Security and rule of law
Organisation

Date

Reporting Period

Embassy Juba

August 2015

2014

Activity

2014

Implemented by

Name

Actual expenditure

Name Organisation

channel

Access to Justice Programme

EUR 2.107.141,80

UNDP

Multilateral organization

Effective Rule of Law

Significant

25564

Community Safety & Security

EUR 708.514,56

Saferworld

NGO

Human Security

Significant

26704

Radio Tamazuj

EUR 420.661,00

FPU

NGO

Legitimate and Capable Government

Not applicable

25523

SAJP - support to police

EUR 761.052,80

ATOS

Human Security
Research institute and companies

Not applicable

24650

SAJP - police academy

EUR 325.886,50

IPA

Research institute and companies
Human Security

Not applicable

Number
25529

Result Area

Gender marker
significant/principal

Activity

2014

Implemented by

Result Area

Gender marker

Number

Name

Actual expenditure

Name Organisation

channel

significant/principal

24638

Support to Radio Miraya

EUR 567.387,00

Fondation Hirondelle

NGO

Legitimate and Capable Government

Not applicable

23859

Multidonor Capacity Building Trust Fund

EUR 382.166,00

Mott McDonald

Research institute and companies
Legitimate and Capable Government

Not applicable

26139

Support to peace process Jonglei

EUR 300.950,00

PAX

NGO

Inclusive Political Processes

Not applicable

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Result Area 1

Human Security

Result Question 1a: To what extent have physical security and freedom from
fear as experienced by men and women from all social groups improved?

In South Sudan during 2014 overall the physical security and freedom from fear as experienced by men and women from all social groups has diminished. The fact
that South Sudan has been judged as the most Fragile State in the world attests to the negative trend. This is mainly due to protracted conflict in 3 of the 10 States
and decreasing Rule of Law in the other 7 States. In the North-Eastern States Unity, Upper Nile and North Jonglei there has been extensive armed conflict
between opposition and government, as well as several other armed groups, as a result of the internal conflict that broke out in Juba in December 2013. While
during the course of 2014 the situation in Southern Jonglei State stabilized, the country as a whole experienced continuous polarization between and within
different ethnic tribes. This was caused, beside the broader opposition-government struggle by and overall decrease in structural factors in the areas of security,
rule of law, macro economy and institutional stability. The decrease in Human Security caused over a million internal displaced persons, and an increase in people
living in UN Protection of Civilian Camps in Juba (mainly Nuer), Malakal (mixed Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk) and Bentiu (mixed Nuer and Dinka). International and
Dutch efforts focused on emergency relief in these areas, as well as, through the Dutch contribution to UNMISS, providing security at the UN PoC Camps.

(outcome, country-level)
Sub-goals:
1.1 All kinds of violent acts against citizens, including sexual violence, and
other physical security threats are reduced
1.2 Institutions responsible for maintaining security perform their tasks
effectively, accountably and in better coordination, responding to the needs
of citizens
1.3 Communities and civil society contribute to human security and a
culture of non-violence, independently and in coordination with responsible
institutions
1.4 Transnational drivers of conflict such as organized crime and (illicit)
flows of finance, arms and conflict commodities are reduced, based on an
integrated approach

Indicator 1: Homicides per 100.000 population

Indicator 2: Percentage of population that feels safe

Violent acts against citizens, including sexual violence, increased overall in the country, with a specific increase in the three conflict states Unity, Upper Nile and
Jonglei, but also in the surrounding States of Lakes and the Bar-e-Ghazal region. This is evidenced by several UN Human rights reports, as well as UNICEF,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports. The Equatorian States experienced the lowest level of decrease in human security, although due to the
overall decrease in Rule of Law the Equatorian States experienced a gradual decrease in human security as well. Albeit with, in 2014, less direct consequences for
the civilian population.
Institutions responsible for maintaining security have not improved their security effectiveness, accountability, or response to the needs of the citizens. Even before
the conflict the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), the South Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Wildlife Service (WS) were not in a
capacity to adequately protect the civil population. Due to fractures along the lines of opposition-government, and a trend of further fragmentation along tribal
allegiances the institutional effectiveness diminished severely. The Government invested heavily in military means to increase abilities to fight active conflicts and
neglected to invest sufficient means in developing government institutions like the police service to increase Rule of Law in States not directly affected by the
opposition-government conflict. While the police on a management level showed commitment to increase safety and security of the civilian population, they lack
operational means and solid policies to back up these intentions. Nevertheless, in Juba and Wau the police managed through the implementation of the rapid
response unit "777" to increase the sense of security among civilians. These efforts have, however, been countered by increased criminality and misuse of power
by other uniformed units (including other police units), and 'criminal' elements targeting civilians. This trend was reinforced by decreasing macro economic factors
and severe delays of payments to security forces and government employees in general. Government did not contribute to improved policies of security by
adopting the controversial National Security Services Act, which gives the National Security Services disproportionate powers which are not checked by legal or
government institutions. This resulted in increased intimidation and arbitrary arrests, which are however very difficult to attribute to specific groups or entities. The
international community as whole ceased to support security institutions as a consequence of severe human rights violations which have not been (publicly)
addressed by the government. On a very small scale the police service is supported in the areas of human rights training, "777", and gender based violence. The
Netherlands decided not to support the security services until public measures by the government have been shown against alleged human rights violations.
Transnational drivers of conflict have become more apparent while the conflict in South Sudan continued during 2014. In the absence of a peace deal opposition,
government and other armed groups continued to acquire arms and use public funds for other means then providing services to the population. These drivers are
being addressed through regional forums such as IGAD and the AU, but these processes have yielded limited results due to conflicting interests and lack of
willingness of conflicting parties to come to terms and agree on a viable cessation of hostilities and an inclusive peace deal. The regional efforts continue, as well
as international efforts to set up an international UN sanction regime against those individuals who block peace efforts.
Baseline
Target 2017
Result 2012
Result 2013
Result 2014
Source
The positive trend in South Sudan is that increasingly communities and civil society groups contribute to human security and a culture of non-violence.
13.9 (2012) this has to be done largely outside
13.9 of national institutions.
N/A
UNODC and local governments are being involved in
Unfortunately
However, on aN/A
local level State governments
these efforts. While the civil society, including the churches, at a whole experienced throughout 2014 challenges to come to terms with each other in setting
broader goals, they put in great effort to achieve this. The overall sense amongst citizens is that the current conflict is senseless and that it has to stop.
Consequently slowly an increase in mobilization is visible with a strong message of non-violence and reconciliation. This trend is supported by the international
Gallup World Poll (Percentage of respondents(n), who
44% (2014)
N/A
N/A
44%
community and the Netherlands by assisting in peace building initiatives while at the same time leaving the process to be led by South Sudanese themselves. On a
answered positively to the question, n=1000)
local level this showed tangible results and is a promising positive trend.

Indicator 3: Political stability and absence of violence

7.1 (2011)

12.8

5.7

N/A

World Wide Governance Indicators, World Bank

Indicator 4: Voice and accountability

19.2 (2011)

11.8

9

N/A

World Wide Governance Indicators, World Bank

Result Question 1a (remaining indicators):

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Indicator 5: the budget for the SPLA (inc. national security) has
decreased in absolute and relative terms

FY 11/12 3.650
billion SSP (20%)

FY 12/13 2.940
billion SSP (25%)

FY13/14 3.142
billion SSP (34%)

FY 14/15 4.378
billion SSP (39%)

Min Fin (FY 11/12, 12/13 expenditures. 13/14 budget,
no expenditures 13/14 public, 14/15 budget)

Indicator 6: the budget for the SSNPS (inc. prisons and justice sector)
has increased in absolute and relative terms

FY 11/12 620
million SSP (3,4%)

FY 12/13 578
million SSP (5%)

FY 13/14 1.271
billion SSP (14%)

FY 14/15 1.573
billion SSP (14%)

Min Fin (FY 11/12, 12/13 expenditures. 13/14 budget,
no expenditures 13/14 public, 14/15 budget)

Indicator 7: Number of countrywide security incidents (five major
crimes: murder, grievous hurt, theft, housebreaking, rape)

21.086 (2012)

21.086

50.857

29.089 (Q1-3)

Ministry of Interior/ SSNPS crime statistics (2014
statistics 7 out of 10 States)

Indicator...

Result Question 1b: To what extent have your programmes contributed to
these results?

On the overall goal of physical security and freedom from fear the Netherlands advocated through political dialogue on a local, national and international level for a
swift and immediate end to the violence, human rights violations and to move towards an inclusive peace deal. This advocacy was done in contacts with national
and local government as well as in international fora at IGAD, the AU, the EU, the UN and the Worldbank. The Government of South Sudan was urged to refrain
from further conflict and focus on the needs and plight of the population of South Sudan, who are the victims of the current conflict. Through programming of the
Netherlands the increasing deterioration of security is continually addressed through community security programmes on a local level and several peace building
initiatives on a local level. These activities have been largely successful, but impact on the national picture is hard to establish since overall indicators continue to
decrease in the absence of a national inclusive peace agreement and national reconciliation programme.
The Saferworld Community Security Programme contributed to the subgoals 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. Their inception phase was concluded by September 2014 and
subsequently activities creating community security working groups in the capitals of all 10 States commenced. These groups developed skills for civilians to be
better equipped to formulate and address (broad) safety concerns in their communities. They've also been guided in the process of meeting responsible security
institutions in order to demand from them proper responses therewith increasing accountability. The groups also contribute to peaceful settlement of internal
disputes and alternative non-violent ways to overcome differences. While the first formal results are expected in 2015, preliminary results indicate that the
population as well as local government are enthusiastic about the approach and that the approach yielded in better policies for gender based violence, more
understanding of needs of the civilian population by government institutions, and practical solutions such as a community decision to create weapon free market
and active mediation by chiefs during disputes between youth.
After the conflict mid-December 2013 the Security and Access to Justice Programme (SAJP) which was implemented by ATOS and IPA and funded together with
DFID did not resume. A follow up has not been started due to the decision of the international community not to support the security services until accountability
has been given for alleged human rights violations. However, implementation of SAJP was largely successful. Multiple standard operating procedures for the police
services have been designed, approved and implemented such as a code of conduct, case management, community policing strategy, etc. Police officers were
trained in the use of these SOPs, in internal accountability mechanisms and human rights obligations. Together with UNMISS/UNPOL and UNDP SAJP completed
the registration of the police services and cleaned the payroll. This good practice has been picked up by the police services independently end 2014 in order to
review the status of the police force since the conflict broke out. Also the Police Academy has been finished. The academy is being managed by the police services
and is going to be put to use for training of higher and middle management police officers. The police stations constructed in Bor and Torit have survived the
conflict, are operational and help police services to conduct their jobs more efficiently. It remains to be seen if the good results of SAJP can be sustained in the
current context of decreased government funding for the police services and halted international support. Especially extensive training of the police force is needed
to make good qualitative improvements.
On a local level several activities of Dutch funded programs contributed to more active civil society involvement in peaceful conflict resolution. Amongst others
PAX, Cordaid, VNG, Justice and Peace, Saferworld and CMC were able to continue trainings and support to local civil society, churches and local government civil
servants in areas of reconciliation, peacebuilding and non-violent solutions for internal differences.
Unfortunately relevant specific indicators relating to the programmes are of yet not available due to reporting cycles starting up.

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 1

Human Security

B.

The first half year of 2014 all development programs in South Sudan had been paused due to the erupted conflict in mid-December 2013.

Results achieved as planned

Reasons for result achieved:

This period was firstly used to reassess the security situation in the different parts of the countries, as well as for the international community to redefine
development goals, humanitarian response and common lines towards de government. Secondly this period was used by the Netherlands to request from
implementing partners extensive conflict sensitivity and context analysis, including implications for programming, updates of log frames and work plans, as well as
possible adjustments for results.
From half 2014 onwards most programs, with the exception of those directly supporting the central government, restarted their activities according to the new
planning. As indicated in subsequent letters to Parliament most of the programs increased their focus on peacebuilding and support to local (human security)
initiatives in order to address root causes of conflict (access to water, land, long lasting grievances and access to justice).
Since half 2014 results of the programmes have been achieved as planned. Impact of these outputs of the programmes on the overall trend in South Sudan is
however limited due to the ongoing conflict and absence of an inclusive peace.

Implications for planning:

The overall decrease in human security in South Sudan has prompted the Netherlands to intensify and adjust programming aimed at improving human security.
As communicated in letters to Parliament programmes continue to invest in local peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives. Besides, the Embassy prepared a
civic engagement project which aims to create a protection network for civil society activists. This project will start early 2015. Furthermore, the Embassy decided
late 2014 to take on the lead donor role for the set-up of the multidonor civil society fund aimed at supporting grass root civil society organisations, countrywide.
The preparations for this fund started late 2014 and it is planned to continue preparations to be able to start the inception phase of the fund late 2015. Because of
the increase in human insecurity, particularly for women, the Embassy is working on a programme to address gender based violence through empowering women
in protection and a more prominent role in conflict resolution and reconciliation. It is envisaged that this programme starts in the second half of 2015.

Result Area 2
Result Question 2a: To what extent do men and women from all social
groups have access to effective and independent justice institutions and have
confidence in the rule of law? (outcome, country level)
Sub-goals:
2.1 Men and women from all social groups are aware of their basic rights
and fundamental freedoms and have equal means to access formal and
informal justice systems
2.2 All justice institutions perform their tasks effectively, accountably and in
better coordination, responding to the needs of citizens
2.3 The justice system is independent and effectively curbs abuse of power
by state institutions, armed actors or powerful private actors
2.4 Formal and informal justice institutions effectively address legacies
of human rights violations and serious crimes committed during periods
of armed conflict or dictatorship, and address root causes that give rise to
conflict

Effective Rule of Law
According to the 2013 UNDP country wide survey 46% of the South Sudanese population has access to a Statutory Court in a 50 km range. 69% op the population
has access to a Customary Court within a 50 km range. 46% of the population has confidence in the formal Justice institutes, while 59% is "satisfied" with the
service delivered by the Customary Court institutes. South Sudan knows a dual system of statutory and customary courts, governed by law which attributes well
defined competencies to different Customary and Statutory Courts. Although in theory these competences are well defined, in practice large parts of the population
don't have access to the Statutory Courts and thus seek justice at Customary Courts. It is hard to measure, but overall the Rule of Law in South Sudan is by far not
functioning, not very well trusted and at times arbitrary in practice. Quantitative (national) objectives/data are not yet available, but have a high priority amongst
donors, and the management of various justice institutions in order to more effectively manage resources. The overall negative security and macro-economic trend
does not help the efforts of the judicial sector to improve their effectiveness. The armed conflict and political polarization erodes the separation of powers: political
control is increasingly exerted. Hence it is unlikely that access and confidence is improving much in the short term, especially in States where there is active
conflict.
The objective of international and Dutch Rule of Law programming is a properly functioning judicial process on the medium to long term. The programme has a
particular attention for a reduced case load, shorter lead time of cases (from initial arrest to initial verdict, appeal, final verdict and detention), human rights and
awareness raising of fundamental rights. The justice sector institutions and justice sector is working towards higher capacity and better operating standards. For
example, physical case logs have not been available for investigators or judges, this is a step that has been taken in 2013 and 2014.
Momentarily South Sudan has a temporary constitution which has many gaps and susceptible to reform. The constitution is subject to the outcomes of the peace
process. The objective is that the new constitution will guarantee more legal certainty and an independent judicial system. At this point in time, due to lack of data
and lack of appropriate accountability institutions the accountability for the performance of the judiciary sector is minimal. In 2014 coordination between Rule of
Law institutions has improved visibly. Joint meetings to tackle joint issues have been held and there is an increasing sense, interestingly enough most likely due to
pressure created by decline macro-economic factors and increasing conflict, to join efforts to assist the population. The UNDP A2J programme supported by the
Netherlands plays an important catalyzing role in bringing the different Rule of Law actors together.
52% of the population is aware of their basic rights and fundamental freedoms according to the UNDP perception survey in 2013. There is no data to suggest that
this awareness has improved over 2014. Men and women have equal access to formal and informal justice systems by law. In practice especially in the informal
system and in the case of rape and adultery cases women appear to have a worse position. In addition formal judiciary institutions often don't press prosecution
when out-of-court settlements are reached between families, even when those settlements entail the traditional solution for rape cases, forced marriage. Improving
this behavior of legal institutions is a core objective of development of the judicial sector for donors, as well as management of the judicial sector.
The justice system itself is extremely aware of their independent position and tries to defend that up to the point of weak coordination with justice sector institutions.
While coordination has improved, the independent position of the judiciary is being upheld. This is for example shown in the Treason Trial case against four
detained politicians after the mid-December 2013 conflict who were accused by the public prosecution of treason. Only through a political intervention the judiciary
was prevented to rule, most likely in favor of the plea of innocence of the accused. Instances of this independency of the High Courts have been shown throughout
2014, with the Chief Justice -a Presidential appointee- repeatedly conveying that the Judiciary has the laws, but often lacks properly filed cases.

Indicator 1: Human Rights and Rule of Law

Indicator 2: Rule of Law

Human rights and serious crimes committed during armed conflict are not sufficiently addressed. This is caused by immense political pressure and as a
consequence the lack of a strong public prosecution. The army and police have their own internal court system. According to the police and army several officers
Baseline
Target
2017 of humanResult
Result
2013
Result 2014
have been accused and
convicted
rights 2012
abuses. However,
there
is no transparency
or publicity onSource
these cases and therefore objective verification of
these claims are not possible. The international community and the Netherlands in particular intensified its activities in the area of Transitional Justice as a way of
refocusing
transitional justice
and
criminal
prosecution as part of a peace deal.
9.2 (2012) programming after the mid-December
9.2 2013 conflict and
9.3in preparation of a possible
9.9
Fragile
States
Index
The importance of transitional justice is recognized throughout the justice sector.
5.6 (2011)

Indicator 3: Confidence in Judicial System

43% (2014)

Indicator 4: Corruption Perception

Rank 173/177
Score 14/100
(2013)

4.7

N/A

4.2

Rank 173/177
Score 14/100

N/A

World Wide Governance Indicators, World Bank

43%

Gallup World Poll (Percentage of respondents(n), who
have confidence in the judicial system)
Note: 21% of respondents did not, or refused, to
answer the question.
Transparency International

Rank 171/175
Score 15/100

Result Question 2a (remaining indicators):

Baseline

Indicator 5: Control of Corruption

Indicator 6: Corruption in government

23.8 (2010)

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

3.8

3.8

N/A

World Wide Governance Indicators, World Bank

62%

Gallup World Poll (Percentage of respondents(n), who
believe corruption is wide spread throughout the
government)
Note: 22% of respondents did not, or refused, to
answer the question.

Result Question 2b: To what extent have your programs contributed to
these results? (output, programme level)

Different donors, including the Netherlands, the UK, the EU, and implementing partners have invested throughout 2014 in building the capacity of the justice
system, throughout the justice chain. This consisted of training, mentoring, policy development, construction and assistance with operating procedures. Since the
outbreak of the mid-December 2013 conflict particular attention has been given to training in human rights, (judicial) reconciliation mechanisms and transitional
justice. The Netherlands advocates for strong donor coordination and effective use of funds in order to stimulate improvements of the justice sector, improve
national coordination and prepare national institutions for transitional justice mechanisms.
The support to the Access to Justice Programme with UNDP started in november 2013 and implementation of the activities was halted due to the erupted conflict in
mid-December 2013. However, after an initial period of a couple of months in which UNDP executed a conflict sensitivity analysis and a Human Rights Due
Dilligence analysis, the programme adjusted slightly to incorporate more emphasis on human rights, reconciliation and transitional justice. According to the decision
of donors UNDP also put work with the central government on hold, except for those Rule of Law institutions working with human rights and (transitional) justice
mechanisms. Due to the conflict work could only be done by UNDP directly in 6 States. UNDP started working through local CSOs in Jonglei and Lakes State. This
concept proves to work very well and helps strengthening local civil society capacity at the same time. Collection of reliable data is one of the important focus areas.
Not only to manage results, but more importantly to enable the justice institutes to effectively manage their resources. Through the Dutch support to the UNDP
Access to Justice Programme case management systems have been set-up in every branch of the Rule-of-Law chain throughout 2014. The first results of this
improved management system are expected in 2015.
UNDP continued to work on strengthening of the judicial chain, improved access to justice, and the improvement of prison conditions. Attention will be specifically
given to the backlog in court cases and sentencing, the prison conditions for vulnerable groups (women, adolescents, and mentally ill), the judicial process and
legal aid/lawyers. The programme thus focusses mainly on result areas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4. Where activties specifically target increase awareness and access for the
South Sudanese population and more effective service delivery by justice institutions, additional attention was given to addressing possible mechanisms to address
human rights violations in the past and in the current conflict once a peace deal has been signed.
Significant results include, amongst others: training of two legal aid officers in each of 7 States and legal aid units established; ICT equipment and training for legal
aid, judiciary case administration and prison administration has been provided for 6 of the 10 States; monthly and quarterly reporting of crime, case and prison
statistics has started; in total 39 Rule of Law forums have been held coordinating between different justice sector institutions on State level; 2500 people have been
reached in outreach programmes; two studies on the application of traditional law and a traditional leaders training manual have been published; 3 prisons have
been renovated; 400 Rule of Law personnel was trained in case management, human rights and alternative dispute resolution; 40 judges and 39 public prosecutors
have been trained on human rights and international criminal justice. In closure, on the initiative of the Dutch Embassy UNDP in cooperation with a local Law
Research Institute conducted a first of its kind national survey on transitional justice needs. The survey is being finanlized and serves as input to inform needs
based programming in the future. The challenge remains that due to the decreasing security and macro-economic factors judicial actors have less access to certain
areas and often lack operational budget which should be provided by the central government to effectively do their respective jobs.
Through the Rule of Law Platform modality in the Netherlands several studies have been commissioned in South Sudan focussing on land rights, human rights and
transitional justice. These research programmes intend to strenghten development programme implementation and work closely with Dutch and others' partners.

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Indicator 1: level of knowledge of information on individual rights and
freedoms

52% (2013)

N/A

52%

N/A

UNDP countrywide perception study A2J and RoL

Indicator 2: confidence in Judiciary of South Sudan

46% (2013)

N/A

46%

N/A

UNDP countrywide perception study A2J and RoL

Indicator 3: acces to statutory law court <50km

46% (2013)

N/A

46%

N/A

UNDP countrywide perception study A2J and RoL

Indicator 4: access to customary courts <50km

69% (2013)

N/A

69%

N/A

UNDP countrywide perception study A2J and RoL

Result Question 2b (remaining indicators):

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Indicator 5: access to ministry of justice <50km

40% (2013)

N/A

40%

N/A

UNDP countrywide perception study A2J and RoL

Indicator 6: satisfaction with customary law courts' services "statisfied"

59% (2013)

N/A

59%

N/A

UNDP countrywide perception study A2J and RoL

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 2

Effective Rule of Law

B.

The first half year of 2014 all development programs in South Sudan had been paused due to the erupted conflict in mid-December 2013.

Results achieved as planned

Reasons for result achieved:

This period was firstly used to reassess the security situation in the different parts of the countries, as well as for the international community to redefine
development goals, humanitarian response and common lines towards de government. Secondly this period was used by the Netherlands to request from
implementing partners extensive conflict sensitivity and context analysis, including implications for programming, updates of log frames and work plans, as well as
possible adjustments for results.
From half 2014 onwards most programs, with the exception of those directly supporting the central government, restarted their activities according to the new
planning. The UNDP Access to Justice Programme restarted its activities as planned and achieved most of the expected results, despite the difficult contextual
circumstances to work in. Impact of these outputs of the programmes on the overall trend in South Sudan is however limited due to the ongoing conflict and
absence of an inclusive peace.

Implications for planning:

Planning of activities will continue as foreseen, and according to the readjusted work plans after the mid-December 2013 conflict. In 2015 both the EU and DFID
will start two relatively large Access to Justice programmes. Together with these donors the Netherlands will strive for mutual strengtening of efforts.
With a view to a possible peace deal in the near to medium term future, it is important to start preparing for addressing accountability for human rights violations.
Transitional justice and possibly criminal accountability will form a crucial part of any peace agreement. In terms of planning the Netherlands will look for
opportunities to support national needs and systems to provide for this transitional justice.

Result Area 3

Inclusive Political Processes

Result Question 3a: To what extent can men and women from all social
groups participate in and influence political and peace processes? To what

In 2014 South Sudan got considerably less inclusive in political processes and peace processes. The erupted conflict in mid-December made the lack of
inclusiveness and divisions within society even more visible. While there was hope in the first 3 quarters of the year that an inclusive peace deal could be reached
between the government and opposition after conflict broke out in mid-December 2013 through mediation of the regional IGAD body, this hope was diminishing
towards the end of 2014. It became apparent that leaders from both sides were not willing to compromise in order to create peace for the South Sudanese
population. The IGAD peace process started off by including all parties: government, opposition, former detainees, political parties, churches and civil society. After
extensive rounds of negotiations in the summer of 2014 an inclusive peace deal seemed possible in autumn of 2014. However, the warring parties could not agree
on ceasing hostilities and power sharing. Because of these blockades, the peace process increasingly focused on both warring parties and became less inclusive.

extent are peaceful and inclusive mechanisms to resolve and prevent conflict
in place?
Sub-goals:
3.1 Political decision making at all levels is participatory, representative and
inclusive of all social groups
3.2 Domestic and international actors take responsibility for effective
and inclusive mechanisms for peacebuilding and prevention of conflict at
different levels, with an active role for women

Throughout the year decreasing security and decreasing macro-economic factors caused a deterioration of inclusiveness throughout the country. Increasingly in all
parts of life polarization and factionalism along tribal affiliations was noticeable. This became especially apparent in Lakes State where intra-Dinka rivalries flared
up due to lack of governance and Rule of Law. Towards the end of 2014 increasingly tensions between pastoralists fleeing the conflict zones with their cattle, in
combination with traditional (changing) grazing patterns, and agriculturalists grew. These factors countered the few years of relative calm and efforts to resolve
root causes and work on peaceful conflict prevention. However, domestic initiatives to guide pastoralist movement seem to have increased. It remains to be seen
whether and where these initiatives had an effect.
In 2014 it was still believed that elections would be held in June 2015, which could have been an opportunity for a more open political process. However, up to the
end of 2014 no census had been conducted, the committee for registration of political parties was not installed and the electoral commission lacked funds to
prepare for elections. Moreover, a peace deal was not in sight, implying that a third of the country would not be able to participate in elections.
International actors took increasingly more responsibility to work towards effective and inclusive mechanisms for peace building and prevention of further conflict.
These efforts were on a national scale largely fruitless due to lack of willingness of political leaders to agree on a peaceful settlement of their differences. Domestic
actors throughout the second half of 2014 were increasingly aware and increasingly working towards (very) local peace initiatives trying to get communities to work
together towards peace and prevent further conflict. Increasing polarization and protracted conflict did not help these local processes. An active role for women
has been advocated for both internationally and domestically by the international community and women activist groups. These were supported and strengthened
throughout 2014.

Baseline

Indicator 1: Factionalized Elites

10.00 (2012)

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

10.00

9.8

10.00

Fragile Sates Index (Scale of 0=very sustainable and
10=very high alert)

Result Question 3b: To what extent have your programs contributed to
these results?

The Netherlands actively advocated in national, regional and international fora for an inclusive peace process, followed by an inclusive reconciliation and peace
building process. To that end the Netherlands supported the regional organization IGAD in its mediation efforts, as well as the IGAD Monitoring and Verification
Mission in South Sudan, who have the task to oversee implementation of the cease fire agreement(s). Unfortunately IGAD has not been able in 2014 to bring the
parties to concrete results, due to lack of willingness to come to peace of South Sudanese political leaders.
In absence of an inclusive peace deal and the decision by Cabinet not to directly support central government as a consequence, no work could be done on sub
goal 3.1, political decision making at all levels is participatory, representative and inclusive of all social groups.
Sub goal 3.2, domestic and international actors take responsibility for effective and inclusive mechanisms for peace building and prevention of conflict at different
levels, with an active role for women, has been addressed through several programmes:
One of their successes was the support to PAX' efforts to foster a peace deal between the David Yau Yau rebel group in Jonglei and the government in Juba
through efforts of church leaders. This activity resulted, despite the national conflict, in a peace deal which has held throughout 2014. This is an example of a
localized peace process, supported by the international community, through domestic actors, which yielded results.
Another example is the joint programme of the NGOs VNG, PAX and Cordaid called Interlinking Peace Building, Decentralisation and Development in Western
Bahr El Ghazal (WBeG) and Eastern Equatoria states. In for instance WBeG, a conference was held to follow-up a conference in 2013, in which all relevant actors
had agreed on resolutions to deal in the agricultural society of WBeG with the challenges of migrating pastoralists from Warrap State in order to reduce conflicts
between farmers and pastoralists. CSOs and community leaders were trained in local lobbying & advocacy and now interact with local government representatives
through dialogue forums, which have produce tangible results for the population.

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 3

Inclusive Political Processes

C.

The outbreak of conflict and the inability of political leaders to come to a peace deal has made results on inclusive political processes severely difficult.

Results achieved poorer than planned

Reasons for result achieved:

However, increasingly throughout 2014 domestic actors with the support of Dutch NGOs and programming were able on a local level to initiate peace building
initiatives. These initiatives are producing results according to adjusted planning as a consequence of the outbreak of conflict mid-December 2013. These results
have less direct impact on national level level trends, such as deteriorating security and macro-economic factors. On a local level these interventions helped
fostering a more conducive climate for peaceful solutions to conflicts.

Implications for planning:

Inclusive political processes remain high on the agenda of international and domestic actors. An inclusive peace is needed first before work can be done with
government and political parties to create an inclusive environment. Up to that point national programs and trend will negatively effect results. The importance of
inclusive peace & reconciliation processes will continue to be constantly advocated for by the Netherlands at all relevant political levels.
At the local level, results can be achieved by supporting local domestic processes even more. In the absence of good governance and strong Rule of Law it is the
local communities and more neutral actors, such as the churches, who are best positioned to address local grievances and start reconciliation and peace building
from the bottom up. In 2015 more attention will be given to these local processes wherever possible in our programming.

Result Area 4

Legitimate and Capable Government

Result Question 4a: To what extent are government institutions at all levels
perceived by citizens as legitimate and accountable?

Throughout 2014 the legitimacy and accountability of the government in South Sudan decreased. In the beginning of 2014 Parliament, at the request of the
Government, decided to prioritize Government budget for the security sector and war efforts, naming basic service delivery like health and education not a priority.
Due to the decreasing macro-economic and security situation, service delivery with the little budget available at State and local level was increasingly difficult to
deliver by the local government. This severely impacted government legitimacy and accountability, which consequently decreased during 2014. This went hand in
hand with a continuously worsening humanitarian situation, starting in the active conflict States, but spreading outside of these areas during 2014.

Sub-goals:
4.1 Government institutions at all levels implement laws and policies
and deliver core tasks in a manner that promotes inclusive and sustainable
development
4.2 Government institutions at all levels are responsive to needs and views
articulated by citizens and civil society and have functioning mechanisms in
place for internal and external accountability
4.3
Government institutions manage domestic resources and public
finance transparently and have functioning mechanisms in place to reduce
and prevent corruption

In the meantime during 2014 the Government and opposition failed to achieve an inclusive peace deal, and by the end of 2014 the peace negotiations largely
halted. Despite the lack of a peace deal, Government announced at the end of 2014 to hold elections in June 2015, in order to prevent the loss of formal legitimacy
due to the constitutional ending of the Presidential and all government terms of office in July 2015.
In response to the outbreak of conflict mid-December 2013 and lack of a willingness to move to a peace deal in 2014, the international community developed
donor principles laying the common principles of engaging with the Government. It was commonly decided that the Government would only be directly supported
on certain "critical functions" and Aid would focus on service delivery through NGOs and humanitarian organizations. The Netherlands decided to put on hold all
direct support to the central government. Most international donors continued to support the South Sudanese population at a local and State level, thereby making
use of (very weak) local government expertise to try to strengthen these technical governance aspects. It is safe to say that these efforts during 2014 became
more and more challenging and trying to keep the ship afloat, rather than increasing capacity of these local structures and institutions. In the end, it is the first
responsibility of the Government to take care of its population. A responsibility which has not been taken up and was increasingly difficult to take up by those
willing and aware of this responsibility due to decreasing macro-economic factors, protracted conflict and increasing polarization.
Oversight mechanism were largely unable to function in 2014, mainly due to lack of operational funds and political space to do their jobs. There is almost a
complete lack of transparency of any government institution, especially with regard to financial and resource management. Several media reports hint to large
scale corruption and depletion of government resources by individuals. However, there is no concrete evidence to support this beside the fact that it is apparent
that mostly all government sectors aimed at service delivery had a severe lack of operational budget and severe delays in payments of salaries. Increasingly
macro-economic indicators translated this practice in decreasing trust, for example in a continuously rising informal exchange rate and increasing inflation.

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Indicator 1: Regulatory Quality

2.8 (2011)

6.2

4.8

N/A

World Wide Governance Indicators, World Bank

Indicator 2: Government Effectiveness

0.5 (2011)

2.0

5.7

N/A

World Wide Governance Indicators, World Bank

46%

Gallup World Poll (Percentage of respondents(n), who
have confidence in the national government)
Note: 19% of respondents did not, or refused, to
answer the question.

Indicator 3: Confidence in National Government

Result Question 4b: To what extent have your programs contributed to
these results?

In May 2014 the Netherlands decided to put on hold all direct support to the central government.
During the 2014 the Netherlands consequently addressed the issue of governance and the responsibility of the South Sudanese Government for its population in
numerous official and unofficial meetings, as well as during public and private fora and seminars.
In January 2014 the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF), working on increased capacity and legitimacy of government structures, ended. It was intended that the
activities under the CBTF were continued in other programmes and multi-donor funds, for example through the World Bank and UNDP, and the Netherlands would
channel its support through these initiatives. However, these initiatives were put on hold after the mid-December 2013 outbreak of conflict by donors and
international financial institutions. It is important to note here that the terminal evaluation of the CBTF, conducted mid-2014, showed that a very large part of the
investment in IT systems, buildings and operating procedures which have been done under the CBTF have not been lost due to the conflict. However, the local
government structures, and civil servants who had been extensively trained, in the conflict affected States (Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei) are very likely lost. It is
noted that the process of working towards more improvement and implementation of better governance structures, and thus sustainability, is more and more
halted over time the longer no durable peace is reached and no additional capacity building support is given.

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 4

Legitimate and Capable Government

D.

The Netherlands decided to put on hold all direct support to the central government, until South Sudan's government action's are genuinely committed to
sustainable peace in its country.
On a small scale, NGOs have been working with local government to assist them in building their technical capacities.

Results achieved much poorer than planned

Reasons for result achieved:

Implications for planning:

Once there a sustainable peace deal is being implemented, either in 2015 or later, it is of great importance for the international community to reengage with the
central government to build their capacities to deliver services to the South Sudanese population. This vital function of the state needs to be improved. Most likely
this will be stimulated with a leading role for international financial institutions, UNDP and the major bilateral donors (US, UK, NO). However, if there is no political
willingness or leadership, nor a peace deal, capacity building efforts will not have the desired impact.
Meanwhile the Netherlands will continue to address the responsibility of the Government for its people, and thus service delivery to them. The Netherlands will
advocate as well for an accepted role of the International financial institutions by the South Sudanese Government in order to work on policies for macro-economic
reform in order to tackle macro-economic challenges.

Result Area 5
Result Question 5a: To what extent have sustainable basic services and
employment opportunities – especially for marginalized groups - increased
and improved? To what extent do these contribute to a reduction of key
conflict-related grievances as perceived by the population?
Sub-goals:
5.1 Government institutions, (local) civil society and the private sector
increase sustainable employment opportunities in a conflict sensitive
manner, working towards inclusive development and social cohesion
5.2 Governments institutions, (local) civil society and the private sector
improve (equitable access to) basic services in a manner that increases
legitimacy of institutions and social cohesion
5.3 In situations of protracted crisis, national and international actors
support vulnerable groups (including refugees, displaced persons and host
communities) to enhance their resilience and build sustainable livelihoods

Social and Economic Reconstruction
Sustainable basic services and employment opportunities have mostly decreased, and therefore have not contributed to conflict-related grievances as perceived
by the population. This is due to the structurally negative factors in South Sudan after the outbreak of conflict mid-December 2013: decreasing security and Rule of
Law, decreasing macro-economic factors and an increasingly spreading humanitarian crisis. The Government is not able nor willing to invest in basic service
delivery, rather a large part of the budget is allocated to security forces and war related efforts. Early 2014 Parliament decided explicitly not to treat Healthcare,
Education and Agriculture as budgetary priorities in the 2014/2015 budget. Also the bulk of international community aid to South Sudan has shifted throughout
2014 from development programmes towards addressing the humanitarian needs, which amounted to about 1.8 billion USD.
South Sudan is experiencing one of the world's biggest humanitarian crises (level 3 emergency). Over 2 million people have fled their homes, of which half a
million have sought refuge in neighboring countries (more than half of the refugees, around 60%, are children. More than 50% of the population is aid dependent.
South Sudan has the lowest health and nutrition levels in the world. South Sudan’s education indicators remain among the lowest in the world, despite increases in
school enrollment over the past few years. access to clean water and sanitation is a a huge problem (only 30% of the population has access to clean water). The
situation is increasingly deteriorating, taken into account that the country soon is facing its worst food crises in years, due to weather conditions and lack of
agriculture yields due to insecurity, declining macro-economic factors and lack of investment. The UN estimates that over 4.5 million people will be severely food
insecure by the end of July, 2015. The conflict in 2013 had an negative impact on economic growth and inflation. Recent employment figures are not available,
Reliable data in general are scarce. The World Bank Fragile States Index 2014, published by the Fund for Peace, is used (scores on a 1-10 basis, 10 being the
worst situation) to indicate South Sudan's position.
South Sudan is indeed in a situation of protracted crisis, expanding from the three active conflict States into surrounding States and pressuring generally less
affected Equatorian States. National and International actors have set up one of the biggest humanitarian operations in the world to support vulnerable groups in
the conflicted areas, and throughout 2014 increasingly outside these areas responding to emerging needs. This aid focused primarily on emergency relief, but
nearing the end of 2014 within the humanitarian community debates started to also direct humanitarian aid to building resilience and safeguarding and improving
sustainable livelihoods.

Baseline

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

9.5 (2012)

9.5

9.8

9.9

Fragile States Index (Scale of 0=very sustainable and
10= very high alert).

Indicator 2: national food production

865,000 (in
tonnes, 2013)

N/A

865,000

1,000,000

FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment, May
2015 (in tonnes)

Indicator 3: production in ton/ha

0.80

0.85

0.95

1.25

FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment, May
2015

Indicator 4: cropland under cultivation in ha

625.000

630,000

640,000

516,000

World Bank
FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment, May
2015

Indicator 1: ‘public services’

Target 2017

Result Question 5b: To what extent have your programs contributed to
these results?

Due to the outbreak of the mid-December 2013 conflict, many programs were forced to halt or delay the implementation of their activities for 4-6 months. This time
was used to conflict sensitively adapt pre-crisis strategies and reformulate outputs. The Food Security and Water programs are handled more in depth in their
specific results reports. The programs aimed to contribute to the 3 subgoals of Social and Economic Reconstruction.
The 12 programmes of NGOs in South Sudan that are funded through the Reconstruction tender (with an estimated budget of EUR 40 million for the period July
2012-2016 for activities in South Sudan) were revised on the basis of a conflict sensitivity assessment to ascertain they did not unintentionally aggravate local
conflicts (eg. by working insufficiently inclusive at local levels) and contribute as much as possible to conflict prevention- and mitigation. Most of the programmes
could start to resume their activities in the Spring of 2014. Despite the mounting implementing challenges and delays encountered, the implementing NGOs
managed to deliver meaningful results to the intended beneficiaries: for instance unemployed youth and other marginalized groups have been trained in
entrepreneurship and income generating activities and marginalized groups' access to clean and potable water has been improved (resp. Spark, Save the
Children, Oxfam Novib and World Vision).
UNICEF's Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme, of which the Netherlands is the main donor, helped increase access to education and
quality conflictsensitive education. It made eg. 70 schools (48 of which are pilot sites) start Life Skills and Peacebuilding Education, applying inclusive education
and child-friendly school principles. PBEA's innovative vocational education programmes provided 517 youth with opportunities to learn livelihood skills such as
carpentry, tailoring, driving, building and construction.
The SSLDP program, implemented by IFAD and the local Ministries of agriculture, established around 900 small holder groups (of which around 600 female
headed households) to increase agricultural production.
The Netherlands contributed an amount totaling 32 million euros to humanitarian aid, which includes efforts to improve the resilience of vulnerable people. The
Netherlands contributed among others to Common Humanitarian Fund, Dutch Relief Alliance and UNHCR .

Baseline

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

Indicator 1: food produced in households/communities benefiting from
our programme in metric tons

500

25000

1500

2250

2500

SSLDP/IFAD(In metric tons)

Indicator 2: number of households benefitting from our programme with
increased food production

750

5000

1000

2500

2500

SSLDP/IFAD

Indicator 3: number of people having gained income generating
activities (disaggregated for women)

190 (82)

53 (32)

Annual reports for 2014 by Save the Children and
Spark (Reconstruction tender)

Indicator 4: number of people trained for income generating activities

353 (31)

487 (107)

Annual reports for 2014 by Save the Children and
Spark (Reconstruction tender)

Result Question 5b (remaining indicators):

Baseline

Indicator 5: number of people having received better access to clean
and potable water

Target 2017

Result 2012

Result 2013

Result 2014

Source

14.500

World Vision's 2014 annual report on activities in
Warrap State (Reconstruction tender).

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 5

Social and Economic Reconstruction

C.

The outbreak of conflict and the inability of political leaders to reach a peace deal has made the achievement of results in social and economic reconstruction on a
national level deeply challenging. The results of the international humanitarian effort have been largely successful and for instance avoided an all out famine.
These efforts were aimed at emergency relief and not aimed at long-term investment in reconstruction.

Results achieved poorer than planned

Reasons for result achieved:

After the adaptation of the various development programmes supported by the Netherlands to a new context (following the outbreak of widespread violent conflict
in late 2013), most programmes restarted halfway through 2014. Results can be seen on a local level, although they were poorer then planned and negatively
affected by the structural negative factors of increasing insecurity, decreasing macro-economic factors and the near exclusive focus of (local) government on
security issues.

Implications for planning:

We continue to invest substantial means in the improvement of our efforts to monitor & evaluate our work with likeminded partners, just like we did in 2014. We
continue to build innovative partnerships that seek to respond better to the complex challenges in South Sudan, for instance by setting up a Strategic Partnership
for Lobbying and Advocacy with Cordaid and its partner organizations to restore the ‘social contract’ in South Sudan and five other fragile states.
We continue to strengthen the linkages between our work on social economic reconstruction and the work on interlinked themes, such as peacebuilding, access to
justice, humanitarian aid and good governance.