Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor
on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between
the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security
THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 16 thereof,
Having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in
particular Articles 7 and 8 thereof,
Having regard to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, 1
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free
movement of such data, and in particular Article 41 thereof, 2

HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING OPINION
I. Introduction
1.1. Consultation of the EDPS and aim of the Opinion
1. On 28 November 2011, the Commission adopted a Proposal for a Council Decision on
the conclusion of the Agreement between the United States of America and the
European Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records (PNR) to the
United States Department of Homeland Security 3 (hereinafter: "the agreement").
2. On 9 November 2011, the EDPS was consulted informally on the draft Proposal, in the
context of a fast track procedure. On 11 November 2011, he issued a number of
restricted comments. The aim of the present Opinion is to complement these
1
2
3

OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31
OJ L 8, 12.01.2001, p. 1
COM(2011) 807 final.
Postal address: rue Wiertz 60 - B-1047 Brussels
Offices: rue Montoyer 63
E-mail : edps@edps.europa.eu - Website: www.edps.europa.eu
Tel.: 02-283 19 00 - Fax : 02-283 19 50

comments in light of the present Proposal and to make his views publicly available.
This Opinion also builds on a number of earlier interventions by the EDPS and the
Article 29 Working Party in relation to PNR.
1.2. Context of the Proposals
3. The agreement aims at providing a solid legal basis for the transfer of PNR data from
the EU to the US. The transfer is currently based on the 2007 agreement 4 because the
Parliament decided to postpone its vote on the consent until its data protection
concerns were met. In particular, in its resolution of 5 May 2010 5, the Parliament
referred to the following requirements:











compliance with data protection legislation at national and European level;
a privacy impact assessment prior to the adoption of any legislative instrument;
a proportionality test demonstrating that existing legal instruments are not
sufficient;
strict purpose limitation 6 and limitation of the use of PNR data to specific crimes
or threats, on a case-by-case basis;
limitation of the amount of data to be collected;
limited retention periods;
prohibition of data mining or profiling;
prohibition of automated decisions significantly affecting citizens 7;
appropriate mechanisms for independent review, judicial oversight and democratic
control;
all international transfers should comply with EU data protection standards and be
subject to an adequacy finding.

4. The present agreement must be considered in the context of the global approach to
PNR, which includes negotiations with other third countries (namely Australia 8 and

4

Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p.18.
5
European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on the launch of negotiations for Passenger Name Record
(PNR) agreements with the United States, Australia and Canada (OJ C 81, 15.3.2011, p.70). See also European
Parliament resolutions of 13 March 2003 on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic
flights (OJ C 61 E, 10.3.2004, p. 381), of 9 October 2003 on transfer of data by airlines in the case of
transatlantic flights: state of negotiations with the USA (OJ C 81 E, 31.3.2004, p. 105), of 31 March 2004 on the
draft Commission decision noting the adequate level of protection provided for personal data contained in the
Passenger Name Records (PNRs) transferred to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (OJ C 103 E,
29.4.2004, p. 665), recommendation to the Council of 7 September 2006 on the negotiations for an agreement
with the United States of America on the use of passenger name records (PNR) data to prevent and combat
terrorism and transnational crime, including organised crime (OJ C 305 E, 14.12.2006, p. 250), resolution of 14
February 2007 on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues (OJ C 287E ,
29.11.2007, p. 349), and resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR Agreement with the United States of America
(Texts adopted, P6_TA(2007)0347). All available on www.europarl.europa.eu.
6
Limited to law enforcement and security purposes in cases of organised and transnational serious crime or
terrorism of a cross-border nature, on the basis of the legal definitions laid down in Council Framework Decision
2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.06.2002, p.3) and in Council Framework
Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant (OJ L 190, 18.07.2002, p.1).
7
"No 'no-fly' decision or decision to investigate or prosecute may ever be taken on the sole results of such
automated searches or browsing of databases".
8
Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, signed on 29
September 2011.

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Canada 9), and a proposal for a PNR scheme at the EU level 10. It also falls within the
scope of the current negotiations for an agreement between the EU and the US on the
exchange of personal data in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters 11. In a wider context, the agreement has been initialled a few weeks
before the expected adoption of the proposals for the review of the general data
protection framework. 12
5. The EDPS welcomes this global approach aiming at providing a coherent legal
framework for PNR agreements in line with EU legal requirements. However, he
regrets that this timing does not allow in practice to ensure the consistency of these
agreements with the new EU rules on data protection. He would also like to recall that
the general agreement between the EU and the US on data exchanges should be
applicable to the EU-US PNR Agreement.
II. General remarks
6. According to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, any limitation to fundamental
rights and freedoms must be necessary, proportional and laid down by law. As
repeatedly stated by the EDPS 13 and the Article 29 Working Party 14, the necessity and
proportionality of the PNR schemes and of the bulk transfers of PNR data to third
countries have so far not been demonstrated. The European Economic and Social
Committee and the Fundamental Rights Agency also share this view 15. The specific
9

Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of Advance
Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data, OJ L 82, 21.3.2006, p.15.
10
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record
data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime
(COM/2011/0032 final).
11
On 3 December 2010, the Council authorised the opening of the negotiations for an agreement between the EU
and the US on the protection of personal data when transferred and processed for the purpose of preventing,
investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offences, including terrorism, in the framework of police and
judicial
cooperation
in
criminal
matters.
See
Commission
press
release
on
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1661.
12
See Commission Communication on a comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European
Union, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 609 final, and its follow up.
13
EDPS Opinion of 25.03.2011 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and
serious crime; EDPS Opinion of 15.07.2011 on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of an
Agreement between the EU and Australia on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service; EDPS Opinion of 19.10.2010 on the global approach to
transfers of PNR data to third countries; and EDPS Opinion of 20.12.2007 on the Proposal for a Council
Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes. All available on
http://www.edps.europa.eu.
14
WP29 Opinion 10/2011 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
use of passenger name record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist
offences and serious crime; Opinion 7/2010 on European Commission's Communication on the global approach
to transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to third countries; Opinion 5/2007 on the follow-up
agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of
passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security
concluded in July 2007 and Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the US for the Transfer of
Passengers'
Data.
All
available
on
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2011_en.htm.
15
FRA Opinion of 14.06.2011 on the Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data
for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (available on
http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-PNR-Opinion-June2011.pdf) and EESC Opinion of 5.05.2011
on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name
Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime
(available on http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.soc-opinions.15579).

3

comments below are without prejudice to this preliminary and fundamental
observation.
7. While this agreement includes some improvements in comparison with the 2007
agreement, and includes adequate safeguards on data security and oversight, none of
the main concerns expressed in the above mentioned opinions nor the conditions
required by the European Parliament to provide its consent appear to have been met 16.
III. Specific remarks
3.1. The purpose should be clarified
8. Article 4(1) of the agreement states that the US processes PNR data for the purposes of
preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting (a) terrorist offences and related
crimes and (b) crimes that are punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of three years
of more and that are transnational in nature. Some of these concepts are further
defined.
9. Although these definitions are more precise than in the 2007 agreement, there are still
some vague concepts and exceptions that could override the purpose limitation and
undermine legal certainty. In particular:
 In Article 4(1)(a)(i), the wording "conduct that (...) appears to be intended to
intimidate or coerce" [or] "influence the policy of a government" could also refer to
activities which cannot be considered terrorist offences according to Council
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 17. The notions "appear to", "intimidate" and
"influence" should be clarified to exclude this possibility.


Article 4(b) should contain a specific list of crimes. The reference to "other crimes
that are punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of three years of more" is not
sufficient, as this threshold includes different crimes in the EU and the US and in
the different EU Member States and US States.



Minor offences should be explicitly excluded from the purpose of the agreement.



In Article 4(2), the concept of "serious threat" should be defined and the use of
PNR data where "ordered by a court" should be limited to cases referred to in
Article 4(1).



Similarly, in order to avoid the application of Article 4(3) to purposes such as
border control, it should be specified that only the persons who are suspected of
having taken part in any of the offences listed in Article 4(1) may be "subject to
closer questioning or examination."

3.2. The list of PNR data to be transferred should be narrowed
10. Annex I of the agreement contains 19 types of data that will be sent to the US. Most of
them also comprise different categories of data and are identical to the data fields in
the 2007 agreement, which were already considered disproportionate by the EDPS and
the Article 29 Working Party 18.
16

See footnote 5.
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.06.2002,
p.3).
18
See EDPS and WP29 opinions cited above.
17

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11. This refers in particular to the field "General remarks including OSI 19, SSI 20 and SSR 21
information", which can reveal data related to religious beliefs (e.g., meal preferences)
or to health (e.g., request for a wheelchair). Such sensitive data should be explicitly
excluded from the list.
12. While assessing the proportionality of the list, it should also be taken into account that
due to advanced transmission (Article 15(3) of the agreement), these categories will
refer not only to actual passengers but also to those individuals who do not finally fly
(e.g., due to cancellations).
13. In addition, the presence of open data fields could undermine legal certainty.
Categories such as "all available contact information", "all baggage information" and
"general remarks" should be better defined.
14. Therefore, the list should be narrowed. In line with the Article 29 Working Party's
opinion 22, we consider that data should be limited to the following information: PNR
record locator code, date of reservation, date(s) of intended travel, passenger name,
other names on PNR, all travel itinerary, identifiers for free tickets, one-way tickets,
ticketing field information, ATFQ (Automatic Ticket Fare Quote) data, ticket number,
date of ticket issuance, no show history, number of bags, bag tag numbers, go show
information, number of bags on each segment, voluntary/involuntary upgrades,
historical changes to PNR data with regard to the aforementioned items.
3.3. The DHS should not process sensitive data
15. Article 6 of the agreement states that the DHS shall automatically filter and "mask
out" sensitive data. However, sensitive data will be stored at least 30 days and might
be used in specific cases (Article 6(4)). The EDPS would stress that even after being
"masked out", these data will still be "sensitive" and relate to identifiable natural
persons.
16. As already stated by the EDPS, the DHS should not process sensitive data related to
EU citizens, even if they are "masked out" upon reception. The EDPS recommends
specifying in the text of the agreement that air carriers should not transfer sensitive
data to the DHS.
3.4. The retention period is excessive
17. Article 8 states that PNR data will be retained for up to 5 years in an active database
and then transferred to a dormant database and stored for up to 10 years. This
maximum retention period of 15 years is clearly disproportionate, irrespective of
whether the data are kept in “active” or “dormant” databases, as already underlined by
the EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party.
18. Article 8(1) specifies that the data will be "depersonalised and masked" six months
after their reception by the DHS. However, both "masked out" data and data stored in
a "dormant database" are personal data as long as they are not anonymised. The data
should therefore be anonymised (irreversibly) or deleted immediately after analysis or
after a maximum of 6 months.
19

Other Service related Information.
Special Services Information.
21
Special Service Requests.
22
See WP29 Opinion 4/2003, cited above.
20

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3.5. Use of the "push" method and frequency of the transfers
19. The EDPS welcomes Article 15(1), which states that data will be transferred using the
"'push" method. However, Article 15(5) requires carriers to "provide access" to PNR
data in exceptional circumstances. In order to definitively preclude the use of the
"pull" system, and in view of the concerns recently once again underlined by the
Article 29 Working Party 23, we strongly advise that the agreement expressly prohibits
the possibility for US officials to separately access the data via a "pull" system.
20. The number and periodicity of the transfers from air carriers to the DHS should be
defined in the agreement. To enhance legal certainty, the conditions in which
additional transfers would be allowed should also be more detailed.
3.6. Data security
21. The EDPS welcomes Article 5 of the agreement on data security and integrity and, in
particular, the obligation to notify the affected individuals of a privacy incident.
However, the following elements of the data breach notification should be clarified:


The recipients of the notification: it should be specified which "relevant European
authorities" should be notified. In any case, these should include national Data
Protection Authorities. A competent US authority should also be notified.



The threshold of the notification to these authorities: it should be defined what
constitutes a "significant privacy incident".



The content of the notification to individuals and to authorities should be specified.

22. The EDPS supports the obligation to log or document all access and processing to
PNR, as this will allow a verification of whether the DHS has made appropriate use of
the PNR data and whether there has been any unauthorised access to the system.
3.7. Supervision and enforcement
23. The EDPS welcomes the fact that compliance with the privacy safeguards in the
agreement will be subject to independent supervision and oversight by Department
Privacy Officers such as the DHS Chief Privacy Officer, as stated in Article 14(1).
However, in order to ensure an effective exercise of data subjects' rights, the EDPS
and the national Data Protection Authorities should work with the DHS on the
procedures and modalities of exercise of these rights 24. The EDPS would welcome a
reference to this cooperation in the agreement.
24. The EDPS strongly supports the right to redress "regardless of nationality, country of
origin, or place of residence" laid down in Article 14(1), second subparagraph.
However, he regrets that Article 21 explicitly states that the agreement “shall not
create or confer, under US law, any right or benefit on any person”. Even if a right to
"judicial review" is granted in the US under the agreement, such right may not be
23

See Letter of 19 January 2011 from the Article 29 Working Party to Commissioner Malmström regarding the
EU PNR Agreements with the US, Canada and Australia.
24
The Article 29 Working Party has for example already provided guidance on the provision of information to
passengers (see WP29 Opinion 2/2007 of 15 February 2007 (revised and updated on 24 June 2008) on
information to passengers about the transfer of PNR data to US authorities, available on
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp151_en.pdf)

6

equivalent to the right to effective judicial redress in the EU, in particular in the light
of the restriction stated in Article 21.
3.8. Onward national and international transfers
25. Article 16 of the agreement prohibits the transfer of the data to domestic authorities
that do not afford to PNR “equivalent or comparable” safeguards to those set forth in
this agreement. The EDPS welcomes this provision. The list of authorities that might
receive PNR data should however be further specified. As regards international
transfers, the agreement provides that they should only take place if the recipient's
intended use is consistent with this agreement and adduces privacy safeguards
“comparable” to the ones provided in the agreement, except in emergency
circumstances.
26. With regard to the wording "comparable" or "equivalent" used in the agreement, the
EDPS would like to emphasise that no domestic or international onward transfers by
the DHS should take place unless the recipient adduces safeguards that are not less
stringent than the ones established in this agreement. It should also be clarified in the
agreement that the transfer of PNR data shall be done on a case-by-case basis,
ensuring that only the necessary data will be transferred to the relevant recipients, and
no exceptions should be allowed. In addition, the EDPS recommends that data
transfers to third countries should be subject to prior judicial authorisation.
27. Article 17(4) states that when data of a resident of an EU Member State are transferred
to a third country, the competent authorities of the Member State concerned should be
informed in cases where the DHS is aware of this situation. This condition should be
deleted, as the DHS should always be aware of onward transfers to third countries.
3.9. Form and review of the agreement
28. It is not clear what is the legal form chosen by the US for entering into this agreement
and how this agreement will become legally binding in the US. This should be
clarified.
29. Article 20(2) addresses coherence with the possible EU PNR scheme. The EDPS notes
that consultations on the adjustment of this agreement shall in particular examine
“whether any future EU PNR system would apply less stringent data protection
safeguards than those provided for in the present agreement”. In order to ensure
consistency, any adjustment should also (and particularly) take account of stronger
safeguards in any future PNR scheme.
30. The agreement should also be reviewed in view of the new data protection framework
and of the possible conclusion of a general agreement between the EU and the US on
the exchange of personal data in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters. A new provision similar to Article 20(2) could be added stating that
"if and when a new data protection legal framework is adopted in the EU or a new
agreement on the exchange of data between the EU and the US is concluded, the
Parties shall consult each other to determine whether the present Agreement would
need to be adjusted accordingly. Such consultations shall in particular examine
whether any future modification of the EU data protection legal framework or any
future EU-US data protection agreement would apply more stringent data protection
safeguards than those provided for in the present agreement".
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31. As regards the review of the agreement (Article 23), the EDPS considers that national
Data Protection Authorities should be explicitly included in the review team. The
review should also concentrate on assessment of the necessity and proportionality of
the measures, on the effective exercise of data subjects' rights, and include the
verification of the way in which data subjects' requests are being processed in practice,
especially where no direct access is allowed. The frequency of the reviews should be
specified.
IV. Conclusion
32. The EDPS welcomes the safeguards on data security and oversight foreseen in the
agreement and the improvements in comparison with the 2007 agreement. However,
many concerns remain especially as regards coherence of the global approach to PNR,
purpose limitation, the categories of data to be transferred to the DHS, the processing
of sensitive data, the retention period, the exceptions to the “push” method, the rights
of data subjects and onward transfers.
33. These observations are without prejudice to the necessity and proportionality
requirements for any legitimate PNR scheme and agreement providing for the bulk
transfer of PNR data from the EU to third countries. As the European Parliament
reaffirmed in its resolution of 5 May, "necessity and proportionality are key principles
without which the fight against terrorism will never be effective".
Done in Brussels, 9 December 2011
(signed)
Peter HUSTINX
European Data Protection Supervisor

8