IOB Study
Premises and promises
A study of the premises underlying the Dutch policy
for women’s rights and gender equality

IOB Study | no. 403 | Premises and promises | IOB Study | no. 403 | Premises and promises | IOB Study | no. 403 | Premises and promises | IOB Study | n

IOB Study
Premises and promises
A study of the premises underlying the Dutch policy
for women’s rights and gender equality

June 2015

|2|

Preface

Preface
This report presents the findings of a desk study of existing research, including academic
publications, reviews, grey literature and evaluations, etc. on the premises underlying the
Dutch international gender policy. The report is part of a number of sub-studies of the
policy evaluation on women’s rights and gender equality conducted by the Policy and
Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Other sub-studies of this policy evaluation are the evaluation of the Netherlands and
United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on gender, peace and security and the
evaluation of the MDG3 Fund ‘Investing in equality’ (2008-2011).
Instrumental arguments for Dutch support to gender equality feature in various policy
documents, including the Dutch international gender policy of 2011. Studying these policy
documents has prompted IOB to find out what is known of the premises underpinning the
instrumental arguments in said policies, and if these premises can indeed be linked to the
intended, or promised, changes in gender equality and women’s rights. In addition, a brief
overview is provided of international experiences with institutional factors that have
influenced the realisation of gender policies and gender mainstreaming.
Starting points for identifying relevant literature were recommendations from the reference
group that was established for the gender policy evaluation and the study of Marleen Dekker
of 2013 ‘Promoting Gender Equality and Female empowerment: a systematic review of the evidence on
property rights, labour markets, political participation and violence against women’.
IOB sincerely hopes that this publication will encourage reflections and debates on the
promises and their underlying premises of future gender policies, both in the Netherlands
and outside.
This document was prepared by evaluator Paul de Nooijer together with researcher
Kirsten Mastwijk.
The final responsibility for the content of this publication rests with IOB.

Geert Geut
Deputy Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands

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Premises and promises

Table of contents
Preface 
List of tables, figures and text boxes
List of abbreviations
1

3
6
7

Introduction8

2 Violence against women
10
2.1 Introduction
11
2.2 The international framework and national legislation on VAW
12
2.3 Prevalence
16
2.4 Causes and consequences
17
2.5 What works?
20
Notes25

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3 Women’s education30
3.1 Introduction31
3.2 Developments and state of affairs
31
3.3 Importance of education to women and girls
33
3.4 What works?
35
Notes 
37
4 Women and economic development 
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Women and economic development 
4.3 Women in agriculture and food security
4.4 What works? 
Notes 

40
41
42
47
50
54

5 Women’s right to land
60
5.1 Introduction61
5.2 Women and land rights – the issues
61
5.3 Arguing the importance of women’s land rights – a theory of change
68
5.4 What works?
71
Notes73
6 Women and water and sanitation
78
6.1 Introduction79
6.2 Women and infrastructure 
79
6.3 Women and water and sanitation 
80
Notes82

Table of contents

7 Women’s political voice 
84
7.1 Introduction
85
7.2 International framework
85
7.3 Political representation: a right or an instrument? 
87
7.4 Women’s participation in politics 
90
7.5 What are the main issues?
97
Notes100
8 Organisational matters related to gender mainstreaming
104
8.1 Introduction105
8.2 Staffing matters
105
8.3 Resource matters
107
8.4 Monitoring and evaluation matters
109
Notes110
Annexes112
Annex 1 About IOB
113
Annex 2 Literature 
115
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Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation
Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

142

Premises and promises

List of tables, figures and text boxes
Tables
Table 2.1	Approaches of what works – and what does not – in combating
violence against women21
Table 3.1
Summary of evidence of what works for girls in education36
Table 4.1	Summary of evidence of what works for economic empowerment
of women52
Table 4.2	Promising and emerging policy options to narrow the gender gap
in African agriculture53
Table 7.1	Women’s share in parliament and ministerial positions in (former)
Dutch aid partner countries92
Table 7.2
SWOT analysis on women’s political participation98

Figures

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Figure 2.1
Lifetime prevalence of violence against women (% of women affected)17
Figure 2.2
Ecological model on causes of VAW18
Figure 4.1	Women’s labour market participation rate in (former) Dutch partner
countries (2012)45
Figure 5.1
Share of women owning land in (former) Dutch partner countries62
Figure 5.2
Results chain for women and land rights70

Text boxes
Text box 2.1
What is gender based violence?11
Text box 2.2
International agreements on violence against women12
Text box 2.3
Women’s organisations and government response to VAW14
Text box 3.1
Child marriages34
Text box 4.1	Six strategic objectives on women and the economy from the Beijing
Platform for Action (1995)41
Text box 4.2
Does Paid Work Provide a Pathway to Women’s Empowerment?43
Text box 4.3
Women and micro-finance – on impact44
Text box 5.1
Land issues in Burundi and Rwanda62
Text box 5.2	Statutory and customary land rights in Burundi, Mozambique
and Rwanda64
Text box 5.3
Women and land rights in Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda65
Text box 5.4	Issues in land law implementation in Burundi, Mozambique
and Rwanda67
Text box 7.1
On gender quotas86
Text box 7.2
Outcomes of research on the quota system in India88
Text box 7.3
Strategies for addressing gender equality in political parties97

List of abbreviations

List of abbreviations
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSW
Commission on the Status of Women
DFID
Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DUAT	Right to Use and to Benefit of Land (Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra,
Mozambique)
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GENDERNET DAC Network on Gender Equality
GPI
Gender Parity Index
IFAD
International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO
International Labour Organization
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
(Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie, The Netherlands)
KST
Parliamentary paper (Kamerstuk)
MDG
Millennium Development Goal
NGO
Non-governmental organisation
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development /
Development Assistance Committee
SRHR
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
UNSCR
United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD
United States Dollar
VAW
Violence against women
WHO
World Health Organization

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1
Introduction

Introduction

Study of the Dutch international gender policy showed that it combines two lines of
reasoning justifying attention to the issue of women’s rights and gender equality. First of all,
there are rights-based elements: equality of women and men is one of the fundamentals of
society, or ought to be, and women have the same rights as men, or ought to have. This aspect
is linked to a range of international conventions and agreements. Secondly, there have been
instrumental arguments: equality and equal rights are better for economic growth,
reducing poverty, increasing food security, governance that aligns with women’s needs, etc.
The instrumental arguments appear in different policy documents but are most obvious in
the Dutch international gender policy of 2011 (KST 32735-39 (2011)) that, among others
things, includes the following observations:
• ‘Equal rights and opportunities for women, their full participation in society and design
making are of great importance for international security and stability, for welfare
creation and stable growth’.
• ‘…it is proven that more women and a greater diversity contribute to better and better
supported decision making and to more stable, sustainable societies’.
• It is important to involve women in resolving issues of peace and security because ‘the
specific needs and rights of women, their opportunities and capacities in the peace
process and in reconstruction, are decisive for sustainable peace’ (‘smart security’).
• ‘Greater economic decision making power of women makes them self-reliant, gives them
bigger control over resources, enhances their action radius and gives them the
opportunity to have their voice heard in politics and governance. More economic power
for women contributes to economic growth’ (‘smart economics’).
• ‘Awareness raising and credit programmes can contribute to the development of the economic
potential of women and thereby promote food security and stable economic growth’.
• ‘Establishing water and sanitation in neighbourhoods and close to schools increases the
participation of women and girls in education and in the local community’.
This document summarises the results of a study of the premises underlying the Dutch
policy for women’s rights and gender equality. It is structured around the themes that are
also covered in IOB’s gender policy evaluation:
• Violence against women
• Educating women and girls
• Women as economic actors
• Women and land rights
• Women and water and sanitation
• Women’s political voice
The document concludes with a brief overview of international experiences with respect to
institutional factors influencing implementation of international gender policies. For an
overview of the available publications on women, peace and security please refer to IOB’s
report ‘Gender, peace and security – Evaluation of the Netherlands and UN Security Council resolution 1325’.

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2
Violence against women

‘Researchers, policymakers, and programmers are just beginning to understand what
strategies may reduce gender-based violence in the long run’ (Morrison et al. (2007): 41).

Violence against women

2.1 Introduction
Gender based violence, which is often synonymous for violence against women (VAW) (see
text box 2.1), is an ‘expression of unequal relations between men and women’ (Oxfam
(2012): 6). It includes ‘a range of violent acts committed by males against females, within
the context of women and girls’ subordinate status in society, and often serves to retain this
unequal balance’ (Willman and Corman (2013): 6).1 It is ‘an intentional and systematic
mechanism of social control which reinforces the subordinate status of women and girls
and impedes women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms equally to men’ (GDN et al.
(2015): 27). What is more, the relationship between this kind of violence and gender
inequality is often a reinforcing one (Bott et al. (2005): 8); violence against women is an
‘extreme manifestation of gender inequality, and is the direct result of gender norms that
accept violence as a way to control an intimate partner’ (Pulerwitz et al. (2010): 283).
According to a study of the UN Secretary General, VAW ‘is not the result of random,
individual acts of misconduct, but rather is deeply rooted in structural relationships of
inequality between women and men’. These roots lie in ‘historically unequal power
relations and pervasive discrimination against women in both the public and private
spheres’ (UN (2006): ii, 21).
Text box 2.1

What is gender based violence?

The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women of 1993 defined
violence against women as ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether
occurring in public or private life’.2 The definition covers not only domestic or
intimate partner violence but also physical, sexual and psychological violence
within the family, girl child sexual abuse, female infanticide and prenatal sex
selection, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation, rape and
sexual abuse, early marriages, crimes against women committed in the name of
honour, sexual harassment and structural violence in the workplace and educational institutions, custodial violence against women, forced sterilisation, trafficking in
women, and forced prostitution.3 Violence against women and girls in conflict
situations is part of a wider continuum of violence that they experience already
outside of conflict. It often reflects violence that already existed in the pre-conflict
period.4

This chapter is structured as follows: it starts with a brief presentation on what international
agreements have to say on VAW and what they have meant for national legislation on this
topic. This is followed by a discussion of its universal prevalence and the identification of its
causes, using the so-called ‘ecological model’. Before summarising what is known of what
works in addressing these causes, the chapter provides a brief overview of the consequences
of violence against women.

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Premises and promises

2.2 The international framework and national legislation
on VAW
A series of international agreements (see text box 2.2) demonstrates that violence against
women is a violation of human rights. Starting points in this respect are General
Recommendations #12 and #19 of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women of 1992. In Recommendation # 12 (1989), the Committee noted that all UN
member states have the obligation to protect women from violence. It also asked them to
include information on the incidence of violence and the measures adopted to confront it in
their periodic reports to the Committee (UN (2006): 10). According to Recommendation #19,
‘(gender) based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights
conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
of 1979)’ (UN (2006): 10). As far as violence is concerned, CEDAW makes reference to e.g.
prostitution and women trafficking, but does not include a specific provision on domestic
violence or on sexual violence encountered in the public domain.
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Text box 2.2

International agreements on violence against women

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) recognised violence against
women in the private sphere as an abuse of human rights. It stated that ‘the human
rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of
universal human rights’. It observed that the elimination of VAW in all areas of life, the
public and the private, was central to the attainment of women’s human rights.5
Likewise the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) recognised violence against women as a breach of human rights and made the state
responsible to uphold the right to live free of violence. The Declaration realises that
particular groups of women are especially prone to be targeted for violence (e.g.
minority, indigenous and refugee women, destitute women). It requires states to
condemn VAW and not to invoke custom, tradition or religion to avoid their
obligations to eliminate such violence (UN (2006): 11).
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development recognised that the
elimination of violence against women is necessary for women’s empowerment.
The Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 incorporates the agreement to ‘Prevent and
eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls’. Violence against women is
one of its twelve areas of critical of concern. It also specified various forms of sexual
assault on women that were not specifically mentioned in the Declaration of 1993.6
Paragraph 69 of the outcome document of the special session on Beijing +5
furthermore called for the criminalisation of violence against women.7

Violence against women

The Millennium Declaration of 2000 which resolved ‘(to) combat all forms of
violence against women’ and to implement CEDAW.
In 2013, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) adopted the agreed
conclusions on the elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and
girls at its 57th session. Also in 2013, over two thirds of all members of the United
Nations endorsed the Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in
Conflict.
Violence against women is furthermore a core element of UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 (2000) and its sister resolutions that were adopted since
(e.g. UNSCR 2106 and 2122 of 2013).
There is also a series of regional agreements, including the Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against
Women (1994), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (1999), the ASEAN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women (2010), the Council of Europe Conventions on the Protection of
Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2010), and on preventing
and combating violence against women and domestic violence (2011).
The international normative framework, in particular CEDAW Recommendation # 19 of
1992, obliges states to take action to prevent VAW.8 States have indeed increasingly ratified
the relevant treaties. Moreover, over last two decades, many countries have incorporated
these international agreements into their own legislation. They have put legislation in place
to end VAW in all its different forms. As text box 2.3 shows, women’s organisations have
played an important role in this respect.9 Women’s rights activists and NGOs continue to use
these international standards and norms on the elimination of VAW as ‘lobbying tools and
benchmarks for assessing government efforts to prevent, eliminate and redress such
violence’ (UN (2006): 23).

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Premises and promises

Text box 2.3

Women’s organisations and government response to VAW

A frequently quoted study on the role of autonomous feminist movements on VAW
policy is that by Htun and Weldon (2012), The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change:
Combating Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975-2005. Covering 70
countries, the study is based on scores for different dimensions of government
response to VAW, i.e.:

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•	Government services to victims (government funding for shelters, rape crisis
centres, crises services for other forms of violence);
•	Legal reform (i.e. legislation pertaining to domestic violence, sexual assault/rape
and other forms of violence);
•	Policies and programmes target to vulnerable populations of women (i.e.
support for women of marginalised groups, VAW as a basis for refugee status,
protection of immigrant women in abusive relations from deportation);
•	Training of professionals (police, nurses, social workers, etc.) who respond to
victims;
•	Prevention programmes financed by Government;
•	Administrative reforms, i.e. presence of a Government agency on violence
against women policies, etc.
Focusing on policy adoption, variation in government action and commitments to
address VAW, the study concludes that ‘feminist mobilization in civil society — not
intra-legislative political phenomena such as leftist parties or women in government or economic factors like national wealth — accounts for variation in policy
development’ (Htun and Weldon (2012): 548). At the same time, the authors
underscore that ‘the study is not about how well governments implement their
response, the degree to which they follow through on promises’ or the ‘degree to
which legal reforms are incorporated into the practice of law, whether promised
funds are actually allocated and fully spent, and the like’ (Htun and Weldon (2012):
551). The study is also not about effectiveness or the reduction in rates of VAW that
may be associated with these measures.

According to UN Women, ‘as of 2012, 125 countries are reported to have laws penalizing
domestic violence’ (UN Women (2013): 8). A recent World Bank report gives a more nuanced
picture however. It mentions that out of the 100 countries included in Women, Business and the
Law 2014, 75 have criminalised domestic violence, 79 have legislation on sexual harassment
in employment, 8 countries have legislation against harassment in public places, 38 have
laws or provisions that criminalise marital rape and sexual assault within marriage and in 62
countries with no specific legislation, marital rape can still be tried under general rape
legislation, unless a spousal exemption provision exists’ (World Bank (2014): 75). An issue is
furthermore that there may be contradictions between statutory legislation on violence
against women and religious or customary laws resulting in non-application of the first.
Changing the law is nevertheless ‘only the first step in a long process’ (Bott et al. (2005): 4,

Violence against women

20; Morrison et al. (2007): 35).10 While legal sanctions can be important in reducing VAW,
including by establishing normative frameworks and providing resources to address it,
‘legal reform on its own is not sufficient to prevent violence against women and girls, and
can have negative results’ (DFID (2012a): 6).11
Many countries have also developed sector policies to address the needs of survivors of
violence. International agreements as mentioned above, lobbying by international
organisations and donors combined with advocacy by women’s rights organisations have
been instrumental in this respect.12 These reforms indeed ‘represent a significant symbolic
achievement in the effort to strengthen women’s rights and reduce violence against
women’ (Bott et al. (2005): 4).
However, the literature is also clear in its verdict that ‘much remains to be done and that
implementation of these laws and frameworks has been inadequate to date’ (Heise (2012):
14).13 Progress in the development of the international norms, standards and policies ‘has
not been accompanied by comparable progress in their implementation at the national
level, which remains insufficient and inconsistent in all parts of the world’ (UN (2006): 1, 19).
Consequently, without ‘sufficient implementing measures and a budget to monitor and
seek enforcement, these laws have so far failed to demonstrate results’ (De Silva de Alwis
(2014): 13). Under these circumstances even progressive laws will be ‘less useful’ (Maguire
(2012): 27).14 In fact, ‘no state in the world is effectively fulfilling its obligations to prevent
violence against women and girls, protect women and girls from violence or provide
comprehensive services to survivors’ (DFID (2012a): 7). In many countries and for a variety
of political, institutional, ideological and financial reasons, law enforcement institutions
are under-funded, inaccessible, incompetent or even corrupt, Governments fail to budget
resources, and police and judges are often unwilling or unable to enforce laws.
As a result, ‘(widespread) failures to enforce existing laws have been documented’.15
Another consequence is that ‘(most) prevention activity worldwide continues to be driven
by women’s, children’s and other civil society organisations, with limited resources’ (Fergus
(2012): 14). Moreover, even where good laws are in place, women are often unaware of their
existence – or how to make use of them. They often face a lack of access to legal services,
because of their high cost and high court fees, long and inefficient court processes,
inaccessible court locations and language barriers. DFID in this respect also refers to ‘the
traditions, beliefs, norms and practices that operate within communities’ as a ‘major barrier
to women’s access to justice, protection and freedom from violence’ and impunity and
discriminatory treatment of women reporting violence within formal legal systems (DFID
(2012b): 2).16

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Premises and promises

2.3 Prevalence
Despite all the international agreements and changes in national laws and policies, VAW
remains a universal phenomenon. It can be found in every setting of the world and not only
in situations of conflict or crisis and is ‘one of the most widespread violations of human
rights’ (UN Women (2013): 12). Women experience violence across their lifespan, i.e. from
childhood sexual abuse, sexual harassment at school and forced early marriage, to after
their marriages.17 Factors such as women’s race, ethnicity, caste, class, migrant or refugee
status, age, religion, sexual orientation, marital status, disability or HIV status ‘influence
what forms of violence they suffer and how they experience it’ (Fergus (2012): 6).18

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Contrary to common believe, most women who are victims of violence know the
perpetrators, who often include intimate partners, stepfathers, fathers, other relatives,
authority figures, teachers, and acquaintances. Intimate partner violence is the most
common form of VAW19 but often goes unchallenged, especially within the family.20 Both
males and females often justify such violence as acceptable. Rather than as criminal act, it is
considered a ‘normal’ aspect of marriage and family life, expressing men’s legitimate
authority over women, or a ‘private’ matter outside the remit of the law’ (Kabeer (2014): 4).
Family bonds and economic and emotional dependence make prevention of and protection
from VAW particularly complex.
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), one in every three women over 15 years
is confronted with physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence worldwide, although
this share varies within and among countries (WHO (2013): 2, 16).21 The highest rates (37%)
are reported in Africa, eastern parts of the Mediterranean and South East Asia.22 Countrywise, population-based surveys give figures between 10-70% or between 13 and 62% of
women who report having experienced physical assault by an intimate male partner at some
point in their lives.23 Rates in countries like Uganda and Bangladesh are reported to be
particularly high (Willman and Corman (2013): 6), i.e. more than 80% and 94% respectively.
The Dutch national emancipation policy informs that 39% of all Dutch women had been a
victim of sexual violence at one point in their life (KST 30420-180 (2013): 9).
Though high, these figures have to be interpreted with caution: real figures are probably
higher because women do not (dare to) report such violence – because of the stigma
associated with it – and/or do not seek external care or formal services in case these are
available.24 Such barriers ‘to disclosing and reporting violence are exacerbated in conflict
and crisis’ (Spangaro et al. (2013): 17).
Figure 2.1 gives the percentage of lifetime prevalence of physical and/or sexual violence by
intimate partners and sexual violence committed by non-partners, divided by WHO region.

Violence against women

Lifetime prevalence of violence against women (% of women affected)

Figure 2.1
50
40

11.9

4.9
10.7

30

11.9
5.2

6.8

12.6

37.7

24.6

23.2

South
East Asia

Western
Pacific

High
income

20
10
36.6
0

Africa

29.8

37.0

25.4

Americas Eastern
Europe
Mediterranean

Lifetime prevalence of non-partner sexual violence
Lifetime prevalence of physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence
Source: WHO (2013): 16-17, 19.

2.4 Causes and consequences
Multiple factors increase the likelihood of gender based and intimate-partner violence in a
particular setting. A framework for examining this combination of factors is the so-called
‘ecological model’, This model distinguishes multiple factors ‘that contribute to
perpetration of violence at various ‘levels,’ as well as ‘the inter-relationship between the risk
factors’ (Fergus (2012): 18). This ecological model has gained broad acceptance and
originates in public health approaches. It combines risk factors operating at four levels
(see figure 2.2)25 i.e. the individual, relationship (i.e. a person’s closest social circle), the
community context in which social relationships are embedded, and society, which refers to
the larger, macro-level factors that influence sexual and intimate partner violence. Together,
these factors determine the likelihood of abuse occurring. There are ‘likely to be different
constellations of factors and pathways that may converge to cause abuse under different
circumstances’ (Heise (2012)).26 Gender inequalities are among these factors but ‘intersect
with other forms of inequality as well as variations in the larger political economy to
differentiate the experience of violence for different groups of men and women’ (Kabeer
(2014): 9).
The fact that ‘risk and protective factors operate at multiple levels’ implies that ‘to be
effective, interventions will generally need to address factors at these different levels’
(Morrison et al. (2007): 28). Using one intervention method or ‘single sector responses’ can
achieve results ‘but these will be limited’ (DFID (2012a): 8).27

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Premises and promises

Figure 2.2

| 18 |

Ecological model on causes of VAW

Society

Community

Relationship

Individual

•	Traditional/
cultural gender
norms that give
men economic
and decision
making power
over women in
the household.
•	Traditional
gender norms
that support/
justify violence
against women
as an accepted
way to solve
conflicts or to
punish
transgressions.
•	Women’s lack of
economic and
legal rights.
•	Government
policies and laws
that discriminate
against women in
all spheres.
•	Impunity.
•	High levels of
crime.
•	Armed conflict.

•	High neighbourhood crime rate.
•	Weak community
sanctions against
violence.
•	Missing or
maladaptive
teaching of
alternatives to
violence.
•	Lack of shelters
or other forms of
assistance/
sanctuary.
•	Community
poverty.
•	Limited
economic and
recreational
opportunities.
•	Women’s
traditional
gender roles.
•	Normative use of
violence to settle
disputes.
•	Social norms that
restrict women’s
public visibility.
•	Unsafe public
spaces.

•	Association with
gang members,
delinquent or
patriarchal peers.
•	Marital instability
and conflict.
•	Family dysfunction
and parental
conflict.
•	Male control of
household
decision making
and wealth.
•	Economic stress.
•	Early age at
marriage.
•	Large number of
children.
•	Family honour
considered more
important than
victim’s health or
safety.

•	History of
violence in the
perpetrator’s
family (witnessing
violence as a
child; suffering
violence as a
child).
•	Poor parenting
practices.
•	Alcohol or other
substance abuse.
•	Personality
disorders.
•	Low level of
education.
•	Unemployment,
low income or
low economic
status.

Source: adapted from Morrison et al. (2007); WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2010); Fergus
(2012); Spangaro et al. (2013); Kabeer (2014).28

Violence against women

The impact of violence extends beyond the individual survivor, affecting children,
households, workplaces, and communities. There are similarities in this respect between
intimate partner and non-partner violence. In brief, it seriously limits women’s ability to
participate fully and share in the benefits of development and has ‘a profound and enduring
effect on their lives’ (Abrahams et al. (2014): 6). This starts with violence occurring during
the younger years, which ‘can lead to negative consequences in many spheres of life,
including educational and economic under-performance, unsafe sexual practices, reduced
ability to bond as part of parenthood, increased uptake of health-risk behaviours (…) and
the perpetration of intimate partner and sexual violence’ (WHO/London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine (2010): 15).

2.4.1 Health consequences
The health consequences of VAW ‘are complex and multifaceted’ (Duvvury et al. (2013): 6).
The literature29 shows that compared to non-abused peers, women who have been victims
have higher rates of unintended pregnancies and abortions, are more likely to have a
low-birth-weight baby; sexually transmitted infections, including HIV as well as higher rates
of psychological outcomes such as post-traumatic stress syndrome, chronic pain syndrome,
depression, hypertension, anxiety, sleep and eating disorders, and low self-esteem.30 When
violence occurs during pregnancy, it is furthermore associated with a higher incidence of
miscarriages, pre-term births and stillbirths as well as obstetric complications. Women who
have been victims are also more likely to be victims of homicide, suicide and femicide, i.e.
the killing of females by males because they are females, which is considered the most
extreme form of gender based violence, killing some 60,000 women per year (Willman and
Corman (2013): 8).
VAW also has inter-generational consequences and ‘has severe negative impacts on the
emotional and social well-being of the whole family, with adverse effects on parenting skills
and on educational and employment outcomes (of their children), contributing to early
school dropout, youth offending and early pregnancy’ (WHO/London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine (2010): 5).31 ‘Children who witness violence against their mothers or
other female care givers are at significantly higher risk of health problems (…), poor school
performance and behavioural disturbance’ and, especially in the absence of effective
support, it can also ‘influence their own behaviour and limit their capacity to imagine
alternatives, potentially increasing the risk of future perpetration’ (Fergus (2012): 6),
although, not too much is known ’about the mechanisms through which early exposure to
violence operates to increase risk of future perpetration’ (Heise (2012): 5).

| 19 |

Premises and promises

2.4.2 Economic costs
Over the years, several attempts have been made to estimate the financial and economic
impact of VAW.32 Different methodologies have been used to do so, relating to: (i) direct
costs, including the costs of medical care, judicial and legal services, and social services;
and (ii) indirect costs resulting from lost productivity in both paid and unpaid work, lost
opportunities in domestic and external investment, and lost investments in human capital
(Bott et al. (2005): 13).33
The majority of estimates come from developed countries (Duvvury et al. (2013): 1, 21) and
tend to focus on direct costs; however, only a few reliable studies are available. These
studies show that the aggregate costs of intimate partner violence are high.34 Studies from
the US and Australia refer to the impact of intimate partner violence on women‘s
employment for higher levels of absenteeism, their ability to retain their job, more frequent
job turnover and employment instability, lower earning capacity, limited occupational
mobility, lower earning capacity and days lost from both paid work and household chores.35
An issue with these studies is that different sources come up with different figures
depending on what costs are included in these estimates and the accounting methodology
that is used: there is no single method (Morrison et al. (2007): 31).
| 20 |

Still, there is general agreement that VAW poses significant costs for the economies of
developing economies, ‘including lower productivity and incomes, lower rates of
accumulation of human and social capital, and the generation of other forms of violence
both now and in the future’ (Morrison et al. (2007) 30). Even ‘the most conservative
estimates measure the national costs of (violence against women) in the billions of dollars’
(What Works (2014): 2). Still, little is really known of the size of the costs and of the
macro-economic implications in developing countries.36 The few studies that the literature
quotes are from Latin America and concern Chile (1999), Nicaragua (1996) and Brazil (2007).
They refer to economic losses as a result of violence against women equal to between 1.2
and 2% of their respective gross domestic product.

2.5 What works?
Response mechanisms to address VAW have included a range of interventions that were
implemented by formal and informal institutions and civil society organisations in the
security and justice, health and social sectors. Their aim was to ensure that women and girls
suffering from VAW received support, affirmation and advice about options as well as
medical attention, counselling, shelter and access to justice. In developing countries
‘(many) of the interventions emerged out of HIV programming, with the growing
recognition of gender inequality and intimate partner violence as a driver of HIV infection’
(Arango et al. (2014): 31).
Still, the knowledge base about what works to prevent VAW is limited, especially for
developing countries. What is known primarily relates to some of the high-income
developed countries (Arango et al. (2014): 1). But even here, while many public and private

Violence against women

organisations have made an effort to improve care for survivors, ‘(few) have demonstrated
an impact on levels of violence or measured quantitative outcomes among survivors’ and
‘the most that can be said about certain approaches is that they are more or less promising’
(Bott et al. (2005): 3, 4). The knowledge gained from the affluent North may not always be
directly transferable to low and middle-income countries, where the evidence of effective
approaches is limited. Even less is known of the effectiveness of interventions to address or
prevent sexual violence in conflict or crisis (Spangaro et al. (2013): 2). The literature37 refers in
this respect to a ‘lack of evaluations containing robust designs and quality implementation’
in developing countries in general and fragile settings in particular. The available evaluations
suffer from a broad range of methodological concerns.38
Though the evidence is growing, many gaps remain. As observed by the World Bank (2014),
‘greater investment in documenting what works in developing countries is needed’ keeping
in mind that there is ‘no single recipe’ that ‘will bring success across diverse social and
geographical contexts’ (World Bank (2014): 71). To address this caveat in knowledge on what
works to prevent violence against women and girls, i.e. preventing violence from occurring,
the programme called ‘What Works To Prevent Violence’ was set up. This is a global
programme administered by a consortium led by the Medical Research Council of South
Africa, in partnership with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Social
Development Direct, on behalf of DFID.
Table 2.1 attempts to summarise what is known of the different types of interventions.39
Table 2.1	Approaches of what works – and what does not – in combating violence against
women40
Type of approach

Fair evidence to
recommend the
intervention

Insufficient
evidence to make a
recommendation

Conflicting evidence Fair evidence to
that does not
advice against the
permit to
intervention
recommend or
advise against the
intervention

Police and justice
sector responses

•	Protection orders
for victims or
restraining orders
for perpetrators

•	Police and security
personnel training
and capacity
building
•	Sex offender
policies and
disruption plans41
•	Community
policing
•	Women’s police
stations or
specialised
response units42
•	Paralegal and
community based
legal interventions

•	Pro-active arrest
•	Mandatory
policies
reporting and
•	Second responder
arrest requiring
43
programmes
police to arrest in
•	Specialised courts
all cases of
•	Advocacy
domestic violence
interventions that •	Requiring
provide
healthcare workers
information and
to report such
support to help
violence to the
access legal
police44
redress and
resources in the
community
•	Legal interventions
in conflict or
humanitarian
crises

Crisis interventions

•	Shelters45

•	Hotlines
•	One stop centres

| 21 |

Premises and promises

Table 2.1	Approaches of what works – and what does not – in combating violence against
women40
Type of approach

Fair evidence to
recommend the
intervention

Insufficient
evidence to make a
recommendation

Health sector
responses

| 22 |

Social sector
interventions

•	Counselling,
therapy and
psychological
support
•	Alternative/
restorative justice
mechanisms

Prevention
interventions

•	Group based
•	Alcohol reduction
microfinance
programmes
combined with
•	Whole school
gender-transforinterventions
mative
•	School-based
approaches47
curriculum
•	Large scale social
interventions
norm and
community
mobilisation
interventions
•	Interventions
targeting boys and
men (alongside
women and girls)
through group
education combined
with community
mobilisation in
specific sectors
(e.g. education,
health)
•	Parenting
programmes

Conflicting evidence Fair evidence to
that does not
advice against the
permit to
intervention
recommend or
advise against the
intervention
•	Screening
interventions with
therapeutic
intervention
•	Referral and case
management

•	Healthcare
professionals’
training and
universal, routine
screening
interventions of
women for
experience of
violence in health
facilities
•	Requiring
healthcare workers
to report such
violence to the
police

•	Advocacy and
support to access
services
•	Perpetrators’
programmes

•	Single component
communication
campaigns46

•	Bystander
programmes

Violence against women

Against the above background and given the great variation that exists between and within
countries, recent literature calls for ‘complex interventions’ at ‘multiple levels’, addressing
‘environmental and structural factors as well as working on individual level factors, such as
gender attitudes and engaging with different audiences and stakeholders’ (What Works
(2014): 8-9) . The literature in this respect calls for28:
• Knowledge of the landscape – i.e. the overall setting in which violence occurs – on the
basis of a thorough situational and gender analysis. Such analyses help to understand the
different types of violence, population groups most affected, and the factors that drive
the overall level of physical and sexual violence within the population in general and VAW
in particular. They are vital for designing interventions that have a bigger chance of
success (DFID (2012a): 5-6). The World Bank calls for ‘understanding which attitudes are
most directly linked with violence and identifying potential levers of change, including
community, opinion and religious leaders’ (World Bank (2014): 71).
• Use of a well-articulated theory of change that demonstrates e.g. how programme
components deal with the different risk factors identified in the ‘ecological model’.
DFID emphasises the importance of ‘a holistic approach’, with ‘coordinated interventions
operating at multiple levels, across sectors and over multiple time-frames’ and that
recognises the link between prevention and response interventions (DFID (2012a): 8).
Operating at multiple levels implies that engaging at the community level is essential
for improving support to survivors of violence. DFID underlines the importance of
community mobilisation to ‘build a critical mass of individuals and groups who no
longer tolerate violence against women and girls’ (DFID (2012b): 11).29 Targeting
interventions to maximise potential impact (e.g. by focusing on the more severe forms
of violence in a setting or on populations at higher risk) is recommended as well.
• Combine community mobilisation with awareness and advocacy campaigns rather
than having these campaigns as a stand-alone effort, as was e.g. done by the ‘We Can’
campaign (DFID (2012b): 10).30 Awareness campaigns, community engagement
programmes, or communication and ‘edutainment’ through radio and television can
help to break the silence about violence against women and contribute to a critical mass
of pressure to convince key public sector stakeholders to take violence seriously.31
However, they ‘do not result in attitudinal or behavioral change by themselves’ as they are
‘typically not intense enough or sufficiently long-term transform norms or change
behaviour’ (Willman and Corman (2013): 31). In general, ‘short-term and one-off
interventions are less likely to show positive effects’ on ‘changing deep-seated norms and
behaviours’ (World Bank (2014): 74).
• Ensure a variety of interventions for different age groups: different types of violence affect
women and girls across the various stages of this life cycle. The evidence also calls for
particular attention to youth since ‘(young) people appear more open to changing their
views about the acceptability of violence than older adults’ (Bott et al. (2005): 6-7).32
• Design interventions that target both the general population (e.g. when dealing with
social norms around acceptability of violence against women) and high-risk groups
(such as youth).

| 23 |

Premises and promises

| 24 |

• Design interventions that challenge discriminatory gender norms – i.e. explicit and
implicit, formal and informal attitudes, social norms, beliefs, attitudes, behaviour and
practices at all levels (i.e. from individuals to communities to institutions) – that condone
or tolerate violence. This is a challenging and ‘long-term process’ that requires ‘a
sustained effort and a commitment to a human rights perspective’ since it ‘takes time to
change deep-rooted norms and behaviours’ (Bott et al. (2005): 6). As mentioned above,
few short-term or one-off interventions have proven effective in reducing violence
(Kiplesund and Morton (2014)).
• Seek to include men as appropriate: involving men in ‘interventions that aim to empower
women and reduce violence can be critical’ (Solotaroff and Prabha Pande (2014): 200).
This is about involving men ‘as critical decision makers and potential agents of change’
(Kiplesund and Morton (2014)) and about ‘enlisting men as allies in women’s rights
advocacy and accountability work around violence against women and girls’ (DFID
(2012b): 17). Ricardo et al. (2011) found that studies provide evidence of effectiveness of
interventions to improve boys’ and young men’s attitudes towards rape and other forms
of violence against women, as well as towards rigid gender stereotypes that condone or
allow this violence to occur. However, ‘(evidence) of effectiveness related to behaviours is
less straightforward’ and ‘there is little evidence of the effectiveness of interventions to
actually decrease boys’ and young men’s perpetration of violent behaviors in the
long-term’ (Ricardo et al. (2011): 5, 6). In relation to engaging boys and men, the World
Bank moreover advocates for ‘messaging that promotes and reinforces positive norms
– such as showing men modeling equitable and non-violent behaviours’ (World Bank
(2014): 73). At the same time: ‘There is evidence that programmes targeting men and boys
are effective at tackling violence against women and girls only where they explicitly focus
on transforming unequal power relations between women and men, including
promoting alternative notions of masculinity’ (DFID (2012a): 12).
• Improve monitoring, documentation of the implementation process, and evaluation and
undertake rigorous impact evaluation, in view of the skewed distribution of evidence of
what works mentioned above in favour of the high-income countries.
• Work with partners (women’s organisations or women-led organisations) that represent
local women, have a sound understanding of the context, power-holders and risks
involved, have a history of working at the community level and in remote areas and a
track record plus expertise of working on the subject, show a commitment to women’s
human rights; and have women in key decision-making positions within the organisation
(DFID (2012b): 6, 7, 9). Social institutions – religious institutions, ‘traditional’,
community and religious leaders, and ‘modern’ media – play a powerful role in
influencing social norms and can be allies and opponents to shifting norms.

Violence against women

Notes
1

Along the same lines, the UN Millennium Project Task Force on Gender Equality of 2005 observed that
‘(gender) inequality perpetuates violence against women, and violence against women restricts
women’s ability to use their capabilities and take advantage of opportunities, thereby reinforcing
gender inequality’ inequality’ (UN Task Force Gender Equality (2005): 110). The study of the UN
Secretary General of 2006 states: ‘violence against women is a violation of human rights, rooted in
historically unequal power relations between men and women and the systemic discrimination against
women that pervades both the public and private spheres. The broad context from which it emerges
includes disparities of power in the form of patriarchy, socio-cultural norms and practices that
perpetuate gender-based discrimination and economic inequalities’ (UN (2006): 131).

2

The term ‘gender based’ is used to ‘to highlight the links between violence against women and
women’s subordinate status’ (Bott et al. (2005): 8; 14-15).

3

See also Oxfam (2012): 5. According to the WHO, intimate partner violence also includes ‘emotional
abuse and controlling behaviours by a partner, such as not being allowed to see friends or family’,
although there is ‘currently a lack of agreement on standard measures of emotional/ psychological
partner violence and the threshold at which acts that can be considered unkind or insulting cross the
line into being emotional abuse’ (WHO (2013): 10). In its report there are ‘measures of intimate partner
violence solely include act(s) of physical and/or sexual violence’ (WHO (2013): 10).

4

Although men (and boys) are most often the perpetrators of rape and violence in armed conflict and
women the victims, men (and boys) may also be subject to violence that is designed to ‘shatter male
power’, with all the effects that come with it (increased rate of HIV infection, disruption of lives,
damage to physical and psychological health, etc.) (El Jack (2003): 12, 16, 18). The literature indicates
that it has been difficult to quantify the incidence of such violence as men are reluctant to speak out
(El Jack (2003): 18).

5

Another outcome was the appointment by the Commission on Human Rights in 1994 of a Special
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences.

6

These include systematic rape and forced pregnancy during armed conflict, sexual slavery, forced
sterilisation and forced abortion, female infanticide, and prenatal sex selection (UN Special Rapporteur
(2009): 5). The strategic objectives of the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 read as: (a) to take
integrated measures to prevent and eliminate violence against women; (b) to study the causes and
consequences of violence against women and the effectiveness of preventive measures; and (c) to
eliminate trafficking in women and assist victims of violence due to prostitution and trafficking.

7

It also called upon states to take measures to address violence against women resulting from prejudice,
racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia, pornography, ethnic cleansing, armed conflict, foreign
occupation, religious and anti-religious extremism, and terrorism.

8

The obligation for states to prevent violence against women and girls and to provide comprehensive
services to survivors of such violence was established as a ‘due diligence’ standard by Recommendation
#19 of the CEDAW Committee of 1992. It furthermore specifies that these rights and freedoms include: ‘(a)
The right to life; (b) The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; (c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of international or
internal armed conflict; (d) The right to liberty and security of person; (e) The right to equal protection
under the law; (f) The right to equality in the family; (g) The right to the highest standard attainable of
physical and mental health; (h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work’.

9

See Bott et al. (2005): 4; Morrison et al. (2007): 33, 39; Oxfam (2012): 4. Legislation concerns e.g. the
criminalisation of domestic violence and marital rape, eliminating provisions that allow perpetrators of
rape to escape criminal sanctions by agreeing to marry the victims, and revising criminal procedures to
make it easier to prosecute offenders.

| 25 |

Premises and promises

10

While ‘(some) qualitative data supports the view that legislation against (gender based violence), even
without full enforcement, sends an important message about the non-acceptability of the behavior.
However, this has not necessarily borne out in practice’ (Willman and Corman (2013): 24).

11

See also World Bank (2014): 77. As stated by the World Bank, a ‘well-functioning justice system, with
appropriate sanctions against violence against women, can help deter future violence and is an
important element of prevention efforts’ (World Bank (2014): 76).

12

Bott et al. (2005): 4; Heise (2012): 14; UN Women (2013): 8.

13

See also DFID (2012a): 7; GDN et al. (2015): 29.

14

The study of the UN Secretary General of 2006 refers in this respect to ‘a significant and unacceptable
gap between the international standards on violence against women and the concrete commitment of
political capital and resources to implement these standards’ (UN (2006): 132).

15

Bott et al. (2005): 4, 20; Morrison et al. (2007): 35; Fergus (2012): 12, 14; Maguire (2012): 27.

16

See also GDN et al. (2015): ‘(one) of the key challenges is the failure to address institutional practices
and broader social norms that reinforce and condone (violence against women)’ (GDN et al. (2015): 30).

17

According to the WHO, violence starts early in women’s relationships and reaches a peak in the age
group of 40-44 years with few data available for women who are 50 years or older, especially in low and
middle-income countries (WHO (2013): 16). Willman and Corman (2013) refer to ‘National Violence
against Children Surveys estimating that ‘among women 18-24 years old, 38% in Swaziland, 27% in
Tanzania and 32% in Zimbabwe had experienced sexual violence before they were 18 years old’
(Willman and Corman (2013): 6.

18

See also the study of the UN Secretary General of 2006: ‘While violence against women is universal and
present in every society and culture, it takes different forms and is experienced differently. The forms of
violence to which women are subjected and the ways in which they experience this violence are often
shaped by the intersection of gender with other factors such as race, ethnicity, class, age, sexual
orientation, disability, nationality, legal status, religion and culture’ (UN (2006): 132).

19

’Sexual violence perpetrated by people, such as strangers, acquaintances, friends, colleagues, peers,
teachers, neighbours, and family members is referred to as non-partner sexual violence. In developed
countries a greater proportion of violence is mutual but the health consequences of men’s violence
remain more severe for women’ (Abrahams et al. (2014): 1).

20

Worldwide, men experience higher levels of physical violence than women as a result of war,
gang-related activity, street violence, and suicide.

21

According to the WHO, around 7% of women worldwide have experienced violence by a non-partner,
with the highest rates reported in high-income countries (12.6%) and Africa (11.9%), and the lowest
prevalence was found for the South-East Asia (4.9%) (WHO (2013): 18).

22

According to the WHO, 38% of all murders, i.e. ‘the extreme manifestation of existing forms of violence
against women’ and ‘the ultimate act of violence which is experienced in a continuum of violence’ are
committed by intimate partners (WHO (2013): 2).

23

See e.g. Bott et al. (2005): 10 and United Nations (2013): 3. There is considerable data variation since
different definitions of ‘violence’ are used and researchers use different questions and timeframes and
different sample characteristics. This makes it difficult to compare research findings (Bott et al. (2005):
9).

24

Spangaro et al. (2013) in this respect refer to ‘Fear of retribution, by the perpetrators or others,
punishment, shame, disruption to community and family support, instability, and the break down in
law and social services, coupled with a lack of confidence in systems, opportunities, and confidential
responses, all contribute to under-reporting’ (Spangaro et al. (2013): 17). See also Abrahams et al. (2014):
5 and WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2010) stating that, ‘the occurrence and

| 26 |

Violence against women

impacts of intimate partner and sexual violence are frequently ‘hidden’ resulting in a significant
underestimation of the real level of harm caused’ (WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine (2010): 5). Cross- country comparisons are furthermore difficult to make because of
differences in measurement. These differences may relate to (1) the scope of violence, (2) the definition
of violence, (3) the means by which violence is measured, (4) the survey instrument, (5) the scope of the
population studied, (6) the representativeness of the sample selected, and (7) country-specific
considerations’ (Day et al. (2005): 5).
25

See e.g. Bott et al. (2005): 14-15; United Nations (2006): 37-38; 60; Morrison et al. (2007): 26;
Heise (2012): 3; and Fergus (2012): 18.

26

As a result, ‘the same set of genetic, personal history and situational factors (such as abuse in
childhood, a proclivity toward impulsiveness, and having too many drinks) may be sufficient to push a
particular man toward partner violence in one socio-cultural and community setting, but not in
another’ (Heise (2012)).

27

Legal reform is a good example. Despite laws that criminalise marital rape at the level of ‘society’,
marital rape is still widely practised at the ‘relationship’ level in a number of countries because social
norms at the level of ‘relationship’ have not sufficiently changed (DFID (2012a): 8).

28

Also see http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/647-key-theoretical-models-for-building-acomprehensive-approach.html.

29

See e.g. Bott et al. (2005): 12; UN (2006): 58-59; Morrison et al. (2007): 32-33; ICRW (2007): 7; WHO
(2009): 11; WHO (2010): 16,17; WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2010): 3, 15;
Fergus (2012): 5; Duvvury et al. (2013): 6-8; Abrahams et al. (2014): 6; Spangaro et al. (2013): 18; WHO
(2013); Kabeer (2014): 19-20.

30

On the complex relationship between HIV and violence against women and the different pathways
involved see WHO (2009): 1-2, 9, 10. According to WHO (2013) women who have been physically or
sexually abused by their partners are 1.5 times more likely to acquire HIV in some regions.

31

See also Heise (2012): 5-6.

32

See e.g. UN (2006): 181-190 for a summary of different studies. See also Day et al. (2005), which
provides a summary overview of the research done on the economic costs of gender-based violence.
Pages 12-13 provide an overview of categories and examples of such costs.

33

Day et al. (2005) distinguish between: (i) direct tangible costs (i.e. actual expenses paid, e.g. for hospital
and shelter staff); (ii) indirect tangible costs (e.g. lower earning and profits coming from less
productivity); (iii) direct intangible costs (which have no monetary value, e.g. pain and suffering); and (iv)
indirect intangible costs (which also have no monetary value, e.g. negative psychological effects on
children who witness violence) (Day et al. (2005): 6-7). As stated by the World Bank, unless violence
against women, as a critical constraint on agency, is addressed ‘women cannot take full advantage of
potential economic opportunities’ (World Bank (2013): 2).

34

Estimates for the UK were close to USD 34.5 billion per year (2004); for Australia they were estimated at
USD 8.1 billion, while in the case of the US they ranged between USD 3.5 and USD 12.6 billion (2002)
(ICRW (2007): 4). The differences are explained by the different types of costs that are included in the
estimates.

35

ICRW (2007): 4-5; Durruvy et al. (2013): 11.

36

Estimating the economic costs in developing countries is difficult for amongst others the following
reasons: (i) the lack of services (or serious under-funding of services) generally means that direct cost
estimates associated with gender-based violence will be low, giving a mistaken impression that that the
problem is not important; (ii) the coexistence of formal and informal structures of health provision and
economic activity; as well as (iii) minimal information technology and record-keeping, and difficulties
with data collection.

| 27 |

Premises and promises

| 28 |

37

These methodological concerns are e.g.: (i) insufficient control for biased results leading to an
over-estimation or under-estimation of effects; (ii) lack of comparable control groups; (iii) evaluations
that were conducted only at the conclusion of an intervention and therefore failed to capture fade-out
effects or results that could emerge 6 or 12 months later; and (iv) evaluations were often based on
self-reporting, by women and/or men, with the two sides not always agreeing on what happened in
reality, in other words a discrepancy that ‘puts in question the actual attainment of behavior change
and the reliability of outcomes based on self-reporting’ (Arango et al. (2014): 39). See further Morrison
et al. (2007): 44; WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2010): 37; Fergus (2012): 4;
Arango et al. (2014): 30, 39. Also Heise (2012) observes that ‘the field benefits from several decades of
practice based learning that has been systematized into various ‘best practice’ documents; however,
rigorous evaluations are largely lacking on how effective these programmes have been in actually
reducing violence’ (Heise (2012): 4). Berg and Denison come to the same conclusion in their systematic
review of interventions to reduce the prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting in African
countries, i.e.: ‘that there is a paucity of high quality evaluations of the effectiveness of interventions to
reduce the prevalence of FGM/C’ (Berg and Denison (2012): 79). According to Fulu et al. (2014): ‘while
many intervention evaluations show an impact on risk factors related to violence such as attitudes,
school attendance, sexual practices, alcohol use, harsh parenting and others, evaluations that
demonstrate a significant impact on women’s experiences or men’s perpetration of VAWG are still
relatively rare’ (Fulu et al. (2014): 33).

38

See also Fulu et al. (2014) stating that ‘(even) where interventions did demonstrate an impact on VAWG,
the findings are often inconsistent. For example, we are yet to see an intervention that has effectively
reduced both men’s perpetration and women’s experiences of violence, with evaluations tending to
report a change in one but not the other’ (Fulu et al. (2014): 33).

39

For an overview of what works to reduce violence against women in conflict and post-conflict zones
and other humanitarian crises in lower and middle-income countries see Spangaro et al. (2013). The
authors refer e.g. to provision of firewood, alternative fuels and patrols during firewood collection;
multi-strategy interventions; medical care plus post-trauma counselling improved functioning for
women and participation in groups and building networks with other women who have experienced
trauma may reduce stress. Legal interventions were not associated with reduced risk.

40

Adapted from Jewkes (2013); What Works (2014); Jewkes (2014); Morrison et al. (2007); Willman and
Corman (2013); WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2010); Heise (2012); Fulu et al.
(2014); World Bank (2014).

41

Ex-offender policies stipulate that sexual offenders should be recorded on a register and barred from
having contact with children. This is done by vetting people who work with children across a range of
settings from schools to playgroups to foster parents. Disruption plans use surveillance measures and
information about risky adults’ association with vulnerable children to ‘disrupt’ abuse attempts without
involving the child (Jewkes (2014): 10).

42

Evaluations have demonstrated the following issues: (i) female officers have not automatically
demonstrated better attitudes toward victims of violence simply by virtue of their sex; (ii) they have
often been severely underfunded: officers have received inadequate training, and stations have lacked
equipment, transportation, and other key resources; (iii) when working well, their efforts are often
undermined by other parts of the justice system that are unwilling or unable to enforce the law; (iv)
they often encourage regular police stations to abdicate responsibility for crimes against women
(Morrison et al. (2007): 37).

43

Second responder programmes entail a follow-up visit (after the initial police response to domestic
violence) – usually by a specially trained domestic violence police officer and a civilian domestic
violence advocate (Jewkes (2014): 10).

44

This is in line with one of the guiding principles mentioned in the study of the UN Secretary General of
2006, i.e. to ‘(maintain) the confidentiality and privacy of the victim/survivor’ (UN (2006): 115).

Violence against women

45

According to the study of the UN Secretary General of 2006, ‘(while) the State may not always be the
best provider of such shelters, it is good practice for the State to assist, encourage, finance and
cooperate with NGOs in establishing and maintaining them’ (UN (2006): 118).

46

These are short-term campaigns that focus on one particular issue only.

47

According to Heise (2012), ‘the role of economic factors on women’s risk of violence appears to be
complex, context-specific and contingent on other factors (such as partner’s employment or
education). Current research suggests that economic empowerment of women in some situations can
perversely increase the incidence of partner violence, at least in the short term. This seems especially
common in situations where a man is unable to fulfil his gender-ascribed role as ‘bread-winner’ and a
woman is beginning to contribute relatively more to family maintenance, or where a woman takes a job
that defies prevailing social convention’ (Heise (2012): 7; also DFID (2012a): 14). Along the same lines,
‘(findings) suggest that microfinance schemes can have either a positive or negative effect on a
woman’s risk of partner violence, depending on other aspects of her situation’ (Heise (2012): 7). Also
Kabeer (2014) refers to mixed findings (Kabeer (2014): 12) while Willman and Corman (2013) observe:
‘Increasing income for women provides greater agency and power in household decision-making, but
may also trigger resentment if they are perceived as ‘disempowering’ to male partners’ (Willman and
Corman (2013): 13).

48

See e.g. What Works (2014); Solotaroff and Prabha Pande (2014): 200, 214; Fulu et al. (2014); DFID
(2012a); DFID (2012b); Kiplesund and Morton (2014); Spangaro et al. (2013); World Bank (2014): 71-79.

49

Working at local level requires acquiring the buy in of local (women) leaders to gain acceptance of
culturally sensitive programmes, reducing the risk of backlash; building strong relationships with
communities and regular consultations through the programme cycle; anticipating and responding to
the risk of backlash against women organising at community level; sustaining partnerships beyond a
single programming cycle; taking into account that formal service provision may be weak or absent or
difficult to reach because of specific barriers women may face (finance, mobility constraints) (DFID
(2012b): 5).

50

Along the same lines, Spangaro et al. (2013) recommend that ‘(interventions) should be multifaceted,
incorporating as relevant: survivor care, community engagement, systems and security, personnel and
infrastructure measures. Community consultation on needs, preferences and risk factors should be
undertaken before and during implementation’ (Spangaro et al. (2013): 106).

51

According to Heise (2012), larger-scale ‘edutainment’ or campaign efforts coupled with efforts to
reinforce media messages through street theatre, discussion groups, cultivation of ‘change agents’ and
print materials. Both these strategies have demonstrated modest changes in reported attitudes and
beliefs – and in some cases, reductions in reported rates of partner violence (Heise (2012): 5).

52

The World Bank argues the focus on youth from another perspective: a multi-country study showed
that youth tended to report a higher justification of violence against women than older respondents,
‘underscoring that much more work is needed to change norms and attitudes among youth’ (World
Bank (2014): 72).

| 29 |

3
Women’s education

‘Women’s education is probably the single most important policy instrument to increase
agricultural productivity and reduce poverty’ (Quisumbing and Meinzen-Dick (2001): 1).

Women’s education

3.1 Introduction
A series of international conventions and agreements emphasises women’s right to
education, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. It is also
incorporated in CEDAW (1979) and the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and a
core element of the Jomtien World Conference on Education for All of the same year. Also
the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) underscores the importance women’s training and
education in several of its strategic objectives. Women’s right to education was recognised
in the follow-up World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000 as well as in MDG3, which
talks about eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 and
achieving gender equality in education by 2015.
Following a brief presentation on the state of affairs with respect to women and girls’
participation in education, this chapter focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the
importance of gender equality in education. It underlines the importance of women’s
education for women’s empowerment in a broad range of areas, i.e. from employment, to
sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), increasing women’s voice in the family
and reducing gender-based violence. Still, there is a need for ‘caution in assuming that the
effects of education can be taken for granted or that they will be uniform across all contexts’
(Kabeer (2005): 18).

3.2 Developments and state of affairs
Data from the UN’s Millennium Development Goals Reports shows that girls’ enrolment in
primary education has continued to increase during the first decade of the new Millennium.
By 2012, all developing regions have achieved, or were close to achieving, gender parity in
primary education. The gender parity index (GPI) grew from 91 in 1999 to 97 in 2010.
Southern Asia stands out in overall progress. Figures remain lower in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Western Asia, despite the increase in gross enrolment of girls from 72 to 96% and from
87 to 97% respectively. Although more girls are now in school in Sub-Saharan Africa, only 93
girls are enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys. In parallel with this increase in
school enrolment, the number of out-of-school children – mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Southern Asia – declined from 106 million in 1999 to 69 million in 2008 and 61 million
in 2010 as mentioned in UNESCO’s EFA Global monitoring report 2012. Overall, girls
represent an estimated 53% of these children; this share varies across regions, with the
highest share reported for Northern Africa.
Primary school attendance of girls and boys is nearly equal in the richest households and in
urban areas; however this is not the case for girls from poor households in rural areas,
where, for many reasons (school fees, lack of safe school environment, early marriage
practices, etc.), girls leave early. Girls from the poorest households continue to face the
highest barriers to education: being poor, female, living in rural areas1 or a conflict zone
increases the probability that a child will be out of school. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 23%

| 31 |

Premises and promises

cent of poor, rural girls complete their primary education, though when kept in school,
girls tend to outperform boys.
The gender gap in school enrolment widens when moving to secondary education. Gender
disparities associated with poverty and rural residency are also larger at this level of
education, also for girls from wealthier households.2 In the poorest households, about
twice as many girls of secondary-school age are out of school compared to their wealthier
peers. The GPI in secondary education in the developing world as a whole was 96 in 2010
but only 82 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 91 in Western and Southern Asia. According to the
World Bank, ‘(the) number of countries with girls disadvantaged in secondary education is
similar to the number with boys disadvantaged’ (World Bank (2011): 108).

| 32 |

Worldwide, women outnumber men in tertiary education in 62% of the countries; between
1970 and 2008 ‘the number of female tertiary students increased more than sevenfold (from
10.8 million to 80.9 million), compared with a fourfold increase among males’ (World Bank
(2011): 108). The ratio of girls’ to boys’ enrolment went from 96 in 1999 to 108 in 2007,
though, once more, with substantial regional disparities. By 2012, the overall GPI in tertiary
education was 98 but rates were lower in Sub-Saharan Africa (63), Southern Asia (76) and
Western Asia (89). In contrast, young women in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Eastern Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern Africa and South-Eastern Asia have higher
enrolment ratios than young men. In general, countries with lower levels of national
wealth tend to have more men enrolled in tertiary education than women, while the
opposite occurs in countries with higher average income. Tertiary education completion
rates also tend to be lower among women than men and women continue to be
overrepresented in the humanities and social sciences and are significantly
underrepresented in science, technology and, in particular, engineering.3
In 2010, 122 million people between 15 and 24 years of age (of which 74 million women)
were unable to read and write a short, simple statement about their everyday life. Gender
gaps in youth literacy rates are at the same time narrowing. However, literacy rates continue
to be worse for women than for men, especially in South Asia and East and North Africa
(Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013): 8). According to GDN et al. (2015), ‘(over) recent years,
women’s literacy has barely progressed at all and has attracted very little investment’
and women account for almost two-thirds of the world’s 774 million illiterate adults
(GDN et al. (2015): 53).
Reasons for the failure to achieve gender parity in education are varied and context-specific
– and generally well known. They include4:
• Demand side issues such as the direct costs of sending girls to school even when
countries have instituted free universal primary education5, demand for girls’ domestic
labour in the household, socio-cultural norms and traditions (e.g. early marriage); and
• Supply side issues such as lack of accessible and safe school infrastructure and of qualified
and committed (female) teachers, gender stereotyping in curriculum6 and textbooks and
teachers reinforcing societal perceptions towards girls.7

Women’s education

3.3 Importance of education to women and girls
The importance of girls’ education has first of all been argued from a human rights
perspective: girls have a right to be included based upon their entitlements as citizens
(Calder and Huda (2013): 2). This is e.g. also evident from the title of the Dutch education
policy document of 1999: Education, A basic human right. This position finds it origins in the
international conventions and agreements mentioned above.
A second argument has been instrumentalist: girls’ education is key to a range of economic
and social development aims. According to Quisumbing and Meinzen-Dick (2001),
‘(improving) women’s education is probably the single most important policy instrument to
increase agricultural productivity and reduce poverty’.
While the benefits of education vary and are context-specific and depend on the quality of the
education that is provided8, generally, they are higher for girls than for boys, especially after
completing secondary education (Levine et al. (2008): 16-17).9 Moreover, ‘(the) benefits of
investing in girls are amplified and sustained in the next generation’ (Levine et al. (2008): 19).
A critical reflection is at the same time given by Duflo (2012). She argues that the evidence that
educating girls has ‘tremendous spill over effects’ is not as strong as commonly believed.
‘More needs to be learned about this, the automatic presumption that female education is
more important than male education for child mortality and for other children outcomes may
need to be revised: it seems that both matter’ (Duflo (2012): 1066).10
Looking at the economic aspects, studies11 confirm the importance of girls’ education for
gross domestic product and macro-economic growth and that female education has a larger
impact on growth than male education (World Bank (2007): 108). Gender inequality in
education impedes economic growth and income generation.12 Cross-country evidence
shows that gender inequality in education accounts for a sizable portion of the empirically
observed growth differences between countries and regions’ (Blackden et al. (2006): 6). It
has impact, directly, through lowering the average quality of human capital, and indirectly,
through its impact on investment and population growth.13 According to the World Bank,
major drivers of women’s increased labour force participation and earnings in the Latin
America and the Caribbean region ‘include increased investments in education alongside
the decline of fertility and delays in marriage’ (World Bank (2013): 8).
Using cross-country and panel regressions covering the period 1960-2000, Klasen and
Lamanna (2009) found in this respect that:
• Gender inequality in education reduced economic growth in the 1990s;
• Gender inequality in education in the Middle East and North Africa and the South Asia
region continues to harm growth in that region but by decreasing amounts; and
• Gender inequality in labour force participation (as a proxy for gender gaps in employment)
has a sizable negative impact on economic growth (Klasen and Lamanna (2009): 117).
Educated women are furthermore more likely to enter the formal labour market, where
earnings exceed those of informal or home-based work, though Darkwah (2010) based on a

| 33 |

Premises and promises

study in Ghana makes the case that getting access to what ILO defines as ‘decent work’ and
‘whether or not an educated girl will grow up to become an empowered woman’ (Darkwah
(2010): 13) is context-specific – education alone will not be enough.14 Women’s education
raises agricultural productivity with most farmers being women in developing countries.15
Looking at the issue of social impact and other dimensions of human development, the
literature16 indicates that there is strong evidence on the importance of women’s and girls’
education for improving health outcomes on general health status, maternal health and
mortality, child immunisation and child and infant health and mortality, and SRHR
including HIV/Aids and the prevalence of female genital mutilation (IOB (2011e): 31-34).17
Moreover, it is important for reasons of family planning, delaying marriage
(see text box 3.1), reducing family size, reducing risk behaviour and lowering fertility rates.
Education is also found to have an empowering effect on women’s voice in the family and their
participation in public life and for reducing the incidence of violence against women (UN
Millennium Project (2005): 39-40; Kabeer and Natali (2013): 35); education inequalities, including
low levels of literacy for women, are significant barriers to participation (Moosa et al. (2013): 468).
Text box 3.1

Child marriages

| 34 |

According to Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014b), ‘child marriage is closely linked to
poverty and girls’ educational opportunities’. It is ‘a practice that robs women of agency
on a number of fronts. Not only are girls often coerced into arrangements against their
will, the effects of being married at a young age tend to include lower levels of education and long-lasting health problems as a result of early pregnancies’ (De Silva de Alwis
(2014): 22; OECD/DAC (2010): 4). In 18 of the 20 countries with the highest prevalence of
child marriage, ‘girls with no education are up to six times more likely to marry than girls
with a secondary education’ and ‘girls living in poorer households are almost twice as
likely to marry before the age of 18, compared with girls in higher-income households’.
Not surprisingly, net enrolment in primary education is, on average, lower in countries
with high levels of early marriage (OECD/DAC (2010): 4).
While already CEDAW (1979) calls on all countries to take necessary action to eliminate
child marriage and encourages lawmakers to set the minimum age for marriage to 18
years, the practice of child marriage continues in many countries, even despite local laws
that regulate age at marriage. Its high prevalence ‘is both a symptom and a consequence of poverty’ and is ‘driven by social norms and expectations and by gender discrimination that devalues women and girls and their right to make choices for themselves’
(Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014b)). Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014b) highlight that
programmes and strategies must address multiple social and economic drivers to delay
marriage and that it is ‘also critical to provide individual and family-level resources
within interventions’ (Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014b): 4-5). There is a need for
strengthened legal and policy frameworks, to ensure increased awareness of and
changes in attitudes on early marriages, as well as greater enforcement of existing laws.

Women’s education

At the same time, there is no evidence that educational expansion has reduced social and
economic inequalities. As mentioned by IOB, ‘the impact of education on socio-economic,
gender or ethnic equality is not necessarily of the magnitude or direction that one might
hope for’ (IOB (2011e): 27). Access to education in itself ‘is insufficient to overcome a variety
of important contextual causes of exclusion that sustain existing inequalities’ (IOB (2011e):
28, 43). Moreover, whether, despite the positive aspects referred to above, education leads
to women’s empowerment is not certain (Kabeer (2005): 18). As observed by the World
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department in 2005, ‘(studies) have shown that growth helps
reduce poverty where there is more education and higher literacy rates, but where
education levels are low, the link is negligible. In addition to investing in women’s human
capital, therefore, it is critical that women participate more in economic activities to reduce
poverty and enhance women’s welfare overall’ (World Bank Operations Evaluation
Department (2005): xiv; 47).

3.4 What works?
To address the many issues related to educating girls, a range of strategies has been
implemented both on the demand side and the supply side. These have ranged from the
abolition of school fees, introducing stipends for girls, community sensitisation on the
importance of girls’ education, to the recruitment of female teachers, teacher training,
the development of girl-friendly teaching and learning materials and the construction of
girl-friendly schools.
On what works, table 3.1 gives an overview of different types of interventions – that can be
used in combination18 – for which there is either strong or promising evidence of girls’
participation in education, their learning outcomes and, finally empowerment.19

| 35 |

Premises and promises

Institutions
and policy
| 36 |

Norms and
inclusion

Empowerment

Infrastructure

Learning outcomes

Resources

Participation

Table 3.1 Summary of evidence of what works for girls in education

Cash interventions targeted at populations most in need and
at grade levels where drop-out is most likely to have an
impact on girls’ participation (if these are seen to be
objective and fair).20

++

++

-

In-kind resource interventions.21

+

-

-

Information about employment returns to schooling.

++

-

-

22

Provision of additional schools in underserved areas.

++

+

-

Integrated water, sanitation and hygiene interventions.

+

-

-

Formal and informal teacher training in subject content,
(gender sensitive) pedagogy, management, gender equality
and to develop attitudes of inclusion and tolerance.

++

+

+

Girl friendly schools.

++

+

+

Classroom level group learning.

++

++

++

Learning through formal informal extracurricular activities.

-

++

++

The involvement of women in school governance and
community mobilisation and in community leadership.

+

+

+

Gender mainstreaming as an approach to changing
institutional cultures may have a positive impact provided
that adequate resources are allocated.

+

-

-

Teaching about personal, social and health issues linked with
sex education both at school and in complementary
programmes.

+

+

+

Women’s literacy programmes, in case they offer women
and girls to develop gender awareness, literacy knowledge
and skills and spaces for reflective discussion.

+

+

+

Interventions that seek to enhance the capacity of poor or
marginalised women and girls to participate in discussing
school practices and reflecting on their experience.

+

-

+

Supporting young women to proceed to higher levels of
education.

+

-

-

Legenda: ++ = strong evidence; + = promising evidence; - = no evidence.

Women’s education

Notes
1

Inequalities between males and females for access to and completion of education and what they learn
during the process remain acute among the world’s poor, especially in rural areas (see e.g. Nallari and
Griffith (2011): 56 -57; Bachelet (2012): 72; Grown (2014): 160).

2

This is linked to a range of cultural attitudes and practices that promote early marriage, son preference,
encourage the seclusion of young girls or attach greater value to educating boys than girls can create
formidable barriers to gender parity as well as the costs of education, especially for the poor (United
Nations (2012): 21).

3

According to the World Bank (2011) ‘(there) has been less success in addressing stream divergence
because many barriers need to be lifted at the same time – households, markets, and institutions need
to change simultaneously, through complex polices that act on multiple fronts’ (World Bank (2011): 107).

4

See e.g. Calder and Huda (2013).

5

This refers to the costs of e.g. school uniforms, transport, textbooks, etc.

6

Based on research on secondary education in Honduras, Murphy-Graham (2008) emphasises the need
to open the ‘black box’ of education content (the ‘hidden curriculum’ that often reflects prevailing
social attitudes and prejudices) and processes since ‘not all forms of education will necessarily serve as
‘resources’ for empowerment’ (Murphy-Graham (2008): 32).

7

See also Levtov (2014) underlining that national curriculum can ‘reinforce existing social and gender
inequalities by implicitly upholding traditional gender stereotypes or by disregarding the diversity of
learning needs and learning styles among girls and boys throughout the country’ and that ‘(addressing
gender biases in textbook and curriculum is an important avenue towards equality within education’
(Levtov (2014): 6-7).

8

See e.g. Kabeer (2005): 17; Calder and Huda (2013): 2; Behrman et al. (1999); Hanushek and Woessmann
(2007) and Cooray (2009); IOB (2011e): 15.

9

On e.g. the case of Bangladesh see IOB (2011d): 99.

10

Duflo’s critique is that ‘(although) an association between education of mothers and the outcomes of
their children has been found over and over again, the evidence, in most cases, suffers from obvious
biases: educated girls come from richer families and marry richer, more educated, more progressive
husbands. As such, it is, in general, difficult to account for all of these factors, and few of the studies
have tried to do so’ (Duflo (2012): 1065-1066).

11

See e.g. Centre for Economic and Business Research (2008); Lewis and Lockheed (2008); Hanushek and
Woessmann (2007); Hanushek (2008); Levine et al. (2008); and Chaaban and Cunningham (2011).

12

See e.g. Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2007): 4-5.

13

See also IOB (2011e): 27, 74; Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2007): 2; Klasen (1999): 23 and Dollar and
Gatti (1999): 21.

14

See also Murphy-Graham (2008): 45-46; Kabeer (2011): 5.

15

On the link between education and agricultural productivity see e.g. Croppenstedt et al. (2013): 23-24.

16

See e.g. Rose and Subrahmanian (2005); Lewis and Lockheed (2008); Levine et al. (2008); Hanushek
(2008); Baliamoune and McGillivy (2007); Calder and Huda (2013) and Patrinos (2008); Nallari and
Griffith (2011): 11; World Bank (2011): 106.

17

See also UN Millennium Project (2005): 37-41; Hargreaves and Boler (2006): 25-26, 31-32; Meinzen-Dick
et al. (2011): 5; Kabeer and Natali (2013): 35; Blackden et al. (2006): 4, 7; World Bank (2007): 110-111;
World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (2005) : 41.This was also confirmed in the case of

| 37 |

Premises and promises

Bangladesh showing that: (a) women’s education was a significant determinant in household diet
quality and protein intake (together with income, household composition and prices of protein-rich
commodities); (b) increased education could play a significant role in lowering the gender wage gap as
it allowed women to move out of low productivity and into higher productivity and more skilled
occupations (IOB (2011d): 18, 39).

| 38 |

18

Lessons from World Bank impact evaluations of education programmes suggest ‘that sustained impact
on education — from higher rates of enrolment to increased attendance and lower dropout rates —
requires multi-level programmes’ (Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014a)).

19

The table is based on the systematic review of Unterhalter et al. (2014): 2-6. See further World Bank
(2003): 12-13.

20

Conditional cash transfers are more effective as is clear from Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014a).

21

Promising are: (i) iodine supplements to pregnant women where iodine deficiencies are prevalent; (ii)
deworming; (iii) school feeding programmes (though with a possible negative effect on learning in
crowded classrooms).

22

Particularly where safety concerns associated with distance to school are significant.

Women’s education

| 39 |

4
Women and economic
development

‘The challenge is to reach poor women who are landless labourers, smallholder agricultural
producers, cross-border traders and factory and domestic workers and ensure that these
women have access to the opportunities and benefits of economic growth and trade’
(GENDERNET (2011): 10).

Women and economic development

4.1 Introduction
According to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) of 1979, ‘discrimination against women violates the principles of equality
of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on
equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries,
hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the
full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of
humanity’. This is further elaborated upon in a series of CEDAW’s articles (e.g. Article 3, 11,
13, and 14). Likewise, the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action provides six strategic objectives
that relate to women’s economic rights (see text box 4.1). At the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) Summit in 2010, member states called ‘for action to ensure the equal access of
women and girls to education, basic services, health care, economic opportunities and
decision making’ and stressed that ‘investing in women and girls has a multiplier effect on
productivity, efficiency and sustained economic growth’.51 On the other hand, the MDGs
themselves are not very specific on the issue of women’s economic empowerment, with
only MDG1 referring to ‘Achieve Decent Employment for Women, Men, and Young People’.
There are also several ILO Conventions that promote women’s rights in employment.2
Text box 4.1	Six strategic objectives on women and the economy from the Beijing Platform for
Action (1995)
1)	Promote women’s economic rights and independence, including access to
employment, appropriate working conditions and control over economic
resources.
2)	Facilitate women’s equal access to resources, employment, markets and trade.
3)	Provide business services, training and access to markets, information and
technology, particularly to low-income women.
4)	Strengthen women’s economic capacity and commercial networks.
5)	Eliminate occupational segregation and all forms of employment discrimination.
6)	Promote harmonization of work and family responsibilities for women and men.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First of all, it includes a presentation
on the importance of reducing gender equality from an economic development perspective
and the link between economic development and gender equality. This is followed by more
focused sections on what is known of what works for women in small-scale enterprise
development, women and access to micro credit and development in women’s
employment. The chapter then discusses the role of women in agricultural development
and in international agricultural value chains. The issue of women’s land rights is tackled
separately in the following chapter.

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Premises and promises

4.2 Women and economic development
4.2.1 General picture
It is undisputable that women make a major contribution to economic welfare through
large amounts of unpaid work that often remains unseen and unaccounted for in gross
domestic product. There is also ‘ample evidence that when women are able to develop their
full labour market potential, there can be significant macroeconomic gains’, also in
developing countries.3 In the long term, women’s employment has the potential to increase
women’s assets, to shift the balance of power within the family and to lead to their greater
independence in household decision making. It may furthermore lead to greater
investments in the health and education of their children.4 As Stotsky (2006) argues ‘(there)
is a simultaneous relationship between gender inequalities and economic growth. Gender
inequalities reduce economic growth while at the same time economic growth leads to
lower gender disparities’ (Stotsky (2006): 49-50).5 The Global Gender Index reports observes
that progress closing the gender gap in economic participation is slow: in 2014 only 60% of
the economic outcomes gap was closed, compared to 59% in 2010 (Hausmann et al. (2010):
7, 19 and Hausmann et al. (2014): 12).

| 42 |

Various studies (e.g. Ferrant (2011) and IDRC (2013)) find that a persistent gender inequality
accounts for some 16% of the difference in per capita income between South Asia and East
Asia and the Pacific. There is also evidence that gender inequality in its various dimensions
– from inequalities in education to gender gaps in access to and control over key economic
assets – ‘plays a significant role in accounting for the poor growth performance in Africa’
(Blackden et al. (2006): 1, 6).6 On a more positive note, higher levels of gender diversity in
companies can furthermore drive up productivity and innovation, have a positive impact on
a company’s relations with the community, increase sales by getting greater insights into
consumer preferences (IFC (2013): 2-3, 9, 12, 14, 22-23). The overall effect is ‘likely to differ by
sector, region, the individual company and the type of strategy on women’s employment’
(IFC (2013): 10). The literature furthermore demonstrates that women’s participation in the
labour market on an equal footing with men could boost economic growth by mitigating
the impact of a shrinking workforce in rapidly ageing economies. It allows companies to
better tap the available talent pool and increase production and productivity.7
The reasoning is furthermore that when such employment is outside the agricultural sector
– and provided that it does not erode women’s health or exploits their labour – access to
paid work, also from home, can increase women’s agency – i.e. their capacity to make
strategic choices (Kabeer (1999): 437).8 However, much depends on whether women’s
education translates ‘into employment opportunities and on the kind of employment
opportunities available to them’ (Kabeer and Natali (2013): 35) (see text box 4.2). An issue is
furthermore that women’s increased participation in the labour market has not been
accompanied by changes in the gender division of unpaid labour at the home front: women
continue to take care of the children and the elderly, plus domestic activities such as food
production, collection of fuel wood and water, etc.9

Women and economic development

Text box 4.2

Does Paid Work Provide a Pathway to Women’s Empowerment?

Based on research done in Bangladesh, Kabeer et al. (2010) find that ‘it is the kind of
paid work that women do, rather than the fact of paid work, that influences
women’s voice, agency and relationships both within the home, and to some
extent, outside it’.10 The very small minority of women in formal/semi-formal
employment reported the ‘most positive changes’ on retaining some control over
their income, their ability to move around in the public sphere unaccompanied, as
well as increased recognition within the community. Although women also engaged
in informal work outside the home reported a number of positive outcomes, ‘their
greater poverty and the less favourable working conditions partly offset the
transformative potential of their work’ (Kabeer et al. (2010): 30). According to the
report, paid work ‘is not the only route to positive forms of change in women’s
lives’; (post primary) education, regular TV watching and doing work that is valued
by the family (e.g. in civil society organisations) were found to be significant factors
in promoting women’s agency and empowerment (Kabeer et al. (2010): 31, 35-36).

In brief, there is a strong instrumental rationale or ‘business case’ for ensuring women’s
participation in economic growth – apart from a rights or equality perspective.11
On the other hand, the link between gender equality and economic growth is a complex
one and ‘asymmetrical’, keeping in mind that what de facto constitutes women’s
empowerment varies considerably by country context and even within a country (Kabeer
(2011): 2). The evidence that gender equality, particularly in education and employment,
contributes to economic growth is far more consistent and robust than the evidence that
economic growth contributes to gender equality in health, wellbeing and rights (World
Bank (2007): 107). The impact of economic growth on gender equality appears far less
consistent and there is ‘no guarantee that growth on its own will address critical
dimensions of gender equality’ (Kabeer and Natali (2013): 3, 34-36, 38).66 Likewise Duflo
(2012) recognises that on its own, economic development ‘is not enough to bring about
complete equality between men and women’ in the foreseeable future and ‘policies will be
required to accelerate this process’ (Duflo (2012): 1556, 1063).67

4.2.2 Women and access to finance – the case of micro-credits
As reflected in e.g. ILO (2014), ‘(one) of the main challenges female entrepreneurs face is
limited access to finance. On average, women have less access than men to basic financial
services including checking and savings accounts, as well as to formal credit; they are
substantially ‘credit-constrained’ (ILO (2014): 2, 4).
In relation to what is known on women’s access to credit, IOB (2014b) indicates that women
have been a main target group of micro-finance initiatives. Women are often among the
poor; they are better in repaying loans and are thought to realise better results than men.
Since they have less access to the labour market, starting their own business using credit

| 43 |

Premises and promises

can be a way out of poverty. However, ‘literature reviews of empirical research on the impact
of microfinance on the poor found controversial (and inconclusive) findings’ (Stewart et al.
(2010): 14; World Bank (2013): 38). They point out that:
• There is often little more than anecdotal evidence of the positive impact of micro
finance;14
• The poorest of the poor often hardly benefit; and
• There is a real chance that micro finance has a negative impact for this group: per
definition they live in a fragile environment in which micro credit can bring about
limited change (see further text box 4.3).15
There has also been critique on the inability of micro-finance programmes to move women
into profitable non-traditional forms of entrepreneurship (Nallari and Griffith (2011): 132).
Text box 4.3

Women and micro-finance – on impact

On the impact of micro-finance for women, Stewart et al. (2010) indicate that there
is some evidence that:
| 44 |

•	
Micro-savings for women have a significant impact on their individual
expenditure;
•	Increased food quality is due to increased food expenditures, which increased
significantly for women who are clients of micro-credit programmes; and that
•	Micro-credit is empowering women, although this is not consistent across the
reviewed studies.
Studies on women’s empowerment (e.g. greater control over the earnings from the
business) are, with one exception, ‘inconclusive’.16
Also the systematic review of Yoong et al. (2012) concludes that ‘(findings) for
micro-credit remain highly controversial and inconclusive’, mixed and contradictory
and that the impacts by gender of micro-credit ‘are more ambiguous’ (Yoong et al.
(2012): iv, 31-32). Likewise a recent ODI review states that ‘the majority of studies
looking at micro-finance as a single intervention found that it has no effect on
female bargaining power in the household, expenditure on female goods or on
children, or even on female health outcomes like more knowledge of how to avoid
sexually transmitted infections or a decrease in unwanted pregnancies. In many
cases, though, microfinance is not offered as a stand-alone intervention’. However,
‘(other) components, such as business training are built into it and are often not
considered within the evaluation’ (Taylor and Pereznieto (2014): 35). The prevailing
disagreement over the benefits of micro-credit programmes is partly due to
different ways of measuring impact (Esplen and Brody (2007): 3).17

Women and economic development

Another recent study on the effects of micro-credit on women’s control over
household spending in developing countries aimed to assess the causal relationship between micro-credit and specific dimensions of women’s empowerment and
the mechanisms which mediate this relationship (Vaessen et al. (2014): 8, 17). It
found that, based on studies deemed comparable and of minimum acceptable
quality, that there was an ‘overall lack of evidence for an effect of microcredit on
women’s control over household resources’. Henceforth, it was ‘very unlikely that,
overall, micro-credit has a meaningful and substantial impact on empowerment
processes in a broader sense’ (Vaessen et al. (2014): 10, 80).18 Another observation is
that ‘(from) the identified mechanisms at work we can conclude that the way in
which micro-credit is delivered, in combination with the given gender relations
context, seem to determine to a large extent whether or not microcredit can make
a difference for women’s decision-making power and control over resources in the
household’ (Vaessen et al. (2014): 82).

4.2.3 Women’s labour market participation
While the role of women for economic development is recognised and differences in male and
female labour market participation have narrowed, these same labour markets remain highly
divided along gender lines with differences across regions. The share of women in paid
employment has increased only marginally in recent years due to the financial and economic
crisis of 2008-2009. Globally, women’s share in paid jobs outside of the agricultural sector
increased from 35% in 1990 to 40% in 2012. Overall, women’s labour force participation has
stagnated over the last two decades at some 55%, with considerable variation across regions
and countries (World Bank (2013): 1).19 According to the UN, the gender gap in employment is
most acute in Northern Africa, Southern Asia and Western Asia, where women are far less likely to
be employed than their male counterparts. The differences in the employment-to-population
ratio between men and women in these three regions approached 50 percentage points in 2012
(UN (2013): 9; UN (2014): 11). At the same time, the data in figure 4.1 shows that many of the
Dutch partner countries in Africa outperform the Netherlands.
Women’s labour market participation rate in (former) Dutch partner countries (2012)

% of women

Figure 4.1
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

83
68

86

78
67

87
76

62

57

51
31
16

59

51
24

25

in pia na ya ue ali nda dan nda tan esh esia ypt en nds
di
M a
run Ben thio Gha Ken biq
Eg Yem erla
Su Uga anis glad don
Rw
E
th
zam
fgh Ban In
o
A
Ne
M

Bu

Source: United Nations (2013); United Nations (2014).

| 45 |

Premises and promises

Women’s labour market participation remains curtailed by a broad range of social, cultural,
legal, regulatory and political restrictions in parts of the world.20 According to the World
Bank, the fact that gains in women’s economic opportunities continue to lag behind their
capabilities is inefficient and not ‘smart economics’.
When women are employed in paid work, they are confronted with the following issues:21

| 46 |

• Women are more likely to have informal jobs in both formal and informal enterprises
and thus lack social protection and / or entitlement to employment benefits such as paid
annual or sick leave.
• Women are over-represented in the lower echelons of the informal sector (especially in
services and in traditionally lower value-added production sectors).
• Due to their lower levels of skills, women are less mobile than men regarding labour
migration, even though they are now migrating in larger numbers than ever.
• Women are more likely to be engaged in vulnerable employment as either unpaid
workers who contribute to a family business or own-account workers. In either case they
are unlikely to benefit from safety nets that guard against income loss during economic
hardship.22
• Women perform temporary, seasonal and unregulated work, often under unsafe and
unhealthy working conditions that are incompatible with international labour
standards.23
• Women are generally less well paid than men (the ‘gender pay gap’ that is observed in
both the formal and informal sectors24) and face more barriers in reaching top-level
occupations – a phenomenon that is well known in the Netherlands as well.
• Women have a bigger chance of being unemployed, they are more likely to be made
redundant with the introduction of new technologies, have little social protection and
they remain disproportionally vulnerable to the effects of economic crisis.25
• Women experience multiple discrimination and exclusion because of factors such as
ethnicity or caste: they are not a homogeneous or undifferentiated group that lives
outside social reality.
The above arguments and ‘business case’ have not meant that, among OECD/DAC members
or within the World Bank, gender equality and women’s empowerment have received the
same attention in economic and productive sectors as it did in others.26 According to OECD,
using the gender marker, while shares of bilateral aid that targeted gender equality and
women’s empowerment in the social sectors were quite high, it was much smaller in aid
targeting gender equality in the economic and productive sectors (OECD (2014)). This state
of affairs is not very different from what was observed by Pinder or in an issues paper of
GENDERNET of 2011.27

Women and economic development

4.3 Women in agriculture and food security
4.3.1 General picture
While the situation varies considerably across countries, the overall picture is clear. Women:
• are major food producers and play a vital role in enabling food security at the household
level. This is recognised in e.g. the Comprehensive Framework for Action that was
produced by the UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (2008), the
Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (2009), the Updated Comprehensive
Framework for Action of the High Level Task Force on the global food security crisis (2010)
and in the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (2013);
• represent a large share of the world’s farm workers, albeit with wide variations within and
among countries;
• are highly dependent on agriculture for survival; and
• provide a large proportion of the labour needed to bring food to the table in developing
countries.28
Women work in agriculture as farmers on their own account, as unpaid workers on family
farms and as paid or unpaid labourers on other farms and agricultural enterprises. They are
involved in both crop and livestock production at subsistence and commercial levels,
producing food and cash crops and managing mixed agricultural operations often involving
crops, livestock and fish farming (FAO (2011): 7).
What is more, in many parts of the world, married women and men have distinct roles and
activities, including separate crops, agricultural plots, and agricultural tasks (see e.g. FAO et
al. (2010b): 13-19). Roles and tasks are context-specific though in practice the division may
be blurred, with men preparing ‘women’s plots’ and women involved in weeding ‘men’s
crops’ (BRIDGE (2014): 16). Traditionally, women are responsible for producing locally
important staple crops and provide most of the labour in the production of non-traditional
agricultural exports. Women moreover provide most post-harvest labour, arrange storage,
and take care of handling, stocking, processing, and marketing of the produce. Women’s
role in agriculture is moreover expanding: in some regions the out-migration of young men
from rural areas, conflict and the HIV/aids pandemic have led to permanent changes in
women’s responsibilities and tasks.29 Nevertheless, men still largely control the sale of crops
and animals and use of the income. With the increasing commercialisation of agriculture,
the dominant position of men is changing gender roles – in men’s favour.30
At the same time, women’s full potential in agriculture remains un(der)utilised as a result of
the following gendered constraints:31
• Not having secure rights in the land they cultivate plus constraints when protecting these
rights (see further chapter 5) in addition to the size, and at times, also the quality of
women’s land holdings.
• Less access to and lower use of key agricultural inputs such as: (hired) (male or family)
labour; livestock; fertilisers; water and irrigation; technology and tools; extension

| 47 |

Premises and promises

| 48 |

services and information on new agricultural practices and inputs (e.g. improved varieties
and pest control measures)32; marketing infrastructure, including financial services such
as savings, credit (for which often collateral (such as land) is needed, of which women
have less); and insurance. The often held assumption that when such inputs are
channelled through men they will trickle down to the household does not hold,
‘particularly when men and women perform different tasks or even grow different crops’
(Croppenstedt et al. (2013): 27) and when women do not control the proceeds of the sale
of their produce.33 Poor access to such resources results in poor access to profitable cash
crops, prevents women farmers from diversifying, limits their prospects for generating
cash income and reduces chances of participating in agricultural value chain
development.
• Little account is taken of women’s role in livestock production, fisheries and aquaculture
as well as agro-forestry – both for interventions and agricultural research.
• Women have a greater overall workload that includes low-productivity activities like
fetching water and firewood34 and, when employed, are more likely to be in part-time,
seasonal and low-paying jobs, getting less pay than men for the same work.
• Another constraining factor is women’s limited membership of and participation in
farmers’ associations and other types of organisations and related decision-making
structures and processes.35 Such organisations, cooperatives and worker unions ‘are
generally controlled and managed by men’ and women have less voice and decisionmaking power (FAO (2011): 51). Still, they ‘can be an effective means of building social
capital and addressing gender gaps in other areas as well, through reducing transactions
costs, pooling risks, developing skills and building confidence’ and ‘a stepping stone to
closing the gender gap in participation in other civil society organizations and
government bodies’ (Croppenstedt et al. (2013): 29).
The resulting gender gap in these respects differs across countries, but is reinforced by
social/cultural/religious restrictions in public participation and mobility and in performing
certain tasks that are considered ‘male’.36 Following a gender-neutral approach to economic
interventions, assuming that ‘economic opportunities are equally available to women and
men alike’ implies that the ‘uneven playing field on which people live’ is overlooked (World
Bank (2013): 34). This makes it unlikely in many instances that women will be able to benefit
from the same interventions on an equal footing with men.
Unequal access to one or several of the above production factors and the resulting differences
in input levels explain the lower yields on women’s farms: on average these may be 25% lower
than those of male farmers.37 The shortfall in use of such inputs together with limited control
over resources ‘may be reasons for agricultural segregation, the concentration of women in
lower-value, less-marketed crops’ (Croppenstedt et al. (2013): 36).38
According to the FAO, when women’s constraints are reduced they could raise yields on their
farms by 20 to 30%, raise agricultural output in developing countries between 2.5 to 4% and
thus make a substantial impact on food output and food security globally.39 It would also
have ‘important additional benefits through raising the incomes of female farmers,
increasing the availability of food and reducing food prices, and raising women’s

Women and economic development

employment and real wages’ (FAO (2011): 3, 39, 42, 43). DFID (2014a) underlines however,
that ‘(whilst) it is possible to draw some conclusions about the relationship between
agricultural growth and women and girls’ well-being, data limitations and weaknesses in
the existing evidence-base and the contextual nature of gender relations make it difficult to
generalise across countries and to accurately estimate the magnitude of effects’ (DFID
(2014a): 5).

4.3.2 Women and value chains
As in other areas, women’s roles in agricultural value chains will differ between
commodities, locations and over time (Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 34). The literature
indicates that ‘underlying patterns of asset ownership and control condition men’s and
women’s ability to participate in and benefit from value chain projects’ (Quisumbing et al.
(2014): 2).40
Nevertheless, various reports41 show that such gender issues are often ignored in value chain
interventions. While much of the farm work done on contracted plots is performed by
women as family labourers, men control the contracts and receive and control the income
that is generated.42 As a consequence, women ‘do not reap the full benefits of their labor as
family work is often unpaid or inadequately remunerated’ (Maertens and Swinnen (2009):
16). As the literature shows, such increases in cash income for men ‘do not necessarily
translate into gains for all the household members and can even lead to a loss of welfare
and nutritional status for some’ (Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 34). Again, the situation differs
between commodities, contexts and over time which ‘illustrates the importance of looking
closely at gender relations and structural factors when pursuing value chain development’
(Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 36).
In practice, women are usually concentrated in less profitable and less visible areas of the
value chain – especially in nodes that require relatively unskilled labour.43 They lack secure
control over land, family labour and other resources required to guarantee delivery of a
reliable flow of produce (e.g. Chan (2010): 12).44 The job segregation that is observed is
‘deeply rooted in global and local social constructs and perceptions of what is considered
appropriate male and female work’ (Staritz and Reis (2013): 7, 24).45 There is moreover
conflicting evidence that participation in high-level contract farming has been
accompanied by decreased access to resources for female farmers concerned with
subsistence food production. The situation is different for women employed through
off-farm wage work; in this case the women are contracted and receive a wage.
As observed by Riisgaard et al. ‘(assuming that) women will automatically gain from generic
value chain interventions can have unintended negative consequences’. Moreover, ‘these
interventions are not sufficient in themselves to secure (…) meaningful welfare outcomes
for women when working in ‘gender conservative’ areas’ (Riisgaard et al. (2010): 52).
Furthermore, studies on supply chains indicate that they may contribute to gender
inequality because of discriminatory practices in the labour market: women have lower
wages, have unstable, temporary, seasonal jobs and are more often unemployed during
winter months, etc. (Maertens and Swinnen (2009): 20-21; FAO et al. (2010c)) – though this

| 49 |

Premises and promises

is not the case everywhere. This underlines the importance of socially responsible sourcing
practices and the adoption of corporate codes of conduct. In this respect it has been
observed that ‘(there) is growing evidence that women working for exporters directly
engaged with the value chain’s lead firms have better work conditions and greater wage
equality than those who work on family holdings or for smaller, independent outgrowers’
(Staritz and Reis (2013): 24). Still, literature on the gender implications of modern value
chains is not abundant.
KIT et al. (2012) argue the importance of attention to gender equity in certified value chains
from three main perspectives: rights and social justice, poverty reduction – which is hard ‘if
you’re (gender) blind’ – and instrumental arguments.46 It talks in this respect about ‘(a)
mutually beneficial and iterative relationship between standards and certification on one
hand and gender issues on the other (which) is beginning to materialize. This relationship
is two-pronged: improving gender dynamics improves chain performance; and certification
offers specific mechanisms that facilitate addressing gender’ (KIT et al. (2012): 257). Main
reasons are that:

| 50 |

• When women are not informed on agricultural practices, standards and certification
– e.g. because women do not participate in training or information meetings and
(informed or trained) men do not pass on the message to women – this presents a
‘serious risk’ to certified production and the certificate may be lost (also Agarwal (2011):
16); and
• When women do not get equal benefits, are not rewarded for the additional effort needed
for organic production, or have little opportunity to participate in decision-making at
household, community or producer organisation level, they are less interested in
complying with standards and in taking care of the crops – which, in turn, hampers the
expansion of production of certified products.
The report underlines the importance of including women ‘at operational and management
levels in all links of the chain’, the involvement of female extension officers, and the
training of farmers in gender as these ‘can also act as role models for other female farmers’.
The report also talks about the incorporation of gender indicators into existing standards in
order to be able to identify ‘the different positions, constraints, opportunities and benefits
available to men and women’ (KIT et al. (2012): 248, 251).

4.4 What works?
Still the picture of what works, where, how and under what conditions is far from clear.
What is more, what works in one setting may not work in another. As observed by ODI, the
literature on economic empowerment ‘is narrowly focused on direct outcomes of women’s
economic participation rather than their broader empowerment impact’. It rarely explores
‘how women’s diverse characteristics, identity and experiences account for differential
empowerment outcomes’ and fails to ‘account for differences in context when presenting
their results, which may explain some of the ambiguous and inconclusive findings’

Women and economic development

(Domingo et al. (2015): 61). Also in the area of trade liberalisation is the literature on the
impact on gender inequality in e.g. employment, income, health and education still scarce
(Aguayo-Tellez (2011): 22-23).47
On what – possibly – works for women running small-scale enterprises, Buvinic and
Furst-Nichols (2014) conducted a review of evaluations (mostly relying on randomised
control trials). These evaluations concerned interventions that gave women access to capital
and savings accounts, business management training, on-the-job and skills training, and
job vouchers.48 They used women’s productivity and earnings as proxies for the more
complex notion of economic empowerment. The review also examined the timing of
outcomes and how long-lasting they were, and the cost-effectiveness of interventions.
Their findings indicate49:
• Interventions seem to work best when women micro and small producers and
entrepreneurs have economic independence or autonomy and few social restrictions.
• To make sure that they can keep their income, and protect the privacy of their choice on
how to spend it, the use of ‘mobile money’ is important.50 It may provide women with
sufficient autonomy and independence from social pressures to invest in the business
rather than in the extended family. Moreover, the use of mobile phones makes access to
financial services less costly; it may also improve access to market information.
• Capital in-kind works better than cash for more successful and larger women-owned
small enterprises (i.e. with 5-19 employees) since it ‘seems to nudge women to keep the
money invested in their businesses’ (Buvinic et al. (2013): 5, 31). A precondition is that the
amount is large enough and women are given sufficient time to show results.51
• Capital alone, whether cash or in-kind, is insufficient for subsistence-level firms. Very
poor women need a more intensive package of services to break out of subsistence
production and to be able to reap the benefits of higher productivity and earnings. They
require a sufficiently large capital transfer paired with business training and follow-up
technical visits – but silver bullets of how to realise this do not exist.52
• Business training, which is more cost-effective than customised advice, works better for
women-owned SMEs rather than micro-enterprises. There is a need to target motivated,
self-selected women entrepreneurs to increase its impact. At the same time, as for men,
such training has few measurable effects on business survivorship or profits for women.
Independent of the quality of the training, short courses are likely to have less impact.53
• Savings are a promising way to improve rural women’s productivity and increasing their
business earnings, especially for more risk-averse women. They may particularly benefit
the smallest, subsistence-level women entrepreneurs and women with little household
decision-making power.
• Access to childcare increases women’s wage employment levels and earnings, but design
and delivery matter to ensure quality, affordable and cost-effective care.54
Table 4.1 summarises the above for different groups of women, taking into account that ‘the same
class of interventions (has) significantly different outcomes depending on the client or beneficiary’.

| 51 |

Premises and promises

Table 4.1	Summary of evidence of what works for economic empowerment of women55

Target
group

Proven/being
proven

Promising

All

•	Savings
•	Land rights/land
titling
•	Child care for wage
workers

•	Mobile phones (for •	Farmer field schools
financial
•	Firm certification
transactions and
•	Non-traditionally
market information)
female job skills
•	Information on land
training for wage
rights
workers
•	Farmer associations
and networks

Non-poor

•	Credit
•	Business
management
training

•	Modern agricultural
inputs (e.g.
improved seeds,
fertiliser, irrigation)

Non-poor
and poor

•	Consulting services
for entrepreneurs

Poor

•	In-kind capital
tailored for women
microentrepreneurs
•	Integrated services
for farming

| 52 |

Poor and
very poor

High potential

•	Bundled services:
In-kind capital
(large) + assetspecific training &
technical assistance
•	Rural electrification

Skills, on-thejob training and/
or wage
subsidies for
unemployed
 icro cash loan
M
or grant alone

Business
management
training alone

Very poor

Young
women

Unproven

•	Demand-driven job •	Livelihood
•	Information on jobs
services: skills
programmes
(through mobile
training, internships,
(reproductive health
phones)
vouchers, and/or
+ asset building +
•	Mentors and role
subsidies
safe spaces)
models
•	Conditional cash
•	Un-conditional cash
transfers
transfers

Proven/being proven = Evidence for effectiveness or cost-effectiveness is robust or, in the absence of cost-effective data,
simple and replicable in different settings, or weight of evidence is more than promising; Promising = Credible evidence
is positive, but not yet convincing for breadth; High potential = Intervention has been largely untested but promising on
conceptual grounds; Unproven = Intervention has not been effective for the particular category of women in the specific
settings where it has been evaluated.

Furthermore, O’Sullivan et al. (2014), identifies ten policy priorities to narrow the gender
gap in African agriculture distinguishing based on available evidence between promising
– for which existing evidence indicates a high potential for success – and emerging

Women and economic development

interventions, which may benefit from further testing (see table 4.2).56 It is to be kept in
mind in this respect that ‘not all women are the same, and that large variations in their age,
marital status, education level and size of holding require more specific targeting than just
differentiating between men and women farmers’ (Hazel (2014): 16).

Table 4.2	Promising and emerging policy options to narrow the gender gap in African agriculture

Land

Promising policy options

Emerging policy options

Formalise women’s land rights through
registration to increase tenure security57

Reform family and inheritance law to
protection women’s rights58

Expand co-titling and individual titling
for women
Labour

-

Offer women farmers financing to hire
farm labour
Task agents with helping women
farmers to find labour
Provide women farmers with financing
or discounts for hiring or purchasing
machinery
Provide community-based child-care
centres

Non-labour
inputs (seeds,
fertiliser)

Provide women farmers with financing
Certify small bags of fertiliser for use by
or price discounts aligned with their cash women
flow to encourage the purchase of
Provide flexible financing for seeds
fertiliser
Help women better identify and obtain
good-quality seed

Information

Train extension agents to target female
farmers and be more responsive to their
agricultural information needs59

-

Bring agricultural training and advice to
women’s doorsteps through farmer field
schools and mobile phone applications
Identify female volunteer farm advisors
to spread information within women’s
social networks
Access to
markets

Provide market services through
information and communications
technology (ICT)

Human capital Raise education levels of adult female
farmers
Source: O’Sullivan et al. (2014): 13.

Promote women’s cultivation of
high-value/cash crops
Channel existing groups to access
market opportunities60
-

| 53 |

Premises and promises

Notes
1

Draft resolution referred to the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly by the General
Assembly at its 64th session: Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals (United Nations, General Assembly, 17 September 2010).

2

Examples are: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No.
156), Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183), and Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 2011
(No. 189).

3

See e.g. Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013): 4; Johansson de Silva et al. (2014): 8; Hallward-Driemeier (2011): 2;
World Bank (2013): 1. A more critical note is provided by Kabeer (2011), stating that ‘(attempts) to
understand the relationships between women’s paid work, gender equality and economic growth
continue to be based on very imperfect measures of women’s work. Efforts to make generalisations
about the impact of women’s work on economic growth have to always be qualified by a caveat about
the reliability of the measure’ (Kabeer (2011): 7). Another critical note can be found in Eyben and
Napier-Moore (2009): 294.

4

See e.g. Kabeer (2005): 18-19; UN Millennium Project (2005): 89; Blackden et al. (2006): 5; Deere and
Doss (2006): 1; Esplen and Brody (2007): 1; Johansson de Silva et al. (2014): 8 and Nallari and Griffith
(2011): 11.

5

Along the same lines, Duflo argues that when economic development reduces poverty it can have an
important positive impact on gender equality (Duflo (2012): 1053-1054, 1058).

6

See also Buvinic et al. (2013) arguing that the disparity between genders in productivity and earning is
‘primarily the result of differences in the size of businesses and farms, in the sectors where they
operate, and in both educational levels and returns on this education’ (Buvinic et al. (2013): 12; 27).

7

See e.g. Blackden et al. (2006): 3-4; Kabeer and Natali (2013): 35; IFC (2013): 2; Johansson de Silva et al.
(2014): 8.

8

Kabeer gives the example of women employed in the garment industry in Bangladesh, with women
reporting amongst others that their new earning power had enabled them to postpone early marriage,
renegotiate their relations within marriage, to leave abusive marriages, support ageing parents (Kabeer
(2005): 19). At the same time, she highlights the exploitative working conditions women are generally
confronted with, such as extremely long working hours during busy seasons, often combined with
lay-offs in the slack season, poor working conditions, restrictions on unionisation and health hazards
(Kabeer (2005): 20). See also Solotaroff and Prabha Pande (2014), indicating that ‘(analyses) of the role
of Bangladesh’s garment industry — dominated by women workers — in empowerment and violence
suggest that while such employment has changed women’s lives in terms of their mobility and access
to resources, it may be associated also with higher risks of violence. Working women face double risks
of harassment: at work and on the street while getting to work (Siddiqi 2003). The specific conditions of
work in this sector may contribute to an environment conducive to violence, such as the lack of formal
contracts, which creates pressure on women to succumb to employers’ sexual advances, or the
necessity to work at night but without adequate oversight and other safeguards against sexual or
physical harassment (Siddiqi 2003)’ (Solotaroff and Prabha Pande (2014): 138-139).

9

See further on this issue e.g. Blackden et al. (2006): 17; Esplen and Brody (2007): 2, 12; FAO (2009): 14,
24; Gallina (2010): 24; Agarwal (2011): 7-8; FAO (2011): 5, 7, 13, 27; ActionAid (2012): 2, 5, 7; Duflo (2012):
1059; GDN et al. (2015): 58-59; Kabeer and Natali (2013): 40; and Nallari and Griffith (2011): 107, 112.

10

See also Kabeer (2011): 3, 5. Kabeer furthermore highlights that most of the women in the study
locations, also ‘fell outside the purview of normal trade union activity’ and therefore had ‘organisational bargaining power to negotiate for fairer returns to their labour, for better conditions or for greater
recognition of their rights as citizens’ (Kabeer (2011): 6).

| 54 |

Women and economic development

11

A similar business case is used for investing in women and girls in agricultural development in e.g. DFID
(2014a): 9.

12

See on this issue also e.g. Esplen and Brody (2007); Chant and Sweetman (2012); and World Bank (2013):
11.

13

According to the World Bank, while economic growth is important for improving the incomes of poor
people and for moving people out of poverty, this does not imply ‘that economic growth necessarily
improves gender equality’ and ‘some gender inequalities persist despite economic development’
(World Bank (2014): 181, 183). Pages 182-183 of the report provide several pathways through which a
‘more vibrant economy’ can increase gender equality, keeping in mind that economic change affects
women and men differently. Pages 202-203 observe furthermore: ‘The overall evidence from different
types of data and empirical analyses supports the conclusion that economic development provides an
enabling environment for gender equality — though its effects are not immediate or without costs, at
least in the short run’.

14

Also according to ILO (2014) ‘there is little rigorous evidence that access to finance — either as a loan or
grant — leads to sustained increases in the revenues or profits of women’s microenterprises. There is
even less evidence that finance has any positive effect on the number of employees in women’s firms.
This suggests that finance alone, particularly in small amounts typically associated with microcredit, is
insufficient to enable female micro-entrepreneurs to make long-term business investments or to
overcome other constraints that may limit their businesses’ growth potential.’ (ILO (2014): 4).

15

Not surprisingly, according to ActionAid et al. (2012) ‘women smallholders and marginal farmers need
support to enable them to make informed decisions before applying for credit (which in some
circumstances can place farmers in unmanageable debt, resulting in loss of land or other assets put up
as collateral), and in developing viable business plans’ (ActionAid et al. (2012): 9).

16

See further Stewart et al. (2010): 32-38, 48; Dickson and Bangpan (2012): 68; and ADB (2007): 7.
Different and often contradictory views can also be found in e.g. Esplen and Brody (2007): 21; Banerjee
et al. (2009) 14-15, 21; Banerjee et al. (2013): 13, 34; ADB (2007): iv and earlier studies like Pitt et al.
(1998): 987-988 and Pitt et al. (2006): 817. A discussion on micro-credit can also be found in Todd
(2012).

17

This implies that impact was not assessed in combination with other activities (microfinance plus
– which may include social activities and mobilisation, working through self-help or savings groups,
training in e.g. financial literacy, i.e. activities that go beyond the savings and loans elements), or how
any impact could be differentiated between microfinance input only, and microfinance plus (Taylor and
Pereznieto (2014): 28, 35). A more positive assessment can be found in Cho and Honorati (2013) based
on a meta-regression analysis of 37 impact evaluation studies of entrepreneurship programmes in
developing countries. The authors refer to the positive effect of releasing women’s credit constraints on
enhancing business performance and earning opportunities (Cho and Honorati (2013): 32).

18

The study used a broad definition of empowerment, which included, following Kabeer, aspects of
access and control over resources (inputs), women’s control over household spending and participation
in decision-making, increased female mobility, increased spending on education, health, nutrition, with
corresponding developmental effects on household well-being. ILO (2014) also found ‘very little
rigorous evidence on the impact of finance on women’s agency in the household or over their
businesses’ (ILO (2014): 6). Moreover, the evidence was mixed.

19

See e.g. Johansson de Silva et al. (2014): 8; UN Millennium Project (2005): 88. The situation was not too
different in the Netherlands (Eerdewijk et al. (2009): 37-38).

20

E.g. the gendered legal differences that still exist in many countries and the lack of legal parity between
women and men create additional business costs for women (IFC quoted in Buvinic et al. (2013): 28).

21

See e.g. Nallari and Griffith (2011): 112-113; UN (2009): 9; UN (2012): 5; UN (2014): 22; Esplen and Brody
(2007): 2.

| 55 |

Premises and promises

| 56 |

22

According to the World Bank, excluding housework and childcare, it is ‘estimated that women account
for 58 percent of all unpaid contributing family work, and about one out of every four women in the
labor force globally is an unpaid contributing family worker – someone who works in a market
orientated business owned by a related household member but is not a partner in the business’
(World Bank (2013): 21).

23

According to the UN, ‘(the) higher part-time employment rates are associated with a number of factors,
including gender inequality in family roles, the absence of adequate and affordable childcare and
elderly-care facilities, and/or other social perceptions which play a significant role in the participation of
women in employment, in their occupational choices, and in the employment patterns that reinforce
gender disparities in the labour market’ (UN (2014): 22). At the same time, Kabeer (2012) points at weak
enforcement of existing labour legislation and the potential benefits of voluntary codes of conduct as
part of international efforts to promote corporate social responsibility, especially in consumer goods
industries, though the ‘effectiveness of these codes in bringing about improvements in wages and
working conditions has been very varied’ (Kabeer (2012): 42).

24

Kabeer and Natali (2013) recognise that such a gender gap in wages can, under certain conditions,
contribute to the pace of economic growth: ‘However, such strategies are most likely to work in highly
patriarchal or politically repressive societies, where women can be crowded into these sectors and their
bargaining power repressed. Moreover, even within these societies, such strategies are likely to only
work in the early phase of export-led industrialisation when there is a relatively large surplus of female
labour’ (Kabeer and Natali (2013): 36). See also Blackden et al. (2006): 4-5 and World Bank (2013)
referring to an ILO analysis of 83 countries showing that women in paid work earn on average between
10 and 30% less than men (World Bank (2013): 2).

25

See e.g. Pinder (2005): 11; Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013): 5-12; Kabeer (2005): 20; Esplen and Brody
(2007): 6-7; UN Millennium Project (2005): 90, 94-95; GDN et al. (2015): 61-62. This also applies to
women working in the agricultural sector (FAO (2011): 17).

26

See e.g. GENDERNET (2012).

27

See KST 91585 (2005): 103-104. Pinder (2005), using the same gender marker, concluded with respect to
DFID that ‘gender equality is being sidetracked and is receiving less attention now than it was eight
years ago’ but that ‘concerns over data quality mean this finding should be further investigated’ (Pinder
(2005): 2). According to the paper of GENDERNET, ‘DAC members placed comparatively less emphasis
on gender equality and women’s empowerment in the economic and productive sectors than they did
in their support for other sectors’ with the largest share committed to agriculture/rural development
(GENDERNET (2011): 8).

28

Using ILO data, DFID (2014a) demonstrates that 37% of all employed women work in agriculture (this is
33% for all employed men) but that ‘the overall share of employment in agriculture declined by 5.5
percentage points, compared to women’s employment in agriculture which declined by 9.5 percentage
points between 1991 and 2012 in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (DFID (2014a): 14).

29

See e.g. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 25.

30

See FAO (2009): 7; Gallina (2010): 21; Farnworth (2010): 64; FAO et al. (2010): 22. As also observed by
Oxfam, ‘(when) a crop becomes commercial, it changes gender and becomes a man‘s crop‘, as it is men
who control its production, marketing, and, most importantly, the use of income accruing from its sale’
(Oxfam (2013): 9; FAO et al. (2010): 24).

31

See Pinder (2005): 20; Blackden et al. (2006): 6-7, 16-18; Deere and Doss (2006): 6, 7, 14-15; Quisumbing
and Pandolfelli (2009) Gallina (2010): 8, 16-18, 20; Buvinic et al. (2010): 1; Agarwal (2011): 11, 12; FAO
(2011): 23-40, 60; GENDERNET (2011): 18-19; Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 4, 6; ActionAid (2012): 5, 8;
Croppenstedt et al. (2013): 5-10, 12, 13, 15, 19, 21, 31; World Bank (2014): 6, 7, 10; BRIDGE (2014): 16-17.

32

With respect to e.g. extension services, a SIDA evaluation of 2010, indicates the importance of: (i) not
conceptualising extension ‘as a technical, value free activity’; (ii) building household rather than
individual capacity – seeing the farm as a productive enterprise; (iii) gender awareness training of

Women and economic development

extension staff and creating ‘space for women’ in community dialogues (Farnworth (2010): 61-62).
33

See also the overview provided in GENDERNET (2011): 18.

34

The SIDA evaluation of 2010 in this respect advocates for addressing women’s practical needs such as
women-friendly agricultural tools, water sources located close to homes, improved cooking stoves and
the introduction of improved labour saving technologies (Farnworth (2010): 63).

35

See e.g. FAO (2009): 16; Gallina (2010): 9; FAO (2011): 23, 32; Agarwal (2011): 13; ActionAid (2012): 2, 10.

36

A new initiative in this respect is the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index that aims to measure
the empowerment, agency, and inclusion of women in the agriculture sector. The index defines
women’s empowerment in terms of: decisions about agricultural production; access to and decisionmaking power over productive resources; control over use of income; leadership in the community; and
time use. So far, data are publicly available on Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda. For a brief overview
see http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/weai_brochure.pdf.

37

Croppenstedt et al. (2013): 3; World Bank (2013): 2; World Bank (2014): 9. According to Alderman et al.
(2003), using data from Burkina Faso from the 1980s, ‘(large) gender differences in yields, however, do
not imply that women are less efficient cultivators than men’ Alderman et al. (2003): 63). The yield
differences might reflect differences in the intensity with which inputs, such as labour and fertiliser, are
applied on men’s and women’s plots.

38

At the same time, ‘in many countries, even when women have access to the same amount of inputs as
men, equal access does not achieve the same effect in terms of agricultural productivity’ (World Bank
(2014): 10).

39

See Agarwal (2011): 14; FAO (2011): 6, 42. Similar instrumentalist arguments are given by e.g. MeinzenDick et al. (2011), arguing that ‘incorporating gender issues more widely and systematically in
agricultural research, development, and extension systems will contribute significantly to meeting the
food needs of the future population or ensuring that productivity translates into the improved welfare
of the poor’ (Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 1). Increasing women’s control over resources would moreover
have ‘positive effects on a number of important development outcomes, including food security, child
nutrition, and education’ (Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 4).

40

‘A value chain refers to an entire system of production, processing and marketing from inception to the
finished product. It consists of a series of chain actors, linked together by flows of products, finance,
information and services. At each stage of the chain, the value of the product goes up because the
product becomes more available or attractive to the consumer – hence the term ‘value’ chain. Costs
also accumulate at each stage of the chain’ (KIT et al. (2012): 5). A value chain can be a vertical linking or
a network between various independent business organisations and can involve processing, packaging,
storage, transport and distribution. Modern value chains are characterised by vertical coordination,
consolidation of the supply base, agro-industrial processing and use of standards throughout the chain
(FAO et al. (2010c)).

41

See e.g. Gallina (2010), Riisgaard et al. (2010), FAO (2011), FAO et al. (2010), and IOB (2011h).

42

Martens and Swinnen (2009): 14; Chan (2010); FAO (2011): 13.

43

A WIEGO review of 49 value chain-related studies and resources shows e.g. that women, across
different crops and countries: (i) constitute a substantial proportion, and often the majority, of the
workforce in packhouses and processing units; (ii) tend to be employed in harvesting, peeling/slicing of
fruit, sorting, grading and packing, while men were employed in operating machinery, loading and
unloading of boxes/crates and other heavy work, and typically under-represented in better-paid and
more secure jobs in all of the focus sectors (Chan (2013): 10). At the same time, ‘the literature also
indicated that the extent to which horizontal job segregation by gender translated into gender
inequality in pay and conditions depended on the country, crop and level in the chain, demonstrating
that horizontal segregation does not always lead to women being worse off than men’ (Chan (2013): 10).
FAO et al. (2010c) refer to ‘gender stereotypes that keep poor and uneducated women in lower paid,

| 57 |

Premises and promises

less skilled and more insecure work in the value chain’ with gender-biased segregation often used to
legitimise the payment of lower wages to women though with exceptions for some non-traditional
agricultural exports. See also Staritz and Reis (2013): 7.
44

Looking at horticulture in South Africa, Kenya and Zambia, Barrientos et al. (2003) refer to ‘Female
employment is characterized by highly gendered and informal employment relations. In all three
countries, women form the core of the temporary, seasonal and casual work force, while men tend to
be concentrated in the fewer permanent jobs. Women tend to be crowded into a narrow range of
seasonal occupations characterized by long hours and few opportunities for meeting domestic
responsibilities (due to insufficient childcare, social provision and maternity leave). Informal female
employment is accompanied by job insecurity, risk and lack of employment or social protection,
often with the poorest conditions of employment amongst horticultural workers’ (Barrientos et al.
(2003): 1514). See also KIT et al. (2012), which refers to ‘an increased workload coming with women
participating in agricultural value chains, which can come at the cost of other income-generating
activities’ (KIT et al. (2012): 3).

45

According to the same authors, gender-intensified constraints persist that limit chances of women
participating in value chains, including limited access to economic inputs, networks, education, skills
development and training, and their responsibility for unpaid household duties, which, in many
countries, cover both the immediate and the extended family (Staritz and Reis (2013): 7, 24).

46

On instrumental arguments, KIT et al. (2012) refer to ‘serving women is good for business and the
economy’, ‘women present new market opportunities as buyers, suppliers, and consumers’, ‘profiling
gender sensitivity can bolster a company’s reputation’ and ‘when women are in management positions,
profits go up’ (KIT et al. (2012): 25; see also World Bank (2013): 6). At the same time they argue that the
arguments are ‘interconnected and overlapping’ and together ‘form a solid rationale for addressing
gender equity in value chains’ (KIT et al. (2012): 26).

47

On the differential impact of trade policies on men and women see e.g. Randriamaro (2006) and
Aguayo-Tellez (2011). According to Aguayo-Tellez (2011), the ‘empirical literature predominantly
indicates that trade liberalization policy and foreign direct investment reduced gender inequality in
developing countries, bringing female complementary technologies, improving labour rights and
reducing discrimination’ (Aguayo-Tellez (2011): 23). Key in this respect are women’s educational
opportunities and skill endowment since ‘(in) the long run, women’s relative improvements, in every
way, will depend on their improvements on skills to better compete on the newly skill-biased
competitive world’ (Aguayo-Tellez (2011): 24).

48

A job voucher is a non-transferable voucher that can be used to pay for educational retraining or skill
enhancement in order to prepare for future employment.

49

Similar findings are reported in Buvinic et al. (2013) and ILO (2014) though the latter source warns at the
same time that there is ‘very little rigorous evidence on how and what types of programs are effective
in improving the business performance and growth of women-owned SMEs’ (ILO (2014): 11). What is
more, out of the 28 studies used, eight measured the effects on women’s agency, with four finding no
effect, two finding mixed effects and two finding negative effects (ILO (2014): 6). For young women’s
employment reference is furthermore made to: (i) skills training, job search assistance, internships, and
wage subsidies increase young women’s employability and earnings if social restrictions are not
binding; and (ii) quality youth training programmes that include ‘soft skills’ (i.e. personality traits,
motivations and preferences that are valued in the labour market) plus technical skills, classroom
training, job internships and stipends for child support, ‘especially in low-income socially conservative
setting’ (Buvinic et al. (2013): 6).

50

Mobile money refers to the use of a mobile phone to pay for a wide range of services and digital or hard
goods. It replaces paying with cash, cheque, or credit card.

51

The problem is however that women often ask for small amounts of credit, financial institutions often
do not find such small loans profitable enough or find such loans too risky (see e.g. Kantor (2001): 6, 7).

| 58 |

Women and economic development

52

ILO (2014) questions the cost-effectiveness of interventions combining supervision and advice with
cash grants for very poor micro-entrepreneurs (ILO (2014): 11).

53

ILO (2014) in this respect advocates for training with medium to high intensity, simpler training tailored
to low-skilled entrepreneurs and focused on the practical application of skills to women’s business (ILO
(2014): 7).

54

A recent ODI review suggests in this respect that ‘(if) family planning, health, and education services are
not made available, the impact of an intervention on women’s economic empowerment is unlikely to
be maximised. This implies that an integrated approach to programming may be very important’
(Taylor and Pereznieto (2014): 38). See also IDRC (2013) and Kabeer and Natali (2013): 39. Johansson de
Silva et al. (2014) talk in this respect about measures designed to: (i) ease women’s time constraints by
providing child care and improving infrastructure; (ii) improve women’s endowments by enhancing
their access to productive resources — especially to land and to credit — and skills development,
predominantly through training; and (iii) tackle information problems and institutional biases that work
against women’ (Johansson de Silva et al. (2014): 8-9). IFC (2013) moreover argues that this may result
in savings from reduced staff absenteeism and turnover (IFC (2013): 2, 16).

55

Based on Buvinic et al. (2013); Buvinic and Furst-Nichols (2014).

56

Quisumbing and Pandolfelli observe that ‘(future) interventions need to consider interactions among
inputs rather than treat each input in isolation, adapt interventions to clients’ needs, and pay attention
to the design of alternative delivery mechanisms, the trade-offs between practical and strategic gender
needs, and the culture and context-specificity of gender roles’ but that are ‘no one-size-fits-all
strategies for addressing the needs of poor rural women’ (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli (2009): vi, 22).
See also Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 14-15 who also stress that it may be needed to strengthen women’s
access to a range of resources rather than treating each input in isolation (Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 15).

57

Along the same lines, Quisumbing and Pandolfelli recommend to ‘(increase) tenure security through
low-cost, rapid, and transparent community land registration’ (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli (2009).

58

See also FAO (2011): 46-48.

59

In this respect the literature indicates that there is consistent evidence of a gender bias in access to
extension services and adoption of new technologies. Issues in this respect include: (i) cultural
perceptions that women do not farm; (ii) perceptions that if extension services are provided to a
member of a family (usually the man), they will trickle down to the household, including female
members; (iii) most extension services have traditionally been devoted to farmers who own land and
are willing and able to obtain credit and invest in inputs and technological innovations (See e.g.
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011): 81-82).

60

On this issue see also Agarwal (2011): 16; Kumar and Quisumbing (2010): 2, 45.

| 59 |

5
Women’s right to land

It is clear that land redistribution has been one of the most politically controversial and
resisted of redistributive reforms (Eyben et al. (2008): 11).

Women’s right to land

5.1 Introduction
According to Duflo (2012), there is a strong correlation between economic development and
women’s legal rights, in areas as diverse as property rights, access to land, access to bank loans,
violence against women, abortion policy, etc. (Duflo (2012): 1059). OECD/DAC underlined in
2010 that ‘(ownership) rights are critical to securing a sustainable livelihood and income, and
the lack of these rights is one of the main sources of women’s economic insecurity’ and that
‘(discriminatory) attitudes and practices regarding the role of women in society, such as the low
status of female-headed households or the limited inheritance rights accorded to women, are
significant barriers to their control over resources’ (OECD/DAC (2010): 2). To address these issues,
already back in 1979, Article 14 (g) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) recognised women’s right ‘(to) have access to
agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treatment
in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes’.1 The Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action (1995) likewise reflects the UN Member States’ determination to ensure
‘women’s equal access to economic resources, including land, credit, science and technology
vocational training, information, communication and markets, as a means to further the
advancement and empowerment of women and girls’.2
The following paragraphs focus on women’s access to land, one of the priorities of Dutch
development policies. They first of all provide a brief on the main issues with respect to
women’s right to land, with particular attention to the relationship between customary and
statutory land rights systems. More detailed information is provided on women’s land rights
issues in three countries in which the Netherlands has been supporting land rights
programmes: Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda. The chapter includes an attempt to draw
up a theory of change with respect to women’s land rights and concludes with information
on what is known of promising interventions in this area.

5.2 Women and land rights – the issues
5.2.1 General
In many developing countries, small-scale food production and the women involved in this
process are the backbone of rural livelihoods. Women farmers produce more than half of all
the food grown in the world and 60 to 80 percent of the food grown in most developing
countries. For them, as well as the urban poor, land remains a critical asset as it provides
them a basic means for subsistence and market production. Land rights, as written and
legally enforceable and socially recognisable instruments, are important formal institutions
that ‘determine the fundamental elements of land governance, namely the rights to access,
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation’ (Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): 8).
Nevertheless, gender disparities in land access remain high and ‘(in) almost all countries,
the gender gap in land rights has been widening rather than narrowing’ (Dorn (2006): 2).
According to a joint study of FAO, IFAD and ILO of 2010, in all countries for which data are
available, women are less likely to own land than men. The general notion is that ‘large

| 61 |

Premises and promises

gender inequities exist in the ownership and control of an asset of primary importance, both
globally and in Africa’ (Doss et al. (2013): 1). When women do own land, the size of their plots
is smaller, the quality is poorer and plots are often divided over several locations. Women’s
access to land is moreover undermined by pressure on the land caused by the growing market
for land, increased competition as a result of population growth, rural-urban migration, etc.3
Text box 5.1 provides more details on the land rights issues in Burundi and Rwanda.
Land issues in Burundi and Rwanda

Text box 5.1

Land conflicts between neighbours and within families over property, boundaries and
transactions are widespread and can be violent in densely populated Burundi (315
persons per square kilometre). Land issues are involved in more than half of all court
cases, often between family members, and are among the most important factors for
all crimes. Violence around land issues has regularly produced large flows of refugees
and IDPs. Their return and resettlement add to the complexity of land in Burundi.

Data from the FAO Gender and Land Rights Database confirm the low share of women
owning land in a series of (former) Dutch aid partner countries for which data is available –
and the Netherlands itself (see figure 5.1).4
Share of women owning land in (former) Dutch partner countries

Figure 5.1
25

20

19

5
0

8

10

ia
C
so
Fa DR hiop
ina
Et

rk

Bu

19
16

15
10

23

23

20
% of women

| 62 |

Also Rwanda, one of Africa’s most densely populated countries with 416 persons per
square kilometre, is confronted with serious land tenure and land scarcity issues. As a
result, the country is facing declining agricultural productivity and increasing food
insecurity. Land is likely to remain to be one of the most sensitive issues in Rwandan
society (IS Academy (2012) Rwanda). A population growth of 2.8% per year and the
traditional custom to divide land among the members of a new generation has
contributed to increased land fragmentation. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1994
genocide there was a lack of clarity over legal status and rights to land, with
landowners returning to Rwanda to find their land occupied by others.

9

8
3

5

5

9
6

s
li
e
a
a
h
ia
ia pt
la
ia
m
Ma biqu nzan gand amb Egy ema ragu lades nes etna rland
o Vi
a ng
t
e
Z
m
a
U
c
d
a
i
h
T
a
n
u
t
I
z
N Ba
G
Ne
Mo

Source: FAO Gender and Land Rights Database.5

Women’s right to land

There are three general mechanisms for women and men to obtain rights to land: (i) through
social and kinship relations at the local level, (ii) on the land market, and (iii) from the
state. These mechanisms are embedded in various (interacting) institutions that create,
modify, and influence land tenure systems. The literature shows that gender inequality in
land ownership is related to a male bias or preference in these institutions, including
customary inheritance and marriage laws, community and state programmes of land
distribution as well as in the land market, with women less likely than men to be successful
buyers.6

5.2.2 Formal and customary land tenure
Nowadays, in many countries there is constitutional protection of women’s rights. In many
cases, though not in all, this was followed by the more recent introduction or reform of
land related statutory laws (or state laws) that have given women equal rights to men.
However, even where gender-friendly land legislation laws are in place, they are often not
applied in practice and many rural women still do not own, control or inherit land
(Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): iii).
An important factor is in this respect that customary laws – that may conflict with and are
stronger than formal laws in governing women’s right to land, especially in rural areas7 –
continue to exist in parallel with statutory (see text box 5.2 on the state of affairs in Burundi,
Mozambique and Rwanda). As a consequence, ‘changes to state laws have limited impact on
their land access’ (PLAAS (2011): 3).8 To add to this complexity, customary laws are difficult to
translate and may not be written down. What results is ‘a complex and opaque system in
which the rules determining the ownership, control and disposition of productive assets
within households vary with location, ethnicity, and religion within the same country’
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003): 160). At the same time, customary regulations and
traditions do not always discriminate against women. Some of them were meant to protect
women. An example is the igiseke in Burundi, which is meant to provide daughters who get
married a small plot of land (usufruct rights) to show that they are part of the family and to
provide them with a safety net in times of problems (e.g. when they cannot access land
anymore through their husband). Problems start when these customs are no longer
applied.

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Premises and promises

Text box 5.2

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Statutory and customary land rights in Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda

Formal access to land in Burundi is regulated by the Land Code of 2011, which
replaced the Land Code of 1986 and is the result of a process dating back to 2000
with the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation. This Code Foncier introduced land certificates, decentralised land administration and a revocation of the
governors’ authority to allocate state land. It recognises the legitimacy of land
rights acquired and held under customary law, provided that all asserted rights are
registered – unregistered customary rights do not have the protection of the formal
law. Under customary law, land is usually held either individually and by households
and land transactions and succession are regulated at family level. The new land
policy enables the implementation of a decentralised system of land registration
that results into the delivery of land certificates. Most of the land certificates are
registered in man’s name. Parallel to the official system (equal rights to land) there
is a customary practice which is patrilineal and limiting the rights to land for
women. Women have no rights on the land of their husband or on the family land.
Women can have a usufruct right on the land of their father. However, the rights of
women on the family land (igiseke9) that exist under customary practice are not
taken into account in the new land certification system. This right is not included in
the certificates on the family land and as such weakens the claims of women for
this right. The usufruct right is only described in the report of the recognition process
but does not appear on the official land certificate, which will also be a legal piece
of evidence.
Mozambique’s new Land Law of 1997 was designed to regulate and control the
on-going process of land-grabbing, secure the rights of the Mozambican people
over land and other natural resources, and promote investments and the sustainable and equitable use of these resources. Key principles of this law include10: (i) state
ownership of the land; (ii) recognition of customary rights and the customary
system of land adjudication; and (iii) recognition of local communities as rightholding entities.
In Rwanda, after the introduction of a new Constitution in 2003, the land reform
process started with the National Land Policy in 2004, followed by the Organic Land
Law of 2005. The Land Law recognises land claims obtained under customary law,
and converts them to lease rights and demands that they be registered, thereby
incorporating these claims into the formal system. In practice, though, the reach of
formal law, especially where land dispute resolution is concerned, remains limited.

In many countries, customary laws do not recognise women’s rights in areas related to
marriage and divorce and inheritance11 but follow patriarchal traditions and practices (also
see the case of Burundi in text box 5.2) – and the values and norms that come with them.
These patriarchal traditions and practices often discriminate against women and are biased
against women owning land.12 They dictate in this case that men are the owners of the land,

Women’s right to land

and the rights of women, as ‘secondary community members, are generally derived from a
male relative – be it father, husband, brother, or brother-in-law’ (World Bank et al. (2008):
4). Community norms and customary arrangements may furthermore restrict women and
favour men in access to community land.
Since women’s rights are often insufficiently protected in traditional systems, they come
under threat as land values increase, or when the land is in danger of being appropriated by
the better-off or the well-informed.13 Polygamy, though illegal in most countries, also
impacts on women’s rural land holdings and use rights, with polygamous partners having a
weaker position in comparison to those in monogamous marriages. Text box 5.3 provides
further information on the women and land rights in Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda.
Text box 5.3

Women and land rights in Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda14

Customary law in Burundi excludes daughters from inheritance, with the exception
of the igiseke system referred to above. Under formal law wives and daughters are
not granted inheritance rights to land either; however the same applies for sons.
Although widows are granted lifetime use-right of land owned by former spouses,
this custom is fading due to land scarcity and pressure for land among an everincreasing population. The high level of competition over land makes the issues of
women’s land rights very sensitive within families, and potential source of conflict
and even violence. Displacement due to Burundi’s conflict and post-conflict
situation has worsened the situation for women further. Efforts to reform the
inheritance and marital property regime have not led to any substantial results yet
(IS Academy (2012) Burundi).
In Mozambique, the 2004 Constitution and the 2004 Family Law assert the equality
of men and women and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The Family Law
also provides that both women and men have rights to administer marital property
and have equal rights to devolve and inherit property. Also according to the
country’s Land Law of 1997 women and men have equal rights to hold land and
that woman have the right to participate in all land-related decisions and to
register for a DUAT.15 In addition, women can request the title over the same land
with registration in the National Land Cadastre. However, gender inequities with
regard to land tenure persist under customary laws and practices, which often do
not recognise women as title bearers. Under customary law, women usually cannot
inherit land and in court cases men are often favoured over women for inheritance
and management of marital property. Widows that were married under the
‘community of property’ regime are officially entitled to inherit half of the property
which was acquired during their marriage, but in practice few women exercise this
right, partly due to a lack of information.

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Premises and promises

| 66 |

In Rwanda, the Land Law of 2005 prohibits any discrimination based on sex or
origin in matters relating to ownership of rights over land and protects the rights of
other family members in the case of a land transfer. In Rwanda too, women are
caught between traditional practices and the new land policy. Customary law
continues to have a strong influence on how marriage and inheritance are regulated in rural areas and determines that land rights follow the patrilineal line.
Rwandese women can acquire land through marriage but this does not entail the
right to control the land by means of selling, gifting, renting or building. Moreover,
women cannot inherit their husband’s or father’s land under customary law and
the rights gained – most often user rights – are normally secondary to those of
father or husband. The Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties and Succession Law (1999),
opposed this practice by granting daughters the right to inherit land from parents
and widows to inherit their deceased husband’s property. However, in practice the
scope of this law is limited, as it only concerns formally married wives and widows,
whilst women who were married under customary law or religious union (a
common practice in rural areas) are excluded. The adoption of formal laws
guaranteeing women’s access to marital and natal family land has not led to
significant changes on the ground (IS Academy (2012) Rwanda). What is more,
Rwandese men find it difficult to accept the new rights of women under the
inheritance law, causing an increase of gender-based violence (EKN Kigali (2011)).16

The perseverance of customary practices plus the existence of many different state and
non-state institutions, with competing laws and regulations related to land make it ‘difficult
for women to enforce their legal claim to land rights and to benefit from the protection
accorded them by law’ (PLAAS (2011): 3). Women are thus ‘caught between differing sets of
laws and are under pressure to conform to traditional practices’ which may force women to
abandon their property, even when they have marriage certificates and hold joint title to the
land (Brown and Gallant (2014): 6). A complicating factor is that in the face of increasing
poverty, commercialisation of agriculture (which ‘generally has a negative effect on
women’s traditional rights to access land’), and increased land scarcity ‘many customary
tenure systems are no longer capable of ensuring that households and women have access
to sufficient land and other resources’ (World Bank et al. (2008): 13, 14).131 According to
Joireman, ‘(as) land gains in relative value, and the incentives for titling increase due to
changing economic opportunities or population growth, multiple legal systems can create
confusion in the allocation of property rights and conflict’ (Joireman (2008): 1237, 1240).
On the other hand, the existing cultural structures still play an important role for women
when making efforts to settle land related conflicts.18 Going through customary institutions
has advantages in being more easily accessible and being ‘speedier forums for rural women’
(World Bank et al. (2008): 25). This is also where the so-called community paralegals may
come in as they ‘are being incorporated into or serving as advisors to customary systems,
such as local councils or tribunals, and providing information so that women’s rights will
be upheld in the process’ (Brown and Gallant (2014): 29). IDRC research moreover indicates

Women’s right to land

‘that women’s access to land does not simply hinge on a choice between customary and
statutory systems’, that the ‘official relation between customary and statutory law differs
from country to country’ and that ‘we are faced with a more complex question of how the
two systems interact and are used by different groups of women and men’ (Budiender and
Alma (2011): 29, 70).19
The importance of these customary structures is reinforced by the following observations.
First of all, government institutions for land reform in many may have a suitable law to
implement but lack the means – and at times the political will – to systematically enforce it,
‘particularly in areas far from the center of power’ (Joireman (2008): 1235). Secondly,
obstacles to applying land legislation are manifold and context-specific. Examples include:
• conflictive legislation that, though ‘gender neutral’20, tends to ignore the many
constraints women face in obtaining land rights. These challenges, associated with social
norms and culture ‘cannot be solved by legal reform alone’ (World Bank (2014): 139);
• institutional weakness (with e.g. a weak presence beyond major urban areas, often weak
institutional structures and capacities). As observed by Van Gelder, ‘(the) weaker a state in
enforcing its laws and the lower its legitimacy, the lower will be the importance and
effectiveness of property rights as states may not be able to effectively keep a property
rights system afloat’ (Van Gelder (2010));
• the pervasive influence of gender bias, with male-dominated institutions for land
administration still discriminating against women, either explicitly or implicitly21; and
• the inaccessibility of formal institutions for poor women due to high cost, high illiteracy
rates, the need for legal documents, the language used, lack of legal knowledge, distance
and lack plus costs of transport and the length and the complexity of the registration
process (see text box 5.4).22
In addition there is ‘community pressure or threats against women who chose to go against
community norms and access judicial systems’ and ‘women incur significant social costs for
going against cultural norms; these costs include social ridicule and the possible loss of
social benefits’.23
Text box 5.4

Issues in land law implementation in Burundi, Mozambique and Rwanda

In Burundi, registration of land rights has hardly taken place due to a complex and
costly registration process. Implementation of Mozambique’s Land Law of 1997
has been slow and weak, mainly due to poor knowledge and understanding of the
law and its implications by local communities and farmers and limited capacity of
land administration bodies. As a result, most communities have not delimited their
land or registered their rights, with government and investors failing to recognise
the extent of community land, sometimes leading to land grabbing or ‘distress
sales’. Rwanda is confronted with the issue of how to deal with polygamy – which
is illegal but still frequently practiced.24

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Premises and promises

5.3 Arguing the importance of women’s land rights –
a theory of change
For both rural and urban people alike, secure and long-term property rights are essential. As
the literature states, ‘it is now increasingly recognized that, as a consequence, land and the
institutions governing its ownership and use are of great importance for broader economic
growth and poverty reduction from a much broader range of perspectives’ (Augustinus and
Deininger (2005): 2). Looking more specifically at the issue of women’s land rights, the
literature25 argues the importance of women’s access to secure land tenure rights in the
following terms:

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• ‘Women’s land rights and gender justice in land governance are fundamental pillars in
the promotion and protection of women’s human rights in rural areas’– they are ‘human
rights themselves’ – and the question of women’s right to land is ‘one of citizenship’
(Daley et al. (2013): 4, 7).
• Positive effects of land titling programmes on perceived tenure security of women and
outcomes regarding productivity-enhancing land investment (in soil and water
conservation (improved drainage and irrigation, planting of perennial crops, terracing
and tree planting) and increased agricultural productivity. The argument is that with
increased security of land tenure, land-right holders are more likely to make long-term
investments in their land if they are confident that the state cannot expropriate their
holdings . At the same time, while land registration may increase legal tenure security it
does not automatically lead to a woman’s perception of her land tenure as being secure.26
• Positive effects of land titling programmes on women’s participation in rental market –
provided that that land rights are transferable. The proceeds can then be used to finance
household expenditures and investments in the land. Women with land tenure security
are less likely to become economically vulnerable when they grow old, lose their spouse,
divorce or separate from a spouse in case of migration by men.27
• Potentially perceived tenure security may result in increased income and a better
bargaining position of women in their household (including increased control of
household productive resources) and in the community as well as vis-à-vis Government,
e.g. to demand their share in government-established infrastructure and services
(Agarwal (2003)). It may also be a critical element in diversified livelihood systems, e.g.
having a positive effect on women’s employment outside the home, self-employment,
and earnings. Interestingly, according to DFID, ‘evidence on whether strengthening
women’s property rights results in greater agricultural productivity is limited and
contested’ though women’s ownership of land and housing does offer ‘poor women
security against poverty that other forms of income do not’ (DFID (2014b): 49, 55).
• Potentially perceived tenure security also improves women’s potential access to credit
since land is a particularly important asset for getting bank loans that require collateral.
At the same time, the literature shows that: (i) poor households in general and poor
women in particular may be hesitant in offering their land as collateral; and (ii) that the
positive effects of land rights on access to credit mostly concern richer households, urban
areas, and larger-scale farms (Rodgers and Menon (2012): 11, 17). According to the World

Women’s right to land

Bank, however, even with a title to land, smallholders and low-income households
continue to find access to commercial credit elusive’ and there is no reason to believe
that for women this will be different (World Bank et al. (2008): 31). Moreover, the ability
to successfully use land as collateral depends on reliable information on property rights
and transparency in the regulatory structure.28
• Perceived land tenure security may also have less tangible effects such as an increased
knowledge of the outside world contributing to increased self-confidence. Women with
property rights are more likely to be active members of their communities and
community institutions (DFID (2014b): 67). It may also provide a safe haven/outside
option that may protect women against domestic violence and abandonment and/or
increase her mobility and decision making power.29 Other sources in this respect indicate
that granting property or inheritance rights to women and girls may have potential
backlash effects on increased tension within the household, justifications for wife
beating and suicide rates, including negative social effects on women’s access to land
(Lawry et al. (2014)).
• Finally, according to several sources30, secure land rights also lead to increased allocation
of household resources to women and children (and their education and nutrition31) as
well as increased household welfare.
However, giving equal access to land is not enough. There is also a need for changing
cultural norms, e.g. those that prohibit women to plough the land they own, and for
increased access to and control over other resources such as water, labour, credit,
agricultural inputs, information and knowledge.32 Secondly, it is important to realise that
not all women benefit equally, benefits or effects may depend on their marital status, the
type of household they reside in and their position in this household and the community,
the division of labour in agriculture, women’s literacy levels, the geographical or political
economic context they live in, etc.
Finally, land rights programmes should be very context-specific; there is not one fixed
answer.33 Good knowledge of the context, customary tenure systems, which are not
standard, and of existing barriers is a prerequisite for ‘gender and land rights’ interventions
to make the right choices and to have an impact.34 Such heterogeneity makes it difficult to
reconstruct a generic theory of change on the issue of land rights. Moreover, ‘insufficient
information is available to properly assess the long-term impacts of land titling and
challenges of implementation or to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of these
programs’ (Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): 18).35 An attempt to do so is provided in figure 5.2
which is based on the literature and the experiences within land right programmes
supported by the Netherlands.

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Increased production,
increased (self)employment; higher efficiency of
land use; increased rental
of land; increased cost of land
transfers

Access to economic input,
access to water, increased
technical knowledge

Secured land rights for
women, improved
inheritance rights

Strengtened women’s
groups

Knowledge on property rights
and how to claim them

Credit schemes,
economic support
programmes,
technical training

Land reforms,
land titling schemes,
land registration
programmes

Lobby and advocacy,
organisation and
support to women’s
groups

Training, information,
research

Enabling environment:
• State: conflicts between statutary and costumary laws, reluctance to enforce the law
• Local: traditional norms and beliefs, customary practices, power relations
• Individual: No demand for enforcement of law out of fear to loose familiy support

Increased self-reliance and
self-confidence; increased
decision-making power in
the household and
community; increased
household conflicts

Community level
• Lower poverty levels
• Higher economic
development
• Increased environmental
sustainabilty
• Increased peace and
security

Househould level
• Improved health and
development of children
• Improved family
welfare and health

Improved quality of life of
women and of future
generations

Impact

Figure 5.2

Increased family income
and food security

Outcome

Immediate outcome

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Input/resources

Premises and promises

Results chain for women and land rights

Women’s right to land

5.4 What works?
Against this background of heterogeneity and obvious lack of impact evaluation, it is
difficult to answer the question: what works? Given the variety in existing land tenure
systems, coming up with an answer that is applicable to all contexts is impossible. At the
same time, this variety underlines ‘the importance of understanding local contexts and the
realities on the ground, including customs and traditions and the way statutory right play
out’ for designing effective land reform policies and interventions (World Bank (2014): 139).
Some key elements identified in the literature, realising that women are not helpless
victims but have a role, either individually or collectively, to secure their land tenure,
include the following:36
Joint titling and registration in the name of the husband and wife, with potential benefits for
guarding against arbitrary action by one spouse, protecting against the dispossession of
women through abandonment, separation, or divorce.37 According to Eyben et al. (2008),
women are more likely to benefit from the provision of joint entitlements when it is made
mandatory rather than optional (Eyben et al. (2008): 11).38 Domingo et al. (2015) are more
reserved in this respect: ‘Empowerment potential is greater where women can access land
directly, rather than through a male family member, but whether benefits are greater for
those with individual or joint land title or access through customary rights depends on
context’ (Domingo et al. (2015): 61). Reality may be more complex though39:
• Women may not insist on having their names included on the title to household land
because of potential conflicts with husbands or their family;
• Women may not claim their rights because they prefer to have long-term social support
from brothers and other family members;
• Having their names on the land titles does not necessarily come with any decisionmaking powers concerning the land;
• Land may not be an asset that provides long-term economic security. On this point, one
issue is whether to recognise consensual unions if the legislation mentions only legal
marriage and does not explicitly recognise them.
Collective action and organisation and support of women’s groups can ‘increase women’s land
tenure security by enforcing existing legislation and gender-responsive policies from the
community level’ (Paradza (2011): 4).40 This is linked to the ‘watchdog function’ that e.g.
NGOs can play when identifying and highlighting land-related problems in a community.
Community sensitisation and training sessions on customary and statutory legal systems41 which is
about providing access to information and creating what is referred to as ‘social capital’. It is
also about creating legal awareness among women as well as at the level of the community
as a basis for asserting their rights and secure land rights. This needs to be ‘part of a larger
effort to provide education, training, and other means of raising awareness of women’s lack
of land rights and the consequent impact on the larger economy, well-being of the family,
and position and viability of women’s livelihoods’ (World Bank et al. (2008): 19). Results of a

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Premises and promises

study on land rights in Peru furthermore indicate that women’s education level matters,
finding ‘support for the hypothesis that women’s education level is an important
contributor to women’s capacity to claim their rights’ (Orge Fuentes and Wiig (2009): 48).
Accessible legal information – through broader awareness raising – is important together
with legal advice, through e.g. community paralegals that can provide advice, and access to
resources for grassroots women (World Bank et al. (2008): 27).42 Such informal paralegals
may be trusted women or women leaders who have experienced land disputes themselves.
Local-to-local dialogues with headmen, clan heads, chiefs, and local councillors ‘to re-assess
traditional practices and adapt customary law so that it reflects current realities and
communities are strengthened by women’s increased access to land rights’ (Brown and
Gallant (2014): 29) and the development of partnerships with key stakeholders. Such
community-level consultative processes may also have a role before land deals are agreed
upon (Oxfam (2013): 13). As argued by Paradza, ‘(the) dynamics of women’s land access are
complex, which means that there is room for diverse actors to exert influence from a variety
of standpoints in the governance structures’ (Paradza (2011): 4).43

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Women’s right to land

Notes
1

Articles 14-16 of CEDAW deal with rural women, ownership of land, inheritance rights and right to
access property. CEDAW moreover emphasises that legislation is important (de jure) but that state
parties to the Convention also need to pursue ‘de facto’ equality (articles 2-5).

2

The issue is further elaborated under various strategic objectives of the Beijing Platform for Action.

3

On the issue of gender and large-scale land acquisitions see e.g. Tanner (2013): 14-17 and Behrman et al.
(2011). Tanner (2013) underlines, amongst others, the need for more empirical evidence on the
differential effect of large-scale land deals on women and men. The appendix of Behrman et al. (2011)
provides amongst others recommendations for gender-equitable large-scale land deals (Behrman et al.
(2011): 26-27).

4

The Database was consulted on 23 March 2015. Country data are for different years. According to the
explanatory notes on the database, ‘(the) landowner is the legal owner of the land. However,
definitions of ownership may vary across countries and surveys. The indicator illustrates the proportion
of women owning land, out of the total landowners in a country and as such reveals women’s share in
ownership. However, it does not show how widespread landownership is in the total population of a
country’ (http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/data-map/statistics/en/?sta_id=1162). The
data on shares of women owning land should however not be seen as the sole indicator of their tenure
insecurity, especially since ‘data on property ownership are usually recorded at the household level in
both censuses and household surveys, making it difficult to breakdown ownership by sex’ (NamubiryMwaura (2014): 7).

5

As Doss et al. (2013) argue, the data in the database need to be interpreted with caution: (i) ‘much of the
data available on land-related statistics is dated’; and (ii) ‘the agricultural censuses provide measures of
management rather than of ownership’ and since a holder is not the same as an owner, ‘this database is
not appropriate for making generalizations about the extent of women’s landownership, which are
often made by advocacy and policy organizations’ (Doss et al. (2013): 16). The authors call for a clear
conceptualisation and contextualisation of what is meant by the term ‘ownership’ and for a definition
of the indicators that are used to measure such ownership. ‘Yet, across countries, the pattern that
women own less land than men, regardless of how ownership is conceptualized, is remarkably
consistent. Further, in many cases, the gender gaps are quite large’ (Doss et al. (2013): 29).

6

See e.g. Deere and Leon (2002); Agarwal (2003); World Bank and TrustLaw Connect (2013); Rodgers and
Menon (2012).

7

See Rodgers and Menon (2012): 14; Namubiru-Mwaura, E. (2014): 10.

8

Though legal pluralism exacerbates knowledge uncertainty and ‘can be disadvantageous for some
groups, such as poor and uneducated women, for whom formal state institutions are distant,
expensive, and conceptually foreign’ it also ‘enables individuals to use more than one type of law,
customary or statutory, to rationalize and legitimize their decisions or their behavior’ (World Bank et al.
(2008): 26).

9

Daughters can only claim their ‘igiseke’ in the form of an agricultural plot of land after the death of the
last remaining parent and when the mourning period is over, at the request of one or more of the
usufructuaries; if they do not make the request, it means they do not need it and that they have enough
land through their new family. But in this case, the brothers have a duty to send them the agricultural
produce, just as what was being done when their parents were still alive. The portion of land that can
be considered to be igiseke land that is not being claimed by any of the daughters will be farmed by the
brothers, who must cede it to their sisters if the need arises (Diarra (2010)).

10

Other principles are a participatory methodology for land delimitation and the existence of just one
type of land use right.

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Premises and promises

11

On the differences between patrilineal, matrilineal, bilateral and Muslim inheritance practices, different
marriage practices in customary societies see e.g. World Bank et al. (2008): 4-6.

12

Because of the resulting ‘complex overlapping web of rules, regulations and practices that can severely
disadvantage women’s opportunities’ there is a need that these plural legal systems are addressed as a
whole’ (World Bank and TrustLaw Connect (2013): 5).

13

The importance of customary law in determining women’s rights to land has ‘contributed to gender
inequities in the face of cross-border, large-scale land transactions or global ‘land grabs’ (Rodgers and
Menon (2012): 11). According to the same source the ‘lack of a formal land title greatly increases the risk
of land loss in the face of land commodification’ (Brown and Gallant (2014): 21). It is worth noting in this
respect that according to Daley there is a ‘notable lack of specific information about – or indeed
attention to – gender issues within the wider literature’ on commercial pressures on land. The author
refers to the current situation as one of ‘overwhelming gender blindness’ with most of the literature on
this topic barely mentioning gender issues (Daley (2011): 9, 14).

14

While in relation to these three countries, widows are specifically mentioned as a group experiencing
problems in relation to land rights, divorces or separated women experience similar issues and
constitute a growing group of vulnerable people.

15

The Land Law of Mozambique provides for the Right to Use and to Benefit of Land – a Direito de Uso e
Aproveitamento da Terra (DUAT). According to the Law, such a DUAT can be acquired from the State by
individual men and women, by communities, and by companies.

16

Also see Dekker (2013) on the so-called backlash effect: ‘papers in this field have also stressed the
potential backlash effects that may result from granting property or inheritance rights to women and
girls, with reference to (justification) of wife beating and suicide rates’ (Dekker (2013): 7, 26).

17

According to Crowley (2001) moreover, customary systems ‘operate most effectively when land is
relatively abundant and most land users know one another and have regular and direct contact’.

18

According to the study of Brown and Gallant (2014), 46% used grassroots mechanisms and 44% used
village chiefs and only 9% went through the formal legal system (Brown and Gallant (2014): 22).

19

Crowley (2001) also observes that ‘the codification of customary rights has often strengthened and
concentrated land rights of individual, senior, male household heads over multiple other interests,
resulting in only a small percentage of the population, and strikingly few women, holding land
certificates or titles in developing countries’.

20

Government land distribution schemes have ‘typically distributed land to household heads, a process
that favours men in general and specifically the more senior men who already have power through
customary land holdings’ and despite the reform of land laws, women ‘may not receive plots in the
reallocation process when local officials redefine them as dependents of male relatives’ (Rodgers and
Menon (2012): 22). Also see World Bank et al. (2008): 13 and Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): 18.

21

See e.g. World Bank et al. (2008): 3 and Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): 9. Dorn emphasises in this respect
the importance of the legitimacy of institutions and organisations that govern land use and management and that institutional transparency and accountability are necessary for equitable land allocation
and management (Dorn (2006): 3).

22

See also Crowley (2001); GENDERNET (2011): 22; Deere and Doss (2006): 15; Van Gelder (2010).

23

See e.g. Brown and Gallant (2014): 28; PLAAS (2011): 3; World Bank et al. (2008): 5-6, 20, 24.

24

On the implication of polygamy for women’s land rights see Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): 13, 16 and
World Bank et al. (2008): 18).

25

See e.g. Dekker (2013); Daley et al. (2013); Augustinus and Deininger (2005); Meinzen-Dick et al. (1997);
Agarwal (2003); Holden et al. (2007); Gomez and Tran (2012); Rodgers and Menon (2012); Lawry et al.
(2014); Namubiru-Mwaura (2014); Dorn (2006); World Bank et al. (2008).

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Women’s right to land

26

On the issue of the different meanings of the concept of ‘tenure security’ and the relationship between
the different conceptualisations see e.g. Van Gelder (2010), who distinguishes between perceived
tenure security, legal or de jure tenure security, and de facto tenure security of urban dwellers. According
to Van Gelder, ‘(in) situations where the different elements of tenure security do not coincide, titling
programs are unlikely to be the right policy option’ and ‘(a) better grasp of the concept can help in
developing better indicators and also increase our knowledge about when and why certain interventions will fail and how they can be improved’ (Van Gelder (2010)).

27

According to World Bank et al. (2008) ‘for widows, control over land may be one of the few ways that
elderly women can elicit economic support from their children, in the form of either labor contributions
to agricultural production or cash and in-kind transfers’ (World Bank et al. (2008): 1). In Sub-Saharan
Africa this has become more important because of the increase of the number of female-headed
households because of HIV/Aids.

28

A study on land titling in urban Buenos Aires only found ‘a modest but positive effect of land titling on
access to mortgage credit, and no impact on access to other forms of credit’ but that ‘moving a poor
household from usufructuary land rights to full property rights substantially increased investment in
the houses’ (Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010): 711).

29

Brown and Gallant (2014): 20; Rodgers and Menon (2012): 16, 19; World Bank et al. (2008): 1. Dorn
(2006) in this respect refers to gender equity in access to assets is a valuable outcome in its own right
because it can lead to greater mobility for women, increased political awareness, and fewer incidents of
domestic violence (Dorn (2006): 2).

30

See Gomez and Tran (2012) and FAO et al. (2010).

31

In the case of inheritance reform in India (the Hindu Succession Act), Deininger et al. (2014) find a
positive impact on girls’ education regarding better performance in reading and higher completion
rates at primary and secondary level in addition to more women engaging in productive work
(Deininger et al. (2014): 2).

32

See Lawry et al. (2014); Meinzen-Dick et al. (1997); and Dorn (2006).

33

See Meinzen-Dick et al. (1997); World Bank (2005); Namubiru-Mwaura (2014); PLAAS (2011); and Daley
et al. (2013) stating that ‘(laws) and policies should capture diversity among rural women and the ways
they use land and natural resources’ (Daley et al. (2013): 7).

34

There is a FAO technical guide (Governing land for women and men: A technical guide to support the
achievement of responsible gender-equitable governance of land tenure (2013)) that provides advice on
how to maximise benefits from land reform for women and on mechanisms, strategies and actions that
can be adopted to improve gender equity in the processes, institutions and activities of land tenure
governance. For a summary of the main elements see Lock and Henley (2014): 24-25. Buvinic et al.
(2013) underline the importance of ‘grounding land ownership processes in social and local contexts’
(Buvinic et al. (2013): 39).

35

According to the same source, ‘there is a paucity of consolidated and synthesized data on women’s land
rights, especially in rural areas’ and ‘not enough information is available to confirm their effectiveness
in addressing women’s land rights in rural areas’ (Namubiru-Mwaura (2014): iii)

36

See Meinzen-Dick et al. (1997); Brown and Gallant (2014): 28-29; Namubiru-Mwaura (2014); World Bank
et al. (2008).

37

See also World Bank et al. (2008): 32.

38

Oxfam (2013) stresses in this respect that ‘allotting individual land ownership with titles to the poorest
or least powerful members of a community does not automatically secure them either power or wealth.
On the contrary, placing individual ownership of assets in the hands of vulnerable people could lead to
them losing these assets very quickly’ (Oxfam (2013): 13). According to DFID (2014b), there is ‘inconsistent evidence about whether individual private tenure provides better conditions for women’s
economic empowerment than alternative systems, including customary tenure’ and about ‘whether

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Premises and promises

formal individual title improves or worsens women’s access to land’ (DFID (2014b): 6, 33). The same
source explains that ‘(this) is largely because authors examine different groups of women (e.g.
female-headed households, unmarried women, etc.), and because the ways that women access land
through social relations varies in different contexts’ (DFID (2014b): 33).
39

On the complications related to the notion of co-ownership in the African context see Joireman (2008),
stating amongst others that ‘(in) the few African countries where there are laws providing for the
co-ownership of marital property such as the family home or other assets, these laws have proven very
difficult to enforce because they go against the grain of cultural practice’ (Joireman (2008): 1238). See
further Hazel (2014): 18 and DFID (2014b): 49.

40

Along the same lines, Budiender and Alma state that ‘(building) alliances and partnerships and stronger
women’s movements will provide a more effective platform from which to advocate women’s secure
access to land. It will also build the capacity of women by encouraging the exchange of information
about land administration systems and other practicalities that affect their land rights’ (Budiender and
Alma (2011): 73). On the broader relevance of farmer groups, associations or collectives see e.g. Buvinic
et al. (2013): 40-41 and Oxfam’s publication ‘Women’s collective action: unlocking the potential of
agricultural markets’ (2013). Benefits are related to linking to markets, overcoming market failure (e.g.
unequal access to information), dissemination of extension messages, and the use of group savings. On
the more critical side, groups demand time and money – of which women farmers are generally short
– and there is a risk of elite capture.

41

See also World Bank (2014) referring to the importance of combining policy reforms and programmatic
interventions with ‘awareness raising for women, men and local leaders (including customary and
religious leaders) on women’s rights as well as on the benefits of women’s land ownership’ (World Bank
(2014): 140). Likewise, the importance of educating women (and men) on land rights is underscored in
Buvinic et al. (2013): 39-40.

42

The same source refers in this respect to the importance of combining a mass media effort with the
sustained presence of knowledgeable people at village level (World Bank et al. (2008): 20).

43

According to the same source, ‘(a) multi-stakeholder platform involving both governmental and
non-governmental organizations is an important precondition for effecting the implementation and
continuous monitoring of policies aimed at ensuring women’s land tenure security’ (Paradza (2011): 4).

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Women’s right to land

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6
Women and water and sanitation

‘At a policy level, it is also recognized that infrastructure development needs to be gender
aware in order to realize gender benefits’ (IFC (2012): iv).

Women and water and sanitation

6.1 Introduction
Gender equality and its importance for access to good quality infrastructure has been firmly
on the international policy agenda in the last 10 years. This has been accompanied by a
political commitment to promote gender equality and take action to address it through
infrastructure development and an awareness ‘that infrastructure development needs to be
gender aware in order to realize gender benefits’ (IFC (2012): iv).
With respect to the water sector this is e.g. already evident from the Dublin International
Conference on Water and the Environment and the Rio Conference on sustainable
development of 1992, the Beijing World Conference on Women of 1995, the 2nd World Water
Forum that was held in The Hague in 2000 and the World Summit on Sustainable
Development of Johannesburg of 2002. The reasoning in this respect has been as follows:
• The lack of or insufficient provision of physical facilities – from roads to water and
sanitation – results in a far greater time burden on women than on men because of a
gender-based household division of labour;
• Women would thus benefit more if this situation were improved, i.e. ‘(well) designed
infrastructure projects can bring significant positive benefits for women and girls by
improving access to markets, schools, and health services or improving women’s safety’1;
• Improving domestic infrastructure may ease women’s time constraints – which may, in
turn, ‘free up time for educational opportunities, productive work, and participation in
community life and decision making’ (GENDERNET (2011): 24).2
Still, ‘(while) the evidence is clear on the need for infrastructure investments as part of a
comprehensive agenda to increase gender equality in the world of work, there have been
few rigorous evaluations on the effect of large-scale infrastructure projects on women’s
time allocation’ (World Bank (2013): 62). Consequently, it is not possible to give a concise
overview of ‘what works?’ on the relationship between infrastructure and gender equality
in this chapter.
The following paragraphs provide a short overview on the importance of paying attention
to women’s infrastructure needs and demands in general and with respect to water and
sanitation in particular.

6.2 Women and infrastructure
In infrastructure, the specific needs and service demands of (poor) women’s are often
different from those of men. They are also different from what the wealthier strata of
society would like to see in this respect. Therefore, when planning infrastructure, the
different needs and interests of women and men and their ability to pay for the use of this
infrastructure need to be considered.

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Premises and promises

Infrastructure development is thus not simply a technocratic question. It is not genderneutral but ‘requires combining supply-side issues of technical design specifications for
provision of infrastructure services with demand-side dimensions of who uses
infrastructure, for what purposes, how it is paid for, and with what impacts on individuals,
households, and communities’.3
This necessitates efforts ‘to support women’s involvement and to convince both women and
men of the benefits’ to address ‘practical and cultural obstacles to women’s equal
participation in management and decision making’ (OECD (2006): 29-30).4 Moreover, there
are instrumental arguments (the ‘business case’) for addressing gender issues in
infrastructure: meaningful participation of (poor) women and men improves project
effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

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Various reports show nevertheless that integrating gender aspects in infrastructure
programmes has been an arduous task: there have been ‘very real difficulties translating (…)
political and policy commitments into practice on the ground’. This holds particularly,
although with some exceptions in the field of water and sanitation, for large-scale
infrastructure projects.5 A study on water users’ associations in South Asia of 2003 refers in
this respect to the low participation of women in these organisations, despite their high
involvement in irrigated agriculture and agricultural decision making (Meinzen-Dick and
Zwarteveen (2003)).6 An IFC literature review on the gender impact of public private
partnerships in infrastructure moreover found scarce evidence ‘on actual demonstrable
impacts on women and girls’, reflecting the more general concern that ‘many infrastructure
projects do not attempt to take account of the full range of positive and negative social and
economic impacts of infrastructure’ (IFC (2012): 7, 22).

6.3 Women and water and sanitation
With respect to water and sanitation, it is known that women, and to a lesser degree girls,
are usually the ones who collect water from communal sources and often they also pay for
it: lack of access continues to impact women significantly through the burden of water
collection with women taking care of two-thirds of this burden (DFID (2013): 9).7 As result,
‘women are likely to be the leading beneficiaries of improved water supply and sanitation
arrangements’ (IOB (2007): 36).
The importance of better and more accessible water and sanitation for (poor) women and
girls has been argued as follows:
• it reduces the disease burden8; and
• it reduces the burden and time associated with water collection, which in turn translates
into school performance of girls.9

Women and water and sanitation

Better and more access to water and sanitation is sometimes also linked to an economic
purpose, though with little empirical evidence to support it (Koolwal and Van de Walle
(2010): 23)10: better access to water would free women’s time to invest in income earning
activities such as petty trade.11
A range of sources12 refers in this respect to the importance of women’s participation in
training and water user committees (as a forum for women to participate in decision
making (World Bank (2000): 14), the choice of technologies, site locations and local
maintenance, management and financing systems and in sharing in the burdens and
benefits during operations. At the same time, it is underscored that ‘mechanisms for water
management and access are shaped by other societal relationships and structures of
inequality’ and that existing inequalities (poverty, caste, etc.) may limit women’s chances to
effectively raise their voice through community water management systems (Cleaver and
Hamada (2010): 32-35).
On the issue of women’s participation, there is ample evidence that in practice, women
often face specific obstacles to participating in projects and programmes, in joining and
participating in water-user committees, or in getting elected to positions on water
committees or village development committees. Women and men may also differ in
capacities and forms in which they can support water and sanitation: women often have
less time to devote to new activities or to participate in committees and have lower literacy
levels.
It is at the same time not clear whether increased women’s participation in water user
committees and having more women in leadership committees lead to better maintenance
of water infrastructure. According to Dekker (2013), referring to a study on the impact of an
intervention that verbally encouraged communities to increase female participation on
their water users committees: increased participation in water user groups ‘did not however
have any effect, positive or negative, on the frequency and quality of maintenance of the
water infrastructure’ (Dekker (2013): 52). Along the same lines, a randomised evaluation of
gender and community management of water infrastructure in Kenya found that increased
participation and increased leadership had no impact on the quality of infrastructure
maintenance.13

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Premises and promises

Notes
1

OECD (2006): 29; Kabeer (2012): 45.

2

See e.g. UN Millennium Project (2005): 66; GENDERNET (2011): 24; Kabeer (2012): 45.

3

See e.g. World Bank (2010b): 1; World Bank (2010c): 4; IFC (2012): iv. In relation to transport, World Bank
(2010d) calls for information on e.g.: (i) gender trip patterns and mobility constraints – that are different
for women and men ‘resulting in gender differences in mode of transport used as well as travel patterns
in relation to trip purpose, frequency and distance of travel’ and stem ‘from differences in the social
and economic roles of men and women, with their respective household and caretaking responsibilities’; (ii) gender transport needs, keeping in mind that women ‘bear a disproportionate share of the
transport burden to fulfill their economic, social, and domestic roles’ (iii) the social and cultural context
of gender differences affecting and affected by transport, such as time spent on social, economic and
household-related tasks; (iv) women’s access to means of transport, with women often having fewer
transport choices and facing concerns on restrictive social and cultural rules and norms, ‘personal safety
and the avoidance of harassment’ and spending more time on waiting for transport and paying on
average a higher share of their income on transport than men’ (World Bank (2010d): 9-10, 13, 15, 18, 22).

4

See also IFC (2012): 30; UN Millennium Project (2005): 70. The World Bank observed that ‘women’s time
constraints combined with inequitable gender norms surrounding economic and civic participation
mean that in very many contexts women likely will need extra support to engage meaningfully’ (World
Bank (2010c): 33). Nevertheless, only 25% of researched infrastructure projects had indeed taken ‘steps
to support women’s as well as men’s full access to project benefits’ in 2009 (World Bank (2010c): 4).

5

OECD (2004): 2, 6; World Bank (2010d): 9.

6

The study attributes this phenomenon to the following main factors: rules for membership, which
determine eligibility to participate (e.g. only formal right holders to irrigated land), stereotypical ideas
about the gender division of labour and about appropriate male and female behaviour, women’s
(presumed) inhibitions to meaningful participation (e.g. illiteracy) and the balance of ‘costs’ and
‘benefits’ to be derived from involvement, which influence individuals’ willingness and ability to
participate with women having less time than men to attend because of their high domestic and
productive workloads.

7

See also the UN’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2008, indicating that women shoulder the
bulk of responsibility for collecting water when none is available on the premises. Women are more
than twice as likely as men to collect water, while children usually collect water in 11 per cent of
households. More girls than boys fetch water’ (United Nations (2008): 42). The same report on 2012
observes that ‘(according) to an analysis of data from 25 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, representing
48 per cent of the region’s population, women and girls bear the primary responsibility for such water
collection. Only one quarter of the population in these countries had water on their premises in 2010.
For the remaining 75 per cent, water had to be collected from some distance. The time and energy
devoted to this manner of water collection is considerable, even under the most conservative
assumption of only one trip per day. For the 25 countries combined, it is estimated that women spend
at least 16 million hours each day per round trip; men spend 6 million hours; and children, 4 million
hours’ (United Nations (2012): 54).

8

According to WHO, approximately 10% of the worldwide disease burden and 88% of diarrheal diseases
can be prevented through improved drinking water and sanitation, hygiene and improved water
management (IOB (2012a): 36).

9

IEG (2010): 54; DFID (2013): 9.

10

According to Koolwal and Van de Walle (2010), using data sets from 10 countries in the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa and South and South-East Asia: ‘We do not find any evidence that improved access
to water leads to greater off-farm work for women. However, we do find that in countries where

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Women and water and sanitation

substantial gender gaps in schooling exist, both boys’ and girls’ enrollments improve as a result of a
reduction in the time needed to collect water. In addition we find some signs of impacts on child health’
(Koolwal and Van de Walle (2010): 24).
11

IEG (2010): 54; DFID (2013): 67.

12

See e.g. Narayan (1995): 2, 77; World Bank (2000): x, 15, 34; Gross et al. (2001): iii, v, 2, 4-5; UNDP (2003):
8-11, 13; Khosla et al. (2004): 13-14; Gender and Water Alliance and UNDP (2006): 13-15; IFAD (2007): 3, 6,
17. Using data from 88 communities in 15 countries, Gross et al. (2001) indicate in this respect that
‘projects that used more gender- and poverty-sensitive demand response approaches had results that
were better sustained’ and that the communities involved had used water services in a ‘health
promoting manner’ (Gross et al. (2001): v). Services were also better sustained ‘when projects offer
informed choices to both women and men, poor and better off’ includes both women and men in
water management (Gross et al. (2001): 2, 18-19).

13

Leino (2007). See also Mansuri and Rao (2014): 258-259.

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7
Women’s political voice

‘Maybe the very question ‘do women make a difference in politics?’ is wrong:
try ‘do men make a difference in politics?’ (Ballington (2008): 56).

Women’s political voice

7.1 Introduction
Women can play different roles in politics: as voters, political party members, candidates
and office holders, and members of civil society. They have to operate in political systems
that were established, organised and dominated by men (Karam and Lovenduski (2005):
188) and that, in many places, are not favourable to historically marginalised social groups,
including women. Women’s political voice is strongly related to the need for educating
women, as described in chapter 3. A literature review by Kenway et al. (2014) found that
women’s capacity, knowledge and skills are necessary preconditions for exercising
leadership, both in a political sense and outside of the political realm. Therefore, it is
essential that leadership programmes are combined with basic education, including
alphabetisation (Kenway et al. (2014): 1), because ‘women need an education to access
power’ (O’Neil et al. (2015): 21-22).
This chapter first of all describes the international framework concerning women’s
(political) voice, with particular attention to the issue of gender quotas. It then provides
information on the current state of affairs of women’s participation in political life. It also
provides a background on the debate on the instrumental value of increasing women’s
participation in politics and on women’s involvement in political parties. The chapter
concludes with an overview of the main issues concerning women’s participation.

7.2 International framework
At global level, the issue of women’s political participation – as one face of women’s
empowerment – has been on the agenda since the adoption of CEDAW in 1979. Article 7 of
the Convention obliges States Parties to ‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in
particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:
• to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly
elected bodies;
• to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof
and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
• to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the
public and political life of the country’.
Relevant is also General Recommendation #23 in relation to this Article that was issued by
the CEDAW Committee in 1997.1
The Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 emphasised as well the need for ‘women’s active
participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in
economic, social, cultural and political decision-making’. It recommended that
governments set a target reserving 30% of seats in national parliaments for women as a first
step toward gender equality in politics2 – which is line with what was agreed at ECOSOC in

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Premises and promises

1990 when a similar target was set for female representation in decision-making bodies (on
the issue of quotas, see text box 7.1).3
Text box 7.1

On gender quotas

In line with the international principles described above, more than 110 countries
introduced gender quotas (not necessarily adhering to the 30% recommendation)
to increase women’s role in the political arena by 2013. In many countries, international pressure has been instrumental, especially in countries that are concerned
with foreign aid, foreign investment, international reputation, and legitimacy.4
According to some authors, this international focus on quota is because ‘institutional rules are viewed as relatively easy to change and therefore as a promising
gender-based governance intervention’ (Horowitz (2009): 13).5

| 86 |

Different types of quota exist, often in combination, including:
•	Voluntary internal party quotas (in around 60% of countries with a gender quota)
that aim to increase the proportion of women among party candidates through
party reform;
•	Legislative candidate quotas (38% of the countries with a gender quota) which
require parties to nominate a certain proportion of women among their
candidates through constitutional or legal reforms; and
•	Reserved seats (20% of the countries with a gender quota) that set aside a certain
number of positions for women among elected representatives through
constitutional reforms.
Candidate quotas only work when women are placed in winnable positions on
party lists and compliance with quotas is monitored and sanctioned in case of
non-compliance (UNDP and NDI (2011): 5).6 According to Palmieri (2011), ‘(quotas)
tend to work best when tailored to a country’s electoral system, enforced with
sanctions, accompanied by rules on where women should be placed on parliamentary lists, connected to a meaningful definition of participation and combined with
steps to generate political and public support’ (Palmieri (2011): 14).
At the same time is evident that a country’s electoral system is one of the key
factors in determining how many women will make it into the legislature with
proportional representation offering better chances than majoritarian systems .7
Moreover, political cultures that emphasise sexual differences and group representation also tend to have a positive influence on gender quotas (Krook et al. (2009): 9).
Electoral systems, quota arrangements and other affirmative action measures
taken by political parties continue to be key predictors of progress for women.

Women’s political voice

7.3 Political representation: a right or an instrument?
Having more women into politics, and henceforth the importance of gender quotas, has
been argued from two main angles – at times simultaneously.

7.3.1

The rights-based approach

The first angle is that women and men are the same and since they make ‘up half the
population so it is only fair and right that women have equal representation in legislatures
that make decisions over their lives’ (Tinker (2004): 533).8 The following arguments are used:
• increasing women’s presence in Government may be valued ‘of its own sake’ (Dollar et al.
(2001): 427);
• ‘equality of opportunity in politics is a human right’ (UN Millennium project (2005): 104);
• ‘women’s right to equal representation in formal political systems needs to be recognised
as a fundamental part of the project of democratization’ (Alcântara Costa (2010): 25);
• ‘(women’s) equal and meaningful participation and influence in decision making at all
levels, and in both formal and informal spaces, is fundamentally a question of social
justice’, making sure that ‘the priorities, skills and needs of women are reflected in the
policies, laws, institutions and service delivery by community, local, national and
international governance structures’ (GDN et al. (2015): 44).9
This right to participate in political life is guaranteed by several international conventions.
According to the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation #23 (1997), ‘(societies) in
which women are excluded from public life and decision-making cannot be described as
democratic. The concept of democracy will have real and dynamic meaning and lasting
effect only when political decision-making is shared by women and men and takes equal
account of the interests of both’.

7.3.2 Instrumental evidence
The second angle is clearly instrumental. The argument is that women are different from men
and bring to governing distinct attributes, different visions and concepts of politics that
encourage a more compassionate and less-corrupt society (Tinker (2004): 533; Bari (2005): 1).
According to this line of reasoning, women’s participation in politics is likely to have ‘important
spinoffs’ for benefits to society in general (Dollar et al. (2001): 428) or that ‘when such policy
actors are female, they are more cognizant of and/or receptive to women’s needs and
preferences, and they may be more willing to allocate resources to meeting them’ (Horowitz
(2009): 7).
Whether this is indeed the case at the level of national parliaments is another matter since ‘the
women who enter national parliaments are not generally drawn from the ranks of poor people,
nor is there any guarantee that they will be more responsive to the needs and priorities of poor
women than many men in parliament’. When hand-picked from an elite with no grassroot
constituency to represent and answer to, their presence in governance structures of society ‘will
only be a token one’ (Kabeer (2005): 22, 24). Women are not homogeneous groups but, like men,
‘are divided along the line of class, ethnicity, religion and rural/urban background’ and the

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Premises and promises

gender gap in politics cannot simply be changed by adding more women with political structures
dominated by elite women (Bari (2005): 6). Also issues such as party loyalty are easily overlooked
when looking for the impact of increased influence of women on decision-making (Tinker
(2004): 231).10
Another issue with respect to the instrumental approach is that the link between women’s
presence in politics, their influence over political outcomes and, in the end, the outcomes as
such – has not been the subject of a lot of research.11 However, what is clear is that impact is likely
to vary from country to another. It depends on the economic and political context, the rules of
the parliamentary game, the number of women elected etc.
Much of the evidence from developing countries, which is contradictory at times and not as
straightforward as would seem from the 2014 World Bank document ‘ Voice, Agency and
Empowering women and girls for shared prosperity’12, comes moreover from India’s system for
elections at village level (see text box 7.2).13 As stated in a recent ODI report, overall ‘we have a
limited understanding of how women navigate what happens at the intersection of formal
institutions (quota systems, political party systems, regime types) and the informal rules and
networks of political decision-making – and the impact this has for gender equality agendas’
(Domingo et al. (2015): 14-15).14
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Text box 7.2

Outcomes of research on the quota system in India

In India, the village council is responsible for the provision of local infrastructure –
such as public buildings, water, and roads – and for identifying government programme
beneficiaries. Since 1998, one third of the councillor positions at this level and one
third of the Pradhan positions, with the Pradhan elected by the councillors, are
randomly ‘reserved’ for women. Researchers, focusing on the (randomly assigned)
gender of the Pradhan and not on the mandatory one-third female reservation of
village council posts, studied the effects of this policy on: (i) women’s participation in
village meetings, (ii) local policy, and (iii) changes in attitudes (aspirations, voice and
perceptions on female leadership). In brief, the main findings are as follows.15
Having a Pradhan position reserved for women in earlier elections, motivated
women to stand for this position in the village council. There is also evidence ‘that
women and other excluded groups are more likely to run for non-mandated seats
once they have had some experience on a mandated seat’ (Mansuri and Rao (2014):
10). Their chances of winning these elections were also higher in this case, especially
when seats had been reserved for women for more than one term (Beaman et al.
(2009) and (2012)) indicating that ‘lasting change requires that the inclusion
mandates remain in place for long enough to change perceptions and social norms’
(Mansuri and Rao (2014): 10; 276). This is partly attributed to improved ratings of
their performance, also among male voters. Women were also more likely to attend
and speak out at village meetings when the Pradhan position was reserved for a
woman (Beaman et al. (2010); Dekker (2013): 7).

Women’s political voice

The picture on the impact of having a woman Pradhan on the provision of public goods
is at the same time mixed. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) suggest that when the
Pradhan is a woman, the provision of public goods is on average more closely aligned to
the preferences of women than to those of men (Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004):
1409, 1411, 1431, 1440). The explanation is that the preferences of women Pradhans are
more aligned to those of women, and that therefore, they end up serving women
better (Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004): 1431; Duflo (2004): 5-7).
Other studies however find no such evidence or find that having women taking the
helm does not have any impact on the targeting of local government programmes on
women headed or landless households.16 Vissandjee et al. (2005) argue that simply
fulfilling the quantitative quotas ‘does not guarantee a level playing field for women in
the political arena’ (Vissandjee et al. (2005): 132).
On impact on the next generation, some sources indicate that children were better off e.g.
completion of immunisation and access to government day care) in villages with women
leaders for longer periods (Beaman et al. (2007)). Also a closing of the gender gap in
aspirations is observed: with both parents and adolescents having higher aspirations for
girls in villages that were assigned a female leader for two periods in a row (Beaman et al.
(2012): 582).17 The presence of elected women leadership as positive role models
contributed to higher girls’ educational attainment, a reduction in the gender gap in
educational outcomes, and a reduction in the time girls spent on household chores.
According to Pathak and Macours, the reservation policy in the long-term impacted on
learning outcomes of primary school children when they were exposed to reservation very
early in life because of ‘ improved health and nutritional environment in utero and during
the first years of life’ (Pathak and Macours (2013): 13).
Iyer et al. find that the introduction of the quota system at village leads to large and
statistically significant increases in the number of reported crimes against women
(rather than a rise in the actual crimes committed against women) and that ‘political
representation is an important means of providing voice to disadvantaged groups
within the criminal justice system’ (Iyer et al. (2011): 1-2, 5, 23). However, having ‘local
council reservations has a much larger effect on documented crimes against women,
than having the district chairperson post reserved for women’ (Iyer et al. (2011): 31). At
the same time, no overall deterioration in law and order was observed; rather, people
reported a positive change in police attitudes (with less bribes paid) and police efforts,
e.g. an increased number of arrests (Iyer et al. (2011): 6, 22, 34). No similar impact was
observed at district level and no effect of the presence of women in the state legislature: ‘It is the presence of women in the broad base of political representatives’ – i.e.
there ‘where they have greatest proximity to potential crime victims’ – rather than in
leadership positions at higher levels of governance per se, that generates a more
powerful impact on reporting of crimes’ (Iyer et al. (2011): 2, 8-9, 31-32).
Once again, all these reported results at outcome and impact level only apply to
village councils in India.

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Premises and promises

According to UNDP and the National Democratic Institute of the US, having more women in
parliament makes it more likely that parliament addresses women’s issues and influences
‘the nature of the debate in politics’ (UNDP and NDI (2011): 8; 37). Domingo et al. (2012) on
the other hand observe that ‘the extent to which women politicians can set agendas and be
accountable to constituencies for these depends not only on their political commitment to
gender equality (not to be taken for granted) but also on the nature of the (formal and
informal) institutional settings and the national and sub-national levels they operate at’
(Domingo et al. (2012): 26).
Finally, an issue not often mentioned is the risk of backlash when talking about women’s
political participation. In their literature review, Kenway et al. (2014) come across studies
about women who, due to hampering cultural attitudes, are faced with increased levels of
violence – including sexual violence – after seeking political office. This occurred not only
in countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka where
gender based violence is commonplace, but also in the Pacific region women with political
ambitions were faced with sexual harassment, including rape, and physical abuse (Kenway
et al. (2014): 12-13).

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7.4 Women’s participation in politics
7.4.1 Women politicians – the data
While overall gender-disparities in voting participation have been on the decline since
World War II and the number of women candidates for national office seems to be on the
increase, the overall picture is still that women ‘remain underrepresented in leadership
positions in politics and business across the globe’ (Pande and Ford (2011): 1). Laws
restricting women’s rights to vote and stand for elections still exist in several countries in
the Middle East. The available evidence suggests that women’s access to politics is not
simply a matter of national wealth, of women’s educational attainment or of increasing
their labour force participation. There is also no ‘significant effect of democratization on
the level of women’s representation in cross-regional data sets’ (Horowitz (2009): 8, 11).18
Still, the proportion of women in national parliaments was included in the MDGs as one of
the key indicators for the achievement of gender equality.
While it is clear that women’s numerical representation says little about their meaningful
engagement and influence in decision making, data on women’s political participation
– table 7.1 provides information on several (former) Dutch partner countries – are
illustrative of their absence from key decision-making bodies19:
• In January 2008, women accounted for 7 of the 150 elected heads of state and 8 of the 192
heads of governments of UN Member States; three years later these figures were 10 and 13
respectively. According to the UN in 2014, the number of female Heads of State or Heads of
Government in the world has gone up to 15 elected female heads of state in January 2014.
• The share of women holding a ministerial post shows great variation among individual
countries (0-58%).20 According to the UN in 2008, only 16% of the world’s ministerial

Women’s political voice

positions were held by women. This increased slightly to just over 17% by January 2014
when there were 36 countries with 30% or more female ministers. Women not only deal
with the traditionally so-called ‘soft’ portfolios (Social Affairs, Education and Women’s
Affairs), but are increasingly holding some of the so-called ‘hard’ ministerial portfolios
(Defence, Foreign Affairs and Environment).
• The global average share of women in parliament (combining upper and lower houses)
stood at 22% in 2014 and 20% in 2012 and 2013. This share was 18% in 2009, 14% in 2000,
12% in 1995 and 9% in 1987. According to the UN, ‘(with) the exception of 2007, the
average annual rate of increase in recent years has been just 0.5 percentage points’ (UN
(2013): 22). The share of women in parliament also shows great variation across regions
and across countries. Country wise, high performers in recent years have included
Rwanda, Sweden, South Africa and Cuba. By 2014 there were more than 30% female
members in parliament in some 46 countries, up from 24 in 2009. At the same time,
there were 5 countries without a woman in parliament in 2014, down from 9 in 2011.
From a regional perspective, women’s share in parliament in Northern Africa, Oceania
and Western Asia continues to be well below the global average.
• Less than 5% of the world’s mayors are women while the share of women among locally
elected councillors varies, equalling 8% of the councillors in Northern Africa and 30% in
Sub-Saharan Africa. According to GDN et al. ‘(women) account for only 20 percent of
elected councilors; and hold mayoral positions in only 10 of the world’s 195 capital cities’
(GDN et al. (2014): 47).21
• The gap between women and men on political empowerment remains: only 19% of the
political outcomes gap was closed in 2010 and 21% in 2014 (Hausmann et al. (2010): 7, 19
and Hausmann et al. (2014): 12).

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Premises and promises

Table 7.1 Women’s share in parliament and ministerial positions in (former) Dutch aid partner countries22
% of women in
parliament (lower house)

2007

2014

2005

2010

2014

No quota

Voluntary political
party quota

% of women in
ministerial positions

2000

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Legislated
candidate quota

Reserved seats

Type of quota

Afghanistan

n.a.

28

28

10

4

11

Bangladesh

9

15

20

8

16

7

Benin

6

11

8

19

22

22

Bolivia

12

17

25

7

24

33

Burkina Faso

8

15

19

15

14

14

Burundi

14

31

31

11

30

36

Colombia

12

8

20

n.a.

n.a.

31

DRC

n.a.

8

11

13

12

10

Egypt

2

2

2

6

9

10

Ethiopia

8

22

28

6

7

13

Georgia

7

9

12

n.a.

n.a.

21

Ghana

n.a.

11

11

12

22

23

Guatemala

9

12

13

25

0

27

Indonesia

8

12

17

11

11

12

Kenya

4

7

19

10

15

33

Mali

12

10

10

19

21

12

Moldova

8

22

18

n.a.

n.a.

28

Mongolia

11

7

15

n.a.

n.a.

17

Mozambique

30

35

39

13

26

29

Netherlands

36

39

39

36

24

47

Nicaragua

10

19

42

n.a.

n.a.

57

Pakistan

n.a.

21

21

6

4

0

Palestinian territories

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Rwanda

26

49

64

36

33

39

Senegal

12

22

43

n.a.

n.a.

16

South Africa

30

33

41

41

34

37

South Sudan

n.a.

n.a.

27

n.a.

8

23

Sudan

n.a.

18

24

3

6

16

Suriname

n.a.

26

12

12

n.a.

6

Tanzania

n.a.

30

36

15

27

37

Uganda

18

31

35

23

32

32
9

Vietnam

26

26

24

12

4

Yemen

0.7

0.3

0.3

3

6

9

Zambia

10

15

11

25

19

15

Women’s political voice

Coming back to the quota system mentioned above, UN data indicates that in 2009, the
average share of women elected to parliament was 27% in countries that applied a quota
system and 14% in countries that did not. Similar figures were reported in 2012 while in
2013, women took 24% of parliamentary seats in countries with legal quotas, 22% in
countries with voluntary quotas and 12% in countries without a quota (UN (2012): 25; UN
(2013): 22). This confirms that, on average, female representation is higher in countries with
any type of gender quota than in those without a quota (Pande and Ford (2011): 3, 13, 26).23
Other sources come to different conclusions, indicating that ‘the mere advent of gender
quotas has not resulted in uniform increases in the percentage of women in parliament
worldwide’: some countries have seen ‘dramatic increases’, others more modest changes or
even setbacks in the number of women elected (Krook et al. (2009): 9). Quotas ‘interact in
various ways with features of the broader political context’ (idem).
Still, while important, quotas in themselves are not enough: quotas ‘are not a panacea, and
will only be successful when they are used as one of many strategies for women’s enhanced
political participation’ (De Silva de Alwis (2014): 30). They should be accompanied by a
political commitment to gender equality, sanctions for non-compliance with the quota
system, political parties must be supportive and put women candidates in winnable
positions on party lists (UN (2014): 23). Moreover, in the case of Mali, ‘political parties have
interpreted the quota’s minimum requirement as a threshold to meet, rather than a level to
exceed’ thereby turning the quota into a new ‘glass ceiling’ (Kang (2013): 8).

7.4.2 Women politicians – representation and results
An important question when discussing women’s political participation is furthermore:
who gets elected, whom do they represent and what do they vote?
On who gets elected, the literature indicates that opinions differ. According to some, quotas
do not ‘necessarily result in equal access for all women, but rather often those who are
privileged with respect to socio-economic advantages, education and other factors’
(Greenberg and Zuckerman (2006): 6).24 Krook et al. (2009) on the other hand mention that
there has been little research on exactly what kinds of women benefit from quota, despite
the often expressed objections that quota will only lead to the election of elite women
(Krook et al. (2009): 15-17). Still, numbers matter, since ‘women’s increased presence in
parliament can, at a minimum, facilitate the articulation of women’s concerns and alter the
gender dynamics. At a maximum, increased numbers can result in women’s leadership in
sponsoring bills, working in committees or amending laws that transform and benefit
communities and the society as a whole’ (Ballington (2008): 59).
The literature is reserved as well on the question whom these elected women represent:
• ‘(women) elected through quota systems often do not champion gender issues’
(Castillejo (2012): 4)
• ‘having more women in power will not necessarily lead to better representation of a
broader constituency of women or of gender issues’ (Popovic et al. (2010): 16);

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Premises and promises

• (it) is not clear, however, if the women elected through a quota system necessarily have
‘women’s interests’ at the forefront of their thinking and policy-making’ (Miller et al.
(2014): 5);
• women who enter national parliaments ‘tend not to be drawn from the ranks of the poor
in any part of the world, nor is there any guarantee that they will be more responsive to
the needs and priorities of poor women than many men in parliament’ (Kabeer (2003):
188; Kenway et al. (2014): 20).25

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Moreover, in non-democratic regimes, gender quotas may be implemented for purely
symbolic purposes, to create new avenues for patronage or to gain legitimacy within the
global community – resulting in high numbers of women in legislature but without having
any real power.26 However, as the literature points out, quota legislation on its own is
‘insufficient (…) to achieve the full and equal participation of women in politics’ (Markham
(2013): 3). Or, as observed by Domingo et al. (2012), ‘(whilst) achieving greater numbers of
women in office is crucial, translating presence into actual influence for agenda setting and
access to real decision-making processes remains a challenge. Moreover, women’s presence
in parliament does not ensure loyalty to a political agenda for gender equality’ (Domingo et
al. (2012): vi). Still, ‘the introduction of quota systems in legislatures, party lists, cabinet
positions, bureaucracies and the civil service may increase the presence of women in
political and decision-making bodies. Getting women into public office in itself constitutes
an equality gain, and legal change that facilitates this is therefore important. Moreover,
increasing the presence of women in public or elected office is itself a gender equality gain,
and therefore a legitimate objective’ (Domingo et al. (2012): 3).
Information on the impact of having more women in parliament is less well researched and
focuses on two aspects: (i) that it leads to more attention to women’s, children’s and family
issues; and (ii) that it improves the quality of governance and reduces corruption.
Attention to women’s issues
On the first issue, research indicates that ‘(women) are often more active in supporting laws
benefiting women, children, and families’ and that ‘(the) likelihood that women will
promote such laws rises when there is a critical mass of women leaders and when there are
mechanisms to institutionalize collective action such as women’s caucuses or multiparty
women’s alliances’ (UN Millennium Project (2005): 104-105). This is shown to have been the
case in the US and Western Europe, though it varies across issues and activities, and for
selected countries in Latin America. According to Schwindt-Bayer (2006) women place more
priority than men on women’s, children’s and family issues27 and are more likely to sponsor
legislation in these areas, even though both men and women view these as ‘important
political concerns’ (Schwindt-Bayer (2006): 1, 4-6, 10, 18). A survey done in Sweden indicates
that women were more likely than men to raise issues of social policy, family policy, care of
the elderly or health care in their election campaigns. According to the survey, gender
equality is among the issues that women have put on the political agenda; without them
there would be silence on this topic (Wängnerud (2005): 243). Finally, Markham refers to
OECD research findings that ‘an increase in the number of women legislators results in an
increase in total educational spending’ (Markham (2013): 7, 8).

Women’s political voice

The study of the Inter-Parliamentarian Union (Equality in Politics) which is based on a survey
among 272 parliamentarians from 110 countries found in this respect the following
(Ballington (2008): 1-3, 32, 43-44). Women parliamentarians reported that they tend to
emphasise: (i) social issues, such as childcare, equal pay, parental leave and pensions;
(ii) physical concerns, including reproductive rights, physical safety and gender-based
violence; (iii) development, which includes human development, the alleviation of poverty
and delivery of services; and (iv) gender equality laws and electoral reforms that enhance
women’s access to parliaments. Still, though women are more likely to introduce legislation
related to women’s concerns and family issues, it is ‘difficult to assess the legislative impact
of women across all regions, however, as there is little in the way of comparative research in
this area’ (Ballington (2008): 44).28 Partly these findings are linked to women’s membership
of parliamentary committees: women remain concentrated in committees that deal with
the same social issues and are often absent from the debate on e.g. economy, finance and
foreign affairs.
In addition, as Kenway et al. (2014) state: ‘If part of the rationale for women’s leadership is
that women are able to bring something different to the leadership arena in terms of
articulating their own needs and interests, as well as using different ways to influence
change, then it follows that men could also exhibit these types of attributes if focus was
placed on allowing these to develop’ (Kenway et al. (2014): 16). What is more, a distinction
needs to be made between the legislative process and the legislative outcome. A study on
legislative behaviour by female parliamentarians from Argentina (which was among the
first countries in the world to introduce legislation on gender-quota) showed that ‘more
women’s rights bills were introduced (both by men and women) when women held a
greater share of seats in both chambers. However, the approval rates of these bills actually
declined’ (Htun et al. (2013): 95-97). So having more female parliamentarians does not
necessarily mean that more ‘women-friendly’ bills are passed. As an extreme example:
Rwanda, one of the countries with the highest level of female parliamentarians (see table 7.1),
adopted a labour law in 2009 that cut in half the length of publicly paid maternity leave
(Htun et al. (2013): 96-97).
Women and corruption
On the issue of better governance and less corruption, a range of authors reports that
having more women in a country’s parliament improves the quality of governance reduces
the level of corruption, implying ‘that women will be less likely to sacrifice the common
good for personal (material) gain’ (Dollar et al. (2001): 423-424).29 Others nuance this
position, come up with mixed evidence or come up with contradictory findings and suggest
that ‘some caution needs to be taken in asserting that increased female participation will
lower corruption in all countries’ (Alatas et al. (2006): 14; Michailova and Melnykovska
(2009): 8). Different arguments justify such caution.
First of all, Esaray and Chirillo (2013) find that ‘women are more disapproving of corruption
than men where (democratic) institutions suppress corruption but equally approving
otherwise (in autocratic contexts)’and that ‘(female) participation in government would
only reduce corruption in functional democracies where the electorate tends to punish

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Premises and promises

corruption via removal from office’ (Esarey and Chirillo (2013): 369, 384).30 This explains also
the observation of Transparency International that ‘it could be questioned whether women
are intrinsically less corrupt, or whether it is democracy which is the underlying condition
behind the argument that more women’s participation in government, is associated with
less corruption. In fact, countries where women are more represented in government tend
to also have more liberal democratic institutions, providing for more effective checks on
corruption as well as ‘fairer systems’ that promote gender equality’ (Transparency
International (2014): 2).31
Secondly, Alatas et al. (2006) find that cross-country variation in female behaviour and
attitudes vis-à-vis corruption ‘may be influenced to a greater degree by their cultural
surrounds’ and ‘may reflect the differences in the social roles of men and women’ (Alatas et
al. (2006): 2, 14). Similar conclusions are reached by Branisa and Ziegler (2011), finding that
corruption is higher in countries where social institutions deprive women of their freedom
to participate in social life, even accounting for democracy and representation of women in
political and economic life as well as for other variables. In such a context, ‘neither political
reforms towards democracy nor increasing the representation of women in political and
economic positions might be enough to reduce corruption’ (Branisa and Ziegler (2011): 1;
Transparency International (2014)).
| 96 |

Finally, women as new comers on the political scene are more restricted in their
opportunities for corrupt behaviour (Goetz (2007)). It is their inexperience that counts
rather than their preferences since, particularly in socially conservative societies, ‘it is
difficult for women to become either clients or patrons in the male-dominated patronage
networks through which corrupt exchanges occur’ (Horowitz (2009): 18).32

7.4.3 Women politicians and political parties
Political parties are one key avenue for women’s participation in politics: they recruit and
select candidates and determine a country’s political agenda. Also at this level, and for reasons
that mirror those identified above, women participate less and are underrepresented in
positions of power (UNDP and NDI (2011): 1). According to UNDP and NDI (2011): ‘If strategies
to promote women’s involvement in the political process are to be effective, they should be
linked to steps parties can take across the specific phases of the electoral cycle (...) and to
the organization and financing of the parties themselves’ (UNDP and NDI (2011): 2; also see
text box 7.3 on the suggested strategies). Still, ‘political parties have a mixed record in
addressing gender issues in governance’ (UNDP and NDI (2011): 38) and according to
Domingo et al. (2012) ‘(focusing) mostly on parties in some contexts where these are likely
to remain captured by elite and patriarchal interests is not an effective strategy’ (Domingo
et al. (2012): vii).33 According to the same source, it is necessary that the particular features
of the political party system and the political parties themselves (their internal democracy,
accountability between party and state and society) – as the gatekeepers to formal political
participation – are problematised (Domingo et al. (2012): 26). Likewise, Ballington (2008)
refers to limits set on addressing women’s issues and concerns because of party politics and
discipline – it is unlikely that gender identity will trump party identity (Ballington (2008): 50).

Women’s political voice

Text box 7.3

Strategies for addressing gender equality in political parties

UNDP and NDI (2011) suggest the following strategies for enhancing gender
equality in internal party organisation:
•	Address gender equality in internal party regulations (e.g. by having clear and
formal rules of recruitment and nomination).
•	Adopt measures for women’s participation in governing boards and decisionmaking structures (as well as key party committees, task forces, etc.).
•	Set targets for women’s participation in party conventions.
•	Establish women’s wings and sections within political parties to allow women
party members to meet, discuss and deliberate, articulate their priorities, and
seek solutions to common problems.
•	Ensure a gender equality perspective in policy development, ensuring that party
policies and priorities respond to the needs of women and men.
•	Enforce the implementation of the quota system and address gender inequality
in the candidate recruitment process by: (i) galvanising and formalising party
support for candidate quotas; (ii) establishing clear and transparent guidelines
for candidate recruitment in party nomination committees; (iii) ensuring
implementation of the quota system and putting women in winnable positions;
(iv) work with civil society to monitor compliance; (v) cultivate strategic alliances
with men; and (vi) expand the pool of women candidates and provide skills training.
•	Address financial issues that women face in electoral campaigns, e.g. by
establishing fundraising networks, establishing an internal party fund for women
candidates, public funding of political parties or by subsidising women candidates and setting limits on nomination and campaign expenditures.
•	Undertake actions during the campaign and electoral period regarding: (i)
training and mentoring of women candidates (campaigning skills, working with
the media, etc.); (ii) ensuring women’s visibility in campaigns (television, posters,
access to campaign machinery); (iii) identify and disseminate party positions on
issues that are priorities for women (such as gender based violence); (iv)
monitoring the voting process and checking for irregularities; and (v) gendersensitive voter information.

7.5 What are the main issues?
Unlike previous chapters, this section does not present an overview of what works due to
the fact that no studies were found containing suggestions for approaches and
interventions. Instead, table 7.2 provides a summary of the main issues when addressing
women’s political participation. This summary also shows that the support in this area
would benefit from structured analysis ‘that integrates social and political analysis,
including of the political economy of context-specific gender equality barriers to political
participation, into programming and implementation’ (Domingo et al. (2012): vii).

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Premises and promises

Table 7.2 SWOT analysis on women’s political participation34

| 98 |

Strengths

Weaknesses

•	Affirmative action in the form of quotas.
•	National instruments such as gender-sensitive
Constitutional provisions on political participation of women.
•	National machineries for the advancement of
women (e.g. ministries for women and gender)
– even though these are often weak in mandate
and human and financial resources.
•	Civil society and women’s organisations
providing women with the opportunity to come
into public space.
•	Civil society and women’s organisations
working at community level to change attitudes
and promote women’s leadership, campaigning
and networking skills and provide capacity
building to women to effectively perform
political jobs once they are in office.
•	Political will from (some) governments and
political parties that provide quotas for
women’s representation.
•	Existence of women-in-politics role models.

•	Lack of enforcement of quotas and insufficient
women to fill the seats in parliament.
•	Cultural and religious beliefs and gender norms
that hinder women’s mobility, keeps them silent in
the presence of men, affect their confidence to
pursue a political career and influence how women
are perceived by voters, party leaders and media.
•	Political participation captured by elite women and/
or male dominated (informal) patronage networks
preventing women from converting presence into
influence.
•	Women’s presence in political forums does not
guarantee actual influence in political processes or
a qualitative change in political society – this is
influenced by context-specific factors such as
regime type and electoral or political party system.
Moreover, political power is regularly brokered
outside formal political institutions.
•	Persistent negative attitudes towards and
stereotyping of female leaders, also in mainstream
media – who are often judged to be less
experienced and to lack ‘masculine traits’ such as
leadership – perpetuating myths that women
cannot or should not take on leadership roles or
participate in decision-making.
•	Lack of political will within ruling governments and
electoral laws and legal frameworks that do not
translate constitutional provisions.
•	Failure by political parties to promote female
candidates and appoint women in leadership roles.
•	Women’s multiple roles at household level and
related time burdens – i.e. the way the political
system is organised does not always tally with the
way women have to organise their day life.
•	Comparatively high illiteracy rates among women.
•	Comparatively high level of poverty among women
and (poor) women who are unable to raise funds
for election campaigns and face high opportunity
costs in participation, especially if it displaces
income-earning opportunities, which leads to the
so-called middle-class effect documented in some
places.
•	Costs of obtaining identity cards, necessary for
electoral and candidacy registration, were a major
obstacle to ensuring electoral participation and
meeting the legal quotas for women’s
representation.

Women’s political voice

Table 7.2 SWOT analysis on women’s political participation34

Opportunities

Threats

•	
Existence of international and regional legal
instruments (such as CEDAW, Maputo Protocol,
UNSCR 1325) as benchmarks to help frame
national laws and policies and their implementation.
•	
Gender sensitive international support that tags
financial support to women’s participation in
politics and governance issues.
•	
Improvements in women’s education levels and
better access to modern ICT.
•	
Slow yet growing change of mentality on
women’s political role among women and men
and greater acceptance of women’s political
leadership roles.
•	
The post-conflict moment of political change
can create special opportunities for women to
embed new rules about gender equality in
state-building processes.
•	
Initiatives to tackle discriminatory social norms
that obstruct women’s participation in
decision-making at all levels.

•	
Patriarchal nature of institutional framework
and the political system pushing women back
into the private sphere.
•	
Inconsistent and insufficient long-term support
(both financial and political) from the donor
community.
•	
Lack of general security and political unrest that
tends to affect women more.
•	
Increasing costs of nomination and election
campaigns, with women facing specific
challenges in raising funds and getting access to
money networks.
•	
Integration of gender equality into policies is
not always the result of an endogenous
initiative but due to pressure from the
international community.
•	
Ideology, values and standards evolve very
slowly.
•	
Backlash in the form of violence against women
running for office (women politicians risking
rape and physical abuse).

Given these context-specific and complex issues, it is understandable for Domingo et al.
(2012) to conclude that, ‘the primacy of domestic factors and the long-term nature of
women’s empowerment demand that external actors be realistic about how much they can
contribute to transformative change in practice and over what timescales’ (Domingo et al.
(2012): 5).

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Premises and promises

Notes
1

This recommendation inter alia stresses that the obligation specified in article 7 of CEDAW ‘extends to
all areas of public and political life’ and that ‘(the) political and public life of a country is a broad
concept’ that: (i) ‘refers to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, judicial,
executive and administrative powers’; (ii) ‘covers all aspects of public administration and the
formulation and implementation of policy at the international, national, regional and local levels’; and
(iii) ‘also includes many aspects of civil society, including public boards and local councils and the
activities of organizations such as political parties, trade unions, professional or industry associations,
women’s organizations, community-based organizations and other organizations concerned with
public and political life’.

2

This 30% rule goes back to Dahlerup’s publication ‘From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in
Scandinavian Politics’ of 1988. It is related to the concept of having a critical gender mass: ‘women are
not likely to have a major impact on legislative outcomes until they grow from a few token individuals
into a considerable minority of all legislators: only as their numbers increase will women be able to
work more effectively together to promote women-friendly policy change and to influence their male
colleagues to accept and approve legislation promoting women’s concerns’ (Childs and Krook (2008):
725; Pedwell (2008): 26). It has also been used to justify measures to bring more women into political
office to be able to impact parliamentary debates and laws (Baliamoune-Lutz (2013): 2, 15). According to
Horowitz (2009): ‘Assuming a shared perspective among women as a unified group is a key basis for the
critical mass argument widely employed by international organizations, transnational women’s
networks, and party activists. However, the empirical evidence for this claim should be tested’
(Horowitz (2009): 15).

3

Also in other international forums similar recommendations were agreed upon. See e.g. the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (July 2003) which
states that States Parties ‘shall take specific positive action to promote participative governance and
the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative action,
enabling national legislation and other measures’ and ‘shall ensure increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making’. See also Kang (2014): 141.

4

Sunn Bush (2011): 131; EASSI and International Alert (2012): 43.

5

On the rationale for adopting quotas, reasons for quota reform and the different groups of women
articulating quota demands see also Krook (2007): 369-370, 373.

6

On quota and political parties see also Cornwall (2014): 13.

7

Palmieri (2011): 10; Cornwall (2014): 13; UN (2010): 25; UN (2013): 22.

8

This applies to women’s role in decision-making on peacebuilding as well, also see IOB (2015a).

9

See also Bari (2005): 1; Ballington (2005): 24; Pedwell (2008): 13; Horowitz (2009): 7.

10

On this issue see also Luttrell et al. (2009): ‘(in) some cases, it has been shown that democratisation and
participation projects bring empowerment predominantly to the middle classes’ (Luttrell et al. (2009):
10). Along the same lines Pedwell (2008) observes that ‘(women’s) different social locations and
experiences’ – differing in terms of by race, ethnicity, nation, culture, class, caste, sexuality, ability,
religion, etc. – ‘mean that they have a range of varied needs and political interests. These differences
can conflict and contribute to political outcomes not of benefit to all women’ (Pedwell (2008): 13; 26).
See also Dekker (2013) referring to work done by Clots-Figuras observing that ‘female legislators from
higher castes do not have any impact on ‘women-friendly’ laws, oppose land reforms, invest in higher
tiers of education and reduce social expenditure’ (Dekker (2013): 50).

11

According to Karam and Lovenduski (2005) ‘there is relatively little research and information available
on what sort of impact women have made’ (Karam and Lovenduski (2005): 188).

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Women’s political voice

12

See World Bank (2014): 158-159.

13

There is some literature on Africa, but this is less systematic and lacks ‘the ability to econometrically
link women’s representation to outcomes’ and focuses ‘on either women’s numerical participation or
qualitative aspects of their political effectiveness’ (Horowitz (2009): 31).

14

Along the same lines, the same ODI report observes that there is ‘(very) little evidence exists that
explicitly links women’s political participation in parties to improved gender equality or future voice
and leadership’ (Domingo et al. (2015): 30).

15

See also Duflo (2012): 1070-1072 and Mansuri and Rao (2014).

16

See Bardhan et al. (2005); Bardhan et al. (2010); Besley et al. (2005); Mansuri and Rao (2014): 257-359.

17

No evidence was found on changes in women’s labour market opportunities, suggesting that ‘the
impact of women leaders primarily reflects a role model effect’, i.e. ‘their presence as positive role
models for the younger generation that seems to underlie observed changes in aspirations and
educational outcomes of adolescent girls’ (Beaman et al. (2012): 582, 584, 586).

18

According to Schwindt-Bayer (2006), that cross-national studies have found little effect of quotas on
the election of women is ‘probably explained by the variation in quota rules – the use of placement
mandates, the target percentage of women, and enforcement mechanisms – that generally are not
taken into account’ (Schwindt-Bayer (2006): 2).

19

See e.g. Waring (2010) and Alcântara Costa (2010).

20

According to Ballington (2008) this was 16% overall in 2008, with 22 countries in which women held
30% or more of the ministerial posts (Ballington (2008): 15).

21

Against this background, GDN et al. (2015), underline the importance of supporting women’s
meaningful local level participation and leadership: ‘it is at this level that many of the decisions that
affect women’s lives are being made’ and it ‘is essential to ensure that the needs and priorities of
women are reflected in local decision making processes’. Moreover, it ‘can also provide critical
opportunities for women to assume leadership positions which are often overlooked such as in
non-governmental organisations, clubs and community centres’ (GDN et al. (2015): 49).

22

Data from www.ipu.org, www.quotaproject.org and data.worldbank.org.

23

There is evidence that effective implementation of the quota system for several times in a row leads to
an increase in the number of female candidates and – having more confidence in them and adjusting
their beliefs on the role women ought to play – with more people voting for such candidates even
without a quota requirement (Dekker (2013): 49). Having female leaders for some time may weaken
men’s stereotypes about gender roles in public and the home, and alter their perceptions about the
effectiveness of female leaders (Horowitz (2009): 12).

24

See also Pedwell (2008): 13.

25

In her advice The Post-2015 Development Agenda – The Millennium Development Goals in perspective of April
2011, the AIV observed in this respect: ‘The number of seats in parliament has not always proved
effective in initiating women’s empowerment’ (AIV (2011): 31).

26

See e.g. UN Millennium project (2005): 108-109; Horowitz (2009): 7; Cornwall (2014): 13.

27

Also according to Markham (2013), even though women are not a homogenous group, they ‘do tend to
see ‘women’s’ issues (…) more broadly as social issues, possibly as a result of the role that women have
traditionally played as mothers and caregivers in their communities’ and women’s ‘meaningful
participation in politics affects both the range of policy issues that are considered and the types of
solutions that are proposed’ (Markham (2013): 7).

28

See also IPU (2000): 39.

29

See also Blackden et al. (2006): 6; UN Millennium project (2005): 105; Tinker (2004): 540; Duflo (2004):

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Premises and promises

10; Horowitz (2008): 18; Beaman et al. (2010); and Michailova and Melnykovska (2009) though they
acknowledge that the findings from their analysis ‘should be considered very critically’ and that ‘no firm
conclusions can be drawn’ (Michailova and Melnykovska (2009): 1, 13).
30

The authors argue as follows: ‘We think this is because women are more averse to the risks of violating
political norms and because gender discrimination makes violating institutional norms a riskier
proposition for women than men (or: ‘women are differentially impacted by these risks and thus feel
greater pressure to conform to existing political norms about corruption’ (Esarey and Chirillo (2013):
362)). Where corruption is stigmatized, women will be less tolerant of corruption and less likely to
engage in it compared to men. But if ‘corrupt’ behaviors are an ordinary part of governance supported
by political institutions, then there will be no corruption gender gap’ (Esarey and Chirillo (2013):
383-384).

31

In this respect, see also the study of Breen et al. (2015) that focuses on bribery within the business world
using the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys that document firms’ (self-reported) experiences of
corruption, as well as information on firms’ characteristics and the business environment. While
concluding that ‘women in business are less corrupt’ it also reports that ‘cultural and institutional
variables moderate the effect of gender on corruption’ and that ‘(the) effect of female ownership is
much greater under democracy or high rule of law than under autocracy or low rule of law, confirming
our expectation that risk aversion is an important factor and that gender matters more in countries
where the threat of detection is greater and punishment is more likely’ (Breen et al. (2015): 15-17).

32

Yet another study on the Indian state of Andra Pradesh and focusing on the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (Afridi et al. (2013)) points into another direction: corruption and sub-standard
administration of the Act are more likely to occur in village councils reserved for women in the early
stages but declines during the tenure of the female sarpanch (Afridi et al. (2013): 34). They also find that
female leaders generate governance dividend once they have experience (Afridi et al. (2013): 7, 24-25,
28-29, 35). According to the authors, this ‘highlights the need for capacity building and institutional
support to make women’s political participation and affirmative action policies more effective’ (Afridi
et al. (2013): 8, 35).

33

For example in relation to political parties, the same source states: ‘in reality, the nature of parties in
Burundi is highly problematic: they are weak and poorly institutionalised, and the dynamics of
dominant party rule weaken the possibility of enhanced accountability mechanisms between elected
representatives and constituencies of voters’ (Domingo et al. (2012): 15). In the case of Nigeria, the
authors refer to political parties that ‘are patronage-based and reflect deep ethnic and regional
tensions, which shapes the agendas they pursue and opportunities for promoting women’s concerns’
(Domingo et al. (2012): 17-18).

34

See e.g. CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 23 (16th session, 1997); Duflo (2004): 10;
Tinker (2004); 531, 541; Bari (2005): 3; Waterhouse and Neville (2005): 10, 13-15, 42-43; Dahlerup (2005):
152; Schwindt-Bayer (2006): 20; Greenberg and Zuckerman (2006): 3; EASSI and International Alert
(2008): 16-18; Pedwell (2008): 26; Ballington (2008): 18; Horowitz (2009): 12, 40; Eerdewijk et al. (2009):
38; Ospina (2010): 20-21; Alcântara Costa (2010): 25; Palmieri (2010): 10-24; Pande and Ford (2011): 26;
UNDP and NDI (2011): 5-10; EASSI and International Alert (2012): 44; Castillejo (2012): 4-5, 8; Domingo et
al. (2012): 3-5; Mukankubito et Mihigo (2012): 35, 36, 38, 43; Markham (2013): 3, 8-9, 12-17; Moosa et al.
(2013): 468, 470; Mansuri and Rao (2014): 61; De Silva de Alwis (2014): 3, 15, 29, 31; World Bank (2014):
159; GDN et al. (2015): 47-50. The literature shows also that the same issues are relevant when talking
about women’s participation in peace building and conflict resolution in (post) conflict states – see e.g.
Popovic et al. (2010): 15-16.

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Women’s political voice

| 103 |

8
Organisational matters related
to gender mainstreaming

‘Leadership has not consistently supported or prioritized gender mainstreaming in policy or
operations, resulting in what has been widely described as ‘policy evaporation’’ (AfDB
(2012): 32).

Organisational matters related to gender mainstreaming

8.1 Introduction
Although many donors talk about mainstreaming gender into their development policies,
the actual translation from policy to practice is often very weak. As Moser and Moser (2005)
point out, ‘turning to the implementation of gender mainstreaming, most efforts are
considered inconsistent, and generally involve only a few activities, rather than a coherent
and integrated process. Policy commitments to gender mainstreaming frequently evaporate
in planning and implementation processes’ (Moser and Moser (2005): 15).
This problem of ‘policy evaporation’ is due to a number of factors, such as: lack of expertise;
insufficient resources; treating gender equality as a ‘separate issue’ (which actually
marginalises the issue); insufficient feelings of ownership of the policy, often combined
with a lack of accountability; and sometimes even organisational (male) resistance to the
notion of gender equality.1 The following paragraphs summarise what is known from other
gender evaluations on these key institutional factors that have influenced the realisation of
donor gender policies and gender mainstreaming in said policies.

8.2 Staffing matters
| 105 |

8.2.1 Role of management – commitment at the top
International gender evaluations and reports demonstrate that management has a key role
in ensuring gender mainstreaming: ‘(it) can work, but it requires high-level leadership as
well as technical and budgetary resources – it is not cost free’ (World Bank (2007): 145).
What is more, support from lower levels of management is also essential: ‘Accountability
and commitment at all levels, and leadership from senior and middle management, is
essential to speed up progress towards gender equality’ (Hunt (2004): 6).2 Management has
a role in creating the enabling environment and systematic approach that are necessary for
change to occur and for ensuring support to gender equality.3 This is also apparent from e.g.
the OECD/DAC Resource book on concepts and approaches linked to gender equality of
1998, pointing out that ‘(if ) leadership is clearly disinterested in progress on equality issues,
it is highly unlikely that policy will go beyond a rhetorical stage. They must demonstrate
that it is important through allocating resources, raising equality issues in other policy
discussions and demanding progress from senior staff’ (OECD/DAC (1998): 6).
Evaluations from a range of countries show that in practice this support was not
consistently provided and ‘(donors) lack of accountability to gender equality policies is an
ongoing and serious obstacle to ensuring that both women and men participate and benefit
from development activities’ (Hunt (2004): 6). Two main reasons are identified4:
• An overload of competing leadership and development priorities (from poverty
reduction, private sector development to climate change) that tended to supplant gender
equality, with gender falling ‘to a relatively low position in the order of priorities, as a
‘cross-cutting issue’ to be attended to in niche sectors of education and health, but very
much an optional and frequently forgotten issue in others’; and

Premises and promises

• ‘A lack of performance benchmarks or delivery standards to hold leaders accountable and
a lack of accountability mechanisms to assess progress in policy implementation and
achievement of desired outcomes’ and to ensure that its gets adequate attention by
middle management and staff.5 Coherent management strategies for sustained
implementation of gender mainstreaming were absent and while it was accompanied by a
repertoire of tools, management has not supported these tools with adequate staffing or
the required organisational changes, resources, or budgets. As a result, the
implementation of gender mainstreaming largely became a ‘voluntary exercise,
dependent on the commitment and interest of individuals’ (AfDB (2012): 48).6 Or, as
already stated back in 1998: ‘when staff are not held accountable for action on issue of
equality, there is little incentive for staff to act’ (OECD/DAC (1998): 53).

8.2.2 The organisation of gender expertise
Evidence on what institutional arrangements for implementation of gender policies work
best, has been inconclusive so far (ECG (2012): 7-8). Most aid organisations have (had) a
small central team of gender experts in headquarters, that coordinates implementation of
the gender equality strategy, plus gender ‘focal points’ in headquarters’ departments and
embassies or field offices.7
| 106 |

Issues identified with respect to the central focal points are8:
• They help to provide more specific sectoral gender expertise and allow for more direct
interventions and cooperation, but rarely have the authority and seniority to realise
effective integration of gender issues in other departments. Gender focal points in
ministry departments are frequently staffed by juniors who are not gender experts, have
limited experience and who have to deal with ‘gender’ in addition to other tasks;
• Gender advisers at central level may not be strategically located within the organisation
and are overburdened with responsibilities and priorities other than gender
mainstreaming. Moreover, their mandates often become diffuse since gender
mainstreaming is everyone’s responsibility – implying that no one seems to be
accountable;
• They are remote from the design and implementation of the interventions they need to
support and have difficulties in monitoring what is happening in practice.
Several evaluations also refer to decisions to disband gender departments, reduce or not
replace gender specialists. Evidently, getting more staff was often unrealistic: reduced
funding and lower administrative budgets called for making choices among the many
priorities competing for attention. A common, though not always very successful, remedy
has been to involve external consultants, especially in the design of interventions, but less
so in implementation or M&E.9
Issues at decentralised level, meaning at embassy or field office level, mirror those at central
level: time and capacity of staff vary from embassy to embassy but are ‘a real challenge’ as
staffing is limited and with staff getting other tasks as well since gender is not always the
main priority.10

Organisational matters related to gender mainstreaming

Related to the need for specific gender expertise and commitment from the top, is a ‘widely
acknowledged need for specific mechanisms of accountability, rather than simply the general
guidelines provided in policy statements. These include incentives for positive behaviour as
well as appropriate sanctions’ (Moser and Moser (2005): 17). An often-cited meta-evaluation
on gender mainstreaming by the African Development Bank (2012) suggests that if there is
one thing we can learn from previous experiences, it is that accountability and incentive
systems are essential for effectively mainstreaming gender within donor organisations. In
the end ‘mainstreaming should result in gender becoming everyone’s business’ (AfDB
(2012): 51, 62).

8.2.3 Gender training
Many evaluations have observed that knowledge of gender equality is thinly spread within
aid organisations. To address this caveat, training has been one of the standard approaches
to raise the profile and practice of gender mainstreaming, particularly among non-gender
specialists.11 Apart from raising knowledge and skills, training was thought to help in
changing negative attitudes to deal with gender issues (Moser and Moser (2005): 17).
Although ‘(there) is little assessment available of what type of training has been most
effective for what purpose’ (ECG (2012): 8), the overall picture of such, often short-term,
training, is not very positive – though there are exceptions.12 Such training has been judged
as fragmented, too short to turn staff into ‘gender experts’, insufficiently targeted to the
needs and functions of staff as a result of little needs assessment, not reaching the local
field level, and susceptible to staff attrition. Moreover, unless made mandatory, it was
difficult to get senior management and non-gender specialist operational staff to
participate. As mentioned already in 1998 by OECD/DAC, while numerous training models
were developed, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness of gender training and what
type of training is more effective (OECD/DAC (1998): 18). Moreover, obstacles regarding
insufficient senior management support are not remedied by training (OECD/DAC (1998): 19).

8.3 Resource matters
8.3.1 Funding women’s organisations
According to Kabeer (1999) ‘(the) project of women’s empowerment is dependent on
collective solidarity in the public arena as well as individual assertiveness in the private.
Women’s organizations and social movements in particular have an important role to play
in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs for the individual’ (Kabeer
(1999): 457). And although it is widely acknowledged that women’s funds and women’s
organisations have an important role to play in the achievement shifts in gender equality
and women’s empowerment, financial support for these institutions has been waning in
the past decade. Between 2009-2010, DAC member countries allocated USD 24.8 billion to
gender equality, but only 1.6% of that money (USD 410 million) was allocated to women’s
equality organisations, even though empirical results have shown that providing funding to
these organisations is effective in general (Baliamoune-Lutz (2013): 3, 14; Rao and Kelleher
(2005): 58). By 2011, this share had gone up to 2.2% of all gender equality-related funding by

| 107 |

Premises and promises

DAC member countries, equalling an amount of USD 457 million (Cordaid and Global
Network of Women Peacebuilders (2013): 34).
Furthermore, several researchers13 point to the fact that ever since mainstreaming was
written into the Beijing Platform for Action, donors have had the tendency to focus on
gender mainstreaming at the expense of funding stand-alone interventions implemented
by women’s organisations. And more oft than not, donors prefer to channel whatever
stand-alone funding they have through pooled funding, trust funds and large-scale
multi-donor arrangements for reasons of efficiency and management. In turn, this has
caused smaller, local NGOs and CSOs to be overlooked when applying for funding14
(GENDERNET (2008); Mukhopadhyay et al. (2011): 27).

| 108 |

Another tendency that many donors have, is to fund short-term projects and programmes,
whereas achieving gender equality requires long-term, sustainable commitments to
partners and interventions (Hunt (2004): 2). Findings point to the need for a shift in funding
patterns: providing medium to long-term, institutional support to women’s funds and
women equality organisations is perceived as an effective way of contributing to women’s
empowerment.15 Because ‘the donor tendency not to stick with anything for very long has
had a negative impact on organisations working to change historical inequities that cannot
be eradicated within a few years’, such as achieving gender equality (Mukhopadyay et al.
(2011): 30).

8.3.2 Gender instruments in the programme cycle
Drawing up a country and sector gender analysis or profile is often an obligatory step at the
start of the programming cycle or when updating their multi-year country programmes or
strategies for many aid organisations. In practice, however, such analyses were rarely done
‘in a sufficiently detailed manner to allow effective and system-wide integration of gender
issues’. They were often confined to particular sectors, such as health and education16, and
findings were ‘rarely followed up during implementation or monitoring’ (AfDB (2012): 75).
Moreover, overall gender policies were not always reflected in the country portfolio that
served to implement the country programmes.
With few exceptions, donor organisations have also prepared gender-related reference
materials, manuals and handbooks together with checklists and guidelines that were to be
used as screening tools. Their purpose was to ensure that gender policy requirements were
followed through in programme and project design. In practice, however, most of these
tools have failed: it was often a matter of choice to use them, they were applied in an ad hoc
manner and people often stopped using them after a short period of time. They soon fell
into the category of administrative rituals: they were too time-consuming and
administrative and had little operational relevance.17

Organisational matters related to gender mainstreaming

8.4 Monitoring and evaluation matters
Though M&E is considered crucial to see, as a minimum, whether women indeed have
benefited from certain interventions, international experience in this area is not a happy
story. It remains ‘a stubbornly challenging area’ with weaknesses in monitoring ‘mirrored
in evaluation, where inclusion and assessment of gender is generally lacking’ (AfDB (2012):
43).18 Gender equality is rarely systematically integrated into evaluative work and, with some
exceptions, specific thematic evaluations of gender equality and women’s rights have been
relatively infrequent. As a result, it is difficult to know the effects on gender equality and
people’s lives or to know what works or not and to learn from good or failing approaches.19
The main issues with respect to M&E are the following: 20 results frameworks suffer from
weak or unclear gender concepts (or are absent) and input, process oriented or quantitative
output indicators dominate with difficulties experienced in identifying proper indicators for
measuring impact and getting access to gender-disaggregated data. This contributes to
weak evaluation frameworks and evaluations have had little choice but to report along
those indicators and ‘to focus on processes and organizational factors relating to policy
implementation and mainstreaming. When they do report on results, evaluations tend to
focus on: (a) women, one main reason being that gender mainstreaming is often
misinterpreted as a focus on women; and (b) education and health because in this case it is
easier to monitor and evaluate effects and because these areas offer ‘relatively
straightforward but narrow women-centered design and implementation opportunities’
(AfDB (2012): 14, 63).

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Premises and promises

Notes
1

See Moser and Moser (2005): 15-17; AfDB (2012): 49-52; Brouwers (2013): 16.

2

See also Hunt and Brouwers (2003): 14; stating that evaluations reviewed at the time showed that ‘the
main obstacle about which there was consensus was their lack of accountability for gender equality
commitments that are not embedded in general agency procedures, instruments and overall policy
implementation monitoring systems’. Others noted that leadership and commitment were key factors
in creating an enabling corporate culture (Hunt and Brouwers (2003): 50).

3

See e.g. Aasen (2006): 5-6; Mehra and Gupta (2006): 16; Byron and Örnemark (2010): 20; ECG (2012): 7;
AfDB (2012): 45; Verner Kristiansen ApS (2013): 35. According to Hunt and Brouwers (2003), ‘(within)
donor agencies there needs to be greater accountability to gender equality policy and for mainstreaming gender equality perspectives in general procedures. Although there are no simple ways to
increase this accountability, leadership and commitment are essential, and overall agency plans have
been useful for some agencies’ (Hunt and Brouwers (2003): 57).

4

See e.g. Moser and Moser (2005): 17; Rao and Kelleher (2005): 61; Roggeband (2009): 65, 72; AfDB
(2012): 12, 44-47, 76; ECG (2012): 7; and Nanivazo and Scott (2012): 24. Ravazi (1997) refers to ‘dogged
resistance’ experienced when bringing in gender into organisations and ‘bureaucrats (often male) who
seem at best indifferent but more often hostile to what they perceive to be irrelevant political
incursions into their professional boundaries and personal lives’ (Ravazi (1997): 1111).

5

This was ‘exacerbated by the lack of monetary and non-monetary incentives to encourage a sustainable focus on gender mainstreaming processes and improving gender equality results’ (AfDB (2012): 48).
See also Rao and Kelleher (2003): 148 and IFAD (2010): 12. On this issue see also a study done by
McKinsey and Company in 2012 among 235 major European companies in the area of gender diversity
practices. It found, amongst others that ‘a company’s perceived commitment tends to dwindle further
down the organization. So while 41 percent of companies said their CEOs were fully committed to
improving gender diversity, only 25 percent felt the same about senior managers and vice-presidents,
and 13 percent about middle managers. The closer to the front line, the less support there appears to be
for gender diversity initiatives, suggesting companies still have considerable work to do to change
attitudes within the organization’ (McKinsey (2012): 11).

6

See also Mukhopadhyay (2004): 98; Uggla (2007): 5; FINIDA (2009): 52; Roggeband (2009): 73; Moser
and Moser (2005): 16; AfDB (2012): 76; Nanivazo and Scott (2012): 20, 24.

7

See McGill (2013): 11; OECD (2008): 14; OECD (2009): 11; Roggeband (2009): 72.

8

See e.g. Roggeband (2009): 70, 72; Moser and Moser (2005): 16; IFAD (2010): 11-12; AfDB (2012): 13, 44,
52; Aasen (2006): 6; Uggla (2007): 5, 22; OECD (2009): 61; OECD (2011): 55; Nanivazo and Scott (2012): 2,
10, 21; McGill (2013): 14; and Verner Kristiansen ApS (2013): 34, 36.

9

See also OECD/DAC (1998), referring to ‘(a) general result of the reliance on consultants is a lack of
continuity in the programme or project cycle (to ensure that issues and strategies identified at one
point are followed up at later stages) and the absence of a solid ‘institutional memory’ about what
works and why’ (OECD/DAC (1998): 54).

10

See e.g. Aasen (2006): 5; McGill (2013): 14; Nanivazo and Scott (2012): 8, 16-17; and Uggla (2007): 9.

11

See AfDB (2012): 40; Roggeband (2009): 72; Woodford-Berger (2004): 68; Mukhopadhyay (2004): 96.

12

See e.g. Hunt and Brouwers (2003); 50; Uggla (2007): 25; Moser and Moser (2005): 17; ECG (2012): 8;
AfDB (2012): 13, 40-42, 75-76; and Mukhopadhyay (2013). On the positive side, Danida’s e-learning
course (together with its Gender Toolbox), which is mandatory for everyone including senior
management, was considered particularly useful (OECD (2011): 30, 57). According to Hunt and Brouwers
(2003), ‘(the) likelihood of training being applied to tasks increased when it was sector-specific, handson and/or directly linked to individual activities and contexts’ (Hunt and Brouwers (2003): 51).

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Organisational matters related to gender mainstreaming

13

See e.g. Eerdewijk & Dubel (2012): 501; Højlund Madsen (2012): 579.

14

Another issue is ‘donors’ preference for channelling funding through English-speaking women’s CSOs
based in the country’s capital city enables these groups to dominate the women’s civil society agenda’
(Castillejo (2012): 6).

15

See e.g. Collinson et al. (2008): 38; Cornwall (2014): 24; Cordaid and Global Network of Women
Peacebuilders (2013): 34; Moosa et al. (2013): 468-469.

16

See e.g. Mehra and Gupta (2006): 4; Aasen (2006): 8; McGill (2013): 13; FINIDA (2008): 24; Brouwers
(2013): 16.

17

AfDB (2012): 13, 35, 38-39, 74-75.

18

See also Hunt and Brouwers (2003) referring to a 1994 review of OECD which looked at the way in which
women in development was handled as a cross-cutting theme in evaluations and found that ‘limited
attention had been given to women and gender issues in the evaluation studies reviewed, and that the
evaluations themselves focused on outputs rather than impacts because agencies were only just
beginning to develop methodologies for impact assessment’ (Hunt and Brouwers (2003): 18). See also
Hunt (2004): ‘Many development activities lack gender responsive indicators and sex-disaggregated
baseline data, and have limited monitoring information. These are serious constraints to assessing
possible differences in participation, benefits and impacts between women and men. Where sex-disaggregated information is collected, this tends to focus on inputs and activities (such as participation of
women in training, number of women in groups, or number of loans provided) rather than benefits and
impacts (such as how women and men control or benefit from loans)’ (Hunt (2004): 3).

19

Moser and Moser (2005): 17-18. On this issue see also Brouwers (2013): 32.

20

Other issues, though not typical for gender M&E, relate to the lack of mechanisms for sharing lessons
and learning from others and that evaluation findings not necessarily translating into improved
systems and practices. See e.g. Snyder et al. (1996): 1492; Moser and Moser (2005):17; Mehra and Gupta
(2006): 12, 16, 24; Uggla (2007): 21-24; IFAD (2010): 12; Byron (2010): 14; NORAD (2011): 11; ECG (2012):
3-4, 8, 16, 29; AfDB (2012): 14, 21, 23, 42-43, 62-64, 77; Nanivazo and Scott (2012):18-20; Verner
Kristiansen Aps (2013): 14-15; Brouwers (2013): 15, 17, 20, 28.

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Annexes

Annexes

Annex 1

About IOB

Objectives
The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight
into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the
independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous
Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and
implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade and
Development Cooperation to account to parliament for policy and the allocation of
resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end,
efforts are made to incorporate the findings of evaluations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to
improving the formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of
implemented policies allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and
focused.
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Organisation and quality assurance
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations
it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under
investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for
each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from
within the ministry and other stakeholders. In addition, an Advisory Panel of four
independent experts provides feedback and advice on the usefulness and use made of
evaluations. The panel’s reports are made publicly available and also address topics
requested by the ministry or selected by the panel.

Programming of evaluations
IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a ministry-wide evaluation
programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the
Explanatory Memorandum to the ministry’s budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the
programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming
of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to
requests from parliament and from the ministry, or are selected because they are issues of
societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other
donors and development organisations.

Approach and methodology
Initially IOB’s activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for
Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive,
covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB’s reports have been
submitted to parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and

Premises and promises

a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 resulted in IOB’s remit being
extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has
extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through
joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC
Network on Development Evaluation.
IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given
to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative
and qualitative methods are applied. IOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of
evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research
material relating to priority policy areas.

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Annexes

Annex 2 Literature
Introduction
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genderbeleid).

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movements. Women’s Voice and Agency Research Series. 2014. No. 7. World Bank.

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Premises and promises

DFID (2012a), A Practical Guide on Community Programming on Violence against Women and Girls.
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Kiplesund, S. and M. Morton (2014), Gender-Based Violence Prevention: Lessons from World Bank
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United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and
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IOB (2011d), The two-pronged approach: Evaluation of Netherlands support to primary education in
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Annexes

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Meinzen-Dick, R., A. Quisumbing, J. Behrman, P. Biermayr-Jenzano,V. Wilde, M.
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Quisumbing, A.R. and L. Pandolfelli (2009), Promising Approaches to Address the Needs of Poor
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Behrman, J., R. Meinzen-Dick and A. Quisumbing (2011), The Gender Implications of Large-Scale
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Property rights evidence paper.

Annexes

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OECD/DAC (2010), Gender Inequality and the MDGs: What are the Missing Dimensions? At Issue.
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Annexes

Literature on women and water and sanitation
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Leino, J. (2007), Gender and Community Management of Water Infrastructure: Evidence from a
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UNDP (2003), Mainstreaming gender in Water management. A practical journey to sustainability: A
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Literature on women and political participation
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Alatas, V., L. Cameron, A. Chaudhuri, N. van Erkel and L. Gangadharan (2006), Gender and
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Besley, T., R. Pande and V. Rao (2005), Political selection and the quality of governments: Evidence
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MIT.

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Duflo, E. (2012), ‘Women Empowerment and Economic Development’. In: Journal of Economic
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EASSI and International Alert (2012), Women’s political participation in post-conflict countries Lessons
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Kabeer, N. (2005), ‘Gender equality and women’s empowerment: a critical analysis of the
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Kang, A. (2013), ‘The effect of gender quota laws on the election of women: Lessons from
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Krook, M. L. (2007), ‘Candidate gender quotas: A framework for analysis’. In: European Journal
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Luttrell, C. and S. Quiroz, with C. Scrutton and K. Bird (2009), Understanding and
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Mansuri, G. and V. Rao (2014), Localising development. A World Bank Policy Research Report.
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Markham, S. (2013), Women as agents of change: having voice in society and influencing policy.
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Mukankubito, I, et J. d’Arc Mihigo (2012), Promouvoir l’égalité des sexes dans les processus de
décentralisation et dans la gouvernance locale. Leçons du Rwanda. International Alert.
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Ospina, S. (2010), Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325
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Palmieri, S. (2011), Gender-sensitive parliaments. A global review of good practice. IPU reports and
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Pande, R. and D. Ford (2011), Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A Review. Background Paper
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Pathak, Y. and K. Macours (2013), Women’s Political Reservation, Early Childhood Development and
Learning in India. Young Lives.
Pedwell, C. (2008), Just Politics. Women transforming political spaces. One World Action.
Popovic, N., M. Lyytikainen and C. Barr (2010), Planning for Action on Women and Peace and
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Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, United Nations International Research and
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Schwindt-Bayer, L. (2006), Female Legislators and the Promotion of Women, Children, and Family
Policies in Latin America. Background paper for UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children Report
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Sunn Bush, S. (2011), ‘International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in
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Tinker, I. (2004), ‘Quotas for women in elected legislatures: Do they really empower
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Transparency International (2014), Policy brief 01/2014: Gender, equality and corruption: what are the
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UN Millennium Project (2005), Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women.
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United Nations (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010.
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Vissandjee, B., A. Apale, S. Wieringa, S. Abdool and S. Dupéré (2005), ‘Empowerment
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Wängnerud, L. (2005), ‘Case Study: Sweden. Sweden: A Step-wise Development’. In: Women
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Waring, M. (2010), Women’s Political Participation. Paper for DFID and IDRC.
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World Bank (2014), Voice, Agency and Empowering women and girls for shared prosperity.
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Brouwers, R. (2013), Revisiting gender mainstreaming in international development: Goodbye to an
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Cordaid and Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (2013), Financing for the implementation of
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Annexes

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Improving implementation results’. In: World Development 24:9, pp. 1481-1496.
Uggla, F. (2007), Mainstreaming at Sida. A Synthesis Report. Sida Studies in Evaluation 2007:05.
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Woodford-Berger, P. (2004), ‘Gender Mainstreaming: What is it (About) and Should we
Continue Doing it?’ In: IDS Bulletin 35:4, pp. 65-72.
World Bank (2007), Global monitoring report 2007. Millennium Development Goals. Confronting the
challenges of gender equality and fragile states.

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Premises and promises

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015
Evaluation reports published before 2011 can be found on the IOB website:
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations or www.iob-evaluatie.nl.

| 142 |

IOB no. Year

Report

ISBN

402

2015

Work in Progress – Evaluation of the ORET Programme:
Investing in Public Infrastructure in Developing Countries

978-90-5328-470-4

401

2015

Evaluation of the MDG3 Fund ‘Investing in Equality’
(2008-2011)

978-90-5328-468-1

400

2015

The Only Constant is Change: Evaluation of the Dutch con- 978-90-5328-467-4
tribution to transition in the Arab region (2009-2013)

399

2015

Gender, peace and security: Evaluation of the Netherlands
and UN Security Council resolution 1325

978-90-5328-465-0

398

2014

Navigating a sea of interests: Policy evaluation of Dutch
foreign human rights policy 2008-2013

978-90-5328-460-5

397

2014

Riding the wave of sustainable commodity sourcing:
Review of the Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH 2008-2013

978-90-5328-464-3

396

2014

Access to Energy in Rwanda. Impact evaluation of
activities supported by the Dutch Promoting Renewable
Energy Programme

978-90-5328-463-6

395

2014

Strategie bij benadering. Nederlandse coalitievorming en
de multi-bi benadering in het kader van de EU-besluitvorming (2008-2012)

978-90-5328-462-9

394

2014

Automy, partnership and beyond: A counterfactual
analysis of policy coherence for Ghana

978-90-5328-459-9

393

2014

Balanceren tussen koopmanschap en diplomatie.
Evaluatie van de Netherlands Business Support Offices
2008-2013

978-90-5328-458-2

392

2014

Good things come to those who make them happen:
Return on aid for Dutch exports

978-90-5328-456-8

391

2014

Useful patchwork: Direct Funding of Local NGOs by
Netherlands Embassies 2006-2012

978-90-5328-455-1

390

2014

Investeren in wereldburgerschap. Evaluatie van de
Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking
en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (NCDO)

978-90-5328-454-4

389

2014

Op zoek naar focus en effectiviteit. Beleidsdoorlichting
van de Nederlandse inzet voor Private Sector Ontwikkeling 2005-2012

978-90-5328-451-3

388

2013

Impact evaluation of improved cooking stoves in Burkina
Faso: The impact of two activities supported by the
Promoting Renewable Energy Programme

978-90-5328-449-0

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

387

2013

Between Ambitions and Ambivalence: Mid-term
Evaluation SNV Programme 2007-2015

978-90-5328-448-3

386

2013

Evaluation issues in financing for development: Analysing
effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on developing
countries.

978-90-5328-447-6

385

2013

Economic diplomacy in practice: An evaluation of Dutch
economic diplomacy in Latin America

978-90-5328-446-9

384

2013

Achieving universal access to sexual and reproductive
health and rights: Synthesis of multilateral contribution to
advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights
(2006-2012)

978-90-5328-445-2

383

2013

NGOs in action: A study of activities in sexual and
reproductive health and rights by Dutch NGOs

978-90-5328-444-5

382

2013

Buscando novas relações : Avaliação da política externa
dos Países Baixos para a América Latina. Informe especial
sobre o Brasil

978-90-5328-453-7

382

2013

En busca de nuevas relaciones: Evaluatión de la politica
exterior de los Paísos Bajos en América Latina. Resumen
del informe principal

978-90-5328-450-6

382

2013

Op zoek naar nieuwe verhoudingen. Evaluatie van het
Nederlandse buitenlandbeleid in Latijns-Amerika

978-90-5328-443-8

381

2013

Balancing Ideals with Practice: Policy evaluation of Dutch
involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights
2007-2012

978-90-5328-442-1

380

2013

Linking Relief and Development: More than old solutions
for old problems?

978-90-5328-441-4

379

2013

Investeren in stabiliteit. Het Nederlandse fragiele
statenbeleid doorgelicht

978-90-5328-440-7

378

2013

Public private partnerships in developing countries.
A systematic literature review

978-90-5328-439-1

377

2013

Corporate Social Responsibility: the role of public policy.
A systematic literature review of the effects of government supported interventions on the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) behaviour of enterprises in developing
countries

978-90-5328-438-4

376

2013

Renewable Energy: Access and Impact. A systematic litera- 978-90-5328-437-7
ture review of the impact on livelihoods of interventions
providing access to renewable energy in developing
countries

375

2013

The Netherlands and the European Development Fund
– Principles and practices. Evaluation of Dutch involvement in EU development cooperation (1998-2012)

978-90-5328-436-0

374

2013

Working with the World Bank. Evaluation of Dutch World
Bank policies and funding 2000-2011

978-90-5328-435-3

373

2012

Evaluation of Dutch support to human rights projects
(2008-2011)

978-90-5328-433-9

| 143 |

Premises and promises

| 144 |

372

2012

Relations, résultats et rendement. Évaluation de la
coopération au sein de l’Union Benelux du point de vue
des Pays-Bas

978-90-5328-434-6

372

2012

Relaties, resultaten en rendement. Evaluatie van de
Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands
perspectief

978-90-5328-431-5

371

2012

Convirtiendo un derecho en práctica. Evaluación de
impacto del programa del cáncer cérvico-uterino del
Centro de Mujeres lxchen en Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-432-2

371

2012

Turning a right into practice. Impact evaluation of the
Ixchen Centre for Women cervical cancer programme in
Nicaragua (2005-2009)

978-90-5328-429-2

370

2012

Equity, accountability and effectiveness in decentralisation
policies in Bolivia

978-90-5328-428-5

369

2012

Budgetsupport: Conditional results – Policy review
(2000-2011)

978-90-5328-427-8

369

2012

Begrotingssteun: Resultaten onder voorwaarden –
Doorlichting van een instrument (2000-2011)

978-90-5328-426-1

368

2012

Civil Society, Aid, and Development: A Cross-Country
Analysis

979-90-5328-425-4

367

2012

Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid –
Beleidsdoorlichting 2006-2010

979-90-5328-424-7

366

2012

Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the Dutch
Development Cooperation 1990-2011

978-90-5328-423-0

366

2012

Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen – Beleidsdoorlichting van het OS-beleid 1990-2011

978-90-5328-422-3

365

2012

Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept –
De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch Concept
2010

978-90-5328-421-6

364

2012

Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: Methoden en
Resultaten van onderzoek.

978-90-5328-420-9

363

2011

Improving food security: A systematic review of the
impact of interventions in agricultural production, value
chains, market regulation, and land security

978-90-5328-419-3

362

2011

Methodische kwaliteit van Programma-evaluaties in het
Medefinancieringsstelsel-I 2007-2010

978-90-5328-418-6

361

2011

Evaluatie van de Twinningfaciliteit Suriname-Nederland

978-90-5328-417-9

360

2011

More than Water: Impact evaluation of drinking water
supply and sanitation interventions in rural Mozambique

978-90-5328-414-8

359

2011

Regionaal en geïntegreerd beleid? Evaluatie van het
Nederlandse beleid met betrekking tot de Westelijke
Balkan 2004-2008

978-90-5328-416-2

358

2011

Assisting Earthquake victims: Evaluation of Dutch
Cooperating aid agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010

978-90-5328-413-1

Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

357

2011

Le risque d’effets éphémères: Évaluation d’impact des
programmes d’approvisionnement en eau potable et
d’assainissement au Bénin

978-90-5328-415-5

357

2011

The risk of vanishing effects: Impact Evaluation of
drinking water supply and sanitation programmes in rural
Benin

978-90-5328-412-4

356

2011

Between High Expectations and Reality: An evaluation of
budget support in Zambia

978-90-5328-411-7

355

2011

Lessons Learnt: Synthesis of literature on the impact and
effectiveness of investments in education

978-90-5328-410-0

354

2011

Leren van NGOs: Studie van de basic education activiteiten van zes Nederlandse NGOs

978-90-5328-409-4

353

2011

Education matters: Policy review of the Dutch contribution to basic education 1999-2009

978-90-5328-408-7

352

2011

Unfinished business: making a difference in basic
education. An evaluation of the impact of education
policies in Zambia and the role of budget support.

978-90-5328-407-0

351

2011

Confianza sin confines: Contribución holandesa a la
educación básica en Bolivia (2000-2009)

978-90-5328-406-3

350

2011

Unconditional Trust: Dutch support to basic education in
Bolivia (2000-2009)

978-90-5328-405-6

349

2011

The two-pronged approach Evaluation of Netherlands
Support to Primary Education in Bangladesh, 1999-2009

978-90-5328-404-9

348

2011

Schoon schip. En dan? Evaluatie van de schuldverlichting
aan de Democratische Republiek Congo 2003-2010.
(Verkorte Versie)

978-90-5328-403-2

347

2011

Table rase – et après? Évaluation de l’Allègement de la
Dette en République Démocratique du Congo 2003-2010

978-90-5328-402-5

346

2011

Vijf Jaar Top van Warschau. De Nederlandse inzet voor
versterking van de Raad van Europa

978-90-5328-401-8

345

2011

Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen. Evaluatie
van de Schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van 2005 tussen
de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. (Verkorte Versie)

978-90-5328-398-1

344

2011

Intérêts communs – avantages communs. Évaluation de
l‘accord de 2005 relatif à l ‘allègement de la dette entre le
Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Version Abrégée)

978-90-5328-399-8

343

2011

Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen. Evaluatie
van de schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van 2005 tussen
de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. (Samenvatting)

978-90-5328-397-4

342

2011

Intérêts communs – avantages communs. Évaluation de
l’accord de 2005 relatif à l’allègement de la dette entre le
Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Sommaire)

978-90-5328-395-0

341

2011

Mutual Interests – mutual benefits. Evaluation of the
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and
Nigeria. (Summary report)

978-90-5328-394-3

| 145 |

Premises and promises

| 146 |

340

2011

Mutual Interests – mutual benefits. Evaluation of the
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and
Nigeria. (Main report)

978-90-5328-393-6

338

2011

Consulaire Dienstverlening Doorgelicht 2007-2010

978-90-5328-400-1

337

2011

Evaluación de las actividades de las organizaciones
holandesas de cofinanciamiento activas en Nicaragua

336

2011

Facilitating Resourcefulness. Synthesis report of the
Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development

978-90-5328-392-9

335

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of the Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment (NCEA)

978-90-5328-391-2

-

2011

Aiding the Peace. A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in
Southern Sudan 2005-2010

978-90-5328-389-9

333

2011

Evaluación de la cooperación holandesa con Nicaragua
2005-2008

978-90-5328-390-5

332

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of PSO

978-90-5328-388-2

331

2011

Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development.
The case of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty
Democracy (NIMD)

978-90-5328-387-5

If you would like to receive a publication in printed form, please send an e-mail to IOB@minbuza.nl,
mentioning the title and IOB number.

| 147 |

| 148 |

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
Cover photo: Two women from Nampula province, Mozambique, present their farmer’s
association | Kirsten Mastwijk
Layout: Xerox/OBT | Den Haag
Print: Xerox/OBT | Den Haag
ISBN: 978-90-5328-469-8
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | June 2015

The Dutch international policy for women’s rights
and gender equality is based on both rights-based
arguments – women have the same rights as
men – and instrumental considerations: equality
and equal rights will lead to better development
results. These instrumental arguments have
prompted the Policy and Operations Evaluation
Department (IOB) to find out what is known of the
premises underlying Dutch policies, and to find

out if these premises can indeed be linked to the
intended, promised changes in gender equality
and women’s rights. This report summarises the
findings of a study of existing research, including
academic publications, reviews, grey literature
and evaluations about themes related to gender
equality. It is part of a number of sub-studies of the
policy evaluation on women’s rights and gender
equality conducted by IOB.

dy | no. 403 | Premises and promises | IOB Study | no. 403 | Premises and promises | IOB Study | no. 403 | Premises and promises | IOB Study | no. 403 |

Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 EB The Hague | The Netherlands
www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations
www.iob-evaluatie.nl
www.twitter.com/IOBevaluatie
www.oecd.org/derec
© Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands | June 2015
15BUZ86033|E