IOB Evaluation
Aided trade
An evaluation of the Centre for the Promotion of
Imports from Developing Countries (2005-2012)

ed trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 408 | Aided trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 408 | Aided trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 408 | Aided trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 4

IOB Evaluation
Aided trade
An evaluation of the Centre for the Promotion of
Imports from Developing Countries (2005-2012)

September 2015

Preface

Preface
High trade costs hamper the economic potential of many of the poorest nations, pricing
them out of global markets. Trade costs also fall disproportionately heavily on small- and
medium-sized enterprises. These companies, which are considered engines of employment
offering a route out of poverty, are hit hardest by non-tariff measures. A study by the
International Trade Centre on how businesses experience non-tariff measures in
23 developing countries has recently confirmed this once more.
An important step towards reducing trade costs was taken in 2013 at the Ninth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Bali where members concluded the Agreement on Trade
Facilitation. Implementation of the Agreement promises to bring substantial cost
reductions for traders in developing and least developed countries (LDCs), thereby
supporting increased economic activity, and potentially increasing government revenues.
The Dutch government has already been actively committed to achieving Aid-for-Trade
objectives since the early 1970s, by assisting developing countries in reducing non-tariff
barriers, particularly through the efforts of the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from
Developing Countries (CBI).
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This report, for the first time, presents the main results of an evaluation on the effect and
impact of CBI’s Aid-for-Trade interventions on the business sector in developing countries.
Findings were based on surveys of assisted companies in developing countries, four
in-depth country case studies, a benchmarking exercise, a literature review and stakeholder
interviews. The evaluation covers the period 2005-2012 and focuses on the backbone of the
CBI programme, which consists of technical assistance (export coaching) to individual
companies in order to strengthen their competitive edge in European markets, and of
improvement of business support organisations in developing countries.
The report concludes that CBI has been successful in helping companies to overcome a lack
of market information and market entry barriers. This was however not always sufficient to
increase exports. In some cases, observed export increases could not always be (fully)
attributed to CBI programmes and activities. CBI’s contribution is therefore more modest
when set against the ultimate intended trade performance goals.
The evaluation has been carried out under the responsibility of IOB evaluator Peter Henk
Eshuis, Rob Kuijpers (research assistant) and Albert Stuijfzand (controller). The following
persons participated in the consultants’ team for the evaluation: Phil Compernolle, Sharon
van Ede, Philip de Jong (APE, country case studies, surveys and benchmark). The following
other persons have contributed to the underlying case studies: Peter Hurst (country study
South-Africa), Oscar Huertas Diaz (country study Colombia), Magda Ghonem, Emad El
Shaarawy, Sally El Hawary (country study Egypt), Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Monica Dutta,
Bhavya Paliwal and Manisha G. Singh (country study India).

Aided trade

A reference group chaired by the former director of IOB, Ruerd Ruben, provided valuable
comments and advice. The group consisted of Clemens Lutz (University of Groningen),
Remco Oostendorp (VU University), Marcel Vernooij, Henny de Vries, Hajo Provó Kluit
(Department of Sustainable Economic Development, MFA), Micha van Lin (FME), and Dick
de Man (CBI). Antonie de Kemp, Piet de Lange and Otto Genee (IOB) acted as peer reviewers
of the evaluation.
IOB would sincerely like to thank CBI, all involved companies, policy officers at the Ministry
and other stakeholders for the information they provided and their constructive feedback to
draft versions of the report.

Dr. Wendy Asbeek Brusse
Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

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Table of contents

Table of contents
Preface
List of tables, figures and boxes
List of acronyms and abbreviations
Management summary

3
7
9
12

1 About the evaluation
1.1 Rationale and objectives
1.2 Evaluation questions
1.3 Approach and methodology
1.4 Reading guide

20
21
21
23
24

2 CBI’s role in private sector development
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Market development policies within PSD
2.3 CBI’s mission and strategy
2.4 CBI’s programme activities
2.5 CBI’s production
2.6 Theory of change and intervention logic
2.7 Findings

26
27
27
28
29
32
32
37

3 CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Institutional context and country/sector selection
3.3 Company intake and addressing its needs
3.4 Institutional arrangement
3.5 Findings

38
39
39
44
47
53

4 CBI’s contribution to export development
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Measuring effects
4.3 Findings
4.4 Programme contribution
4.5 Developmental relevance
4.6 Explanations
4.7 Findings

54
55
55
56
66
70
77
84

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5 CBI’s efficiency
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Organisational efficiency
5.3 Programme efficiency
5.4 Benchmark
5.5 Conclusions

86
87
87
93
97
101

6 CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Relevance of the BSOD programme
6.3 Effects
6.4 Programme efficiency
6.5 Conclusions

102
103
103
105
113
117

Annexes
Annex 1
Annex 2
Annex 3
Annex 4
Annex 5
Annex 6
Annex 7
Annex 8

118
119
120
121
125
126
127
128

Annex 9
Annex 10
Annex 11
Annex 12
Annex 13
Annex 14

About IOB
Organisational chart of CBI
Documentation reviewed
Interviewees
Evaluations by CBI
Working Instruction Export/Business Audit for ECPs
Reconstructed intervention logic of ECP and BSOD programmes
Result chain private sector development policies 2005-2012
(reconstruction by IOB)
Brief description CBI evaluation framework
Enabling trade dimensions – country scores
Employment effects reviewed
Benchmark methodology
Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion
Evaluation matrix

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation
Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

129
130
132
133
134
136
141

143

List of figures, tables and boxes

List of figures, tables and boxes
Figures
Figure 1
Figure 2

CBI’s targeting strategy
Breakdown of ECP Expenditures (CBI completed/delivered companies)
by country income group and sectors (2005 - march 2013)
Figure 3 Production value of CBI services
Figure 4 Schematic overview of theory of change
Figure 5 Company turnover at start of ECP intervention (logarithmic scale)
Figure 6 Programme leavers
Figure 7 Beneficiaries with export effects (all effect sizes)
Figure 8 Beneficiaries with contributed effects at ultimate outcome level
Figure 9 Effects on case study companies
Figure 10 Development cost drivers and programme budget (2005-2009)
Figure 11 Development of net result (2006-2012)
Figure 12 Product modules contribution to net result (2010-2012)

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32
34
58
60
65
70
72
87
90
91

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Aided trade

Tables
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6

Table 14
Table 15
Table 16
Table 17
Table 18
Table 19
Table 20
Table 21
Table 22
Table 23
Table 24
Table 25

ECP programme phases and activities
30
Trade-related constraints
34
Export barriers
46
Exports of beneficiaries the year before ECP started
59
Main reason for limited exports to the EU (multiple response)
60
What was the most important problem at the start of ECPs solved
at the end of ECPs?
61
EU and non-EU exports according to CBI database
64
Size effect and contribution of the effect for EU and non-EU
67
The extent to which participants attribute the growth in turnover to the ECP 86
Internal Rate of Return: count of beneficiary across ECPs
69
Did you sell anything to new importers between the start and the end of the
intervention?
73
Effect of ECPs on employment (multiple response)
75
Company size-class distribution according to survey, case studies and
CBI project administration
76
Intended effect by target group
81
Reasons for not achieving the intended effect
83
Company selection in case studies
83
Overhead percentage
90
Programme costs and efficiency parameters
93
Drop-out rates per country
95
ECP population effects (simulated)
96
Costs of export coaching
98
Export coaching share in total turnover
98
Programme characteristics
99
Geographical spread
100
Assessment of BSOD programme modules
114

Boxes
Box 1
Box 2
Box 3
Box 4
Box 5
Box 6
Box 7
Box 8
Box 9

Changes in operational country list
Regulation departmental agencies, 2007
Additionality defined
Assessing contribution
Sample comments on export skills ratings by CBI experts
Budget maximisation
Is support in LDC countries and fragile states more expensive?
Typical BSOD deliverables
Swiss Import Promotion Programme

Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
Table 13

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41
47
57
66
79
89
92
104
135

List of acronyms and abbreviations

List of acronyms and abbreviations
ADEX
ADR
BLD
BPO
BSO
BSOD
BTC
CADEXCO
CANEB
CBI

Peru Association of Exporters
Central Government Audit Service (Auditdienst Rijk, the Netherlands)
Cost Benefit Service (Baten Lasten Dienst, the Netherlands)
Business Process Outsourcing
Business Support Organisation
Business Support Organisation Development programme
Belgian Development Agency
Costa Rican Chamber of Exporters (BSO)
Cámara Nacional de Exportadores de Bolivia
Centre for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries (Centrum tot
Bevordering van Import uit ontwikkelingslanden, the Netherlands)
CII
Confederation of Indian Industry
CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility
CU
Control Unit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands)
DAC
Development Assistance Committee
DCED
Donor Committee for Enterprise Development
DDE
Sustainable Economic Development Department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Netherlands)
DfID
Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DGBEB
Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Netherlands)
DGGF
Dutch Good Growth Fund
DGIS
Directorate-General for International Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Netherlands)
DGNED
Directorate General of National Export Development Indonesia
EBRD
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECP
Export Coaching Programme
EFTA
European Free Trade Association
EIM
Economisch Instituut voor het Midden- en Kleinbedrijf
ETI
Enabling Trade Index
EU
European Union
EUREP/GAP Good Agriculture Produce guidelines
FDI
Foreign Direct Investment
FEZ
Financieel Economische Zaken
FMO/CD
FMO’s Capacity Development
FSC
Forest Stewardship Council
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GIZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HACCP
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
HCACS
Ho Chi Minh City’s Centre for Agricultural Consultancy and Support
HGIS
Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation
HRD
Human Resource Development

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Aided trade

IBCE
IDH
IEG
IETC
IIFT
ILO
IMF
IOB

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IPD
IRR
ISB
ITC
ITO
ITPC
JBIC
JETRO
JICA
KfW
KOTRA
KPI
LDC
LIC
LMIC
M&E
MASSIF
MDG
MFA
MI
NAFED
ODA
OECD
PPP
PSD
PSOM/PSI
PUM
RVO
SDC
SECO
SIDA
SIPPO
SME
SP
TA

Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade
The Sustainable Trade Initiative (Initiatief Duurzame Handel, the Netherlands)
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group
Indonesia Export Training Center
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade
International Labour Organization
International Monetary Fund
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie, ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands)
Import Promotion Desk
Internal Rate of Return
Inspection, Risk Analysis and Advisory Unit (Inspectie, Signalering, Begeleiding)
International Trade Centre
IT Outsourcing
Investment & Trade Promotion Centre
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Japan External Trade Organization
Japan International Cooperation Agency
German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency
Key Performance Indicator
Least-Developed Country
Low Income Country
Lower Middle-Income Country
Monitoring and Evaluation
Micro & Small Enterprise Fund
Millennium Development Goals
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Market Intelligence
Indonesia National Agency for Export Development
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Public Private Partnership
Privat Sector Development
Private Sector Investment programme (Programma Samenwerking Opkomende
Markten)
Dutch Manager Deployment Programme (Programma Uitzending Managers)
Netherlands Enterprise Agency (Rijksdienst Voor Ondernemend nederland)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Switzerland State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Swedish International Development Cooperation
Swiss Import Promotion Organisation
Small and Medium Enterprises
Strategic Planning
Technical Assistance

List of acronyms and abbreviations

TAM
TDC
TEDO
TK
ToC
ToR
TPO
TRIC
TTT
UNCTAD
USAID
VIRKE
VNO-NCW
WB/IFC
WEF
WTO

Technical Assistance Missions
Belgium Trade for Development Centre
Technology Export Development Organisation
Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer)
Theory of Change
Terms of Reference
Trade Promotion Organisation
Trade Related Instruments Connected
Train the Trainer
United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
United States Agency for International Development
Enterprise Federation of Norway
Dutch employers’ organisation
World Bank / International Finance Corporation
World Economic Forum
World Trade Organization

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Management summary

Management summary

Private sector development (PSD) has become a central theme in international cooperation
policy. By strengthening the entrepreneurial climate in developing countries, donors and
recipient countries aim to create better opportunities for private investment, resulting in
more employment opportunities and less poverty. In the Netherlands, the government is
actively committed to achieving these objectives. An important instrument in Dutch PSD
policies is the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI). CBI is
one of the organisations that receive a financial contribution from the PSD market
development cluster of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The cluster promotes inclusive
economic growth through greater investment, a less informal economy, decent jobs,
increased productivity and more competitive enterprises.
When CBI started its activities in the early 1970s, the world was far less connected than
today. A smaller share of the population, for example, was able to reap the benefits of
information technology, which lowered the costs of trade and transport. While there is still
a need to reduce information asymmetry for exporters from developing countries in the
field of private sector development, and more specifically in trade promotion, an increasing
number of export promoting organisations (EPOs) offer services that are quite similar across
countries. Many companies, assisted by CBI, also use other support service organisations.
The dynamic global context continuously creates challenges that have required CBI to adapt
its strategy. From 2011 onwards, CBI reformulated its interventions into a more integrated
approach. The current impact evaluation has not looked into CBI’s recent mode of
operation, simply because few of the interventions started since then have concluded,
which means that any evaluation of the effects of these interventions would be
inconclusive.
This report presents the results of an evaluation of the effectiveness of CBI. The evaluation
covers the period 2005-2012 and focuses on the backbone of the CBI programme: (1) the
sectoral export coaching programme (ECP), which renders technical assistance to individual
companies in order to strengthen their competitive edge in European markets; and (2) the
business support organisation development (BSOD), which aims to improve the business
support organisations’ (BSOs) export development and promotion activities in Europe.
The evaluation of the ECP programme is based on insights gained from using qualitative
evaluation methods (literature review, document analysis, interviews, and case studies in
Colombia, Egypt, India, and South Africa), combined with quantitative methods (surveys
among exporters and importers, statistical analyses of programme monitoring data, and a
benchmark of CBI’s efficiency). The evaluation of the BSOD programme is predominantly
based on a review of regular programme evaluations conducted on behalf of CBI.

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Aided trade

Findings
Based on the available materials and evidence, the Policy and Operations Evaluation
Department (IOB) has established the following findings:
The main evaluation question is: ‘To what extent is the CBI programme helping to achieve
Dutch private sector development (PSD) objectives?’. The CBI programme is consistent with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ general PSD policy objective. Also, its intervention logic can
be seen as a refinement of the general policies established in the area of market
development. CBI’s contribution is less convincing, however, when set against the ultimate
goals of the PSD policy, i.e. inclusive economic growth through greater investment, a less
informal economy, decent jobs, increased productivity and more competitive enterprises.
This is partly attributable to the way CBI has implemented its programmes, but it is also
reflected in the discrepancy between CBI’s mission statement and MFA’s PSD policy
objectives. Moreover, interventions take time to mature and need to have attained a certain
scale to have an impact on these PSD aims, especially at the meso-level and macro-level.
More detailed findings are presented hereafter:
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1) CBI has been successful in supporting exporting companies to overcome their lack of information on
import markets. However, for many companies this was not sufficient to start exporting to Europe.
CBI has been successful in helping companies to overcome a lack of market information
and intelligence. The ECP programmes trained and supported 86% of its subscribers; 14%
dropped out. An analysis of 48 companies shows that almost half of them (21) managed to
increase their exports. However, taking into account CBI’s own targets, the success rate was
lower. CBI aimed to achieve an additional export value of 2.5 times the amount it invested
since the start of the intervention at the programme level. Given the average costs of EUR
58,000, this is consistent with an additional export turnover of at least EUR 145,000. The
analysis shows that 16 out of 88 companies (for which data were available) managed to
achieve this target within two years after completing the programme.1 Given statistical error
margins and a dropout rate of 14%, this means that 10-20% of the initial participants
achieved the CBI target. There is little information, within CBI or in the literature, on the
sustainability of the effects brought about by promoting export.
A potential reason why the success rate is not higher, even though CBI was successful in
bringing companies into contact with buyers, is that a lack of market information is only
one of the major export constraints. CBI’s interventions only focused on a limited number
of export constraints, and in general did not address other constraints that are preventing
companies from exporting. Moreover, the invested resources were not always optimally
directed at companies according to their needs and existing capacities. Though CBI was
sensitive to the idea that the enabling environment for private sector development matters,
by taking a sector ECP as the basic unit for programming its services, it did not necessarily
1

CBI measures the export turnover from the start of the CBI intervention until one year after completion
of the programme.

Management summary

take adequate account of the importance of the country context of participating companies.
Target companies did not always feel that CBI’s services completely met their specific needs, and
also felt that CBI could have expressed more interest in the process. Even though CBI followed a
more proactive course leading to more structured cooperation with international and national
PSD organisations, some case study countries still viewed CBI as a ‘standalone’ service provider.
2) The criteria for selecting target companies and target countries are not clear. Procedures for identifying
and selecting participants were often unavailable. And when available, these were not always followed.
Larger, well-developed companies often received the most intensive and expensive treatment (‘picking
the winners or low-hanging fruit’). Companies obviously more in need received less support.
CBI selects both stronger and weaker companies for ECP programmes, assuming that the
stronger companies will serve as an example for the weaker ones. In addition, companies
from countries with a weaker export profile or image were expected to benefit from
improved visibility and the reputation of stronger countries, for example in a collective
trade fair. Decisions on company selection, tailoring the types of intervention to
participants and assessments about export competence are not subject to checks and
balances in CBI’s system.
CBI spent 3% of the total expenditure in low-income countries, while 7% was spent in
upper-middle-income countries. The companies that benefited most from CBI’s support are
predominantly from lower-middle-income countries. Interventions in low-income
countries were (necessarily) overly focused on ‘business development’ in general, and left
insufficient room for introducing ‘market access’ modules that should complement the
range of sub-interventions that prepare companies for international market access.
3) BSOD evaluations reveal that in general the interventions were relevant, but that there is hardly any
information on their effectiveness.
One challenge facing private sector development institutions is how to achieve operational
scale and gain access to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries,
which by nature are small, diffuse, numerous and difficult to reach. CBI’s Business Support
Organisation Development programme (BSOD) aims to increase the reach of its traderelated support among SMEs in developing countries, by focusing on strengthening
intermediary trade support organisations. Generally, the BSOD interventions reviewed were
considered to be relevant. However, with the increase in the number of active trade
promotion organisations in developing countries, the relevance and additionality of CBI’s
interventions could be at stake. Given the heterogeneity of local partners in the BSOD
programme, it strongly depends on the mandate of the beneficiary, which underlines the
need for a context-specific and flexible approach in order to meet the needs of BSOs.
The effects of technical assistance for BSOs are hard to measure accurately. One reason is
that the quality and result indicators set by MFA and CBI are too general to measure
increased capacity outcome or even impact. Moreover, the lack of data on the effects of
BSOD programmes also makes it difficult to monitor and evaluate these programmes and
steer them in the desired direction. Good coordination between service providers is often
lacking, leading to the absence or the suboptimal division of tasks between donors.

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Aided trade

4) Available evidence does not point to an efficiently operating CBI. The right incentives were not in place.
During the evaluation period, the overhead costs needed to run CBI’s programmes
increased more quickly than the programme budget itself. The average costs per company
amounted to EUR 58,000 and increased substantially after the introduction of an ex ante
transfer pricing settlement with MFA. More specifically, since becoming an independent
agency in 1998, CBI has struggled to set and justify cost prices for its products. A resultsoriented management model that was supposed to increase the organisations’ efficiency
was not implemented. The introduction of an ex ante cost price model and the modular
programme delivery, in 2006 and 2010 respectively, caused CBI’s turnover and profit rate to
go up, with the profits increasing even more rapidly than the turnover. As a result, CBI
started to pay back part of its accumulated excess capital to MFA, and also introduced
discounts on its tariffs agreed with MFA.

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A comparison between CBI and foreign counterpart organisations suggests that CBI has the
highest cost level per exporter. This may be caused by scale disadvantages and
fragmentation. CBI has a lower number of participants per programme, implying higher
fixed costs per participant, while the geographical spread of the participants is much larger,
implying higher transaction costs per beneficiary. In addition, the inclusion of a
heterogeneous group of companies, with rather different characteristics as expressed by
diverging audit scores in one and the same programme, may be inefficient.
5) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not actively involved in CBI’s strategic choices and operations. As a
result, the organisation operated relatively independently from the ministry. Since 2010, however, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become more prescriptive in what it expects from the organisation.
While the CBI programme is consistent with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ general PSD
policy objectives, the ministry was insufficiently engaged with CBI on priorities and results,
and did not provide the right incentives. Even though MFA did not have detailed
information about CBI’s cost prices, it approved requests for budget increases, which were
not always well-argued or evidence-based.
CBI has operated within its mandate and in accordance with the list of countries approved
by MFA. The focus was not on the poorest countries, but on countries that were sufficiently
developed to contribute businesses on the verge of exporting to Europe.
In 2010, MFA suggested to CBI that it should strengthen the connection between export
promotion, sustainable development and poverty reduction, and make this more
transparent in its operations. CBI subsequently developed a new strategy that would focus
more on least-developed and fragile states and enhance its impact and added value. MFA
granted CBI’s request for a budget increase, which CBI said it needed to compensate for the
losses and intensified interventions in low-income countries. Expenditures have become
more aligned to MFA’s demands since that time. However, during the period under review,
CBI did not become more active in low-income countries and fragile states. Therefore, it
appears that the budget increase was premature. The budget increase was one of the
reasons for CBI’s rapid accumulation of capital.

Management summary

6) CBI’s monitoring & evaluation system needs to be further improved, because, as it stands, it is difficult to
monitor, steer and evaluate the programme effectively, and settle the budget.
For the period under consideration, the programme management system did not meet the
standard for result measurement and evaluation, in spite of improvements over the years.
Recommendations from earlier evaluations (e.g. the introduction of a more meaningful set
of performance indicators) were only partially adopted. No data was being systematically
collected to establish a baseline and end-line situation for CBI’s interventions. Evaluation
outcomes were predominantly based on participants’ self-perception. The evaluations
conducted on behalf of CBI did not systematically address issues such as contribution,
additionality and sustainability.
The assessment of the ECP and BSOD programmes shows that CBI lacked detailed insight
into its own programme results, as well as on the underlying explanatory reasons for these
results. The programme management data did not provide information on export figures
for 20% of the companies declared by CBI as ‘competent exporters’ (which was the base for
financial settlement with MFA), as it should according to the agreed quality indicators for
result, effect and impact.

Lessons for the future
Doing the right things
In terms of whether CBI has been doing the right things, there are a number of areas that
can be improved at the level of programme design and implementation.
Improved needs assessment should increase the number of tailor-made interventions
When looking at the profiles of assisted companies, it becomes clear that CBI has been
servicing a heterogeneous group of companies, in terms of country of origin, sector and
different stages of export development and internationalisation. This implies that
companies need different types of services and interventions, whereas the programme in its
current set-up offers standard service modules for all participants, without addressing other
limiting constraints that hold these companies back from exporting or exporting more.
Narrow the focus and reduce the number of eligible countries
One challenge confronting private sector development institutions is how to achieve
operational scale when providing support to SMEs in developing countries, which by nature
are small, diffuse and numerous. The programme could benefit from a more well-reasoned
selection policy of eligible countries that restricts selection to low- and lower-middleincome countries. (This should also reduce the number of eligible countries.) Selectivity
will also most likely result in lower transaction costs per beneficiary and hence more
efficiency. With the introduction of the integrated approach starting in 2011, CBI has already
entered the path of enhanced selectivity. The selection should also look closely at the
country’s context, making use of existing sources of public information.

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Aided trade

The portfolio reveals that the risk of ending up with an underqualified company is high in
low-income countries. These countries may benefit more from business development than
from standard export coaching programmes. Therefore, in order to enhance effectiveness in
these countries, CBI could work more closely together with business development
organisations and farmer support organisations.
Enhancing sustainability by defining an exit strategy
Starting an intervention does not only require clear commitments between the contract
parties, but also requires good management of expectations and clear thinking about how
to sustain the intervention results. During the evaluation period, CBI had no formal systems
in place to enhance the sustainability of its support to individual companies. As other
evaluators have remarked in the past, BSOD interventions in particular could profit from an
‘exit strategy’. This would create trust and confidence with the counterparts and their
stakeholders, who have to develop a certain confidence in the future capacity of the BSO
without CBI’s support.

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Enhance monitoring, evaluation, and steering of programme interventions
CBI is currently developing a real-time impact monitoring and evaluation system that
should address the current lack of effective programme monitoring and evaluation data,
which makes it difficult to steer the programme effectively. As this is a work in progress, our
advice is to integrate quantitative, research-based impact assessments – such as those based
on randomised controlled trials or quasi-experimental approaches – into programmes from
the design phase. In order to be applicable, baselines need to be established, and expected
results need to be defined clearly from the start of the intervention.
Interventions take time and need to occur at sufficient scale in order to have an impact,
even at the micro-level. This means that evaluations must take into account a longer time
frame, which deviates from CBI’s current evaluation practice. Ideally, sufficient data should
be provided to adequately measure the contribution of CBI’s activities within the
perspective of a longer time frame. Effective monitoring requires all the necessary data to be
in place. Ongoing information on (export) turnover by the beneficiaries is currently lacking.
Submitting these data, and other relevant data, should be contractually arranged between
CBI and beneficiaries.

Enhance efficiency at the organisational and programme levels
More supervision from MFA
The agency model, which should have led CBI to deliver its services more efficiently, never
materialised. The ex ante cost price model has not delivered the desired result from a
financial perspective. MFA could revert back to the old system of ex post financing on the
basis of delivered results. This approach will still generate the necessary flexibility to
implement the programme. MFA could also be stricter with CBI in setting and justifying its
cost prices in a situation of ex post financing.

Management summary

Better cooperation and coordination
Although the ECP programme, as a five-year integrated export support package, is unique,
only a relatively small number of the sample of assisted companies in the case study
countries managed to increase their exports. The reason for this disappointing result is that
the programme has not been able to deal with other constraints, some of which lie outside
the sphere of influence of the current programme design.
Since many of the programme’s components are also offered locally as standalone services,
CBI could enhance the sustainability of its interventions by coaching such local service
providers. Instead of CBI organising a trade fair, CBI could advise local service providers on
how to (better) organise market entry activities, such as trade fair participation.
CBI beneficiaries are used to working with a number of international partners, but good
coordination between service providers is often lacking, which leads to a suboptimal
division of tasks. Coordination between donors is a classic dilemma. It not only requires CBI
to be (more) flexible in supplying the right intervention or part of a wider intervention, but
should also lead to a better division of labour and regional presence at the PSD donor level
in general.
Include more local expertise
In terms of programme expenditures, we see that the dominant share is concentrated in the
hands of a small number of EU consultants. There are excellent local experts, who are often
better at understanding the local context, that could also contribute to more efficient
programme delivery and sustainable intervention results. It would make more sense to
team up EU experts with local experts, which requires more of a supervisory role from the
former expert group.

| 19 |

1
About the evaluation

About the evaluation

1.1

Rationale and objectives

The Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI, the acronym of
Centrum tot Bevordering van de Import uit ontwikkelingslanden) is one of the Private Sector Develop­
ment (PSD) programmes supported by Dutch development cooperation. These programmes
are currently receiving a lot of attention because the ministry has made PSD policies a high
priority. It is therefore important to know whether, how, and for whom they work best.
The establishment of CBI in 1971 should be seen in the context of UNCTAD II (New Delhi,
1968), where the pursuit of developing countries to increase their market share in developed
countries was discussed extensively (which was subsequently referred to as ‘Trade, not Aid’).
CBI, an agency of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), receives funding from the
budget for official development assistance (ODA). Formally, the Regulation of the Minister
of Finance on the establishment, organisation and operation of agencies (‘Regeling
agentschappen’2) requires agencies to be periodically evaluated – at least once every five
years.3 The last time CBI was externally evaluated was in 1999 by MFA, covering the period
1990-1996.4 CBI commissions external evaluations of its work on a regular basis.
This evaluation of CBI intends to assess independently the results of the CBI programme
and the extent to which it helps to achieve Dutch PSD policy objectives.5 The current
evaluation focuses on the programme’s effectiveness and efficiency, and addresses some
issues that generate lessons that will improve programme delivery.

1.2 Evaluation questions
The ultimate goals of PSD policies are inclusive economic growth through greater
investment, a less informal economy, decent jobs, increased productivity, and more
competitive enterprises. This policy field is divided into five theme-based clusters, ‘market
development’ being one of them, to which the CBI programme is an important contributor.
Hence, the central research question of the evaluation is:
To what extent has CBI helped to achieve Dutch PSD objectives?
Three OECD-DAC evaluation criteria were used to compile a list of nine evaluation
questions, namely relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.6,7
2

3
4

5
6

7

‘Regeling van de Minister van Financien van 28 september 2012 over instelling, opzet en werking van
agentschappen (Regeling Agentschappen)’. Staatscourant (Government Gazette) No. 20668; 15 October 2012.
Article 7 of the regulation.
IOB (1999) Hulp door Handel; Evaluatie van het Centrum tot bevordering van de Import uit Ontwikkelingslanden
(CBI), 1990-1996. IOB Evaluations 281. The Hague: Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en
Beleidsevaluatie. October 1999.
See also chapter 2 and Annex 5 of this report.
See: http://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/sites/iob-evaluatie.nl/files/000%20Evaluation%20Policy%20and%20
Guidelines%202009.pdf for a description of these criteria.
The following link provides access to the Terms of Reference for the evaluation: http://www.government.
nl/ministries/bz/organisational-structure/current-evaluations-foreign-affairs.

| 21 |

Aided trade

Relevance
In order to determine the relevance of the CBI programme, its objectives and operations
have been reviewed against insights from the scientific literature, as well as against the
policies of MFA and export promotion policies of recipient governments. The aim is to
assess in which countries or groups of countries and institutional settings CBI has a
competitive advantage compared to other service providers. The following evaluation
questions address the relevance of the programme:
1) Was the programme (objectives, indicators and targets) consistent with the:
• findings of the scientific literature on export promotion?
• priorities set by MFA’s PSD policy?
• priorities set by the home countries of the supported companies and BSODs?
• findings from earlier/other evaluations?
2) How has MFA operated with regard to formulating the assignment, controlling the
budget, and informing CBI of changes in policy, as well as monitoring the results agreed
upon with CBI?

| 22 |

3) Could the objectives of the programme have been achieved through other means, e.g.
direct support to export promotion agencies in target countries (either initiated by the
private sector or through government)?

Effectiveness
Second, this evaluation sheds light on the effectiveness of CBI’s services. Effectiveness is
defined here as the extent to which the outputs have contributed to the project’s expected
results or objectives at the intermediate outcome level. For activities related to the private
sector, effectiveness should also be judged by the programme’s additionality. Special
attention has been given to issues which are less systematically focused on regular
programme evaluations, such as attribution, additionality, and the sustainability of the
interventions. The following questions guided this part of the evaluation:
4) How were clients selected? What are the profiles of the selected beneficiaries?
5) To what extent did participating companies increase exports to EU/EFTA as a result of
CBI’s interventions? Which types of company benefited most? What is the effect on
employment as a result of the interventions?
6) In addition to the direct effects, what kind of indirect effects (e.g. exports to other
destinations than EU/EFTA) can be linked to CBI interventions? How did these indirect
effects contribute to the programme objectives?
7) To what extent did benefits (exports and jobs) continue after CBI’s interventions were
completed?

About the evaluation

8) To what extent did CBI collaborate with other development partners, and to what extent
have beneficiaries of the CBI intervention also been assisted by other trade promotion
agencies, donors and stakeholders?

Efficiency
Efficiency concerns an intervention’s outputs, i.e. the direct results of the intervention
achieved by means of the inputs. It measures the extent to which the outputs have been
achieved as a result of the agreed-upon inputs, and whether the achieved outcomes could
have been delivered for less money (cost-effectiveness).
9) How do costs per service and per realised extra unit of export (added) value compare to
that of other trade promoting organisations?

1.3 Approach and methodology
This evaluation is based on a mixed-method approach, using insights gained from
qualitative evaluation methods (literature review, document analysis, interviews, surveys,
four country case studies, and an external organisational benchmark), and combining this
with quantitative methods where possible.8
Since the main products that underlie this evaluation report (i.e. country reports, survey
and organisational benchmark) contain a detailed description of the methodology used,
which can be read separately, this section provides a general description of the building
blocks upon which evaluation outcomes have been based.9 The relevance of the programme
has been assessed by:
•
•
•

a review of literature on the role and impact of trade promotion agencies;
a short reconstruction of Dutch government policies and guidance that have set the
framework for CBI to formulate and implement its development interventions; and
interviews with CBI staff, exporters, policy-makers, and other stakeholders.

The effectiveness of the programme has been assessed by means of:
• document analysis, evaluation reviews and other relevant documentation, including
monitoring and client relation management data;10
• semi-structured interviews with CBI staff, specifically with responsible managers for ECP
interventions, and external consultants during the given period;
• a telephone survey among beneficiaries, drop-outs and non-beneficiaries;
• a telephone survey among importers; and
8

9
10

Due to a lack of access to financial data for all beneficiaries, it has not been possible to develop a
rigorous quasi-experimental research design that compares intervention and control groups.
The ToR of this IOB evaluation also has a section detailing the methodology.
Information is based on the client relation management system (SAGE) and monitoring data (HBAT).
Since SAGE has been implemented during the course of the current evaluation time frame, CBI has
retroactively completed the CRM database.

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Aided trade

•

case studies in two lower-middle-income countries (Egypt and India) and two uppermiddle-income countries (Colombia and South Africa).

Since it turned out to be impossible to obtain a credible dataset on the financials of
CBI-assisted companies, a rigorous quasi-experimental research process, comparing
intervention and control group, was not executed. Despite this, apart from programme
beneficiaries, non-beneficiary companies (including drop-outs) have been surveyed as well.
Since these ‘non-beneficiaries’ do not have the status of a ‘control group’ in statistical
terms, we refer to them in the report as the ‘reference group’.11
The exporter’s survey was held among 154 companies, including 118 beneficiaries, and 36
non-beneficiaries (including drop-outs), covering a representative sample of the portfolio
in 17 countries. A net response of 27% was attained for the beneficiary group.
Finally, the efficiency of the programme was assessed against a benchmark of CBI’s
organisational set-up and cost structure and compared to that of other trade promotion
organisations.

| 24 |

1.4 Reading guide
Chapter 2 provides a short introduction to the Dutch government’s private sector
development policies and the role that CBI plays in terms of achieving these goals. This
chapter is followed by a description of CBI’s work procedures and institutional embedding
(chapter 3). CBI’s contribution to export development (chapter 4) is followed by an
assessment of the efficiency of programme delivery (chapter 5). Chapter 6 discusses the
relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the Business Support Organisation Development
programme.

11

The reference group was compiled by asking CBI-assisted Business Support Organisations to suggest
comparable companies from their files that are not CBI-assisted. CBI-assisted companies were asked to
suggest names of comparable companies that were also not assisted by CBI.

About the evaluation

| 25 |

2
CBI’s role in private sector
development

CBI’s role in private sector development

2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a short presentation of Dutch government policies and guidance
(section 2.2) that have set the framework for CBI to formulate and implement its
development interventions, i.e. CBI’s position within the framework of Dutch policies on
market development (section 2.3). CBI’s programme activities are described in section 2.4.
A simplified theory of change and intervention logic sheds light on how CBI’s programme
activities should contribute to the government’s wider aims (section 2.5).

2.2 Market development policies within PSD
Policies on private sector development by MFA are organised into five main intervention
categories: infrastructure development, financial engineering, improved market access,
knowledge transfer, and interventions in the area of law and regulation.12
Regarding the financial commitment in the ‘market development’ category with a gross
expenditure of EUR 180 million out of a total of EUR 550 million (33%), CBI is by far the
largest programme in this cluster (2005-2012). Other programmes include Netherlands
senior experts (PUM), the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), and the market development of
Solidaridad, for example. Improved access to markets and improved product ranges are the
two central pillars of the market development category. Whereas in the past emphasis was
laid on access to the European market and the liberalisation of international trade through
WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Round, this focus has been broadened to
also make better use of South-South trade,13 and pursue better production strategies. The
assumption is that this will improve product quality, increase the number of value-added
products, and enhance product diversification, which will broaden the export base of
developing countries, making them depend less on the predominantly low value-added
export of natural resources. The main outcome indicator of the market development
category is increased domestic, regional, and international sales by companies in
developing countries.14

12

13

14

IOB has recently evaluated Dutch support to the development of the private sector in developing
countries, implemented in the period 2005-2012. In search of focus and effectiveness. IOB Evaluation
no. 389, January 2014. See in particular Chapter 3: The Dutch policy for private sector development,
pp. 56-73.
In 2013 the CBI received an extra assignment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to research possible
interventions to enhance regional South-South trade and introduce corporate social responsibility.
TK 2011-2012, 32605, no. 56.

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Aided trade

2.3 CBI’s mission and strategy
CBI’s mission is to contribute to sustainable economic development in developing
countries by increasing their exports. Therefore it is necessary to strengthen SMEs in
developing countries, empowering them to cope with trade barriers and keep track of
trends and market opportunities. By meeting stringent market demands, a growing demand
for sustainably produced products should develop, leading to export growth, employment
creation, and income generation. This should eventually result in poverty reduction and
increased self-reliance.

| 28 |

From 2005 onwards, international cooperation increasingly shifted the focus away from
support projects that directly target beneficiaries on the micro-level (such as individual
companies) to intensified efforts to achieve structural change in partner countries (support
to business support organisations). Important reasons for shifting programmes towards
building institutional capacities (meso-level) and addressing the policy environment
(macro-level) were doubts, substantiated by research and practical experience, about the
efficiency and sustainability of approaches that target the micro-level only. Most donor
agencies, including CBI, follow a multi-level approach that simultaneously involves support
measures for target groups, capacity development for institutional actors in their respective
fields, and that also addresses structural bottlenecks in the policy arena, such as laws and
regulations and sectoral promotion policies.15
CBI’s leadership has not always agreed on its mission. There are basically two camps who
have different ideas about the subject of intervention. First, there are those who believe that
interventions should focus on decreasing information asymmetry, i.e. by exclusively
focusing on the exchange and provision of market information. Others, however, state that
companies and business support organisations need advice and counselling in order to
develop their export capabilities. In their view, the intervention should go beyond simply
providing market information and also include business development in general.
The latter point of view has become the standard operating procedure at CBI. This is
illustrated by the ‘Working Instruction Export/Business Audit for ECP modules’ (annex 6),
where the company audit has become more of a diagnostic tool that is used to lay out an
intervention pathway to address these companies’ weaknesses,16 instead of using the audit
as a strict selection tool for programme admission.

15

16

Policy advice was just recently added to CBI’s portfolio, but no structural interventions have been
defined in this area yet.
This working procedure illustrates that every company is audited on various aspects by CBI, and the
audit scores determine which intervention pathway is offered to the company. According to those who
believe CBI’s main mission is to decrease information asymmetry, CBI should have been more selective
in choosing its beneficiaries, only taking companies on board that are on the brink of exporting to the
EU, since CBI is explicitly not meant to be or become a development organisation.

CBI’s role in private sector development

2.4 CBI’s programme activities
CBI’s multilevel intervention strategy aims to support individual companies as well as
intermediary business support organisations (BSOs). In fact, a company might receive direct
assistance through an export coaching programme (ECP), or benefit indirectly as the result
of CBI support to BSOs (see Figure 1). The backbone of CBI’s interventions, also in terms of
budget, are ECPs for individual companies and assistance to the BSOD programme. Two
other main activities are the provision of market information and training (human resource
development). Since these latter activities are more subservient to both ECP and BSOD
programmes, the current evaluation predominantly focuses on both ECP and BSOD
interventions that started and were finalised between 2005 and the first quarter of 2013.
Figure 1

CBI’s targeting strategy

BSO 1

enterprise 1

BSO 2
CBI

enterprise 2

enterprise 3

EU importer
Source: IOB based on CBI.

Export coaching
ECP programmes aim to strengthen the competitive capacity of SME producers/exporters in
developing countries on European markets in order to achieve sustainable export growth.
During the approximately five years of an ECP intervention, selected companies are assisted
in developing an improvement plan (based on an initial audit) and offered sector-specific
technical assistance. This means export marketing training as well as market entry strategies
(participation in international trade fairs and buying missions, for example). Participants
receive individual support by means of on-site consultancy, coaching from a distance,
market information, trade fair participation, and business-to-business activities. Depending
on their specific needs, companies may also receive technical assistance in the field of
business development, certification, and product and production improvement. The phases
and main activities deployed within the framework of an ECP are indicated below (Table 1).

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Aided trade

Table 1

ECP programme phases and activities

Phase (contractor)

Activities

1. Feasibility study

- Country/sector selection

2. Identification and pre-selection

- Recruit participants
- Identify missions and launch workshops
- Pre-select applications

3. Technical assistance (by external consultant)

- Final selection of participants
- Export auditing
- Action plans and distance guidance

4. Training (EXPRO)

- Various seminars and workshops
- Write export marketing plan

5. Market entry

- Trade fair participations
- Company matchmaking

6. Market consolidation

- Contact consolidation and follow-up

Source: adapted from Triodos Facet (2009).

| 30 |

To be deemed a ‘competent exporter’17 by the CBI sector expert and CBI programme
manager, a CBI-assisted company has to meet three sets of criteria. First, it should fulfil
quality indicators at the result, effect and impact levels.18 At the result level, the company
indicates during the final evaluation of the EXPRO training that its skills and knowledge
have improved as a result of having participated in the seminar. Second, the company
translates its knowledge and insights of the EU and EFTA markets and export marketing into
an export marketing plan. Finally, the company should have made relevant contacts in the
EU/EFTA markets during the various market entry activities.
At the effect and impact levels, the CBI quality indicators verify that the company did
manage to increase its exports to the EU during the programme (effect). The total realised
additional export turnover to the EU is referred to as the impact realised.
The ECP portfolio accounted for in this evaluation totals EUR 24 million and represents 36%
of the total expenditures on ECPs since 2005 (Figure 2).

17

18

The word ‘competent’ exporter is debatable, as we have shown that for a substantial number of
companies no financial data have been found in the programme database, which makes it impossible
to conclude whether these companies fulfilled the quality criteria agreed upon between the client and
contractor. Moreover, as we saw with the companies for which financial data were displayed, we found
that a substantial number did not achieve export turnover at all. Nevertheless, we will use this
terminology throughout the evaluation.
See Annex 9.

CBI’s role in private sector development

Figure 2

Breakdown of ECP Expenditures (CBI completed/delivered companies) by country income
group and sectors (2005 - March 2013, total EUR 24 mln)

upper-middle-income
lower-middle-income
low-income economies
0

5

10

15

20

25

amounts in EUR million
agriculture, food and forestry

consumer products

industrial products

services

Source: CBI/SAGE, elaborated by IOB.

From the above presented portfolio of completed ECPs, 3% of total expenditures (CBI
delivered/completed companies) was realised in low-income countries, by far the largest
share (90%) in lower-middle-income countries, and 7% in upper-middle-income countries.
The budget breakdown by economic sector indicates that the main focus lies with industrial
products.19
Business Support Organisation Development
The BSOD programme aims to improve the business environment by enhancing the
efficiency and effectiveness of the BSOs in their export development and promotion
activities in the European market, and to improve the service delivery to exporters. Of the 56
BSOD modules that have been implemented since 2005 and finalised by the end of 2012,
evaluations of 22 modules implemented by or on behalf of CBI have been included in the
research sample, representing 38% of the budget spent.

19

Since CBI beneficiaries are not consistently earmarked by main sector of economic activity, figures have
been extrapolated.

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Aided trade

2.5 CBI’s production
The production values listed for the four main CBI services (dashed lines) show that ECPs are
the main cost driver, covering almost 50% of the total production value (Figure 3).20
Production value of CBI services

Figure 3
30

EUR million

25
20
15
10
5
0
2005

| 32 |

2007

2008

2009

2010

total realised produce

2006

ECP

BSOD

MI

2011

2012

HRD

Source: annual reports and production figures.

Both BSOD modules and market intelligence products represent nearly EUR 26 million,
whereas interventions related to training represent over EUR 35 million.21 The production
peaks are explained by the fact that ECP modules are launched in batches and take several
years to complete.22

2.6 Theory of change and intervention logic
A theory of change (ToC) explicitly shows how a programme or specific intervention is
intended to function in a particular context, and how it will bring about the planned
outputs and outcomes. It also explains which causal mechanisms are supposed to be
triggered by an intervention, what the underlying assumptions for those causal
mechanisms are, and what potential other development pathways could explain the results
that have been realised.

20

21
22

It should be noted that because the budgeting system changed in 2010, the production value since then
has been based on an ex ante standard tariff per delivered product. This value does not necessarily
represent the costs of production.
The HRD hiccup and ECP decrease in 2010 can be attributed to administrative issues.
There is an additional explanation for the high ECP production peak in 2007, as this marks a change in
the budgeting procedures from ex post product-based to ex ante module-based financing.

CBI’s role in private sector development

IOB recently reconstructed an MFA theory of change at the PSD policy level, which will be
briefly touched upon in this section.23 Better access to markets is one of the central
objectives of the PSD policy. The malfunctioning of markets causes suboptimal terms of
trade, as a result of which different groups are unable to benefit sufficiently from the
opportunities presented by trade. The literature mentions two problems: (a) limited access
to input or output markets, and (b) low or unbalanced competition in goods and services
markets. A lack of market access hampers the development of a balanced private sector. This
lack of access can have several causes:
1. Entrepreneurs have poor access to the market due to a lack of infrastructure or the low
quality of infrastructure, with high (prohibitive) transport costs as a result;
2. Entrepreneurs have insufficient access to information about markets; and
3. The dissemination of information on new production methods and techniques is
inefficient or slow, as a result of malfunctioning public information services, for example.
Especially for the poorer small-scale producers, high transaction costs, market risks, and
limited information are important causes of poor access to (export) markets.24 Problems
arising from the structure and functioning of markets in developing countries include:
1) a lack of networks between producers, traders, and processors, which increases the
costs involved in commercial transactions between companies;
2) small-scale producers cannot achieve sufficient volume in the market and are therefore
at the mercy of middlemen;
3) a lack of knowledge and information on prevailing market conditions; this concerns
both prices and quality requirements in domestic and international markets;
4) a limited number of commercial parties that together determine the price and block
new parties from entering the market (monopoly or oligopoly formation);
5) trade barriers and limited interaction with the world distort domestic price ratios; and
6) low integration of local, regional, and national markets, potentially causing large price
fluctuations and disproportionate margins.
CBI’s theory of change
CBI has never explicated a theory of change at the programme level,25 though it did start to
base each of its interventions on logical framework analyses. Therefore, we have
reconstructed a simplified ECP-oriented theory of change for this evaluation.
The simplified theory of change assumes that initially any company could be a flourishing
exporter, except that certain constraints might be prohibiting this. It further assumes that if
these constraints are – to some extent – removed, by ECPs or by other external or internal
factors, the company will be more likely to increase its export turnover (Figure 4).
23
24
25

See also Annex 8.
SDC/DFID (2008). A Synthesis of the Making Markets Work for the Poor Approach (M4P). Bern.
CBI prepared a ToC ahead of this evaluation, but this document is more of an elaborate description of
its four main products than a ToC. In response, IOB organised a workshop with the CBI programme
managers, management and M&E staff, to reconstruct an intervention logic.

| 33 |

Aided trade

Schematic overview of theory of change

Figure 4

export performance

company

foreign
market

context-related
export constraints
supply-side
export constraints

demand-side
export constraints

Source: IOB.

Potential export constraints are summarised and categorised in Table 2. Exports materialise
when a company’s supply meets demand in the foreign market. Therefore, export
constraints on the demand and supply side are related.
| 34 |
Table 2

Trade-related constraints

Supply-side constraints

Context-related constraints

Demand-side constraints

Cost price level

Trade policy restrictions

Market entry

Design quality

Exchange rate

Customer needs and preferences

Product quality

Currency convertibility

Demand changes and trends

Packaging

Import restrictions

Market size and growth

Parts and raw material
supply

Financing (of export transactions)

Market access (tariff and
non-tariff barriers)

Internal export
organisation/capacity

Shipping delays and costs

Insufficient demand

Production capacity

Communication with foreign
markets/buyers

Source: IOB.

For instance, the packaging of a product (a supply-side factor) can only be considered to be
constraining export performance when it does not meet the customer’s needs and
preferences on the demand side. Supply-side constraints are (mostly) under the direct
control of companies. For instance, the cost price of a product is very closely related to the
organisation of production (due to, for instance, organisational decisions on economies of
scale and the level of mechanisation), but also to other factors outside the company’s
sphere of influence, such as the labour standards the company has to adhere to.

CBI’s role in private sector development

Demand-side barriers, on the other hand, cannot be reduced by a company. However, a
company can potentially overcome these barriers by adapting itself or by committing more
resources. For instance, a company cannot reduce the certification requirements for
accessing a foreign market, but it can get its products certified; and although market entry
in Europe is difficult and costly, a company can decide to commit resources to participate in
a trade fair.
Context-related export constraints are different in this respect because they are considered
more difficult to overcome. Context-related factors include, for instance, the exchange rate
or import tariffs.
Simplified intervention logic
Other than a theory of change, the intervention logic specifically describes the internal logic
of the programme intervention that ultimately should lead to the projected results at the
output, outcome, and impact levels. The logical frameworks supporting CBI interventions
correspond to the intervention logic. Annex 7 reconstructs the intervention logic of both
ECP and BSOD programmes, which form the core object of evaluation.26
Limitations of the evaluation
CBI’s tradition of programme evaluation has improved markedly over the years.
By introducing a programmatic approach in 2011,27 CBI has included a result chain in the
measurement and evaluation plan.28 The ‘old style’ programmes, which are the subject of
the current evaluation, do not work according to this result chain and instead used to
monitor so-called ‘quality indicators’ listed for the different CBI products.29 Quality
indicators and standards were set in order to enable CBI to steer on the basis of the quality
of its activities.

26

27

28

29

The reconstructed intervention logic finds its base in a joint session with the CBI programme
management staff.
Essentially, the new approach that was introduced in 2011 should be more balanced and integrated as a
result of a reinforcement of services, which are to be more focused on addressing capacities and
bottlenecks in the countries of operation, instead of market demand only.
In January 2013, MFA approved CBI’s new ‘Measurement & Evaluation Plan’. This plan is based on the
principles of ‘Protocol Resultaatbereiking en Evalueerbaarheid in PSD 2011’. CBI’s new programme management
system is aligned with the DCED standard. After a few years, it should deliver data on outcome and impact
levels. Currently, the development of a real-time evaluation method is underway (PRIME).
Annex 9 gives an overview of the key performance indicators and quality indicators per intervention
area and level, applied by CBI in the period 2006 up to December 2012. It must be mentioned, though,
that the suggested breach in monitoring and evaluation does not mean – especially for the ECPs – that
the ‘old style’ indicators have become completely obsolete.

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Aided trade

A set of key performance indicators per intervention area, applicable for all ‘old style’
products, was adopted in 2006.30 This allowed CBI to operate in a more result-oriented and
flexible way, more in keeping with its status as an agency responsible for its own income
and expenses.
Performance indicators were developed to serve two goals, namely: (1) project monitoring
(content) and (2) project administrative purposes (accountability). A set of quantitative and
qualitative indicators made it possible to objectively verify the number of completed units,
while enabling financial auditors to verify whether CBI has the right to claim settlement of
the received advance payments.
From a practical point of view, though, the programme management system did not – and
still does not – meet the current standard of result measurement and evaluation. Despite a
comprehensive dataset that was specially prepared by CBI, IOB’s questions challenged the
administrative and financial reporting system.

| 36 |

No data is being specifically collected to establish a baseline or end-line situation for CBI’s
interventions – at least not systematically. Moreover, evaluation outcomes are
predominantly based on self-perception, measuring client satisfaction is not an integral
part of the evaluations, and non-response analysis is absent. There is an obvious lack of
discriminative performance evaluation data.31 Moreover, from a methodological point of
view, the evaluations are also of limited reliability, as they do not systematically address the
issues of attribution, additionality, and sustainability.32

30
31

32

Existing products were subdivided into modules allowing for more flexible programme delivery.
Some examples include the objections that have been raised in several evaluations about the limited
information of the EVALIN evaluation tool, which is based on forms filled out by course participants,
and interviews right after the interventions took place, instead of some time after completion of the
training. Similarly, some evaluators questioned whether CBI should use a longer time frame to measure
additional export turnover at the company level.
Since CBI does not stipulate the reason why companies drop out of the programme, for example,
current monitoring data do not allow one to measure the potential upward bias of the programme
effect (selective attrition).

CBI’s role in private sector development

2.7 Findings
•

•

•

•

•

The focus of international cooperation has shifted away from support directly targeting
companies to support that aims to achieve structural changes in partner countries. Most
donor agencies, including CBI, now claim to follow such a multi-level approach. In
practice, however, CBI’s interventions still focus more on the individual company level.
CBI’s leadership has not always agreed about what CBI’s mission is. While some believe
that CBI should focus on decreasing (trade) information asymmetry, others are
convinced that beneficiaries need general business development, which requires a
broader set of interventions. The latter reasoning has become the guiding principle of
the CBI programme.
CBI achieved just 3% of total expenditures in low-income countries, 90% in lowermiddle-income countries, and 7% in upper-middle-income countries. This kind of
budget allocation deviates from the priorities set by MFA, one of which is to target
low-income countries more. As it takes some time to phase out programmes,
expenditures have become more aligned with MFA demands, though it remains difficult
to scale up in lower-income economies.
CBI does not have an explicit theory of change that explains how the programme is
meant to function in a particular context or how it will bring about the intended
outputs and outcomes. Such a ToC had to be reconstructed for the purpose of this
evaluation. However, CBI’s interventions are based on an intervention logic that reflects
the reconstructed ToC.
CBI’s programme management system does not meet the current standard of result
measurement and evaluation. This makes it difficult to effectively monitor, steer, and
evaluate the programme.

| 37 |

3
CBI’s working procedures and
institutional embedding

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

3.1 Introduction
CBI’s work procedures do influence the final results of its activities. This chapter examines
to what extent work procedures are consistent with the interests and needs of the
beneficiaries, within the changed institutional context in which the organisation operates.
These procedures are related both to the selection of countries and economic sectors and
sub-sectors (Section 3.2), as well as the selection procedures followed to admit a company
into the programme (Section 3.3). Another factor that likely influenced the results of CBI’s
activities can be traced back to CBI’s institutional setting, having been transformed from a
governmental department into an independent agency (Section 3.4).

3.2 Institutional context and country/sector selection
Stimulating national exports by offering information, finance, and technical assistance to
individual firms through export promoting organisations (EPOs) has become an
increasingly popular government intervention. The number of EPOs representing national
interests has tripled worldwide over the last two decades (Lederman et al., 2010). The
literature tells us that the types of service offered by these EPOs seem – at least on the
surface – quite similar across countries.
One could argue that the increase in EPOs has opened up CBI’s market for delivering
support to newly established EPOs, helping them to become more responsive and
professional. On the other hand, one could also say that the increase in the number of
initiatives promoting export would have induced CBI to become more selective regarding
initiatives to support or gaps to fill up. In other words, it raises the question which
considerations played a role to persuade CBI to become active in certain countries and
economic sectors and sub-sectors.
According to CBI the choice to become active in specific market sectors in developing
countries is based on the following criteria:
•
•
•
•
•
•

import potential in EU/EFTA markets;
willingness among potential buyers in EU/EFTA markets to establish relations with
exporters in developing countries;
adequate export potential in developing countries;
no insurmountable trade barriers;
products have added value (no traditional bulk commodities); and
contribution to export diversification of developing countries.

It is important that the production capacity has sufficient potential to be competitive to
conquer, maintain, or expand a market share on the European market. Furthermore, CBI
also takes into account the business climate and social policies of these countries. Countries
with a per capita gross national income equal to ‘upper-middle-income’ and higher,
including China, are excluded. Based on the available portfolio during the period of

| 39 |

Aided trade

evaluation, 90% of total expenditures was spent in lower-middle-income countries, while
3% and 7% was spent in low- and high-income countries, respectively.
Based on feasibility studies, CBI selects countries and economic (sub-)sectors for the
programme. However, decisions to start an intervention are based on import predictions
for the EU industry in general rather than actual market needs (as defined by importers).
A review of country and economic sector selection procedures within the ECP programme
shows that these sometimes deviate from the guiding principles and procedures. For
example, a comparison of the CBI country list and the countries of operation that were
actually chosen, shows that ‘preferred’ countries were not the only ones to be selected but
also countries marked as ‘doubtful’ or ‘not selected’, without explicitly explaining such a
choice.33

| 40 |

33

Selection is based on the same scoring format as for the feasibility criteria, whereby the criteria ‘market
prospects’ and ‘supply potential’ are comprehensive and – methodologically speaking – soundly
underpinned. The remaining sections – ‘assistance’, ‘design of the ECP’ and ‘policy’ – receive
considerably less attention in the ECP feasibility reports. For many indicators in the latter sections, it was
not possible to identify a rationale for the scores underlying the feasibility criteria tables.

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

Box 1

Changes in operational country list

Policy changes introduced by succeeding ministers have had implications for the
operational country list where PSD interventions could be programmed. According
to the 2005 annual plan, CBI was able to operate in 35 countries, including 23
bilateral partners. Western Balkan countries were added to the list in 2005, and in
2006 CBI was assigned to this region. During the following years, the operational
country list increased to 47 (including Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, and Burundi,
while Rwanda and Afghanistan are being considered).
The introduction of a revised – and strongly reduced – operational country list by
MFA in 2008, faced broad resistance and triggered the founding of the ‘PSD
platform’, a round table of PSD implementing bodies and the ministry, initiated by
CBI. In a memo from January 2009, the ministry requested PSD organisations to
establish better contact with the least-developed partner countries, and
simultaneously slowly phase out activities in (upper) middle-income countries.
In response to the increase in the number of countries with limited possibilities for
export to the EU (i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Mongolia, the
Palestinian Authority, and Sudan), CBI proposed to expand its assignment to
include enhancing regional South-South trade, as a preliminary for increased EU
exports. This led to a revised country listing in 2010 encompassing the following
country classifications: (a) nine fragile states, seventeen MDG countries and two
least-developed countries (LDCs); (b) seven ‘broad relation’ countries in which CBI
could start programmes up to the year 2014; and (c) five exit countries where CBI
should have phased out its activities by 2013, seven promising economic partner
countries and five other non-partner countries.
CBI’s 2010 annual plan mentions a focus on development partner countries as well
as LDCs, totalling 70% of the budget spent in 2014, with the remaining 30% to be
spent in ‘broad relation’ countries. This meant a reduction in spending in ‘phasing
out’ countries from 52% in 2009 to 0% in 2014. In 2011, MFA requested CBI to
report in the future about its activities according to the following country groups:
fifteen focus countries, three transition countries, twenty-nine other PSD countries
and seven exit countries – totalling 54 countries. In its 2013 annual plan CBI refers
to expenditure percentages in the following country categories, earmarked for
2017: focus countries (40%), transition countries (20%) and other PSD countries
(40%). The current selection of 13 ECPs evaluated in this report covering the period
2005-2012 reveal the following expense patterns in 26 countries in which CBI has
been operating: exit countries (49%), focus countries (4%), transition countries
(16%) and other PSD countries (31%).

| 41 |

Aided trade

ECP expenditure by size by country classification (13 ECPs, 2005-2012)
Essentially, ECPs were not run exclusively in one or just a few countries, but open to a
‘global’ clientele. The number of countries participating in an ECP ranged from one to
fourteen. In total, the thirteen ECPs under review represent 410 ‘competent exporters’ from
twenty-six countries, i.e. on average fifteen companies per country have been a beneficiary
in one of these thirteen programmes.34 Such a dispersed allocation of resources, already
ex ante, carries with it the inherent risk of becoming too diffuse to be able to make a
reasonable contribution to poverty reduction, which remains one of MFA’s central policy
aims.
The document review indicates that CBI is generally aware of the importance of contextual
issues as potential causes for the observed intervention results. In its annual reviews, CBI
elucidates on contextual developments that influenced production. It mentions the
following issues, for example:
•
•

| 42 |

•
•
•
•
•
•

phasing out of the Multi Fibre Agreement, which hampers textile producers;
a review of the EU Novel Food regulation, which is considered to be a serious barrier for
SMEs in developing countries that are active in this sector;
product energy use as an additional criterion for CE certification;
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) labelling, requiring a substantial investment which
cannot easily be compensated by gains;
EUREP/GAP certification costs, which are an insurmountable barrier for companies;
difficulties that companies face adhering to conformity assessments, which are related
to standards and regulations;
exporters from developing countries seem to be losing ground because of e-business;
and
CSR aims to stimulate transparency in markets, and requires a value-chain-based
approach.

A critical reflection on the implications of the developments mentioned above for the
choice of country-sector combinations did take place. CBI introduced an ‘Access Guide’ (part
of the market information product), providing information on non-tariff barriers. In
response to the phasing out of the Multi Fibre Agreement, CBI initiated a short-track ECP on
clothing (2003-2005) in India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. With regard to FSC labelling,
clinics about FSC certification were organised within the ‘Timber and Timber-related
Products’ ECP (2000-2009). In the Netherlands, a stakeholder meeting was organised to
discuss partnerships. Moreover, CBI introduced the ‘Fresh Fruits and Vegetables’ ECP
(2002-2007), which had been specially started to support companies in low-income
economies that risked losing their market position as a result of EUREP/GAP requirements.

34

Since programme take-up is essentially globally focused, there are examples of ECPs with a dominant
country clientele. See, for example, ECP 1034 (‘Pipe and process equipment’), accommodating
predominantly beneficiaries from India and Pakistan, or ECP 1035 (‘Outerwear Macedonia’), being the
only one of the 13 ECPs investigated that had beneficiaries from one country (Macedonia).

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

Despite the above, not all countries will necessarily reap the benefits of enhanced trade
openness, according to the literature review. Trade particularly seems to benefit more
advanced economies with a good business climate (Winters and Masters, 2013). In this
respect, flexible labour markets, the ease of starting a business and well-established
property rights seem to be especially important (Freund and Bolaky, 2008). The idea that an
enabling environment does matter, as suggested in the literature and also reflected in CBI’s
selection criteria, raises the question of what other information on the enabling trade
environment could have been used ex ante to guide CBI’s country choice.
To cite an example, ‘The Enabling Trade Index’ (ETI)35 provides insight into the fundamental
attributes that govern a country’s ability to benefit from trade. ETI is a collection of
individual indicators compiled in a single index on the basis of an underlying framework
that captures the following trade-enabling dimensions:
•

•
•

•

market access, which measures the extent and complexity of a country’s tariff regime, as
well as tariff barriers faced and preferences enjoyed by a country’s exporters in foreign
markets;36
border administration, which assesses the quality, transparency and efficiency of a
country’s border administration;37
infrastructure, which assesses the availability and quality of a country’s transport
infrastructure, associated services, and communication infrastructure, all of which are
necessary to facilitate the movement of goods within the country and across the border;
and
operating environment, which measures the quality of key institutional factors
impacting the business of importers and exporters operating in a country.

When taking into account the share of companies that left the programme per country, i.e.
the drop-out rate, these countries also seem to be the ones that face the highest barriers in
terms of international market access. This is not to claim causality up front,38 but illustrates
that CBI could have enriched programme information and feasibility studies with publicly
available information in order to reach a more well-reasoned operational country choice,
and to create more valuable information for the steering of the programme.

35
36

37

38

The Global Enabling Trade Reports, World Economic Forum.
The pillar assesses tariff barriers faced by a country’s exporters in destination markets. It includes the
average tariffs faced by the country as well as the margin of preference in destination markets
negotiated through bilateral or regional trade agreements or granted in the form of trade preferences.
The pillar assesses the efficiency and transparency of border administration. More specifically, it
captures the efficiency, transparency, and costs associated with importing and exporting goods.
The real-life picture is more ambiguous than the comparison suggests, as for example, not all
companies experience international market access barriers equally.

| 43 |

Aided trade

According to the assessment of the ETI country rankings, it would have been less likely for a
choice to fall on the following countries at the time of the start of the interventions (listed
in order according to the amount of budget spent): Colombia, Bolivia, Uganda, El Salvador,
Honduras, Tanzania, and Bangladesh.39
A preliminary conclusion, based on information from CBI’s programme database indicates
that countries where the intended results were achieved are the ones that also score
favourably on the ETI (in alphabetic order): Egypt, India, Jordan, Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Serbia, and Tunisia.
Countries with neutral or good perspectives for international market access where export
potential has not been sufficiently realised, if at all, include: Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya,
South Africa and Sri Lanka.

3.3 Company intake and addressing its needs

| 44 |

A specific characteristic of ECPs is the selection of weaker and stronger companies under the
assumption that the stronger companies will serve as a benchmark for the less strong ones
(a ‘healthy mix’). In addition, it is assumed that companies from countries with a weaker
supplier profile or image could benefit from improved visibility and the reputation of
stronger countries in the programme, for example by joining forces at a trade fair.
When addressing company needs, the theory of change identifies the most important
export barriers for companies from developing countries. By comparing these to the
barriers addressed by ECPs, one can assess whether the assisted companies have found the
ECPs to be meaningful.
An illustrative example taken from one of the country case studies lists the biggest export
obstacles ranked by scores according to ‘The Global Enabling Trade Report’40, and the
combined scores of thirteen South African case study companies (Table 3). Moreover, the
export obstacles mentioned by the interviewed trade promotion organisations have also
been referred to in the table. The last column indicates whether the export barriers are in
fact addressed by ECPs. By comparing the perceived barriers to export with the activities
delivered within each ECP, one can judge ex ante the relevance of ECPs. The judgement as to
whether, and to what extent, ECPs have actually removed these export barriers for ECPassisted companies is part of the contribution analysis which follows in the next chapter.
When trying to enter foreign markets, exporters face constraints related to market supply
and demand, as well as the wider economic context within which companies operate. Each
of the export barriers refers to one of these dimensions, as indicated in the third column.
39

40

This assessment goes beyond the political wish of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the CBI to become
more active in least-developed economies. See Annex 10 for a visualisation of the ETI rankings for each
of the countries in which CBI has been running ECPs.
The World Economic Forum, 2014.

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), South Africa faces major export constraints
while lacking access to imported inputs at competitive prices, which increases export prices,
especially since the currency exchange rate has worsened.41 A highly complex tariff structure
for imports and the inefficiency of border administration procedures to import and export
goods are also considered to be the cause of major problems. Half of the top-ten ranked
export barriers are related to contextual issues.
The export barriers perceived by the case study companies partly overlap with those
mentioned in the WEF report (the first 12 obstacles listed in Table 3), but they also indicate
that other issues are at play, such as a lack of internal export organisation (capacity), dealing
with demand changes and trends, and communication with foreign buyers.
Many of the constraints mentioned both by the WEF report and case study companies are
also in line with export obstacles identified by trade promotion organisations (TPOs).42
Triangulating these sources helps us to identify the most important export constraints faced
by South African companies:
•
•
•
•
•
•

no competitive pricing due to high cost of inputs (e.g. raw materials, electricity, labour);
problems identifying potential buyers;
tariff (import duties) and non-tariff barriers (technical requirements and standards);
limited financial resources to overcome market entry costs (especially common among
small companies);
high transport costs (and shipping delays), especially to Europe; and
difficulties in meeting buyers’ quality/quantity requirements.

This example shows that ECP interventions focus on two of the six major export constraints,
namely: (1) the identification of potential markets and buyers, and (2) difficulties in meeting
buyers’ quality/quantity requirements. In addition, much effort goes into dealing with
constraints that were considered less important (e.g. training on legal issues, contracts, and
communication with foreign buyers). However, it should be noted that many of the
important unaddressed constraints are context-related, and hence fall outside the sphere of
influence of ECPs and export development programmes in general.
What does this mean for the relevance of ECPs for assisted companies in South Africa and
elsewhere? While ECPs are actively identifying buyers and markets, which is considered to
be the most important export constraint among assisted companies, there are many other
important factors that are constraining these companies that are not being addressed (e.g.
high input prices). This implies that there was ex ante a considerable risk that the effort of
ECPs, even if highly successful in bringing companies in contact with buyers, would not
increase export turnover when these other constraints turn out to be binding.

41
42

These constraints are not from recent years, but were also apparent at the time of ECP implementation.
The abbreviations TPOs and BSOs are interchangeable.

| 45 |

Aided trade

Table 3

| 46 |

Export barriers

Obstacle

Dimension

TPOs

ECP

1

High cost or delays caused by
domestic transportation

context

X

2

Access to imported inputs at
competitive prices/price level

supply

X

X

X

(X)

3

Identifying potential markets
and buyers

demand

X

X

X

X

4

Tariff barriers abroad (e.g.
import duties in target markets)

demand

X

X

X

5

Inadequate production
technology and skills

supply

X

6

Burdensome procedures at
foreign borders

context

X

7

High cost or delays caused by
international transport

context

X

X

X

8

Access to trade finance

context

X

X

X

9

Corruption at foreign borders

context

X

10

Difficulties in meeting buyers’
quality/quantity requirements

supply

X

X

X

11

Technical requirements and
standards abroad

demand

X

X

(X)

12

Rules of origin requirements
abroad

demand

X

13

Limited knowledge on legal
issues and contracts

context

14

Currency volatility

context

15

Internal export organisation

supply

X

X

16

Demand changes and trends

demand

X

X

17

Communication with foreign
markets/buyers

demand

X

X

18

Design quality

supply

X

X

19

Production Capacity

supply

X

(X)

20

Packaging

supply

X

(X) = ECP partly contributing;
Bold = main obstacles ECPs address.
Sources: World Economic Forum, IOB.

43

Ranking from highest to lowest obstacle.

WEF rank42 Case study
companies

(X)

X
X

X

X

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

3.4 Institutional arrangement
CBI was established in 1971 as the first international ‘import promotion organisation’ to
develop non-commercial policy to increase imports from developing countries to Europe.
Although the minister of development cooperation in 1997 indicated that he was satisfied
with how CBI was functioning, it was decided to investigate whether CBI would function
even more effectively if it was to be placed further away from the core department. A study
decided that the preferred option was its transformation into an agency (see Box 2).44 On
1 January 1998, CBI was spun off into an agency with its own income and expenses regime
(‘Baten Lasten Dienst-model’ in Dutch).
Box 2

Regulation departmental agencies, 2007

Departmental agencies have been operational in the Netherlands since 1994. They
can be defined as government organisations with their own income and expense
regime, which aim to achieve greater effectiveness in policy implementation. In
2011, the ‘Baten Lasten Dienst (BLD)’ scheme was evaluated by the Ministry of Finance.
Departmental agencies are characterised by a results-oriented management
model, supported by a cost-benefit administration. It is a form of internal
autonomy in which the hierarchical subordination to the minister remains fully
maintained. This model is based on two general assumptions: (1) the agency can
similarly be controlled as a company in the private sector; and (2) the agency is not
out to create economic value while serving the general public interest. The BLD
model has the following specific characteristics:
1. results-oriented management model:
a. three distinct roles (contractor, client and owner);
b. output management by the client;
c. presence of conflict of interest/negotiation game;
2. efficiency/measurability:
a. handling a full cost model;
b. presence of homogeneous measurable products and services;
c. monitoring efficiency (using indicators); and
3. different financial regime:
a. the presence of investment and depreciation, use of loan facility;
b. building of equity;
c. use of accrual accounting.
Source: Regulation Departmental Agencies. Ministry of Finance, 2007.

44

The reason for introducing agencies in the Netherlands was to lower the cost of services, without
compromising on quality. The ministry and CBI have agreed on a ‘results-based control model’ (price x
quantity) per product or service. The indicators set by CBI to monitor its performance (key performance
indicators) actually serve two goals: (1) project monitoring (content), and (2) project administrative
purposes (ex ante price setting of services).

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Aided trade

3.4.1 Result-oriented management model
The contribution of CBI to the implementation of market development policies is the
subject of consultation between MFA and CBI. The deputy Secretary-General of the MFA acts
as the ‘owner’ of CBI, while the MFA’s deputy Director-General of International Cooperation
(DGIS) acts as the client45 on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development
Cooperation. The mandate that CBI, the contractor, should contribute to poverty reduction
by strengthening the competitiveness of companies from developing countries, i.e. by
improving internal business conditions, was reconfirmed by the client in September 2009.
CBI submits a multi-annual offer to MFA in which it presents its agenda. Within this general
framework, the deputy DGIS issues annual contracts to CBI for products to be delivered on
the basis of a tender issued by CBI at already approved tariffs. Being an agency implies that
steering from the ministry focuses on products (quantity/price) and to a lesser extent on the
policy impact and quality.

| 48 |

Supervision
According to the assumptions underlying the agency model, MFA’s central financial
department (FEZ)46 acts as advisor to the deputy Secretary-General, representing his or her
interests. The control unit (CU) should focus on assessing the effectiveness of business
processes at CBI, but also make sure that CBI’s cost rate applies. However, document review
and interviews indicate that the CU is primarily involved in advising the deputy DGIS about
the plausibility of the offer submitted by CBI, assessing whether the quoted rates are not too
high. The latter should be the role of the deputy DGIS, supported by its controller.
Several MFA departments have been in charge of steering CBI.47 From interviews held with
current and former policy-makers, controllers and employees of the Central Government
Audit Service (ADR), and supported by detailed document analysis, one could generally state
that despite a great deal of effort, commitment, and good intentions, there has been
insufficient knowledge and operational know-how from within the ministry on how to
manage and steer an agency that is supposed to behave as a private entity.
The available files do not contain good descriptions of the different specific roles for the
owner and client, according to some interviewees, and this has even led to a situation in
which the interpretation of the roles between client and owner were reversed. While the
interpretation of the assignment and the formulation of the results (the ‘how to do’
question) were discussed with the owner, the client focused primarily on more
institutional-related topics (the ‘what’ question), suggesting that they interpreted their
roles in a different way.

45

46
47

The CBI now has de facto one client, namely the deputy DGIS. During the period under evaluation, CBI foresaw
other potential clients over time, such as the European Union, Germany, Ireland, and the World Bank.
The Dutch acronym FEZ stands for Financieel Economische Zaken.
From the Social Development Department to the Sustainable Economic Development Department.

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

Specifically, since MFA began administering an agency of which the operational and
financial control system differs completely from that of regular cash and obligations
systems,48 it can be concluded that the quality of MFA’s administrating of CBI has depended
strongly on the interest and knowledge, as well as available time and priority setting, of the
civil servants in charge, both at the levels of strategy and implementation. Therefore it has
been very difficult to administer a proper result-oriented framework that asks CBI the right
questions.
Agency model requires the owner, client and contractor to play different roles
As in any steering relationship between owner, client and contractor there is a degree of
information asymmetry: contractors have more information at their disposal than clients
and owners. The mechanism of conflict of interest between the client, owner, and
contractor never materialised in the case of steering CBI. The documents reviewed and the
interviews suggest that the negotiation game was never really fully played. Instead, the
relation between owner, client, and contractor can be characterised by a commonly shared
interest or risk.
Moreover, CBI, as the only service provider, had the opportunity to monopolise. In such
cases, transparency must be introduced by benchmarking with comparable providers, from
the private sector or not. However, for specific public goods there are hardly any alternatives
that can serve as a reference to keep the pricing of services transparent. This prevents any
real bargaining from happening, which is illustrated by the following example.
Annually, CBI prepares a quotation for the deputy DGIS and, based on the offer, expects to
engage in a business negotiation with the client regarding the amount, price and quality of
the services. In these types of bargaining situations it makes sense for the contractor to
maximise the initial offer, thus creating room for manoeuvre. Since this kind of negotiation
process rarely occurred between CBI and MFA, one could say that MFA did not push for
efficient service delivery by CBI up front.49
Another intervening factor is the difference in accounting systems used by CBI and MFA,
which are not compatible. MFA reserves approximately EUR 25 million of its budget
annually for CBI, and administers a model that encourages cash flow instead of cost price
reduction. If CBI were to reduce the cost of production, while MFA enforced a predictable
annual cash flow, then CBI would have to increase production. This suggests that there is
not an MFA-induced incentive for CBI to lower its costs. Or vice versa: if the funding by the
client is solely based on the principle of price times quantity, then there is an inherent
interest on the contractor’s side to maximise quantity during the year, without necessarily
contributing to social welfare.

48
49

In Dutch: ‘regulier kas- en verplichtingen stelsel’.
See also the report of the Accounting Unit on the cost prices offered to MFA by CBI.

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Aided trade

3.4.2 Lack of steering by MFA
Until 2010, MFA gave CBI only limited attention in policy, and the relationship between CBI
and its principal was not particularly dynamic. A few parliamentary questions were raised
about alleged subsidies that CBI left for competitors of Dutch companies in developing
countries, thus destabilising a level playing field.50 This lack of steering by its principal gave
CBI room for manoeuvre, and it launched initiatives that were often accepted by the
principal without much comment. Several times, CBI also tried to expand its mission.51

| 50 |

Since 2010 in particular, both MFA and CBI realised that the time had come to change the
attitude that had crept in after years of sustained laissez-faire. Consequently, MFA became
stricter with the agency. It was mutually agreed that CBI had been operating for too long in
splendid isolation.52 MFA asked CBI to introduce initiatives that contribute to the
implementation of policies set in the field of private sector development. It required a more
focused mission and goal-setting, in which CBI was challenged by MFA to establish a more
tangible and transparent link between export promotion, sustainable development, and
poverty reduction. In the ‘PSD protocol on evaluation’ it was agreed that all impact
evaluations should measure net income (exports in the case of CBI), as well as net
additional jobs.53 MFA explicitly requested CBI to establish better connections with the
Dutch (least-developed) partner countries, while stepping back its activities in (upper-)
middle-income countries, and to address SMEs.
Under the State Secretary for European affairs (2010-2012), an interest in supporting
economic sectors was developed, promoting the self-reliance of developing countries.
Policy changes focused less attention for aid, while stimulating more trade and investment,
and promoting mutual beneficial relationships (also with a focus on strengthening the role
of the Dutch private sector in development policy). Furthermore, the previously announced
reduction in the number of countries in which the so-called private sector development
tools could be implemented, was recalled, hence increasing the possibilities for CBI to
become more active globally.
With the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation entering office in late
2012, an ambitious policy agenda54 was introduced that focused on coherency between trade
and aid. It mentions, among others things, that despite diminished tariff barriers over the
years, exporters from developing countries are facing stiffer EU entrance barriers as a result
of non-tariff barriers, such as requirements on safety standards, energy-efficient production
methods, durability and packaging. While Dutch PSD policies defend these more stringent
50
51

52
53

54

See also ‘Tweede Kamer, 2008-2009; aanhangsel van de Handelingen. Vragen nr. 3225 en 3586’.
CBI proactively but unsuccessfully suggested to coordinate projects financed within the framework of
the Schokland agreement (2009), and, more recently, proposed that it become the coordinating body of
the technical assistance part of the Dutch Good Growth Fund.
Internal memorandum DGIS, DDE-564/2010.
Although CBI reports on additional jobs, this indicator has never become relevant for financial
settlement.
‘Wat de wereld verdient: een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen’, Tweede Kamer 20012–2013, 332
625, no.1. Translated into English as: ‘A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment’.

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

product admission criteria, on the one hand, they also aim to help exporters from lessdeveloped regions to mitigate the problems they face because of this. CBI is specifically
mentioned as having to render such support services in developing countries.
A more proactive course taken by CBI led it to cooperate with international and national
PSD organisations in a more structured manner.55 Despite good intentions, as shown in the
country studies, CBI is unfortunately seen as a ‘standalone’ service provider, not actively
searching for or engaging in joint programmes that require more strategic approaches in
country and sector promotion.56 The reports also indicate that during the period under
evaluation, the CBI programme was developed and implemented autonomously, i.e.
independent of the respective governments’ national development strategy and MFA’s
country programme (as implemented by the embassies).57

3.4.3 Rethinking CBI’s status
During the period of evaluation 2005-2012, CBI was in full operational swing and took basic
decisions about its future course and work methods. The transformation into an agency
that is responsible for its own cost and expenses regime and that should operate under a
result-oriented management regime since 1998 took longer than expected.
The years 2005-2008 marked a period in which CBI management focused strongly on the
reduction of a wide array of activities to four main billable products, while at the same time
introducing a result-oriented management model.58 A start was made to change CBI from an
input-driven to an output-driven organisation. Five main priorities were formulated that
CBI needed to act on: strategy and development, administration and financial
management, collaboration and coalitions, and monitoring and evaluation.
After taking office in 2008, a new managing director decided to change course. It was
recognised that too much focus had been laid on internal processes and product supply,
without creating coherency between CBI’s various departments. There was a strong need for
clear organisation-wide goals to guide the activities of CBI and its divisions. Moreover, the
55

56

57

58

CBI initiated the PSD round table, even as the joint website PSD /Trade2gether, to stress cooperation
and synergy amongst network partners. It started cooperation with market access partner
organisations PUM and IDH, later getting involved with the SNV inclusive business programme in
Bolivia. In 2011 CBI started the Trade Related Instruments Connected (TRIC), an international platform
of likeminded trade promotion organisations. In a first step, cooperation among members aims at
market intelligence of which the objective is to prevent duplication of work and to share knowledge,
and sharing information regarding potential SMEs and potential importers or collaboration in market
entry by geographical division.
Unlike its counterpart SIPPO, CBI was less successful in its effort to collaborate with several
development partners and their respective programmes, who work in value chains (e.g. USAID, IFC,
GTZ, DFID and DANIDA).
Since 2011, more integrated partnership programmes with local service providers (agreed upon in
MoUs) have been launched, in which a task division between both partners has been agreed upon.
CBI focuses on topics that local trade promotion organisations are unable to deliver.
For example, employees were required to account for their time, more as a disciplinary measure than
an attempt to create a better basis for justifying the product cost structure. The system was not kept in
place for long though.

| 51 |

Aided trade

client, i.e. the deputy DGIS, called for greater effectiveness and efficiency, introducing the
need for greater external visibility. The organisation was urged to become more active in the
poorest countries and fragile states, and to reduce its activities in upper-middle-income
countries. Moreover, CBI’s management endorsed the findings of an organisational review
by MFA/ISB in 200959 that began a process to develop clearer strategy, measurable objectives
and more synergy.60
An offshoot of this renewed strategy is the integrated work method that was introduced in
2011. The organisation’s new course aims to make CBI’s impact and added value clearer, and
to develop a strategic country focus that includes the least-developed and fragile states.61
A lack of clear internal goal setting by CBI, but also by the client, made it necessary to
implement a monitoring and evaluation framework, which resulted in the ‘Result
Measurement & Evaluation Plan’ in 2012, and the development of a real-time impact
evaluation method since 2013.

| 52 |

The organisation review by MFA/ISB (2009) mentioned the agency’s relatively small size,
implying how urgent it is to rethink the scale of its operations. Efforts by CBI to get financial
contributions from other (predominantly international) donors proved disappointing over
the years.62 This accelerated talks about bringing CBI under the umbrella of NL Agency, the
executive agency for Dutch international business development (and the forerunner of RVO,
the Netherlands Enterprise Agency). CBI initiated this by proposing its owner and client to
set up a business case. As of January 2015, CBI became part of RVO, meaning that CBI ceased
to exist as an independent agency of MFA.

59

60
61
62

’Verkorte Organisatiedoorlichting Centrum tot Bevordering van de Import uit Ontwikkelingslanden (CBI)’, MFA/ISB,
2009. ISB is part of MFA. The acronym stands for ‘Inspectie Signalering en Begeleiding’.
See also the guiding document by CBI: ‘Koers 2010’.
CBI annual plan 2010.
During the evaluation period, CBI received an order from Ecuador (US$ 772,000) and a repeat of the
order in 2015 (US$ 2.2 million)

CBI’s working procedures and institutional embedding

3.5 Findings
•

•

•

•

•

The number of Export Promotion Organisations in developing countries has increased
considerably in recent decades. They deliver similar services worldwide that should have
triggered CBI to become more selective about what initiatives to support or not.
CBI has been sensitive to issues that negatively influence the programme’s effect, and as
a result CBI has reflected critically about which countries and economic sectors to select
for its activities. A review of country and economic sector selection procedures in the
ECP programme shows that not only ‘preferred’ countries were selected, but also
countries marked as ‘doubtful’ or ‘not selected’, without making such choices explicit.
Since its interventions focus only on a couple of major export constraints, CBI has been
unable to address other constraints that prevent companies from exporting. In other
words, there was ex ante a considerable risk that the programme’s efforts, even if it was
highly successful in bringing companies in contact with buyers, would not increase
export turnover.
CBI’s transformation into a departmental agency in 1998 did not lead to the intended
results-oriented management model supported by a cost-benefit administration. It has
never been easy for any of the parties involved (the deputy Secretary-General being the
owner, deputy DGIS being the client and CBI the contractor) to adjust to their new roles.
As result, MFA was unable to steer CBI towards efficient programme delivery.
MFA challenged CBI in 2010 to make the link between export promotion, sustainable
development, and poverty reduction more tangible and transparent, after a period of
sustained laissez-faire in which CBI could operate in splendid isolation.

| 53 |

4
CBI’s contribution to export
development

CBI’s contribution to export development

4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of the export coaching programme. Section 4.2
starts with a short introduction on how these effects are measured. Section 4.3 assesses
both the extent to which ECPs have been able to relieve export constraints, as well as the
effect on export turnover, also discussing the contribution of the programme in achieving
these effects. Section 4.4 discusses how ECPs contributed to the achieved programme
effects. Moreover, in order to have an impact on the national development indicators, the
effects are assumed to be sustainable, and that the extra gains, in terms of added value and
employment creation, will be, as much as possible, beneficial for the national economy
(Section 4.5). Reasons for not achieving the intended effect are given in Section 4.6.

4.2 Measuring effects
A review of the programme documents does not explicitly show how ECPs are supposed to
function in particular contexts or how they will bring about the planned outcomes. Nor
does it explain what causal mechanisms are supposed to be triggered or what the underlying assumptions are for those causal mechanisms to operate, or what potential other
pathways could explain the achieved results. Based on the reconstructed intervention logic,63
we have formulated our own assumptions (at the immediate, intermediate, and ultimate
outcome levels, and at the impact level), which will be tested in order to have a better
understanding of the programme’s effects. We will test these assumptions by looking into
how the following indicators developed, and examining to what extent these developments
can be attributed to the interventions received by the programme beneficiaries.
At the immediate outcome level, ECPs should:
• target companies most in need, which is reflected in the indicators ‘programme
additionality’ and ‘company selection’; and
• overcome key constraints faced by beneficiaries trying to achieve their export goals.
At the intermediate outcome level, ECPs should:
• contribute to (1) more organised and structured export planning and implementation,
(2) an understanding of the European business culture, and (3) a more confident
entrepreneur;
• target both incumbent EU64 and new exporters, which is measured by the share of
beneficiaries that started to export as a result of the programme;65 and
• diversify exports, both in terms of export destinations and product range.
63
64
65

Annex 7 contains a visualisation of the reconstructed intervention logic.
References to the ‘EU’ include ‘EFTA’ countries.
CBI’s Memorandum to its principal dated July 3, 2008 proposed to replace the module name ‘export
diversification’ with ‘market development’. The new name reflects the tapping of new (i.e. European)
markets for products that are already being exported, or placing new products on current EU markets.
It no longer concerns the combination of new products on new European markets, because it is already
known that this combination hardly leads to export growth.

| 55 |

Aided trade

At the ultimate outcome level the ECPs should:
• increase the programme beneficiaries’ exports and export share, measured by the share
of beneficiaries that increased exports, and the size of these additional exports.
At the impact level, ECPs are likely to:
• support those sectors and companies that add substantial value to the domestic
economy;
• contribute to sustainable export increase and stable relationships with importers;
• create additional (sustainable) jobs, while accounting for the potential short-run
trade-off between competitiveness and jobs; and
• prevent substitution effects, since from a macro-development perspective choosing a
CBI-assisted company can be detrimental to current suppliers in developing countries.

4.3 Findings

| 56 |

When discussing effects it is important to remain focused on alternative pathways that
could explain the results (sub-section 4.3.1) as well as any insights about the type of
companies that entered the programme (sub-section 4.3.2). The programme effects at the
intermediate, ultimate and impact levels are discussed in sub-sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.

4.3.1 Additionality
This section asks what inputs and services were provided by ECPs to companies in addition
to what these companies could already obtain on the market or from other institutions
operating in local markets, as these could offer alternative explanations for the results.
The concept of additionality in its most basic form refers to the ‘amount of output from a
policy as compared with what would have occurred without government intervention’.66
Being additional means having added value or being complementary to what the market or
other institutions are already providing (see Box 3).

66

Mceldowney, J. (1997). Policy Evaluation and the Concepts of Deadweight and Additionality:
A Commentary. In: Evaluation, April 1997, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 175-188, European Commission, Brussels.

CBI’s contribution to export development

Box 3

Additionality defined67

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank investigated the
additionality of the International Finance Corporation, a World Bank institution
that provides investment and advisory services to build the private sector in
developing countries. It states that additionality has three main characteristics:
• Additionality is relative, i.e. it refers to what is available from other parties;
• Additionality is situational, because availability depends on circumstances and
‘situations exhibiting market and institutional imperfections that inhibit
development’; and
• Additionality is highly dynamic, i.e. the additionality of an institution may change
as the institution itself changes, as other organisations in the environment
change and as circumstances in developing countries change.

According to our interpretation, we therefore need to ask whether or not ECP-assisted
companies would have had access to a comparable and affordable alternative, in order to
develop their export potential. This requires information on what type of export services
were on offer during the intervention period, and to what extent companies had access to
these services.
The country case study reports reveal that many different types of export development
services and subsidies were on offer by several institutions at the time of the intervention.
Smaller companies, like those targeted by CBI, could generally not afford the consultancy
services available in the private sector. Exporters that did not make use of other service
providers stated that this was due to a lack of quality and availability of services, as well as a
lack of ability to pay for these services.
Moreover, investing in export development is often a low priority, and many companies
even refuse subsidised trade fair participation because the required co-investments are
deemed too large. This means that any export development services offered to these
companies is additional to what they can (or are willing to) obtain on the private market.
The question then remains whether ECPs were additional to the export development
services offered by the local institutional framework.
Our survey of 154 beneficiaries, drop-outs and non-beneficiaries indicates that almost half
of the companies actually made use of export promotion services of organisations other
than CBI since the ECPs started.68 On average companies received 3.2 different types of
67

68

IEG (2008) Independent Evaluation of IFC’s Development Results 2008: IFC’s Additionality in Supporting Private
Sector Development. Washington, D.C.: Independent Evaluation Group World Bank.
The finding that about half of the population has used export promotion service organisations is well in
line with findings in the country case studies and other evaluation studies.

| 57 |

Aided trade

services since ECPs started. The most commonly received assistance is trade fair
participation support, matchmaking, training on technical issues such as certification,
custom procedures, training on personal skills, and one-on-one coaching and advice. On
average companies paid EUR 1,700 for paid services, and in one third of the cases the
services were freely available. A comparison of these other services with services offered in
the ECP programme suggests that in almost 40% of the cases the companies perceived the
ECP service to be totally different from the local services offered. Another 40% found the
services ‘somewhat different’, while 20% said the local services were ‘totally similar’ to CBI’s.
Interestingly, when asked about the quality of the local services compared to CBI’s, 25% of
the companies felt that the quality of the local service was lower than CBI’s, while the
remaining companies either judged the local quality to be of the ‘same quality’ (38%) or
even ‘higher quality’ (38%).
We conclude that half of the ECP beneficiaries also received services from other service
providers. Most of these companies judged these services to be of equal or higher quality
than that of ECPs.

4.3.2 Selected companies and programme drop-outs
| 58 |

In order to get a feel for the type of companies that entered the programme, the company’s
total turnover has been listed (Figure 5), as well as the share of turnover that is earned out of
exports, and the EU export share (Table 4). The mean average turnover is about EUR 23
million, whereas the median is ‘only’ EUR 804,000, indicating a highly skewed distribution
of ECP beneficiaries in terms of turnover.
Company turnover at start of ECP intervention (logarithmic scale, n=76)

Figure 5
100000000
10000000
1000000
100000
10000
1000
100
10
1

individual companies
Source: IOB, survey.

A closer look at the distribution in the above figure shows that this discrepancy is caused by
a small number of outliers on the upper end of the distribution. The turnover for fourteen
out of the reported seventy-six companies in the figure is above, and sometimes far above,

CBI’s contribution to export development

EUR 10 million, with one Colombian company in particular reporting a turnover of EUR 1.2
billion, of which EUR 240 million was export turnover. In other words, using the mean69 for
reporting purposes is not a good measure of central tendency.70
About 75% of the beneficiaries already had some experience exporting to Europe before
entering the programme. The total export range of beneficiary companies, the median
export share of total turnover, and the EU export amount are listed per quartile of
observations (Table 4).
Table 4

Exports of beneficiaries the year before ECP started (n=76)

Total exports
Quartile

Exports to EU

Absolute (EUR 1,000)

Median export share of turnover

≤30

5%

2

30-239

23%

1-18

3

239-1,824

20%

18-182

4

1,824+

40%

182+

1

Absolute (EUR 1,000)
0

Source: IOB, survey.
| 59 |

The data show that the export share of total turnover is positively associated with absolute
export values, i.e. companies with a larger export volume also tend to have a larger export
share of the total turnover. This supports the conclusion that larger companies are also
more likely to reach the highest absolute export value, which is in turn the ECP indicator at
the result level communicated by CBI to MFA.
Another aspect is whether ECPs were offering the right kind of assistance for these
companies to start exporting to Europe. Both survey and country case studies indicate that a
lack of business contacts and a lack of market information were considered the most
important reasons for not exporting or exporting more to Europe at the start of ECPs.
Nevertheless, a large number of export obstacles that are less widely shared among
companies remain, including, among other things, a general lack of organisational
capacity, low European demand, EU import restrictions, unfavourable exchange rates, and
not the right product in terms of quality or price. This indicates that there are many other
reasons why companies were not exporting to the EU.71
69
70

71

Mean figures are always reported for ECPs.
If we look further into the distribution of turnover, as graphically illustrated, we can see that at the start
of ECP the majority of the companies (75%) had revenue that lay between EUR 100,000 and EUR 10
million, while 13% reported an export turnover above EUR 10 million, and 12% below EUR 100,000.
Although not further specified in the survey, the country case studies have given examples of ‘other’
reasons for not exporting more to Europe. An often-heard argument is a country’s bad reputation
(especially Colombia, India and Egypt) compared to other supplying nations. Companies appreciate the
role CBI played in overcoming their reputation abroad, arranging their attendance at trade fairs in CBI
pavillions, for example, instead of the home country, enabling them to avoid negative connotations.
A decline in EU demand as a result of the economic crisis is not an argument that holds true for all
products and services addressed by the ECPs (see, e.g. the South African country report in Annex 4).

Aided trade

Table 5

Main reason for limited exports to the EU (multiple response, N=131)

Reason

Frequency

Lack of business contacts

47

Lack of market information

36

Other

100

Total

183

Source: IOB, survey.

Beneficiaries may drop out of the programme intervention at various levels of the results
chain, implying that the number that actually benefits will be smaller than the number that
might potentially benefit. Of the 479 companies that were admitted to the thirteen ECPs,
69 beneficiaries (14%) left the programme prematurely.
Figure 6

Programme leavers

selection into the programme (100%)
| 60 |
dropouts (14%) / competent exporters (86%)

CBI has not recorded the reasons why companies drop out of the programme, which makes
it difficult to systematically analyse their motivations for doing so. Apparently the reasons
are related to the selection criteria that are often used: capabilities (underqualified or
overqualified), resources, and motivation of the company management. The case study
examples suggest that companies were distracted by better opportunities in the domestic
market, which eroded their commitment to export, while others seemed to be hindered by
a lack of resources (people and money).

4.3.3 Effectiveness in relieving export constraints (intermediate outcome)
The simplified theory of change assumes that initially any company could become a
flourishing exporter, were it not that certain constraints might prohibit this from
happening. It further assumes that if these constraints are (to some extent) reduced by ECPs
or by other external or internal factors, the company has a higher probability of increasing
its export turnover.
This section evaluates whether most of the mentioned export constraints were taken away
during ECPs (Table 6) and to what extent ECPs contributed to this result.

CBI’s contribution to export development

Table 6

What was the most important problem at the start of the intervention solved at
the end of the intervention? (N=99)

Problem

Lack of business contacts

The problem
is entirely
solved

The problem
is partly
solved
3

18

Lack of market information

6

Other

13

Total

22

The problem
is not solved

Total

5

26

15

0

21

20

19

52

53

24

99

Source: IOB, survey.

We conclude that in about a fifth of the cases, the most important export constraints faced by
participants were entirely removed during the intervention, while in half of the cases the
problems were partly solved. For a quarter of the ECP participants, the main export constraint
remained. It is remarkable that in about a third of the cases the export problems did not fit
into any category, as these in particular have not been solved since the intervention started.
An overall list of problems, and ECPs’ contribution in solving these problems,72 indicates
that ECPs were particularly successful in overcoming the lack of market information. About
a third of the companies report that their main problem was entirely solved by ECPs, while
for half of them it was partly solved as a result of ECPs and partly for other reasons. This is
also confirmed by the country case studies and regular CBI evaluations, where a large
majority of the participants reported that they acquired more skills and knowledge on
export marketing and development, a better general orientation of European markets,
better knowledge of characteristics and trends in European markets, and were better
prepared for market entry.73 The examples show that companies made improvements,
especially in terms of preparing the company and product presentation for trade fair
participation.
‘Market access’ refers to problems encountered with tariff and non-tariff barriers, such as
certification. This is mentioned as a barrier for a minor percentage of the companies
interviewed. Remarkably, since promoting ‘certification’ is considered to be an important
aspect of the intervention,74 we conclude that ECPs have been instrumental in general but
hardly helped ECP beneficiaries to obtain certification for their products or services.75

72

73
74

75

The 75 companies who reported that their main export problems were entirely or partly solved were
also asked whether this was because of ECPs or for other reasons.
EIM, 2012.
A separate ‘certification module’ has been launched as part of the new integrated approach, and was
not offered as a separate module under the ‘old style’ programming.
The contribution stories in the country reports often indicate that although it was the CBI expert that
drove the decision to obtain certification, the companies themselves already applied for quotations
before entering ECPs. In only one case is it clear that CBI shared the cost of obtaining certification.

| 61 |

Aided trade

Propensity to start exporting
Since, according to the theory of change, ECPs are directed both at incumbent exporters and
companies that had no earlier export experience, we are paying special interest to first-time
exporters.
Literature is not conclusive on the question whether promoting export helps firms to
become exporters.76 The evaluation of the Swiss Import Promotion Organisation (SIPPO)
revealed that an estimated 5 out of 38 companies that started to export (of 76 targeted
companies) could be referred to as first-time exporters because of the programme.
According to the survey sample, the propensity to start exporting was 22% among
beneficiaries, while a bit lower for non-beneficiaries (18%). This is caused by the share of
companies that left the programme (drop-outs), 15% of which did not export previously.
These figures suggest that both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries do not differ
significantly regarding the propensity to start exporting.

| 62 |

Effect on export diversification (destinations and product range)
If these export problems were solved, it would result in more customers and orders. Since
the start of ECPs, 88% of the participants have found new importers that actually made an
order. In the reference group, this was the case for two-third of the companies. According to
a quarter of the participants this achievement was mainly the result of ECPs, while a third
reported that this was partly the result of ECPs, but also partly for other reasons. A third of
the participants reported that the new importers were found mainly as a result of other
reasons. On average less than half of the new importers are based in the EU.
About 84% of ECP participants reported that they have exported to new countries since the
start of ECPs. This was 73% among the reference group. A quarter of ECP companies
reported that they entered these new countries mainly because of ECPs, while 40% reported
that ECPs partly contributed. Including those companies that already had exported
somewhat to the EU, regular programme evaluations by CBI indicate that about half of the
companies surveyed had at least one new export market (country) in the EU.77
According to the intervention logic, developing countries’ exports tend to concentrate on a
few products, often commodities with fluctuating demand. This translates into high
income instability, which in turn provokes high income volatility. The diversification of
markets and product supply has the advantage of creating a more stable income inflow.
Market development can also contribute to general export growth, and finally there are
spillovers that benefit the larger economy as a result of having a more diversified
production structure. About 75% of ECP participants diversified their product range after
starting the ECP programme, which is a similar percentage to the reference group. 20% of
the ECP companies reported that they diversified their product range mainly because of
76

77

While Görg et al. (2008) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) find that there is no effect on the propensity to
start exporting in, respectively, Ireland and the United States, Cruz (2014) finds that in the case of Brazil
non-exporters are 130% more likely to export after receiving support. Schminke and Biesebroeck find a
more modest effect in Belgium, where there is a 10% higher propensity to export.
EIM, 2012, 2011.

CBI’s contribution to export development

ECPs, while 43% reported that ECPs partly contributed to diversification, and 33% reported
that other reasons were mainly responsible.
Based on the above observations, we conclude that ECPs made a marginal to modest
contribution to export diversification.

4.3.4 Effectiveness on export turnover (ultimate outcome)
In order to become a qualified ‘competent exporter’, CBI-assisted companies need to meet
quality indicators at the result, effect, and impact levels. At the result level, the company
indicates that its skills and knowledge have improved, and that it used its knowledge and
insights of the EU market. The outcomes at the result level, as defined by CBI, will not be
further discussed here.78
This section discusses the effect ECPs had on export turnover. At the effect and impact levels,
CBI quality indicators verify that the company increased exports to the EU during the
programme’s duration, of which the total additional export turnover to the EU is referred to
as the achieved impact.
According to CBI’s project administration, 410 beneficiaries out of the the evaluated ECPs
were reported as ‘competent’ exporters. However, CBI’s project administration does not
contain financial data for a substantial number of competent exporters (no EU export figure
is reported for 17% of the beneficiaries, while the percentage for non-EU exports is 20%).79
Moreover, in light of the criteria for success at the effect and impact levels described above,
CBI seems to be applying these criteria inconsistently. Finally, the programme management
data does not support the evidence for declaring these beneficiaries ‘competent’ exporters,
nor the claim for financial settlement as a result.80
Apart from the 20% of companies with no declared exports, which are discussed above, CBI
project administration indicates that for another 20% of the cases, beneficiaries did not
achieve additional81 exports at all.82 At the other extreme, about 10% (predominantly larger)
companies achieved additional exports to both EU and non-EU countries of more than EUR
1 million. The literature questions the additionality of the programme for large companies,
since these companies are supposed to be self-sustainable due to lower unit market entry
costs, for example, and larger sales volumes. When leaving out both extremes in the first
and last rows of the table below (EU exports ≤ 0 and ≥ EUR 1 million) there remains a group
78
79

80

81

82

Reference is made to the country reports.
ECPs with the highest share of undeclared exports are (1043) ‘Pipes and process equipment’ (30%
undeclared) and ‘Office and school supplies’ (32% undeclared).
Delivering an ‘X’ number of competent exporters is the basis of the contractual agreement between CBI
and MFA. The number of delivered companies forms the basis for financial settlement.
The word ‘additional’ is emphasised, as our review indicates that in a large number of cases CBI experts
have included figures on total exports (instead of additional, defined as in addition to a baseline export
turnover figure for the company).
The percentage is likely to be an underestimation, as the figure only reflects the companies for which
financial data are available.

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Aided trade

of 177 (50%) companies with declared export increases.83 Interestingly, compared to
middle-income countries, a large proportion of the companies from upper-middle-income
countries failed to achieve any exports, or saw a decrease in exports. Moreover, the data
suggest that a higher number of companies from middle-income countries did not achieve
exports at all (not in table).
Table 7

EU and non-EU exports according to CBI database (N=339)
Non-EU/EFTA export

EU/EFTA export

≤ EUR 0

Total

EUR 1 EUR 500,000

EUR 500,001 - ≥ EUR
EUR 1,000,000 1,000,001

N

≤ EUR 0

69

22

2

11

104

EUR 1 - EUR 250,000

19

69

8

14

110

EUR 250,001 - EUR 500,000

6

12

8

11

37

EUR 500,001 - EUR 1,000,000

5

9

3

13

30

≥ EUR 1,000,001

23

10

2

23

58

Total

122

122

23

72

339

Source: CBI project database (SAGE).
| 64 |

According to CBI, the ‘additional’ exports for all 339 beneficiary companies amount to EUR
290 million for EU exports and over EUR 700 million for non-EU exports, suggesting an
internal rate of return (IRR) of over 40 times the invested ECP programme budget. Apart
from the IRR definition used above, there is good reason not to base the IRR performance
indicator on a comparison between programme expenditures and export turnover, and to
use profits or added value instead.
Since the result indicator, as communicated with the client, mentions the average export
turnover achieved by all companies in a given ECP, it is likely that outliers may drastically
disturb the underlying picture.84 In light of the fact that the distribution of export turnover
within (and across) ECPs is imbalanced, a more appropriate measure of central tendency
would have generated a more realistic picture of the programme results.
According to the country case studies, regular ECP evaluations, and surveys, which covered a
longer time span than the usual one year following intervention, the increase in additional
export turnover is modest,85 whereas the distribution across participants is heavily
83

84

85

When we express this as a percentage of all competent companies (including those for which no data
have been included), the share drops to 43% (companies with a declared export increase).
Table IV.8B, EIM 2011/12, provides a good illustration of the skewedness of export turnovers realised
within ECPs.
See for example APE (2014), which concluded that for seven out of twenty-three firms that exported to
Europe, the export value in 2013 was smaller than EUR 20,000. EIM (2012) concluded that most
respondents of the survey already showed a high level of exports to the EU in 2006, and that additional
growth of export to the EU and EFTA has been moderate.

CBI’s contribution to export development

imbalanced, i.e. a small number of companies in an ECP show high export increases, hence
increasing the general average ‘additional’ export.
Of the forty-eight companies with complete financial data in the enterprise survey, ten
beneficiaries experienced a decrease in export turnover, whereas eight companies
maintained a status quo. Of the remaining companies, six reported an increase of over EUR
5 million, including two outliers that reported an increase of more than EUR 50 million in
EU export turnover between the start of ECPs and the first quarter of 2013. The quite large
concentration is notable, and resembles the findings in other evaluations, including
SIPPO’s, which found that ten out of thirty-three exporting companies achieved 70% of
their overall turnover through exports, with four companies achieving a total of 40%.
The surveys and case studies suggest that 44% of the competent exporters86 increased their
exports, and the effects ranged from small to large (Figure 7).
Figure 7

Beneficiaries with export effects (all effect sizes)

selection into the programme (100%)
| 65 |
dropouts (14%) / competent exporters (86%)

eﬀect (all eﬀect sizes, 44%)

86

21 out of 48 companies companies increased their exports. This equals 38% of those companies initially
selected into the programme.

Aided trade

4.4 Programme contribution
Having determined the outcomes in terms of change in export turnover, the question
remains which part of the achieved effects can be attributed to ECPs.
Box 4

Assessing contribution

A contribution score of ‘4’ would typically refer to a case in which CBI helped the
client to understand the EU market, creating awareness of the position of its
product vis-à-vis the global supply on offer. As a consequence, the company would
reposition its product or service, and eventually increase its exports, selling to
clients met during ECP-supported market entry activities.
A contribution score of ‘3’ would typically refer to a case in which CBI helped the
client to understand EU market demands, creating awareness of the position of its
product vis-à-vis its direct competitors. Nevertheless, the programme interventions
could not remove major constraints faced by the company (e.g. certification) or
constraints were removed by other factors, and the company would not benefit
from ECP-supported market entry interventions (trade fairs, matchmaking).
| 66 |

A contribution score of ‘2’ would typically be given to a case in which CBI
accelerated a development path that was already initiated before entering the ECP
programme, but where exports were increased despite ECP intervention. For
instance, this is the situation for a company where an already experienced manager
took the opportunity to develop or further develop an innovative product (on his or
her own behalf), already having a good impression of customer needs and
preferences, and already having a good understanding of global competition.
A contribution score of ‘1’ would typically refer to a case in which CBI has opened
the eyes of the company, but also made the company realise that it is not ready to
export yet. Additional exports to non-EU areas were partially caused by increased
market knowledge obtained at the trade fair and EXPRO, but entry into these
non-EU markets were the company’s own efforts.
Source: IOB.

CBI’s contribution to export development

A total of sixty-two companies (fifty-five competent exporters and seven drop-outs)87 were
interviewed during the case studies in Colombia, Egypt, India, and South Africa. The
contribution of ECPs was assessed for each of the companies according to the methodology
described (Table 8).88 Each company was given a contribution score in the country case
studies, and a contribution narrative was developed for each of the beneficiaries with export
effects to the EU and non-EU.
Table 8

Size effect and contribution of the effect for EU and non-EU (N=62)

Size effect

…of total

…of which EU effect size due to
programme = substantial

…of which non-EU effect size due
to programme = substantial

Large

10

6

5

Moderate

14

2

5

None/weak

31

0

0

Drop-out

7

0

0

Total

62

8

10

Source: IOB, country case studies.

A moderate to large effect was realised by about 40% of the companies interviewed, which is
comparable to the survey results. 50% of the companies interviewed either realised no effect
or a weak effect, and over 10% of the companies interviewed dropped out of the
programme. When combining these effect sizes with the assessed contribution by the
programme, as described above, a small share of the beneficiaries had a substantial
contribution in combination with a large effect size.89 The intended effect with regard to EU
exports for the beneficiaries interviewed hovers around 13-15%.90 For exports to the non-EU
area, the effect seems to be slightly higher.
In the survey, ECP beneficiaries91 were asked to what extent they attributed a growth in
export turnover to ECPs (Table 9). We can see that 60% either did not achieve a growth in
export turnover or could not give an answer. Of all beneficiaries, some 20% perceived the
contribution by ECPs as considerable, or even higher.

87
88

89
90
91

This is a representative sample at the 95% confidence level.
For detailed contribution narratives and background information on the findings, reference is made to
the country case studies.
Large is defined as ≥ EUR 145,000 additional export turnover since the start of the intervention.
15% when expressed in terms of total delivered companies, or competent exporters.
There is little overlap between beneficiaries interviewed during case studies and the ones that
responded to the telephone survey.

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Aided trade

Table 9

The extent to which participants attribute the growth in turnover to the ECP

Extent

Frequency

Not at all (0%)

2

Just a bit (1-30%)

14

Considerably (31-60%)

17

To a large extent (61-90%)

5

Almost entirely (>90%)

2

Don't know/no increase

69

Total

109

Source: IOB, survey.

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Asking a question such as the one above necessarily means that the answer will be based on
the self-perception of the beneficiary. This perception can be biased as a result of the
companies’ experiences or expectations of the results the programme should have
produced, and whether or not these results met expectations. When controlling for the
beneficiary’s export experience to the EU, a more nuanced picture emerges. Companies that
express the highest contribution by the programme are the ones with no export experience
to the EU, whereas those beneficiaries with experience are more reserved about the
programme’s contribution. This seems to be logical, as the more experienced companies
might have higher expectations, as compared to their colleagues who never exported
before. 25% of the companies without former EU export experience consider ECPs to have
contributed to a large extent or even entirely, as compared to 11% of the companies that had
previous export experience.
Consequently, following the reasoning of establishing impact by CBI, the contributed
additional export turnover is confronted with the expenses. The ECP quality indicator ‘total
realised export to the EU markets’ scores sufficiently if the total value of the achieved
additional export is at least the same or more than the planned export. The standard for the
planned export is 2.5 times the planned CBI investment. The export turnover is measured
from the start of CBI intervention until one year after completion of the programme.92 The
IRR, based on average expenses per company and total additional exports, delivers the
following distribution of companies by number by ECP and is highly concentrated at a
limited number of companies (Table 10).

92

CBI theory of change and indicators for IOB evaluation, February 2014.

CBI’s contribution to export development

Table 10

Internal Rate of Return: count of beneficiary across ECPs (N=88)

Export Coaching Programme

Attributed IRR ≥ 2.5
No

Engineering products

Total

Yes
2

2

Food ingredients

5

3

8

Home decoration accessories and gifts

11

1

12

ITO services

6

0

6

Medical devices and laboratory equipment

6

2

8

Mobile equipment parts

3

1

4

Office and school supplies

8

2

10

Macedonia outerwear

6

1

7

Personal protective equipment

7

0

7

Pharmaceutical products

3

2

5

Pipes and process equipment

11

2

13

Subcontracting casting and forgings

4

0

4

Total

72

16

88

4

Source: IOB survey, financial data CBI.

According to the classification in the table, the intended effect, defined an IRR of 2.5 or
higher, was achieved for 16 of the 88 beneficiaries (15%).93 This confirms the findings from
the country case studies that only a small number of companies benefited from the
intervention.94

93

94

Corrected for companies that dropped out the programme, the confidence interval hovers between
10-20%, with a standard error of 0.04.
ECPs with the relatively highest number of companies with a positive IRR are in ‘Food ingredients’, and
‘Engineering products and ‘Pharmaceutical products’. Relatively more companies with a positive IRR
can be also be found in the ‘Medical devices and laboratory equipment’ and ‘Pipes and process
equipment’ ECPs, though one has to realise that the products in this sector are more capital intensive,
which makes it easier to surpass the IRR threshold.

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Aided trade

Figure 8

Beneficiaries with contributed effects at ultimate outcome level

selection into the programme (100%)

dropouts (14%) / competent exporters (86%)

eﬀect (all eﬀect sizes, 44%)

eﬀect (≥ EUR 145,000, 15%)

4.5 Developmental relevance
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Now that we know to what extent ECPs helped to increase the assisted companies’ export
turnover, we need to try to assess the impact of the ECPs on sustainable economic
development. For the sake of simplicity, we define sustainable development as a
combination of economic growth and the creation of jobs. The gross domestic product
(GDP) can be defined as the sum of consumption, investment, government expenditure and
net exports. This implies that only the percentage of additional export turnover, the value of
which is added to the national economy, increases GDP. The effects of the increase of
exports on economic growth will increase more if there is little substitution and more value
is added domestically.
In addition to the effects on economic growth, the effects of ECPs on employment creation
were assessed as well by conducting a contribution analysis as specified in the previous
section.
The above-mentioned illustrates that sustainability can be looked at from different
perspectives, ranging from macro-socio-economic via economic sub-sectors (meso-level),
to the individual company at the micro-level. Since ECP interventions are globally
dispersed, with on average fifteen companies assisted per country in the framework of the
thirteen ECPs under review, one could state that already from the outset there has been an
inherent risk of the portfolio becoming too diffuse. Therefore, it would be going too far to
claim that these interventions would have had a noticeable effect at the meso level, let
alone at the macro-socio-economic level.
In other words, given the setup of the programme and the means spent, it would have been
unrealistic to expect the intervention to contribute to sustainable economic development

CBI’s contribution to export development

from the outset.95 For this reason, in this section we prefer to focus on the company (micro)
level, since this is what the interventions address.

4.5.1 Sustainability of exports
With a better understanding of the programme’s effect, one must pose the following
important question: to what extent did the benefits (in terms of exports) continue after
CBI’s interventions ended?
When looking at outcomes at the intermediate level, regular CBI evaluations state that
participants indicated that they gained more skills and knowledge with regard to export
marketing and development, better general orientation on European markets, better
knowledge of characteristics and trends in European markets, and were better prepared for
market entry.
At the ultimate outcome level, CBI does not keep track of the continuity of export relations
that were generated by the programme. Therefore, no insights can be gained about the
sustainability of the intervention from the programme administration.
The regular programme evaluations on behalf of CBI are not able to look beyond one year
following completion of the intervention. A sample comment in one of the ECP evaluation
reports is that ‘at the time of the evaluation, there is not sufficient information to assess to
what extent the achievements are sustainable. Many companies seem to have started to
establish ongoing relations with EU companies, which is a good starting point for
sustainable export relations. But the companies have not yet been able to enlarge the scale
of their business with the EU. There is no information about the extent to which
programme participants have shared their knowledge within their company’.96
Nor is there much evidence from the literature about the sustainability of the effects of
export promotion.97 A recent communication by ITC–WTO provides some specific insights
into this topic in low-income countries – countries where CBI has been hardly active. ‘SMEs
with greater “internationalisation” tend to report higher turnover and growth and are more
productive than their counterparts. But in low-income countries, 7 out of every 10 new
export relationships fail within two years. Only a minority of SMEs manage to sustain
adequate growth patterns for a significant period of time. The SME sector is characterised by
a high level of ‘churn’ of exit and re-entry’.98
95

96
97

98

See also the recent advice by the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs ‘Ongelijke werelden,
armoede, groei, ongelijkheid, en de rol van internationale samenwerking’, which states that ‘Some parts of the
Dutch private sector/business development programme, which are now settled on a project basis for their
impact on poverty, could be made clearer in their entirety on the poorest groups and regions.’ AIV, 2012.
Ecorys, 2011.
Cadott et al. (2012) forms a notable exception, and finds for an export matching grant in Tunisia that the
increase in the export growth rate is only significant for one year following the intervention. Moreover,
even export levels are no longer significantly different from similar companies that did not receive
support three years following the support.
ITC–WTO, 2014.

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Aided trade

Figure 9

Effects on case study companies (N= 62)

25
20
15
10
5
0

delivered dropout

status

large

moderate

none

contribution
Colombia

large

small

none

eﬀect size EU
Egypt

India

large

small

none

eﬀect size non-EU

South Africa

Source: IOB, country case studies.

| 72 |

We found that positive indications for sustainability increase export volumes and export
shares of total sales over time. Negative indications for sustainability are irregular export
turnovers, or even one-time exports, companies continuously facing cash-flow problems,
and companies that do not seem to be fully committed to export, for instance because they
are too occupied serving the domestic market.
The South African and Colombian case studies indicate temporary export increases for most
of the assisted companies. Although one should be careful interpreting this, as the
backdrop in export turnover by comparable non-assisted companies could have been even
higher, it is clear that export turnover has been irregular. CBI reported that EU exports by
Colombian companies should be qualified as temporary one-off sales during trade fairs,
since none of the assisted companies continued exporting to the EU.99
A small number of Egyptian companies increased EU sales, while the intervention was only
deemed to have made a contribution by one of these companies. For companies that felt
CBI made less of a contribution (or none yet), the effect of participation tapered off rapidly
following the programme. In India, more than half of the beneficiary companies were
found to be on the path to sustainability.
One way of looking at sustainability is to review whether relations between exporters and
importers continued after the intervention ended. Although non-beneficiaries obviously
did not get the intervention, they were also asked to provide their insight into the stability
and continuity of their business contacts (Table 11).

99

Only one company did have a significant contract with a Swiss firm during the CBI programme (and was
therefore considered a showcase for CBI in Colombia), but these exports were actually unrelated to the
CBI programme (contacts and negotiations predate the ECP) and the contract has ended by now.

CBI’s contribution to export development

The figures indicate that a larger share of the non-beneficiaries were still in contact with all
the new importers that were met during the period of intervention. About half of
beneficiaries are still in business contact with some of the newly acquired importers during
the intervention.
Table 11

Did you sell anything to new importers between the start and the end of the
intervention? (N= 132)
Non-beneficiary

ECP participant

Dropped out/rejected

Yes, to all

12

36

4

Yes, to some

4

50

3

No

4

18

1

Total

20

104

8

Source: IOB, survey.

One of the regular CBI evaluations indicates that only a minority (4%) of the beneficiaries
thinks that their current network is completely adequate and 64% thinks that their network
is somewhat adequate. The remaining respondents (32%) find that their current network of
importers is inadequate.100

4.5.2 Added value
In order to have an impact on national development indicators, development should aim to
reduce the share of low value-added commodity exports. According to the survey, on
average exporters import one fifth of the inputs they use to produce their export goods. This
means that the amount of value added domestically, which directly contributes to economic
growth, is estimated at around 80%. Note, however, that this is an upper bound of the
actual value added domestically, as goods higher in the value chain might have been
imported by domestic suppliers of the inputs.
This figure is in line with data obtained in South Africa, where it was found that for eleven
supported companies, 75% or more of the value is added in the country. Low added-value
scores were explained by the fact that the company outsourced the production to an EU
manufacturer, while in the other cases the cost price was mainly determined by expensive
semi-finished products imported from abroad. The average scores confirm that added value
in the service sector is high, compared to manufacturing, for example. It should be noted,
however, that the added value strongly depends on the type of products: some products
require a larger share of foreign input than others.

100

APE, 2014.

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Aided trade

4.5.3 Substitution
If a CBI client gets an order that would otherwise be fulfilled by a company from the same
country or by a company from another developing country, the net developmental effect is
limited. CBI is aware of possible substitution effects. A feasibility study of a new intended
ECP deals with this aspect by looking at the size of the programme, for example, and no new
ECPs are organised in the same sector if the market appears to be tight.
Sixteen importers that did business with ECP participants were asked with whom they did
business before getting into contact with the CBI client. Notwithstanding the fact that the
number of observations was fairly small, the multiple response outcomes indicate that the
goods or services now bought from ECP participants were previously bought from exporters
in the same countries in a quarter of the cases, or from exporters in other developing
countries in almost half of the cases. In such a situation, one may conclude that one
developing country exporter is substituted for another, implying hardly any developmental
impact at all. In almost half of the cases, it was also indicated that goods were previously
bought from developed countries.101

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Another aspect of substitution refers to the geographical distribution of exports. An
increased focus on exports to the EU can be detrimental for exports elsewhere, as has been
shown in the case of the ‘Pipes and process equipment’ ECP. A comparison of the
development in export volumes to the EU and non-EU areas reveals that the size of the pie
did not get any bigger for the companies enrolled in that programme, even if the European
slice increased substantially.102 Many other events may have influenced these results, such as
market developments in and outside the European market. But it raises the question
whether the increase in exports to Europe was achieved at the expense of exports to other
parts of the world.103
Another aspect is that of institutional substitution, which is caused by a lack of donor
coordination. As was indicated in the Colombian case study, there are other international
organisations that promote exports from Colombia. The EU and USAID work on business
competitiveness in general, and the EU and the Swiss development cooperation SECO have
programmes to improve the business environment in Colombia, for example by
strengthening the government’s systems for quality control or export registrations.
Countries such as South Korea (KOTRA), Germany (German Chamber of Commerce) and
Japan (JETRO) focus on the import of specific products intended for their countries, but with
SIPPO, Switzerland has a programme similar to CBI. This has led to situations in which CBI
and SIPPO interventions overlapped, though both organisations agreed later on to avoid
such duplication.104
101
102
103

104

As the question had multiple responses, the percentages add up to more than 100%.
APE, 2014.
This phenomenon is not exclusively related to the ECP mentioned, but also comes back in the
contribution stories of other beneficiaries, having not been active in this specific ECP and showing
comparable trade-off effects.
In the ECP ‘Macedonia Outerwear’, both SIPPO and CBI cooperated by organising a combined buyer
mission and several training sessions together with USAID.

CBI’s contribution to export development

4.5.4 Employment
One of the quality indicators that gauges the effect and impact of ECPs is the number of
additional jobs created within the company measured one year after completion of the
programme. The indicator is sufficient if the number of jobs has increased.
Almost 90% of the beneficiaries reported some type of effect on employment, which is
confirmed by survey results from regular CBI evaluations. However, when we control for
ECP contribution in export increases, a different picture emerges. Of the companies that
indicate that ECPs contributed to a considerable or large extent to increased exports, ECP
led to increased employment in the form of full-time jobs in 15% of cases. Some reported
increases in part-time jobs (9%), outsourced jobs (11%), and better working conditions (17%)
(Table 12).
Table 12

Effect of ECPs on employment (N= 318)
Effect

Attributed to ECP (%)

More full-time jobs

53%

15%

More seasonal/part-time jobs

31%

9%

More outsourced jobs in own country

46%

11%

Better working conditions/other benefits

68%

17%

Other improvements

70%

12%

No improvements

9%

0%

Don't know

4%

0%

Source: IOB, survey.

We briefly examined the effects on employment as reported by CBI and in the regular ECP
evaluations, since these are communicated with the client as a result indicator.105 Our
evaluation did not find evidence to underwrite CBI reporting, which suggests large job
increases (Annex 11) instead. A closer look shows that the total of reported numbers is
overestimated by more than 50%.
Reasons for not achieving an effect on employment
The survey and country case studies indicated that the dominant size class of assisted
companies is micro or small. According to CBI/SAGE project administration data, the share
of large companies that were assisted is apparently somewhat higher (Table 13).

105

The employment figures are also openly communicated, such as in the recent debate on the budget
2015.

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Aided trade

Table 13

Company size–class distribution according to survey, case studies and CBI project
administration

Size-class

Survey (N=126)

Case studies (N=62)

CBI/SAGE (N=479)

Micro

15%

15%

12%

Small

37%

43%

33%

Medium

41%

30%

41%

Large

7%

11%

14%

Sources: IOB, CBI/SAGE.

| 76 |

Since large firms tend to be engines of job creation, it is not surprising that only a small
number of jobs were created.106 According to the case study data, more than half of the
medium-sized companies experienced an increase in employment development, whereas
about half of the companies in the other size classes witnessed that kind of positive trend.
Assisted companies with the highest contribution score are more likely to see their
employment increase, indicating a positive association between contribution score and
employment development. The South African case study showed that companies in the
service and home decoration sectors employ a large share of the total staff on a temporary
basis (e.g. freelance, home producers), creating a flexible base for their operations.
Three micro-companies were assisted, which should be considered as inventing and design
houses, that outsourced the complete manufacturing process. Supply chain spillovers, in
terms of employment, are not known for these companies. What is known is that these
employment effects (to a smaller or larger extent, depending on the company) take place
outside the country.
The Indian case study revealed that most companies employed fewer than 100 workers, both
before and after the intervention. The reason why entrepreneurs do not officially hire more
than 100 employees seems to be the result of Indian labour laws that restrict retrenchment
to this number of workers. This could dampen the increase in employment when the
company might be considering to increase the size of the workforce to the extent that
demand is perceived to be stable.

106

This fact should not be taken to imply that CBI should concentrate on larger companies, since the
contribution of the programme in especially these companies is modest. On the other hand, assisting
more SMEs could also contribute to more job creation.

CBI’s contribution to export development

4.6 Explanations
In search for an explanation for why the intended effect was achieved only for a small share
of beneficiaries, and not for the remaining 80% of the companies that entered the
programme, we can look for answers at the macro, meso, and micro levels.
Since potential reasons at the macro and meso levels have already been discussed (Section
3.2), we would rather focus in this section on the micro level, since this is what ECP
interventions address. We will look at both the explanations from the perspective of
programme intake, selection, and implementation, on the one hand (Section 4.6.1), and
company internal issues, on the other hand (Section 4.6.2).

4.6.1 Programme implementation and company selection
Apparently, since the intended effect was achieved only for a limited number of companies,
we must ask what can be said about the type of companies that benefited most. Since we do
not want the answer to be biased by the self-perception of the beneficiary, we use the
company audit assessments provided by CBI experts as a more neutral source of
information.
CBI does not use diagnostic tools for company selection apart from an initial audit. Clear
procedures for identifying and selecting companies are absent, although officially a
company has to comply with a range of selection criteria in order to qualify for
participation.107 This means selection depends strongly on the subjective opinion of CBI’s
product consultants, who play a dominant role in the selection process.
In order to join an ECP, a company needs to apply. Potential participants of ECPs are
identified and invited to participate, in cooperation with CBI network partners in the
respective country and sector. With the help of a CBI sector expert, the CBI programme
manager pre-selects companies that meet the selection criteria and are eligible for
participation based on the information provided on the application forms.108
Once a company is pre-selected, CBI sector experts will carry out an export audit, evaluating
factors deemed crucial to export success such as: production facilities and capacity; price;
marketing and management skills; product features and packaging; certification; quality
and safety; labour conditions; and compliance with consumer health regulations and

107

108

These selection criteria are: the company is at least 51% locally owned, or by owners or co-owners who
reside in another developing country (excluding developing countries characterised as UMIC or higher);
it has 25 to 500 employees; it is no joint venture with a company based in a country with a classification
of UMIC or higher; compliance or the willingness to comply with EU market requirements; no licensing
commitments that prohibit or limit export possibilities of products to the EU; competitive prices and
sufficient production capacity; a management which is able to communicate in English; the willingness
and capacity to invest in adaptations of, for instance, product assortment and production processes, if
and as required by the European market.
CBI theory of change and indicators for IOB evaluation, February 2014.

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Aided trade

corporate social responsibility.109 The export audit leads to an action plan, suggesting areas
of improvement, required measures, and (business development) deadlines.
Comparing the average audit scores for both beneficiary groups, i.e. with and without the
intended effect for EU as well as non-EU exports, clearly shows that these scores differ in
terms of statistical significance. Beneficiaries with the intended effect have particularly
higher average audit scores in the following aspects:
•
•
•
•
•
•

| 78 |

management skills rating;
production process and ICT rating; company website rating;
sales history rating; profit rating;
export performance rating; export skills rating; export experience rating;
export packaging rating; and
order/quantity rating; delivery times rating; functionality rating;

The above-mentioned aspects boil down to a company’s export experience, a conclusion
which is also supported by the fact that the export share of total company turnover of
companies with lower audit scores is also lower than that of companies with higher audit
scores, but this difference is not statistically significant. An example with explanatory
comments on ‘Export skills rating’ made by CBI experts can be found below (Box 5).
Interestingly, the average audit scores suggest that differences in the following aspects are
less of an issue when comparing beneficiaries with and without the intended programme
effect: price; quality; product range; cost price calculation; effectiveness of communication;
trade offer; organisational structure rating; financial situation rating; access to credit rating;
quality control and procedures rating.

109

The project management information received from CBI provides the audit scores per company, based
on the clusters mentioned, that are divided into more than 50 aspects. The data file received from CBI
shows that these audit scores have not been consistently administrated by the experts. Moreover, the
scores show that these have not been harmonised among the individual experts, as indicated by
consistent outliers on all aspects by these experts.

CBI’s contribution to export development

Box 5

Sample comments on export skills ratings by CBI experts

Companies with intended effect:
• all master both German and English | 650 people employed in factory, 550 of
which in production
• no problems at all
• mr. X speaks English very well and is well informed about the market
• two people involved in marketing and export | English language
• people involved in marketing and export | all of them speak English
• good general manager, speaks very good English, UK education
• they have an excellent dedicated team
• well equipped to allow further growth of exports
• 21+ years in export, three people involved
• sixteen, English spoken!
• two people involved, full time
• four people involved in marketing and export | all of them speak English
• four people in export out of 10 people in sales and marketing | all in export speak
English
Companies without intended effect:
• an experienced sales and marketing team for the local market is available and is
capable to further develop an export strategy | start to gather information in the
CBI surveys; see www.cbi.eu and continue to look for potential customers and
competitors and develop a good understanding of European product
assortments | continue to search!
• mr. X is working on his English
• search with the help of mr. X for sales people, initially for domestic and regional
markets
• little English or other languages
• the relatively large turnover of export staff might indicate that too much time is
being spent on internal administration and too little time on market research
• mrs X. speaks English and knows Italian due to colleague with whom she still
works on ideas and on fabric buying
Source: CBI/HBAT.

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Aided trade

What this tells us is that companies with the highest audit scores seem to benefit most from
the programme.110 But at the same time, it also raises the question about the target group
for which ECPs can have the most added value. In other words, the additionality of the
programme could be at stake here. As was concluded in the literature review, the group of
companies for which export promotion seems to be most effective are generally those with
little export experience (Martincus and Carballo, 2010b; Schminke and Van Biesebroeck,
2013). Intuitively this seems logical, as these companies have the most to learn about
exporting. Moreover, the companies that seem to benefit most are mid-sized companies
(Martincus et al., 2012) that have sufficient capacity to fully use governmental support, but
just not enough to overcome market entry barriers on their own.
From the perspective of programme implementation, we must then ask what kind of
treatment both of the company groups received.
The ECP intervention is subdivided into a number of sub-treatments (or modules): audit;111
capacity building (technical assistance missions;112 distance guidance113 and EXPRO114);
market access (trade fair participation;115 buyer mission/showroom116 and consolidation117).

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According to the modules registered in CBI’s database (SAGE), companies with the intended
effect, i.e. those with the highest audit scores, received significantly more market access
(trade fair participation) and consolidation. On average companies with the intended effect
received distance guidance 3 times, as compared to 1.8 for the other group. They also
received trade fair participation on average 2.5 times and consolidation 2.1 times, as
compared to 1.8 and 1.7 respectively for the companies without the intended effect.

110

111
112

113
114

115

116
117

The reason why some of the companies benefited more than others could also partly be explained by
reverse causality. This does not seem to be likely though, since we were able to control for audit scores
at programme entry. Also, both company groups do not differ significantly on the distribution of
achieved export turnover.
One day assessment of a company on more than 50 different aspects.
Although there are differences between experts and ECPs, the general picture is that companies are
visited once (maybe twice) a year during the multinannual intervention.
Intermittent guidance by the CBI expert.
One-week training in the Netherlands for one company employee. This will familiarise them with the
European market and equip them with practical skills on export marketing, export management and
promotion in their sector in Europe. By the end of the seminar, they will have developed their own
export marketing plan for the European market, for which they will receive (individual) counselling.
Up to three trade fair participations organised and financed by CBI. For the second and third fairs,
participants are required to contribute to the costs for stand space and stand construction of
respectively EUR 2,500 and EUR 3,500 (depending on the fair’s m2 price, for example).
Only implemented in ECP 1035 ‘Macedonia Outerware’.
Following B2B activities and trade fairs, the CBI expert will help consolidate, solidify and expand the
business contacts.

CBI’s contribution to export development

It suggests that the group of companies to which ECPs contributed the least received the
most intensive (and expensive)118 treatment. Whereas companies with lower audit scores
received less capacity building (TAM and distance guidance), which intuitively goes against
the ‘Working Instruction for Implementing ECP modules’ (see Annex 6).
Based on the distribution of audit scores, we subdivided the beneficiary companies into
three new groups (average audit score per cluster119 in brackets): ‘overqualified’ (3.4), ‘target
audience’ (2.58), and ‘underqualified’ (1.95). Or rephrased in other terminology,120 within
the heterogeneous ECP population one could discern the following groups: (1) ‘last milers’,
who are self-supporting; (2) advanced companies already engaged in export activities, who
ECP could assist by accelerating exports; and (3) companies with support needs stretching
beyond the ‘last mile’.
Table 14

Intended effect by target group (N= 59)

Intended effect?

Overqualified

Target group

Underqualified

No

8

26

13

Yes

5

7

0

Total

13

33

13

Source: IOB, survey.

Cross tabulation, combining the distribution scores with the assessment of whether the
intended effect has been achieved, essentially shows that a relatively large share of
companies qualified as ‘overqualified’ achieved the intended effect (40%), whereas this was
only true of about one fifth of the companies defined as the ‘target group’. Hence a large
potential remains unexploited.121 As expected, neither of the underqualified companies
achieved the intended effect. The outcome underlines the finding that the investment of
scarce resources was not optimally directed at the group of companies most in need of it.
Crossing the data with company size class confirms the conclusion from the literature
review that overqualified companies are often also the larger companies, whereas microsized companies tend to be overrepresented in the underqualified group.

118

119

120
121

Price of export capacity development (module E) amounts to EUR 26,000; market access (module H)
EUR 43,000.
Scores rank from 0 (worst) to 4 (best). Only companies with an average score of 1 on critical aspects are
eligible.
Terminology based on COMO Consulting, 2011.
Well-targeted beneficiaries are predominantly in the following ECPs: ‘Food ingredients’ (1037), ‘Personal
protective equipment’ (1038), and ‘Pipes and process equipment’ (1043). It seems that overqualified
companies were selected in the ‘Pharmaceutical products’ (1043) and ‘Medical devices and laboratory
equipment’ (1030) ECPs.

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When looking at the companies’ export experience, we find that 60% of the overqualified
companies had never exported to the EU before (though they did to non-EU destinations),
whereas more than 70% of the underqualified companies had already exported to the EU.
Indeed, company selection was flawed in two fundamental ways:
•
•

First, overqualified companies with no experience in the EU, but some experience in
non-EU areas, are considered qualified and motivated to start exporting to the EU.
Second, companies that are essentially not ready to export (underqualified), but which
proved capable of occasionally exporting to the EU in the past, are taken up into the
programme on the assumption that they will be able to start exporting on a more
structural basis.

The fact that hardly any ECP beneficiaries are to be found in lower-income countries,
reflects the perceived risk of ending up with an underqualified company. Target companies
seem difficult to find in these countries. The majority of the defined ‘target group’
companies come predominantly from lower-middle-income countries, where additionality
and attribution seem to be the highest.

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The outcome of the analysis reflects the deliberately diverse selection of weaker and
stronger companies into ECPs (‘healthy mix’), in line with CBI’s assumption that the
stronger companies will serve as a benchmark for the less strong ones. In addition,
companies from countries with a weaker supplier profile or image could benefit from
improved visibility and the reputation of stronger countries in the programme, for example
during a collective exhibition. CBI’s assumptions underlying the ‘healthy mix’ seem to be at
least partly invalidated by the analysis.122
As some external experts remarked, the selection process could benefit from cooperating
with local organisations, in order to broaden the base for company selection and thus
increase the quality of the intake. Since this basis has obviously been too small in some
cases, requirements were dropped, thus making it difficult to execute the programme as
intended.

4.6.2 Internal company reasons
The following internal preconditions are necessary for a company to export: (1) willingness
and motivation, and (2) being ready to export. ECP interventions focus on the latter: getting
companies ready to export.
According to the country case study results, half of the ECP participants achieved either a
minor effect or none at all. There are several reasons why the intended effect was not
achieved (Table 15). In about eight out of thirty-one of the cases the intended effect was not
achieved due to a mismatch between the product and the intended export market,
122

Since companies in ECPs will only meet sporadically during the intervention period (EXPRO and at trade
fairs), and no such counselling between firms is organised as part of the intervention, it is also less likely
for the expected effect to actually occur.

CBI’s contribution to export development

under-qualification, and not being ready to export. In another seven cases the motivation
seemed to be a hindering factor, while other companies became distracted because of
increased sales opportunities in the domestic or other markets.
Since motivation is a serious factor, the selection procedure should attempt to understand
these soft skills better. In another fifth of the cases, companies were overqualified, such as
in Egypt, for example, where companies that were already competent exporters before the
programme started were included in the programmes. In such cases, the companies were
often disillusioned when the programme failed to live up to their expectations in terms
services, which were not delivered, or because the company was still too far from being
ready to export to Europe (e.g. because the company’s product did not meet the
requirements of the European market). In these cases, the ECP was of limited added value.
Table 15

Reasons for not achieving the intended effect (N= 31)

Reason

Beneficiaries (case studies)

Mismatch between offer and demand (product not suitable/
not competitive/company not export ready or underqualified)

8

Motivation/domestic orientation/distracted

7

Overqualified

6

Lack of finance/production capacity

3

Intervention not relevant

2

ECP premature cancelled

2

Unknown

3

Total

31

Source: IOB, country case studies.

An examination of the initial audit scores of the case study companies reveals the following
picture (Table 16). The distribution scores confirm the idea that CBI has been focusing on
picking winners. More than half of the companies with an audit score higher than three
could be labelled as ‘overqualified’.123
Table 16

Company selection in case studies (N= 62)

Audit score at intake

Beneficiaries

1-2

2

2-3

12

3-4

18

Unknown

30

Total

62

Source: IOB, country case studies.

123

Out of the group with an audit score ≥ 3, 40% had a score ≥ 3.5, i.e. 21% of the total intake.

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4.7 Findings
•

•

•

•
•

•

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•
•

•
•

ECPs have been particularly successful in overcoming the lack of market information.
The large proportion of other problems that remained unsolved, thus preventing
companies from exporting, is striking.
Almost half of the companies actually used support services from organisations other
than CBI, and half of those evaluated the quality of these local services as equal to or
even higher than CBI’s services.
The sample data suggest that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries do not differ
significantly when it comes to diversification of exports (products and markets) and
employment creation.
Increases in export turnover are modest for the majority of beneficiaries. The dominant
share of additional exports is achieved by a small number of larger companies.
About 44% of the competent exporters for which export figures are declared achieved an
increase in export. About 15% of the competent exporters increased exports
substantially (≥ EUR 145,000).
CBI selects a ‘healthy mix’ of both stronger and weaker companies for the programme,
assuming that weaker companies will benefit from the mix. The analysis does not
support this assumption. Companies that benefited the least from ECPs received the
most intensive (and expensive) treatment, while other companies received fewer of the
needed interventions.
The majority of companies that benefited from CBI’s support come predominantly from
lower-middle-income countries.
CBI’s programme administration and programme evaluations do not give insight in the
sustainability of results. The results, if any, are often temporary. Nor is there much
evidence from the literature for the sustainability of the effects of promoting export.
The proclaimed employment effects as communicated to MFA are severely overstated.
There are indications of substitution effects, in terms of replacing a developing country
exporter for another, implying limited developmental impact at the meso/macro level.

CBI’s contribution to export development

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5
CBI’s efficiency

CBI’s efficiency

5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the efficiency of export coaching programmes, both from an
organisational perspective (Section 5.2) and at the programme level (Section 5.3).
The results of an external (organisational) benchmark are reported in Section 5.4.

5.2 Organisational efficiency
Efficiency is a measurable concept, determined by the ratio of output to input. In order to
address the efficiency question, it is necessary to understand the development of the
programme budget and the cost drivers in the evaluation period (sub-section 5.2.1).
When CBI turned into an agency, it introduced a cost and expense organisational model
that presumes the handling of a full cost accounting model. An understanding of the
development of cost prices resulting from the cost accounting model is instrumental in
order to gain insight into the efficiency of the organisation (sub-section 5.2.2).

5.2.1 Budget and cost drivers
The development of the main cost drivers, i.e. material and personnel, had to be in line
with the development of the programme budget received from MFA.

EUR million

Figure 10
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Development cost drivers and programme budget (2005-2009)

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

programme budget (excl. ITC)

personnel costs

material costs

trendline (programme budget excl. ITC)

trendline (material costs)

The total costs of personnel increased until 2009, as can be seen from Figure 10, which
describes the development of the development costs and programme budget between 2005
and 2009. With the introduction of the new cost accounting model, all direct personnel
costs were attributed to the specific products/modules, and became part of the ‘material
costs’.124 (After 2009, personnel costs only included personnel costs that cannot be
attributed to a specific product (module), i.e. overhead.) Two trendlines are included in
124

The term ‘material costs’ includes more than costs of housing, office supplies and the like. It includes all
costs that can be directly attributed to a product module.

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Aided trade

the figure, representing the rate of increase in the programme budget and material costs.
A comparison of the slopes of both trendlines makes it clear that the cost of running the
programmes have been increasing at a faster pace than the programme budget itself.125 This
is an indication that the organisation did not become more efficient over time.

5.2.2 Full cost model
Effectiveness and measurability within a cost and expense organisational model requires
the handling of a full cost model, in which the costs ideally should be based on a good
understanding of the contribution of each of the cost drivers in the production (see
Figure 11). The model is based on the presence, among other things, of homogeneous
measurable products and/or services and presumes efficient monitoring using indicators.
Insight into the relative efficiency of the implementation can be gained by comparing
calculated production costs with costs from previous years or the cost of a product or service
from other organisations. For this, it is necessary to relate the relevant costs of a service to
its performance. Moreover, in order to improve efficiency, it is necessary to have a multiannual insight into performance indicators in terms of quality and cost. Our analysis
indicates that at CBI such an overview is still problematic.
The cost accounting model needs to be rethought for a number of reasons:
| 88 |

a) to line it up with changes that had been introduced in the operational country list
(more focus on partner countries, LDCs and fragile states)126;
b) to meet the wish of the client to introduce a more active steering of CBI;
c) to address remarks that had been made by the ADR, which repeatedly requested the
accuracy of the costs charged by CBI to be examined; and
d) to address the need to introduce more flexibility into programme implementation.127
Until 2006, it was common practice for CBI to clear finances at the time of delivery against
an ex post price for its products (ECP, BSOD, MI and HRD). Briefly, this meant that all costs
incurred were charged to the client.128 Additional requests from the Ministry of Finance led
to a change in clearance settlement (ex ante rather than ex post).

125

126

127

128

Also, when the costs for personnel and material are added, it does not affect the difference in the slope
of the two trendlines.
In the CBI country-sector statements for the years 2010 and 2011, however, twelve countries are
reported that should have been excluded according to the MFA operational country list. These are:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jordan, Macedonia, Montenegro, Peru, South
Africa, Suriname, Thailand and Tunisia. It is unclear to what extent the operations in these countries fall
under the agreement that allows for a 15% deviation of the budget to be spent in non-MFA listed
countries.
For example, in the former situation CBI could not invoice the interventions delivered to companies
that dropped out of the programme, losing the investment so to speak.
Programmes executed in this period are so-called ‘task 1’ programmes.

CBI’s efficiency

From 2006 onwards, CBI and MFA agreed that in the new multi-annual programmes ECP
and BSOD products would be settled at the time of delivery against an ex ante price.129 The
settlement price was based on allocated expenses using hourly rates for the programmes, to
which a ‘risk’130 and ‘profit’ mark-up were added. This led to cost prices that were
structurally higher than the actual programme expenses.
In 2007 MFA approved a request from CBI to increase the budget per delivered competent
ECP exporter by 17% (from EUR 56,750 to EUR 66,445). CBI argued that relatively cheaper
ECPs had been cancelled, since they did not live up to the requested level of quality, the
assumed savings in programme delivery costs did not materialise, and/or market
developments requested more extensive coaching of beneficiaries by CBI consultants. Based
on the documents reviewed, this was accepted by the client without any further request for
clarification. Another example of budget maximisation is shown in Box 6.
Based on detailed evaluation of the intervention activities deployed at the company level for
the ECPs that started since 1999, IOB concludes that the claimed intensity of ECP
interventions was never really there, and that therefore the justification for increased
financing per competent exporter was not empirically supported.
Box 6

Budget maximisation131

For the purpose of better estimating CBI’s liquidity needs to implement both
contracts (‘old’ ex post and ‘new’ ex ante regime products), the planned production
was multiplied by the price (P) per unit (Q). As the P and Q were not quantified for
the old regime products, it was decided to curb CBI’s production by allowing a
maximum increase in either P or Q of 25%. In the accountability statement of the
2008 production, which was approved by the ADR, the approved budget per
competent exporter is set at EUR 57,543, which is 27% higher than the agreed price,
and therefore not in line with the maximum variation set at 25%. This was accepted
without intervention from the clients’ side.

Up to 2010, CBI programmes were linked to a single product. This ensured that no
programme that entailed a more comprehensive approach, for example by combining
sub-products into a tailor-made product offer, could be launched. To ensure consistency
with the introduction of the new programmatic work approach since 2011, the cost model
was adjusted to allow for a more flexible form of programme delivery. Existing products
were subdivided into modules, and the then current programmes were incorporated into
the new modular approach.

129
130
131

These are so-called ‘task 2’ programmes.
Economic, political and cultural risks and natural disasters.
Source: Memo 09/06/2006.

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In order to achieve a more accurate cost price132 of programme modules, MFA and CBI
decided that starting in 2010 price setting would be based on out-of-pocket expenses, to
which were added a 10.5% mark-up on the net programme management costs and a 20.5%
mark-up on the net programme overhead costs. Our analysis indicates that the mark-up for
overhead is much higher than the actual costs of production, at least for two of the three
years projected in the table (Table 17).

Table 17

Overhead costs
2010

2011

2012

133

Total overhead

3,677,206

3,510,147

3,727,273

Total expense (incl. depreciation)

29,338,859

16,809,588

20,656,327

12.5%

21.9%

18.0%

Overhead to expenses ratio
Source: IOB, based on CBI annual financial accounts.

Figure 11
EUR million

| 90 |

CBI saw its turnover and profit rate increase from 2009 onwards, with the profit ratio
increasing from an annual average of a 0.5 percentage point between 2005 and 2008 to a 3.1
percentage point between 2009 and 2012, which is more rapid than the increase in turnover
of 36% over the same periods. The explanation lies with CBI’s introduction of the ex ante cost
price settlement, combined with the transfer pricing model allowing for more flexibility, as
well as mark-up cost prices, while CBI has not yet become more active in LDCs and fragile
states.
Development of net result (2006-2012)

5
4
3
2
1
0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

-1
net result (excl. rebate)

132

133

trendline (net result excl. rebate)

Actually, the term ‘transfer pricing’ better reflects reality since it is based on real expenses, including
mark-ups to cover overhead, risk, and profit. The term ’cost price’ suggests real expenses per unit,
excluding these mark-ups.
Total of indirect costs of personnel plus material costs (excluding programme costs). Any personnel
costs that can be attributed to a product have not been included.

CBI’s efficiency

A breakdown of these profits by product modules shows the following picture (Figure 12).134
The implementation of ECPs, especially the aforementioned ‘Company audit and action
plan’, ‘Export capacity development’, and ‘HRD training’ modules have been highly
profitable. Losses on the following products could be easily offset by gains: ‘BSOD export
development promotion’ and ‘Market and tailored intelligence’.
Figure 12

Product modules contribution to net result (2010-2012)

10

EUR million

8
6
4
2
0
-2

HRD

ECP
MI

conferences
ITC
management

BSOD

-4

Given MFA’s wish for CBI to become more active in LDCs and fragile states, one of the
arguments underpinning the need to introduce cost price mark-ups was that operational
costs to implement programmes were supposed to be higher in these countries compared
to areas CBI used to operate in. Since CBI’s activities in LDCs and fragile states did not meet
the client’s expectations, the mark-up cost prices were, in fact, too high to compensate for
its activities, which took place predominantly in lower cost countries, and hence resulted in
a rapid build-up of equity.135 In order to prevent this from happening, the ‘Regulation
Departmental Agencies’ of the Ministry of Finance introduced a threshold above which
excess capital had to be transferred back to MFA,136 while CBI proposed a discount of 20% on
total ECP production in 2010, 10% on 2011 production, and 5% for the years 2012 and 2013.137

134
135

136

137

Annex 8 provides detailed insight into profit/loss per intervention module.
In 2013 the price level of the modules was reassessed. This reassessment has led to an adjustment of
the prices of nine modules (Annual plan, 2014). This adjustment is approved by owner and client, with
the consent of the control unit.
The regulation stated that CBI’s equity could not become more than 5% of its average turnover of the
last three years. CBI has tried to double the percentage but, according to the documents reviewed, this
was never granted by the Ministry of Finance.
In 2012 the client was granted a discount of EUR 1.5 million to adjust profits downward, in order not to
exceed the threshold.

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Box 7

Is support in LDC countries and fragile states more expensive?

EUR thousand

One of the arguments behind the ‘cost price’ mark-up has been the fact that CBI
should become more active in LDCs and fragile states, countries where production
costs are assumed to be higher. A financial analysis of ECP activities deployed in
so-called ‘focus countries’ does not provide evidence for such a claim. In fact, the
contrary has been proven to be the case: the costs per company in these countries
are lower (EUR 56,000) compared to other country classifications (e.g. EUR 63,000
in PSD countries). One of the reasons that might explain the average lower costs in
‘focus countries’ is that the interventions primarily involve business development,
and to a much lesser extent deploy modules in the fields of export capacity building
and market entry.
64
62
60
58
| 92 |

56
54
52

focus transition exit other PSD total
transfer price per company

Non-homogeneous measurable products and services
As indicated earlier, effectiveness and measurability within a cost and expense model
require the handling of a full cost model, which assumes the presence of homogeneous
measurable products and services. Commercial work assumes control on the basis of
products and services, and funding on the basis of production, based on full cost.
Therefore, according to the scheme, it only makes sense to use an income and expenses
model if clear products and/or services are identified. In addition, the contractor’s activities
need to be predictable, and the contractor must be able to influence the costs.
Several evaluations, especially those of implemented BSOD modules, clearly indicate that a
standard module with a standard transfer price do not go well with the demand-driven,
context-determined needs of the beneficiary, which require tailor-made assistance. For
example, BSOD modules had to be changed in India, while in Indonesia the key question
was how the BSOD programme could complement and synergise best with other projects to
get maximum added value for the BSOD.138
138

Ilumtics (2013) pp. 21-22.

CBI’s efficiency

The cost and expense model requires all actors to enter into a discussion on the price,
quality, and quantity of the services to be provided. It makes more sense, in particular with
organisations that provide heterogeneous and/or socially relevant products, to start from
the available budget.

5.3 Programme efficiency
This section focuses on an efficiency analysis at the programme level. It provides
information about expenses, transfer prices, overhead, delivery rate, costs associated with
drop-outs and rejected companies, employment change at the ECP level, and also compiles
ratios based on the number of competent companies.
Table 18 gives an overview of the number of competent companies per ECP, the amounts
received per competent company by CBI, based on the pre-agreed prices with MFA per
delivered programme intervention module, actual costs made by CBI per competent
exporter, the overhead rate per ECP, costs related to companies that left the programme,
and the average change in employment per competent company.
Table 18

Programme costs and efficiency parameters

| 93 |

Overhead to
expenses ratio

Delivery rate

51,251

51,251

21%

88%

22

Engineering products

32

58,564

58,564

22%

82%

20

Medical devices and laboratory
equipment

37

57,969

57,969

23%

90%

9

ITO

38

41,938

41,938

22%

88%

15

BPO

10

65,584

65,584

30%

56%

-10

Pipes and process equipment

47

58,119

58,119

18%

87%

Outerwear

21

73,381

59,645

13,736

25%

88%

1.3%

-73

Sub-contracting castings and
forgings

38

79,126

57,965

21,161

20%

88%

4.6%

16

Food ingredients

29

84,600

64,511

20,089

24%

76%

5.3%

0

Personal and protective equipment

21

80,467

70,557

9,910

25%

76%

4.4%

n.a.

Office and school supplies

44

86,455

65,833

20,621

24%

90%

1.3%

-4

Home decoration accessories and gifts

44

79,205

60,772

18,433

26%

94%

0.9%

0

Pharmaceutical products

19

86,200

58,786

27,414

23%

96%

0.7%

5

Total

410

68,672

58,393

23%

86%

2.7%

9

Sources: CBI, IOB.

Employment change
per competent
company

Expenses per
competent company
(in EUR)

30

Costs of drop-outs
to total expenses rate

Transfer pricing per
competent company
(in EUR)

Mobile equipment parts

Profit per competent
company
(in EUR)

Competent companies

Description

58

Aided trade

The table is split into two compartments. The ECPs above the marked line represent the
ones that were financially settled ex post (task 1 assignment), and the ones below the line
represent ECPs that were financially settled ex ante (task 2 assignment). The table illustrates
that CBI started ‘to make money’ after the ex ante pre-agreed pricing was introduced in 2006,
while overhead did not decrease.
The first column mentions the name of the ECP, followed by the number of companies
within that ECP. The ‘transfer pricing’ column is different from the column on actual
programme expenses, since an ex ante product pricing method was introduced halfway
through the period of evaluation. Until 2006 the agreement was that only costs incurred
were settled (task 1 assignment of CBI by MFA). Under the task 2 programmes, individual
modules delivered per company were settled in advance with the client against a pre-agreed
price. This marks the point at which CBI actually started to make a profit on delivered
programmes, up to EUR 4 million,139 after which it was decided to introduce a cap on the
build-up of private equity.

| 94 |

The ‘profit delivered’ column shows the profit (the sum of transfer prices minus expenses)
per delivered company. The ‘Pharmaceutical products’, ‘Sub-contracting castings and
forgings’, ‘Food ingredients’, and ‘Office and school supplies’ ECPs have been highly
profitable. The total average profit per company amounts to EUR 19,085, or 15% of the
average total transfer price per delivered exporter.140
When looking at how expenses per ECP developed vis-à-vis the transfer price between ‘task
1’ and ‘task 2’ assignments, it becomes clear that expenses raised by 13% from EUR 55,200 to
EUR 62,500.141 At the same time the average transfer price of a ‘task 2’ assignment increased
to EUR 81,300, an increase of 46% compared to the ‘task 1’ average. One possible
explanation for the rise could be a more intensive intervention delivery. As mentioned
above, our analysis at the sub-module intervention level does not indicate any significant
change between ‘task 1’ and ‘task 2’ programmes. A comparison of both assignments reveals
that the average overhead percentage did not reduce overtime – on the contrary, a slight
increase can even be discerned.142
Considering the profit per delivered company, it is good to keep in mind that one of the
drivers for these profits are the exaggerated mark-ups for overhead that came with the new
cost price system. The average mark-up introduced in the cost prices for task 2 ECPs was 31%
(10.5% programme management and 20.5% programme overhead), whereas the figure
indicates the average to be 23%. Another profit driver was the budget rise of 17% discussed
in the previous section.
139
140

141
142

Capital ceiling set by the Ministry of Finance.
By introducing a cap on equity accumulation, excess profits were returned to MFA, followed by
agreements between client and CBI to carry through rebates on the sales price. This example indicates
that CBI has not been able to set an accurate cost price, despite being pushed by MFA’s accounting and
control unit.
This is about 2% on average per year, which reflects the annual inflation.
Overhead has been expressed as direct and indirect personnel costs, general fund, CBI innovation,
evaluation and unforeseen. Source: CBI.

CBI’s efficiency

One of the determinants of overhead is the programme drop-out rate, being one of the
indicators of its efficiency. Ideally, effective targeting should reduce the drop-out rate.
The table shows that the ‘delivery rate’, as a reciprocal of the drop-out rate, varies across
ECPs. Furthermore, costs associated with drop-outs (and those rejected after programme
admission) have been expressed in terms of total ECP expenses. Despite the fact that the
costs of drop-outs are limited compared to total costs, the number of drop-outs influences
the costs per competent exporter significantly.
The drop-out rates vary strongly across the four case study countries (Table 19). The figures
indicate that South Africa is the country with the highest rate of companies that left the
programme, almost twice the average drop-out rate. The last column seems to suggest that
higher drop-out rates are more likely in lower-middle-income countries.
Table 19

Drop-out rates per country

Country

Companies
delivered

Drop-outs

Country
income group

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2

6

Kenya

2

2

UMC
LIC

Indonesia

8

3

LMC

Philippines

10

3

LMC

South Africa

22

6

UMC

Peru

8

2

LMC

Thailand

5

1

UMC

Colombia

44

8

UMC

Macedonia

23

4

UMC

Ecuador

18

3

UMC

Serbia

7

1

UMC

India

164

23

LMC

Pakistan

22

3

LMC

Egypt

31

4

UMC

Ghana

1

0

LMC

Sri Lanka

10

0

LMC

Armenia

2

0

LMC

Tunisia

8

0

UMC

Vietnam

1

0

LMC

Honduras

3

0

LMC

Jordan

8

0

UMC

El Salvador

1

0

LMC

Tanzania

1

0

LIC

Bolivia

4

0

LMC

Uganda

4

0

LIC

Bangladesh
Bold indicates the case study countries.
Source: CBI/SAGE.

1

0

LIC

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Aided trade

5.3.1

Cost-effectiveness

Translating the findings from survey and case studies to the ECP population under review
enables us to develop an understanding of the number of assisted companies that benefited
from the programme interventions, which can be used to determine the programme’s
cost-effectiveness. It is important to note that enterprises may drop out at various levels in
the result chain, so that the number of companies that actually benefit might be smaller
than the number that might potentially do so. A reconstruction has been made for all ECPs
based on the evaluation findings (Table 20).
The table describes the various phases, starting from the selection into the programme by
CBI. Of the 479 companies that got selected into the programme, 14% dropped out during
the intervention, leaving 410 competent exporters.
How does this translate into the cost-effectiveness of the programme? The total ECP
portfolio accounted for EUR 24 million, or on average EUR 58,000 per competent exporter.
If the beneficiary group was to be limited to the number of companies that achieved an
effect, or even a sizeable effect, the average cost per company would increase substantially.

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Table 20

ECP population effects (simulated)

Phase

Pipeline

1

selection into the programme

2
3

Number
of ECPs

Share of initial
selected

Share of competent
exporters

479

100%

drop-outs

69

14%

competent exporters

410

86%

100%

4

effect (all sizes)

180

38%

44%

5

effect (≥ EUR 145,000)

62

13%

15%

6

sustainability

30

6%

7%

7

substitution

15

3%

4%

Source: IOB.

Another way of assessing a programme’s cost-effectiveness is the return on investment.
CBI uses this definition as a standard for assessing the impact, which is defined as the total
achieved exports to EU markets measured one year after completion of the programme.
The export turnover is measured from the start of the intervention until one year after
completion of the programme.143
Applying this definition to the survey results, programme costs can be set against the
additional exports (instead of total exports achieved). According to this definition, export
turnover is the sum of additional exports over the years 2006-2012 plus the sum of baseline
export turnover during these years. Please note that we use a longer time frame than the

143

CBI theory of change and indicators, 13 November 2013.

CBI’s efficiency

five year time frame used by CBI, which enables us to record effects more than one year after
completion of the programme.
IOB estimates that additional exports during the period 2006-2012, extrapolated for the
population of CBI-assisted companies (13 ECPs), amount to EUR 29 million to the EU and EUR
31.5 million to non-EU countries.144 Given the average programme costs per competent
company of EUR 58,000, one could state that for every euro spent by the programme,
additional exports achieved amounts of EUR 1.2 (EU) and EUR 1.3 (non-EU). When, for
comparative reasons, the review is limited to 2006-2011, the additional exports achieved
would be reduced to EUR 0.49 (EU) and EUR 0.53 (non-EU) for every euro spent.
In conclusion, when defined according to the return on investment of attributable
programme effects it can be stated that these have not been cost-effective for the 13 ECPs
under evaluation, even when looking at a longer time span. Also, when looking at total
additional (EU and non-EU) export development, according to CBI’s internal standards, we
conclude that the programme was not cost-effective. This is even more the case when, instead
making use of CBI’s own internal rate of return definition, the attributed value added or
profits are taken as relevant indicators for determining cost-effectiveness.

5.4 Benchmark
Apart from discussing efficiency based on internal organisational and programme data,
we collected and compared benchmark data from external trade promotion organisations.145
The goal of the external benchmark is to assess the efficiency of CBI’s services by comparing
CBI’s cost structure to the cost structures of similar organisations. This evaluation
concentrates on output and outcome efficiency, specifically for the export coaching
programmes. In other words, the ECP costs have been related to output, i.e. numbers of
assisted exporters, and outcome, i.e. additional exports realised.
Costs and cost drivers
Table 21 presents the total annual cost of the activities that most resemble CBI’s export
coaching programmes. Overhead is defined as all expenses for secondary (or support)
processes, such as general management, finance, marketing, and human resources
management. CBI’s breakdown of primary costs (‘programmakosten’) and secondary costs
(‘opslagen’/ ‘doorbelastingen’) has been used. Programme management is seen as part of the
primary process and thus is not included in overhead. In SIPPO’s annual activity reports,
programme, project, and other organisational costs are specified.146
144

145
146

It should be noted that the ECP evaluation perspective used here differs from that used by CBI. Instead of
evaluating all companies participating in the same ECP, the subject of the current evaluation is ECPassisted companies in a specific country.
See Annex 12 for a methodological description of the benchmark.
According to a COMO consultant who studied SIPPO’s accounting system in 2010, programme management is
accounted for in programme costs, which is also the case at CBI. Therefore, the breakdown in the annual reports
is considered useful for such a comparison. For TDC, the average overhead percentage has been calculated on
the basis of two annual reports, and this has been added to the costs for the export coaching activities (‘Renforcer
les capacités et l’accès au marché des producteurs du Sud’ and ‘Encourager les échanges commerciaux Sud-Sud’).

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Aided trade

Table 21

Costs of export coaching (average 2010-2012)
CBI

TDC

SIPPO

Export coaching costs incl. overhead

EUR 11,414,373

EUR 861,099

EUR 5,997,946

Export coaching costs excl. overhead

EUR 7,987,099

EUR 672,734

EUR 5,521,132

30%

22%

8%

Overhead to expenses
Source: IOB.

The cost of export coaching is a net cost, meaning that contribution fees have been
accounted for. The share of contributions by beneficiaries is divided as follows: CBI (6%),
the TDC (20%) and SIPPO (7%).

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To reflect the scale of operations, and thus the potential for economies of scale for each
TPO, we have gathered information about the share of export coaching activities in the
organisation. We selected TPOs for comparison as they have separate financial accounts,
which allows us to do this at the TPO level. It is important to note that all three TPOs are in
fact part of a larger organisation. TDC is a part of the Belgian Development Agency (BTC).147
The annual accounts show that TDC uses BTC’s infrastructure, and pays for it. SIPPO has
over the past years been integrated into Switzerland Global Enterprise, just as CBI is
currently being integrated into RVO.
The table clearly shows that CBI is the largest organisation in terms of turnover, while SIPPO
focuses most on export coaching, with all activities plausibly targeted at increasing its
beneficiaries’ exports. Although SIPPO apparently began to shift its focus onto more
systemic interventions in 2012, this shift was not yet evident in that year’s financial report.
Table 22

Export coaching share in total turnover (average 2010-2012)
CBI

Total annual turnover (IPO level)
Export coaching share in organisation's
turnover

TDC

SIPPO

EUR 22,516,783

EUR 1,968,769

EUR6,047,292

51%

44%

100%

Source: IOB.

Cost differences can also be related to programme characteristics. In terms of programme
duration and content, CBI and SIPPO are quite similar (Table 23). The standard programme
duration in both organisations is three to four years. While evaluation and administrative
(preparation and closing) activities are not fully included, the part of the programmes in
which companies actively participate is similar. Also comparable is the number of visits to
trade fairs: companies participate in a maximum of three fairs, and have to make a higher
147

TDC is a part of BTC, which is a much larger organisation than CBI. BTC has offices and personnel both
in Belgium and abroad, and has a turnover of around EUR 229 million (2012 Annual Report). The cost
structure for the overall organisation has been made transparent in its annual reports. But as TDC is
such a small part of BTC (± 1%), we do not believe the overall cost structure to be relevant for our
comparison with CBI.

CBI’s efficiency

contribution for each subsequent fair. The actual amount of trade fair visits per company is
unknown for SIPPO, as it does not register drop-outs.
Table 23

Programme characteristics (average 2010-2012)
CBI

Duration

TDC

SIPPO

4.4 years

n.a.

3 years
(max. 4 years)

Estimated number of
beneficiary companies
per year

597

843 'individus'
+ 27 'groupes'

1,000

Average number of
beneficiary companies
per programme

32

n.a.

65

Amount of sectors
targeted per year

19

2

15

Industrial products
(e.g. medical devices,
engineering products,
personal protection
equipment),
consumer products
(e.g. clothing, home
decoration and
accessories), services
(e.g. IT outsourcing),
agriculture, food and
forestry (e.g. food
ingredients).

Agriculture (80%),
handicrafts.

Food (fish and seafood,
fruit and vegetables,
natural ingredients,
bio-products), non-food
(home textiles, alpaca,
fashion, jewellery,
handicraft, indoor
furniture, outdoor
furniture), technical
products (metal processing and mechanical
engineering, software
applications, technical
wood), tourism.

Main sectors targeted

Source: IOB.

Whereas SIPPO and CBI offer multiple export-oriented services (such as individual coaching
and collective visits to trade fairs) integrated into a single programme, TDC has not yet
developed such an integrated programme. Financial and technical support to businesses
that want to visit a trade fair, for example, is a separate activity from marketing support.
TDC’s programme does not have a predetermined duration, as it is fully tailor-made, based
on participants’ own plan of action.
The amount of personnel needed to execute programmes is not reported here, as we could
not find any trustworthy data. The export coaching activities are performed largely by
contractors, and the number of contractors has not been reported upon in any of the cases,
nor has the size of their contracts.
The CBI and SIPPO programmes differ quite a bit in terms of the number of companies
participating in export coaching: SIPPO has twice as many companies. CBI targets more
sectors in any given year than SIPPO, i.e. 19 as opposed to 15.

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Aided trade

A special attribute of TDC is their exclusive focus on fair trade. Many of its activities involve
promoting and certifying fair production methods. At CBI and SIPPO, fair trade is neither a
selection criterion nor the main focus of the export promotion activities, although SIPPO
currently has one programme that deals with responsible tourism and CBI is working on
integrating international corporate social responsibility criteria into its operations.
Choice of sectors and products
CBI and SIPPO have a comparable sector focus, which can be described as a combination of
agricultural, industrial, and services industries, which includes both products intended for
business-to-business and business-to-consumer trade. TDC stands out in this respect, with a
clear focus on agricultural products (mostly commodities) and handicrafts. Unlike CBI and
SIPPO, TDC does not work at all with industrial companies. In practice, ECP participants are
mainly from the industrial and consumer goods sectors, and less so from agriculture.

| 100 |

Geographical spread
The number of countries in which export coaching programmes were implemented differs
quite a bit between the three organisations. CBI has the broadest focus (29 countries on
average) and TDC the narrowest (7 on average). The difference in geographical focus
between SIPPO and CBI can be explained by the fact that SIPPO has had to work with a
much shorter country list than CBI. Their sponsors (SECO and the MFA, respectively) only
allow them to work in a predetermined set of countries.
Table 24

Geographical spread (average 2010-2012)
CBI

Average amount of
countries targeted per year
Countries targeted

TDC

SIPPO

29

7

14

Afghanistan, Armenia,
Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Guatemala,
Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya,
Macedonia, Mali, Morocco,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Serbia, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia,
Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia.

Bolivia, Ecuador,
Democratic
Republic of
Congo, Germany,
Kenya, Morocco,
Palestine, Peru,
Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda.

Albania, Bolivia,
Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Cambodia,
Colombia, Egypt,
Ghana, Indonesia,
Jordan, Kosovo,
Laos, Macedonia,
Nepal, Peru,
Serbia, South
Africa, Ukraine,
Vietnam.

Source: IOB.

Looking at the type of countries targeted, we note that sub-Saharan countries are overrepresented at TDC (7 out of the 13 countries worked with in 2010-2012) and underrepresented at CBI (5 out of 43) and SIPPO (2 out of 18).

CBI’s efficiency

Target group characteristics
The evaluation of SIPPO and CBI has shed light on the types of business that enrol in export
coaching programmes. It seems that CBI’s beneficiaries are somewhat larger in terms of the
number of employees. Even so, SIPPO and CBI beneficiaries both fall within the limits of
any definition of SME. Both CBI and SIPPO’s beneficiary companies have considerable
exporting experience, even to the European market. This suggests that these businesses are
quite advanced, indeed on the higher end of the value chain, as SIPPO has put it.
TDC, on the other hand, works mostly with small mainly agricultural producers
(smallholders). Many of its activities aim to unite individual producers into cooperatives
and integrate these cooperatives into newly developed value chains.
Looking at the tables presented in the sections above, SIPPO is most likely to have the
lowest cost per exporter. SIPPO has twice as many participants in its sector programmes,
suggesting lower start-up and evaluation costs per participant. In addition, these
participants are probably located in far fewer countries, suggesting lower travel costs and
time needed to visit them.

5.5 Conclusions
•
•

•

•
•
•

•

•

•

The overhead needed to run programmes increased at a faster pace than the programme
budget.
The creation of CBI as an independent agency did not make it more cost efficient. One
possible explanation for this is that there was no MFA-induced incentive for CBI to
lower its costs.
With the introduction of ex ante cost prices and the modular programme delivery, CBI
has seen its turnover and profit rate rise, with profits increasing more rapidly than
turnover.
MFA approved requests for budget increases, even though they were not always justified
by CBI and lacked information about cost prices.
Our empirical analysis could not find any justification for CBI’s extra budget claims either,
which supposedly resulted from the intensification of its interventions over the years.
CBI agreed to pay back accumulated excess capital to MFA, even introducing discounts
on its tariffs. This may create the wrong impression of an efficiently run operation,
while in fact cost prices had been too high for too long.
Translating the number of companies that benefited from the programme interventions
into cost-effectiveness, we conclude that the average cost per company is far above the
financial settlement per competent exporter.
The benchmark indicates that CBI had the highest cost per exporter. This was caused by
high fixed costs per participant and high transaction costs as a result of its presence in a
wide range of countries.
As an independent agency, CBI was not run efficiently, and the programme itself was
not cost-effective either, because it did not optimally direct its investment of scarce
resources towards the group of companies that needed it most.

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6
CBI’s Business Support
Organisation Development
programme

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

6.1 Introduction
We will discuss the relevance of the BSOD programme by juxtaposing findings from the
literature with CBI’s assistance rationale, curriculum, and implementation of the BSOD
programme in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents an assessment of the effects of the BSOD
programme, followed by a reflection on the efficiency of its implementation in Section 6.4.

6.2 Relevance of the BSOD programme
One challenge facing private sector development institutions is how to achieve operational
scale when providing support to SMEs in developing countries. The problem is that SMEs
are by nature small, diffuse and numerous. Supporting SMEs carries with it the inherent risk
of the institution itself becoming too diffuse, as highlighted in a number of recent
evaluations of development assistance to SMEs. One way through which institutions seek to
increase the scale of impact of trade-related SME support is to focus on strengthening
intermediary organisations, such as trade support institutions, as highlighted in a recent
evaluation (ITC, 2013).148
In recent decades, stimulating national exports by offering information, finance and
technical assistance to individual firms via trade promoting organisations has received
broader attention. The number of TPOs that represent national interests has tripled over the
last two decades (Lederman et al., 2010). The literature tells us that the types of service
offered by these TPOs seem – at least on the surface – quite similar across countries and can
broadly be divided into three categories:
1. market research and publications (offering firm, sector or country-specific market
information on tariffs, standards, trends, opportunities, and competition, for example);
2. training and technical assistance (training and advice on export processes, the
regulatory environment, legal issues, logistics, marketing, and developing export
business plans); and
3. market entry support (facilitating and (co-)financing trade fair participation, trade
missions, and matchmaking activities).
Theoretically, these services could promote export by reducing information asymmetries
and transaction costs, and by giving firms incentives to invest in entering new markets.
However, in the past there has been a great deal of criticism on the functioning of TPOs in
developing countries. Hogan et al. (1991) argued that TPOs were generally ineffective
because of inadequate capacity, insufficient customer orientation, heavy government
involvement, and a lack of long-term support to companies. Since then much has changed
(arguably in response to these criticisms). Nevertheless, the question of the additionality of

148

WTO, ‘Connecting developing country SMEs to global value chains’; joint communication from the
International Trade Centre and the WTO secretariat, September 2014.

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Aided trade

donor programmes in specific fields has become more pressing, and requires donors to
become even more selective choosing where and who to support.
CBI’s management has shown a greater interest in expanding the BSOD portfolio in the last
decade. It assumed that this product could contribute more effectively and efficiently to
CBI’s greater goal, i.e. that a larger group of companies could be reached for less cost per
company compared to the ECP programme. While the initial focus was entirely on
reinforcing local business support organisations, since 2011, CBI has attempted to create
more synergy between supporting BSOs and companies and is trying to achieve this in a
more coherent and structured manner.
BSOs need qualified and well-trained staff who have the competences to provide relevant,
digestible, practical, and tailor-made EU export marketing and management services to
their member clients. These services include skills pertaining to market research and trade
promotion techniques for BSO staff so they can identify different sectors and niches in new
EU markets. And they may also include services to individual exporting companies, like
export audits, market research, or providing information on market requirements.
Box 8

Typical BSOD deliverables

| 104 |

The following list contains examples of results that are typically generated by BSOD
programmes:
• collaboration models and agreed task divisions with other export service
providers and actors in export value chains;
• improved organisational vision, policies, strategy, and structure enabling
adequate European market-related export service delivery;
• a quality assurance system (including manuals, established client feedback
processes, internal quality control procedures, etc.) for European market-related
export services;
• business processes for (European market-related) service delivery;
• marketing and communication of the market proposition of BSOs to their
clientele and stakeholders;
• a network of local external experts under the umbrella of the BSO;
• enhanced competences of BSO staff regarding identifying and transferring
European market opportunities to exporters;
• enhanced competences of BSO staff to deliver quality services for export value
chains and exporters to the European market; and
• new (European market-related) products and services developed by BSOs.
Source: CBI.

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

Given the heterogeneity of BSOs, the relevance of the technical assistance depends very
much on the mandate and competence of the beneficiary. For example, CBI supported the
Indian BSO TEDO, which was having difficulty expanding its activities as the organisation’s
headcount was limited. As a result, they had to build a small network of external experts
who supported them in their programmes. The feasibility report mentions strong signals
that there was a lack of strategic coherence and professionalism at TEDO. Therefore, the
technical assistance of the programme was highly relevant to TEDO’s mandate.
The evaluation of SIPPO also indicates that the quality of cooperation is not uniform, since
BSOs are weak in many countries. Their financing is not secure and their choice of
personnel is often politically motivated, and therefore the work relationship between CBI
and beneficiaries depends on individuals, not on structures.149 For that reason, SIPPO views
joint strategic planning as wishful thinking and usually unrealistic.

6.3 Effects
According to the literature reviewed, the capacity and internal organisation of TPOs are
important determinants of their effectiveness (Lederman et al., 2010). Lederman et al.
demonstrate that TPOs perform well when they are publicly funded but also at least partially
managed by the private sector. Apart from this paper, however, there is little rigorous
evidence on what type of internal organisation is important and whether building the
capacity TPOs is an effective strategy. The reason for the lack of good studies, according to a
review by SIDA (2013), is the absence of objective indicators that can measure increased
capacity (e.g. how to measure whether the training of staff led to improved services) and the
difficulty in attributing the observed changes at a company or country level to capacity
building activities at an organisation that operates on a national or regional level.150

6.3.1 Challenges of measuring capacity development effects
The exact results that a BSOD programme will achieve depends on the particular
organisational needs of the BSO, as well as the country and/or sector needs.151 One year after
a programme ends, an independent evaluation is conducted to assess the extent to which
the programme’s purpose/effect and objective/impact have been achieved. The evaluation
uses quality indicators that rate a programme as ‘sufficient’ if (a) 80% of the competences
have been transferred, (b) 60% of the transferred competences are being used, and (c) 60%
of the clients of the services provided by the BSOs agree that they are receiving better service
provision than they did prior to the support provided by CBI.
149

150
151

One important learning point for the BSOD programme at the Indian BSO TEDO is the implementation
of the strategic planning module. TEDO worked on projects and was relying too heavily on external
funding. As result, it could not grow as an independent EU export-supporting entity within its mother
company, as initially expected.
See also IOB evaluation no. 336 ‘Facilitating resourcefulness: Evaluation of Dutch support to capacity development’.
These needs are assessed during the programme’s preparatory phase. In this stage, one or more of the
four available BSOD modules are considered for implementation: strategic planning for the EU, export
marketing and management, market information, and market development.

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Aided trade

Several BSOD evaluators indicated that measuring such a quality standard is a great
challenge, since interviewees have little understanding of how to interpret indicators such
as ‘transfer of competences’ or ‘use of the capacity’, nor are they able to provide a sound
opinion on the ‘effect of the use of capacity’. For example, one of the evaluators stated that
60% to 80% of BSO staff expected their job performance towards exporters to improve after
training. One should also note, however, that the reported figures should be read as
anticipated rather than actual impact.

| 106 |

These quality standards set by MFA and CBI seem to be too general and hard to measure
accurately. In other words, assessing effects or impact is hindered by the absence of
objective indicators that can measure increased capacity. Moreover, since the effects of
organisational changes are less likely to take place immediately, but might manifest only
after several years, they will not necessarily be captured during the regular evaluations that
take place one year after the intervention has terminated. To make it even more complex,
the fact that the project is normally implemented for several years increases the possibility
that the learners/participants fail to accurately recall their experiences. They might still use
knowledge, skills, and methodologies provided by CBI, but may be unable to name these
things due to the fading memory over time. There is another, more culturally induced bias,
also highlighted in some BSOD evaluations, which tells us that recipients are more inclined
to give socially desirable answers.152
Aware of the limits of indicators, and the distorting effects mentioned above, CBI has
experimented with other assessment methodologies, which did not lead to any radically
different approach. One example is the 5C model, proposed by one of the evaluating
bodies, which suggests a more objective and process-oriented evaluation perspective, as
opposed to a task and result-oriented one. ‘It attempts to make profound changes in the
organisation that could take a longer time than the one established for the BSOD
programme, but also, it could aim for a broader objective that may not necessarily or easily
translate into export gains in the short run’.153
Evaluators indicate they were limited in their research by a more general problem, namely
the lack of reliable data.154 No data has been specifically collected to establish a baseline or
end-line situation related to the BSOD, or to measure client satisfaction. Moreover,
evaluation outcomes are predominantly based on self-perception, and the measurement of
BSO clients’ satisfaction is not an integral part of evaluations.155 With some notable
exceptions, no quantitative data is available to draw conclusions on the programme’s
contribution to increased exports. The lack of data also suggests that the programme
152

153
154

155

For example, one of the evaluators mentions that the recipient organisations’ staff is rather obedient
and in need of a more assertive mindset, also vis-à-vis CBI.
Efece & asociados s.r.l., 2013.
Because data was unavailable, or when available, conclusions are based on small sample sizes. The
smaller the sample size, the larger the bias. Efficiency could not be assessed because of a lack of
concrete financial data due to the change in CBI’s (accounting) system.
To evaluate the impact of the programme, CBI could do a (qualitative and/or quantitative) survey with
SMEs and other BSOs at the beginning and the end of the programme.

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

management lacks the information to monitor and steer programmes in the desired
direction.156
The regular BSOD evaluations on behalf of CBI indicate that the assessment of the quality
criteria could not be as specific as expected. Also, the limited availability of data to evaluate
the impact of the programme on SMEs/exporters leads to descriptive rather than evaluative
conclusions.

6.3.2 Findings
Our review included twenty-one of the fifty-six BSOD modules: three in Bolivia, one in
Ecuador, three in India, four in Indonesia, three in Peru, three in the Philippines, and four
in Vietnam.
Organisational capacity
A review on behalf of CBI concluded that in general evaluators were moderately positive
regarding achievements at the result and effect levels (Triodos, 2009). The BSO staff
members interviewed were satisfied with the programmes and indicated that many of the
acquired tools and skills were being applied in practice. As the report on the Investment and
Trade Promotion Centre (ITPC) in Vietnam puts it: ‘The training introduced content and
supported the restructuring process of ITPC. Staff received content to get involved in the
work, while in the past they had concentrated on administration’.157 As a result, the
professional organisation and service packages of ITPC improved. This has boosted the
organisation’s confidence and status, making it more attractive for exporters to use their
services.158 CBI also helped to identify and develop new export products, though it remains
unclear to what extent these products will actually be marketed on a large scale. According
to some participants, marketing these products is still high-hanging fruit as the road from
production to export is long.
One aspect of the export marketing and management module (EMM) has been the inclusion
of local consultants and service providers, through a ‘train the trainer’ (TTT) programme.
The anticipated multiplier-effect of trained trainers remained below expectations because
SME-level data measuring client satisfaction is lacking, as well as information on export
increases. Of course, there are exceptions, such as the example of Indian consultants
trained by the BSOD programme, who managed to start their own commercially based
156

157

158

For example, it is difficult to measure the effect and impact of CBI training courses when former
participants of these courses cannot be tracked. A good quality database would make it relatively easy
to develop a cost-effective way of measuring effects and impact over time.
Thanks to CBI support, the organisation is now better at designing its curriculum and syllabus,
approaching customers, and managing customer relationships. In the Philippines, at the start of the
BSOD programme, Philexport Cebu did not have a market information service at all.
Bringing more structure and ‘content’ to the work of BSOs seems to be an important asset of the BSOD
programme. From this perspective it is good to understand the positive reactions of BSOs while
implementing a market intelligence plug-in on the organisations’ website, since it creates a new and
improved service offer for the organisation. On the contrary, companies themselves, as ultimate
beneficiaries of market information services are more diverse in their assessment of these services,
especially more experienced organisations expressing often critical opinions.

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Aided trade

advisory service, proving that opportunities can be converted once the client values the
expertise and is willing to pay for such services.159

| 108 |

Increased exports
As indicated, no quantitative data is available to draw conclusions about the programme’s
contribution to increased exports. Nevertheless, in qualitative terms, various authors agree
that the direct or indirect effect of the projects on the capacity of SMEs to export is minor. A
review by Triodos concludes that trained BSO staff, local consultants, and exporters expect
training to have a positive effect in terms of contributing to increased exports. Nevertheless,
six months after training there appeared to be no effect on export development, and even
though exporters’ knowledge increased, new product development remained limited.160
In other words, this leaves the impression that workshops as stand-alone activities cannot
contribute significantly to export, and that such expectations are in fact unrealistic and
exaggerated. Indeed, since most of the anecdotal and observable evidence does not point
towards the claimed effect, stronger facts or metrics that would underpin the opposite, i.e.
that the BSOD programme would have a positive indirect effect on exports, still need to be
presented. Moreover, these evaluations also indicate a shortfall of the programme, namely
that BSOs have not been able to tackle other barriers that prevent SMEs from exporting,
such as the business community’s lack of English language skills or the small size of
companies.

6.3.3 Explanations
This section touches on some of the reasons why the objectives of the BSOD programme
were not achieved, and in doing so distinguishes between the programme design, the
programme implementation, and target group characteristics.
A lack of clear objectives and focus
Business support organisations with a strong sector focus seem to have benefited most
from organisational development support. This is in line with the conclusion in the
evaluation of CBI’s Swiss counterpart SIPPO.161 Cooperation seems to improve with
sector-oriented partners, whereas the chances of a successful intervention are more limited
when working with organisations that have a broad mandate and political mission. Large
organisations are often bureaucratic and less sensitive to change. They often have a specific
organisational structure, mission, vision, and core values that cannot be changed easily.
There is also a difference between public BSOs,162 which rely heavily on government funds

159

160

161

162

In the Philippines, for example, some of the local consultants were being hired for their expertise by
companies or local government, without intervention or mediation by Philexport or CBI. The
consultants are too expensive for Philexport, but got paid by CBI through the Export Diversification
module.
For example, the impact of the BSOD programme at NAFED has been modest, suggesting that none of
the SMEs that participated in the BSOD programme conducted any export activities.
For example, SIPPO’s support of the association of the textile sector in Vietnam (Vietcraft) proved to be
much more reliable and concrete compared to Vietrade, a non-sector oriented governmental agency.
For example DGNED (Indonesia) and HCACS (Vietnam).

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

and for that reason are not inherently motivated to expand their client base vis-à-vis private
sector organisations that are in need of clients and thus willing to pay for their services.163
A more detailed analysis of the context in which BSOs operate could help to more accurately
establish these organisations’ actual needs. According to the evaluator of supported BSODs
in Latin America, a continent where business support has a long history, the assessment of
the perceived priorities by the BSO’s top executives should have been more detailed and
carried out in tandem with an assessment of the BSO’s needs. That would have it made it
possible to select a core process for spreading specific BSOD interventions throughout the
organisation.
CBI’s predefined modular intervention approach does not always give enough attention to
the internal and external dynamics and politics of the BSOs. In some cases, the programme
did not understand, interpret, or properly address the environment in which the BSOs were
operating. In such cases, the cost of not having a precise understanding of the BSO’s context
resulted in growing internal tensions as the programme progressed.
BSOs could have benefited from more sensitivity on CBI’s part regarding the local project
setting, especially when BSOs are part of a network. Apparently reports that date back to the
formulation of the BSOD intervention in South America already mention the problem of
cultural differences within BSO networks, and the fear of losing autonomy when favouring
a more empowered beneficiary. The fundamental question then becomes how CBI can
develop a better understanding of these potential constraints, and how to address them.164
Supply driven, lack of market demand
The development of new European market-related products and services is an example of a
deliverable from the BSOD programme. But as the example of the BSO CADEXCO’s HACCP
certification services shows, a newly developed service that does not appeal to the BSO’s
clients, or is priced unrealistically vis-à-vis real market prices, is condemned to disappear.165
In cases such as this, all the efforts by CBI, the external experts, and the BSO have no
tangible impact as a result. A very conventional way to solve this is the same way that any
private company would, namely by determining whether the effort to try to sell a new
product is justifiable. This type of analysis should guide the areas of intervention based on a
thorough study of demand conditions for such services.

163

164

165

For example, the publicly funded HCACS clients are beneficiaries of local government-supported
services and the BSO is the budget allocator; hence this does not represent a market customer-oriented
process.
To assist competing BSOs at the same time can be quite frustrating. This is not exclusive of CANEB, it
was also the case in ADEX and the Lima Chamber of Commerce in Peru; the members of the network
were competing for the same clientele with very similar kinds of services.
Based on a pilot project in the natural ingredients sector it was estimated that, on average, 48
companies would demand HACCP certification each year after CADEXCO and a local consultancy with
experience in this sector, started offering the service. One year after programme closure, no company
had been certified and only one has expressed real interest.

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Aided trade

The BSOs have local consultants participating in their events, training sessions, and
consultancy assignments. As mentioned, the effect of this group of trained consultants on
the capacity of enterprises to export should be considered minor. Not surprisingly, many of
the trained consultants are somehow frustrated by the promise that was made after they
had participated and passed the training (Triodos, 2009). They expected further initiatives to
unfold and also expected to participate in projects or programmes. However, there has
hardly been any follow-up or communication following the TTT programme, and graduates
indicated that they felt the training was too short to give them enough ammunition to face
the industry. It is therefore recommended that future capacity building interventions
should focus more on sectors instead of general export management only.
Other evaluations mention the suggestion by local experts that the level of training be
customised, which could have been achieved by including local sector experts to deliver
certain parts of the EMM training. Including local experts is a potential problem as there is a
risk of inconsistent programme delivery (e.g. in the case of IETC from Indonesia) since
different local experts might not share the same view of a given matter. However, the way
they deliver services to local SMEs should be consistent. This helps to assure the quality of
the programme, protect the image of the donor and BSOs, and protect learners and
participants from confusion.
| 110 |

Ownership, leadership and commitment
As the case of Philexport shows, ownership and leadership commitment are preconditions
for a programme’s success. In this specific case the director was already familiar with CBI
and had lived in the Netherlands for almost 20 years. Moreover, the organisation already
had a clear picture of its future strategy and plans, even before the arrival of CBI.
Allocating time efficiently by beneficiary staff seems to have been problematic. Each CBI
mission expert delivers technical assistance for only a couple of days, but of course staff
cannot always leave their daily job assignments to attend BSOD activities. This has limited
the transfer of competences.
In India the transfer of competences to just six TEDO coordinators, who were also
responsible for other jobs at the mother institute, resulted in only temporary commitment
towards the jobs assigned in TEDO. From this perspective it might have been more effective
to offer the strategic planning (SP) module at the level of the mother institute.
Another aspect of ownership is the high staff turnover rate at supported organisations, or as
one of the evaluation reports phrased it: ‘high rotation is the enemy of sustained results’.
This is a general problem, though at the same time a normal situation that occurs in cases
where people are trained, and invest in themselves, which could also generate spillover
effects. Nevertheless, the general criticism made by these evaluators is that the programme’s
design could have paid more attention to sustaining the effects of its deliverables.

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

This criticism was also voiced with regard to CBI’s HRD programme. The MASTER/MAR and
FAME studies state that the use of newly acquired competences becomes less obvious at the
BSO level. This is due to the fact that some of CBI’s seminars are predominantly an
investment in individual development rather than in organisational development. So even
though individual participants benefit from the training, the knowledge and tools obtained
in the training are not always spread to others in the same organisation. Some authors
argue that in order to strengthen effects at the organisational level, more follow-up is
needed. However, both the FAME and the MASTER/MAR evaluations suggest that follow-up
is not always an integral part of CBI’s training programmes.
Last but not least, the English language proficiency of beneficiary staff has been mentioned
as a problem in various interventions. Given the nature of the activities, this aspect should
have played a major role in the selection of beneficiaries and staff. In some cases, CBI
accommodated this problem by having the curriculum translated. The key question here is
whether programme management should have made such a compromise at all, since
English language proficiency is one of the programme’s admittance criteria.
Limited additionality?
Since CBI beneficiaries are used to working with a number of international partners, such as
– in the case of IETC, for example – the Pacific Resource Exchange Centre in Japan, the Trade
Facilitation Office in Canada, the Canada Indonesia Private Sector Enterprise Development
Project, the Japan External Trade Organization and the International Trade Centre, effective
coordination between service providers is often lacking, which leads to a suboptimal task
division.
In Indonesia, according to the evaluation report, CBI’s intervention via an SP module played
a very modest role in organisational change, from NAFED to DGNED. Indeed, NAFED’s
organisational structure, vision and mission had already been proposed by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). CBI’s role here was to provide a second opinion,
and to align the proposed structure, vision and mission with CBI’s policy to improve export
performances to EU markets.
The additionality is also questionable in the example of Philexport, which already had a
clear strategic plan prepared before CBI arrived on the scene. In this case, the contribution
boiled down to accelerating an already ongoing process.

6.3.4 Sustainability
The evaluation of CBI’s Swiss counterpart, SIPPO, reveals the weaknesses of its current
approach in strengthening the export-related capacities of BSOs. These would also affect the
sustainability of SIPPO’s interventions, as lasting changes in this field have not been
achieved yet. Such a result would occur, for example, if a BSO that was not actively
supporting or capable of supporting local companies to participate in international fairs
learned to do so by cooperating with SIPPO and went on to offer this service at a reasonable
quality on its own.

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Aided trade

Some of the evaluations provide some evidence of self-sustaining BSO services, for example
at Philexport. In this case the implementation of the MI module created a more or less
self-sustaining service, where the increase in membership fees allowed payment for the
salary of a market analyst.
As the case studies show, CBI is said to have contributed to the development of business
support operations even when no official BSOD programme had been implemented, and
despite not being a formal part of ECPs. This happened in particular through partnerships
that CBI forged with organisations like Expolink and FTTC in order to organise local events.
These organisations have stated that they still benefit from this capacity development. By
working through the national export promotion organisation Proexport, CBI contributed to
export promotion in Colombia.

| 112 |

In the case of local consultants receiving training, twenty-five local consultants were trained
by CBI experts in the EMM module at TEDO in India. Each consultant was assigned to assist
four to five companies to develop an export marketing and strategy plan. As the BSO had
financial resources at its disposal from the government, the local consultants were paid for
their consulting services at the pilot SMEs. After the BSOD programme, some local experts
created their own consortium to provide export-related services to Indian SMEs.
Nevertheless, the evaluators reported cases in which the actual number of job opportunities
available to the TTT graduates was lower than was suggested at the beginning of the
programme, so they needed to pursue their careers elsewhere.
From the perspective of the SMEs, the ultimate beneficiaries of BSOs, the sustainability of
the programme depends on how the transferred competences are used to support SMEs in
their efforts to export to the EU. Indeed, the local experts play an important role in
sustaining the use of EMM and MI competences. Therefore, BSOs can play a key role in
facilitating and mobilising the network of local experts to promote export in addition to
each expert’s proactivity, and most likely seem to have had an impact.
In the majority of cases, the programme’s focus on sustainability could have been better
conceived. Evaluators recommend investing a large part of every BSOD programme in
sustainability issues. This could start by developing a business plan at the beginning of the
programme. Close to the end of the programme, an ‘exit strategy’ could boost the
counterpart’s trust or confidence. The exit strategy should also be directed towards the
stakeholders, who will need to have faith in the BSO without CBI’s support. CBI could have a
monitoring and facilitating role in this phase.166 Moreover, CBI should have a good
understanding of the BSO’s financial management. There should also be a good
understanding of the market’s willingness to pay for a given service.

166

One proposed idea is gradually losing traction, namely the idea of facilitating one or two conferences
with the management team and stakeholders a year after the end of the programme. In the case of
Philexport, it is a good sign that MoUs were signed with donors that identified Philexport Cebu as
preferred supplier of MI and training and coaching services, thereby enhancing service delivery after
termination of the BSOD intervention.

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

6.4 Programme efficiency
This section describes the efficiency of the BSOD programme, based on what is known from
currently available evaluations. The theme is analysed both from the institutional
perspective (sub-section 6.4.1) as well as the project perspective (sub-section 6.4.2).

6.4.1 Institutional perspective
As the assessment of the effectiveness of the BSOD programme has shown, CBI is often not
the only contributing donor. The key question for the BSOD programme, then, is how to
complement and synergise with other projects to get maximum value out of the
investments.
As described in the evaluation of the Indonesian big BSO NAFED, this organisation also
received assistance from other international partners, such as the Japan International
Cooperation Agency, the Swiss Import Promotion Programme, the Hong Kong Trade
Development Council, as well as other international cooperation organisations. The
evaluator concluded that providing complementary assistance can be only effective and
efficient if the BSO is strongly committed to allocating CBI-trained staff to the right position
after its organisational change. This change, incidentally, was brought about by the JICA
programme. Therefore, the BSOD capacity building component should have been launched
after NAFED was restructured into DGNED. Moreover, the report also suggested that if CBI
had focused on the EMM module instead of the strategic planning module, it might have
increased efficiency.
In the case of the Indian beneficiary TEDO, the intervention, though relevant and aligned
with government policies, would have been more effective and efficient if the mother
organisation had been targeted instead of TEDO.

6.4.2 Programme perspective
Evaluating the efficiency of BSOD programmes at the project level is seriously hampered by
a lack of documentation in the project files. The systematic lack of planned financial
resources in each of the modules, in particular, as well as the budget have not been an
integral part of the documentation. A detailed budget overview would have clarified the
planned budget allocation for each of the projects. Furthermore, an assessment of the spent
budget can only be made if there is information available on the outputs and their quality.
Here too, we must conclude that insufficient information is available to review the BSOD
evaluations.
Based on what was found, the following information per BSOD intervention module has
been reconstructed (Table 25).

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Aided trade

BSO

status

module

relevance

effect

efficiency

expenses (in EUR)

over- / underspending

CBI

Vietnam

ITPC

public

SP

+

+/-

+/-

393.000

+4.5%

CBI

ITPC

EMM

+

+/-

--

549.000

+29%

40-50 advisors
trained

CBI

ITPC

MI

+

+/-

-/+

492.000

+12%

portal
launched;
MI strategy
development

SP

+

+/-

n.a.

444.000

EMM

+

+/-

n.a.

495,000

+7%

n.a.

n.a.

CBI

Philippines

CBI

Philexport
Cebu

public

Philexport
Cebu

CBI

| 114 |

output

country

Assessment of BSOD programme modules

internal / external

Table 25

MI

+

+

n.a.

ext.

Vietnam

HCACS

public

SP

+

-/+

n.a.

ext.

Indonesia

NAFED/
DGNED/
IETC

public

SP/EMM

--

--

--

808,000
- 39%

ext.

Indonesia

IETC

public

SP/EMM

+

+

+/-

ext.

India

TEDO

private

EMM

+/-

-/+

-/+

426,000

- 22%

network of
trained
local experts;
‘Value Magics’
publication;
pilot SMEs
EMM
knowledge

ext.

TEDO

SP

--

--

--

301,000

7 coordinators
trained

ext.

TEDO

MI

+

-/+

-/+

299,000

20 ready-touse market
reports,
MBA syllabus

ext.

Peru

PROMPERU

public

SP

+

+

-/+

478,000

+8.7%

ext.

Peru

ADEX

private

SP/ EMM

+

--

+/-

842,000

- 4.3%

ext.

Bolivia

CANEB

private

SP/ MD

+

+/-

-/+

966,000

+10%

ext.

Bolivia

IBCE

private

SP/ MI

+

+

+

814,000

- 7.5%

ext.

Ecuador

Corpei

public

MI

+

--

--

n.a.

+3.5%

Legend: + = good; -- = bad; n.a.= not available.
Source: CBI regular evaluations.

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

The first column indicates the information source, either an evaluation / peer review
conducted by CBI experts, or an evaluation conducted by an independent external
organisation. The second and third columns mention the beneficiary country and
beneficiary name. The ‘status’ column indicates whether the BSO is a publicly or privately
administrated organisation. The modules delivered to the BSOs are mentioned in the
following column.167 This is followed by an assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, and
efficiency of the respective modules. The expenses and the overspending and
underspending, respectively, is mentioned in the following columns (in some cases no
details per module were available, which is why integrated expenditures per programme are
listed instead). The outputs, to the extent that they are available, and not always in full, have
been summed up in the final column.
Modules that either severely underspent or overspent were nevertheless implemented. Both
can point to either poor planning or inefficient programme delivery. The latter is believed
to be the most likely case. Also, an examination of the expenditures against the delivered
outputs suggests that programme delivery could have been more efficient. In the case of
IPTC the average costs of a trained local consultant were at least EUR 11,000, which is rather
expensive for the type of training delivered. Also the seven coordinators trained in the TEDO
strategic planning module were trained for an average cost of EUR 43,000, which is not a
sign of efficient programme delivery.
An unknown number of local experts were trained in the TEDO EMM module, which costed
EUR 426,000, and a publication written by the CBI expert and local consultant168 was
financed from the budget. Furthermore, some pilot SMEs have been equipped with EU
export marketing and management knowledge. The market information module, costing
EUR 299,000, has delivered twenty ready-to-use market reports, an MBA syllabus, and access
to EU market information from a CBI database. The cost for this seems high, if you consider
that these are no tailor-made products but outputs of other CBI products. The actual
expenditures for the MI module delivery at Philexport went over budget by 12%. This was
caused by additional efforts, i.e. two additional missions for two external experts, to make
the achieved results more sustainable.

167

168

The exact results achieved by a BSOD programme will depend on the particular organisational needs of
the BSO, as well as the country and sector needs. These needs are assessed during the programme’s
preparatory phase. In this stage, one or more of the four available BSOD modules are identified that
would best address these particular needs. These modules should be seen as focus areas of the BSOD
intervention. They are adapted to the needs of each particular BSO, and are not standard ‘one-size-fitsall’ solutions. A module can span a period of three to five years.
It is not clear if the publication (titled ‘Value Magics’) should be considered as part of the external
experts’ assignment. This is but one example of a situation in which a CBI expert, besides having a
contract with CBI, is also personally involved in business activities related to the CBI assignment.
Another example is the expert that starts to become the EU importer for a company, which was
selected into the ECP programme by the expert him/herself. This seems to be undesirable, as it triggers
potentially adverse effects.

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Aided trade

As for the modules that underspent, the evaluator concluded that these interventions could
have been implemented in a more efficient manner if the difference between the budget
and the expenditure had been used to train more experts and facilitate a close and strong
partnership agreement between locally supported Indian beneficiaries. One year after the
completion of the programme, at the time of the evaluation, this partnership was still
unofficial.
NAFED also underspent, to the tune of 40%. It suggests that the programme might have had
more impact if it could have used the remaining budget to develop more activities for
people from NAFED and IETC, consult and coach more Indonesian SMEs, or even support
one or two potential SMEs to export to EU markets. Unfortunately, the evaluation team was
unable to obtain any information on the cancelled activities. No document is available, and
according to in-depth interviews, no activity was reported as cancelled. Due to the
unavailability of an expenditure breakdown for either the modules or the BSOs, it was not
possible to arrive at any kind of specific conclusion on the efficiency of the programme.

| 116 |

The support of the (privately organised) IBCE, on the other hand, is an example of an
effective and efficiently run intervention, in part thanks to the commitment and ownership
of the programme by the beneficiary. Targets were achieved despite spending being 7.5%
under budget. This is an example of the efficient use of resources by both IBCE and CBI, who
prioritised interventions that could have greater impact, and when possible hired a local
consultant that worked at IBCE for much less than a European consultant would have cost.
There was a solid balance between strategic activities for capacity development and
technical assistance for the market information module. Implementation took one year
longer than originally programmed. Additional time was necessary, mostly to complete the
programme and to fine-tune some of the results from completed activities.
Due to changes in the accounting system of CBI, the evaluators did not have access to the
information that would have allowed a detailed comparison of the budgeted amounts and
expenditures by module and by activity in each BSO. However, in general terms, and based
on the achieved effects, it appears that the amounts spent in CANEB and ADEX were the
largest, but at the same time, these BSOs were the ones with more mixed results.

CBI’s Business Support Organisation Development programme

6.5 Conclusions
•

•

•

•

•

•

The increase of trade promotion organisations means the relevance and additionality of
interventions are now at stake, because good coordination between service providers is
often lacking, and this has led to a suboptimal division of tasks. The relevance of
technical assistance to BSOs depends very much on the beneficiaries’ mandate. Their
financing is often not secure and their choice of personnel is often politically
motivated. Generally, the BSOD interventions reviewed were considered to be relevant.
The effects of the technical assistance provided to BSOs is hard to measure accurately,
given that the quality standards set by MFA and CBI are too general. Anecdotal and
observable evidence produces a mixed picture of the BSOD programmes’ effectiveness.
Evaluations indicate that more focused sector-oriented BSOs, which can play a key role
in facilitating and mobilising a network of local experts to promote export, seem the
most likely candidates to have an impact. The assumed effectiveness is not underpinned
by strong facts or metrics.
The use of newly acquired competences is less obvious at the BSO level, since CBI
interventions are predominantly an investment in individual development rather than
in organisational development.
There is no evidence that the assumed improved service delivery by supported BSOs to
client exporters also leads to increased export turnovers for these clients. Since most
anecdotal and observable evidence does not point towards the claimed effect, stronger
facts or metrics that would underpin the opposite still need to be presented.
Due to a lack of reliable and valid programme monitoring data, there is still substantial
empirical uncertainty regarding efficiency. Based on what we know about the
programme costs and outputs, we conclude that the implementation of the BSOD
programme generally lacked efficiency, both from an institutional and programmatic
perspective.
From a programme management perspective, we conclude that the lack of data severely
hampers attempts to monitor and steer programmes in the desired direction.

| 117 |

Annexes

Annexes

Annex 1

About IOB

Objectives
The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) aims to contribute to knowledge
of the implementation and impact of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for
independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous
Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and
implementation of evaluations falling under the responsibility of the policy departments
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and its embassies.
IOB’s evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade
and Development Cooperation to give account to Parliament for their policies and for
resources spent. In addition, the evaluations aim to contribute to learning by formulating
lessons and options for policy improvements that can be incorporated into the ministry’s
policy cycle. Insight into the outcomes of implemented policies allows policymakers to
devise new policy interventions that are both more effective and better targeted.
Organisation and quality assurance
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out
evaluations, IOB calls on specialist knowledge from external experts with knowledge of the
topic under investigation. By way of quality control, IOB appoints an external reference
group for each evaluation, which includes not only external experts, but also relevant
policy-makers from the ministry and other experts. Moreover, for each evaluation IOB
appoints several of its own evaluators to act as peer reviewers. IOB’s Evaluation policy and
guidelines for evaluation are available on the website www.iob-evaluatie.nl, hard copies can be
requested through the IOB secretariat.
Evaluation programming
IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a ministry-wide evaluation
programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the
Explanatory Memorandum to the ministry’s budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the
programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming
of foreign policy evaluations. The themes selected for evaluation respond to requests from
the ministry and Parliament and/or are considered relevant to society. IOB actively
coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other donors and development
organisations.
Approach and methodology
IOB aspires to relevance, high quality and methodological innovation. Whenever possible,
the research applies both quantitative and qualitative methods leading to robust impact
evaluations. IOB also undertakes systematic reviews based on empirical results relating to
priority policy areas. IOB has extended its partnerships with evaluation departments in
other countries, for instance through joint evaluations and evaluative knowledge
exchanges, undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-Development Assistance
Committee Network on Development Evaluation.

| 119 |

Aided trade

Annex 2

Organisational chart of CBI

Organisational Chart
Business Operations

Managing Director

Research & Development
- Market intelligence
- Marketing & communication
- Sector- and Theme expertise
- Learning
- Strategy
- Monitoring & Evaluation

mutual exchange
of intelligence

Regional team
- Asia
(including
Eastern Europe)

international network of external experts

| 120 |
Source: CBI (2013a: 60).

Regional team
- Africa
(including
Middle East)

Regional team
- Latin America

Annexes

Annex 3

Documentation reviewed

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Dutch Advisory Committee on International Development Cooperation. The
Hague, 2012.
Bank, S. and Tersteeg, J. (2009). Netherlands Trust Fund with International Trade Centre. Report of the
external evaluation 2005-2008. Rotterdam: CBI. January 2009.
Cadot, et al. (2011). Are Export Support Programs Effective? Evidence from Tunisia. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank.
Cadot, et al. (2011). Impact Evaluation of Trade Interventions. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
CBI (2010). CBI Jaarverslag 09. Rotterdam: CBI. March 2010.
CBI (2011). CBI Jaarverslag 10. Rotterdam: CBI. May 2011.
CBI (2012a). CBI Annual Report 2011. The Hague: CBI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands. May 2012.
CBI (2012b). CBI Program Management Manual. Developing Integrated Export Value Chain Programmes.
The Hague: CBI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. July 2012.
CBI (2012c). Business Case CBI 2013-2017. Shaping the Future. The Hague: CBI, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands. October 2012.
CBI (2013a). CBI Annual Report 2012. The Hague: CBI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands. May 2013. http://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/files/files/CBI_annual_report2012.pdf
CBI (2013b). Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries. The Hague: CBI, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. http://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/files/publications/
Corporatebrochure-English.pdf
CBI (2013c). CBI the Expert in Export. The Hague: CBI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands.
http://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/files/publications/CBI_Expert_in_Export_v1.2.pdf
Ecorys (2011). Evaluation of ECP Programmes ITO, BPO, Timber and timber-related products. Draft final
report. Rotterdam: Ecorys, October 2011.
EFECE (2013). External Evaluation of the BSOD Programme in Latin America (2006–2011). Final Report.
La Paz: EFECE & Asociados s.r.l., May 2013.
EIM (2007). CBI Market Information Programme. Final Evaluation Report. Zoetermeer: EIM,
May 2007.
EIM (2012a). CBI Export Coaching Programmes (ECP). Evaluation Report 5 sector programmes
Part I – Main Report. Zoetermeer: EIM, March 2012.
EIM (2012b). CBI Export Coaching Programmes (ECP). Evaluation Report 5 sector programmes.
Part II – Annexes. Zoetermeer: EIM, March 2012.
EIM (2012c). CBI Export Coaching Programmes (ECP). Evaluation of three ECP programmes. Final
Report. Zoetermeer: EIM, December 2012.
iLumtics (2013). BSOD Programme Evaluation 2012-2013 TEDO (India), DGNED/IETC (Indonesia) and
HCACS (Vietnam). iLumtics Vietnam, March 2013.
Evaluatiegroep (2008). Evaluation of the CBI Commercial Attaché Training Programme. Utrecht:
Evaluatiegroep Overheid en Bedrijf, April 2008.

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Aided trade

| 122 |

IOB (1999). Hulp door handel. Evaluatie van het Centrum tot bevordering van de Import uit
Ontwikkelingslanden (CBI), 1990-1996. IOB Evaluation 281. The Hague: Inspectie
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie. October 1999.
ISB (2009). Verkorte organisatiedoorlichting Centrum tot Bevordering van de Import uit
Ontwikkelingslanden (CBI). MFA/ISB.
Lederman et. al. (2010) Export Promotion Agencies: What Works and What Doesn’t. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank.
MDF (2007a). Evaluation CBI Market Access Requirement seminars and workshops –
MASTER and MAR 2003-2006.
MDF (2007b). On the Path to Fame. Evaluation CBI Training Course Facilitators and Advisors for
Marketing and Export Promotion (FAME) 2003-2007. Rotterdam: MDF, November
2007.
Novatech (2011). Corpei’s Market Information System: Evaluation Report. CBI BSOD
Programme Corpei 2006-2009. Quito: Grupo Novatech, April 2011.
Panteia (2013). Towards better MI products. Results of the survey on the quality of CBI’s MI products.
Zoetermeer: Panteia, January 2013.
ProFound (2007). Final Evaluation of CBI’s Human Resource Development Programme Workshops
2000-2006. Utrecht: Profound, June 2007.
Triodos Facet (2009). Review and Summary of CBI Evaluations 2003-2009. Zeist: Triodos Facet,
October 2009.
WEF (2012). The Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum.

Literature review
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Annexes

Annex 4

Interviewees

Name

Function
CBI

Mr Ton Lansink

Former Director CBI (2002–2008)

Mr Hans Klunder

Former Director CBI (2008–2014)

Mr Dick de Man

Deputy Managing Director CBI (CBI since 1995)

Ms Henrique Postma-Hazelaar

Programme manager 1040

Ms Melanie Haga

Programme manager 1039/38/34

Mr Cor Dieleman

Programme manager 1028/29/36

Mr Wim van Heumen

Programme manager 1031/43

Mr Jan Oude Eferink

Expert 1028

Mr Arjan Hock

Expert 1030

Mr Lazlo Klucs

Expert 1030/1032

Ms Aileen Brindle

Expert 1040

Mr Jan Ramakers

Expert 1043

Mr Bouke van de Pol

Managerial controller CBI
MFA

Mr Ad Lansu

Senior account advisor (DDE169/ CU170)

Mr René Rotteveel

Controller DDE/CU

Mr Sjoerd Smit

former account advisor CBI at DDE

Ms Henny de Vries

Account advisor CBI at DDE

Mr Menno Zijlstra

Accountant The Central Government Audit
Service
RVO

Mr Robert Dijksterhuis

169
170

Sustainable Economic Development Department.
Control Unit.

Director at the Netherlands Enterprise Agency
(RVO)

| 125 |

Aided trade

Annex 5

Evaluations by CBI

Recent CBI evaluations

| 126 |

Year

Interventions
evaluated

Some details of the evaluations

2009

4 BSODs

Support programmes in Vietnam, East Africa, Philippines and Jordan

2011

5 ECPs

ECPs in the areas of mobile equipment parts, engineering products,
subcontracting, medical devices and laboratory equipment, and
pharmaceutical products, which received extremely high satisfaction
ratings from participants

3 ECPs

IT Outsourcing, Business Processes Outsourcing, Timber and
timber-related products

2 BSODs

2006-2009 assistance to Corpei Ecuador; assistance to IBCE Bolivia

2012

3 ECPs

Three ECPs finalised towards the end of 2012 in the areas of
outerwear (Macedonia), food ingredients, and home decoration,
accessories & gifts

2013

2 BSOD
programmes

Asia (India, Indonesia and Vietnam) and Latin America (Bolivia and
Peru)

Source: CBI annual reports and various evaluation reports.

Annexes

Annex 6
		

Working Instruction Export/
Business Audit for ECPs
market entry EU

market entry
regional

grade =>3
certiﬁcation

export capacity
building

grade =>2
business
development

grade =>3
(exceptional cases)
grade =>2

no further
support

grade <1 or 4

export audit and
action plan

grade =>1

Source: CBI, Working Instruction Export/Business Audit for ECPs.
| 127 |

The figure illustrates the modus operandi of an ECP. Every company that receives export
coaching from CBI is audited on various (clusters of ) aspects. The working instruction
provides insight into the relation between the audit and the various modules of an ECP.171
The audit scores determine which intervention pathway to offer the company. The working
instruction underlines that the intervention does not focus solely on decreasing
information asymmetry, but also reaches out to business development in general.
Moreover, the figure also shows that CBI targets companies with a broader range of needs,
since beneficiaries’ scores on critical clusters lie in the range of grades 1-4.172
According to advocates of a more strict interpretation of CBI’s mission, the audit was only
meant to be a selection tool. Instead, the audit has become a diagnostic tool based on
which action plans are being developed in order to address these companies’ weaknesses.173
Advocates of this view argue that if these weaknesses should be addressed in order to
include a company in the programme, CBI should leave it to local companies to provide
such support. According to those that believe CBI’s main mission is to reduce information
asymmetry, CBI should have been more selective when choosing its beneficiaries, only
taking companies on board that were on the brink of exporting to the EU, since CBI is
explicitly not meant to be a development organisation. Consequently, this line of reasoning
also ex ante denied the potential effectiveness of the CBI programme in least-developed
countries. Nevertheless, advocates of this vision were unsuccessful.
171

172

173

These modules are export audit and action plan, business development, export capacity building,
certification, and market entry regional/EU.
A similar argument about a broad strategy approach can be upheld for interventions within the BSOD
programme, in which a wider variety of organisations (including, for example, government export
departments, chambers of commerce, or trade/sector associations) have been supported.
One interviewee specifically typifies this development as ‘mission creep’.

Aided trade

Reconstructed intervention logic of
ECP and BSOD programmes

impact level

Annex 7
		

sustainable
economic
development

intermediate outcome level

ultimate
outcome
level

enhanced
enterprise
competitiveness
in EU/EFTA

enhanced
market entry in
EU/EFTA

immediate outcome level

| 128 |

export
diversiﬁcation

access to
certiﬁcation of
production

business
coaching

business links

export audit

client selection

drop outs

labour and
working
conditions

substitution of
market players
from other
developing
countries

enhanced
value added of
company
exports

ﬁrst time export
experience

export capacity
building

net
employment
created

better services
to SMEs

increased
domestic market

more
coordination
within the
sector

increase in BSO
knowledge base

BSO training
support

country/sector
analysis

more coordination
with external
parties (government, service
providers)

Human
capacity
(FTE)

Multilateral

Companies
and NGOs

Bilateral

Channel

FMO-MASSIF,
NIPP, GTLP,
FMO-CD, TCX

Financial sector
(EUR 736 bln.)

PSOM/PSI,
PUM,
Agriterra,
Woord en
Daad

Bilateral
programmes
in Bolivia,
Rwanda,
Zambia, etc.
IFC Africa

Knowledge
transfer
(EUR 615 bln.)

Law and
regulation
(EUR 60 mln.)

CBI, IDH,
Solidaridad,
IFDC

ORET,
FMO-IDF,
PIDG, ORIO

Infrastructure
(EUR 1.171 bln.)

Market
development
(EUR 550 bln.)

Instruments/
programmes

Thematic
clusters

Analysis of business
climate constraints.
Technical assistance
to (local) governments.

Co-financing of joint
ventures.
Analysing business
processes.
Financing vocational
education.
Supporting producer
organisations.

Advisory services on
products/services and
production methods.
Developing partnerships for sustainable
market chains.

Financing and
support of financial
intermediaries.
Development of
innovative financial
services.
Advisory services
financial law and
regulations.

Delivery of capital
goods and technology.

Co-financing local
infrastructure.

Activities
Better access of
infrastructure.

Roads, bridges, harbours,
electrification, hospitals,
water & sanitation,
irrigation, telecom.

Innovative production.

Joint ventures.
Company advises.
Trained employers
and employees.
Better organised producer
organisations.

Reports, proposals,
seminars, aimed at law
and regulatory reform.

Improved production,
production processes
and marketing.

Reports on products and
production processes.
Market chain partnerships.

Law and regulatory
reforms (indicator:
Doing business scores)

Stronger social
dialogue.

Improved
entrepreneurship.

Better acces
(innovative)
financial services.

More widespread and
improved financial service
delivery.
New financial products
Financial sector reforms.

Reduced transaction
costs.

Outcome

Output

Less informal
economy

Better
company
results

Productivity
increase

Better jobs

Stronger
companies

Higher
investments
(national
and FDI)

Impact

Annex 8
		
		

Financial
means
(ODA)

Input
MFA

Annexes

Result chain private sector
development policies 2005-2012
(reconstruction by IOB)

Economic growth & reduced poverty

| 129 |

Aided trade

Annex 9
		

Brief description CBI evaluation
framework

CBI evaluates its programmes, the results of which are judged according to the defined
result indicators of the programme interventions. The relevance and quality of these
indicators are not at stake during these regular evaluations. CBI (result/effect/impact)
programme indicators have been formulated to serve two goals: (1) project monitoring
(content), and (2) project administrative purposes (ex ante price-setting mechanism).
The CBI Programme Management Manual lists some key performance indicators (KPIs) per
intervention area at both the output and outcome levels.174 These KPIs are presented in the
table below. However, this set of indicators was defined in 2012, whereas the period under
evaluation is 2005-2012. Hence, it would not be fair to assess the CBI interventions on the
basis of these indicators if they were not used in the preceding years as well.
Table A

Key performance indicators per intervention area

Intervention Area

KPIs

Measured by

ECP (Exporters)

• # of competent exporters
• # of exporters that have established number of relevant business
contacts with EU/regional
importers
• increase in exports (outcome
indicator)

• internal audits & external client
satisfaction surveys
• external exporters survey

BSOD (Chain
supporters)

• # of clients of BSOs that use related
service (uptake)
• increase in exports (outcome
indicator)

• internal reporting/assessments
• external client satisfaction surveys

Policy (Chain
influencers)

• # of improved trade policies
• increase in exports (outcome
indicator), if relevant175

• internal assessment
• documentation or exporter surveys

Importers

• # of ongoing partnerships with
BSOs in target export markets
• increase in exports (outcome
indicator), if relevant

• external exporters survey
• external exporters survey

| 130 |

Source: CBI (2012b: 22).

174
175

CBI (2012b: Table 4 and Annex 8).
Policy as well as importer projects may not necessarily contribute directly to outcome (i.e. export), but
only support the efforts of other (e.g. ECP) projects. In these cases, no increase in exports needs to be
reported.

Annexes

Actually, a different, though partially overlapping set of indicators was defined earlier.176
This set includes indicators on the so-called ‘result’, ‘effect’ and ‘impact’ levels, which were
formulated with the introduction in 2006 of the ex ante price system.177 Table B gives an
overview of the ‘quality indicators’ that were formulated for ECP and BSOD programmes, as
well as indicators for market information and training. Norms have been specified for these
indicators.
Table B

Quality indicators per intervention area and level

Intervention
area

‘Result’
(capacity transfer)

‘Effect’
(use of capacity)

‘Impact’
(effect of use of capacity)

ECP
(Exporters)

• Sufficient score (i.e. at
least 2 on a scale of 4)
for the clusters of the
CBI export audit.
• Export marketing plan
that reflects knowledge
of EU/EFTA markets
and export marketing.
• Sufficient # of relevant
business contacts in
the EU market and
demonstrated skills
and experience in
product marketing.

• # of businesses
with demonstrated exports
to the EU/EFTA.

• Total additional exports to EU/
EFTA one year after completion
of the CBI intervention.
• Total additional exports to
non-EU/EFTA from the start of
the CBI intervention until one
year after its completion.
• Additional number of jobs
measured from the start of the
CBI intervention until one year
after its completion.

BSOD
(Chain
supporters)

• Certification of transfer
of competences.

• Use of
competences.

• Users/clients of the services
provided by BSOs judge that
they receive a better service
provision than they received
prior to the support given by
CBI.

Market
information

• # of received units of
market information.

• Received market
information
actually read.

• Usefulness of received market
information.
• Enhanced knowledge of EU
export market.

Training

• More insight and
knowledge of
exporting.

• Use of insight
and knowledge.

• Additional exports or more
effective service provision.

Source: CBI (2007), Memorandum of 16 November 2007; CBI (2008) Memorandum of 31 March 2008; see also EIM
(2012c).

176
177

This set is documented in a Memorandum from CBI to DGIS dated 16 November 2007.
Memorandum from CBI to DGIS dated 16 November 2007; Memorandum from CBI to DGIS dated
31 March 2008. The three levels appear to be equivalent with the output, outcome and impact levels in
a results chain.

| 131 |

Aided trade

Annex 10
		

Enabling trade dimensions –
country scores

| 132 |

Sources: The Enabling Trade index, CBI.

The amount spent on ECPs is represented by the size of the blocks. The colour of the blocks
represents the assessment on the ETI dimension ‘market access’. Countries marked in green
have good prospects for accessing markets, while the prospects for those marked in red are
generally judged to be unfavourable. The orange-coloured countries hover in between. Each
block further indicates the country name, followed by the CBI country group indicator (exit,
PSD, transition, and focus countries), the country income group (lower-income country,
lower-middle-income country, upper-middle-income country,), and the assessment on the
ETI dimensions ‘infrastructure’ and ‘operational environment’.

Annexes

Annex 11

Employment effects reviewed

1028

Mobile equipment parts

1,270

30

42

660

1029

Engineering products

861

32

27

640

1030

Medical devices and
laboratory equipment

343

37

9

343

1031

ITO

836

38

22

570

1032

BPO

-100

10

-10

-100

1034

Pipes and process equipment

4,051

47

86

2,714

1035

Outerwear

-1,533

21

-73

-1,533

1036

Sub-contracting castings and
forgings

593

38

16

593

1037

Food ingredients

0

29

0

0

1038

Personal and protective
equipment

373

25

15

n.a.

1039

Office and school supplies

349

47

7

-159

1040

Home decoration accessories
and gifts

2,303

44

52

14

1043

Pharmaceutical products

Total

Competent
exporters

Description

Increase per
competent
exporter

Employment
Increase

Reassessment

Programme

Employment
increase

CBI testimonials

| 133 |

89

27

3

89

9,435

425

22

3,831

Source: CBI regular evaluations, IOB survey.

According to programme management information obtained from CBI, which has been
collated in this annex, there have been substantial job increases in ‘pipes and process
equipment’ , ‘home decoration accessories and gifts’ and ‘mobile equipment parts’178, while
the ‘outerwear’ programme in Macedonia has suffered major job losses.179 Another regular
ECP evaluation indicated that the total number of jobs attributed by 31 respondents was 471
(an average of 15 per enterprise), but a disclaimer stated that more than 110 additional jobs
were reported by one company, so the average number of jobs per company was
exaggerrated.180
178

179

180

This number seems to be rather high bearing in mind the discussion on the trade-off between market
destinations, which suggests there has not been an increase in funds.
The evaluation of ‘business process outsourcing’ (1032) concluded that at the end of the programme in
2009, all companies had to reduce the size of their staff as a result of the economic crisis. By contrast,
the evaluation of the ITO programme (1031) suggested that the programme has had a positive and quite
significant impact.
EIM 2011/2012.

Aided trade

Annex 12

Benchmark methodology

The following set of criteria has been used to identify and assess the appropriateness of
potential benchmark organisations:
•
•
•
•
•

•

| 134 |

Organisation promoted imports from developing countries between 2005 and 2012
(required);
Operational focus of the import promotion programme is on individual businesses in
developing countries (required);
Import promotion programme aims to increase exports (end or intermediate goal) (required);
Organisation has data available on (the development of ) export turnover of supported
businesses in developing countries (required);
Organisation has similar import promotion strategy to CBI, including technical
assistance/ coaching of individual businesses, dissemination of market intelligence, etc.
(preferred); and
Import promotion programme has similar sector and geographical focus (preferred).181

These criteria were applied to all member organisations of the Trade Related Instruments
Connected (TRIC) network, known as the TRIC partners, in accordance with CBI advice.182
The activities of these organisations were screened on the basis of their websites and annual
reports. Some organisations were contacted with requests for additional information. Our
conclusion was that all IPOs, except VIRKE, have promoting imports from or private sector
development in developing countries as one of their goals, but the strategies that most of
these organisations employ to reach these goals are different from CBI’s.
The Swiss Import Promotion Programme matches the criteria and shows the greatest
resemblance to CBI’s export coaching programme. The programme works in similar sectors
as CBI, i.e. jewellery, agricultural and forestry products, fisheries, vehicles, and electronics
(see Box 9 below).
A second comparable organisation, the Trade for Development Centre, a programme of the
Belgian Development Agency, meets the three required criteria but was not able to provide
information on the outcome of their activities in terms of increased exports. The sector
focus is also slightly different from CBI, with a major focus on (small) agricultural
businesses and no industrial products at all. Even so, TDC is included in the benchmark for
the purpose of comparing the cost structures of the IPOs and their approaches to export
promotion.
181

182

If a criterion is ‘required’, this means organisations have to meet it to be able to serve as a benchmark
for CBI. If a criterion is ‘preferred’, a higher score on this criteria means higher eligibility.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Import Promotion Desk (IPD), Swiss
Import Promotion Programme (SIPPO), Finnpartnership, The Enterprise Federation of Norway (VIRKE),
Trade for Development Centre (TDC) and Chamber Trade Sweden.

Annexes

Box 9

Swiss import promotion programme

The Swiss Import Promotion Programme (SIPPO) is an instrument of economic
development cooperation, under the responsibility of the State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs (SECO) of Switzerland. It was founded in 1985 to promote SMEs’
access to Swiss and EU markets. SIPPO operated independently in its first decade,
but was integrated into Switzerland Global Enterprise in 2007 and 2008. This is also
the dedicated agency that promotes Swiss exports abroad and tries to attract
inward foreign investments.
SIPPO’s operational focus during most of the evaluation period was on bringing
individual businesses to the European market, via trade fairs and coaching. The
target group consisted of small and medium-sized businesses on the verge of
export-readiness. SIPPO’s products – training, matchmaking, and market information – closely resembled CBI’s. However, as recommended in the 2011 evaluation
report, SIPPO has started to move away from increasing individual businesses’
competitiveness towards building the capacity to support local business and
promoting market development. This change is being implemented gradually, as
shown by the 2012-2015 Performance Contract. Two new approaches are added to
the portfolio in this new contract: ‘systemic market development’ and ‘country
pavilion’. These approaches, which were first developed in pilot projects, are now
being incorporated into SIPPO’s modus operandi. Even so, a considerable share of
the budget (40%, according to the 2012-2015 Performance Contract) is still awarded
to the traditional ‘SIPPO Pavilion’ approach, which bears the most resemblance to
CBI’s Export Coaching Programmes in the evaluation time frame. Also, bearing in
mind that CBI has started out on a similar path towards more systemic interventions, this gradual development towards more systemic interventions does not stand
in the way of a meaningful comparison.

Additional information on cost drivers has been gathered and analysed, in order to analyse
and explain variations in cost-per-unit between TPOs:
•
•
•
•

scale of operations (TPO annual turnover, number of simultaneous programmes,
number of beneficiary companies per programme);
geographical spread of operations (number of countries per programme/sector,
weighted average travel distance per programme);
target group characteristics (average amount of employees and turnover per beneficiary;
% of beneficiaries with export experience at programme entry); and
programme characteristics (average programme duration, average number of fair visits
per programme, average number of personal visits to beneficiaries per programme).

| 135 |

Multiple

Tunisia

Peru

Cadot et al.
(2012)

Volpe
Martincus
and
Carballo
(2008)

PROMPEX: offers training on
the export process, marketing,
and business negotiations;
provides information on trade
opportunities and disseminates analyses on country and
product market trends;
provides technical assistance;
coordinates and supports (and
in some cases co-finances)
firms’ participation
in international trade missions
and trade shows.

FAMEX: matching grant (50%
co-finance of export business
plan). 60% of funds were
spent on market information
and market entry. The rest on
product development,
organisational development,
or foreign subsidiaries.

Export promotion agencies in
103 countries.

Double
difference
and PSM

Double
Difference
and PSM

Cross-country
regression

Significant

Significant

Significant

Positive
effect on
export
turnover?

Lederman
et al.
(2010)

Method

Author and
date of
publication

Type of assistance

Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion

Country

Annex 13

Existing markets:
Insignificant
New products:
Significant
New countries:
Significant

Existing markets:
NA
New products:
Significant
New countries:
Significant

NA

Positive effects
via intensive
and extensive
margin?

NA

- Effects on intensive margin are
not durable (disappear after
three years);
- Effects on extensive margin are
durable;
- Diversification does not reduce
the volatility of the export
turnover;
- The FAMEX programme did not
lead to significant positive
spillover effects.

- There are notable decreasing
returns to scale in resources
devoted to export promotion.

Other effects:

Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion

| 136 |

Annex 13

NA

- Firms that seek to enter new
markets or develop new export
products benefit more than firms
that seek to increase exports in
existing markets with existing
products;
- Activities focused on acquiring
market information and on market
entry seem to be more effective
than product or firm development,
or setting up foreign subsidiaries.

EPAs are more effective when:
- They support firms that produce
heterogeneous goods;
- When trade barriers are high;
- A large share of the EPA’s budget is
publicly funded;
- A large share of the executive board
consists of private sector actors.

Identified key success factors

Aided trade

Colombia

Chile

Volpe and
Martincus
and
Carballo
(2010b)

PROCHILE: training
in market research, logistics,
banking,
international law, and
business plans, and market
intelligence services.
Specialised counselling and
technical assistance on how to
access specific markets,
coordinates and, in some
cases, co-finances firms’
participation in international
trade missions and trade fairs.

PROEXPORT: offers and (co-)
finances trainings, counselling,
information, trade fair
assistance, trade missions, and
match-making services.

Fixed effects
and quintile
treatment
effects

Double
difference
and PSM

Significant

Significant

Positive
effect on
export
turnover?

Volpe
Martincus
and
Carballo
(2010a)

Method

Country

Author and
date of
publication

Type of assistance

Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion

Annex 13
Other effects:

- Individual services only have a
significant effect on extensive
margin, while bundled services
also have a positive effect on the
intensive margin.

NA

Positive effects
via intensive
and extensive
margin?
Existing markets
/ products:
Significant
New products:
Significant
New countries:
Significant

Existing markets
/ products:
Significant
New products:
Insignificant
New countries:
Significant

- Smaller and relatively inexperienced firms, as measured by their
total exports, benefit most from
promotion actions.

- Firms that simultaneously receive
counselling, participate in
international trade missions and
fairs, and get support in setting up
an agenda of commercial meetings
exhibit higher growth in total
exports and the number of
countries they export to than
comparable firms that only join one
or a combination of two of these
activities.

Identified key success factors

Annexes

| 137 |

Argentina

Ireland

Volpe
Martincus
et al.
(2012)

Görg et al.
(2008)

183

Costa
Rica

Double
difference +
PSM

Fixed effects

Double
difference
and PSM

Significant

Significant

Significant

NA

Existing markets
/ products:
Insignificant
New products:
Insignificant
New countries:
Significant

Existing markets
/ products:
Insignificant
New products:
Insignificant
New countries:
Significant

Positive effects
via intensive
and extensive
margin?

- Insignificant effect on the
propensity to start exporting.

NA

NA

Other effects:

- The larger the grant, the more likely
it will increase a firm’s exports.

- Export promotion did not
significantly affect the export
turnover of large companies
(> 200 employees).
- Medium (between 50 and 200
employees) and small companies
(< 50 employees) benefit most from
export promotion.
- Medium companies benefit more
than small companies.

- No significant effects on firms that
sell homogenous goods;
significant effects on firms selling
differentiated goods.

Identified key success factors

‘Projects suitable for assistance had to either involve the production of goods primarily for export; be of an advanced technological nature for supply to international trading
or skilled self-supply firms within Ireland; and/or be in sectors of the Irish market that are subject to international competition’ (Görg et al., 2008: 4-5)

IDA: grants for investments in
physical capital, training or
technology with the aim to
increase international
competitiveness.183

EXPORTAR: training on the
export process; market
intelligence; organising and
co-financing the participation
of Argentine firms in trade
fairs, exhibitions and missions;
arranging meetings with
potential foreign buyers; and
supporting the association of
small companies to operate
more effectively in external
markets.

PROCOMER:
Training and counselling on
the export process; market
intelligence; coordinates and
co-finances the participation
of Costa Rican firms in
international trade missions,
fairs, and shows; arranges
foreign buyer missions; and
sponsors the creation of
consortia.

Positive
effect on
export
turnover?

Volpe
Martincus
and
Carballo
(2012)

Method

Country

Author and
date of
publication

| 138 |

Type of assistance

Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion

Annex 13

Aided trade

Spain

United
States

Brazil

Bernard
and Jensen
(2004)

Cruz (2014)

APEX: Matching domestic
sellers and foreign buyers (e.g.
through participation
in trade fairs) and providing
standard information on
foreign markets.

State export promotion.

Regional export service
agencies all over the world
assisting Spanish firms with
economic, legal and taxation
information, finding and
managing third party funds,
searching for suitable partners
and locations, assistance with
administrative procedures,
identification and initial
selection of staff in the target
area, and search for premises
and available industrial land.

Double
difference +
PSM

Fixed effects
and GMM
first
differences

Fixed effects

NA

NA

Significant

Positive
effect on
export
turnover?

Gil et al.
(2008)

Method

Country

Author and
date of
publication

Type of assistance

Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion

Annex 13

NA

NA

- Insignificant effect on the
propensity to start exporting.

- Significant positive influence on
the propensity to start exporting.

NA

Existing markets
/ products:
NA
New products:
NA
New countries:
Insignificant
Existing markets
/ products:
NA
New products:
NA
New countries:
Significant

- Export promotion did not help
large firms to become exporters.
- Export promotion did help micro,
small and medium-sized firms to
become exporters.

- Export promotion does not seem to
be effective in helping large
companies to start exporting.

Identified key success factors

Other effects:

Positive effects
via intensive
and extensive
margin?

Annexes

| 139 |

Netherlands

Belgium

Schminke
en van
Biesebroeck
(2013)

Flanders Investment and
Trade.

Netherlands Business Support
Offices, embassies, consulates,
and foreign affiliates of
bilateral chambers of
commerce in 50 most
important trading countries
and trade missions organised
by the government or by the
sector.

Fixed effects

Random
effects model

Significant

Significant

Positive
effect on
export
turnover?

Creusen
and Lejour
(2011)

Method

Country

Author and
date of
publication

Existing markets
/ products:
Significant
New products:
Significant
New countries:
Significant

Existing markets
/ products:
NA
New products:
NA
New countries:
Significant

Positive effects
via intensive
and extensive
margin?

| 140 |

Type of assistance

Literature overview of impact studies on export promotion

Annex 13

- Significant positive influence on
the propensity to start
exporting.

NA

Other effects:

- Export promotion is most effective
in increasing the propensity for
hard-to-reach destinations, for
firms without export experience,
and for small firms.

- All instruments except missions
organised by specific sector have a
significant effect on export
probability.
- Effects of trade missions and
NBSOs on export volumes are
larger in middle-income countries,
than in high-income countries.
- Firms follow a stepping stone
approach for reaching markets
further away (physically and
culturally).

Identified key success factors

Aided trade

Evaluation matrix

policy reconstruction

policy reconstruction

How has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs operated with regard to
formulating the assignment, controlling the budget, and informing CBI
of changes in policy, as well as monitoring the results agreed upon with
CBI?

Could the objectives of the programme have been achieved through
other means, e.g. direct support of export promotion agencies?

CBI selection process and
procedures followed
additional export value/
export diversification/
additional jobs

additional export value and
jobs/export diversification

To what extent did companies increase exports to EU/EFTA as result of
the CBI programmes? Which company types did benefit most (company
size class, sector, export experience, export share of total turnover,
policy context, and country income class)? What is the employment
effects resulting from the interventions?

To what extent did benefits (exports, jobs) continue after CBI’s
intervention was completed?

x

x

x

counterfactual, interview and survey data,
case study

x

x

x

x
x

x

X

x

x

see above

x

case study, project administration,
secondary data (such as large-scale
enterprise panel surveys)

primary survey data, secondary data (e.g.
enterprise panel surveys); counterfactual
analysis; enterprise level employment
figures

monitoring data collected as part of the
programme management process

strategic guidance documents, policy
briefs, annual plans, grant agreements

Document analysis
x

Source(s) of evidence

Interviews
x

Benchmark

x

Survey

How were clients selected? What are the profiles of the selected
beneficiaries?

x

Case study

Effectiveness: is CBI doing the things right?

policy reconstruction,
literature review

Literature review

Was the programme consistent with international academic literature,
findings from evaluations, priorities set by the minister for development
cooperation, priorities set by the resident countries of the companies
and BSODs?

Operationalisation /
indicator(s)

Annex 14

Relevance: has CBI been doing the right things?

Evaluation questions

Annex 14

Annexes

Evaluation matrix

| 141 |

partnerships between CBI
and other donors, local
service providers, inventory
of other company
assistance of any kind

To what extent did CBI collaborate with other development partners,
and to what extent have beneficiaries of the CBI intervention also been
assisted by other trade promotion agencies, donors/stakeholders;
before, during or after the CBI intervention?

x

x

x

Interviews

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Benchmark

How costs per service and per realised extra unit of export value
compare to that of other trade promoting organisations?

Document analysis
x

Survey

unit cost of services (e.g.
cost price differentials at
sector level, cost per
additional export turnover)

net income, net output, net
export to outside EU/EFTA

Besides direct effects, what kind of indirect effects (net income, net
output, and net export to other destinations then EU/EFTA) can be linked
to CBI interventions? How did these indirect effects contribute to the
programme objectives?

Case study

Efficiency: does CBI execute its programmes efficiently?

Operationalisation /
indicator(s)

Evaluation matrix

| 142 |

Evaluation questions

Annex 14

CBI annual (budget) reports, financial
allocation and realisations to different
types of activity, evaluation of other IPOs

interview data, strategic documents,
project administration, case study, survey

case study, project administration

Source(s) of evidence

Aided trade

Literature review

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015
Evaluation reports published before 2011 can be found on the IOB website:
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations or www.iob-evaluatie.nl.
IOB no.

Year

Report

ISBN

409

2015

Evaluation of the Matra Programme in the Eastern
Partnership countries 2008-2014

978-90-5328-475-9

408

2015

Aided trade: An evaluation of the Centre for the
Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries
(2005-2012)

978-90-5328-477-3

407

2015

Opening doors and unlocking potential: Key lessons
from an evaluation of support for Policy Influencing,
Lobbying and Advocacy (PILA)

978-90-5328-474-2

406

2015

Beleidsdoorlichting van de Nederlandse humanitaire
hulp 2009-2014

978-90-5328-473-5

405

2015

Gender sense & sensitivity: Policy evaluation on
women’s rights and gender equality (2007-2014)

978-90-5328-471-1

404

2015

Met hernieuwde energie. Beleidsdoorlichting van de
Nederlandse bijdrage aan hernieuwbare energie en
ontwikkeling

978-90-5328-472-8

403

2015

Premises and promises: A study of the premises
underlying the Dutch policy for women’s rights and
gender equality

978-90-5328-469-8

402

2015

Work in Progress – Evaluation of the ORET Programme:
Investing in Public Infrastructure in Developing Countries

978-90-5328-470-4

401

2015

Evaluation of the MDG3 Fund: ‘Investing in Equality’
(2008-2011)

978-90-5328-468-1

400

2015

The Only Constant is Change: Evaluation of the Dutch
contribution to transition in the Arab region (20092013)

978-90-5328-467-4

399

2015

Gender, peace and security: Evaluation of the Netherlands
and UN Security Council resolution 1325

978-90-5328-465-0

398

2014

Navigating a sea of interests: Policy evaluation of Dutch
foreign human rights policy 2008-2013

978-90-5328-460-5

397

2014

Riding the wave of sustainable commodity sourcing:
Review of the Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH 2008-2013

978-90-5328-464-3

396

2014

Access to Energy in Rwanda. Impact evaluation of
activities supported by the Dutch Promoting Renewable
Energy Programme

978-90-5328-463-6

395

2014

Strategie bij benadering. Nederlandse coalitievorming
en de multi-bi benadering in het kader van de EUbesluitvorming (2008-2012)

978-90-5328-462-9

| 143 |

Aided trade

| 144 |

IOB no.

Year

Report

ISBN

394

2014

Autonomy, partnership and beyond: A counterfactual
analysis of policy coherence for Ghana

978-90-5328-459-9

393

2014

Balanceren tussen koopmanschap en diplomatie.
Evaluatie van de Netherlands Business Support Offices
2008-2013

978-90-5328-458-2

392

2014

Good things come to those who make them happen:
Return on aid for Dutch exports

978-90-5328-456-8

391

2014

Useful patchwork: Direct Funding of Local NGOs by
Netherlands Embassies 2006-2012

978-90-5328-455-1

390

2014

Investeren in wereldburgerschap. Evaluatie van de
Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking
en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (NCDO)

978-90-5328-454-4

389

2014

Op zoek naar focus en effectiviteit. Beleidsdoorlichting
van de Nederlandse inzet voor Private Sector Ontwikkeling 2005-2012

978-90-5328-451-3

388

2013

Impact evaluation of improved cooking stoves in
Burkina Faso: The impact of two activities supported by
the Promoting Renewable Energy Programme

978-90-5328-449-0

387

2013

Between Ambitions and Ambivalence: Mid-term
Evaluation SNV Programme 2007-2015

978-90-5328-448-3

386

2013

Evaluation issues in financing for development:
Analysing effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on
developing countries.

978-90-5328-447-6

385

2013

Economic diplomacy in practice: An evaluation of Dutch
economic diplomacy in Latin America

978-90-5328-446-9

384

2013

Achieving universal access to sexual and reproductive
health and rights: Synthesis of multilateral contribution
to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights
(2006-2012)

978-90-5328-445-2

383

2013

NGOs in action: A study of activities in sexual and
reproductive health and rights by Dutch NGOs

978-90-5328-444-5

382

2013

Buscando novas relações : Avaliação da política externa
dos Países Baixos para a América Latina. Informe
especial sobre o Brasil

978-90-5328-453-7

382

2013

En busca de nuevas relaciones: Evaluatión de la politica
exterior de los Paísos Bajos en América Latina. Resumen
del informe principal

978-90-5328-450-6

382

2013

Op zoek naar nieuwe verhoudingen. Evaluatie van het
Nederlandse buitenlandbeleid in Latijns-Amerika

978-90-5328-443-8

381

2013

Balancing Ideals with Practice: Policy evaluation of
Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health
and rights 2007-2012

978-90-5328-442-1

380

2013

Linking Relief and Development: More than old
solutions for old problems?

978-90-5328-441-4

379

2013

Investeren in stabiliteit. Het Nederlandse fragiele
statenbeleid doorgelicht

978-90-5328-440-7

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

IOB no.

Year

Report

ISBN

378

2013

Public private partnerships in developing countries.
A systematic literature review

978-90-5328-439-1

377

2013

Corporate Social Responsibility: the role of public policy.
A systematic literature review of the effects of
government supported interventions on the corporate
social responsibility (CSR) behaviour of enterprises in
developing countries

978-90-5328-438-4

376

2013

Renewable Energy: Access and Impact. A systematic
literature review of the impact on livelihoods of
interventions providing access to renewable energy in
developing countries

978-90-5328-437-7

375

2013

The Netherlands and the European Development Fund
– Principles and practices. Evaluation of Dutch involvement in EU development cooperation (1998-2012)

978-90-5328-436-0

374

2013

Working with the World Bank. Evaluation of Dutch
World Bank policies and funding 2000-2011

978-90-5328-435-3

373

2012

Evaluation of Dutch support to human rights projects.
(2008-2011)

978-90-5328-433-9

372

2012

Relations, résultats et rendement. Évaluation de la
coopération au sein de l’Union Benelux du point de vue
des Pays-Bas

978-90-5328-434-6

372

2012

Relaties, resultaten en rendement. Evaluatie van de
Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands
perspectief

978-90-5328-431-5

371

2012

Convirtiendo un derecho en práctica. Evaluación de
impacto del programa del cáncer cérvico-uterino del
Centro de Mujeres lxchen en Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-432-2

371

2012

Turning a right into practice. Impact evaluation of the
Ixchen Centre for Women cervical cancer programme in
Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-429-2

370

2012

Equity, accountability and effectiveness in decentralisation policies in Bolivia

978-90-5328-428-5

369

2012

Budgetsupport: Conditional results – Policy review
(2000-2011)

978-90-5328-427-8

369

2012

Begrotingssteun: Resultaten onder voorwaarden –
Doorlichting van een instrument (2000-2011)

978-90-5328-426-1

368

2012

Civil Society, Aid, and Development: A Cross-Country
Analysis

979-90-5328-425-4

367

2012

Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid –
Beleidsdoorlichting 2006-2010

979-90-5328-424-7

366

2012

Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the
Dutch Development Cooperation 1990-2011

978-90-5328-423-0

366

2012

Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen – Beleidsdoorlichting van het OS-beleid 1990-2011

978-90-5328-422-3

| 145 |

Aided trade

| 146 |

IOB no.

Year

Report

ISBN

365

2012

Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept –
De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch
Concept 2010

978-90-5328-421-6

364

2012

Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: Methoden en
Resultaten van onderzoek.

978-90-5328-420-9

363

2011

Improving food security: A systematic review of the
impact of interventions in agricultural production, value
chains, market regulation, and land security

978-90-5328-419-3

362

2011

Methodische kwaliteit van Programma-evaluaties in het
Medefinancieringsstelsel-I 2007-2010

978-90-5328-418-6

361

2011

Evaluatie van de Twinningfaciliteit Suriname-Nederland

978-90-5328-417-9

360

2011

More than Water: Impact evaluation of drinking water
supply and sanitation interventions in rural Mozambique

978-90-5328-414-8

359

2011

Regionaal en geïntegreerd beleid? Evaluatie van het
Nederlandse beleid met betrekking tot de Westelijke
Balkan 2004-2008

978-90-5328-416-2

358

2011

Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch
Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010

978-90-5328-413-1

357

2011

Le risque d’effets éphémères: Évaluation d’impact des
programmes d’approvisionnement en eau potable et
d’assainissement au Bénin

978-90-5328-415-5

357

2011

The risk of vanishing effects: Impact Evaluation of
drinking water supply and sanitation programmes in
rural Benin

978-90-5328-412-4

356

2011

Between High Expectations and Reality: An evaluation of
budget support in Zambia

978-90-5328-411-7

355

2011

Lessons Learnt: Synthesis of literature on the impact and
effectiveness of investments in education

978-90-5328-410-0

354

2011

Leren van NGOs: Studie van de basic education
activiteiten van zes Nederlandse NGOs

978-90-5328-409-4

353

2011

Education matters: Policy review of the Dutch
contribution to basic education 1999-2009

978-90-5328-408-7

352

2011

Unfinished business: making a difference in basic
education. An evaluation of the impact of education
policies in Zambia and the role of budget support.

978-90-5328-407-0

351

2011

Confianza sin confines: Contribución holandesa a la
educación básica en Bolivia (2000-2009)

978-90-5328-406-3

350

2011

Unconditional Trust: Dutch support to basic education in
Bolivia (2000-2009)

978-90-5328-405-6

349

2011

The two-pronged approach Evaluation of Netherlands
978-90-5328-404-9
Support to Primary Education in Bangladesh, 1999-2009

348

2011

Schoon schip. En dan? Evaluatie van de schuldverlichting
aan de Democratische Republiek Congo 2003-2010.
(Verkorte Versie)

978-90-5328-403-2

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

IOB no.

Year

Report

ISBN

347

2011

Table rase – et après? Évaluation de l’Allègement de la
Dette en République Démocratique du Congo 20032010

978-90-5328-402-5

346

2011

Vijf Jaar Top van Warschau. De Nederlandse inzet voor
versterking van de Raad van Europa

978-90-5328-401-8

345

2011

Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen. Evaluatie
van de Schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van 2005 tussen
de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. (Verkorte Versie)

978-90-5328-398-1

344

2011

Intérêts communs – avantages communs. Évaluation de
l‘accord de 2005 relatif à l ‘allègement de la dette entre
le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Version Abrégée)

978-90-5328-399-8

343

2011

Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen.
Evaluatie van de schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst
van 2005 tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria.
(Samenvatting)

978-90-5328-397-4

342

2011

Intérêts communs – avantages communs. Évaluation de
l’accord de 2005 relatif à l’allègement de la dette entre
le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Sommaire)

978-90-5328-395-0

341

2011

Mutual Interests – mutual benefits. Evaluation of the
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and
Nigeria. (Summary report)

978-90-5328-394-3

340

2011

Mutual Interests – mutual benefits. Evaluation of the
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and
Nigeria. (Main report)

978-90-5328-393-6

338

2011

Consulaire Dienstverlening Doorgelicht 2007-2010

978-90-5328-400-1

337

2011

Evaluación de las actividades de las organizaciones
holandesas de cofinanciamiento activas en Nicaragua

-

336

2011

Facilitating Resourcefulness. Synthesis report of the
Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development

978-90-5328-392-9

335

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of the Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment (NCEA)

978-90-5328-391-2

-

2011

Aiding the Peace. A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support
to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in
Southern Sudan 2005-2010

978-90-5328-389-9

333

2011

Evaluación de la cooperación holandesa con Nicaragua
2005-2008

978-90-5328-390-5

332

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of PSO

978-90-5328-388-2

331

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty
Democracy (NIMD)

978-90-5328-387-5

If you would like to receive a publication in printed form, please send an e-mail to IOB@minbuza.nl,
mentioning the title and IOB number.

| 147 |

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands

| 148 |

www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.iob-evaluatie.nl/en
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
Photo cover:
Workers at a textile factory in Tirupur, India. There are some 7,000 garment factories in the
city, providing employment to close to one million people | Atul Loke / Panos Pictures
Photo chapter 1:
CBI-assisted company, Ahmedabad, India ; pipes and process equipment | Peter Henk Eshuis
Photo chapter 2:
CBI-assisted company, India ; pipes and process equipment | Peter Henk Eshuis
Photo chapter 3:
CBI-assisted company, India ; leather and garment industry | Peter Henk Eshuis
Photo chapter 4:
Workers assemble leather items at the Picard leather goods factory in Savar, Bangladesh |
G.M.B. Akash / Panos Pictures
Photo chapter 5:
non-CBI-assisted company, India ; food ingredients | Peter Henk Eshuis
Photo chapter 6:
CBI-assisted company, Ahmedabad, India ; pipes and process equipment | Peter Henk Eshuis
Layout: Xerox/OBT | The Hague
Print: Xerox/OBT | The Hague
ISBN: 978-90-5328-477-3
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | September 2015

This report presents the findings of the evaluation
of the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from
Developing Countries (CBI) and its contribution to
Dutch Private Sector Development (PSD) policy
between 2005 and 2012. The evaluation uses a
mixed-methods approach to investigate CBI’s
sectoral export coaching programme and the
business support organisation development.
The report concludes that CBI’s sectoral export
coaching programmes were relevant, though often
insufficient to stimulate companies to start exporting
to Europe, mostly due to unclear or misguided
targeting of participating companies and target

countries. Business Support Organisation
Development interventions, on the other hand,
were generally relevant, but there is little
information on their effect on the PSD goals.
Although CBI operated relatively independently from
the ministry during most of the evaluation period,
the ministry has already become more prescriptive
in what it expects from the organisation. A resultsoriented management model with ex post transfer
pricing and a reinforced monitoring & evaluation
system are necessary to further improve CBI’s
operating efficiency.

ded trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 408 | Aided trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 408 | Aided trade | IOB Evaluation | no. 408 | Aided trade | IOB Evaluation | no.
Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.iob-evaluatie.nl/en
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | September 2015
16BUZ90347|E