 (Remmers and Hamer v. the Netherlands)

43

ECtHR 30 July 1998, Application no. 58/1997/1048 (Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain)
ECtHR 16 February 2000, Application no. 27798/95 (Amann v. Switzerland)
ECtHR 12 May 2000, Application no. 35394/97 (Khan v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 4 May 2000, Application no. 28341/95 (Rotaru v. Romania)
ECtHR 25 September 2001, Application no. 44787/98 (P.G. and J.H. v. the United 		
Kingdom)
ECtHR 20 June 2002, Application no. 50963/99 (Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria)
ECtHR 17 July 2003, Application no. 6373/00 (Perry v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 5 April 2005, Application no. 9940/44 (Brinks v. the Netherlands) 			
(admissibility decision)
ECtHR 6 June 2006, Application no. 62332/00 (Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others
v. Sweden)
ECtHR 29 June 2006, Application no. 54934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany)
Zakharov v. Russia, Application no. 47143/06, lodged on 20 October 2006.
ECtHR 2 November 2006, Application no. 23543/02 (Volokhy v. Ukraine)
ECtHR 3 April 2007, Application no. 62617/00 (Copland v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 26 April 2007, Application no. 49234/99 and 7152/01 (Dumitru Popescu
v. Romania (No. 1 and 2))
ECtHR 28 June 2007, Application no. 62540/00 (Association for European 			
Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria)
ECtHR 1 July 2008, Application no. 58243/00 (Liberty and Others v. the United 		
Kingdom)
ECtHR 4 December 2008, Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04 (S. and 		
Marper v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 10 February 2009, Application no. 25198/02 (Iordachi and Others
v. Moldova)
ECtHR 14 April 2009, Application no. 37374/05 (Társaság a Szabadságjogokért
v. Hungary)
ECtHR 9 June 2009, Application no. 72094/01 (Kvasnica v. Slovenia)
ECtHR 27 October 2009, Application no. 21737/03 (Haralambie v. Romania)
ECtHR 18 May 2010, Application no. 26839/05 (Kennedy v. the United Kingdom)
ECtHR 2 September 2010, Application no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany)
ECtHR 24 May 2011, Application no. 33810/07 (Association ‘21 December 1989’ 		
and Others v. Romania)
ECtHR 21 June 2011, Application no. 30194/09 (Shimovolos v. Russia)
ECtHR 18 October 2011, Application no. 16188/07 (Khelili v. Switzerland)
ECtHR 2 October 2012, Application no. 22491/08 (Sefilyan v. Armenia)
ECtHR 23 October 2012, Application no. 22373/04 (Hadziev v. Bulgaria)
ECtHR 13 November 2012, Application no. 24029/07 (M.M. v. the United 			
Kingdom)
ECtHR 22 November 2012, Application no. 39315/06 (Telegraaf and Others
v. the Netherlands)
ECtHR 27 November 2012, Application no. 7222/05 (Savovi v. Bulgaria)

44

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

ECtHR 8 January 2013, Application no. 40238/02 (Bucur and Toma v. Romania)
ECtHR 9 January 2013, Application no. 21722/11(Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine)
ECtHR 14 March 2013, Application no. 24117/08 (Bernh Larsen Holding AS and 		
Others v. Norway)
ECtHR 18 April 2013, Application no. 19522/09 (M.K. v. France)
ECtHR 25 June 2013, Application no. 48135/06 (Youth Initiative for Human 		
Rights v. Serbia)
ECtHR 16 July 2013, Application no. 142/04 (Bălteanu v. Romania)
Big Brother Watch v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 58170/13, lodged on 		
4 September 2013
ECtHR 28 January 2014, Applications nos. 14876/12 and 63339/12 (I.R. and G.T.
v. the United Kingdom) (adm.)
ECtHR 15 January 2015, Application no. 68955/11 (Dragojević v. Croatia)

Used publications
Report on the democratic oversight of the security services, adopted by the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Venice,
1-2 June 2007 (CDLAD(2007)016).
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies,
Report and Recommendations: Liberty and security in a changing world, 12
December 2013.
C. Moraes (rapporteur), S. in ‘t Veld and C. Ernst (co-authors), Working
document on democratic oversight of member state intelligence services and of
EU intelligence bodies, for the European Parliament Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), 20 December 2013.
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records
Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the
Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 23 January 2014.
C. Moraes (rapporteur), Report on the US NSA surveillance programme,
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’
fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs, for the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and
Home Affairs (LIBE), 21 February 2014 (A7-0139/2014) (2013/2188(INI)).
Resolution on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various
Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on
transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, adopted by the European
Parliament on 12 March 2014 (2013/2188(INI)).

45

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the surveillance program
operated pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2
July 2014.
Update of the 2007 report on the democratic oversight of the security services
and report on the democratic oversight of signals intelligence agencies, adopted
by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Venice, 20-21 March 2015 (CDL-AD(2015)006).
P. Omtzigt (rapporteur), Mass surveillance, for the Parliamentary Assembly
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 18 March 2015 (Doc. 13734).
P. Omtzigt (rapporteur), Improving the protection of whistleblowers, for the
Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 18
March 2015 (AS/Jur (2015) 06), draft report.
Resolution 2045 (2015): Mass surveillance, text adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly on 21 April 2015 (12th Sitting), provisional version.
Recommendation 2067 (2015): Mass surveillance, text adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly on 21 April 2015 (12th Sitting), provisional version.

Recommended publications
M. Scheinin (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism), Compilation of
good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure
respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism,
including on their oversight, presented to the Human Rights Council of the
United Nations’ General Assembly in its fourteenth session, 17 May 2010 (A/
HRC/14/46).
A. Wills and M. Vermeulen, Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence
agencies in the European Union, study requested by the European Parliament’s
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), June 2011.

F. la Rue, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
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46

Ten standards for oversight and transparency of national intelligence services

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Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 2012.

47

I. Cameron, National security and the European Convention on Human Rights,
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D. Wright and R. Kreisel (eds.), Surveillance in Europe, Oxon: Routledge 2015.

IViR (Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam)
www.ivir.nl