Anti-money laundering
and counter-terrorist
financing measures

The Netherlands
Mutual Evaluation Report

August 2022

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and
promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing
and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations
are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF)
standard.
For more information about the FATF, please visit the website: www.fatf-gafi.org.

This document and/or any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty
over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of
any territory, city or area.

This assessment was adopted by the FATF at its June 2022 Plenary meeting.

Citing reference:

FATF (2022), Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – The Netherlands,
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, FATF, Paris
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-netherlands2022.html

©2022 FATF/OECD -. All rights reserved.
No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission.
Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to
the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France
(fax: +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: contact@fatf-gafi.org).
Photo Credit - Cover: © Gettyimages

Table of Contents

Key Findings ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Risks and General Situation ................................................................................................................ 6
Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness ................................................................................. 7
Priority Actions................................................................................................................................. 13
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS ..................................................................... 15
Preface .............................................................................................................................................. 15
Chapter 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT .............................................................................................. 17
ML/TF Risks and Scoping of Higher Risk Issues ............................................................................. 17
Materiality ........................................................................................................................................ 21
Structural Elements ........................................................................................................................... 21
Background and Other Contextual Factors ....................................................................................... 21
Chapter 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO-ORDINATION ...................................................... 33
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ........................................................................................ 33
Immediate Outcome 1 (Risk, Policy and Co-ordination) .................................................................. 35
Chapter 3. LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES ....................................................................... 45
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ........................................................................................ 45
Immediate Outcome 6 (Financial Intelligence ML/TF) .................................................................... 49
Immediate Outcome 7 (ML investigation and prosecution) .............................................................. 61
Immediate Outcome 8 (Confiscation) ............................................................................................... 76
Chapter 4. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION .......................................... 91
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ........................................................................................ 91
Immediate Outcome 9 (TF investigation and prosecution) ............................................................... 95
Immediate Outcome 10 (TF preventive measures and financial sanctions) .................................... 104
Immediate Outcome 11 (PF financial sanctions) ............................................................................ 113
Chapter 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES .................................................................................................. 121
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ...................................................................................... 121
Immediate Outcome 4 (Preventive Measures) ................................................................................ 123
Chapter 6. SUPERVISION ................................................................................................................... 141
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ...................................................................................... 141
Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision) .............................................................................................. 144
Chapter 7. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS .......................................................................... 167
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ...................................................................................... 167
Immediate Outcome 5 (Legal Persons and Arrangements) ............................................................. 169
Chapter 8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ..................................................................................... 179
Key Findings and Recommended Actions ...................................................................................... 179
Immediate Outcome 2 (International Co-operation) ....................................................................... 181

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE .................................................................................................................. 201
Recommendation 1 – Assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach .................................... 201
Recommendation 2 - National Co-operation and Co-ordination ..................................................... 205
Recommendation 3 - Money laundering offence ............................................................................ 206
Recommendation 4 - Confiscation and provisional measures ......................................................... 209
Recommendation 5 - Terrorist financing offence ........................................................................... 211
Recommendation 6 - Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing....... 213
Recommendation 7 – Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation..................................... 219
Recommendation 8 – Non-profit organisations .............................................................................. 222
Recommendation 9 – Financial institution secrecy laws ................................................................. 226
Recommendation 10 – Customer due diligence .............................................................................. 227
Recommendation 11 – Record-keeping .......................................................................................... 232
Recommendation 12 – Politically exposed persons ........................................................................ 232
Recommendation 13 – Correspondent banking .............................................................................. 234
Recommendation 14 – Money or value transfer services ................................................................ 235
Recommendation 15 – New technologies ....................................................................................... 236
Recommendation 16 – Wire transfers ............................................................................................. 238
Recommendation 17 – Reliance on third parties ............................................................................. 241
Recommendation 18 – Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries ............................. 243
Recommendation 19 – Higher-risk countries .................................................................................. 245
Recommendation 20 – Reporting of suspicious transaction ............................................................ 246
Recommendation 21 – Tipping-off and confidentiality .................................................................. 246
Recommendation 22 – DNFBPs: Customer due diligence.............................................................. 247
Recommendation 23 – DNFBPs: Other measures .......................................................................... 249
Recommendation 24 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons ........................... 250
Recommendation 25 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements .................. 255
Recommendation 26 – Regulation and supervision of financial institutions ................................... 257
Recommendation 27 – Powers of supervisors................................................................................. 258
Recommendation 28 – Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs ..................................................... 259
Recommendation 29 - Financial intelligence units ......................................................................... 261
Recommendation 30 – Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities ............. 263
Recommendation 31 - Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities ........................... 265
Recommendation 32 – Cash Couriers ............................................................................................. 267
Recommendation 33 – Statistics ..................................................................................................... 270
Recommendation 34 – Guidance and feedback .............................................................................. 271
Recommendation 35 – Sanctions .................................................................................................... 271
Recommendation 36 – International instruments ............................................................................ 274
Recommendation 37 - Mutual legal assistance ............................................................................... 274
Recommendation 38 – Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation ..................................... 277
Recommendation 39 – Extradition.................................................................................................. 278
Recommendation 40 – Other forms of international co-operation .................................................. 279
Summary of Technical Compliance – Key Deficiencies ..................................................................... 285
Glossary of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ 289

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Executive Summary

1.

This report summarises the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
(AML/CFT) measures in place in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereafter
referred to as the Netherlands) as at the date of the on-site visit (27 October – 18
November 2021). The report includes an assessment of Bonaire, St. Eustatius and
Saba (hereafter referred to as the BES Islands) as these Caribbean islands form part
of the Netherlands. This report analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40
Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of the AML/CFT system, and
provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened.

Key Findings
1.

2.

Overall, the Netherlands has a good understanding of its money laundering and
terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks, as reflected in the National Risk Assessments
(NRAs), Supranational Risk Assessments (SNRAs) and other sector assessments,
policies, projects and cases. In continental Netherlands, fraud and drug related
offences account for more than 90% of all proceeds of crime and ML risk manifests
via the use of crypto currencies; trade-based services; underground banking,
including unlicensed payment services; offshore companies; and services/goods
of dealers of high-value goods. The methodology of the NRAs is generally sound
and based on a structural process to collect and evaluate qualitative inputs from
policy, supervisory, law enforcement and private sector authorities through
extensive surveys, meetings and interviews. However, inputs into the NRAs can be
strengthened by the inclusion of additional quantitative sources. A key strength of
the Dutch system lies on its robust domestic co-ordination and co-operation on
AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels and it is a leader in
public-private partnership and information sharing to combat ML/TF.
Competent authorities use a wide range of financial intelligence sources in their
investigations, including data hubs, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
disseminations, inter-agency co-operation platforms and public-private
partnerships. Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) increasingly access FIU
disseminations and request information exchange on criminal and unexplained

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 4

wealth (iCOV) reports during their investigations into ML, TF and predicate
offences. FIU products are of high quality, timely and targeted to law enforcement
needs. Minor concerns exist on the lack of a feedback mechanism to the FIU on the
follow-up given by LEAs to its disseminations and on the number of
disseminations left unattended in the Police database; however, these issues are
largely mitigated by the close operational co-operation between LEAs and FIU-NL.

LEAs initiated a significant number of ML investigations at both national and
regional levels, and pursue different types of ML. The AML Strategic Programme
and thematic investigation projects are two strengths of the Dutch system. Case
studies on regional and national investigations are consistent with the ML
channels and methods identified in the NRAs. The lack of statistics on predicate
offences and on the type of ML pursued limits a comprehensive view of ML cases.
The sanctions imposed in ML cases are low, including in complex and serious
cases, and are therefore not considered dissuasive by the Assessment Team.

In the BES Islands, the expertise of LEAs to conduct financial investigations has
improved, and a specialised ML Prosecutor role has been created. Nevertheless,
LEAs are still reliant on the support from continental Netherlands for ML cases,
especially for complex investigations. Authorities focus mainly on the prosecution
of predicate offences, and the overall number of ML investigations and convictions
is low.
The Netherlands pursues confiscation as a policy and strategic objective,
supported by a solid legal and institutional framework and financial expertise.
Competent authorities regularly seek object and value confiscation. The statistics
available, even if not comprehensive, demonstrate that confiscation results are in
line with national policies and the main proceeds-generating crimes. Confiscations
in out of court settlements with legal persons account for the high majority of
collected confiscation results. Netherlands has seized cash at the borders and
initiated ML investigations, but some concerns remain in terms of the
dissuasiveness of sanctions related to the cash declaration system.

The Netherlands has successfully detected, investigated and prosecuted TF
generally in line with its risk profile, with a majority of cases involving the funding
of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). While there have been some investigations of
non-profit organisations (NPOs) possibly involved in TF, no conviction has been
achieved, which is not in line with their high risk categorisation for TF in the NRA.
Competent authorities co-operate closely on TF and terrorism investigations and
regularly discuss any possible TF signal. Furthermore, partnerships with the
private sector enable LEAs to gather additional insights into potential suspects.
However, the level of sanctions imposed is generally low, which affects
dissuasiveness. The authorities used various alternative measures when it was not
practicable to obtain a TF conviction.
The Netherlands implements proliferation financing (PF) and TF targeted
financial sanctions (TFS) without delay. As there is no supervision of the
implementation of TFS without delay for DNFBPs other than trust offices, the
authorities cannot determine to which extent these entities implement TFS
obligations. Supervisors are not mandated to supervise the implementation of TFS
obligations by these obliged entities and cannot impose sanctions or remedial
actions. Similar deficiencies exist in the BES Islands for DNFBPs and VASPs. The
understanding of TFS obligations is strong amongst financial institutions (FIs). TF

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8.

9.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 5
domestic designations have targeted mostly FTFs, resulting in small amounts
frozen consistent with the risk profile.

Self-regulation is a key feature of the Dutch NPO sector. The Netherlands has
proactively and extensively engaged NPOs to raise awareness on TF risks. The
Netherlands has a robust understanding of the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to
TF risk. This understanding could be improved by a specific sectoral risk
assessment. Good faith NPOs which, by virtue of their activities, are more exposed
to TF threats are well aware of the risks and already implement mitigating
measures. However, the limited visibility on NPOs’ financial activities is an
obstacle in detecting and investigating NPOs that willingly sponsor terrorism.

Understanding of ML risk for FIs and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) is
generally good, and policies and procedures are in place commensurate to risks.
The same applies to trust offices, which are supervised by the Dutch Central Bank
(DNB). For other designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs),
understanding of ML risk and obligations varies and is generally more limited. The
understanding of TF risk is lower across all obliged entities.

10. Where a legal person has no beneficial owner (BO) (e.g., in the case of some
foundations and associations) or in exceptional circumstances where it is not
possible to identify the ultimate BO, Dutch legislation allows the registration of
senior managing directors as ‘pseudo’ BOs 1. Some FIs and most DNFBPs struggle
to identify the ultimate BOs of legal persons that are part of complex structures or
have international components. In such circumstances, the obliged entities can fall
back too quickly on the legally permitted option to register the ‘pseudo-BOs’.
11. In some cases, FIs—including larger banks—tend to classify too many customers
as low risk without adequate justification. Obliged entities in most sectors
generally understand and implement their reporting obligations, but unusual
transaction reports (UTRs) filed in some sectors, such as lawyers and real estate,
are low.
12. The Netherlands has a strong licensing and registration framework for FIs, some
VASPs and trust offices, which consists of robust checks to ensure criminals and
their associates are prevented from operating in these sectors. However, while
underground banking, unlicensed payment services and non-regulated providers
of trust services are identified as high risk, there are insufficient resources
allocated to mitigating these risks.

13. DNB and the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) have a good
understanding of risk and apply a risk based approach, which is increasingly
informed by robust data analysis. Understanding of risk by DNFBP supervisors is
less developed and although some elements of a risk based approach are starting
to be applied in some sectors, supervision is generally reactive and limited due to
resource constraints. Despite two recent high profile out-of-court settlements
involving major Dutch banks, some supervisors heavily rely on informal
enforcement actions and warning letters. While informal measures can be
1 Dutch legislation allows the registration of senior managing officials as BOs. These are
sometimes referred to as ‘pseudo-BOs’. Pseudo BOs can be natural persons that belong to
the senior management staff or the company, but can also be independent directors, or
directors provided by trust offices that are senior management officials.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 6

effective, they can also be slower to address significant issues, including
unlicensed activity.

14. Most trusts cannot be established in the Netherlands (with the exception of Mutual
Funds). Although nominee directors and shareholders are not recognised
concepts in the Netherlands, they do exist in practice and are used in the
management of conduit companies, which have no real presence in the
Netherlands. Sanctions for failing to provide correct or up-to-date basic
information are rarely imposed and no cases of providing incorrect BO
information have been detected to date. At the time of the onsite, the Netherland’s
BO register was only 27% populated.
15. The Netherlands provides timely and constructive responses to mutual legal
assistance (MLA) and extradition requests. Responses received by the FATF global
network indicate that the provision of MLA is of high-quality, and properly
prioritised. Simplified procedures within the European Union (EU) enhance cooperation with EU member states, which account for the vast majority of the
Netherlands’ MLA requests. The Netherlands’ international co-operation on major
international cases involving virtual assets (VA) is significant. However, pursuant
to the international co-operation feedback received, the FIU-NL should seek a
dialogue on how the quality of cross-border dissemination reports between EU
FIUs can further improve their utility by recipient FIUs from the EU.

Risks and General Situation
2.

The Netherlands is a financial centre with a large and globally interconnected
financial system. It has one of the most concentrated banking sectors in the EU, with
three Dutch banks controlling 82% of the sector’s assets. Two of these banks have
recently been part of a settlement with the office of the Public Prosecutor (OM) for
significant AML/CFT failings and culpable ML and both banks have substantial
presences abroad. The DNFBP sector includes approximately 162 TCSP providers
in 2020, which are involved in activities including providing legal persons to
manage the capital and business income of internationally operating companies,
approximately 9 000 real estate agents and approximately 3 400 notaries and 790
notary offices. Notaries are required for most real estate transactions and
incorporation of public or private limited-liability companies or the amendment of
their articles of association, the formation of foundations or associations (including
cooperatives). There is one state owned casino, approximately 4 000 dealers in
precious metals and stone, who also trade in high value items such as watches and
approximately 18 000 lawyers, although the authorities report that the majority of
these do not carry out activities in scope of Dutch AML/CFT regulations. The
Assessment Team therefore weighted most heavily the positive and negative
aspects of supervision for FIs, as opposed to the DNFBP sector.

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3.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 7
The Port of Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe and is vital for European import
and export activities. This port acts as a gateway to Europe for people and goods,
including significant volumes of illegal drugs, particularly cocaine from South
America. A socio-cultural factor that is characteristic of the Netherlands is the
culture of tolerance, in which tolerance with regard to soft2 drugs has been
identified by the Government as a contributing factor for the prevalence of drug
crime and associated organised criminality.3 Indeed, the Netherlands estimates that
fraud and drug-related offences account for more than 90% of all Dutch proceeds of
crime. Criminals use a variety of methods to launder their illegal proceeds, including
licensed banks, dealers in high-value goods, intermediaries, purchasing real estate,
or using companies or underground banking and unlicensed payment service
providers. Terrorism related to religious extremism presents the main TF risk, but
other terrorism threats exist, including right-wing terrorism.

Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness

Assessment of risk, co-ordination and policy setting (Chapter 2; IO.1, R.1, 2, 33 &
34)
4.

Overall, the Netherlands has a good understanding of its ML/TF risks, as reflected
in the NRAs and other sectoral assessments, policies, projects and cases. Many of
the FIs and firms met by the Assessment Team were aware of the NRA’s conclusions
but noted that the NRAs and SNRAs are high-level policy documents that do not
provide sufficient granularity on their specific sectoral risks. For example, the NRA
does not provide a detailed assessment of the risks associated with the types of legal
persons and arrangements in the Netherlands. National AML/CFT policies,
strategies and activities generally seek to address the risks identified in the NRA,
such as: risk-based thematic projects for criminal investigations; dedicated
resources to countering organised criminal groups; and requiring payment service
providers to make available all transaction data to the regulator.

5.

The key strength of the Dutch system lies in its robust domestic co-ordination and
co-operation on AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels. The
Netherlands is also seeking to explore and expand measures to intensify this
domestic co-ordination. The Netherlands leverages a number of platforms to
facilitate public-public, public-private and private-private partnerships to
coordinate on AML/CFT and public-public partnerships to counter proliferation
financing (CPF). There is room for improving the risk understanding, by including
more relevant information in the NRAs. Some exemptions are inconsistent with the
BES Islands’ risk profile.

2

3

The Opium Act sets out the rules pertaining to drugs, and defines “soft drugs” as cannabis
products (hash and marijuana), sleeping pills and sedatives. According to the government,
these drugs carry less serious risks than hard drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine, amphetamine,
ecstasy and GHB) (see: www.government.nl/topics/drugs/difference-between-hard-andsoft-drugs).
NL ML NRA 2019-2020, p. 46.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 8

Financial intelligence, ML investigations, prosecutions and confiscation
(Chapter 3; IO.6, 7, 8; R.1, 3, 4, 29–32)
6.

7.

8.

9.

LEAs, including the Police and the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service
(FIOD), have access to a broad range of financial intelligence and information to
conduct their investigations into ML, TF and predicate offences and to trace criminal
proceeds. Parallel financial investigations are a common practice for LEAs and OM.
Datahubs such as iCOV, AMLC Suite, JustisTRACK, and the CT Infobox are a strong
feature of the Dutch data-driven investigative model. Public-private partnerships,
such as Financial Expertise Centre (FEC) including TF Task Force and the Serious
Crime Task Force and the Fintell Alliance, as well as the close operational cooperation between FIU-NL and LEAs are additional strengths of the Dutch system
to gather financial evidence, share best practices and discuss operational activities.

FIU-NL plays a major role in the production and dissemination of financial
intelligence to LEAs, both proactively and upon request. It receives a significant
amount of information from obliged entities on subjective and objective indicators.
It has access to a large number of datasets, which allows it to enrich its analysis.
These sources are an important added-value for the analysis performed by the FIU.
FIU-NL’s analytical products are of high quality and targeted to the needs of LEAs.
In recent years, approximately 60% of FIOD investigations made use of STR
information, and half of all TF investigations were triggered by FIU-NL’s analytical
products. The lack of comprehensive statistics on the usage of FIU disseminations
in Police investigations and on the number of disseminations left unattended in the
Police database is a minor concern, which is largely mitigated by the extensive cooperation between FIU-NL and LEAs and the frequent use of datahubs by the Police.
The Netherlands has a solid legal and institutional framework to investigate ML
effectively. Financial specialists with the necessary expertise operate at both
national and regional levels. There is sound co-operation and co-ordination
between all competent authorities involved in ML investigations and combined
teams merging police and FIOD expertise, are often deployed for complex
investigations.

The Netherlands does not rely on the establishment of a predicate offence to
investigate and prosecute ML. The authorities detect signals to initiate ML
investigations from thematic projects involving all relevant authorities based on the
NRA results, and on the national AML programme. The authorities do not maintain
statistics on the types of ML and associated predicate offences investigated,
prosecuted and convicted. However, case studies demonstrate that the authorities
pursue a wide range of investigations, from self-laundering to complex cases,
including offshore companies, professional money launderers and VAs, and that
there is a general alignment between ML investigations and ML risks. Overall, the
low level of sentencing for ML—including in some high-profile cases presented by
the authorities—raises concerns on the dissuasiveness of the sanctions imposed for
ML. ML investigations in the BES Islands mainly focus on predicate offences. While
BES LEA expertise to conduct financial investigations has improved in recent years,
the overall number of ML investigations and convictions remains low.

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10.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 9
The Netherlands prioritises confiscation as a policy objective. Financial
investigations into criminal assets and money-flows are a standard practice in all
criminal investigations. Each LEA, as well as the OM, set annual seizure targets.
Major multi-million confiscations imposed in out of court settlements involving
legal persons account for the majority of the collected confiscation results. While
not comprehensive, the statistics show that confiscation results are generally in line
with the country’s risk profile. The authorities actively pursue the tracing of VAs
related to criminal activities as demonstrated by case studies, and the increasing
amount of VAs seized annually. The Netherlands also pursues restitution, but no
statistics are available.

Terrorist and proliferation financing (Chapter 4; IO.9, 10, 11; R. 1, 4, 5–8, 30, 31
& 39.)
11.

12.

The Netherlands has a robust framework to detect, investigate and prosecute TF.
The types of TF investigated and prosecuted are generally in line with the country’s
risks, with a majority of cases involving the funding to FTFs. However, the lack of
any TF conviction for NPOs appears not in line with their high-risk categorisation in
the TF NRA. The Netherlands also makes use of specific TF related public-public
(FEC) and public-private TF Task Force (TFTF) partnerships. The authorities are
aware of possible new emerging TF threats, such as right-wing terrorism. No TF
case has been detected in the BES Islands, which is consistent with its TF risk profile.
A CFT component is incorporated into the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and
the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security cooperates closely with
CFT authorities. The Netherlands has a good conviction rate in TF cases (70%), but
the level of sentencing imposed is generally low. The Netherlands uses alternative
measures where it is not possible to achieve a TF conviction, including alternative
criminal charges, or administrative measures such as introducing community
interventions at the local level.

The Netherlands implements TFS without delay, through a combination of EU and
national provisions. Any new UN designation is immediately applicable in the
Netherlands through a bridging provision, overcoming the delays with EU
transposition. The Netherlands has a mechanism in place to identify targets for
designation, and implements domestic designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373, in
line with its risks. The communication of TFS lists to obliged entities may in some
cases occur with delay. With the exception of trust offices, DNFBPs implementation
of TFS without delay is not supervised. The same deficiency applies to DNFBPs in
the BES Islands. This may impact their ability to implement TFS without delay.

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13.

10 |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 10

The Netherlands has a robust understanding of the TF risks associated with the
misuse of NPOs. Self-regulation is a key feature of the Dutch non-profit sector. The
Netherlands has no supervisory authority to monitor NPOs and relies on voluntary
certification mechanisms, such as the ANBI status and CBF seal, to promote
transparency and accountability. The authorities have undertaken extensive
outreach to the categories of good faith NPOs vulnerable to potential TF abuse. Good
faith NPOs are aware of the risk of TF abuse, and are already implementing
mitigating measures. The Assessment Team has some concerns as to whether the
existing voluntary regulatory framework would be sufficient to detect bad faith
NPOs 4 willingly sponsoring terrorism. The lack of supervision and transparency
obligations for certain NPOs could be a challenge in detecting organisations raising
funds without appropriate controls on the final beneficiaries or the intended use of
the funds.

14.

The Dutch authorities have a good understanding of contextual elements, risks and
vulnerabilities linked to proliferation financing (PF). In particular, the authorities
are aware of the possible exposure to PF, due to the country’s position as a trade
hub and its large financial sector, even if the overall risk is considered low. There is
no supervision in place on the implementation of TFS obligations by DNFBPs other
than trust offices. The Netherlands applies the same system in relation to TF, to
implement PF TFS without delay, and the same issues relating to communication
and supervision of the implementation of TFS obligations apply. Understanding of
TFS obligations is strong in the financial sector, where DNB and AFM have provided
guidance on sanctions implementation. In the absence of any supervision, it is
unclear whether the DNFBP sector in the continental Netherlands, and DNFBPs in
the BES Islands, are implementing TFS obligations at a satisfactory level.

Preventive measures (Chapter 5; IO.4; R.9–23)
15.

FIs and VASPs demonstrate a strong understanding of their ML risks and
obligations. DNFBPs have a reasonable understanding of ML risk. Understanding of
TF risk is lower in all sectors. FIs and VASPs understand their CDD obligations, but
the understanding of record-keeping requirements is varied. DNFBPs have a basic
understanding of CDD and record-keeping requirements.

16.

Some obliged entities find it difficult to determine BOs of complex structures,
especially if these structures have international components. In these cases, obliged
entities fall back on the legal option to identify pseudo BOs. Some DNFBPs rely on
self-certification to identify BOs. However, they have limited options to verify this
information and are unable to use the BO register as a source of information, given
it is only partially populated. Implementation of EDD measures is generally
comprehensive by FIs and VASPs. DNFBPs generally understand EDD obligations,
but it is unclear how well these measures are applied in practice. Although most
obliged entities were able to explain their obligations in relation to TFS, it was not
clear if the DNFBPs implement TFS without delay, with the exception of trust offices,
as most DNFBP supervisors do not review this as part of their supervision (see also
IO.3).

4

NPOs that deliberately give up tax advantages to avoid any transparency and
accountability requirements linked to the voluntary certification systems, such as the ANBI
status or CBF seal.

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17.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 11

While obliged entities met by the Assessment Team generally understand and
adequately implement their reporting obligations, it is not clear that this applies
equally across all firms and sectors. For example, UTRs filed by some sectors, such
as lawyers and real estate are low. Moreover, the overall quality of UTRs is unclear
as there is little feedback provided by FIU-NL, other than to larger credit institutions
(see also IO.6). Notaries are not able to submit UTRs until a business relationship
has been established, which is inconsistent with other sectors and noted as a
deficiency by the Assessment Team.

Supervision (Chapter 6; IO.3; R.14, R.26–28, 34, 35)
18.

19.

20.

In the financial sector, there are strong systems in place to assess the fitness and
propriety of persons performing regulated activities. Many DNFBPs are not subject
to licencing and registration, and where they are, it is often limited to professional
body registration (e.g., Bar Association) and not fitness and propriety. The lack of
access to BO information for most supervisors is a weakness. DNB and AFM have a
strong understanding of sectoral risks and a robust risk model for categorising the
risks of individual firms. Most DNFBP supervisors understand their sectoral risks.
At the time of the onsite, some DNFBP supervisors were developing measures to
improve risk understanding and help embed a risk-based approach to supervision.

DNB and AFM use a range of supervisory tools, including on and offsite supervision.
DNB is harnessing data to deliver supervision more efficiently and this helped it
respond to the challenges of the COVID-19 global pandemic. DNFBP supervisors use
thematic investigations to some extent to address emerging issues. However, the
frequency, scope and intensity of AML/CFT supervision and monitoring for DNFBPs
is impacted by a lack of resources.

The recent high profile fines against two of the largest FIs in the Netherlands has
had a significant impact on the prioritisation of AML/CFT compliance across the
banking sector in particular. This has also had positive cascading effects in other
sectors. While this is a noteworthy development, the duration of these AML/CFT
failings suggests that previous actions were not sufficiently proportionate or
dissuasive to change the culture within these large organisations and address longterm systemic AML/CFT failings. Some supervisors rely heavily on informal
measures, such as warning notices, and do not use the full range of sanctions
available to them in a consistent and proportionate way. A strength of the system is
that in most cases remedial action plans are put in place and monitored by the
regulators to ensure that issues have been addressed. The NRA highlights
underground banking, unlicensed payment services and non-regulated providers of
trust services as high risk for ML. However, the authorities do not currently allocate
appropriate levels of resources to address these risks.

Transparency and beneficial ownership (Chapter 7; IO.5; R.24, 25)
21.

The Netherlands has launched various initiatives aimed at identifying and assessing
ML/TF risks of legal persons, but these do not provide a clear and coherent
overview of these risks. Most trusts cannot be established in the Netherlands (with
the exception of Mutual Funds). However, the Netherlands recognises foreign trusts
and acknowledges there are a number in operation. The Dutch authorities do
maintain information on foreign trusts holding real estate in the Netherlands.
Supervision of TCSP also provides the authorities with some understanding of the
types of investments the foreign legal trusts are engaged in.

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

12 |

|

22.

12 |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 12

All legal persons and other legal entities need to register basic information with the
Chamber of Commerce (CoC) and most must also register BO information in the BO
register. This information is publicly available, but currently the BO register is
approximately 27% populated. The Netherlands mainly relies on FIs and DNFBPs
to act as gatekeepers in order to mitigate the misuse of legal persons and
arrangements for ML/TF. This is particularly important for notaries who play a key
role in real estate transactions and company formation, and for the trust sector that
service a large percentage of conduit companies for customers located in different
jurisdictions seeking financial, tax, legal or other benefits. 5 While conduit companies
are generally set up for legitimate financial tax or legal benefits, their international
nature and often complex ownership structure makes it difficult to identify the
ultimate BO, leading many obliged entities to settle for pseudo BOs (i.e., senior
managing officials). This risk is intensified by the fact that 15% of trust services
provided to conduit companies are offered by entities that have restructured their
business models to circumvent stricter regulation (so-called “illegal trust offices”).
The Dutch authorities recognise this problem, but are still struggling to identify
solutions to address it, despite strengthening regulations in this area in 2018.

International co-operation (Chapter 8; IO.2; R.36–40)
23.

In general, the Netherlands makes and responds to requests for international cooperation, aided by a broad range of international instruments, treaties and the use
of Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) which guarantee that legal and nonlegal assistance is sought and provided to the fullest extent possible, and in line with
risks. The centralisation of incoming/outgoing legal requests ensures that requests
are tracked, prioritised and executed in a timely and coordinated manner. These
legal requests are delivering results as evidenced through the numerous ML/TF
case studies provided. Furthermore, feedback from the FATF global network on the
Netherlands’ provision of MLA was generally positive.

24.

Informal co-operation is facilitated through extensive networks of international
Liaison Officers posted to jurisdictions based on risk. In particular, proactive
assistance with EU member states is facilitated by a wide range of regional cooperation tools and information-sharing gateways, which streamline and expedite
the process. This is an important feature as the majority of the Netherlands’
international co-operation is with other EU member states. FIU-NL actively
cooperates at operational and strategic levels with a wide range of FIUs through the
Egmont Group. Co-operation with European FIUs is robust with exchanges also
occurring via the FIU.net.

25.

In relation to FIU exchanges of cross-border dissemination reports, feedback from
EU member states indicates that FIU-NL disseminations are numerous and that this
type of disseminations can benefit from more context.

5

The term “conduit company” does not refer to the strict legal definition of conduit company
in the Wtt 2018, but to companies with features that are typical for a conduit company.
The relevant factors are whether a company has international structures, conducts
transactions with related parties, has little or no real presence in the Netherlands, and has
tax, financial or legal motives and/or substantial international money flows or balance
sheet positions.

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13 |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 13

Priority Actions
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

The Netherlands should require all categories of DNFBPs and FIs, to take adequate
measures to implement TFS without delay and to report frozen assets and ensure
the implementation of TFS is supervised.

The Netherlands should take appropriate steps to ensure obliged entities,
particularly notaries, take all reasonable measures to obtain and hold BO
information and refuse their services when the ownership structure of their
clients is so complex or opaque that they pose a genuine ML/TF risk.
Supervisory authorities should continue to make full use of the powers available
and rely less on informal measures when significant AML/CFT violations are
identified. All DNFBP supervisors should ensure they have appropriate
enforcement policies so there is clarity when specific interventions should be
applied.

The Netherlands should increase supervisory resources to improve risk-based
supervision with varying levels of intensity. Resources should also be enhanced to
tackle unlicensed activity, including underground banking and the provision of
illegal trust services.
The Netherlands should enhance efforts to ensure the BO register is populated
with accurate information on the BOs of legal persons active in the Netherlands
and ensure that ‘pseudo’ BOs are only used in limited circumstances and not as an
alternative to carrying out checks to identify ultimate BOs.

The Netherlands should further develop its understanding of the risks of conduit
companies and take mitigating measures to reduce these risks. The Netherlands
should also develop an understanding of the activities of foreign trusts operating
within the jurisdiction and consider measures to mitigate risks in relation to high
risk activities, such as real estate transactions.

The Netherlands should review the ML sentencing regime for natural and legal
persons to ensure the penalties applied are sufficiently dissuasive and develop
specific ML orientation points, including factors to consider when determining the
penalty, based on the gravity of the offence. The OM should ensure that a larger
and wider range of penalties is demanded in practice.

The Dutch authorities should amend BES legislation to address some technical
deficiencies noted in the TC Annex. Moreover, BES LEAs should prioritise the
investigation and prosecution of ML cases, in line with the risks and pursue standalone ML investigations.

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14 |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 14

Effectiveness & Technical Compliance Ratings
Table 1. Effectiveness Ratings
IO.1 - Risk,

IO.2

IO.3 -

IO.4 - Preventive

IO.5 - Legal

IO.6 - Financial

policy and coordination

International cooperation

Supervision

measures

persons and
arrangements

intelligence

Moderate
IO.9 - TF

Moderate
IO.10 - TF

Moderate
IO.11 - PF

investigation &
prosecution

preventive measures
& financial sanctions

financial sanctions

Substantial

Substantial

Moderate

Substantial
IO.7 - ML
investigation &
prosecution

Substantial

High
IO.8 Confiscation

Substantial

High

Note: Effectiveness ratings can be either High- HE, Substantial- SE, Moderate- ME, or Low – LE, level of
effectiveness.

Table 2. Technical Compliance Ratings

R.1 - assessing risk

R.2 - national co& applying risk-based operation and coapproach
ordination
LC

R.7- targeted

financial sanctions proliferation

LC

R.13 –

Correspondent
banking

PC

R.19 – Higher-risk
countries

LC

C

LC

R.8 -non-profit
organisations

LC

R.14 – Money or
value transfer
services

C

R.9 – financial

institution secrecy
laws

suspicious
transactions

C
and supervision of
financial institutions

LC

LC

due diligence

PC

LC

transfers

R.22 - DNFBPs:
Customer due
diligence

R.6 - targeted

financial sanctions –
terrorism & terrorist
financing

LC

R.11 – Record
keeping

LC

R.12 – Politically
exposed persons

C

LC

R.17 – Reliance on R.18 – Internal
third parties

controls and foreign
branches and
subsidiaries

LC

R.23 – DNFBPs:
Other measures

LC

R.24 –

Transparency & BO of
legal persons

LC

LC

R.27 – Powers of

R.28 – Regulation

C

LC

C

C

R.33 – Statistics

R.34 – Guidance

R.35 – Sanctions

R.36 – International

LC

LC

LC

LC

supervision

assistance: freezing
and confiscation

LC

R.10 – Customer

R.16 –Wire

technologies

financing offence

C

R.15 –New

R.37 – Mutual legal R.38 – Mutual legal R.39 – Extradition
C

provisional measures

LC

and confidentiality

R.32 – Cash
law enforcement and couriers
investigative
authorities

assistance

R.4 - confiscation & R.5 - terrorist

C

R.20 – Reporting of R.21 – Tipping-off

R.31 – Powers of

LC

laundering offence

LC

R.25 - Transparency R.26 – Regulation
& BO of legal
arrangements

R.3 - money

LC

and supervision of
DNFBPs

and feedback

LC

R.29 – Financial
intelligence units

LC

R.30 –

Responsibilities of
law enforcement and
investigative
authorities

instruments

R.40 – Other forms
of international cooperation

LC

Note: Technical compliance ratings can be either a C – compliant, LC – largely compliant, PC - partially
compliant or NC – non compliant

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS

This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place as at the date of the on-site
visit. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the
level of effectiveness of the AML/CFT system, and recommends how the system could
be strengthened.

This evaluation was based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations, and was prepared
using the 2013 Methodology. The evaluation was based on information provided by
the country, and information obtained by the evaluation team during its on-site visit
to the country from 27 October to 18 November 2021.
The evaluation was conducted by an Assessment Team consisting of:
•

•

•
•
•
•

Ms. Ohood AL BALUSHI, Central Bank of Oman, Oman (financial expert)
Mr. Ichiyo OSAKI, Ministry of Finance, Japan (financial expert)

Mr. Dieter PETRACS, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Austria (law
enforcement expert)
Ms. Cristina Schwansee ROMANO, Federal Public Prosecution Service, Brazil
(legal/law enforcement expert)

Mr. Werner VAN NOPPEN, Finance Ministry, Belgium (financial and sanctions
expert)
Mr. Shingo Yu-ho LAI, Hong Kong Police Force, Hong Kong, China (law
enforcement and FIU expert)

The assessment process was managed by Ms. Kristen ALMA, Secretariat Team Lead,
Mr. Ben ALDERSEY and Ms. Gaia MANSELLI, Policy Analysts, all FATF Secretariat. The
report was reviewed by Mr. Juan Cruz PONCE (GAFILAT Secretariat); Ms. Shengnan
YAN (China); and Mr. Carmine CARRELLA (Italy).

The Netherlands previously underwent a FATF Mutual Evaluation in 2011, conducted
according to the 2004 FATF Methodology. The 2011 evaluation and 2013 and 2014
www.fatffollow-up
reports
are
published
and
available
at
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mutualevaluationreportofthe
netherlands.html.
That 2011 Mutual Evaluation concluded that the country was compliant with seven
Recommendations; largely compliant with 20; and partially compliant with 22. The
Netherlands was rated compliant or largely compliant with nine of the 16 Core and
Key Recommendations.
In February 2014, the FATF recognised that the Netherlands made significant
progress in addressing the deficiencies identified in the 2011 Mutual Evaluation
Report and should be removed from the regular follow-up process. At that time, the
Netherlands received re-ratings on all Core and Key Recommendations rated partially
compliant in its 2011 MER.

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Preface

Preface

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT | 17

Chapter 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT
26.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a parliamentary democratic constitutional
monarchy consisting of continental Netherlands in Northwest Europe, three selfgoverning islands in the Caribbean (Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten), and three
smaller Caribbean islands, Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba (the BES Islands). Since
2010, the BES Islands are defined as public bodies (Dutch municipalities) of the
Netherlands. Before this constitutional change, the BES islands formed part of the
former Netherlands’ Antilles. The self-governing Caribbean islands (Aruba, Curaçao
and Sint Maarten) are subject to separate Mutual Evaluations by the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force and not considered as part of this MER. The BES Islands
(Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba) are for the first time assessed and included in the
Netherlands MER. Henceforth, the report will indicate specifically when the analysis
refers to the BES Islands, whereas references to the Netherlands will imply
continental Netherlands in Europe.

27.

Continental Netherlands, with a population of 17.5 million, is bordered to the west
and north by the North Sea, which separate it from the United Kingdom (UK),
Denmark and Norway. It has land borders with Belgium and Germany. The BES
Islands—with a population of 25 987 inhabitants in 2020 and a total surface area of
322 km²—are situated in the Caribbean Sea.

28.

The Netherlands is a founding member of the EU, and since 2002 its monetary unit
is the euro (EUR). The BES Islands are not part of the EU and adopted the US dollar
(USD) as its monetary unit. The Netherlands is the 17th largest economy in the
world, with a GDP of EUR 810 billion in 2020, and the sixth largest economy in the
EU. 6 The GDP of the BES was approximately USD 720 million in 2019, with tourism
and salt mining as the main sources of income.

29.

The Netherlands is a financial centre with a large and globally interconnected
financial system. It has one of the most concentrated banking sectors in the EU, with
three Dutch banks controlling 82% of the sector’s assets. The financial sector is
dominated by a small number of large national banks undertaking a wide range of
activities (including one systemically important bank). The banking system
comprises half the financial sector in terms of asset size.

ML/TF Risks and Scoping of Higher Risk Issues
Overview of ML/TF Risks
30.

The Netherlands’ first NRA 7 was published in 2017, and a second published in 2020.
The first NRA for the BES Islands was published in 2018, and a second published in
2021. In a separate study regarding the nature and scope on criminal expenditure
in 2018, it was estimated that the volume of money laundered in continental
Netherlands in 2014 was EUR 16 billion.

6
7

World Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf, 2020.
Separate NRAs were produced for ML and TF. These are referred to collectively.

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1

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT

31.

In continental Netherlands, fraud8 and drug related offences (including the
production and sale of synthetic drugs) are considered major predicate offences,
accounting for more than 90% of all proceeds of crime.9 Domestic and international
cases indicate that the proceeds of drug trafficking is often laundered through
physical cash, often via the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport. 10 A sociocultural factor that is characteristic of the Netherlands is the culture of tolerance, in
which tolerance with regard to soft drugs are contributing factors for the prevalence
of drug crime and associated organised criminality.

32.

Theft, embezzlement, burglary and forgery are also common predicate offences.
However, these account for significantly lower ML proceeds compared to fraud and
drug-related offences. Criminals use a variety of methods to launder their proceeds,
including licensed banks, dealers in high-value goods, intermediaries, purchasing
real estate, or using companies or underground banking and unlicensed payment
service providers.

33.

The use of cash is relatively lower in the Netherlands than the rest of Europe. For
example, in 2018, 37% of all purchases made by Dutch consumers were made in
cash, while 63% was paid using a debit card. 11 However, as noted above, illicit
proceeds related to drug trafficking is laundered using cash, and therefore remains
a risk. The BES Islands have, to a large extent, a cash-based economy, which
contributes to its ML risk profile.

ML through the financial system and shadow banking
34.

As noted above, the Dutch banking sector is highly concentrated with three Dutch
banks controlling most of the sector’s assets. Two of these banks were recently
subject to criminal investigations and significant out of court settlements for
serious, systemic and long-term AML/CFT violations. Two of these institutions have
substantial presences abroad. During the onsite visit, a third Dutch bank announced
it was under-going a “punitive enforcement procedure”, but it was unclear at that
time if this procedure would result in a fine. As a result, the Assessment Team
closely examined the contributing factors to these failings and the effectiveness of
mitigation/remedial measures.

8
9
10

11

Fraud is a catch-all term covering many different forms of fraud, including tax fraud, social
fraud and identity fraud.
NL ML NRA 2019-20, p.44 (English version).
For example, see www.eurojust.europa.eu/french-and-dutch-authorities-take-downdrug-trafficking-network-eurojust-support
and
www.dutchnews.nl/news/2020/05/police-find-e12-5m-in-cash-stashed-in-a-house-ineindhoven/, NL ML NRA 2019-20, pp. 12, 18, 42.
Joint study by the Dutch Payments Association and De Nederlandsche Bank, see
www.dnb.nl/actueel/algemeen-nieuws/oude-bulletins/dnbulletin-2019/dalende-trendcash-zet-verder-door/. During the COVID-19 pandemic, cash payments dropped further to
13% of all payments, see www.dnb.nl/en/actueel/news-sector/sector-news2021/payment-behaviour-during-the-pandemic/.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT | 19

35.

The NRA identifies Virtual Assets (VAs) as high risk for ML and TF in the
Netherlands, given their relative anonymity. There is also evidence of criminal
networks being increasingly active online (e.g., distributing drugs via the
“darkweb”) and using VAs in their illegal activities. 12 Furthermore, not all Virtual
Asset Service Providers (VASPs) activities defined in the FATF recommendation are
regulated in the Netherlands.

36.

The Netherlands also identifies ML and TF by shadow banking—including the use
of unlicensed payment service providers (PSPs) or intermediaries—as high risk.
The Assessment Team therefore focussed on measures to address shadow banking,
including hawala and unlicensed PSPs.

Offshore companies, legal entities and trust offices
37.

The Netherlands has one of the highest global levels of incoming and outgoing
foreign direct investment, including share capital and lending. At the end of 2018,
Statistics Netherlands reported that the majority of incoming foreign investments
was immediately channelled abroad via conduit companies. There are an estimated
12 000 conduit 13 companies in the Netherlands, with a balance sheet total of EUR 4
500 billion (550% of Dutch GDP). 14 Often the financial management and company’s
operations are located in a different jurisdiction and non-residents directly or
indirectly participate or exert influence via share capital, including through trust
offices. It is estimated that approximately 90% of conduit companies do not have
their own staff in the Netherlands. A number of these entities are also used as
holding companies with links to countries and regions with high levels of
corruption 15 and can be used to channel money to offshore anonymous companies
in jurisdictions with weak AML/CFT regimes. Complex structures with limited
presence in the Netherlands can be used to disguise illicit funds and integrate them
into the financial system due to the difficulties for gatekeepers in understanding the
origin of assets and BOs. Conduit companies can also be created to facilitate tax
evasion although various measures have been taken by the authorities to address
tax base erosion and profit shifting to counter conduit companies and promote
transparency and integrity. The Netherlands notes that unlicensed trust offices, in
particular, are associated with ML risks related to offshore companies. 16

Trade-based Money Laundering
38.

The NRA identifies trade-based ML (goods and services) as a significant ML risk and
there are cases where ML has been detected (e.g., in the context of a case of export
of foodstuff to West Africa). 17 Accordingly, the Assessment Team considered efforts
to detect and trace trade-based ML, including false invoicing and transactions.
12
13
14
15
16
17

NL ML and TF NRAs 2019-20.
The term conduit company used in this text is not a definition used in applicable Dutch
legal instruments, but one that is used for statistical purposes.
Government of the Netherlands, The road to acceptable conduit companies (2021).
See: Corruption in the Great Lakes Region and Possible Ties to the Dutch Financial System
(2020)
NL ML NRA 2019-20, p.60.
ML NRA 2019-20.

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1

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT

Real estate and DPMS
39.

Transactions involving high value goods and real estate are also identified as high
risk in the NRAs. Several cases indicate ML through purchasing high value goods
and property, often through intermediaries. 18 Therefore, the Assessment Team
considered the role of intermediaries including notaries and other legal
professionals, DPMS, real-estate agents and FIs in undertaking adequate due
diligence on higher risk transactions, the ability of law enforcement to obtain
property ownership information and seize and confiscate assets.

Terrorist financing
40.

The number of terrorist incidents in the Netherlands is low. Terrorism related to
religious extremism (e.g., ISIL and other UN designated groups) presents the main
TF risk in the Netherlands, but other terrorism threats exist, including right wing
terrorism.19 The TF NRA considers that terrorism in the Netherlands is largely selffunded through legal and illegal means, and is primarily used to finance family
members in conflict zones. The highest TF risks were associated with the:
•

•
•

BES Islands
41.

acquisition and/or financing via foundations or other legal entities
(charitable, religious, educational) established in the Netherlands and
abroad,
acquisition of and/or financing with legally obtained personal funds, and

re-location via underground banking, including via unlicensed payment
service providers.

The 2021 NRA for the BES Islands identifies the following ML risks: real-estate; use
of physical cash; the formal and shadow banking sector (i.e., illegal money transfer
businesses); falsification of company turnover and loan back constructions; misuse
of front companies and misuse of legal arrangements; physical movements of cash
(i.e., cash smuggling). The NRA also notes that due to the size of the islands,
customers often know service providers personally, which may lead to a reluctance
to apply stringent CDD measures or report unusual transactions to FIU-NL. The NRA
notes that Bonaire is a transit point for drugs to Europe from Latin America, and the
BES Islands can be used as transit and final destinations for human trafficking.

Areas of lower ML and TF risks and focus
42.

The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index identifies the
Netherlands as having relatively low levels of domestic corruption. 20 Therefore, the
Assessment Team de-prioritised the laundering of illicit proceeds from domestic
corruption.
18
19

20

ML NRA 2019-20, p. 52 (English version).
NL Terrorism Threat Assessment, April 2021, https://english.nctv.nl/topics/terroristthreat-assessment-netherlands/documents/publications/2021/04/26/terrorist-threatassessment-for-the-netherlands-54.
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index,
www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nld, 2020.

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CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT | 21

43.

Concerning TF, the Dutch authorities noted in the BES NRAs that there are no
indications of the existence of threats relating to terrorism or TF in the BES Islands.
The risk and materiality of the various sectors in the BES Islands were also weighted
accordingly throughout the MER.

Materiality
44.

The Netherlands is the 17th largest economy in the world, with a GDP of EUR 810
billion in 2020, and the sixth largest economy in the EU. 21 The GDP of the BES was
approximately USD 720 million in 2019. The Netherlands is the fifth largest
exporter of goods in the world (after China, US, Germany and Japan) and the sixth
largest exporter of commercial services. Currently, almost two-thirds of the
economy is based on foreign trade, primarily with Germany, Belgium, UK and
France.

45.

The financial sector is dominated by a small number of large national banks
undertaking a wide range of activities. The banking system comprises half the
financial sector, in terms of asset size.

46.

During the financial crisis, the government bailed out a limited number of banks and
remains part owner of one bank and full owner of another bank. The pension system
is ranked first globally by share of GDP and the insurance sector has consolidated
assets amounting to around 140% of GDP. The financial sector contributes 7% to
the overall GDP.

Structural Elements
47.

The Netherlands has all of the key structural elements required for an effective
AML/CFT system, including political and institutional stability, a high-level
commitment to address AML/CFT issues across various parts of government,
governmental accountability, rule of law, and a professional and independent
judiciary.

Background and Other Contextual Factors
48.

In 2017, the World Bank reported that 100% of the adult population in the
Netherlands held a bank account. 22 In 2020, migrant remittance outflows and
inflows totalled just over EUR 13.9 billion and EUR 2.5 billion respectively.23

AML/CFT strategy
49.

21
22
23

The government launched a ML Action Plan in June 2019, which is comprised of
three main pillars, and includes initiatives such as enhancing transparency of legal
persons and arrangements, a prohibition on cash transactions over EUR 3 000 for
dealers in goods, regulation of VAs, strengthening the AML/CFT framework in the
BES Islands; increasing effectiveness of supervision, and strengthening
investigation, prosecution and the confiscation of criminal assets. This Plan is
supported by a series of programmes, such as the confiscation of criminal assets
initiative, and increased financial support for FIOD, the Anti Money Laundering
Centre (AMLC).
World Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf, 2020
World Bank, Global Findex Database, 2017.
World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data (worldbank.org)

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22 |
1

50.

51.

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT

In September 2020, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice and Security
issued a TF Policy Statement 2020 to the Parliament in response to the TF NRA
2019. This Statement refers to existing measures taken to mitigate risks related to
TF via foundations or other legal forms, to TF using underground and hawala
banking, and the movement of cash and TF via VAs.

Regarding CPF, in 2020, the Netherlands conducted an initial risk assessment, the
“Proliferation Financing Policy Monitor”. The authorities consider the threat of PF
sanction evasion to be insignificant due to the limited financial flows with Iran and
DPRK, and the implementation of PF sanctions at the EU and Dutch levels.

Legal & institutional framework
52.

AML/CFT policies and activities in the Netherlands are characterised by strong cooperation between competent authorities, as well as with the private sector. The
Minister of Finance shares responsibility for the AML/CFT policy with the Minister
of Justice and Security. The primary authorities responsible for AML/CFT are
outlined below:
•

•

•

•
•

•

•

The Ministry of Finance coordinates the prevention of ML, TF, and PF and
ensures the implementation of the laws relevant for the proper operation
of the financial markets. The Ministry also oversees the AML/CFT
supervisors for the financial markets and some DNFBPs.

The Ministry of Justice and Security is responsible for legislation related
to civil, administrative and criminal laws and procedures. The Ministry is
also responsible for the Police, OM, and FIU-NL, as well as some DNFBP
supervisors.

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV)
falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Justice and Security and is
responsible for policy development, analysis of intelligence and other
information as well as co-ordination of counter-terrorism measures.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) coordinates and carries out Dutch
foreign policy, including the implementation of UN and EU sanctions.
The Chamber of Commerce (CoC) falls within the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Climate and maintains the commercial register, including a BO
Register.

The Netherlands Police (Police) is the national police force comprised of
ten regional units, and a Central Unit. All regional units feature a financial
investigation team on AML/CFT and teams specialising in terrorism
(including TF). The BES Islands have their own Dutch Caribbean Police
Force (KPCN), which can be supported in large investigations by the
Netherlands Police and the police from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten.
The Detective Co-operation Team (RST) is a partnership of police forces
from all jurisdictions within the Kingdom, in charge of serious crossborder offences across the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten and
the BES.
The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-NL) is located within the
Netherlands Police, and is operationally independent and autonomous.
FIU-NL is the national centre for receiving, analysing, and declaring

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•

•

•

•

•

•

suspicious transaction reports, which are disseminated to LEAs. The FIUNL is also responsible for the BES Islands, where it has stationed an officer.

The Public Prosecution Service (OM) independently decides whether to
prosecute a case and on how to deal with certain categories of crimes
without going to court. The OM ensures that criminal offences, including
ML and TF are detected and prosecuted and cooperates with the
Netherlands Police and other investigation services, such as the Fiscal
Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD). The OM BES operates in the
BES Islands and forms part of OMCarib (which includes Curaçao and Sint
Maarten). OM BES also has one specialised prosecutor for ML
investigations.
The Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD) falls under
the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and is responsible for
investigating fiscal and financial crimes, including ML and TF.

The Tax and Customs Administration is part of the Ministry of Finance
and, inter alia, is responsible for supervising the transit of goods and
currencies and has AML/CFT as one of its key tasks. The Caribbean
Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (BCN) is responsible for the
BES Islands.

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) falls under the Ministry
of Defence and is responsible for both national and Schengen border
control, participates in Cost Guard Agency Frontex and investigates
migration and border related crimes in co-operation with Customs and
FIOD.

De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) is the independent Dutch central bank
and acts as the prudential supervisor for the financial sector and AML/CFT
and Sanctions Act supervisor for banks, pension funds, insurers, payment
institutions, foreign exchange offices, electronic money institutions,
virtual asset service providers (since 2020), and trust offices. In addition,
DNB supervises the institutions that mainly engage in the performance of
one or more activities listed under points 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12 and 14 of
Annex of the Capital Requirement Directive. For example granting loans,
factoring, financing of commercial transactions, custody and management
of securities and safe custody services. On the BES Islands, DNB is the
AML/CFT and Sanctions Act supervisor for the same categories of
institutions. In addition, DNB is the AML/CFT and Sanctions Act
supervisor for casinos on the BES.

The Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) is responsible for
supervising AML/CFT compliance by (managers of) alternative
investment funds, (managers of) undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities, investment firms and financial service providers
providing intermediary services in life insurance contracts. In regard to
the Sanctions Act, the AFM supervises the compliance by the managers of
alternative investment funds and undertakings for collective investment
in transferable securities as well as investment firms. In the BES Islands,
AFM is the supervisor for AML/CFT compliance and compliance with the
Sanctions Act for all of the above categories of institutions.

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53.

The main public-public and public-private co-operation bodies are summarised in
the below table:

Table 1.1. Primary domestic co-operation bodies (including public-private
partnerships)
Name
Financial Expertise Centre (FEC)

Public-Public or
Public-Private
Both

Anti-Money Laundering Centre
(AMLC)
Steering Team Money Laundering
Steering Team on Supervision

Both

The Regional Information and
Expertise Centres (RIECs) and the
National Information and Expertise
Centre (LIEC)
The Obliged Entities Committee

Public-Public

AML/CFT Supervisors Committee

Public-Public

TF Platform

Public-Private

Asset Freezing Committee

Public-Public

Carré Consultations

Public-Public

Sanctions Act Consultation Meeting

Public-Public

Sanctions Expert Pool and
International Sanctions Network

Public-Private

Fintell Alliance

Public-Private

Public-Public
Public-Public

Public-Private

Description
Permanent AML/CFT body for supervisory, investigative and enforcement
agencies. FEC Structural programs involving public-public and public-private also
exist, on TF as well as serious crimes.
Is a platform where all parties, both public and private, involved in AML share their
knowledge and experience and work together on operational matters.
Assesses whether LEA signals qualify for ML investigation.
Makes una via 24 decisions, in close co-operation with DNB and AFM, on cases
involving punitive enforcement measures.
Work at a regional level to link up the information, expertise, and powers of
government bodies, including the municipal authorities, the provincial authorities,
and various LEAs on organised crimes including ML investigations.
Coordinating partnership to discuss (proposed) legislation and policy plans related
to UTRs.
The six AML/CFT supervisors (and MoF, MoJ&S and FIU-NL) frequently meet to
discuss cases and case law and consult one another to achieve AML/CFT
supervisory convergence.
Initiative of the Dutch Banking Association and FIU-NL to share knowledge of
themes, phenomena and typologies with the four Dutch major banks.
The consultations address both the implementation of TFS and the placement of
suspected terrorists and terrorist organisations on the National Terrorism
Sanctions List.
Headed by MoFA to discuss export controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (including sanctions evasion).
Discusses the legal aspects of implementing sanctions and sanction Acts with
multiple government organisations
Sanctions Expert Pool organised by the Dutch Banking Association, is a forum for
banks and DNB to discuss the execution of sanction measures and to share best
practices. MoF facilitates a similar meeting of all non-bank FIs (the International
Sanctions Network).
A public-private partnership with four major banks to exchange financial
intelligence and knowledge to improve the efficiency and efficacy of UTRs.

Financial sector, DNFBPs and VASPs
54.

This section provides general information about the size and composition of the FI
and DNFBP sectors in the Netherlands. FIs and DNFBPs are not of equal importance
given their role and size, and their different levels of exposure to ML and TF risks.
The level of risk also varies greatly between individual FIs and DNFBPs within the
same sector. The Assessment Team ranked the sectors based on the relative
importance, materiality and the level of risk. These rankings have been used to
weight positive and negative implementation issues throughout the report, as a
basis for conclusions.
24

Whereby it is impossible to impose both criminal and civil/administrative sanctions for
the same offence.

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Overview of Financial Sector
Banking sector: is weighted as the most important in the Dutch context, reflecting
the size of the sector, and its exposure to ML/TF risks, and the recent significant and
long-term AML/CFT violations identified. At the end of September 2021, 84 banks
or branches of banks from Member States or third countries were active in the
Netherlands. The total balance sheet of all banks amounted to EUR 2 780 billion in
Q3 2021, with three banks holding more than 80% of the balance.

55.

MVTS: is weighted as important in the Dutch context, reflecting the diversity of the
population, not only in size and transaction volume, but also in services, channels
and geographical activity, all of which expose it to ML/TF threat. The sector includes
mobile and internet-based payment systems, digital wallets, electronic money,
money transfer offices (MTOs) and alternative banking platforms. This sector
continues to grow, both in number of institutions and transaction size. For example,
in 2019, the market for licensed payment institutions and electronic money
institutions grew by almost 50%. There are also a number of underground payment
service providers in the Netherlands. With the passage of the EU Payment Service
Directive, the number of locations where a money transfer can be carried out in the
Netherlands has increased to more than 900 locations, including approximately 818
agents operating on behalf of foreign MVTS providers.

56.

VASPs: is also weighted as important in the Dutch context. The NRAs identify VAs
as high risk for ML and TF. Not all VASPs activities defined in the FATF Standards
are currently regulated in the Netherlands. As of 18 November 2021, 65 VASPs have
applied for mandatory registration to operate in the Netherlands, 25 VASPs have
been registered by DNB and nine applications are being processed (including two
expansions). 25

57.

Asset Management: is weighted as moderately important in the Netherlands. This
is the second largest asset management sector in Europe and includes the broader
securities sector and investment management activities such as managing
alternative investment funds, managing of undertakings for collective investment
in transferable securities (UCITS). In 2019, the Netherlands held the second largest
foreign investment stock in Africa after France, although more than two thirds of
those investments were in Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. At the end of 2019,
investment funds managed EUR 899 billion in assets and investment firms managed
EUR 249 billion in assets. Approximately 90% of the managed assets of investment
firms come from professional clients and 10% from retail investors.

58.

The insurance and pensions sectors: are weighted as less important in the
Netherlands context, due the low inherent ML/TF risk. In 2019, the insurance sector
was composed of a total of 136 insurers. This includes life insurers, which are
subject to AML/CFT regulation. The insurance sector is diverse. Based on premium
volumes, the health insurance sector is by far the largest in the Dutch insurance
market with premium volumes in excess of EUR 52 billion. Life and non-life
insurance (excluding health insurance) both represent approximately EUR 13
billion in premium volume. The Netherlands has one of the world’s most highly
developed pension fund industries, with total private assets managed being
amongst the highest in Western Europe. The value of the pension funds’ equity and
debt portfolios was EUR 1 560 billion at the end of 2019.

59.

25

26 have withdrawn.

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BES Islands: The financial sector in the BES is very small, with financial services
sector comprising 10.4% of the economy in Bonaire, and less than 5% in both Saba
and St. Eustatius. 26 In total, in 2020, there were 10 credit institutions offering
services in the BES Islands.

60.

Overview of DNFBP Sector

Trust company and service providers (TCSPs): the TCSP sector is weighted as
important in the context of the Netherlands. The Dutch NRAs note that unlicensed
trust offices are associated with significant ML risks. The Dutch TCSP sector in 2020
was comprised of 162 licenced trust offices and an estimated 600 domicile
providers. The services provided by a trust office include acting as director of a legal
person or company and the provision of a postal address, combined with the
provision of certain specific administrative services (the latter is referred to as
‘domicile plus’). Trust offices are regulated by the Trust and Company Service
Providers Supervision Act 2018 (Wtt 2018) in as far as CDD and ethical business
operations are concerned and are regulated by the Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing Prevention Act (Wwft) for AML/CFT obligations. A trust office may, for
the benefit of a customer, use a legal person or company that is part of the trust
office for managing the capital and business income of an internationally operating
company. The provision of a postal address not combined with certain specific
administrative services (referred to as ‘domicile sec’), is a service that is covered by
the Wwft and the providers are described as domicile providers. Domicile provision
without certain specific administrative services is a lower risk activity than those
provided by trust office or domicile plus.

61.

Real estate agents: are weighted as moderately important in the Dutch context.
Transactions involving real estate (including through loan back arrangements, ABC
supply chain transactions, offshore companies and trusts) are identified as a
significant ML risk. However, real estate agents are not involved in all transactions.
There are approximately 9 000 real estate agents in the Netherlands and some real
estate is held by foreign trusts, which do not need to be registered as such in the
Netherlands.

62.

Notaries: are weighted as moderately important in the context of the Netherlands.
Around 3 400 civil-law notaries (776 firms) have been appointed by the Ministry of
Justice and Security and they are required to be members of the Royal Dutch
Association of Civil-law Notaries (KNB). Dutch law requires a notarial deed for a
number of agreements and legal transactions, including real estate transactions and
the incorporation of all private legal entities, with the exception of church
communities. This makes notaries key gatekeepers, particularly in higher risk areas
such as real estate transactions in the continental Netherlands and BES Islands.
Notary trust accounts in the Netherlands are estimated to hold over EUR six billion
each day. 27

63.

26
27

Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, “Trends in the Caribbean Netherlands”, 2019,
www.cbs.nl/en-gb/publication/2019/51/trends-in-the-caribbean-netherlands.
Onvolledige dossiers en weinig controle op witwassen: kwart notariskantoren heeft
zaakjes niet op orde

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Lawyers: are weighted as moderately important in the context of the Netherlands.
There are approximately 18 000 lawyers in the Netherlands (5 600 firms), some of
which are involved in company formation and real estate transactions. According to
the Netherlands Bar (NOvA), in 2020 only 28% of the lawyers and only 22% of the
law firms were involved in AML/CFT services. All lawyers are required by law to be
a member of the Bar Association.

64.

Dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS): are weighted as moderately
important in the Netherlands context. DPMS is regulated for AML/CFT when cash
payment exceeds EUR 10 000. There are approximately 4 800 DPMS in the
Netherlands.28

65.

Accountants: are weighted as moderately important in the Netherlands. Some 8
800 public accountants (as opposed to in-house accountants) are active in the
Netherlands. Of the total number of public accountants, 4 600 are registered
accountants. In addition, there are about 4 200 accounting consultants. An
accounting consultant is an internationally recognised accountant authorised to
perform audits.

66.

Casinos: are weighted as being of lower importance in the context of the
Netherlands. There is only one licensed casino in the Netherlands (with multiple
branches), which offers croupier-serviced betting games over EUR 3 000. This
casino is state-owned and its managing and supervisory boards are appointed by
the Minister of Finance. The gross revenue of the company amounted to EUR 729
million in 2019. Amusement arcades, which sometimes advertise as “casinos”, may
only operate slot machines for small bets and are exempt from AML/CFT
supervision due to their perceived low risk. As of 1 October 2021, the Netherlands
began regulating online casinos (including supervision for AML/CFT), with 10
licenses provided by 18 November 2021. 29

67.

BES Islands: The DNFBP sector is very small and poses a relatively small risk
compared to continental Netherlands. Most DNFBPs present in the BES Islands (80
in total) fall under the supervision of the BTWwft. The one trust office and the two
casinos present are considered low risk and are supervised by DNB. Risks relating
to real estate are high, particularly in Bonaire.

68.

Preventive measures
69.

The Netherlands is a member of the EU, and therefore bound by EU law. EU
AML/CFT Regulations directly apply in the Netherlands (excluding the BES Islands),
and EU AML/CFT Directives are transposed through Dutch domestic law. The main
elements of EU legislation, including AML Directives, have been implemented in the
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Prevention) Act (Wwft). This law was
most recently amended by the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive
(Amendment) (Implementation) Act, which entered into force on 21 May 2020.
28

29

A wider range of dealers or brokers in high-value goods are subject to supervision in the
Netherlands than prescribed by the FATF. For instance, dealers and brokers in vehicles
(e.g., cars), vessels (e.g., yachts), art and antiques, jewellery, furniture and kitchens are also
supervised.
The AML/CFT regulation of online casinos extends to activities that are not regulated for
physical casinos, such as sports betting and horse racing.

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70.

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT

In addition to the Wwft, there are several other laws in the Netherlands containing
AML/CFT elements, notably:
•

•
•
•

•
•

Financial Supervision Act (Wft): deals with the supervision on banks,
insurance companies and other FIs;
Criminal Code (WvSr): establishes criminal offences under Dutch law,
including ML and TF;

Code of Criminal Procedure (WvSv): outlines criminal justice procedures
and powers of LEAs;
Sanctions Act: provides the basis for international and national freezing
measures and other sanctions, and for supervision of compliance with
sanction regulations.
Trust and Company Service Providers Supervision Act (Wtt 2018): includes
the primary preventive measures for trust offices; and

Economic Offences Act: criminalises breaches of legislation prescribing
preventive measures in the field of AML/CFT.

Legal persons and arrangements
71.

Most legal persons in the Netherlands, are established through a notarial deed for
an indefinite period of time. All types of legal persons and other legal entities are
required to register with the Dutch CoC. In September 2020, the CoC started
operating a public BO Register for legal entities. Foreign legal entities are registered
with the CoC if they have a branch or commercial undertaking in the Netherlands.
As of 18 November 2021, a total of about 1.93 million Dutch and 9 000 foreign and
European legal entities were registered with the CoC. Approximately 67% of all
private legal persons registered in the CoC are private limited liability companies.
In 2020, there were approximately 6,200 legal persons registered in the BES
Islands. Approximately 2335 of these were Private Limited Liability Companies, 200
were foreign entities and 1800 sole proprietorships.

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Table 1.2. Number of legal entities registered as of 15 November 2021 30
Description

Number

Basic characteristics

Private limited liability
company (BV)

1 121 871

Foundation

266 109

General partnership
(VOF)

193 736

Association

131 676

Association of
proprietors

128 071

Professional
Partnership

37 763

Limited partnership
(CV)

11 628

Cooperative

9 417

Church Community

7 369

Public limited liability
company (NV)
Public legal person
Mutual insurance
company
Shipping company
European Economic
Interest Grouping
European Company
(SE)
European cooperative
society (SCE)

4 935
5 767
247
125
58
35
2

BVs may be set up by one or more natural or legal persons and are managed by one or
more directors, which are elected by the shareholders. Any powers not conferred upon the
directors remain vested in the general meeting of shareholders. BVs may issue only
registered shares. BVs have an obligation to register the transfer of shares within the
company and to have such a transfer certified by way of notarial deed.
Foundations have no members and their purpose is to realise a (charitable) objective.
While profits are not excluded, there are strict restrictions in place concerning the effective
allocation of these profits. A foundation is established by notarial deed.
This a partnership in which two or more partners cooperate in the exercise of their
business (e.g., contractors).
An association is a partnership between two or more members to achieve an objective,
which can include profits. However, profits may be used only to further the common goal
and may not be distributed to its members. Associations have full legal personality and
are set up by notarial deed and required to register with the CoC.
Members are owners of apartments within an apartment building, with the objective to act
in their common interest in regard to the building, such as maintenance. Membership is
mandatory.
This is a partnership in which two or more professionals join activities for a common
purpose (e.g., cooperating doctors, lawyers, etc.). Partners are in equal parts liable for
debts arising out of legal acts engaged upon by each of them on behalf of the partnership.
This is a partnership where a company is operated in a manner visible to third parties. In
this respect it is similar to the general partnership. However, there are one or more silent
partners that provide capital and are only liable to the extent of their investment. In
exchange for their limited liability, the silent partners are not allowed to engage in legal
acts on behalf of the partnership.
Cooperatives are legal entities in which a number of persons combine their resources to
facilitate their individual but similar interests. Cooperatives may be established by two or
more members through a notarial deed. A Cooperative has no minimum capital
requirement and cannot issue any shares or certificates.
Church communities are religious legal persons governed by their own articles of
association and do not require notarial deed.
Public limited liability companies (NV) are subject to the same establishment
requirements, and closely follow the ownership and management structure, of the private
limited liability company (BV). Dutch NVs require a minimum capital (EUR 45 000) and
NV-shares may be publicly traded
Public entities such as the State, provinces and municipalities.
Mutual insurance companies are associations for insurance purposes.

Legal
personality
Yes

Yes
No
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Used when a ship has multiple owners for the purpose of exploitation of the ship.
European form of partnership in which companies or partnerships from different European
countries can cooperate. Partners are jointly and severally liable.
SEs are subject to the same registration requirements as NVs.

No
No

SCEs are subject to the same registration requirements as NVs.

Yes

Source: Chamber of Commerce

30

1

This does not include legal entities incorporated in the BES Islands.

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30 |
1

72.

73.

CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT

Dutch law does not provide for the establishment of legal arrangements, such as
express trusts. However, express trusts established under the laws of another
country are recognised. The Dutch authorities estimate that there are up to 15 000
legal arrangements, including foreign legal arrangements, in operation in the
Netherlands.

There is one Dutch legal arrangement, referred to as a “mutual fund”, which shares
similarities with a trust, in the sense that it is a freeform contractual arrangement
often used for some form of asset management, with the important distinction that
it has transferable participant certificates. The mutual fund has two variants: the
open fund and the closed fund. As of 2020, there are approximately 2 800 open
mutual funds in the Netherlands. The open fund is primarily used as an investment
fund, as it allows a number of participants to deposit capital to be invested for their
mutual benefit. These investment funds require a license to operate. Since open and
closed mutual funds do not have legal personality, have no rights or obligations
other than certain tax advantages (open funds are held to pay corporate tax), no
procedural requirements apply to their creation.

Supervisory arrangements
74.

75.

There are six independent AML/CFT supervisors for different groups of obliged
entities. The supervisors for FIs are DNB and AFM. Concerning the BES Islands, DNB
supervises FIs, TCSPs and casinos, and the AFM supervises life insurance
intermediaries. VASPs are not regulated in the BES islands. The below table
summarises their respective responsibilities for AML/CFT supervision, as well as
the number of entities under their responsibility.
DNB employs in 2021 60 staff dedicated to AML/CFT supervision, and the AFM
employs 13 staff members dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. These figures
include AML/CFT supervision for the BES Islands.

Table 1.3. Supervisory authorities for FIs in the Netherlands in 2020
FI Sector

Supervisor

Number of FIs

Banks, including non-EU branches

DNB

84

Payment Institutions (including MVTS, foreign exchange offices and
electronic money institutions)
Insurers (including life insurance companies)

DNB

60

DNB

91

VASPs

DNB

15

Investment firms (licensed)

AFM

308

Managers of investment institutions, including UCITS (licensed)

AFM

Managers of investment institutions (registered, unlicensed)

AFM

109 (of which 14 managers of
UCITS)
478

Intermediaries of life insurance

AFM

4 473

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CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT | 31

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

The supervisors for the DNFBP sectors, other than DNB, are the Financial
Supervision Office (BFT), Tax and Customs Administration AML/CFT Supervision
Office (BTWwft), Netherlands Gambling Authority (Ksa) and the Deans of the
Netherlands Bar (NOvA). The below table summarises their respective
responsibilities for AML/CFT supervision, as well as the number of entities under
their responsibility.

The BFT is the independent AML/CFT supervisor of (junior) civil-law notaries,
public (chartered) accountants, business administration consultants, tax advisors
and other independent financial economic or legal advisers. The BFT employs 15
staff members dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. The BFT has supervisory
arrangements with professional bodies or organisations, including the Dutch
Register of Tax Advisers (RB) and the Association of Registered Accountants (SRA),
which peer review or audit their own members.

The BTWwft is responsible for the AML/CFT monitoring of traders or brokers in
high-value goods, including DPMS and dealers or traders yachts, cars, art and
antiques, as well as real estate brokers, real estate valuers, pawnbrokers, and
natural or legal persons that provide street or postal addresses in a professional or
commercial capacity (domicile providers). In addition, BTWwft supervises all
DNFBPs on the BES Islands (except for one trust office and two small casinos, which
are supervised by DNB). BTWwft employs approximately 41 staff members
dedicated to AML/CFT supervision.

The Ksa is the supervisor of games of chance in the Netherlands. In 2016, the Ksa
took over the AML/CFT supervision of casinos from DNB. The Ksa employed one
AML/CFT supervisor until 2021, but has now increased its number to three due to
Ksa taking on supervision of online gambling.

NOvA is the professional organisation of the legal profession. The local bar
presidents of the 11 districts and their staff members (approximately 125) and eight
staff members of the NOvA act as supervisors of the legal profession. As of July 2021,
one of the Deans was appointed to supervise lawyers in the BES Islands.

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CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT

Table 1.4. Supervisory authorities for DNFBPs in the Netherlands in 2020
FI Sector

Supervisor

Casinos
Real estate agents
Traders in high-value goods (including
dealers in precious metals and stones)
Lawyers
Notaries (individuals)
Accountants
Tax advisors and independent legal
professionals
TCSP - Trust offices
TCSP - Natural or legal persons that
provide street or postal addresses in a
professional or commercial capacity
(domicile provider)

Number of DNFBPs

Ksa
BTWwft
BTWwft

1 (including 14 branches)31
9 000*
90 200 (DPMS is 4 800*)

NOvA
BFT
BFT
BFT

18 000
3 38232
9 064
25 000*

DNB
BTWwft

162
600*

Note: These figures are estimates by the authorities.

International co-operation
81.

The Netherlands makes and responds to requests for international co-operation,
aided by a broad range of international instruments, treaties and the use of
Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) which guarantee that legal and non-legal
assistance is sought and provided to the fullest extent possible.

82.

MLA requests are centralised for non-EU countries through the Department of
International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (AIRS) of the Ministry of Justice
and Security, prior to referral to International Legal Assistance Centres (IRCs). An
IRC is a co-operation between the OM and LEAs and consists of one or two
prosecutors, administrative staff and police officers. For EU states, requests are sent
directly to and from IRCs. The centralisation of MLA requests ensures that requests
are tracked, prioritised and executed in a timely and coordinated manner.

83.

Since 2016, more than 20 000 MLA requests were received annually by the
Netherlands, and over 13 000 requests were sent to foreign counterparts. About
85% of the incoming requests come from EU member states. Within the EU most
requests between 2015 and 2019 came from Belgium, Germany, France and Poland.
Outside of the EU, the most frequent incoming requests are from the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and Norway. Outgoing MLA
requests are sent mostly to EU member states (75%), primarily to Belgium,
Germany, Poland, Spain and France. Outside of the EU, the Netherlands most
frequently sends MLA requests to the United States, Turkey, Surinam, Switzerland
and Morocco.

84.

The Netherlands initiates and takes part in Joint Investigative Tools (JITs), but there
is no legal basis for the establishment of JITs in the BES Islands.
31
32

Online casinos have been regulated since October 2021 and there were 10 licensed online
gambling sites at the time of the onsite.
As of 1 October 2021.

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Chapter 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO-ORDINATION
Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key findings
1. Overall, the Netherlands has a good understanding of its ML/TF risks, as
reflected in the NRAs, SNRAs and other sector assessments, policies, projects
and cases. The methodology of the NRAs is general sound and based on a
structural process to collect and evaluate qualitative inputs from policy,
supervisory, law enforcement and private sector authorities through extensive
surveys, meetings and interviews. However, inputs into the NRAs can be
strengthened by the inclusion of additional quantitative sources.
2. In continental Netherlands, fraud and drug related offences account for more
than 90% of all proceeds of crime and ML risk manifests via the use of crypto
currencies; trade-based services; underground banking, including unlicensed
payment services; offshore companies; and services/goods of dealers of highvalue goods. The TF NRA considers that terrorism in the Netherlands is largely
self-funded through legal and illegal means, and is primarily used to finance
family members in conflict zones.
3. For the BES Islands, the authorities have a less informed but adequate
understanding of the islands’ ML/TF risks as outlined in the BES NRAs.
According to the NRA, the highest ML risk lies in the real estate sector, in
particular large cash transactions. The NRAs briefly touch upon TF, but do not
include a detailed assessment, as there were no authorities who were aware of
any indication of terrorism or TF in the BES Islands.

4. The ML risks identified seem reasonable and align with input received from
FATF and FSRB members. The authorities could further strengthen this
understanding by building upon the risks related to methods and channels,
considering the ML risks associated with the underlying predicate offences
including the origins of proceeds, and expanding the categorisation of the risks
of different FI and DNFBP sectors compared to each other at the national level.

5. TF risks are well identified and understood. This understanding is supported
by knowledge, projects and cases developed by the FIU-NL, OM and LEAs,
coupled with the on-going terrorism threat assessments conducted by the
intelligence agencies involved in counter-terrorism.
6. FIs, DNFBPs and NPO sector representatives met by the Assessment Team had
a reasonable understanding of their risks. However, the NRA and SNRAs are
high-level policy documents that inform this understanding and do not provide
sufficient granularity on specific sectoral risks. Some high-risk areas, including
NPOs and legal persons and arrangements, lack a detailed risk assessment to
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improve risk understanding and inform policy and operational responses.

7. The key strength of the Dutch system lies on its robust domestic co-ordination
and co-operation on AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels.
The Netherlands demonstrated significant AML/CFT co-operation and
collaboration at the public-public, public-private and private-private levels.

8. National AML/CFT policies largely address identified ML/TF risks. For
instance, the ML Action Plan is targeting the ML risks identified in the ML NRA
and the SNRA. The risk assessment process is defined as an on-going process,
resulting in amendments to policies to mitigate new or emerging ML/TF risks.
However, a number of AML/CFT exemptions exist in the BES Islands, which are
inconsistent with the risk assessments.
9. Some FIs, DNFBPs and NPOs were directly involved in the development of the
NRAs. The results of risk assessments were also communicated to obliged
entities in a proactive and consistent manner.

Recommended Actions
1. The Netherlands should continue its persistent efforts to improving the quality
and utility of ML/TF NRAs by:
•

•

•

expanding the scope to cover the ML threats associated with the underlying
predicate offences, including the origins of proceeds, rather than focusing
solely on the ML methods and channels;
expanding the categorisation of the risks of different FI and DNFBP sectors
compared to each other at the national level using the same assessment
standard; and

validating qualitative inputs with quantitative data, including prosecution
data, LEA investigations, STR information and international
requests/spontaneous co-operation in more recent years.

2. The Netherlands should develop a more detailed risk assessment for legal
persons and arrangements and the NPO sector. Such assessments should
include engagement with relevant private sector entities, including NPOs
representing different parts of the sector.
3. The Netherlands should continue efforts to conduct more targeted and
proactive measures against high risk areas, in particular against underground
banking activity which is identified in both ML and TF NRAs.
4. The Netherlands should remove its exemptions for DNFBPs in the BES Islands
related to identifying and assessing ML/TF risks and having policies to mitigate
risks.

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85.

The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.1.
The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R.1, 2, 33 and 34, and elements of R.15.

Immediate Outcome 1 (Risk, Policy and Co-ordination)
86.

87.

The Netherlands has a good understanding of its ML/TF risks, which is primarily
informed by a continuous risk assessment process. The Assessment Team based
this conclusion on a review of the NRAs and interviews with authorities and private
sector representatives (including representatives from the non-profit sector).

The Netherlands has issued a total of six NRAs: two ML NRAs (in 2017 and 2020);
two TF NRAs (in 2017 and 2020); and two ML/TF NRA for the BES Islands (in 2018
and 2021). All NRAs were developed by the WODC (the Research and
Documentation Centre) of the Ministry of Justice and Security. The methodology
was based on a previous study conducted by the WODC, which concluded that the
ISO 31000 risk management framework is most suitable for this purpose. In short,
this research methodology involves:
•

•
•

•
•
88.

89.

A literature review of key characteristics of the Netherlands that influence
the prevalence of ML/TF (e.g., socio-cultural, economic, geographical and
criminal factors);

A survey circulated to authorities and experts to indicate the prevalence
of ML/TF threats, methods and channels;
Expert meetings with policy, supervisory, law enforcement and private
sector authorities to identify ML/TF threats with the greatest potential
impact;
Multiple interviews with experts, including to assess and validate the
resilience of the available policy instruments to prevent ML/TF; and

Quantitative data (e.g., a study of criminal proceeds) for the description of
the risk context and – to a limited extent to analyse ML/TF risks.

In accordance with this methodology, the NRAs identify, analyse and categorise the
ML/TF risks having the greatest potential impact, as well as the resilience of policy
instruments (laws, regulations, etc.) aimed at prevention and mitigation of ML/TF.
The NRAs do not include a breakdown of threats based on predicate offences, but
instead outline the risks associated with various methods and channels.
Information related to the general criminal situation, including statistics, was
included in the background contextual analysis of the NRAs. This methodological
approach is justified by authorities as LEAs are required to pursue ML cases
regardless of the underlying predicate offence. That considered, a better
understanding of the ML risks associated with underlying predicate offences, may
be valuable to inform risk-based policies, strategies, measures and resource
allocation.
The NRAs are largely driven by qualitative data, including expert judgements from
the participating experts and independent reports such as the EC’s SNRA and
EUROPOL’s Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Given the materiality of
expert judgements, the methodology was refined in the second NRA to increase the
amount of experts consulted and the number of meetings and interviews held in
order to deepen the understanding of ML/TF risks.

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90.
2

91.

92.

93.

94.

CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO-ORDINATION

Quantitative input included an overview of reported crimes (e.g., on property crime,
theft and fraud) and a study of criminal proceeds (e.g., fraud and drug crimes), the
latter of which includes data from up to 18 years ago. While the WODC attempted
to carry out more comprehensive quantitative analysis to supplement the NRAs, it
was unsuccessful due to issues related to data privacy and obtaining timely consent.
The WODC is aware of these statistical deficiencies and is examining ways it can
enrich its analysis with more quantitative data for the next NRAs. For example, the
WODC aims to include conviction and enforcement data in the preparation of the
upcoming NRAs.
The NRAs were drafted in a coordinated manner, with all relevant authorities
participating in various stages of the process (e.g., as experts and/or survey
respondents). The private sector was also engaged as experts.

The ML risks identified by authorities are reasonable, consistent and in line with
international feedback received from FATF and FSRB delegations. Fraud and drugrelated offences are identified as the most significant predicate offences
contributing to the highest ML threats, based on the separate study commissioned
by the WODC in 2018 on the nature and scope of criminal expenditure between
2004 and 2014. The authorities state that the associated criminal proceeds of these
offences both transit through and remain in the Netherlands. The highest ML risks,
when taking into account various policy instruments and other mitigation
measures, are ML through: the use of virtual assets; trade-based services;
underground banking, including unlicensed payment services; offshore companies;
and services/goods of dealers of high-value goods. The ML NRAs do not categorise
the risk levels of FI and DNFBP sectors at national level using the same assessment
standard, which may assist with risk mitigation and resource allocation. Instead, the
ML NRAs identified the ML methods/channels of higher risk, including banks, trust
offices, VASPs, unlicensed/licensed payment institutions (including MVTS) and
dealers in high value goods.

The TF risks identified by the Dutch authorities are informed by the TF NRAs and
terrorism threat assessments and are comprehensive and in line with international
feedback. The Dutch authorities consistently demonstrated a shared understanding
of the Netherlands’ TF risks in line with the TF NRAs. Terrorism related to religious
extremism presents the main TF risk, but other terrorism threats exist, including
right-wing terrorism. The highest TF risks come from the acquisition of funds and
the financing of terrorism through NPOs both in the Netherlands and abroad, TF
with the personal means of the financier, as well as the moving of funds through
underground banking including unlicensed payment services. These risks align with
the TF cases submitted, including a large percentage of cases in which funds were
provided to family members to participate in terrorist organisations in conflict
zones.
In addition to the NRAs, the Netherlands’ risk understanding is also based on
sectoral risk assessments that guide risk-based supervisory activities. For example,
in 2020 a detailed sector assessment was published on the casino/gaming sector.
However, the Dutch authorities have not undertaken a more detailed sectoral
assessment of risks associated with the types of legal persons and legal
arrangements and the NPO sector. Given the materiality and the risks present, the
Netherlands should conduct a thorough assessment of the ML/TF threats and
vulnerabilities of such high risk areas in order to consider possible additional riskbased measures.

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95.

96.

97.

In addition, a number of thematic studies have been conducted through various
platforms with the joint efforts of policy, supervisory, law enforcement and private
sector authorities to identify emerging ML/TF risks for policy and operational
purposes. For instance, FIU-NL (in collaboration with the Police, OM and AMLC) has
conducted studies into underground banking and virtual assets in 2016 and 2017,
respectively. Both studies resulted in typologies, which are publicly available on the
website of FIU-NL.

Many of the FIs and firms met by the Assessment Team were aware of the ML and
TF NRAs’ conclusions but noted that the NRAs and SNRAs are high-level policy
documents that do not provide sufficient granularity on their specific sectoral risks.

For the BES Islands, the authorities have a less informed but adequate
understanding of the islands’ ML/TF risks as outlined in the BES NRAs. This
understanding is predominately informed by expert judgements and FIU-NL data.
The WODC experienced significant difficulties in obtaining basic quantitative data
to inform the BES NRAs. For example, the BES Police (KPCN) is unable to provide
the number of drug-related offences and arrests after 2017. However, there were
improvements in accessing relevant statistics in the recent 2021 NRA. Moreover,
the lack of local knowledge about financial crime amongst LEAs and the reluctance
of the local community to report crimes, as addressed in the NRA, might have
resulted in an information gap in the understanding of ML/TF risks. According to
the NRA, the highest ML risk lies in the real estate sector, in particular large cash
transactions. The NRAs briefly touch upon TF, but do not include a detailed
assessment, as there were no authorities who were aware of any indication of
terrorism or TF in the BES Islands. All competent authorities consistently reiterated
this conclusion during interviews with the Assessment Team.

National policies to address identified ML/TF risks
98.

99.

In general, national AML/CFT policies appropriately address identified ML/TF
risks. The Assessment Team based this conclusion on a review of available
AML/CFT Action Plan and Statements and various policy instruments and
discussions with authorities and private sector representatives.

A key strength of the Dutch system is the close domestic co-ordination and cooperation, including for ML/TF risk assessment and the development of risk-based
strategies/policies. This collaboration occurs through established working groups
at the public-public and public-private levels (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). This
institutional co-operation facilitates information sharing when conducting risk
assessments, pursuing project-based investigations and developing national
policies aimed at addressing identified ML/TF risks.

100. The Netherlands developed its national AML/CFT policies based on the findings of
the various NRAs and other risk-based initiatives, such as thematic studies and
sector risk assessments. For instance, following the ML NRA 2017, the Minister of
Finance and the Minister of Justice and Security jointly formulated an AML policy in
2019, entitled the ML Action Plan. This Action Plan is a national-wide and
comprehensive policy targeting the ML risks identified in the ML NRA and the SNRA.

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101. The ML Action Plan clearly outlines national AML/CFT measures around three
pillars: (1) raising barriers; (2) increasing the effectiveness of the gatekeeper
function and supervision; and (3) strengthening investigation and prosecution. The
pillars include measures such as enhancing transparency of legal persons and
arrangements, a prohibition on cash transactions over EUR 3 000 for dealers in
goods, regulation of VAs, strengthening the AML/CFT framework in the BES Islands;
increasing supervisory and LEA resources. This Action Plan is also supported by
thematic projects (e.g., by FEC, AMLC and FIU-NL), the Strategic Program AML and
by a series of programmes, such as a national programme targeting organised,
subversive crime and initiatives on the confiscation of criminal assets. All of these
measures are intended to mitigate the residual risks identified in the ML NRAs.

102. The ML Action Plan and its progress reports were presented by the Minister of
Finance and the Minister of Justice and Security to the Parliament, which is a clear
indication of the high-level commitment afforded to it by the Dutch authorities.
These policy responses are reviewed and updated as part of a policy cycle, which is
repeated bi-annually to ensure that the risk assessment and policies in the area of
AML/CFT remain up-to-date. Most of the Action Plan items have been completed
while the remaining actions are reported to be on track.

103. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, under the Ministry of
Justice and Security, is responsible for counter-terrorism (CT) policy and strategy.
The national CT policy is outlined in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 20162020, which involves all government partners in the fight against terrorism. CFT is
a core component of the CT policy, and embedded in the intervention areas of
procuring, preventing and pursuing.

104. In September 2020, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice and Security
issued a TF Policy Statement to Parliament in response to the 2019 TF NRA. This
Statement refers to existing measures taken to mitigate risks related to TF via
foundations or other legal forms, to TF using underground and hawala banking, and
the movement of cash and TF via VAs.

105. Similar to the ML Action Plan, a number of additional measures have been
implemented to mitigate TF risks. For example, additional resources are allocated
to the Police and FIOD for TF investigation, the Terrorist Financing Programme
within the FEC is running a sub-project to map the foreign financing of NPOs that
could be related to TF, and the FIU-NL has developed TF risk profiles to increase the
knowledge and understanding of obliged entities.
106. For the BES Islands, the ML Action Plan seeks to address identified ML/TF risks by
strengthening AML/CFT legislation and enhancing the knowledge and capacity of
local authorities. No CFT policies or strategies are in place for the BES Islands, which
aligns with its risk profile based on the limited qualitative and quantitative
information available.

107. In general, the national policies and strategies in place are in line with the
Netherlands ML and TF risks.

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Exemptions, enhanced and simplified measures
108. The Netherlands legal framework for exemptions and applying enhanced measures
are largely related to the EU’s Anti-Money Laundering Directives. For example,
certain issuers of electronic money (i.e., prepaid cards that can be exchanged with
multiple parties) are exempted from the obligation to conduct CDD under a number
of strict conditions, such as low amounts and restriction to spend in the
Netherlands. This exemption is based on the EU’s AMLD5 and the low risks
identified in the SNRA and NRA.

109. For the BES Islands, DNFBPs (except for trust offices) are exempt from the following
obligations:
•

•
•
•

Identifying and assessing its ML and TF risks;

Having in place policies, procedures and measures to mitigate ML and TF risks
identified in the NRA;
Designate a person to be responsible for ensuring compliance with the
AML/CFT obligations in the Wwft BES; and
Implementing group-wide policies and procedures.

110. These exemptions are not in line with the ML risks identified in the updated BES
NRAs of 2021, as the purchase of real estate and the use of legal entities is identified
as carrying ML risks.

111. In the Netherlands, only one casino (with multiple branches) is licensed and
regulated under the AML/CFT legislation. Other stakeholders in the physical gaming
sector such as providers of lotteries, slot machines, horse racing and sports betting
are exempted from AML/CFT requirements. These exemptions are based on the
sectoral ML/TF risk assessments commissioned by the WODC in 2017 and 2020.
Online gambling is subject to a licensing regime and the AML/CFT requirements
extend to the aforementioned exempted gaming sectors.

112. Valuers of real estate and dealers in vehicles, vessels, antiques and art are
supervised for AML/CFT due to EU requirements and identified ML/TF risks. In the
BES Islands, dealers in construction materials are also included in AML/CFT
legislation. While these AML/CFT requirements (beyond real estate and DPMS) are
not part of the FATF Standards, the inclusion of these high-value sectors
demonstrates that the Netherlands is proactively including sectors it identifies as
high risk in the NRAs. The Assessment Team did not meet representatives or assess
the level of AML/CFT effectiveness in the sectors that are not covered by the FATF
Standards.

Objectives and activities of competent authorities

113. The risk assessments have informed the objectives and activities of authorities. At
the policy level, the authorities have introduced a number of legislative
amendments to address ML/TF risks. Some of these legislative amendments
respond to ML/TF risks identified in the European SNRA, and are elements required
by EU AML Directives. Recent amendments include the introduction of:
•
•

a public BO register for legal persons;
Customs supervision and enforcement with respect to the transport of
currency and other liquid assets within the EU;

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•
•
•
•

2

regulation of VASPs;
a separate AML/CFT legislation on trust offices;
AML/CFT regulation for online gambling; and
amendments in the BES Islands for obliged entities in order to strengthen
AML/CFT compliance.

114. At the operational level, the OM in consultation with the FIU-NL, FIOD and Police,
has established the Strategic Program AML 2019-2022, which aims to enhance
coherence and synergy amongst parties to better align their activities with the ML
risks identified in the ML NRA 2017. The programme sets out specific thematic
priorities, such as concealed assets and trade-based money laundering (TBML). In
addition, specific strategies have been formulated to mitigate the major ML threats
in the Netherlands, including organised, subversive crime with a focus on drugrelated crimes and separate strategies on fraud. The below case study box
summarises a recent initiative to combat organised, subversive crime and obstruct
the criminal revenue model.

Box 2.1. Multidisciplinary Intervention Team
The Multidisciplinary Intervention Team (MIT) 33, established in 2020, focuses on
organised, subversive criminality. The objective of the MIT is to dismantle the
dominant positions of criminal leaders and their facilitators, and put up barriers
against the misuse of the legal economy and infrastructure through criminal law
as well as surveillance, enforcement, administrative law and taxation.

The MIT was set up at the initiative of the Ministry of Justice and Security.
Specialists in the area of intelligence, digital, international and financial
investigations from various units cooperate in the MIT (OM, Police, FIOD,
KMar/Defence, Customs, and the Tax and Customs Administration). A specific area
of focus of the MIT is the confiscation of criminal proceeds.

The purpose of the MIT is to establish an overview of the activities related to
organised, subversive criminality. The establishment of this team, which in part
covers ML, was in response to the country’s assessment of risks, particularly risks
related to organised criminal activity and drug trafficking.
115. The Dutch authorities have a robust CFT framework to address TF risks, for instance
through the FEC TF Programme and FEC TFTF, which identify TF signals for
corresponding preventive, supervisory and enforcement activities. There is also an
integrated approach to CT and jihadism, which includes co-operation amongst
national and regional LEAs and FIU-NL. These measures seek to prevent and repress
extremism and terrorism, including TF. The key objectives of the approach are the
strengthening of information exchange and the early identification of and response
to the threats posed by radicalised persons.
33

As of 1 July 2022, the MIT changed its name to ‘National Collaboration against Organised
Crime’ (NSOC) and has specified its operational focus on Trade Based Money Laundering,
the criminal abuse of financial service providers and logistic services, and fighting
corruption and violence.

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116. The FIU-NL also organises its analytical priorities based on system queries informed
by ML/TF risks. This ensures that the FIU’s analytical and strategic products
respond to the country’s priorities and ML/TF risks (see IO.6 for more information).
FIU-NL has also completed other risk-based studies resulting in refined indicators
circulated to obliged entities to better detect these high-risk activities. For example
in 2016, FIU-NL completed a study on underground banking and established new
indicators/typologies for obliged entities, and in 2019 the FIU-NL circulated
indicators to identify high-risk NPOs.

117. At the AML/CFT supervisory level, supervisors, in particular DNB and AFM, are
committed to the implementation of measures under the national AML/CFT
policies. AML/CFT supervisors conduct additional sectoral assessments, trend
analyses and good practice studies to intensify their understanding of the sectoral
ML/TF risks. For example, DNB issued two good practices documents on bank and
trust office customer tax integrity risk in 2019; and AFM conducted a thematic
investigation on investment institutions on VAs.

National co-ordination and co-operation

118. The key strength of the Dutch system lies its robust domestic co-ordination and cooperation on AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels. The
Netherlands leverages a number of platforms to facilitate public-public and publicprivate partnerships to coordinate on AML/CFT and CPF. As noted in Chapter 1 (see
table 1.1), there are extensive co-ordination bodies focusing on policy and
operational matters, including bodies on thematic priorities.

119. At the policy level, this co-ordination is largely led by the Ministry of Justice and
Security and the Ministry of Finance, which report to Parliament every six months
on progress against the ML Action Plan. The Ministers of Finance, Justice and
Security, and Foreign Affairs are jointly responsible for CFT and CPF policy.

120. At the operation level, there are a large number of formal and informal coordination bodies. These bodies (1) implement measures taken on a national level,
for example in the 2019 ML Action Plan, (2) address risks assessed at a national
level with specific projects and, (3) perform exploratory or additional research into
specific risks. The main co-ordination bodies for AML/CFT on operational and/or
supervisory issues are:
•

•

•

FEC, established in 1998, is responsible for protecting and strengthening the
integrity of the financial sector. The FEC exchanges strategic and tactical
information, shares knowledge and expertise, and conducts projects, a
structural Programme on CFT and two Taskforces (TF Task Force and Serious
Crime Task Force), including private sector partners. Primary participants
include AFM; DNB; FIOD; FIU-NL; Police; OM and the Tax and Customs
Administration.
AMLC, established in 2013 by the FIOD, contributes to the formulation of new
ML typologies for use in criminal investigations, facilitates to launch major NL
investigations, draws up specific phenomenon descriptions, runs projects,
builds and manages unique data availability, supported by a wide-ranging
intelligence position. Primary participants include FIOD, Police, FIU-NL, OM,
KMar, Tax and Customs Administration and private sector partners.
RIECs, established in 2008, enhance awareness and support administrative
authorities with combatting organised crime, support regional co-operation

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•

•

•

by exchanging strategic and tactical information, providing expertise and
information, intelligence, and reinforce resilience on the regional/local level.
Participants include: FIOD; Police; Municipal/Provincial authorities; KMar,
OM, Tax and Customs Administration etc.

Consultation Team on Non-Reporting Obliged Entities, established in
2012, is a selection committee chaired by the OM. During the consultations,
supervisors and the FIU-NL present matters that may qualify for criminal
investigation into breaches of the Wwft or other compliance legislation, such
as the Wtt, by obliged entities, which are punishable in the Economic Offences
Act.

Obliged Entities Committee, established in 2008, discuss (proposed)
legislation and policy plans that relate to the organisation and performance of
the obligation to report UTRs and the objective indicators for establishing
whether a transaction is unusual. Participants include obliged entities and
public authorities.

Important operational co-operation also includes sharing and combining of
data institutionalised in co-operation mechanisms like iCOV, AMLC Suite,
JustisTRACK and CT Infobox (See also IO.6).

121. In addition to public-public and public-private coordinating bodies, the Netherlands
also has a number of private-private initiatives on AML/CFT. The below case study
box outlines a recent initiative of the private sector to provide new insights into
potential ML/TF across the Dutch banking sector.

Box 2.2. Transaction Monitoring Netherlands (TMNL)
Launched in 2020, TMNL is a joint initiative of five Dutch banks to collectively
monitor their transactions to identify signals that could indicate ML/TF. Through
collective transaction monitoring of combined transaction data, the primary goal
of this initiative is to improve the detection of ML/TF by identifying unusual
transaction patterns that individual banks cannot identify alone. As such, TMNL
will focus on so-called multi-bank alerts. The privacy sensitive information of the
transaction data to be exchanged between the banks and TMNL is pseudonymised.
Currently, the utility is solely focusing on transaction information related to
corporate clients.

122. For CPF activities and PF TFS, various coordinating bodies exist, focusing on the
implementation of sanctions in general (the Sw Consultation Meeting and the Interministerial Sanctions Consultation Meeting), on taking specific freezing measures
(Asset Freezing Committee), and on consulting with banks and insurers on
implementing TFS (Sanctions Experts Pool). Representatives of DNB, AFM and of
the OM are present during these consultations. In addition, the co-operation
between the OM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Customs, and FIOD in the field of
export controls for dual-use goods and the Carré Consultations increase knowledge
on PF sanctions evasion. Such co-operation also helps ensure that any signals of PF
are disseminated to and actioned by the relevant authority (e.g., supervisor,
intelligence service, or LEAs).
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Private sector’s awareness of risks
123. The Netherlands has undertaken extensive outreach to ensure that the private
sector was involved in the development of the NRAs, and received the final version
of the assessments via dissemination by competent authorities. All NRAs, including
the SNRAs, are also available on publicly accessible webpages, in English and Dutch.
FIs, DNFBPs and other sectors met by the Assessment Team are aware of the
relevant results of the ML/TF NRAs. This is in line with the legal obligations as
obliged entities are required to take into account the NRAs when adopting risk
mitigating policies, procedures and measures.
124. The below private sector entities were involved in the development of the NRAs.
These entities acted as experts and survey respondents:
•

•
•
•

Major banks (all as survey respondents and experts in in-depth
interviews, while one bank was also included in the expert meetings and
validating interviews)
Umbrella NPO organisation (as a survey respondent)

DNFBPs (all as survey respondents, while some in interviews and
meetings)
BES Islands obliged entities as experts to identify potential ML threats.

125. In terms of proactive circulation of the NRA results to FIs and DNFBPs, the NRAs
were also included in the agendas of meetings of the Obliged Entities Committee.
Supervisors also disseminated the findings of NRAs to their respective sectors, and
integrated the findings into sector guidance (e.g., the DNB guidance on Wwft and
Sw, and Wwft guidance for lawyers of the NOvA). The AMLC also incorporated the
NRAs into training materials for obliged entities and competent authorities.
126. Regarding the TF risk understanding of the NPO sector, the Netherlands has a strong
collaborative approach with self-registered NPOs (i.e., so-called “good faith” NPOs).
The NPO sector was informed of the NRAs through meetings held by the Ministry of
Justice and Security, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as
well as through fact sheets prepared in consultation with and disseminated to the
sector. The representatives of the NPO sector met by the Assessment Team had a
strong understanding of the TF vulnerabilities. These representatives also
expressed the need for a more detailed NPO risk assessment, as the findings of the
NRAs are regarded as high-level policy documents. Moreover, the sector
emphasised the need for more engagement and with a broader range of NPO
participants in the next assessment of the TF risks in the NPO sector. The
Assessment Team concurs with this view, as a more detailed sectoral assessment
with enhanced engagement will provide a more comprehensive overview of the
threats and vulnerabilities of the NPO sector, which could also consider the selfregulatory measures already in place in the sector.

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CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO-ORDINATION

Overall Conclusion on IO.1
2

1.

2.

3.
4.

Overall, the Netherlands has a good understanding of its ML/TF risks, with a
relatively stronger understanding on TF. ML and TF risks identified seem
reasonable and in line with feedback received from FATF/FSRB members.
National AML/CFT policies, strategies and activities are formulated and
implemented in a targeted manner to address identified ML/TF risks, though
some exemptions are inconsistent with the BES Islands’ risk profile. The objectives
and activities of the competent authorities seek to address or mitigate identified
risks.
The key strength of the Dutch system lies its robust domestic co-ordination and
co-operation on AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels. The
Netherlands also leverages a number of platforms to facilitate different forms of
partnerships (public-public, public-private and private-private) to coordinate on
AML/CFT as well as public-public platforms on CPF.

There is room for improving ML/TF risk understanding by including more
relevant information in the NRAs and providing sufficient granularity on specific
sectoral risks.
The Netherlands is rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.1.

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Chapter 3. LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Key Findings and Recommended Actions
Immediate Outcome 6
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

LEAs have access to a broad range of financial intelligence and information to
conduct their investigations into ML, TF and predicate offences and to trace
criminal proceeds. Datahubs, in particular iCOV and AMLC Suite, are a strong
feature of the Dutch model of financial intelligence, as they provide LEAs with FIU
disseminations and a wide spectrum of other information in a timely manner to fit
investigative needs. Investigators regularly use these data sources to enrich their
analysis and identify criminal assets or criminal connections.
The FIU-NL plays a central role in the production and dissemination of financial
intelligence. It has improved its analytical capacities to process a considerable and
increasing amount of information included in its UTR database, by investing in
system queries and automation. FIU-NL uploads its disseminations on Blueview,
which is directly accessible by LEAs, as well as in iCOV and AMLC Suite.

FIU-NL’s analytical products—both in relation to operational and strategic
analysis—are of high quality and targeted to identified ML/TF risks and
operational needs of LEAs. In recent years, approximately 60% of FIOD
investigations have direct linkages to the FIU-NL disseminations, and half of all TF
investigations are triggered by FIU-NL’s analytical products. FIU-NL also performs
strategic analysis, including new ML typologies, in general in co-operation with
AMLC and the OM.
Inter-agency co-operation platforms, including Programme FEC TF, public-private
partnerships, such as the FEC TF Task Force and Serious Crime Task Force and the
Fintell Alliance, and the long-established operational synergy between LEAs and
FIU-NL, are additional strengths of the Dutch system to gather financial evidence,
share best practices and discuss operational activities.
There are some minor concerns in relation to the unavailability of data on the
extent of FIU disseminations left unattended in Blueview, and of the usage of FIU’s
disseminations in police investigations into ML and predicate offences. These are
largely mitigated by the extensive co-operation between LEAs and the FIU-NL, and
the frequent use of datahubs by the police.

Immediate Outcome 7

1. The Netherlands proactively initiates ML investigations, through police
intelligence signals detected in the course of investigations into predicate
offences, as well as through financial intelligence developed by the FIU-NL. In
addition, the authorities adopted an innovative approach by launching thematic
AML projects based on the ML risks in the NRAs to increase their ability to detect
new ML schemes and typologies, resulting in additional cases identified. Queries
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

in the iCOV, AMLC and JustisTRACK datahubs enable investigators to gain financial
insights into suspects and their networks.

The high level of expertise, and extensive co-operation between all competent
authorities involved in ML investigations are strengths of the Dutch investigative
system. LEAs use a wide range of special investigation techniques to access
documents and information. However, there are persisting challenges in accessing
the information protected by legal professional privilege in a timely manner.

A national AML Prosecutor ensures co-ordination at policy and operational levels.
The Steering Team coordinates and prioritises most complex ML investigations at
national level and has initiated over 700 investigations since 2016. ML
investigations are generally aligned with the country’s ML risks. As no
comprehensive statistics on underlying predicate offences or types of ML are
maintained, this conclusion is based on the consideration of the large number of
cases studies provided by the authorities. Similarly, the authorities demonstrated
their ability to investigate and prosecute different types of ML, including standalone, third party ML and ML investigations into foreign predicate offences. Since
2016, the Netherlands has pursued more than 17 000 ML investigations at
regional and national levels. Investigations at regional level cover all types of ML,
but are generally less complex, with a majority of self-laundering cases.

The OM has wide discretionary powers in deciding whether to prosecute a case
for ML. There is a relatively high number of cases dismissed, or concluded through
out of court settlements. This is not limited to situations where it is not possible
to secure a ML conviction, but it also due to the priority given to confiscation
efforts, and to the overall length of trials.
The Netherlands has a good conviction rate of ML cases which are brought to court
(62% of final convictions in the first instance). Sanctions applied to ML cases are
low, thereby limiting their dissuasiveness and effectiveness. The lack of ML
sentencing guidelines for judges, and the breaches of the principle of undue delays
impact on final ML sentences.

In the BES Islands, the establishment of a specialised ML prosecutor, additional
financial training and close co-operation between KPCN and RST are important
steps to streamline the authorities’ approach to ML cases. LEAs are mainly relying
on support from continental Netherlands as well as police staff in the Kingdom to
handle complex financial investigations. The lack of stand-alone ML investigations
and the limited number of cases where the OM BES pursued a ML charge are
indicative of an investigative approach mainly focused on predicate offences.

Immediate Outcome 8

1. The Netherlands pursues confiscation as a policy and strategic objective. At an
operational level, there is a clear instruction to LEAs to pursue a financial
investigation in parallel to criminal investigations. Additional resources are
allocated to LEAs and OM to strengthen capacities to trace and confiscate assets,
including in complex cases involving VAs, and to improve co-ordination, through
a National Confiscation Steering Team. There are effective mechanisms in place to
register, manage and store seized and confiscated goods.

2.

The Netherlands has a comprehensive regime to deprive criminals of their assets,
through object and value confiscations. The OM retains discretion in deciding

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3.

4.

5.

whether to pursue confiscation through a court proceeding or an out of court
settlement. The Dutch approach on reversal of the burden of proof on the
convicted person to demonstrate the licit origin of income or assets, in case of a
conviction for serious and lucrative crime, is a particular strength of the
confiscation system. Tax and administrative measures are used to complement the
criminal approach.
The statistics available on seizures and confiscations offer a partial image of the
results achieved by the authorities in depriving criminals of their proceeds, and
providing restitution to victims. However, they demonstrate a correlation
between seizure results and the prevailing proceeds generating offences. The
Netherlands demonstrated strong and effective co-operation with international
counterparts to trace and seize criminal assets.
Customs have extensive investigative powers to perform their tasks, and seize
cash or valuable goods whenever there is a false declaration. The very low
threshold to initiate a ML investigation resulted in a good number of seizures and
ML cases transmitted to LEAs. The sanctions applied to violations of the obligation
to declare in both the Netherlands and the BES Islands are low, which limits their
dissuasiveness.

In the BES Islands, there have been 12 confiscation cases between 2017 and 2020.
While the annual confiscation target was achieved in terms of value of confiscated
proceeds, in the absence of more detailed information the Assessment Team
cannot establish whether these results are consistent with the risks. Furthermore,
the limited expertise noted in IO.7 in relation to the conduct of financial
investigation in the BES Islands may also impact the ability of the authorities to
pursue confiscation.

Recommended Actions
Immediate Outcome 6
1. The Netherlands should develop a systematic feedback mechanism to provide
information to the FIU-NL on the follow-up given by LEAs to the disseminations in
Blueview, and to identify the disseminations left unattended.

2.
3.

The Netherlands should systematically track the extent of the use of FIU’s
disseminations and other financial intelligence reports in ML, TF and predicate
offence investigations, prosecutions and convictions.

The FIU-NL should continue its efforts to ensure that its products are timely and
of high quality, given the increasing number of UTRs submitted and increasing
demands from various co-ordination and co-operation platforms.

Immediate Outcome 7

1. The Netherlands should collect comprehensive statistics on ML investigations,
prosecutions and convictions, including on the underlying predicate offences in
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2.
3.
4.
5.

mixed cases, and on the types of ML offences investigated. The statistics should
inform future ML NRA updates.

The Netherlands should review the ML sentencing regime to ensure that penalties
applied are sufficiently dissuasive and develop specific ML orientation points (i.e.,
akin to sentencing guidelines), which include factors to consider when
determining the penalty based on the gravity of the offence.
The OM should ensure that a higher and more gradual range of penalties is
demanded in practice.

The Netherlands should enhance its efforts to reduce the delays in deciding the
cases where the legal professional privilege has been invoked in Courts, by
streamlining the judicial procedures to filter and assess these requests.
The Netherlands should review the resources allocated to the judges and
prosecutors to ensure that ML investigations are timely, of high quality and with a
minimum of undue delay.

BES Islands
6.
7.
8.

KPCN should strengthen the training of its police force, to increase their ability to
investigate ML. The Netherlands should continue assisting and providing
additional expertise to KPCN.
BES LEAs should prioritise the investigation and prosecution of ML cases, in line
with the risks and should pursue stand-alone ML investigations.

BES authorities should review the level of sentencing applied in practice to ML
cases, and consider the development of sentencing guidelines or points of
reference to guide the OM and judges.

Immediate Outcome 8

1. The authorities should improve the collection of comprehensive and reliable
statistics on seizure and confiscation to measure the success of their confiscation
policies.

2.

The Netherlands should enhance its efforts to recover criminal proceeds located
abroad and collect more extensive statistical data in this respect.

4.

LEAs and OM BES should review their annual confiscation target, taking as a
baseline the results achieved in recent years.

3.

The Netherlands, including BES Islands, should review the maximum level of fines
applicable for failure to declare cash/BNI, to ensure that the penalties are
proportionate to the amount involved, and dissuasive.

127. The relevant Immediate Outcomes considered and assessed in this chapter are IO.68. The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R.1, R. 3, R.4 and R.29-32 and elements of R.2, 8, 9, 15, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38,
39 and 40.

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Immediate Outcome 6 (Financial Intelligence ML/TF)
Use of financial intelligence and other information
128. LEAs, in particular FIOD and the Police, routinely use financial intelligence in their
investigations into ML, TF and predicate offences to develop evidence and trace
criminal proceeds. As the conduct of parallel financial investigations is a common
practice across all LEAs, various financial investigation teams directly access and
process financial information. The FIU-NL plays an important role in the production
of financial intelligence products for ML, TF and predicate offence investigations.

129. As noted in the TC Annex, FIU-NL is the national centre for the receipt and analysis
of suspicious transaction reports and threshold reports submitted by obliged
entities in continental Netherlands and the BES Islands. The Netherlands refers to
both suspicious transaction reports and threshold reports (e.g., on cash payments
over EUR 3 000) jointly as “unusual transaction reports” (UTRs). Obliged entities
must submit UTRs to the FIU through goAML on the basis of a subjective indicator
(i.e., reason to believe that a transaction may be related to ML/TF) or objective
indicators (i.e., threshold reports), which significantly enrich the FIU-NL data pool
(see table 3.5). UTRs are available only to the FIU-NL and not accessible to LEAs.
When the FIU produces a dissemination report 34 based on its analysis, data
matching, or requests (see further details in the section below) and uploads it in
various databases, LEAs have access to it. An overview of the number of UTRs
received by the FIU-NL, and on the number of disseminations is included in
Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1. FIU analysis: number of UTRs and disseminations
Total UTRs received
[subjective vs objective indicators]
FIU disseminations
(% of UTRs disseminated)

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

417 067

361 015
[68%;32%]

39 4743
[69%;31%]

54 1236
[59%;41%]

722 247
[57%;43%]

1 098 913
[44%;56%]

53 533
(12.8%)

40 546
(11.2%)

57 950
(14.7%)

39 544
(7.3%)

10 3947
(14.4%)

80 448
(7.3%)

Split based on reason for FIU-NL dissemination
Match with VROS/CJIB databases
FIU-NL own investigation**
Of which, number initiated by foreign
requests
LEAs (LOvJ) requests

29 266

18 502

32 488

12 104

42 440

16 555

14 875

17 982

18 963

54 884

(900)

(976)

(1 139)

(2 999)

(4 015)

7 712

7 169

7 480

8 477

6 623

35 859
37 991

(6 452)

6598

* Covers the period up to 18 November.
**These figures include FIU-NL analysis based on foreign requests.
Note: The table includes UTRs and disseminations in both continental Netherlands and the BES Islands.
34

The Netherlands refers to its FIU disseminations to LEAs as suspicious transaction reports
(STRs). As the term STRs is defined differently by the FATF Standards and globally used to
refer to the information reported to the FIU from reporting entities, the Assessment Team
instead uses the word “dissemination” to avoid confusion.

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130. Since 2019, the number of UTRs has increased significantly. This is partly due to an
increase in reports filed by banks following a significant financial penalty imposed
on two major Dutch banks for non-compliance with AML/CFT requirements (see
IO.4 for the breakdown of UTRs filed over the assessment period). Furthermore, this
increase is also due to specific FIU alerts related to COVID-19 related fraud (see Box
3.3), and to the regulation of VASPs, which became obliged entities in 2020 and are
subject to reporting obligations since May 2021. The decrease of disseminations in
2019 is caused by a temporary suspension of the cross-matching of UTRs with the
Criminal Records database (VROS) between October 2019 and September 2020,
due to technical issues. A significant increase in the disseminations based on the
VROS matching and FIU own investigations was noted in 2020 and 2021. This is due
to several factors, including the resumption of the VROS matching, and of the FIU
work to refine its automation system to improve UTR analysis.

131. The FIU-NL also receives UTRs from the BES Islands, and makes disseminations to
LEAs in the BES Islands (see Table 3.2). In performing investigations on the BES,
FIU-NL has access to additional sources of information, including the RST list of
suspects in ongoing investigations. FIU-NL and BES LEAs can also consult the BES
land registry, BES CoC and other registries and information to gain financial insights
into suspects. FIU-NL also shares pseudonymised information with the other FIUs
of the Kingdom through FCI.net (see IO.2).

Table 3.2. UTRs and disseminations in the BES Islands
Total UTRs received
Disseminations to LEAs
(%)

2016
1 038
231
(22%)

2017
1 037
337
(32%)

2018
993
174
(18%)

2019
1 031
276
(27%)

2020
858
107
(12%)

2021*
1 681
114
(7%)

* Covers the period up to 18 November.

132. The FIU-NL provides quarterly reports to sectoral supervisors with a breakdown of
UTRs filed by individual FIs and DNFBPs. These reports include aggregated
information per individual obliged entity on their reporting behaviours (e.g.,
transaction date, reporting date, total of UTRs and disseminations, the indicators
and length of the transaction description). Acting on specific requests by
supervisors, the FIU-NL supplements this with additional information such as
reporting behaviours, which allow supervisors to take a risk-based approach in
performing their statutory duties. The number of such requests has increased over
recent years, reflecting a more targeted and risk-based approach to AML/CFT
supervision, and a recognition of the importance of the FIU-NL’s information.

133. During criminal investigations, LEAs have direct access to FIU’s disseminations via
Blueview and systematically use financial and tax information and network analysis
obtained by submitting requests to different financial intelligence datahubs (see
Box 3.1 below). Through these datahubs, LEAs can proactively gather a holistic
financial overview in a timely manner, without the need to consult each data source
separately. This is a key strength of the Dutch system on the access and use of
financial intelligence.

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Box 3.1. Non-exhaustive list of financial intelligence datahubs
Criminal and Unexplained Assets Infobox (iCOV): is a partnership of 13
authorities, including LEAs, OM, and FIU-NL, which provides and develops datadriven intelligence reports. Over 22 datasets (e.g., FIU disseminations, land
register, CoC register, and tax information) are linked to track criminal and
unexplained assets, to uncover ML and fraud. iCOV reports are generated within a
few minutes to a few hours. There are three types of reports: assets and income
reports (financial situation of a specific subject), relation reports (financial and
business relations of a natural or legal person) and thematic reports (insights into
ML through real estate or another specific theme). iCOV reports are used by more
than 4 200 authorised users, whereby each user has insight into the specific
information for which they are legally permitted.
AMLC Suite: managed by AMLC/FIOD, is a browser which combines FIU
disseminations and legal information, depending on each organisation’s needs and
legal status (e.g. tax information for FIOD), with each other, and with open source
information (e.g., Panama papers, Bahama Leaks) to detect signals/patterns of ML.
Authorised officers (155 from FIOD and approximately 100 from the Police) can
use the browser to perform searches and analysis.
JustisTRACK: can provide network drawings or information on possible abuse of
legal persons, spontaneously and upon request (see IO.5).

Information Exchange on Counter Terrorism (CT Infobox): is a partnership
between intelligence units, LEAs, OM and FIU-NL, headed by AIVD. It shares
information on persons posing a terrorist threat. It works according to a closed box
principle whereby the CT Infobox advises participating partners on the provision
of information between them and the measures to be taken. It also draws attention
to information that is available within the partners’ own organisations.

Bank data referral portal: is a technical facility to automatically and centrally
process the data of banks at the request of criminal investigative and prosecuting
authorities and searches by FIU-NL and the Tax and Customs Administration. The
portal enables LEAs to retrieve the requested information, including the BO
information available in the data of banks (see IO.5).

134. In recent years, LEAs have increasingly requested iCOV reports to develop financial
intelligence in the course of their investigations (see the statistics on iCOV usage in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below). iCOV can generate new investigative leads by combining
financial information to reveal assets related to a suspect and relationships between
suspects, or other known criminals. A concrete example on LEAs’ use of iCOV is
included in Box 3.2. As a part of its in-depth analysis, FIU-NL also frequently
requests iCOV reports to decide whether to declare a UTR suspicious and
disseminate it to LEAs. The dissemination then becomes part of the iCOV reports by
default, giving LEAs a holistic financial overview of the targets. LEAs in the BES
Islands can submit requests to iCOV through the Netherlands Police or FIOD. They
submitted a total of 15 requests between 2016 and 2021.

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Box 3.2. Use of iCOV information by the Police
During an investigation into a possible violation of a police officer's integrity, the
Police requested an income and assets report and a relationship report to iCOV.
iCOV reports revealed that the officer had a connection with a large network of
drug criminals through a personal relationship. The network report also
uncovered a connection with a person working at another governmental agency,
possibly involved in facilitating drug trafficking. The Police team expelled the
police officer and shared the information about the drug-importing group with a
special unit of the police for further investigation.

3

Table 3.3. Requests for iCOV reports
*

Number of requests

2016
5 076

2017
6 715

2018
8671

2019
14 454

2020
16 150

2021*
14 621

Covers the period up to 18 November.

Table 3.4. Requests for iCOV reports by agency
Police
Tax Administration
OM
FIOD
FIU
Customs
CJIB
DNB
Special Investigation Service ILT
Special Investigation Service ISZW
Special Investigation Service NVWA
Police Internal Investigation Department
ND Authority for Consumer and Markets
Total

2019
5 135
2 325
1 624
1 033
640
23
3 193
19
44
190
50
108
70
14454

2020
5 161
2 984
1 372
1 124
1 416
21
3 241
16
60
518
67
114
56
16150

2021*
3 848
3 147
1 013
1 351
1 003
18
3610
18
37
393
59
97
27
14621

* Covers the period up to 18 November.

135. In addition to the information and reports available through the datahubs, LEAs can
also separately consult other registers, such as the CoC, insolvency register, vehicle
authority database or the land register. An essential source of financial information
for LEAs is also their network of domestic and international partners. As described
in IO.1, public-public and public-private partnerships are a key feature of the
Netherlands AML/CFT system. LEAs also proactively engage their international
counterparts through judicial and police-police MLA requests, as well as through
Police/LEA/OM liaison officers to pursue cases with an international dimension
(see IO.2).

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Disseminations received and requested by competent authorities
136. FIU-NL produces and disseminates financial intelligence to LEAs, both
spontaneously and upon request. FIU-NL receives a significant amount of
information from obliged entities based on subjective and objective indicators. The
below table provides a breakdown of UTRs reported to FIU-NL. The total number of
UTRs in this table differs from Table 3.1, as some transactions were reported based
on both subjective and objective indicators.

Table 3.5. The UTRs reported to FIU-NL from subjective and objective indicators

Subjective UTRs (suspicions of ML/TF)
Objective UTRs (e.g., threshold reports)

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

245 062
117 524

267 920
119 109

317 379
217 233

413 840
308 165

479 073
621 632

* Covers the period up to 18 November.

137. FIU-NL has a wide range of powers to obtain information through direct and
indirect access to several databases and datahubs. It has also frequently used its
unique legal power to request information relevant for its analysis from all obliged
entities to develop a complete financial intelligence picture and add value to its
disseminations, in particular those triggered by FIU-NL’s own investigation, LEA
and foreign requests. The ability to process this extensive dataset is a key strength
of the FIU, as it enables it to produce high quality analytical products for LEAs.

138. Customs (including in the BES Islands) submits all cross-border declarations and
disclosures of currency and BNIs to FIU-NL, which are used in its analytical
enrichment process. All declaration and disclosure information is integrated into
the UTR database and can be used for future cross-matching (see Table 3.6).
Approximately 7.5% of the Customs reports are included in FIU disseminations.

Table 3.6. Custom disclosures and declarations sent to FIU-NL
Customs (NL)
Customs CN (BES)

2016
5 492
121

2017
5 775
41

2018
7 263
46

2019
6 644
25

2020
3 781
97

* Covers the period up to 18 November.

2021*
3 390
35

139. On a daily basis, the FIU-NL automatically screens all UTRs in its database against
the Criminal Records (VROS) database and Central Fine Collection Agency (CJIB)
register to identify any matches with subjects of ongoing criminal investigations, or
with outstanding criminal fines. Positive hits result in the immediate automatic
conversion of the UTR into a dissemination report to the relevant investigative,
intelligence and security services.

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140. The FIU-NL has also developed a system of queries to cross-check UTRs. Queries
consist of specific themes, or key words used to automatically check and filter the
large amount of information included in the UTR database. FIU-NL constantly
refines and reviews queries based on the NRA, priorities of OM and LEAs, or any
other identified risks to detect any new trends related to ML, TF or other offences.
Whenever there is a match with a query, an automatic alert is generated and an
analyst will perform a more in-depth assessment of the transaction(s) to determine
whether it is appropriate to disseminate to LEAs.

141. FIU-NL also analyses requests received from foreign FIUs in the same way as
domestic requests (see Table 3.1). While the TC Annex notes a minor technical
deficiency under R.40, as there is no explicit legal basis for FIU-NL to exchange
information with non-EU/EEA FIUs (outside of an MOU), this is not an issue in
practice. Indeed, the FIU-NL regularly exchanges information, upon request or
spontaneously, with foreign FIUs, including non-EU/EEA states. Information is
exchanged via the established channel amongst EU FIUs (via FIU.net), which allows
automated matching against subjects of interest. There has been an increasing trend
in the number of FIU disseminations based on foreign requests, which is largely
attributed to the digitalisation of FIU-NL internal procedures. However, in some
cases the information transmitted by the FIU to its EU counterparts in the form of
cross-border dissemination reports includes limited contextual analysis. FIU-NL
provides further information and context to EU FIUs upon request (see IO.2).

142. The FIU-NL transfers its disseminations directly into LEAs databases. For example,
FIU disseminations are exported into Blueview (the Police database) on a daily
basis. LEAs, including the police and FIOD, have direct access to Blueview and
therefore to FIU-NL disseminations. LEAs also consult iCOV and the AMLC Suite
information hubs, which also contain FIU disseminations received on a weekly
basis. The different frequencies in exporting FIU disseminations have only a minor
impact on the timeliness and consistency of intelligence for LEAs’ investigations, as
LEAs, as a general practice, consult Blueview first when they are searching for FIU
disseminations, and then iCOV and AMLC Suite as additional tools for both FIU
disseminations and other relevant information for their investigative needs.

143. The case studies provided to the Assessment Team demonstrate an extensive use of
financial intelligence in different types of investigations. The statistics on Blueview
usage demonstrate an increase in the use of FIU disseminations by the Police (see
Table 3.7 below). FIOD also regularly accesses dissemination reports as a standard
practice in nearly all financial investigations. Indeed, approximately 60% of FIOD
investigations include FIU dissemination reports.

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Table 3.7. Number of dissemination reports consulted by Police in Blueview

Dissemination reports consulted by Police in Blueview

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

871

4 924

4 900

8 429

12 624

3

144. As there is no system in place to monitor follow-up action by LEAs, it is unclear how
many FIU disseminations are left unattended in Blueview, particularly those
deriving from FIU-NL’s spontaneous disseminations. However, this is a minor
concern considering the extensive co-operation between LEAs and FIU-NL,
including joint ventures which ensure a timely hand-over and appropriate
prioritisation of FIU disseminations. There is also no data to assess the full extent of
FIU disseminations used in Police investigations into every ML or predicate offence.
However, this is largely mitigated by the high usage of iCOV reports, and the
exponential increase in Blueview usage by the Police to search for FIU
disseminations during their investigations.

145. LEAs also seek financial intelligence from FIU-NL when no disseminations are
available in Blueview. Such requests are sent through the OM and are referred to as
“LOvJ” requests (see Table 3.8). These requests generally contain more operational
details of an investigation. In 2020, over 50% of LOvJ requests originated from the
Police, followed by FIOD and KMar. Based on the details of requests received, the
FIU-NL conducts thorough analysis making use of its UTR database, and information
requested from obliged entities, as well as from its international network and other
available databases. In general, the FIU-NL responds to such requests within 21
days and there are often multiple dissemination reports generated for a single
request.

146. BES Islands’ authorities also submit LOvJ requests to FIU-NL, but to a significantly
lesser extent. As noted under IO.7, there has been an increase in the resources
allocated to BES prosecution and investigative services for ML and financial
investigations. However, BES LEAs have limited capacity to analyse and process
intelligence provided by FIU-NL in a timely manner (see also IO.7).

Table 3.8. LOvJ requests to the FIU-NL
LEAs NL

2016
1 277

2017
1 246

2018
1 262

2019
1 298

2020
1 213

2021*
817

LEAs BES

3

5

1

4

1

3

* Covers the period up to 18 November.

147. FIU-NL registers the relevant predicate offence(s) for its disseminations (for both
spontaneous disseminations, and those produced upon LEA requests). As noted in
the below table, the vast majority of disseminations are related to ML with an
unknown predicate (59%), followed by fraud (11%), corruption (7%),
terrorism/TF/TFS (6%), human trafficking (6%) and hard drugs (4%). This is
generally in line with the ML/TF risks in the Netherlands. Furthermore, half of TF
investigations were triggered by FIU-NL’s analytical products (see IO.9).

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Table 3.9. Dissemination reports per predicate offences

3

Type of offence
ML
Terrorism/TF/TFS
Fraud
Hard drugs
Other
Soft drugs

2016
12916
3237
8304
3626
640
795

2017
15195
2204
3508
2540
828
937

2018
20939
2788
1583
1479
329
509

2019
19871
2101
2121
1585
145
228

2020
54231
3601
5964
578
698
77

2021*
36972
3148
7422
1530
538
91

Human
trafficking/smuggling
Murder/homicide
Corruption
Weapon trade
Synthetic drugs
Cybercrime
Child porn

3874
987
141
155
580
5
388

1329
635
407
360
213
7
27

2462
400
6194
101
54
11
284

4012
199
316
351
111
2
1200

875
170
9432
447
373
33
1640

2141
290
2268
102
320
40
1019

Total
160 124
17 079
28 902
11 338
3 178
2 637
14 693
2 681
18 758
1 516
1 651
98
4 558

* Covers the period up to 18 November.

148. The continuous refinement and update of queries, technological developments and
increase in FIU staff contributed to an increased number of disseminations in recent
years. The FIU-NL also strived to maintain efficiency by keeping an average
processing time for disseminations based on its own investigation under 30 days 35
between 2016 and 2021 (from 29 days in 2016 to 21 days in 2021). From an
operational standpoint, this delay is reasonable and can be mitigated by the close
co-operation between the FIU-NL and LEAs, as it allows the FIU-NL to prioritise
urgent requests.

Operational needs supported by FIU analysis and dissemination

149. FIU-NL analysis and disseminations support LEAs operational needs to a very large
extent. LEAs met during the onsite confirmed the long-established partnership and
co-operation with the FIU-NL and the high quality of information provided by the
FIU-NL.

150. As of November 2021, the FIU-NL employed 79 staff members, the majority of which
(over 50) are financial and tactical analysts. 17 staff are in-house specialists for
technological development. The FIU-NL has a permanent team of five analysts and
one data scientist to conduct strategic analysis. One liaison officer operates in the
BES Islands. FIU-NL conducts both operational and strategic analysis.

35

This is the average processing time for FIU-NL’s dissemination based on its own
investigation, from the day a case file is opened to the day of dissemination.

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Operational analysis
151. The FIU-NL can target LEAs’ operational needs through its automatic interface with
various databases. This allows for instant detection and dissemination of matches
with subjects under ongoing criminal investigations in the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the system queries are based on the ML/TF risks identified in the
NRAs and the priorities of OM and LEAs (see Box 3.3). Other positive features
include the direct and automatic transfer of FIU dissemination reports into the
primary police database (i.e., Blueview) and the added value of having FIU
dissemination reports in information hubs such as AMLC Suite and iCOV. As
mentioned above, the increasing use of Blueview and iCOV reports is an indication
of the utility of this information for LEAs.

Box 3.3. FIU intelligence in reacting to the COVID-19 emergency
In March 2020, the Dutch Government decided on a series of emergency allowances
to react to the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 lockdown. FIU-NL made
agreements with FIOD/AMLC, the Police and I-SZW, in co-ordination with the OM
to detect possible fraud cases related to the use of COVID-related benefits. FIU-NL
issued several newsletters to help obliged entities detect fraud, through specific
characteristics and red flags. It also issued a special code for reporting UTRs related
to possible COVID-19 fraud and put together a team to analyse any new coded UTR
on a daily basis.

152. In addition to the FIU disseminations, the FIU also produces Financial Intelligence
Reports (FIRs), spontaneously or in response to LOvJ requests. FIRs are in-depth
analyses to depict complex transactions, networks, criminal activities and ML/TF
patterns in criminal investigations. FIRs often contain hundreds of UTRs, as
compared to FIU disseminations which may contain a smaller amount of UTRs. FIRs
often serve as a package analysis to LEAs detailing a new ML/TF method and trend.
The below table outlines the number of FIRs produced by the FIU during the
assessment period.

Table 3.10. FIRs by the FIU-NL
Total
ML related
TF related

2016
21
21
0

2017
24
23
1

2018
18
6
12

2019
24
9
15

2020
55
22
33

* Covers the period up to 18 November

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2021*
46
20
26

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153. Another direct tool for FIU-NL to respond effectively to LEAs’ operational needs is
to temporarily assign FIU analysts to investigative teams in charge of complex
investigations into criminal organisations. Through this collaboration, FIU analysts
can rapidly detect and provide disseminations upon demand and in line with
operational needs. The below case study provides an example of such collaboration.

Strategic analysis

154. The FIU’s Strategic Analysis Team is responsible for refining system queries and
conducting thematic research to identify criminal trends and phenomena based on
ML/TF risks, as well as LEAs’ investigation priorities (see also IO.7). To provide
some concrete examples, some of the queries seek to identify possible indications
of human trafficking, ML via VAs, underground banking and corruption.

155. The FIU-NL also produces other types of strategic analysis, such as the formulation
of new ML/TF typologies, mainly in co-operation with the AMLC and OM, and the
issuing of binding guidance to certain types of obliged entities (e.g. the obligation
for certain obliged entities to report specific elements or indicators to FIU-NL). The
AMLC specifically scrutinises criminal investigations to detect new ML modus
operandi, such as involving VAs. Based on an AMLC phenomenon description about
bitcoin dealers, new ML typologies have been published on the FIU-NL website. The
typologies also formed the basis of a new thematic ML project on VAs, initiated by
FIU disseminations.

Box 3.4. Example of a FIR analysis
In 2016, FIU-NL analysed 75 transactions involving a total of over EUR 633 million
through a bank account of a local company, carrying out illegal trust activities. The
analysis identified a bank account in the Netherlands channelling funds from
foreign individuals and entities listed in some international ML leaks and public
scandals to other jurisdictions, including Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Estonia, UK,
Israel, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Luxembourg.
The purpose of the transactions was to layer proceeds of crime through a thirdparty country. The operation and structure of the illegal activities was uncovered
and detailed in a FIR after FIU-NL’s extensive enquiries with foreign FIUs and
consultation with other datahubs, such as iCOV and JustisTRACK.

Box 3.5. FIU participation in an investigative team
FIU-NL investigated UTRs concerning a purchase of a very expensive house. The
suspect could not prove a legitimate source of income. Through additional
information from obliged entities and foreign FIUs, as well as from the Blueview
database, CoC and land registry, the FIU produced an intelligence report and
transmitted it to the Criminal Investigative Team. The team involved the FIU
throughout the investigation and the house searches. This close co-operation
allowed the FIU to detect additional suspicious transactions. The suspect used a
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system of companies in the fruit trade and front men to mask money flows. Over
EUR one million was transferred on the bank account of inactive fruit companies
by a Dutch scrap dealer, allegedly for the payment for a large batch of scrap. At
least 38 fictitious companies in the Netherlands and abroad were used to launder
the money. Through a complex network of strawmen, accomplices and
companies, the suspect was able to conceal his involvement and key role in the
criminal network. FIU-NL reports enabled LEAs to gain further insight into a
larger criminal network where the suspect was involved as a facilitator. This
information led to follow-up investigations.

Co-operation and exchange of information/financial intelligence

156. As noted in IO.1, domestic co-operation and co-ordination is a key strength in the
Dutch AML/CFT system, including at the operational level. This system is supported
by extensive public-public, public-private and private-private partnerships. In
terms of financial intelligence, the FIU has a central role in the majority of these
structures. In the TF Platform, a public-private partnership, FIU-NL shares
knowledge on themes, phenomena and typology with the four major banks and the
Dutch Banking Association. It initiated the Fintell Alliance in 2019 (see Box 3.6) and
takes part in the Asset Freezing Committee (see IO.10) and in the Consultation Team
on Non-reporting Obliged Entities (see IO.1), as well as the Wwft Supervisors
consultations (see IO.1 and 3). It is also a regular partner in the FEC initiatives,
including the TF Task Force and Serious Crime Task Force, and a number of joint
projects.

Box 3.6. Fintell Alliance
In 2019, FIU-NL set up the Fintell Alliance, a public-private partnership with four
major banks. It aims to exchange financial intelligence and knowledge to improve
the efficiency and efficacy of UTRs by banks. FIU-NL provides feedback, red flags
and modus operandi to partnering banks to obtain information of higher relevancy
and quality in return. This partnership is utilised in some operational platforms and
thematic projects such as the TF Platform, TFTF, SCTF, FEC Project TBML and FEC
Project Labour Exploitation.
Case example on the use of Fintell Alliance

In 2020, upon request from LEAs, FIU-NL investigated a ML scheme through
underground banking by professional ML groups. By sharing information in Fintell
Alliance, FIU-NL was able to detect a correlation that individual reporting
institutions would not have been able to identify, based on their individual data.
FIU-NL employees analysed their UTR database and conducted a joint analysis with
Fintell Alliance institutions, which eventually mapped out an underground banking
network and money flow involving more than 200 individuals, 200 bank accounts
and 600 companies with a total value of suspicious transactions for over EUR 200
M. In addition to compiling a FIR for LEAs, the findings have been shared with banks
and overseas counterparts to step up prevention and detection of underground
banking.

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157. The AMLC has a unique position in the national AML framework. It is housed under
the FIOD and headed jointly by the FIOD and the Police. It provides a platform where
all parties, both public and private, share their knowledge and expertise and work
together at operational level for the verification of this knowledge and expertise
(see also Box 3.1). Its staff of 40 includes a judge, who is a former prosecutor, ML
experts, investigators and data scientists. Two AMLC employees work directly in the
FIU-NL to further facilitate co-operation and access to information held by the tax
administration. AMLC collaborates with the OM, FIOD, Police, FIU-NL, the Tax and
Customs Administration, KMar and private sectors, and with international
counterparts (through the Europe Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership
Steering Group) to facilitate ML complex investigations and to exchange knowledge
on ML (see IO.7).

158. The frequent use of task forces, joint investigation teams and thematic investigation
projects are also important tools to ensure that financial information and
intelligence reaches the appropriate parties. The fieldlab approach is sometimes
used for project-based co-operation led by the OM with participation of FIU-NL or
other relevant parties. Fieldlabs examine a single offence, or a vulnerable sector, or
a new phenomenon, which may present ML risks. At the regional level, the RIECs
and LIEC also contribute to provide intelligence and analysis, in particular in cooperation with municipalities and provincial authorities, and regional and local
police. The below case study provides an overview of a fieldlab initiative.

Box 3.7. Fieldlab human trafficking/smuggling
In 2018, FIU-NL participated in a fieldlab with the OM, the Police, KMAR, tax
authorities and the Expertise Centre on Human Trafficking and Smuggling to detect
possible transactions indicating sexual exploitation. The Fieldlab aimed at gaining
insight into criminal networks exploiting women from Eastern Europe and worked
together with an investigation team from RIEC. FIU-NL analysis identified multiple
Romanian criminal networks. FIU-NL detected hundreds of money transfers to
Romania, through specific queries and transmitted multiple case files to LEAs
participating in the fieldlab. The transaction analysis exposed a financial pattern
that was followed by the police to identify the network of facilitators.

159. There is a robust system in place to ensure the confidentiality of the financial
information exchanged. The FIU-NL is physically located within the Police premises,
with exclusive access to FIU staff, as verified by the Assessment Team during the
onsite visit. UTR data is accessible only to FIU staff. There are also specific rules in
the different partnerships to protect the information exchanged, including the use
of anonymised information and secure channels. UTR data remains in the FIU
database for a period of five years, while disseminations are retained for 10 years.

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Immediate Outcome 7 (ML investigation and prosecution)
160. The Netherlands does not collect comprehensive data and statistics on the types of
ML investigations and prosecutions, nor on the underlying predicate offenses. As a
result, the Assessment Team relied heavily on the case examples provided by the
authorities and onsite discussions with LEAs, prosecutors and judges to assess
effectiveness.

ML identification and investigation

161. The Netherlands has a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to
investigate and prosecute ML effectively. The Netherlands does not rely on the
establishment of a predicate offence to prosecute ML and has a low threshold to
initiate a ML investigation. It is sufficient to establish that an object is the direct or
indirect proceed of an offence. Financial investigations are pursued systematically
in criminal investigations both at the national and regional levels, in order to detect
and confiscate criminal proceeds (see IO.8).

Overall conclusions on IO.6
1. LEAs use a wide range of financial intelligence to support their investigations into
ML, TF and predicate offences, and to trace criminal proceeds. The FIU-NL is
central to the production of financial intelligence based on the operational needs
of LEAs and has a long-established operational co-operation with LEAs. It
produces high quality operational and strategic analysis targeting LEAs needs and
the ML/TF risks. The technological developments in the FIU have increased its
capacity to analyse a large amount of data. There are minor concerns as to the
unavailability of data on the usage of FIU’s disseminations in Blueview and Police
investigations.

2.

3.

In addition to the FIU products, LEAs increasingly request iCOV reports and
engage AMLC, to gain a better insight into assets and networks of a suspect or a
criminal group. Existing datahubs, public-public partnerships and public-private
platforms are key features of the Dutch system and are regularly used in financial
investigations.
The Netherlands is rated as having a high level of effectiveness for IO.6.

162. LEAs identify ML signals from a range of different sources, including datahubs. The
Netherlands regularly uses financial intelligence from the FIU, as well as iCOV data
intelligence reports, queries to AMLC Suite and JustisTRACK to detect ML signals
and identify proceeds of crime. This conclusion is supported by the statistics
provided in IO.6 on the use of FIU disseminations, and iCOV information by LEAs
during their investigations. In addition to opening a ML investigation in parallel
with predicate offence investigations, the Netherlands proactively initiates and
pursues stand-alone ML. The authorities have prioritised thematic projects in
accordance with ML risks, to detect new ML signals and schemes and develop ML
typologies and indicators.
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163. The authorities’ proactive approach to identify ML offences and detect and
confiscate criminal proceeds is reflected in the annual increase of ML investigations
between 2016 and 2021 (see Table 3.11) and in the high number of stand-alone
cases. Overall, since 2016, the Netherlands has conducted more than 17 200 ML
investigations, of which over 10 100 are standalone. The majority of ML
investigations have been conducted at regional level (approximately 15 300 cases).

164. Cases initiated at the national level as a result of thematic projects are complex and
include the prosecution of different forms of ML. Since 2016, 2 785 investigations
have been launched at the national level by the FP and LP. Due to the low threshold
to initiate a ML investigation, regional cases tend to be less sophisticated, with a
majority involving self-laundering. However, case studies demonstrate that
regional investigations also include complex stand-alone or third-party ML cases,
and criminal investigations into predicate offenses where ML risks are high (i.e.,
drugs and fraud offenses).

Table 3.11. Overall number of ML investigations conducted at regional and national
levels
Police
KMar
BOD (incl. FIOD)
Other
Total

2016
1 589
180
297
36
2 102

2017
1 766
146
290
48
2 250

2018
1 932
93
268
33
2 326

2019
3 040
143
297
71
3 551

2020
3 589
175
248
48
4 060

2021*
2 789
50
134
16
2 989

Total
14 705
787
1 534
252
17 278

* Covers the first half of the year.

165. The OM plays a major role in the investigation and prosecution of ML. Three
different offices handle ML cases:
•

•

•

The National Public Prosecution Office for Serious Fraud, Environmental Crime
and Asset Confiscation (OM/FP) is a specialised office responsible for economic
offences, complex ML and confiscation cases. Within the FP, a dedicated ML
National Public Prosecutor (LOvJ for ML) is responsible for coordinating ML
policies throughout the country and promoting the transfer of knowledge
between all parties involved in ML investigations (e.g., FIOD, Police, FIU-NL,
the LP and the APs). The OM/FP works in close co-ordination with FIOD and
other specialised LEAs (BODs) (see R.30).
The National Public Prosecution Office (OM/LP) focuses on ML related to
national and international organised crime, including human trafficking and
drug trade, and works closely with the Police and its Central Criminal
Investigations Division.
Finally, the District Public Prosecution Offices (APs) manages local/regional ML
cases, in co-operation with regional police units.

166. All LEAs involved in ML investigations have financial expertise and continuous
training available as well as dedicated teams to work on complex financial
investigations.

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Table 3.12. Role of main LEAs involved in ML investigations
Agency

Specialist units and resources

Police

10 regional units
All units have in-house financial investigators. Specialised
financial expertise teams (FinSup) support complex financial
investigations at regional level
1 Central unit with a Central Criminal Investigations Division
(DLR).
Three specialised financial criminal investigation teams (FinEC)
support DLR work on complex ML cases.
In National Police total: 65,000 employees.
773 financial investigators and 203 financial intelligence experts in
the regional units.
159 financial investigators and 21 financial intelligence experts in
DLR.
13 offices in six regions.
1627 staff, of which 1 463 financial investigators

FIOD
KMar

National brigades (5 000 operational staff) divided in tactical,
specialist, and financial and economic teams (28 FinEC staff, 10
staff in SVLM-see IO8)

Responsible
OM office
OM/LP or APs
for regional/
local cases.

Type of ML cases pursued
Regional units:
- ML cases at the regional level (drug
offences or other criminal activities, mainly
self-laundering).
- complex ML cases involving regional
elements and support to financial
investigations of regular teams
DLR: complex ML cases linked to organised
criminal groups, with a national or
international dimension.

OM/FP
AP

Stand-alone ML cases and complex ML
cases related to tax crimes, fraud, corruption
or other economic offences.
Regional ML investigations at the borders,
including at Dutch international airports.

167. Within this general repartition of tasks, the OM can opt to assign a case to a joint
Police and FIOD investigation team, notably for investigations involving complex
financial or economic schemes, and serious organised crime. The national
Combined Team exploits the specific knowledge and expertise of both LEAs. The
Combined Team investigations are usually longer, due to the complexity of the
schemes, and often involve co-operation with international partners. An example of
Combined Team investigation is presented in Box 3.8. The OM can also assign an
investigation to the MIT (see IO.1).

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Box 3.8. Example of ML investigations by different LEAs
ML investigation conducted by the Combined Team
3

In 2018, the Combined Team initiated a complex investigation into TBML and
underground banking. It originated from STR disseminations by FIU-NL that
revealed considerable amounts of transactions in the trade of onions and potatoes
with West African countries were settled in cash, for an amount of over EUR 150
million over the period 2014-2019. The money was moved through underground
banking. The traders in the Netherlands accepted payments in cash over EUR 10
000 without fulfilling the obligation to report them as per the Wwft. The
investigation, which is ongoing, is examining at the role of underground bankers
and cash-couriers, who are suspected of laundering criminal funds through these
cash transactions.
Complex ML investigation conducted at regional level

In 2018, a local investigation team in the Hague regional police unit started a ML
investigation after five Kg of cocaine and EUR 60 000 in cash where found in a drug
dealer apartment. The team was supported by the Police’s regional FinSup and
FinEC teams. Since the drug dealer was not registered at that address, the
investigation tried to identify who was paying the rent. The investigation revealed
constructions set up to hide the criminal identity of the tenants through legal real
estate infrastructures, the use of the properties for criminal activities and the
laundry of illicit money through rent payments. The main suspect’s company
introduced criminal tenants to two real estate investors. He was receiving the rent
in cash and transferring it to them. In 2019, 34 house addresses were searched and
almost eight million EUR in cash and 25 cars were seized, as well as drugs, weapons
and PGP phones. In 2020, five suspects were convicted for habitual ML to
imprisonment sentences ranging from 28 months to five years.

168. The most complex ML cases are discussed by the Steering Team. A Consultation
Team carries out a preliminary evaluation of the ML signals against the main ML
risks and the AML Strategic Programme and presents the most important cases to a
Steering Team. The Steering Team includes representatives from the OM (FP and
LP), the Police and FIOD, and decides on launching ML investigations and assigns
the case to a specific LEA (at regional or national level) or the Combined Team. Highend ML cases are usually conducted at national level. An example of a complex case
handled at regional level is presented in Box 3.8 above.

Table 3.13. ML investigations initiated by the Steering Team
FIOD/FP
DLR/LP
DLR FinEC team dealing
with ML and cash
Combined Team
Total

2016
64
20
n/a

2017
101
16
4

2018
95
40
17

2019
77
32
17

2020
66
33
11

2021*
50
19
9

Total
453
160

11
95

14
135

14
166

11
137

6
116

2
80

58
729

58

* Covers the period up to 1 October.
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169. Since 2016, the Steering Team initiated over 700 investigations, as shown in
Table 3.13. The increasing complexity of the cases and criminal schemes, as well as
the frequent need to request MLA in these investigations, explain the slight decrease
in the overall number of investigations that the Steering Team initiated annually.

170. The case studies on ML project-based investigations and investigations deriving
from the Steering Team show a high level of financial expertise, especially through
the involvement of various specialised investigative services. LEAs use a wide range
of investigative techniques in the course of their financial investigations.
Information obtained through iCOV, JustisTRACK and AMLC Suite is regularly
included in the investigation file and can be used as evidence in Court. Where
needed, a criminal financial investigation (SFO) can also be instituted, providing
powers to prosecutors and investigative officers in obtaining documents and seizing
evidence and assets in the consecutive confiscation process. The below case study
highlights a case initiated by the Steering Team.

Box 3.8. Example of complex ML investigation involving an online bitcoin mixer
In 2018, the authorities received information from a cyber-security company that
a bitcoin mixing service was operating in the Netherlands. The mixer was splitting
up and reassembling virtual currencies to make them untraceable, against the
payment of a commission. The joint investigation by FIOD (and its specialised
cyber team FACT), the AMLC and the Police (High Tech Crime Team) led to
dismantling one of the largest online mixers for VAs, which was used to launder
criminal money. The authorities estimated that the mixer achieved a turnover of at
least USD 200 million per year. The Netherlands cooperated closely with
EUROPOL, Luxembourg and other EU countries. Six servers were seized in the
Netherlands and Luxembourg. FIOD collected and analysed all customers and
transactions data in the server and shared relevant information with other
countries.

171. During interviews with the authorities, a challenge emerged in relation to obtaining
information protected by the legal professional privilege in a timely manner. The
authorities initiated several steps to process and decide cases where the legal
professional was invoked in Courts after the seizure of evidence, but it continues to
be an issue. Almost all ML complex investigations by FIOD require evidence held by
lawyers, notaries, or other (legal) professionals. In order to access this evidence, the
OM must submit a request to an investigative judge, and then to the Court and
possibly the Supreme Court, as the defence often invokes legal privilege regarding
the seized information. In practice, the entire process takes a considerable amount
of time: an average of 211 days for examination by the investigative judge; 346 days
to be discussed in Court; and 269 days to reach the Supreme Court. According to
experts met during the onsite, this time-consuming process has in some cases
resulted in delays in investigations and prosecutions, and reduced sentencing for
ML because of breaches of the undue delay principle. No statistics on the frequency
of undue delays breaches are available, as this issue is not always specifically
mentioned in the final sentencing by the judges.

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172. The OM retains the sole responsibility for the prosecution of offences, including ML.
It has discretionary power to decide whether to prosecute a case or settle it out of
court (see Table 3.14). Since 2016, the OM has unconditionally dismissed 35% of
the ML investigations, due to the unlikeliness to achieve a conviction, or
discretionary or administrative dismissal. An increasing number of cases have also
been settled out of court. Several factors can explain these figures. For example, the
low evidentiary threshold to initiate a ML investigation (a reasonable suspicion that
the money is of illegal origin, without the need to identify a specific predicate
offence) entails that a high number of cases cannot be proven after further
investigation. In approximately 70% of the dismissed cases, there was insufficient
evidence to proceed to court, or insufficient national interest (for instance, in cases
where the same individual is already part of an investigation abroad). Overall,
between 2016 and 2021, approximately 53% of the ML investigations resulted in
ML charges presented to the courts. The OM concluded approximately 10% of the
investigations by imposing out of court settlements or penalty orders (see further
for an analysis of the sanctions imposed). Amongst the ML cases presented to Court
(both mixed and stand-alone), the conviction rate for ML cases concluded in the first
instance is positive, and close to 62%. Table 3.15 presents an overview of the final
Court decisions, in the first instance (i.e. cases where there was no appeal). The
overall conviction rate is higher (80%) when considering all ML convictions in the
first instance (i.e., including also those cases that are not final and for which an
appeal has been submitted).

Table 3.14. Assessment of ML cases (both mixed and stand-alone, national and
regional) by the OM
OM decision

Explanation

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

2016

2136

2514

3383

4321

3335

Summoning

Total decisions by OM
The case is sent to the Court

1248

1201

1395

1801

2119

1581

Unconditional dismissal
(of which, unlikelihood
of conviction)**

OM decision to dismiss a case
(of which, for insufficient
evidence)

539
(339)

687
(468)

847
(563)

1242
(933)

1685
(1242)

1255
(981)

Conditional dismissal

Specific conditions are set up
by the OM to dismiss the case

17

24

28

56

114

115

Out of court settlements
or penalty orders

Non-trial resolutions, either
through an agreement with the
offender, or by imposing a
penalty order
Cases joined together, deregistration, transfer to use
other type of measures (e.g.
administrative,
fiscal,
disciplinary)

200

205

224

262

386

378

1 665
9.4%

12

19

20

22

17

6

96
0.5%

Others

Total
%
17 705
9 345
52.8%
6 255
(4 526)
35.3%
354
2%

* Covers the first half of the year.
**Unconditional dismissal also includes cases where the suspect was unable to go to Court (e.g. death)
or case of insufficient national interest (e.g. foreign proceedings ongoing).

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Table 3.15. Final ML convictions in stand-alone and mixed cases for natural and
legal persons in first instance
2016

Court cases where ML was
charged
(legal persons)
Number of ML convictions**
(legal persons)
ML convictions (%)

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

Total
(of which legal
persons)

891
(25)

1054 (6)

1163
(40)

1480
(23)

1437
(18)

1047
(13)

7 072
(125)

493
(14)

611
(3)

726
(27)

928
(10)

939
(9)

689
(3)

4 386
(66)

55.3%

58.0%

62.4%

62.7%

65.3%

65.8%

62%

* Covers the first half of the year.
**This number refers exclusively to cases where the ML offence was proven.

ML identification and investigation in the BES Islands

173. In recent years, the Netherlands has invested significantly in strengthening the
capacities of the OM BES office to handle ML cases, and has set up a specialised ML
Public Prosecutor within OM BES office. 36 Moreover, the KPCN has started trainings
to increase its expertise on financial investigations and added cyber experts to its
force. The RST has also been deployed locally, to ensure closer co-operation with
the KPCN. The OM BES cooperates closely with the KPCN and with RST to handle
investigations. In practice, for ML investigations, the KPCN is heavily reliant on the
capacity and expertise of the Netherlands Police and the police from Aruba, Curacao
and Sint Maarten. The RST—a partnership between the police forces in the
Kingdom, including FIOD staff members based in Curacao—is often deployed to
deal with serious organised crime.
174. While KPCN is working on enhancing its financial expertise on ML and financial
investigations, this is a recent development and will require additional resources
and continuous commitment from the authorities. LEAs in the BES Islands have
access to FIU-NL disseminations and can submit requests for FIU-NL information
through the OM BES. KPCN has no direct access to intelligence hubs used in
continental Netherlands, as the BES Islands and continental Netherlands form
different legal jurisdictions. When necessary, KPCN can obtain intelligence from
European Netherlands, through MLA and police-to-police co-operation.
175. Similar to continental Netherlands, a Steering Group with representatives from OM
BES, KPCN and KMAR decides whether to launch ML investigations. As shown in
Table 3.16, between 2016 and 2020, LEAs initiated 41 ML investigations, and in all
cases a predicate offence was involved. One case was settled by OM BES and 14 were
brought to trial, with ML convictions achieved in nine cases. Box 3.10 provides an
example of a ML investigation carried out in the BES Islands. The majority of ML
cases in the BES Islands involves an international component. LEAs reported
challenges obtaining relevant information from other countries in a timely manner.

36

At the time of the onsite visit, the ML prosecutor in the OM BES was in the process of
drafting a ML Action Plan to guide the investigation and prosecution of ML cases, but also
the development of prevention mechanisms.

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Table 3.16. ML cases in the BES Islands
2016
Inflow of cases to OM BES

3

2017

2018

2019

2020

14
6
3
15
OM BES decision on the outcome of the ML investigation

Total
3

41

Unconditional dismissal

2

3

1

3

-

9

Conditional dismissal

3

2

2

10

-

17

Settlement

Convictions on ML cases

1

-

1

ML convictions

1

1

5

9

-

2

Consistency of ML investigations and prosecutions with threats and risk profile,
and national AML policies
Box 3.9. Example of a ML investigation in the BES Islands
Between 2019 and 2020, KPCN investigated the illegal granting of loans by unlicensed
individuals, on a large scale and against payment of usurious interests. KPCN cooperated closely
with AFM and DNB, due to their supervisory role on financial companies in the BES Islands. The
investigation used FIU-NL disseminations to gain insights into the financial position of the
suspects. The investigation revealed that almost USD 500 000 was lent in the period from 2018
to October 2019. While one suspect was convicted to three months imprisonment for violations
of several provisions of the Financial Market Act BES (Wfm BES), the person was not convicted
for ML.
176. The national AML Strategic Programme 2019-2022, coordinated by the LOvJ for ML,
identified six priority themes to guide ML investigations, aligned with the 2017 ML
NRA findings. In addressing these priorities through operational activities, LEAs
also integrate the most recent findings of the 2019 ML NRA, and any trends or recent
developments identified during ML investigations, new typologies or indicators.
Box 3.11 outlines the six main themes pursuant to the AML Strategic Programme.
As noted under IO.1, the authorities’ approach to assessing ML risks focused mainly
on the methods and channels, rather than on the identification of the main predicate
offences. The same approach is reflected in the Strategic Programme.

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Box 3.10. The six themes under the Programme AML 2019-2022
1. Concealed assets: tracing criminal assets entering the legal economy, mainly through
fraud.
2. Non-reporting obliged entities: prosecuting obliged entities failing to comply with
Wwft obligations.
3. Illegal service providers: identifying professional money launderers and facilitators.
4. Means of payment: identifying ML methods related to VAs or the use of cash.
5. TBML: using national and international flows of goods and commodities to disguise ML.
6. National and international investments in companies/funds: using national and
international investments in companies/funds to launder money.

177. The Netherlands makes extensive use of thematic investigation projects to enhance
knowledge on ML schemes and identify ML signals. The projects are often started
based on specific investigations. The increased knowledge acquired during a project
allows LEAs to detect new ML signals and initiate new investigations.

178. There is a strong correlation between the topics of the projects, the NRA ML risks
and the themes identified in the national AML Strategic programme. Previous
thematic projects occurring prior to the assessment period contributed to the
identification of the six priority themes of the 2019-2022 AML Strategic Programme
and generated a considerable number of ML investigations conducted within the
assessment period (see box 3.12). For example, in relation to the topic of concealed
assets, in 2015, the AMLC initiated a debit/credit cards project to detect possible
ML, including ML associated with tax fraud, through the analysis of foreign
debit/credit cards used in the Netherlands by Dutch residents, and which revealed
unknown and undeclared foreign bank accounts. Moreover, between 2014 and
2016, FP and FIOD conducted a voluntary disclosure project to investigate whether
the assets declared as part of a voluntary disclosure scheme had a possible illegal
origin. Between 2014 and 2015, FP, FIOD and the Tax and Customs Administration
conducted a project on suspected income tax evaders, to analyse mismatches
between luxurious lifestyles and declaration of incomes. Finally, since 2018 the
offshore project has aimed at gaining insights into the possible use of offshore
companies or legal arrangements to purchase immovable property in the
Netherlands and identify related ML schemes.
179. Between 2012 and 2017, a project on non-reporting obliged entities focused on
criminal enforcement of the AML/CFT violations to improve compliance amongst
obliged entities. It resulted in the opening of 73 criminal files, and 36 out of court
settlements or convictions. In relation to payment means, the AMLC led projects on
VAs (2016-2018) and VA mixers (2019-ongoing) used to launder money, which
focused on developing typologies and indicators with the FIU, based on several
investigations carried out by LEAs. Finally, in 2018, the FEC initiated a publicprivate project to develop further knowledge and expertise on TBML and identify
signals, based on the TBML cases investigated by the authorities.

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180. The Netherlands does not maintain comprehensive statistics on the underlying
predicate offences for ML investigations/prosecutions/convictions, limiting the
assessment team’s view of all ML cases pursued by the authorities. However, the
Netherlands provided sufficient cases to demonstrate the consistency between ML
investigations and the thematic risks and priorities of LEAs. Box 3.12 includes some
examples.

Box 3.11. Consistency of ML investigations with ML channels and methods
identified in the NRA
Investigation into major compliance failures by a bank
Based on signals emerging from the non-reporting entities project, in 2016 the OM
opened a criminal investigation into multiple, structural failures by a FI to perform
appropriate client controls and accounts monitoring over a long period of time
(2010-2016), which resulted in those accounts being used for ML and criminal
activities. The FI accepted to pay an out-of-court settlement of EUR 775 million
offered by the OM for structural violations of the Wwft and culpable ML. In 2020,
the Court of Appeal ordered the OM to prosecute the FI CEO due to his failure to
take measures to prevent the FI criminal conduct.
Investigation into ML through bitcoins

In 2017, the FIU-NL identified an individual at the centre of a criminal network
with EUR 1.4 million in transactions related to bitcoin traders. Based on a FIU-NL
dissemination, FIOD started a criminal investigation into the suspect. The
investigation of the blockchain analysis revealed that the bitcoins were associated
with illegal transactions on the darkweb. The subject was offering services to
convert bitcoins into cash. Bitcoins owners were transferring bitcoins to the
suspect’s wallet or to the wallets of bitcoin sales companies. The suspect was then
transferring the corresponding amounts to his own bank accounts, as well as the
accounts of associates. Transfers for a total amount of EUR 447 882 were made.
The suspect withdrew most of this money in cash and provided it to the bitcoin
owners within 24 hours. In 2017, he was convicted for habitual ML to 12 months
in prison (and eight under probation). The Court ordered a value confiscation of
EUR 142 013, corresponding to his unlawfully obtained benefit.
Investigation on ML through international investments

Between 2015 and 2018, the OM/LP conducted an investigation into a Dutch
individual who invested cash in portfolios registered in the name of offshore
companies in Panama. The subject had worked in Swiss banks, and then started
working as an independent asset manager. The suspect had clients with criminal
antecedents and clients with undeclared savings, who probably wanted to keep
their income or assets out of the sight of the LEAs and tax authorities. The
investigation also revealed that the suspect dissipated part of the money from his
clients for personal purposes. In the course of the investigation, the LP submitted
MLA requests to Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Dominica and Panama. The suspect
was arrested in 2018 while transiting in the Netherlands. In 2021, he was
convicted for habitual ML, forgery, embezzlement and fraud to eight years.

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181. As evidenced by the thematic cases presented, the Assessment Team concludes that
the AML strategic programme and the thematic projects reflect the main ML risks
faced by the Netherlands. Furthermore, the LEAs met during the onsite visit
confirmed that drug trafficking and fraud were the most common predicate offences
encountered in their ML investigations. At regional level, the RIECs play an
important role in ensuring that LEAs focus their efforts on the prevailing proceedsgenerating offences and regional risks when investigating ML and organised crime.

182. ML investigations in the BES Islands are scarce and do not fully reflect the ML risks.
The limited case examples provided by the authorities show that financial
investigations in most of the cases did not result in the formulation of ML charges.
The authorities have so far focused most of their efforts on the prosecution of
predicate offences, and the confiscation of proceeds of crime.

Types of ML cases pursued

183. The Netherlands does not collect statistics on the types of ML investigated and
prosecuted. However, based on the analysis of case studies and interviews with the
authorities, the Assessment Team found that LEAs pursue a wide range of ML
investigations, from self-laundering to complex cases involving offshore companies,
professional money launderers and VAs, as illustrated in Boxes 3.12 and 3.13. The
authorities have pursued and convicted offenders, both for complex and simple ML
cases and for stand-alone ML, without the need to establish a link to a specific
predicate offence.

Box 3.12. LEAs’ ability to pursue different types of ML
Stand-alone ML: In 2016, Customs and FIOD investigated a suspicious intended
shipment of an ambulance and a car from the Netherlands to Suriname and found
hidden parcels of cash for a total of EUR 2 million in EUR 500 notes. The banknotes
were packed with ground coffee, which is regularly used by smugglers to evade
tracking dogs. LEAs found evidence that the suspect was aware of the hidden cash.
The suspect was unable to provide a concrete and verifiable statement on the
origin of the money. The Court concluded that the cash was directly or indirectly
deriving from criminal activities and in 2018 sentenced him to 2.5 years
imprisonment for ML and forgery. The EUR 2 million cash and ambulance were
confiscated.

Third-party ML: This investigation started in 2016, on the basis of residual
information from an earlier investigation into a corrupt Customs officer who was
bribed to allow large quantities of cocaine to be imported in the port of Rotterdam.
The authorities examined the role of a facilitator, a former assistant auditor who
put the corrupted custom officer on a fictitious payroll of an employment and
secondment agency to launder the money. The fictitious salary was paid through
funds coming from a Liechtenstein bank account, in the name of a Panamanian
legal entity and managed by a Russian proxy. The assistant auditor had also used
real estate purchases to launder the money, and facilitated the deposit of money
into the account of the Russian proxy to purchase a luxury car worth EUR 87 000
via a foreign construction. In 2018, he was sentenced to four years imprisonment
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for habitual ML of EUR 307 561 (the fictitious salary), EUR 410 000, EUR 852 050
and EUR 87 500 (for the purchase of two houses and a luxury car).
3

ML from foreign predicate offence: Three private companies laundered EUR 11
million through the purchase of real estate in the Netherlands and Germany. The
companies were controlled by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch holding, managed
by a TCSP that was a suspect in an investigation. The BOs were individuals
convicted in Russia for stealing money from their banks. They purchased the real
estate via a concealing arrangement in order to launder the money. The funds were
transferred to the three Dutch private companies via a Danish and a Swiss bank.
The investigation is ongoing. OM seized the real estate in the Netherlands and
Germany, as well as the bank accounts of the suspects.

Self-laundering: A doctor received payments from the pharmaceutical industry to
test new drugs and deposited them in his Luxembourg bank accounts. The suspect
never declared the balances of these accounts - and thus the income and capital
received - in his income tax returns. In 2016, the investigation revealed that he had
withdrawn over EUR 3 million in cash from the Luxembourg bank accounts over a
ten year period to hide such payments. He was convicted of habitual ML and
deliberately filing tax returns incorrectly or incompletely to a term of
imprisonment of 15 months and a fine of EUR 500 000.
184. In the BES Islands, ML investigations have so far been pursued only in conjunction
with a predicate offence. Over the reporting period, only nine ML convictions were
achieved, which suggests the limited ability of BES LEAs to pursue and prosecute
different types of ML, in particular stand-alone ML investigations.

Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions

185. The Netherlands’ approach to criminal sanctions focuses on a combination of
prevention and repressive measures, as well as prioritising confiscation. When
sanctions are imposed, these can take the form of a fine, conditional/unconditional
imprisonment and/or community service. The authorities consider that the
preventive approach is equally, if not more important than repression. However,
the Assessment Team is concerned by the low level of ML sentences imposed in
practice, including in serious and complex cases.

186. The maximum penalty for ML is a term of imprisonment of six years, which can
increase to eight years in case of habitual ML, or a fifth category fine. In addition,
community service of up to 240 hours can be imposed. For legal persons, the fine
can increase up to a maximum 10% of the annual revenue. No concurrent sentences
are allowed. When the Court sanctions ML in combination with other offences,
judges apply a single combined sentence for all crimes. In such cases, it is not
possible to draw a distinction between the penalty imposed for ML and the one
imposed for other offences, or to assess the extent to which the ML charge led to a
higher sentence.

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187. The Netherlands does not maintain comprehensive statistics on the sanctions
imposed in ML cases. The information provided has been extracted manually, and
is limited to aggregated statistics on the average sentences in ML cases. The
sanctions imposed vary according to the complexity of the cases. However, based
on this limited data, it is not possible to distinguish between the level of sentencing
imposed in simple ML cases (e.g., self-laundering) and in more sophisticated cases.
Accordingly, the Assessment Team considered the case studies provided by the
authorities to gain additional insights into sanctions imposed, and held discussions
with judges and prosecutors in the course of the onsite visit.

188. The actual average of sanctions (prison sentences and fines) imposed to natural and
legal persons in ML cases is very low and well below the legally prescribed
maximum limits. In practice, the Netherlands has imposed, on average, prison
sentences of less than a year in stand-alone cases and between one and two years
in mixed cases involving other offences. This average data includes both the
unconditional prison term, and the part of the sentencing that is suspended under
probation. As a result, the actual level of unconditional prison sentences is lower
than it appears in the table 3.17 below. While this low average can be partly
explained by the higher number of simple ML cases, the review of the case studies
provided confirms that sanctions imposed in many complex and mixed cases are
generally on the lower-end of the scale and not dissuasive.

189. Furthermore, the average fines imposed to natural and legal persons are well below
the legally prescribed maximum limits (see Table 3.18), which affects their
dissuasiveness especially if they are applied as the only sanction. The figures
included in the table do not distinguish between conditional and unconditional fines
imposed.

Table 3.17. Average prison sentence imposed in stand-alone and mixed ML cases
(first instance)
2016
2017
Stand-alone ML cases
Total prison sentences (days)

Total prison sentences (days)

2018

2019

2020

2021*

177
143
193
Combined sentences in mixed cases

144

154

147

580

579

503

646

697

636

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Table 3.18. Average fines imposed on natural and legal persons
2018
2017
Stand-alone ML cases

2016

3

Number of cases
(natural persons)

2019

2020

2021*

12

16

29

35

30

27

Average sanction
(natural persons, in
EUR)
Number of cases (legal
persons)

12 502

8 868

3 678

9 940

3 694

1 227

3

2

15

6

7

2

Average sanction
(legal persons, in EUR)
Mixed cases

35 000

10 000

21 267

27 500

176 929

375 500

6

14

19

19

15

11

Average sanction
(natural persons, in
EUR)
Number of cases (legal
persons)

7 920

16 775

31 514

34 069

5 599

41 721

11

1

12

4

2

1

Average sanction
(legal persons, in EUR)

13 005

20 000

126 992

95 590

25 000

180 000

Number of cases
(natural persons)

* Covers the first half of the year.

190. Overall, in the view of the Assessment Team, the low level of ML sanctions affects
their dissuasiveness. As noted in R.3, the Netherlands applies the una via principle,
whereby it is impossible to impose both criminal and civil/administrative sanctions
for the same offence. Furthermore, the possibility to totally or partially suspend the
prison terms and to replace it with a fine or community service further reduces
dissuasiveness.
191. The OM developed ML prosecutorial sentencing guidelines to determine the
proposed sanction it refers to the Court. The judges are not bound by the OM
proposals and have discretionary powers to assess each individual case. Unlike
prosecutors, they are not guided by specific ML orientation points (i.e., sentencing
guidelines). In practice, for ML cases they use sentencing points of reference for
economic and financial crimes, such as fraud. However, the fraud guidelines give a
prominent role to the actual gain of the suspect, rather than to the complexity of the
cases, and often result in lower sentences being imposed. The breach of the undue
delay principle, due to the excessive length of the investigation or prosecution, is
another element that is taken into consideration by judges and can often lead to
lower sentences. The authorities highlighted that the long duration of ML cases is
also related to some capacity/resource issues for judges, and to a lesser extent, for
prosecutors. The Netherlands was unable to provide statistics on the impact of the
undue delay principle on ML sentencing.

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192. The Assessment Team also notes that in most cases provided by the authorities, the
sentences were not final. Assessors were provided with the numbers of appeals
lodged but did not receive information on the result of the appeals nor the average
success rate in achieving final convictions upon appeal.

193. ML sanctions provided in the BES Criminal Code are high, with a maximum sentence
of 12 and 16 years’ imprisonment for ML and habitual ML, and/or a fifth category
fine. However, the sanctions imposed in practice in the nine mixed ML cases are
much lower, with the highest fine being one year of conditional imprisonment for
embezzlement and ML of USD 300 000. In most cases, only a pecuniary sanction and
a few months of suspended prison term was imposed.

Use of alternative measures

194. The Netherlands can apply alternative criminal justice measures. The decision to
prosecute a case for ML, or for a different criminal charge lies with the OM. This
discretionary power is part of the OM prosecution policy, and it is not limited to
cases where it is not possible to secure a ML conviction. In the presence of an
identified predicate offence, the OM could opt to prosecute for the underlying
offence and the confiscation of proceeds of crime, despite the suspicion of ML, in
case of justifiable reasons. In addition, the OM can also decide to settle a case out of
court. The out of court settlements establish certain conditions for the suspect, such
as the imposition of fines, confiscation measures, or the acknowledgement of the
statement of facts. The Prosecutor can also opt to impose a penalty order to end a
case. If the suspect does not agree with the penalty order, a judge will assess the
case. The authorities consider these types of settlements as a form of prosecution
and have made frequent use of these measures (see table 3.14).

195. In addition, the OM can also decide to share information on a case with supervisory
authorities, for a fiscal or administrative settlement with a penal element when a
criminal approach is not opportune or a fiscal, disciplinary or civil settlement is
more efficient. The Netherlands considers the failure to meet Wwft obligations as a
criminal offence. The Economic Offences Act allows for an alternative approach in
cases where ML prosecution is not possible, and has a lower burden of proof than a
ML charge.

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Overall conclusion on IO.7
3

The Netherlands successfully detects and investigates ML signals and prosecutes
different types of ML through the systematic use of financial intelligence and
investigations and the strong co-operation between LEAs. The AML Strategic
Programme, and the thematic investigation projects provided by the authorities
are strengths of the Dutch system. The Netherlands does not maintain
comprehensive statistics on the underlying predicate offences for ML
investigations/prosecutions/convictions, limiting the assessment team’s view of
all ML cases pursued by the authorities. However, case examples provided on
national and regional investigations are consistent with the ML channels and
methods identified in the NRAs. Although the Netherlands has a high conviction
rate, the low level of sentencing imposed partly frustrates the proactive efforts of
the authorities to prosecute ML. The increasing resources allocated to the
prosecution of ML in the BES Islands are a welcome step, but further efforts are
needed to develop LEAs’ capacities to undertake ML investigations.
The Netherlands is rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.7.

Immediate Outcome 8 (Confiscation)

Confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value as
a policy objective
196. The confiscation of criminal proceeds is a high priority for the Dutch government.
This conclusion is based on the consideration of strategic documents, operational
initiatives undertaken by the authorities in recent years, and interviews with
relevant stakeholders during the onsite visit. The authorities consider depriving
criminals of their assets to be equally, or even more dissuasive, than imprisonment.
LEAs and government policies, strategies and guidance consistently focus on
depriving criminals of their proceeds, and tackling the criminal business model as a
top priority.

197. At a policy level, confiscating criminal assets is an annual priority within the budget
of the Ministry of Justice and Security. The 2019-2022 Agenda of the Ministry of
Justice and Security also recognises the importance of a financial angle to tackle
subversive crime. This includes, in particular, the use of financial investigations to:
identify money flows, uncover financial structures, and ultimately disrupt the
criminal revenue model; collect evidence in criminal investigations; confiscate all
criminal profits, and support compensation for victims.

198. This policy priority is also reflected in the OM Confiscation Instruction (and in the
similar Confiscation Instruction in place in the BES Islands), which requires all LEAs
to conduct a financial investigation into criminal assets and money-flows as a
standard procedure in all criminal investigations. Within the OM, a National
Confiscation Coordinator (LCA) acts as strategic advisor on the national confiscation
portfolio. The LCA is responsible for developing policies in this area, but also
ensuring their operationalisation within the OM.

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199. In 2019, the OM reviewed the confiscation strategy for the Police, FIOD and OM
(“Intensifying the focus on criminal money flows”). The main development was the
setting-up of a Steering Committee for Confiscation, with representatives from the
three institutions. The Steering Committee for Confiscation meets three times per
year to assess and coordinate the implementation of confiscation measures.
Another core action under the strategy is training and continuous learning to
increase LEAs’ ability to deal with complex ML cases, and the adoption of a multidisciplinary approach to make use of the most effective instruments available under
criminal, administrative and tax law. Finally, the confiscation strategy highlights the
importance of international co-operation, to enhance asset sharing and facilitate
cross-border confiscation.

200. The priority attributed to confiscation has also resulted in additional resources
allocated to the OM and LEAs, to enhance the authorities’ ability to seize and
confiscate assets. Within the OM, every department has a dedicated prosecutor for
confiscation, and asset tracers who examine the seizure/confiscation dimension in
each case presented to the OM. In addition, LEAs can rely on the support of a
specialised confiscation team (Team Criminal Cash Flows), coordinated by the LCA.
The Team consists of a policy advisor and approximately 70 staff, including forensic
accountants, civil law advisers, international legal advisers, asset tracers, public
prosecutors and legal staff specialised in confiscation procedures. Upon request
from all OM branches and LEAs in the Netherlands, the LCA can deploy the Team to
provide support on complex confiscation cases, or lead confiscation proceedings. As
noted under IO.1, with the setting-up of the MIT 37, the authorities are also
increasingly targeting subversive crime, including from a confiscation perspective.
201. At an operational level, all LEAs set annual seizure targets to practically implement
the instruction and priority assigned to confiscation. These targets have been
increasing over the years, and have been generally met by all LEAs. The seizure
target for special investigative services (BODs) is EUR 91.6 million a year in 2021
and 2022, of which EUR 70.4 million euros is accounted to the FIOD. The Police
Central Unit has a target of EUR 25 million for 2021-2022, while the regional units
have a confiscation target set at EUR 155 million. Police representatives met during
the onsite indicated that they had already seized approximately EUR 15 million, as
of October 2021.

Confiscation of proceeds from foreign and domestic predicates, and proceeds
located abroad

202. The Netherlands has a robust and comprehensive regime to deprive criminals of
their assets through object and value confiscations. The authorities can apply two
different conviction-based 38 confiscation schemes. Ordinary object confiscation is a
penal sanction applicable when a defendant is convicted of any criminal offense,
with respect to the proceeds directly obtained from the crime and instruments used
to commit the crime.

37
38

As of 1 July 2022, the MIT changed its name to NSOC. See also Box 2.1 in IO.1.
The authorities are currently discussing the introduction of a legislative proposal for nonconviction based confiscation, to broaden their capacities to purse confiscation of criminal
proceeds.

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203. In addition, Dutch legislation provides for a special claim for value confiscation.
Upon request of the OM, the court may issue a separate order for special
confiscation consisting of the obligation for the offender to pay a sum of money to
the State or to the victim in restitution of the illicit earnings, profits or advantages,
as a fine or as a compensation for the victim. Upon conviction for an offence, the
confiscation order may also be imposed for other offenses for which there are
sufficient indications against the convicted individual. The confiscation order can be
executed on all possessions of a convicted individual, regardless of their legal or
illegal origins. Value confiscation proceedings can take place simultaneously with
the main criminal proceeding, or after the criminal conviction has been obtained, as
long as the application is lodged with the Court within two years after the first
verdict. A particular strength of the Dutch legal framework is that, whenever a
person is convicted of a serious and potentially lucrative crime, all income or assets
obtained within six years prior to the conviction are deemed to be originated from,
or connected to, the offence and can therefore be subject to confiscation. In such
cases, there is a reversal of the burden of proof and it is up to the convicted to
demonstrate the licit origin of such assets.

204. The OM has a high degree of discretion in deciding how to proceed with seizure or
confiscation measures. Prosecutors may also choose to impose sanctions that have
a similar effect, such as demanding compensation as part of an out-of-court
settlement or imposing a penalty order. The high number of value confiscation
procedures considered by the Court, or imposed by the OM through settlements or
penalty orders confirms the priority assigned by the authorities to depriving
criminals of their proceeds (Table 3.19).

Table 3.19. Number of value confiscation proceedings (OM and Court)
N. of Court decisions on value confiscation
granted
partly granted
Value confiscation settlements
Penalty orders

2016
2280
1020
620
199
140

2017
2320
1010
620
216
111

2018
2210
970
680
171
66

2019
1810
790
590
262
51

2020
1150
490
390
85
11

2021*
423
135
142
39
46

* Covers the first half of the year.

205. Financial investigations are a crucial element for the authorities to obtain insight
into the assets and flows of money associated with lucrative crimes. As noted under
IO.7, LEAs dispose of a wide range of investigative tools, either within the regular
investigation process, or within a criminal financial investigation, to detect criminal
proceeds. iCOV data intelligence reports are also regularly used to obtain a
comprehensive view on a suspect’s financial position. This information is
particularly useful to determine the amount of illegal profits or advantages obtained
by the suspect, and to substantiate a value confiscation measure. LEAs and the OM
dispose of a high-level of expertise to track criminal proceeds, as a result of
specialised officers such as asset tracers.

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206. LEAs make extensive use of seizures as a precautionary measure to ensure final
confiscation. The OM can directly authorise most seizures, without the need for a
court authorisation, as long as the seizure is based on an existing criminal
investigation and there is a direct or indirect link between the object and the
offence. Under the instruction of the OM, investigative officers can seize objects and
assets, such as money, bank and savings accounts, jewellery, telephones,
documents, vehicles and vessels, which constitute evidence or demonstrate the
illegal nature of the proceeds.

207. In cases of serious offences, the authorities frequently use a prejudgment seizure to
secure the right of recovery in connection with a monetary fine or confiscation
measure to be imposed, or a compensation measure for the victims of crime, at an
early stage of the investigation. In such cases, LEAs need a separate general
authorisation (i.e., without specification of the objects to be seized) from the
examining magistrate and in this context, they can also seize objects unrelated to
the offence. The case below represents an example of the use of a prejudgment
seizure.

Box 3.13. Use of a prejudgement seizure to preserve the right of recovery
The investigation related to large-scale drug trafficking and ML via VAs. In the course
of searches in different premises, the Police found 85 kilograms of amphetamines and
13 kilograms of ecstasy pills. The suspects were dispatching drug orders received
through the darkweb through postal services and were receiving payments in VAs.
Upon authorisation from the examining magistrate, LEAs carried out a prejudgement
seizure on three suspects, for a total amount of EUR 18 130 in cash, and 1.7 bitcoin.
In 2020, the Court convicted four suspects to seven years’ imprisonment for ML and
drug trafficking. VAs, cars and approximately EUR 11 650 in cash were confiscated.
The rest of the seized amount was kept under the prejudgement seizure for the value
confiscation procedure that will follow.
208. The Assessment Team received limited statistics on the seizure and confiscation
results obtained by the Netherlands. However, a review of the case studies and
information provided by the authorities on the registration of the seizures by
predicate offences demonstrate a correlation between the value of the seizures and
the main proceeds generating crimes (ML, drugs-related crimes, fraud and
organised crime).

209. The Dutch authorities provided an overall number of seized assets between 2016
and 2021, which is presented in Table 3.20 below. However, the authorities also
acknowledged that the numbers are incomplete, in particular in relation to the value
of outgoing seizure requests to foreign countries, and of seizures in the Netherlands
based on a MLA request. Information on the number of European freezing orders
sent and received by the Netherlands is available under IO.2; however, it was not
possible to determine the overall number of cases where a seizure was obtained.

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Table 3.20. Value of seized assets (million EUR)

3

Total
Seizures by BODs
Seizures by Police
Seizures by other LEAs (e.g., KMar, Customs)

2016
431.4
106.2
318.2
7

2017
570.8
294.4
271.3
5.1

2018
502.9
253.0
239.1
10.8

2019
329.5
106.5
215.3
7.7

2020
403.5
123.5
266.0
14

2021*
256.2
135.1
117.5
3.6

* Covers the first half of the year

210. The Netherlands has an effective system to manage and preserve the value of seized
assets (deriving from both domestic and international seizures), through an
appropriate registration mechanism and sufficient facilities to store seized and
confiscated goods. DRZ, an agency of the Ministry of Finance, manages seized and
confiscated goods. The OM, advised by its the National Authority for Seized Goods
(LBA), decides what should happen to seized assets, in order to preserve their value:
whether to return, retain, deposit, sell or destroy them. Between 2016 and 2020,
DRZ processed more than 27 034 items and obtained approximately EUR 35.9
million from sold goods. Table 3.21 details the actions undertaken by the DRZ in
relation to prejudgement seizures.

Table 3.21. Objects received and processed by DRZ for prejudgement seizure
Objects received by DRZ (number)

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

4979

6814

6875

4425

3941

Objects managed by DRZ
- Returned (number)
- Sold (number)
- Destroyed (number)
Value of sold goods (EUR)

2236

2557

3150

2397

2708

2029

2148

2114

2714

1829

221

393

314

424

253

6.9 M

7.1 M

6.7 M

7.3 M

7.9 M

Note: An object number does not indicate the volume or number of articles it contains. For example: one
object may actually consist of several pieces of jewellery. The value of sold goods is already included in
the overall seizure results under Table 3.20.

211. The authorities have also pursued the tracing of VAs related to criminal activities
and successfully seized an increased number of assets over the last few years (see
Box 3.15). This is demonstrated by case studies provided by the authorities, as well
as by the statistics on VA seizures presented in Table 3.22 below.

Table 3.22. Annual seizure of VAs
Value of seized VAs in EUR

2019
1.1 M

2020
8.3 M

2021*
34.6 M

* Covers the period up to 18 November.
Note: The value of seized VAs is already included in the overall seizure results under Table 3.19.

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Box 3.14. Process for tracing and seizing VAs
Tracing and seizing VAs has become a national priority since 2017. LEAs developed
specialised expertise and set-up specialised teams to trace VAs, by de-anonymising
the VA trail. The OM can authorise the seizure of any object, including VAs. If the
wallet is located in the Netherlands, LEAs are authorised to conduct a search. If the
wallet is located abroad, the authorities would proceed with a MLA request, either
judicial or police-police, or other type of international co-operation as appropriate.
Where a VA exchange is not located in any particular jurisdiction, the Netherlands
can apply the Dutch law and proceed with a seizure or confiscation. As noted under
IO.7 (Box 3.9), the Netherlands has also demonstrated its ability to seize mixing
services, by seizing the servers.
Once VAs are seized, they are stored in an OM wallet at the Dutch exchange. To
avoid the volatility associated with the value of VAs, as a policy the Netherlands
sells the seized bitcoins in exchange for EUR, as soon as it is reasonably practical.

212. In Netherlands, the OM uses multiple paths to deprive criminals of their assets,
through object and value confiscation. A case example of the use of object and value
confiscation is presented in Box 3.16 below. The OM frequently reverts to out-ofcourt settlements in order to seek compensation. Out-of-court settlements include
a wide range of measures, depending on the single case, and often comprise
confiscation orders, and fines. The Netherlands does not have separate confiscation
statistics for proceeds deprived pursuant to a conviction-based confiscation, and a
non-trial solution through an out-of-court settlement. Separate statistics on out-ofcourt settlement confiscations are maintained only for multi-million Euro cases
against legal persons (Table 3.24). The execution of confiscation is the
responsibility of the Central Judicial Collection Agency (CJIB), which is the authority
in charge of the collection of fines and the handling of decisions under criminal law.

Box 3.15. Use of different forms of confiscation in a ML case
An individual on disability benefit, with no other income, deposited large amounts
of cash into his bank accounts for over EUR 270 000 during several years. The
investigation revealed he had deposited over EUR 12 million into other bank
accounts and then transferred the money to companies and foreign bank accounts.
False documents were used to cover-up the transactions, which were not related
to any business activity. The suspect was using strawmen to hide that the
companies were actually under his control. He was arrested at Schiphol airport,
carrying over EUR 40 000 in undeclared cash. He was convicted to 65 months of
prison for habitual ML, as he was unable to provide any reasonable explanation on
the origin of the money. The court ordered the object confiscation of more than
EUR 550 000. Furthermore, in a separate value confiscation procedure, a payment
of over EUR 340 000 was also imposed, to recover the suspect’s illegally obtained
gains. As a result of this investigation, the Agency for disability benefit also
initiated a recovery procedure for over EUR 65 000. Other convictions and
confiscation measures were imposed on his accomplices.
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213. Overall, the Netherlands achieved a collected confiscation value of over EUR 399
million in the period between 2016 and the first half of 2021, as a result of
confiscation imposed both after conviction, and as part of out of court settlements
(Table 3.23). In addition, the Dutch authorities have confiscated large amounts
through multi-million out of court settlements in some high-profile cases related,
for instance, to non-compliance in the banking sector or major corruption cases
against legal persons. The confiscation component of the settlement is considerable,
with a total amount of EUR 967.3 million since 2016, as shown in Table 3.24 below.

214.

The Assessment Team notes that these major out of court settlements account for
a large part of the overall confiscation results. These values refer exclusively to the
collected assets, as opposed to the value of confiscation orders imposed by the
Courts which is higher. 39 There is also a discrepancy between the year of the initial
seizure and the year of the final collected confiscation, as the confiscation process
may take several years.

Table 3.23. Value of collected confiscated assets (million EUR)
Confiscated assets in EUR
million

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

72.7

76.3

71.3

78.2

84.7

16.1

* Covers the first half of the year.

Table 3.24. Confiscation amounts in major out of court settlements with legal
persons (million EUR)
Confiscation value

2016
329.3

2017
144.9

2018
100

2019
183.6

2020
n/a

2021*
209.5

* Covers the first half of the year.

215. Furthermore, the authorities provided statistics on the number of confiscation
decisions achieved in cases where a ML conviction (both as stand-alone and in
mixed cases) was imposed (Table 3.25). This data, considered with the annual
number of value confiscation proceedings by the Court, and settlements by the OM
supports the conclusion that the authorities are focusing on confiscating criminal
proceeds.

39

The Netherlands does not collect statistics on the value of confiscation orders imposed by
the Courts.

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Table 3.25. Number of imposed Court confiscation decisions in mixed and standalone ML convictions
2016
Confiscation orders on natural
persons
Confiscation orders on legal
persons

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

Total

93

118

156

204

154

190

915

8

1

3

2

5

13

32

3

* Covers the first half of the year.

216. The Netherlands has a solid structure to cooperate internationally on asset recovery
matters. The Asset Recovery Office (ARO) acts as special contact point for asset
confiscation and received a total of 578 incoming and outgoing requests related to
asset freezing and confiscation in 2020 (see IO.2). The Asset Management Office
(AMO), within LBA, handles seizures made in the Netherlands pursuant to a foreign
authority request or freezing order and engages with the foreign authorities to
discuss the proposed approach to maximise yields. In the event of an international
seizure, the requesting country will eventually transfer the execution of the
underlying case to the Netherlands, after which the verdict can be enforced by the
CJIB using the seized assets. In this execution phase, the competent authorities of
the states involved can make agreements about asset sharing.

217. The authorities did not provide specific information on asset sharing and recovery
of proceeds involving foreign predicate offences, or proceeds moved to other
countries, with the exception of the amounts confiscated through European
confiscation orders (see IO.2). The values of the confiscation orders sent by the
Netherlands is noteworthy: approximately EUR 38.9 million between 2017 and
2020. 40 The cases presented by the authorities showed a strong and effective cooperation with international counterparts to trace and seize criminal assets. The
case below is an example of successful asset-sharing with Spain.

40

This amount is already included in the confiscation results in Table 3.23.

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Box 3.16. Example of successful asset-sharing

3

In November 2020, the OM issued a penalty order against an individual, due to his
failure to pay an outstanding amount of EUR 339 million, imposed in a value
confiscation procedure. The convicted person flew to Spain, where he was arrested
based on a Belgian European Arrest Warrant. In May 2021, the Dutch liaison officer
to Spain contacted the CJIB, and further to the co-operation with the Spanish
authorities and an ARO request, the valuable objects found during the arrest were
seized. A few days later, CJIB sent a confiscation order to Spain (based on EU
Regulation 2018/1805). In August 2021, CJIB received a confirmation that the
seized objects (two cars, two scooters and a water scooter) would be sold and the
proceeds would be shared 50-50 between the Netherlands and Spain. The
Netherlands received EUR 30 500.

218. Prosecutors also pursue victim compensation (restitution) as part of the criminal or
confiscation case. If the suspect/convict possesses illegally obtained gains and an
injured third party exists, the OM Confiscation Instruction directs prosecutors to
issue a demand for a confiscation order. The Netherlands has provided some
examples (see Box 3.18), but no statistics are collected on the overall number of
cases or amounts returned to victims, as the corresponding value are not included
in the collected confiscation results (Table 3.23).

Box 3.17. Example of victims’ restitution
LEAs conducted an investigation into a network of criminals exploiting women
from Eastern Europe for prostitution. EUROJUST was involved, and a joint
investigative team with Hungary was created to identify the criminal network. The
investigation was conducted between 2014 and 2015. In the course of the
investigation, the ARO seized several assets of the suspects, including real estate,
two cars, and bank accounts. In 2016, the main suspects were convicted of human
trafficking and ordered to pay compensation to their victims for a total of EUR
459 000.

219. Finally, the authorities also rely on tax and administrative measures as a
complementary tool to recover criminal assets, by levying taxes, imposing tax fines
or seizing wages or benefits. An example of this integrated approach is presented in
Box 3.19.

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Box 3.18. Use of tax measures in addition to confiscation
An individual was convicted to 12 years’ imprisonment for ML, international drug
trafficking and possession of firearms. Criminal assets valued over EUR 3 million
were seized and confiscated under criminal law. Value confiscation proceedings
regarding illegally obtained gains (over EUR 15 million) were still awaiting
decision in second instance at the time of the onsite visit. In addition to these
criminal confiscation measures, the Tax and Customs Administration seized a
luxury car under tax law, and a report was submitted to the municipality in order
to recover undue social benefits provided to the convict and his wife.
220. In the BES Islands, there are limited statistics available on the level of seizures and
confiscations. Between 2017 and 2020, a total of 12 cases involved confiscation. The
annual confiscation target of USD 20 000 was largely exceeded in the years for
which statistics are available. For instance, the overall value of confiscated assets
was USD 315 500 in 2017, USD 76 500 in 2018 and USD 331 000 in 2019. However,
the authorities have also established an annual target in terms of number of
confiscation proceedings per year (two), which was not achieved in 2018 and
2020. 41

221. The Assessment Team is unable to provide a clear interpretation of these figures.
However, the limitations noted under IO.7, in relation to the ability of LEAs in the
BES to perform financial investigations, also affect the confiscation results and
therefore the Assessment Team welcomes the recent increase in resources and
training for BES OM and LEAs. The annual value of confiscated assets suggests a
need to review the annual target of USD 20 000.

Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transportation of
currency/BNI

222. The Dutch authorities are aware of the risks related to the cross-border
transportation of cash and valuable goods associated with criminal activities and
demonstrated an ability to seize assets at the borders, in particular at high risks
ports of entry, such as the Schiphol international airport.

223. Several LEAs are involved in investigating cross-border movements of cash,
including Customs, KMar, FIOD, and cooperate closely with the district prosecutors.
Custom officers are designated as special investigative officers and can apply
criminal investigative powers when performing their tasks (see R.31). The low
threshold for a suspicion of ML enables them to easily initiate a criminal
investigation whenever the origin of money is unclear, or undeclared cash or BNIs
are found. In the performance of its tasks, Customs uses some risk-indicators,
mainly based on FEC studies, NRA results, signals received, with the main one being
the country of origin or destination of the passenger, based on a list of countries
identified as high-risk.
41

During the onsite visit, the authorities also noted that OM BES was preparing a confiscation
proceeding for approximately USD 6 million, in relation to a major drug trafficking case.

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224. Most undeclared cash or money courier cases detected by Customs or KMar occur
at Schiphol Airport. The Netherlands has therefore set-up a specialised
investigation team at Schiphol where KMar and FIOD work together, under the lead
of a dedicated team of prosecutors from the Noord-Holland OM office. All suspicions
of ML identified by Customs are transferred to this team. In the BES Islands,
Customs Caribbean Netherlands and KMar perform AML/CFT tasks at the borders,
in co-operation with the OM BES.
225.

Customs, including in the BES Islands, makes all cash declarations and disclosures
available to FIU-NL within four days through goAML. As noted under IO.6, this
information becomes part of the FIU-NL UTR database. Table 3.26 shows the overall
number and value of cash declarations and disclosures. These figures include both
the declarations over the threshold received by Customs, and the number of reports
for violation of the obligation to declare.

Table 3.26. Number and value of cash declaration/disclosure reports (extra-EU and
BES Islands)
Sea
Air
BES Islands
Total reports
Value NL in EUR
Value BES Islands in USD

2016
1475
3311
4 786
284. 5 M
4.5 M

2017
1097
3280
46
4 423
201.3 M
4.5 M

2018
1428
3247
57
4 732
171.4 M
4.2 M

2019
1412
3121
38
4 571
199.1 M
14.2 M

2020
1778
3242
95
5 115
268.5 M
20 M

2021*
1492
1651
3 143
184.4M
7.6 M

* Covers the first half of the year.

226. As of June 2021, the Netherlands has started implementing the new EU regulation
2018/1672, which imposes a disclosure obligation for the transportation of
cash/BNI via cargo. The implementation of this new regulation is too recent to
assess in terms of effectiveness. The Netherlands implements a broad disclosure
system for intra-EU transportation of cash and valuable goods, pursuant to their
national customs regulation. The so-called “right to report” allows Customs to
request passengers travelling within the EU to disclose information on cash or other
types of valuable goods. Table 3.27 below provides an overview on the number of
disclosures and the type of related valuable goods. These intra-EU disclosures led
to over 50% of the ML investigations initiated by Customs between 2016 and June
2021.

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Table 3.27. Number and value of intra-EU disclosures (million EUR)
Number

Amount
(M EUR)

Number

2016
Total

334

102.3 M

391

Watches
Gold
Precious stones
Jewellery
Intra EU cash
Other

69
111
20
39
69
26

30.3
13.2
34.2
5.6
2.5
16.5

86
121
18
31
93
42

Amount
(M EUR)

Number

Amount
(M EUR)

Number

2017
2018
119.6 M
351
40.5 M
Of which, main figures relate to:
9
76
17.8
7.1
2.6
7.1

145
41
11
36
90
28

16.6
5.7
3.7
7.2
2.4
4.9

Amount
(M EUR)

Number

2019

2020

253

25.2 M

192

24.8 M

92
20
6
24
87
24

10.4
3.2
0.8
5.7
3.1
2

63
15
2
11
78
23

5.3
2.3
6.8
4.1
2
4.3

227. The Netherlands pays particular attention to the use of valuable goods to transfer
criminal profits from, and into, the country. During the onsite visit, the authorities
presented cases to the Assessment Team where individuals were caught travelling
with very expensive watches and could not provide a satisfactory explanation on
their origin. In such cases, Customs initiated a ML investigation and submitted a UTR
to the FIU-NL. In a recent case, the Customs report was picked-up by the FIU’s
queries system, and after in-depth analysis by FIU analysts, and crosschecking of
information with iCOV, JustisTRACK and two FIs, FIU-NL disseminated it to LEAs for
further investigation.

228. Overall, Customs initiated a reasonable number of ML investigations based on
violations of the obligation to declare or the obligation to disclose, as shown in
Table 3.28. Customs seized assets for over EUR 22.7 million. Box 3.20 provides a
case study on a ML investigation initiated by Customs.

Table 3.28. Investigations initiated by Customs
Extra-EU declarations
Asset seized (EUR)
Intra-EU disclosures
Asset seized (EUR)
Total ML investigations
Total seized assets (EUR)

2016
36
3M
17
0.85 M
53
3.85 M

2017
23
1.33 M
31
0.89 M
54
2.2 M

2018
32
2.09 M
43
1.58 M
75
3.6 M

Amount
(M EUR)

2019
37
2.95 M
38
2.06 M
75
5M

* Covers the first half of the year.

2020
33
1.84 M
51
3.20 M
84
5M

2021*
23
2.12 M
25
0.79 M
48
2.9 M

229. The authorities did not provide statistics on the follow-up to these cases, which
limits the ability of the Assessment Team to fully assess Customs’ contribution to
depriving criminals of their assets. In the BES Islands, between 2015 and 2020,
Customs transferred eight investigations to other LEAs, following a violation of the
obligation to declare and a suspicion of ML. Out of these cases, only one led to the
arrest of the suspect. The others were either dismissed by the OM, or closed with a
fine or a settlement.

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Box 3.19. ML investigation initiated by Customs

3

In 2019, Customs at Schiphol airport discovered over EUR 1.38 million in cash in
the suitcases of an Italian resident intending to travel to China via Amsterdam. The
suspect was arrested on the suspicion of ML and the deliberate failure to declare
the money to Customs. The suspect ultimately admitted he was transporting
undeclared cash. The FIOD conducted an investigation into the origin of the money
but could not determine the predicate offence, except for the suspect’s statement
that he partly did not pay taxes. A recorded conversation while the suspect was in
custody also indicated tax evasion and revealed that the money belonged to the
defendant himself. The Court concluded that the suspect did not provide any
substantiation for the legal origin of the money. He was sentenced to 30 months’
imprisonment for ML, and the money was confiscated.

230. In addition to the cases that resulted in the opening of a ML investigation, Customs
have also applied fines for failure to declare. However, as noted under R.32, the
Assessment Team considers that the maximum level of fines, corresponding to a
third or fourth category fine (EUR 8 700 or EUR 21 750) is not proportionate or
dissuasive. The low level of penalties applied in practice also impacts their
dissuasiveness (see Table 3.29). The same conclusions extend to the BES Islands.

Table 3.29. Penalties applied for violation in the obligation to declare
2016
Number of total violations
Number of violations for
which a penalty is applied
Total penalties (EUR)
(average in EUR)
Number of total violations
Number of violations for
which a penalty is applied
Total penalties (USD)
(average in USD)

398
349
344 800
(988)
2
0
0

2017
2018
Customs Netherlands
1249
1054
968
920

2019

2020

2021*

1143
965

624
460

308
285

718 600
603 200
(742)
(656)
Customs BES
0
4
0
0

814 700
(844)

543 000
(1 180)

403 233
(1 415)

8
5

2
2

3
3

10 152
(2 030)

1470
(735)

4 491
(1 497)

0

0

* Covers the first half of the year.

Consistency of confiscation results with ML/TF risks and national AML/CFT
policies and priorities
231. Available statistics and case studies provided confirm the authorities’ focus on the
confiscation of criminal assets, in line with national policies and priorities. The
limited statistics available do not provide a comprehensive picture of the
authorities’ results in this respect. However, they are sufficient to establish a
correlation between the seizure results obtained by the Netherlands, and the
prevailing proceeds-generating offences in the country.

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232. In the BES Islands, authorities have achieved some results in confiscating criminal
proceeds. However, in the absence of more detailed information, it is unclear
whether these results are consistent with ML risks.

Overall conclusion on IO.8
The tracing and confiscation of criminal assets is a clear priority for LEAs and the
OM. The strong legal measures available, and the specific financial expertise enable
LEAs to conduct complex criminal investigations and trace proceeds of crime. A
large proportion of the confiscation results is linked to major out of court
settlements imposed on legal persons. Although comprehensive and detailed
statistics are not available, confiscation results are in line with national policies and
the national risk profile. The collected confiscation results do not reflect the overall
value of confiscation orders imposed by the Courts.
The Netherlands has achieved good results in seizing cash and valuable goods at
the borders, and initiating subsequent ML investigations. However, the level of
sentencing applied for the violation of the obligations to declare is low, which
impacts its dissuasiveness.
The Netherlands is rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness for
IO.8.

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3

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Chapter 4. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION
Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key Findings
Immediate Outcome 9
1. The Netherlands has a robust framework to detect, investigate and
prosecute TF. The Netherlands is able to detect signals from many different
sources and to launch TF investigations, both in parallel to terrorism
investigations, and autonomously. The effective co-ordination in place
between all relevant stakeholders involved in countering TF, such as the
Programme FEC-TF, is a strength. The FIU-NL, in particular, has
significantly contributed to TF investigations, 50% of which were triggered
by its disseminations. The Table of Four, under the OM, ensures that all
signals are considered and TF cases prioritised.

2. The types of TF investigated and prosecuted are in line with the country’s
risks, with a high majority of cases involving the funding to FTFs. While
some investigations of NPOs possibly involved in TF are ongoing, no
conviction has been achieved so far, which is not in line with the high risk
associated to the abuse of NPOs in the TF NRA. The authorities are also
monitoring possible new and emerging TF threats, such as right-wing
terrorism. No TF case has been detected in the BES Islands to date, which is
consistent with its TF risk profile.
3. The conviction rate in TF cases is high (70%). Nevertheless, the level of TF
sentencing imposed in practice is generally low, which affects the
dissuasiveness of the sanctions. There are no TF guidelines for the
prosecution or sentencing orientation points for judges. While the
prosecution policy is that a prison sentence should be requested in all TF
cases, almost half of the judgements resulted in a community service or a
suspended prison sentence.

4. The Netherlands uses a wide range of alternative measures where it was
not practicable to obtain a TF conviction, including pursuing other criminal
charges, or adopting administrative measures, such as halting social
benefits, revoking citizenship or imposing travel bans.

Immediate Outcome 10

1. The Netherlands implements UN designations without delay, through a
combination of EU and national provisions. It has made proactive use of
domestic designations to target FTFs, in line with its risk profile. The
obligation to freeze assets and the prohibition on making funds available
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apply to all persons, including all obliged entities. Nevertheless, in practice,
the lack of supervision of the implementation of TFS without delay for
DNFBPs other than trust offices, and VASPs and certain DNFBPs in the BES
Islands, creates a potential gap in the implementation of TFS without delay.

4

2. There are tools to communicate changes to the sanctions lists. For UN and
EU designations, the Netherlands relies mainly on the publication of the
changes on the UN website and the EU Official Journal. Domestic
designations are published on government websites and the Official
Gazette. DNB and AFM disseminates changes to the national and EU lists in
their monthly newsletters. However, some of these communication
channels are available only to subscribers and may not always ensure the
timely communication of new designations.

3. The Netherlands has a robust understanding of the TF risks associated with
the abuse of NPOs. It has also identified the characteristics of organisations
at higher risk of TF abuse, even if the authorities have some difficulties in
identifying all the organisations that correspond to this profile, as some
charitable foundations operates without an ANBI status of CBF seal.
4. Self-regulation is a key feature of the Dutch non-profit sector. The
Netherlands has no supervisory authority to monitor NPOs. Voluntary
certification mechanisms, such as the ANBI status and CBF seal, promote
transparency and accountability among participating NPOs. The authorities
undertake extensive outreach to the categories of “good faith” NPOs, which,
by virtue of their activities, present a higher risk of potential TF abuse and
have jointly developed good practices to raise awareness on TF risks and
vulnerabilities. The sample of organisations met by the Assessment Team
were well aware of their TF risks. Good faith NPOs, including those at higher
risk, are already implementing effective TF risk mitigation measures and
are engaged in regular dialogue with the authorities.

5. Authorities use financial, administrative and criminal and intelligence
information to detect NPOs sponsoring terrorism. However, due to the
limited visibility on the activities of some NPOs and the lack of any legal
requirement on transparency and accountability, it is difficult to collect
sufficient evidence to start an investigation or to designate them for TFS.
Furthermore, until a criminal conviction is achieved, so-called “bad faith”
NPOs can continue operating, raising and moving funds.
6. The amount of funds frozen based on domestic designations is overall low,
which is consistent with the country’s TF risks. The Netherlands has
confiscated a very limited amount of TF-related assets, due to challenges in
seizing money in conflict zones and in collecting sufficient evidence to
investigate charities possibly involved in supporting terrorism.

Immediate Outcome 11

1. The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) implements UN designations
without delay, through a combination of EU and national provisions. The
mechanism in place to implement PF-related TFS is identical to the one for
TF designations and the freezing obligations apply to any person, including
all obliged entities. However, as the implementation of TFS without delay
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by DNFBPs, with the exception of trust offices is not supervised, the
assessment team has doubts about their ability to implement TFS without
delay. The same considerations noted in IO.10, in relation to
communication mechanisms apply to PF TFS.

2. In total, between 2016 and 2021 the Netherlands identified 15 matches
with PF-listed persons/entities. In seven cases, funds were frozen. With the
exception of a major freezing and other minor ones by a branch of a Dutch
bank located in Asia in relation to DPRK sanctions, the Netherlands has
frozen only a few hundred EUR in relation to Iranian PF sanctions. These
figures are consistent with the Netherlands’ low exposure to PF. However,
as there is no explicit obligation for DNFBPs to report assets frozen or
action taken to implement TFS, and there is no supervision on their
implementation of TFS obligations, the authorities may have only a partial
view of the implementation of TFS implementation by these entities.
3. The authorities have identified some violations related to sanctions
obligations, in particular in relation to the export of dual use, or luxury
goods to DPRK. The supervisors or the OM Office investigated all detected
breaches and the authorities prevented the goods from reaching their final
destination. Nevertheless, as there is no supervision of the implementation
of TFS without delay for DNFBPs except trust offices, and their supervisors
do not perform specific controls regarding TFS, sanction breaches involving
DNFBPs are less likely to be identified.
4. The understanding of TFS obligations is strong in the financial sector. DNB
and AFM have provided guidance on sanctions implementation to FIs and
trust offices and have followed-up on identified breaches to ensure the
adoption of remedial actions. These actions generally resulted in increased
compliance. DNFBPs met during the onsite visit had a good understanding
of their TFS obligations, and most were performing checks against the UN
and EU sanctions lists. However, in the absence of any supervision, it is
unclear whether the entire DNFBP sector, and DNFBPs and VASPs in the
BES Islands, are implementing TFS obligations at a satisfactory level.

Recommended Actions
Immediate Outcome 9
1. The Netherlands should review the current level of sanctions applied in TF
cases, to ensure that they are dissuasive and consider developing specific
TF guidelines for the OM and sentencing orientation points for judges.
2. The Netherlands should continue its efforts to develop a broad range of
financial intelligence to identify and pursue TF cases, including those
related to the use of unlicensed payment services and NPOs, and adopt
effective enforcement action.
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3. In the BES Islands, the authorities should use all intelligence leads,
including financial intelligence, to detect any possible signal of TF.

Immediate Outcome 10

4

1. The Netherlands should consider clarifying the criteria for proposing
designations to the UN 1267 Committee, the EU COMET and third countries,
to ensure they are properly understood and implemented by the
authorities.
2. The Netherlands should further improve communication to ensure that
legal and natural persons, and obliged entities in particular, are notified
promptly of any change in designations, including at the UN level.

3. The Netherlands should conduct a comprehensive NPO TF risk assessment,
to better identify those organisations most vulnerable to potential TF
abuse, in particular amongst those operating without ANBI or CBF
certifications and, on this basis, assess the effectiveness of existing
mitigating measures and implement targeted controls and risk-based
transparency requirements on non-certified NPOs posing a high-risk of TF
abuse.
4. The Netherlands should take measures to ensure that all charitable
organisations, including church communities, are identifiable.

5. The Netherlands should continue pursuing its proactive engagement with
NPOs and the private sector, to avoid de-risking and facilitate NPO’s access
to financial services.
6. The Netherlands should enhance the financial transparency of NPOs and
the donations they receive, including by passing and implementing the
proposed law on transparency for civil society (WTMO).

Immediate outcome 11

1. The Netherlands (including BES Islands) should require all categories of
obliged entities, to take adequate measures to implement TFS without
delay, report frozen assets and any action taken pursuant to TFS
obligations.
2. The Netherlands (including BES Islands) should ensure that the
implementation of PF TFS by all obliged entities is monitored by
supervisors.
3. The Netherlands should maintain statistics to assess whether obliged
entities adequately freeze and report frozen funds or assets from
designated individual or entity without delay.

233. The relevant Immediate Outcomes considered and assessed in this chapter are IO.911. The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R. 1, 4, 5–8, 30, 31 and 39, and elements of R.2, 14, 15, 16, 32, 37, 38 and
40.

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Immediate Outcome 9 (TF investigation and prosecution)
Prosecution/conviction of types of TF activity consistent with the country’s riskprofile
234. The Netherlands has a strong understanding of its TF risks, informed by the two TF
NRAs, terrorism threat assessments, and by the thematic investigation projects
carried out by the authorities (see Project A and Project T below). As noted under
IO.1, religious terrorism poses the most significant threat to the Netherlands, in the
form of Dutch FTFs who travelled to conflict zones to join terrorist groups, and
domestically in the form of radicalised individuals, abroad or in the country,
attempting to spread extremist ideologies in local communities. The Netherlands is
also closely monitoring new emerging terrorist threats, such as right-wing
terrorism. The 2019 TF NRA identifies the following channels and methods as
posing the main TF risks:
•

•
•

foundations and other legal entities both in the Netherlands and abroad;
legally acquired funds; and

licensed and unlicensed payment services.

235. For BES Islands, the ML/TF NRAs did not reveal any clear signals of TF threats and
the Dutch authorities therefore infer the TF risk as low.

236. In recent years, the Netherlands has experienced a number of terrorist incidents
and thwarted plots, mostly carried out by lone actors. While most of these were
related to religious terrorism, there have also been incidents involving right-wing
terrorism. As of April 2021, approximately 105 out of the 305 FTFs who had
travelled from the Netherlands were still in Syria and Iraq.

237. The majority of TF cases investigated until November 2021 involve the provision of
financial and material support to FTFs, which is in line with the Netherlands’ risk
profile. The Netherlands prosecuted 27 TF cases between 2016 and 2020. In 19
cases, a TF conviction was achieved, while eight were acquitted, or are currently
pending trial or in appeal. The different types of TF cases prosecuted and convicted
involves raising funds through legal and illegal means. Licensed and unlicensed
payment services feature as the main channels used to transfer funds. While some
ongoing TF investigations involve the possible abuse of NPOs for TF purposes, no
conviction has been achieved so far, which is not in line with the high risk associated
to the abuse of NPOs in the NRA. Box 4.1 provides some examples of the sources of
TF used in the investigated cases.

Box 4.1. Case examples on the financing of FTFs
Use of legal funds

In 2019, an individual was convicted of TF and violations of the Sanctions Act for
transferring EUR 200 via a money transfer service to an intermediary in Turkey in
2014. The money was sent to a family member participating in ISIL in Syria. The
Court imposed a sentence of two months’ imprisonment with a probationary
period of two years.
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Financing through the abuse of NPOs

4

Upon proactive analysis, the FIU-NL identified an NPO active in charitable projects
in Syria and Iraq, linked to high-risk transactions related to ML/TF. The NPO was
also in direct contact with suspected terrorist sympathisers in Netherlands and
Belgium. The FIU-NL detected money flows to a NPO in Turkey, which was an
intermediary to re-direct money and goods to Syria. The Court proceeding is
ongoing.
Use of unlicensed payment services

In 2020, an individual was convicted of TF, illegal banking and human smuggling.
Between 2016 and 2018, the individual knowingly transferred money via hawala
channels to family members fighting for ISIL. The case came to light upon a
domestic violence report made by his ex-wife, who disclosed the hawala channels
used by the individual to record payment orders to operators and deliver the
money to Syria and Turkey. The Court imposed a sentence of 36-month
imprisonment with a probationary period of one year (the charges included also
other offences not related to TF).
238. The Dutch authorities, in particular the OM, FIOD, Police and FIU-NL, have accorded
priority to CFT. TF cases have been assigned to a designated and secure court in
Rotterdam, which hears the cases since early 2019 on a bi-monthly basis in order to
absorb the prosecution caseload. As discussed with members of the judiciary during
the onsite, the OM and courts assign priority to TF cases.

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TF identification and investigation
239. The Netherlands has a robust institutional framework to proactively identify and
assess any signal related to TF and coordinate the most appropriate response, from
the intelligence phase to the investigation and prosecution. There is close cooperation and co-ordination between the authorities in charge of terrorism and TF
investigations. The FIOD handles autonomous CFT investigations under the
authority of the OM/FP. FIOD has a dedicated CFT Team with 25 investigators. The
Police Central Unit (LE), under the authority of the OM/LP, generally manages CT
investigations. Within the LE, eight staff work on CFT issues detected in the
framework of ongoing terrorism investigations. The OM/FP coordinates both the
intelligence (signals) and the criminal investigation phases. The below diagram
outlines the role of the various authorities in TF investigations.

240. To date, there have been no TF signals or investigations in the BES Islands, which is
in line with its TF risks. Should any TF signal be detected, the OM/FP would
cooperate with the OM Carib to coordinate the investigation.

241. TF signals are reported and discussed at the Table of Four, an operational platform
led by OM/FP, where the FP, LP, FIOD and NP discuss information and decide
whether to initiate a TF criminal investigation. The Table of Four has a no
prioritisation policy, whereby all TF intelligence brought to its attention is
considered. This approach ensures that no information is left unexamined. The
Table of Four assigns the investigation to FIOD or the Police. It can also decide to
pursue an investigation into a different criminal offence, such as fraud or ML. Within
the OM, as a standard policy, TF investigations are conducted centrally by the FP.
Every OM unit that comes across a TF signal should report it to the FP for coordination.

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242. TF cases are identified either in the framework of ongoing terrorism investigations,
or in the course of autonomous TF investigations. The Dutch authorities make full
use of all possible intelligence sources, including reports from the General
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), FIU-NL, Police, FIOD, co-operation projects
and information from foreign counterparts, to identify TF signals. Programme FECTF plays an important role at this stage. The authorities also make use of publicprivate partnerships such as the TF Platform and the TF Taskforce to obtain
additional insights and improve the quality of TF-related financial intelligence (see
Box 4.2 below).

Box 4.2. CFT partnerships
The Programme FEC-TF regroups 13 governmental organisations to analyse
criminal, administrative and tax information with a view to countering TF and
mapping the financial networks of persons and entities known to the FEC
participants, or identified in FEC signals. The insights obtained lead to drawing up
an intervention strategy, or sharing lessons learnt among the participants.
FEC TF Task Force is a public-private initiative established in 2017. The Task
Force allows investigative service (Police/FIOD) to share concrete TF signals and
personal data (specific operational information) with banks, giving them concrete
information that enable them to perform their statutory Wwft duty and search
their systems. UTRs identified by banks trigger FIU-NL’s investigation and
dissemination to LEAs. Such sharing of signals and reporting of unusual
transactions takes place under strict legal conditions.

The TF Platform is a public-private initiative established in 2012, by the Dutch
Banking Association and FIU-NL. The purpose of the Platform is to enhance the
quality and effectiveness of UTRs reported on TF. Via this Platform, the FIU shares
knowledge of themes, phenomena and typologies with the four Dutch major banks.
In addition, research is conducted into the development of TF risk profiles.

243. The FIU-NL has so far contributed to a high number of TF investigations, through
targeted TF intelligence and the use of data profiling to detect TF-related cases for
dissemination, based on thematic projects, such as the Project T. It has also provided
extensive guidance to obliged entities to enable them to detect TF-related
transactions.

Box 4.3. Project T

In 2013, FIU-NL developed a specific TF risk profile to detect the financing of FTFs
by aggregating data on individuals who travelled to Iraq and Syria as FTFs or
settled in the ISIL area, with analysis carried out within the TF Platform and data
from domestic, UN, EU and foreign sanctions lists. The FIU subsequently shared the
risk profile with obliged entities. Since 2013, it has resulted in over 1 600 UTRs, of
which over 70% were found suspicious and disseminated by the FIU to LEAs. The
TF risk profile developed through this project is used to scan daily UTRs in the FIU
database and has been adapted to reflect the evolving nature of the TF threat (e.g.,
to focus on hubs of returning FTFs).
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244. The Dutch authorities have conducted a total of 59 TF investigations in the period
between 2016 and November 2021, involving 99 natural and four legal persons.
73% of the TF investigations are related to FTFs and around 8% are related to NPOs.
Investigations conducted by the police or FIOD make extensive use of datahubs such
as iCOV and the CT Infobox to gather as much information as possible on the
subjects in a timely manner (see IO.6 for more information on datahubs). A number
of TF cases and projects also demonstrate the frequent deployment of special
investigative techniques, including wiretapping and surveillance, and an early
engagement with the foreign counterparts to identify terrorist financiers and their
domestic and international networks.

Box 4.4. Project A
Project A, initiated by FIOD and OM/FP, is a series of ongoing investigations,
started in 2015. The project stemmed from previous investigations into the role of
an intermediary transferring money to FTFs. Authorities involved were the FIUNL, FIOD, OM/FP, Police, CT Infobox, EUROJUST, EUROPOL, and investigation
services from the US, Spain, France and Belgium.
An intermediary was involved in several money transactions to FTFs from the
Netherlands and several countries in Western Europe and North America. On the
initiative of the OM/FP, these countries were informed via a EUROJUST meeting.
The Dutch investigations focused on identifying the Dutch individuals who were
ultimately providing financial support to FTFs. Subsequently, the project went on
with the co-operation amongst foreign authorities in order to gain insight into the
middleman and other intermediaries, with a view to identify and prosecute them.

TF investigation integrated with –and supportive of- national strategies

245. TF investigations are integrated in, and supportive of, the Netherlands overall CT
policy and strategy. TF is explicitly embedded in the National Counterterrorism
Strategy 2016-2020. The Strategy outlines an integrated approach to countering all
forms of extremism and terrorism through five intervention areas: procure,
prevent, protect, prepare and pursue. The TF component is particularly relevant in
the areas of procuring (e.g., gathering financial intelligence on TF, financial
networks and financial transactions), preventing (e.g., disrupting access to means
and financial resources necessary to conduct an attack) and pursuing (e.g.,
investigating and prosecuting persons suspected of TF). The NCTV is in charge of
the co-ordination of the Strategy. At the time of the onsite visit, the NCTV was in the
process of updating the National Counterterrorism Strategy. The new Strategy will
not envisage any substantial change in the approach to TF.

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246. The NCTV is also responsible for the compilation of regularly updated Terrorist
Threat Assessments (DTN). The findings from TF intelligence and investigations are
incorporated into the DTN, which is publicly available on the government website.
The DTNs also ensure that the measures included in CT policy and the national
Strategy remain up to date. Based on DTN findings, the authorities can develop
flexible measures, in the form of inter-ministerial programmes or project plans. The
threat assessments were used as a basis to develop the Comprehensive Action
Programme to Combat Jihadism, and to set-up an inter-ministerial task force on
problematic behaviours and unwanted foreign financing. 42 The findings from TF
investigations contributes also to the TF NRAs, which inform risk-based policies and
mitigating measures.
247. At the operational level, there is strong co-ordination and co-operation between the
authorities in charge of terrorism and TF investigations, as described above. Several
cases demonstrate the strong integration of financial intelligence in CT cases, and
its usefulness to identify terrorist suspects and adopt successful enforcement
actions in a timely manner, including the investigation presented in Box 4.5.

Box 4.5. Use of financial intelligence in a CT investigation
Terrorist attack on Utrecht tram
In March 2019, a lone actor shot four people and severely injured three in a tram
in Utrecht. On the day of the attack, the OM released the suspect’s name to the
media. On this basis, a FI established that the attacker had registered in an online
platform to obtain information about opening a business account. In the
application, the suspect provided an address and a mobile phone number that
were unknown to the police. The FI reported the transaction to the FIU-NL, which
immediately declared it suspicious and informed the investigation team, the CT
Infobox and the AIVD.
Based on the data contained in the reported suspicious transaction, in particular
the telephone number and IP data, the Police were able to trace the mobile phone
and location of the suspect. The suspect was arrested on the same day, thus
preventing possible subsequent attacks. The individual was sentenced in first
instance to life imprisonment for murder with a terrorist intent.

Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions

248. The Netherlands prosecutes TF through three distinct criminal offences: the TF
offence under WvSr, Art. 421, the participation (financing) in a terrorist
organisation under WvSr, Art. 140a and the violation of the Sanctions Act (Sw, Art.
2-3). In practice, the penalties applied by the Court in TF cases are generally low,
which limits their dissuasiveness. The Assessment Team based this conclusion on
the statistics and the analysis of TF case studies provided by the authorities.

42

DTN analysis will also be used to counter the threat from right-wing terrorism.

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249. The prosecution policy is that, as a rule, unconditional imprisonment must be
demanded for TF cases. The prosecution can also request to apply additional
conditions (e.g., surveillance or travel or contacts bans) depending on the merits of
the case. As noted in the TC Annex, the maximum penalty for TF is eight years’
imprisonment, or a fine of the fifth category, and fifteen years’ imprisonment for the
financing of a terrorist organisation. The violation of the Sanction Act is considered
a serious economic offence, punishable by a maximum of six years imprisonment,
community service or a fifth category fine.

250. The Netherlands’ conviction rate for TF offences is approximately 70%. Twentyseven individuals have been prosecuted for TF offences in the period between 2016
and 2021, with 19 convictions and eight acquittals. The majority of cases prosecuted
so far involve the provision of funds to FTFs, often by relatives and involving small
amounts. While this is largely in line with the country’s risk profile, the sentencing
applied in these cases is very low, with only a few months of imprisonment (see Box
4.1). In almost half of the cases, only community service or suspended prison
sentences were applied (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Imprisonment sentences for TF-related convictions (per person)
Sentencing for TF or violation
of the Sanctions Act
Community service or suspended
imprisonment
Under 1 year
1 < 2 years
2 < 3 years

8

Combined sentences [e.g. TF or
violation of the Sanctions Act in
combination with tax fraud or other
offences]
1

4
-

3
1
2

Note: The length of the sentence includes only the unsuspended prison terms.

251. The highest sentences for TF-related convictions are the result of cumulative
sentencing, where the TF offence is combined with other offences such as the
participation in a terrorist organisation, committing preparatory acts with a
terrorist intent, tax fraud and forgery. In the case of cumulative sentences, the
Court’s ruling refers exclusively to the overall sanction. Therefore, it is not possible
to determine the specific sanction accorded to the TF component of the charge.
However, even in these cases, the combined sentences are lenient, with the highest
conviction being 30 months of imprisonment, with an additional suspended
sentence of twelve months. Therefore, the Assessment Team does not consider the
sanctions applied in practice for TF to be dissuasive.

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Box 4.6. Examples of TF cases with the highest sentencing
Support to a terrorist network in Syria

4

The case concerns three suspects in the Netherlands supporting terrorists in Syria
by making money, telephones and laptops available. The investigation began in
mid-2014 and was completed in February 2015. Evidence against the suspects
included the analysis of transaction data from FIs, FIU-NL, FIOD and a money
transfer service. In 2016, one of the suspects was convicted of TF, conspiracy to
prepare terrorist offences and participation in a terrorist organisation, to 30
months of unconditional imprisonment, and 12 additional months on probation.
The other two individuals received lower sentencing: 16 months, and eight
additional months on probation for participation in a terrorist organisation, and
six months imprisonment, with six additional months on probation, for TF.
Providing EUR 17 000 to a FTF in Syria

Between 2013 and 2014, an individual used intermediaries to send nearly EUR 17
000 to his brother, who was fighting with ISIL in Syria and who was placed on the
National Terrorism List. The individual deliberately provided incorrect data to the
Tax Administration and wrongfully received a sum of money in excess of EUR 10
000, the majority of which was transferred to his brother in Syria. In 2017, the
Court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 24 months, of which 14 months
are suspended on probation, and special conditions, for TF, violation of the
Sanctions Act 1977, the Al-Qaida Sanctions Regulation 2011, the Terrorism
Sanctions Regulation 2007-II, and forgery of documents.
252. In terms of TF sentencing, there are no specific TF guidelines for the OM, nor
sentencing orientation points for judges. The Court will take into consideration
several factors to determine the final sentence, including the severity of the case,
the amount involved, the relationships amongst subjects, and past sentencing for
similar offences. While this low level of sentencing is partly related to the personal
motive (e.g., support provided to family members), rather than ideological, the
relatively low frequency and amounts involved, and the heavier weight put on
preventive measures and the integration and rehabilitation of the offenders (see
also IO.7 in relation to the authorities’ approach to criminal sanctions), the
Assessment Team considers the level of sanctions applied for TF in practice not
dissuasive.

Alternative measures used where TF conviction is not possible (e.g. disruption)

253. The authorities make use of a range of alternative criminal justice, regulatory and
administrative measures when it is not possible to achieve a conviction for TF. The
Table of Four examines available evidence to decide whether to pursue a TF charge.
When there is insufficient evidence, the Table of Four can decide to send a case back
to the Police and/or FIOD to request additional investigation. If there is no further
investigative lead to explore, it can request the Police, FIOD, AMLC, or the OM to
investigate/prosecute alternative charges, such as tax fraud or ML.
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254. In the interest of national security, Dutch authorities can also revoke the Dutch
citizenship of individuals who joined a terrorist organisation. This measure can
apply to persons who joined Al-Qaida, Ahrar al Sham or ISIL, and in possession of a
second nationality and 16 years of age or older. The revocation can be based on
AIVD reports, a conviction for a terrorist offence, or other information such as
foreign judgements. This measure has been applied to 17 individuals as of 18
November 2021. 43

255. The Netherlands also adopted an Act on Termination of Benefits, Student Finance
and Allowances in the Event of Participation in a Terrorist Organisation. This is an
administrative measure to ensure that the State does not finance terrorism. The
measure was introduced as the majority of FTFs were receiving some form of
government support. Municipalities initiate the termination of the benefits on the
basis of intelligence received from the CT Infobox, as described in the example
below.

Box 4.7. Termination of public benefits and allowances for FTFs

Between 2013 and 2017, many individuals left for Syria and Iraq to join ISIL as
FTFs. The CT Infobox actively monitored these subjects. In some cases, it turned
out that emigrated subjects were not removed from the municipal registers.
Therefore, the CT Infobox advised the Police to alert the local
authorities/municipalities. As a result, the individuals were cancelled from the
municipal register and social benefit allowances were stopped.

256. Since 2017, the Netherlands imposes a range of administrative measures, including
a requirement to report, a prohibition of contact, an electronic monitoring or a
travel ban to individuals linked to terrorist activities or supporting these activities,
as per the Counter-Terrorism (Interim Administrative Measures) Act. 44 These
measures are not dependent on a TF conviction. Measures such as travel ban or
passport withdrawal can be imposed to individuals who intend to leave the country
to join terrorist organisations. Between 2017 and 2021, these types of measures
were imposed on 11 individuals.

257. The Netherlands has also undertaken initiatives to prevent the undetected return
of FTFs. It has included known FTFs in the Schengen Information System and in the
list of wanted persons and has cooperated closely with its European partners within
Frontex and EUROPOL. It has also informed regional authorities, intelligence
services, KMar with a view to identifying any returnee who attempted to travel back
to the Netherlands. In relation to returnees, the Netherlands has an integrated
approach to determine the best strategy (e.g., a criminal and/or intelligence
investigation or reintegration initiatives).
43

44

This measure has a sunset clause of 1 March 2022. However, the authorities informed the
team that the Senate is considering a bill to extend it for an additional five years. The
deprivation of citizenship was also applied to 20 individuals, as an additional measure
upon conviction for a terrorist offence.
Based on the current threat picture, the Dutch government will extend the Act for a period
of five years, until March 2027. At the time of the onsite, the Bill was before the Senate.

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Overall conclusions on IO.9

4

The Netherlands has a strong understanding of its TF risks and a robust
institutional framework to ensure the detection, investigation and prosecution of
TF. The number and features of the TF cases investigated and prosecuted are
largely consistent with the country’s risk profile, even if further efforts are needed
to successfully prosecute NPOs linked to TF. The authorities demonstrated the
ability to use alternative criminal or administrative measures where a TF
conviction cannot be secured. However, the Assessment Team does not consider
the sanctions applied in practice for TF to be dissuasive.
The Netherlands is rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.9.

Immediate Outcome 10 (TF preventive measures and financial sanctions)
Implementation of targeted financial sanctions for TF without delay
258. Overall, the Netherlands implements TF TFS without delay and makes use of
domestic designations, largely in line with its risk profile; however, some
shortcomings remain, particularly in relation to the implementation of TFS by
certain categories of DNFBPs and the communication of changes to the lists, which
does not always occur without delay. As described under R.6, the Netherlands
implements TF TFS through EU decisions and regulations, complemented by
domestic legislation. To overcome the delays in the transposition of UNSCR
designations at the EU level, domestic ‘bridging legislation’ ensures that UN
designations are in force in the Netherlands (including BES Islands) from the date
of their publication by the UN, until the EU provisions enter into force.

259. In addition to UN TFS, the Netherlands implements EU and domestic designations
related to TF. At the EU-level, at the time of the onsite visit, the terrorism sanctions
list (under CP 2001/931 - CR 2580/2001) included 15 individuals and 21 entities,
and the autonomous EU-regime for ISIL and Al-Qaida (under CD 2016/1693 - CR
2016/1686) included six individuals. At the domestic level, the Netherlands has
designated 145 individuals and two entities. The obligation to freeze funds takes
effect immediately upon the publication of the designations in the national Gazette.

Designations

260. The Netherlands has an effective multi-agency framework in place to identify
targets for designations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is the responsible authority
to designate an individual domestically, and to submit proposals to the UN Sanction
Committees, the EU COMET or to third countries. It acts in co-ordination with the
Ministers of Finance and Justice and Security, and after consultation of the Asset
Freezing Committee (BVO). The Asset Freezing Committee convenes on a regular
basis (every one or two months) to discuss designation proposals. The participation
of the OM 45, AIVD, FIU-NL, and NCTV enables the Committee to consider all relevant
financial and non-financial intelligence in its determinations.
45

For the BES Islands, the OM Carib will also participate.

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261. Generally, the OM and AIVD submit nomination proposals and initial supporting
information to the Committee, while FIU-NL intervenes to provide additional
information on a specific target. As a standard practice, in all cases FIU-NL consults
iCOV, to gather a comprehensive assessment of the target’s financial assets, or
possible relevant connections. NCTV also regularly consults local actors, such as
municipalities and presents relevant information to the Committee. In practice,
authorities, in particular the OM, have discretionary powers to decide whether to
propose a name for listing. This power is not always associated to the application of
clear listing criteria to decide whether to propose a name for domestic, EU, UN or
third country designation and may lead to missed opportunities to prevent
terrorists, or their supporting network, from raising funds. The Netherlands may
also opt for other types of criminal or administrative measures, as described under
IO.9.
262. The Dutch national sanctions list includes mostly FTFs who left the Netherlands to
fight in Syria and Iraq and join terrorist groups, such as ISIL and Al Qaida. The two
entities listed at the time of the onsite visit were charitable foundations suspected
of indirectly providing financial support to terrorist organisations. The composition
of the sanction list is largely in line with the country’s risk profile, although the
Assessment Team expected more NPOs on the national list, given their high-risk
categorisation in the TF NRA. At the time of the onsite, the Netherlands had
proposed two designations to the EU CP931 list, and one designation to the EU ISIL
and Al-Qaida list. The Netherlands had co-sponsored the designation of one
individual and three entities under the 1267/1989 regime, but it had not made any
designation proposals of Dutch nationals to the UN sanctions Committees, nor to
third countries.

263. The Netherlands considers third-party requests through the same procedure
applied to domestic designations proposals. Out of the fourteen requests received
between 2015 and 2020, it has listed only one person (see Box 4.8), as it will
proceed with a listing only if it is possible to establish a link between the proposed
subject and the Dutch system (e.g., indications that the subject is engaged in
terrorist acts in or from the Netherlands, or in facilitating such acts, or in making or
facilitating transactions via the Dutch territory, or Dutch nationals or legal entities).

Box 4.8. Domestic designation pursuant to a third country request and
designation proposal to the EU
In October 2016, the Netherlands listed an individual because of their association
with a terrorist organisation active in the Middle East, and upon a request from a
third country. The AIVD conducted independent research into the subject, which
led to the identification of reasonable grounds for designation. After consultation
of the BVO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed the individual. Based on the AIVD
information, the individual was found to be involved in a European network. The
Netherlands subsequently submitted a listing request to the EU terrorism sanction
list. The proposal was discussed in COMET and agreed at the beginning of 2017.

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Communication of designations

4

264. There are tools available to communicate new designations to obliged entities. For
UN and EU designations, the Netherlands relies on the publication of the EU
designations in the EU Official Journal. A consolidated list is also available on the EC
website and obliged entities can subscribe to the EU financial sanctions database.
However, not all Dutch obliged entities do so, and there is also a delay of a few days
between the UN designations and the publications by the EU. While most FIs and
some DNFBPs rely on commercial databases to screen for TFS, the lack of more
proactive communication channels could hamper the timely implementation of TFS
by some obliged entities. National designations are published in the Government
Gazette and the Government publishes a consolidated national sanction list on its
website and on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has a notification system in place, alerting any modifications to the
national list to subscribed FIs and DNFBPs. However, not all obliged entities are
registered and the list does not cover EU/UN designations. DNB and AFM publish
updates on the national and EU designations in a monthly newsletter to subscribed
FIs and DNFBPs. There are approximately 5 000 subscribers. When new persons or
entities are added to the national list, in the period in between the monthly
newsletter, an additional newsletter about these designations is sent out, but this
notification may also occur with a delay. All DNB newsletters are also available on
DNB’s website. Since this communication comes with a delay, entities relying on it
(particularly smaller FIs and DNFBPs) may implement TFS with a delay.

Implementation of sanctions

265. Between 2015 and 2020, the Netherlands froze around EUR 17 150 under the UN
1267 list, EUR 177 under the UN 1988 list, and EUR 58 710 under the national list.
These relatively low amounts are consistent with the terrorism and TF risk profile
of the country (mainly microfinancing of FTFs). As noted above, the obligation for
any person and all obliged entities to freeze funds starts immediately from the
moment of the publication of a designation by the UN, by the EU on the EU Official
Journal or in the national Gazette for domestic designations.

266. FIs and some DNFBPs have a good understanding of the general obligations related
to TFS. This was confirmed by the interviews held during the onsite visit. As noted
under IO3, since DNFBPs other than trust offices are not supervised for TFS
implementation, it is difficult for the authorities to assess whether, in practice, all
DNFBPs understand and implement their TFS obligations without delay. The same
applies to certain categories of DNFBPs and VASPs in the BES Islands.

267. The Netherlands does not maintain statistics to assess whether obliged entities
froze and reported any funds or assets belonging to a designated individual or entity
without delay (see also IO4). However, the authorities provided two examples to
the Assessment Team, where FIs reacted immediately to new designations on the
national list, and froze the funds on the same day. The FIs also promptly
communicated their actions to DNB and the Ministry of Finance.

268. While all obliged entities are required to freeze the assets of designated individuals
or entities, the Assessment Team considers the lack of an explicit obligation for
certain categories of DNFBPs to report frozen funds, and to have a sanction
screening system in place to screen their clients against the sanction lists as
deficiencies.

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269. The Netherlands has developed effective mechanisms to regularly reconsider the
listing or de-listing of domestic designations, as well as to authorise exemptions
pursuant to UNSCR 1452. Since 2016, the authorities de-listed 20 individuals and
two entities. The Netherlands granted 33 exemptions, mainly to cover basic living
expenses and to pay certain taxes or utility bills.

270. To facilitate TFS implementation, the authorities provide guidance through
information available on their websites, as well as guidance papers, newsletters,
circulars and other policy statements. In addition, there are two public-private
platforms to discuss TFS-related issues. Firstly, the Sanctions Expert Pool brings
together representatives of larger banks, DNB and the Ministry of Finance to discuss
TFS implementation. Secondly, in the Financial Sanctions Network, the Ministry of
Finance discusses issues related to TFS with representatives from non-bank FIs and
TCSPs.

271. Over the past few years, DNB and AFM conducted thematic investigations into TFS
compliance in multiple sectors. The FIOD has actively investigated violations of the
Dutch sanctions law and in several TF cases, individuals were convicted for
providing funds to listed FTFs (see IO.9).

Targeted approach, outreach and oversight of at-risk non-profit organisations
Understanding of the risk and mitigating measures

272. Both the 2017 and 2020 TF NRAs identify the financing via foundations or other
legal entities, including national and international fundraising, as the greatest TF
risk in the Netherlands. The authorities have undertaken significant work to
determine the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to potential TF abuse.

273. In the Netherlands, there are approximately 266 109 foundations and 131 676
associations. 46 Within these groups, the Netherlands considers those NPOs acting
with a charitable purpose as the subset falling within the FATF’s functional
definition of NPO. The authorities assess that most of these NPOs are posing a low
risk, notably the ones with ANBI status and CBF recognition. Using terrorism and
TF intelligence, the authorities identified a small subsector of organisations at
higher risks of potential TF abuse. The features of NPOs at higher TF risks include:
•

•
•
•

46

foundations with potential ties to jihadist groups;

NPOs operating in or close to areas where terrorists operate;

NPOs financed by foreign radical groups to influence certain religious
foundations in the Netherlands;

NPOs abused to collect funding (e.g., for aid projects) in the Netherlands to
finance TF both in the Netherlands and abroad.

. As of 15 November 2021.

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274. The authorities’ understanding of TF risks for the NPO sector was informed by the
NRA results, the NCTV DTN (see IO.9), TF signals and investigations involving NPOs,
FIU-NL research, which also led to guidance and indicators for obliged entities, as
well as information provided through public-private partnerships (see Box 4.9).
Between 2015 and 2020, FIU-NL investigated UTRs involving approximately 1 100
foundations and found that 50 could be linked to terrorism or TF. During the
discussion with the authorities, it emerged that associations are considered to pose
a considerably lower TF risk than foundations, as they have not yet been implicated
in TF signals detected by the authorities.

Box 4.9. Initiatives to detect the abuse of NPOs for TF purposes
Public-public
FEC TF Programme (see Box 4.2): the programme enables participating
government agencies to share information and insights into networks and
methods of financing of suspected individuals, including NPOs. The analysis of TF
subjects shows that returnees are sometimes involved in foundations and small
businesses.
Public-private

FEC TF Task Force (see Box 4.2): this partnership allows LEAs to share concrete
signals and operational information on specific subjects (including NPOs) for
which there is not yet a clear suspicion, with five banks and one insurance
company, for them to search whether they have any UTR or relevant information
in their system.

FEC Rogue Foundations project: it started in 2018 to share knowledge on the
misuse of foundations, including for TF. It involved four major banks, AMLC, FIOD,
FIU-NL, Police and OM. It led to the identification of a risk profile and red flag
indicators to detect UTRs, and in the development of a barrier model to prevent
the abuse of foundations.

TF Platform: every 6-8 weeks, FIU-NL and four participating banks share
anonymised information on previous TF cases – including those involving NPOs, to
support FIs in assessing risks of money flows. This information enabled the FIUNL to identify 50 NPOs possibly linked to terrorism and TF.

275. Notwithstanding these important initiatives, there is room for further improvement
in the authorities’ ability to identify NPOs at high risk for potential TF abuse. For
instance, the Netherlands has not conducted a separate sectoral assessment of its
NPO sector. The authorities met during the onsite had difficulties in obtaining a
clear and comprehensive insight into the number of NPOs that might pose a high TF
risk. In particular, there is no clear information on how many of the 266 109
foundations are set up for charitable purposes (versus other non-charitable
purposes). Consequently, it is impossible to determine the number of charitable
foundations operating without an ANBI status or CBF seal. This is key information,
as the charitable foundations without any of these statuses are not subject to any
standard or transparency requirements, and could therefore be highly vulnerable
to abuse.
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276. Furthermore, the Assessment Team has some concerns in relation to the limited
requirements applicable to church communities. Due to the principle of separation
between church and state, the authorities are reluctant to require transparency or
perform strict controls on these organisations. Church communities have no
obligation to conclude a notarial deed for their establishment, and they are not
subject to the Wna (see IO.5). Some obliged entities met during the onsite
mentioned church communities as high risk for illegal activities and referred to
cases where this legal form was used for non-religious activities.

Outreach to the sector and its understanding of the risk

277. The Netherlands has demonstrated a proactive approach in engaging NPOs in
outreach activities, which increased the sector’s awareness of its potential
vulnerabilities to TF abuse. The authorities have worked very closely with NPOs, in
the development of best practices to address TF risks and vulnerabilities. In June
2021, the Ministry of Finance, in co-operation with NPOs branch organisations and
CBF, published a factsheet to support NPOs in recognising and preventing TF abuse.
The FIU has also developed a non-public factsheet specifically addressed to
gatekeepers, with 66 confidential indicators to help them monitor NPOs
transactions with a risk-based approach.

278. The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Human Security Collective (HSC) have also held a series of
roundtables to establish a public-private dialogue, exchange information and
discuss issues related to TF risks and NPO de-risking. An overview of the
roundtables is presented in Box 4.10. These initiatives were open to all NPOs and
involved those NPOs operating in good faith, which are most vulnerable to potential
TF abuse due to their activities (e.g., organisations operating in or close to conflict
zones, with an active terrorist presence). Between January 2016 and November
2021, ten roundtables were organised. 47

47

The Netherlands aims to organise two roundtables per year. Due to the COVID19
pandemic, in 2020 and 2021 it was possible to organise only one roundtable per year.

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Box 4.10. NPOs roundtables

4

Since 2016, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the HSC, have regularly organised round tables on the
themes of de-risking and financial access for NPOs, CFT policy and FATF standards.
The round tables are open to NPOs of different sizes and to the Dutch Banking
Association. This public-private dialogue gives government agencies, supervisors,
banks and NPOs opportunities to gain a clearer understanding of TF risks, the
effect of CFT regulations on civil society organisations, and prompt the
development of shared solutions.
On average, a subset of 10 to 20 NPOs (most of which are umbrella organisations
representing several members) participate in each round table. HSC
communicates the outcomes of the roundtables within their network via
bimonthly newsletters, which are sent to approximately 200 NPOs and shares
updates online. The roundtable organisers also seek to establish relations with
roundtables organised in other countries, and international roundtables promoted
by international organisations such as the World Bank or EU.

279. NPOs met by the Assessment Team—including organisations which, by virtue of
their activities, are more exposed to TF threats—were well aware of TF risks. They
have effective mitigation measures in place, such as procurement procedures,
vetting of staff and partners on the ground, and performing checks on donors,
beneficiaries and partners against the sanctions lists. NPOs, in particular umbrella
organisations, are actively involved in promoting awareness and good practices to
counter TF abuse within the non-profit sector. NPOs confirmed that there is a good
dialogue with the Dutch authorities and the banking sector. While appreciative of
the current engagement with public and private sector entities on de-risking, they
also stressed that, in some cases, they were experiencing persistent challenges to
access vital financial services to perform their charitable activities abroad
(particularly in or near conflict zones).

Oversight and action taken

280. The Netherlands gives a prominent role to self-regulation. As such, there is no
government authority in charge of supervising the non-profit sector. There are
initiatives and tools that contribute to reducing the risk of TF abuse within the
sector, but they are not part of a general policy or coordinated action plan.

281. There are several moments in the life-cycle of a NPO where some forms of screening
are carried out (see c.8.2). All associations and foundations (including NPOs) must
be established via a notarial deed and register with the CoC’s Company Register. As
noted above, this obligation does not apply to church communities. This registration
and the obligation to register changes to the information in the CoC’s Company
Register will trigger screening via JustisTRACK whereby NPOs with a high TF risk
may be identified, for example, when persons on a terrorist sanction list or with
criminal records are involved in the NPO (see IO5). NPOs are also subject to CDD
measures by obliged entities when opening a bank account.

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282. In the Netherlands, there are two voluntary certification systems rewarding NPOs
(including in the BES Islands) that fulfil certain requirements in terms of
transparency and accountability:
i.

ii.

283.

ANBI (Public Benefit) status, which also provides certain tax exemptions to
stimulate charity. The Tax and Customs Administration delivers the status to
NPOs fulfilling accountability, integrity and transparency standards. 53 565
organisations in the Netherlands 48 and 12 out of 717 associations and
foundations in the BES Islands have the ANBI status.
CBF (Fundraising Accreditation) seal is a quality label for NPOs that want to
raise funds. The Fundraising Accreditation Agency (CBF) delivers this status to
NPOs fulfilling a set of requirements in terms of accountability, integrity and
transparency. 655 organisations have CBF certification. In terms of volume,
these organisations represent a large share (80%) of the total funds raised. The
controls in place for the CBF are stronger than for the ANBI status.

However, for NPOs other than those with an ANBI status or CBF recognition, there
is no obligation to make financial statements available to the CoC, record their
transactions, or undertake similar measures to ensure transparency in their
operations, nor is a supervisory mechanism in place.

284. Organisations which voluntarily agree to be part of umbrella NPOs have selfregulation requirements, or codes of conduct. Both the outreach by the government
and the voluntary certification systems mainly reach the ‘good faith’ NPOs with
legitimate charitable activities. Some obliged entities indicated that they will only
accept charitable foundations with ANBI status or CBF seal as clients, as other
charitable foundations are considered too high risk. 49 Non-compliance with ANBI or
CBF transparency criteria (or membership criteria of an umbrella organisation)
may lead to these labels being revoked, but, aside from losing advantages, there are
no real sanctioning measures in place, such as fines.
285. While self-regulation and voluntary certifications are suitable to increase
transparency and accountability within good faith NPOs, ‘bad faith’ organisations
(i.e., NPOs that deliberately give up tax advantages to avoid any transparency and
accountability requirements linked to the voluntary certification system) can easily
escape from any control on the use of their funds. LEAs are often unable to
investigate foundations, as it is difficult to gather evidence due the lack of
transparency and accountability requirements. With the exception of the two NPOs
placed on the domestic sanction list, criminal prosecution seems to be the only way
to act against foundations suspected of TF. Moreover, it is very difficult to dissolve
NPOs complicit in TF, with the result that, in practice, they can continue with their
activities and raise funds unless a criminal conviction is achieved. As noted under
IO.9, at the time of the onsite visit, no NPO had been convicted for TF.50
48
49

50

32 762 foundations and 2 723 associations. Organisations with an ANBI status include also
other types of legal entities, such as public legal entities and church communities.
The Netherlands is considering to develop a digital portal for NPOs to increase access to
financial services. There are ongoing discussions between CBF and the banking sector to
establish a website where all charities can do a self-assessment of their risk profile, with a
view to facilitate their access to bank services.
At the time of the onsite visit, a draft law to increase transparency of civil society
organisations (WTMO law) was under review by the House of Representatives and the

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286. In the BES Islands, the NRAs concluded that the level of TF risk is low and no specific
TF risks are associated with NPOs. There are no specific measures or actions taken
to NPOs, which suggests that the authorities consider that they pose no risk.

Deprivation of TF assets and instrumentalities
4

287. The Netherlands mainly relies on the use of national designations and freezing
measures to counter FTFs, with the high majority of funds frozen under the national
list (EUR 58 710) and less important sums pursuant to UN designations (EUR 17
150 under the 1267 list; EUR 177 under the 1988 list). As noted under IO.9, the
authorities have also made use of administrative measures, such as the halting of
social benefits, to deprive terrorists and their support networks of any assets.

288. The seizure and confiscation of terrorist assets and instrumentalities during TF
investigations has yielded minimum results, with an estimate of only a few thousand
EUR seized under suspicion of ML rather than TF. The authorities mentioned a
number of challenges in pursuing confiscation of terrorist assets, including that in
most terrorism or TF investigations, the money is already in the conflict zones and
is therefore impossible to seize. Furthermore, when the money is collected under
the cover of a charity, the authorities struggle to collect sufficient evidence to
initiate a TF investigation, due to the lack of any legal requirement for transparency
and accountability of foundations.

Consistency of measures with overall TF risk profile

289. The measures undertaken by the Netherlands are largely consistent with its TF risk
profile. These conclusions are based on the analysis of the NCTV terrorism threat
assessment, and the findings of the TF NRAs. The Netherlands has used domestic
designations and asset freezing measures to target FTFs and their supporting
network, which is consistent with the findings of the NRAs.

290. The Netherlands has also taken action to address the abuse of NPOs for TF purposes,
which is the main TF risk identified by the authorities. It has conducted extensive
outreach initiatives and has established a robust dialogue and co-operation with
good faith NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse. It has invested in intelligence and
public-private partnership to detect the possible abuse of NPOs. However, the
limited controls in place for some NPOs and the lack of a comprehensive assessment
of the sector hamper the ability of LEAs to detect and prosecute organisations
wilfully supporting terrorism.

Council of State. The law would require foundations to file their internal financial records
within the CoC. It would also allow mayors or the OM to request civil society organisations
to disclose information on their financial flows (donations), in some specific
circumstances, and temporarily freeze, prohibit or confiscate some funds/financial flows.
It would also allow to impose penalties in case of lack of co-operation.

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Overall conclusions on IO.10
The Dutch legal framework ensures that UN designations are immediately
applicable in the Netherlands and BES Islands. All natural and legal persons,
including all FIs and DNFBPs, are under an obligation to implement TFS. However,
the lack of certain specific obligations relating to TFS for certain DNFBPs sectors,
creates a potential gap in the implementation of TFS without delay. The
communication mechanisms in place may not always ensure a prompt
communication of new designations, in particular UN and EU ones. The
Netherlands has primarily used its domestic sanction lists to designate FTFs, which
is in line with the risks. The low amount of TF assets frozen is also consistent with
the TF activities in the country.
The Netherlands has proactively engaged with good faith NPOs to raise awareness
on TF risks and vulnerabilities. It has provided good practices to both NPOs and
the private sector to help detecting transactions potentially related to TF, and
limiting de-risking. Good faith NPOs at risk of TF abuse are aware of their risk and
have mitigating measures in place. The authorities have a robust understanding of
the subset of organisations posing higher TF risks. However, a more granular
assessment is hampered by the lack of a sectoral risk analysis and the limited
visibility on the financial activities of those NPOs which are not part of any
voluntary certification scheme, and therefore not subject to supervision. Overall,
the Immediate Outcome is achieved to a large extent.
The Netherlands is rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness for IO.10.

Immediate Outcome 11 (PF financial sanctions)

291. While not presently required under the FATF Standards, in 2020, the Netherlands
conducted an initial assessment of its PF risks, threats and vulnerabilities through
the “Proliferation Financing Monitor”. This exercise contributed to the authorities’
understanding of the risks and exposure to PF activities. The authorities are aware
that some characteristics of the Dutch economy—in particular, the country’s
position as a trade hub and its large financial sector—could potentially expose it to
PF. However, the Netherlands is geographically distant from both Iran and DPRK
and there are no intensive trade relationships with these two countries. The importexport activities are almost negligible with DPRK. The import-export with Iran
corresponds to a minimal part of the overall Netherlands’ trade flows, but still
accounts for an annual average of EUR 187 million of imports, and EUR 626 million
of exports, mainly in relation to mineral fuels (import) and raw materials,
machinery and transport equipment (export). There are very limited financial
transactions made from and to Iran and DPRK. The share of proliferation-sensitive
incoming and outgoing transactions by banks is very low, when compared to the
total number of transactions conducted (>0.0001%).

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292. The Netherlands considers that the direct implementation of PF sanctions at the
European and Dutch levels, combined with limited financing and trade flows, results
in an insignificant risk of PF sanctions being violated. Due to the limited number of
cases related to PF, the authorities have not yet identified any specific typology for
PF sanction evasion. However, they consider that the use of shell companies and
VAs continues to pose a risk.

293. The Netherlands has an export control system in place for the exportation of
controlled goods and technologies related to dual-use goods.

294. The North Korea Sanctions Regulation 2017 designates the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the authorities
responsible for CPF issues related to DPRK. The Iran Sanction Regulation 2012
identifies the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as the competent authorities for the implementation of CPF
measures related to Iran. As noted under IO.1 (see Table 1.1), the Netherlands has
solid inter-agency co-ordination in place to discuss sanctions’ implementation,
including on PF, and to share relevant information and best practices with the
private sector (and banks, in particular). Amongst the different mechanisms, the
Carré Consultation has a specific focus on PF, and enables all authorities involved in
import and export controls to exchange information and discuss real cases.

Implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation
financing without delay

295. As an EU member state, the Netherlands relies on the EU framework for the
implementation of TFS related to Iran and DPRK. Similar to TF-related TFS, national
bridging provisions enables the Netherlands to implement PF TFS without delay.
Any new UN designation is immediately in force in the Netherlands (including the
BES Islands) from the moment of its publication by the UN, and until the
corresponding designation by the EU enters into force. In addition to the UN
designations, the Netherlands also applies the additional sanctions on DPRK and
Iran imposed by the EU to bolster UN sanctions and prevent their circumvention.
The Netherlands adopts the same mechanism described in IO.10 for the
implementation of PF-related sanctions.

296. The same considerations noted in relation to the prompt and proactive
communication of TF designations apply to PF TFS (see IO.10 for detailed analysis)
and may affect the ability of certain obliged entities to implement TFS without delay.
In particular, not all obliged entities use automatically updated commercial
databases for sanctions screening, subscribe to the UN or EU notification systems
or the DNB and AFM newsletters to receive timely updates on new designations,
and the implementation of TFS without delay by DNFBPs, with the exception of trust
offices is not supervised.

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Identification of assets and funds held by designated persons/entities and
prohibitions
297. At the time of the onsite visit, the Netherlands had not made any listing or delisting
proposals to the relevant UN Committees. Very few assets were frozen pursuant to
UN designations related to Iran (EUR 483). In relation to DPRK, the Netherlands
recorded a major freezing of over USD 16.3 million, carried out by an Asian branch
of a Dutch bank and two smaller frozen amounts of USD 26 and EUR 78. The limited
amounts of frozen assets in the Netherlands is consistent with the low exposure to
PF. Nevertheless, the lack of certain specific obligations relating to TFS for certain
categories of DNFBPs in the Netherlands, with the exception of trust offices, and
DNFBPs in the BES Islands and the lack of obligation to report any positive sanction
hits to their supervisor, creates a potential gap in the implementation of PF-related
TFS.

298. In case of a positive hit, FIs, VASPs and trust offices are required to immediately
freeze the assets and report the match to DNB or AFM. The supervisors assess the
reports on their completeness and forward them to the Ministry of Finance for a
second assessment. The assets must remain frozen, until further notice is provided
to the FI or trust office.

299. Between 2016 and 2021, DNB received 15 reports on possible “hits” with
sanctioned individuals and entities in Iran and DPRK. In seven cases, assets were
frozen. In the other eight cases, it was impossible or inapplicable to freeze the assets,
for example because the reporting institution was an insurer and no credits were
paid out yet. The majority of the reports—nine out of 15—were related to Iran. With
the exception of the USD 16.3 million freezing in Asia, the identified matches
involved very small amounts of funds, between 1 and 78 EUR.

300. With a view to detect PF-related activities, the Netherlands monitors trade
movements possibly related to PF and the corresponding money flows. In several
occasions, customs have intercepted and prevented suspicious goods, possibly
related to PF sanctions, to reach their final destination, as illustrated in the case
example below (Box 4.11).

Box 4.11. Shipment of luxury items directed to DPRK
On the basis of intelligence and information provided by an international partner,
the transport of a shipment of containers was halted in the Port of Rotterdam.
Based on intelligence, the ultimate destination of the shipment was the DPRK. Even
though there were suspicions of the sanctions against DPRK having been violated
in this case, there was a lack of evidence. The authorities reached an agreement
with the shipping company to return the containers to the seller, but in the end the
goods were destroyed.

301. The Netherlands has procedures in place to deal with exemptions authorised by the
relevant UN resolutions. In practice, the Netherlands has granted few exemptions
under the EU Iran regulation, related to the payment of legal fees.

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FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs’ understanding of and compliance with obligations

4

302. FIs, VASPs, trust offices and some other DNFBPs understand their general
obligations to implement TFS, including on PF. However, while the Sanctions Act
establishes a general obligation for everyone (i.e., all persons and obliged entities)
to freeze assets and make no funds available, there is no explicit obligation in the
Supervision Sanction Act for DNFBPs other than trust offices to screen for
sanctioned individuals or entities. Many DNFBPs interviewed during the onsite
indicated that they do screen their clients against sanctions lists. Even in cases
where a DNFBP did identify a sanctioned person or entity as a part of its CDD
processes, it is unclear whether this information would reach the Ministry of
Finance. The lack of certain specific obligations relating to TFS for certain DNFBP
sectors and to report any match and the subsequent lack of supervision hamper the
Netherlands’ ability to have a comprehensive view on all assets frozen or other
actions taken to implement TFS.

303. The considerations on the level of understanding and compliance with TFS
obligations are equally applicable to TF and PF TFS. The level of understanding and
compliance between FIs is generally high, with most carrying out their screening
and reporting any match to the relevant supervisor. FIs and trust offices have
administrative and internal control measures to comply with sanctions regulation,
screen any possible match with designated persons or entities, and report
immediately a match to DNB or AFM. Many FIs also assess sanction evasion risks as
a part of their Systematic Integrity Risk Analysis (SIRA), and of their obligation to
determine an integrity risk score for each client, but this is less the case for trust
offices.

304. In relation to insurer branches, a DNB off-site review in 2016/2017 revealed that
approximately 75% of the population was compliant with the Sanctions Act and
screened their clients against the national and EU sanction lists. The non-compliant
institutions were required to remediate and set-up screening processes. They
subsequently reported to DNB to confirm that they had remedied the identified
deficiency. This resulted in 89% of them having specific policy on sanctions’
screening by 2019. Furthermore, the insurers’ trade association (VNAB) supports
insurers’ effective compliance with the sanctions regulations through a sectorspecific online platform (see description in the Box 4.12 below).

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Box 4.12. The insurers sanctions platform
The VNAB Sanctionpl@tform was launched in 2016. The platform identifies
(prospective) business relations and checks them against all sanction lists. The
standardised and computerised operation of the online application facilitates
sanctions’ compliant reviews, which are stored on the platform and accessible to
co-insurance market parties. The platform fully supports CDD and Transaction Due
Diligence reviews required by EU regulations. The platform is web-based and
designed to be used for co-insurance, authorised underwriting and non-bourse
policies, and accessible by both members and non-members of the VNAB. The
platform supports the automated search of organisations and their BOs and
checking them against the sanction lists in the context of CDD. In the context of
Transaction Due Diligence, the platform supports the verification of whether the
policy directly or indirectly relates to countries, products, or services included in
the sanctions lists. The system is regularly tested for known positives and false
positives.
305. As part of their new registration requirement, VASPs are generally aware of and
understand TFS obligations. Sanctions evasion risks are part of their SIRAs. Due to
the very recent supervision of the sector, a comprehensive picture on their level of
compliance is not yet available.

306. The interviews with DNFBPs other than trust offices during the onsite visit revealed
that most screen their clients against sanctions lists, even in the absence of an
explicit obligation to do so, and report information to FIU-NL and/or Police.
Between 2015 and 2021, the FIU-NL received three reports from DNFBPs referring
to proliferation-related activities. These transactions were reported for ML reasons,
but contained also a possible PF component related to dual-use goods. The
Assessment Team notes that the supervision and guidance provided by DNB and
AFM to the obliged entities under their supervision resulted in improved
compliance and implementation with TFS obligations. In the absence of supervision
for the majority of DNFBPs, there is therefore a risk that some shortcomings in the
compliance with TFS obligations may persist for those categories of DNFBPs. It is
also unclear whether DNFBPs other than trust offices understand the specificities
of different sanction regimes (e.g., in relation to PF), or to which extent they are
aware of the most common typologies of sanctions evasion.

307. As noted under IO.5, there are some challenges for obliged entities in identifying the
BO, especially when international complex structures are involved. The Assessment
Team notes that this may also result in a risk of sanctions evasion if the sanctioned
person is the BO of a customer, or transaction. This risk is mitigated to a limited
extent by the implementation of the additional sanctions imposed by the EU in
relation to both DPRK and Iran.

308. In the BES Islands, supervised obliged entities generally understand and comply
with the TFS obligations. However, as noted in IO.3, the lack of supervision for the
implementation of TFS obligations by VASPs and DNFBPs other than trust offices
also impact on the ability to understand the level of implementation and
understanding of TFS obligations by these entities.
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Competent authorities ensuring and monitoring compliance

4

309. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides general information on sanctions, and on
the implementation of the Sanctions Act on its website. Factsheets and manuals are
also available online to raise awareness on TFS obligations and on related topics,
such as export controls. Guidance provided by government institutions as well as
supervisors is mostly related to the implementation of TFS in general.

310. DNB and AFM, as supervisors for FIs, VASPs and trust offices, provided extensive
and, where needed, sector-specific guidance to FIs, VASPs and trust offices on the
implementation of TFS obligations, including PF. This includes DNB newsletters,
notifications, seminars and information material published on the website.
Furthermore, DNB issued a general guidance on the implementation of TFS, and a
specific guidance on doing business with Iran. AFM is regularly in contact with
obliged entities to answer any question via email, and issues monthly notices jointly
with DNB, as well as guidelines.
311. DNB and AFM regularly check the organisation and effectiveness of the sanctions
screening systems as part of their supervisory examinations. They have also
conducted thematic investigations on the compliance with sanction regulations.
While these are not specific to PF, they cover both the TF and PF component of the
sanction measures. Whenever a breach is detected, DNB or AFM will provide
additional guidance to the obliged entity and will follow-up on the remedial
measures adopted. This has generally resulted in increased compliance with TFS
obligations by both FIs and trust offices. For VASPs, due to the very recent
supervision of the sector, a comprehensive picture on the level of compliance is not
yet available. There is no supervision on PF-related sanction obligations by the
supervisors of DNFBPs, with the exception of trust offices.

312. In terms of sanctions, there is effective co-ordination and collaboration between
financial supervisors, FIOD and the OM, to ensure that any breach in the
implementation of TFS is punished appropriately, either as an economic offence, or
under criminal law.

313. DNB and AFM have not detected nor imposed sanctions for specific breaches of
UNSCRs relating to PF. However, they did impose formal and informal measures for
violation of the general obligations of the Sanctions Act to ensure that FIs and trust
offices adopt remedial actions in the field of administrative organisation and
internal control. In case of substantive violations, DNB and AFM exchange
information with FIOD and the OM so as to determine the best approach on a caseby-case basis, as per the una via principle it is not possible to impose both
administrative and criminal sanctions for the same violation.

314. In relation to DNFBPs other than trust offices, and DNFBPs and VASPs in the BES
Islands, there is no supervision on the implementation of TFS obligations, including
on PF. As a consequence, no control is performed on whether these categories of
obliged entities understand or properly implement the sanctions, and the possible
detection of PF TFS breaches is therefore left to LEAs.

315. The FIOD has investigated several violations of the sanctions provisions, and some
legal persons were convicted for breaching PF-related sanctions. However, all cases
investigated so far involve violations in the exporting of military or dual use goods,
or exporting without a license, rather than the provision of funds/assets to listed
individuals or entities.

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Overall conclusion on IO.11
The Netherlands has a legal framework in place to ensure that UN designations are
applicable in the Netherlands and in the BES Islands without delay. The lack of
supervision of the implementation of TFS without delay for certain DNFBPs
hinders the authorities’ ability to assess the overall compliance of the sector with
PF-TFS obligations. The communication mechanisms in place do not always ensure
the prompt transmission of changes to the lists to all obliged entities. The results
in terms of PF-related assets frozen are consistent with the country’s low exposure
to PF.
The level of understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations is strong in the
financial sector. The guidance and supervision provided by DNB and AFM resulted
in increased awareness and compliance by the obliged entities under their
supervision. It is unclear if all DNFBPs other than trust offices promptly implement
PF-TFS, as implementation of PF-TFS is not supervised and there has been no
specific guidance provided to these entities.
The Netherlands is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.11.

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Chapter 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key Findings
FIs and VASPs
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Banks, larger MVTS and VASPs have a good understanding of their ML risks and
obligations and regularly review their risk assessments. Understanding of risk in
the insurance sector lags behind that of other sectors supervised by DNB and ML
risk assessments are generally less developed for smaller and non-bank FIs.
Understanding of TF risk is generally lower across all sectors.
FIs and VASPs generally apply mitigating measures commensurate with their
risks. Many FIs have integrated mitigating measures, such as monitoring systems,
but for some banks and MVTS there has been a tendency to categorise customers
as low risk by default, which makes mitigating measures less effective.

Most FIs have appropriate policies and procedures in place commensurate with
their risks. There has been significant investment in AML/CFT compliance in
recent years and banks have improved controls, including ensuring strong
ownership of AML/CFT issues at the senior management and board level.
CDD measures are generally well implemented, but some FIs including larger
banks struggle to identify the ultimate BO, particularly when complex
international structures are involved. This has been a focus of high profile
enforcement action in recent years and the authorities are seeing improvements
as a result.

FIs generally apply EDD in cases of higher risk and have automated systems to
identify high risk customers and activities. However, in some lower risk sectors,
such as life insurance companies and insurance intermediaries, a significant
proportion of entities lack processes to identify PEPs.

FIs generally understand and implement their unusual transaction reporting
obligations adequately. However, FIU data shows reporting remains low in some
sectors. FIs request feedback from the FIU and suggest this is currently
inadequate.
There are increasing cases of de-risking by FIs and DNFBPs, including of obliged
entities. This is worrying and is something the authorities are aware of and should
continue to address.

DNFBPs
1.

Understanding of risk varies significantly amongst DNFBPs. The land-based casino
and TCSPs (trust offices) generally have a good understanding of risks and
AML/CFT obligations, but there is a lower level of understanding in other sectors
including real estate agents and TCSPs (domicile providers only).

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2.

3.
5

4.

5.

CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES

The implementation of mitigating measures varies across DNFBPs in line with
understanding of risks. Trust offices and the land-based casino generally apply
mitigating measures commensurate with their risks. Other DNFBPs generally
apply CDD measures, but these are often basic and many entities feel CDD is
mainly a role for the banks.
DNFBPs often struggle to identify the ultimate BOs particularly when this relates
to companies with complex structures or entities with an international component
and settle for pseudo BOs as an alternative. This is particularly worrying in the
case of notaries who often register this information in the BO register.

A large number of trust offices use automated screening tools which are effective
in identifying possible PEPs. They also show awareness of the EDD measures that
need to be taken when PEPs are involved and most have processes to handle
customers and transactions from higher-risk countries. Other DNFBPs met during
the onsite were aware that specific measures needed to be taken when dealing
with PEPs, but, they were often unable to clearly articulate what the specific
measures were, that need to be applied in these cases.
UTR Reporting in many sectors is low and this seems to be more acute in relation
to the legal sector, real estate agents and for sectors where there are no trade
organisations (e.g., domicile providers).

BES Islands
1.
2.
3.

4.

FIs on the BES Islands have a reasonable understanding of their risks and
obligations. Most DNFBPs are not required to identify and assess their ML/TF risk,
and the understanding of AML/CFT obligations varies among DNFBPs.
Reporting of UTRs is low across many sectors and the process for entities to
submit reports appears to be time consuming and overly burdensome.

Many DNFBPs rely on screening lists based on open sources and local knowledge.
It is very rare that EDD needs to be applied by DNFBPs. On several occasions the
Assessment Team heard from the Netherlands authorities and private sector
participants that most people on the islands know each other. This may impact the
assessment of individual risk.
Most FIs and some DNFBPs have a basic AML/CFT policy in place in line with their
risks. Training opportunities are limited in the BES Islands and this has impacted
understanding of obligations in many sectors.

Recommended Actions
1.

2.

The Netherlands should continue to raise awareness of AML risks and obligations,
particularly for DNFBPs and smaller FIs and raise TF awareness across all sectors.

DNB and AFM should continue to ensure that all FIs are implementing measures
commensurate with their risks and address areas of concern, such as a lack of PEP
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3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

processes for large parts of the insurance sector and over categorisation of
customers as low risk.

Obliged entities, in particular notaries, should enhance their efforts to identify the
BOs that ultimately have a controlling ownership interest or exercise control
through other means of legal entities or arrangements that are part of complex
international structures. Obliged entities should also as much as possible limit the
identification of natural persons holding senior management positions as BOs. In
cases where the ownership structures are so complex or opaque that they pose a
genuine ML/TF risk, obliged entities should refuse to provide services.

The FIU-NL should improve the feedback and guidance to obliged entities
(including those that are not major reporters but are exposed to high ML/TF risks,
such as smaller banks, MVTS, VASPs, trust offices, domicile providers, lawyers, and
real estate agents) on UTR requirements and on improving the quality of UTRs in
order to raise the level of reporting in these sectors, as appropriate.
The Netherlands should consider the growing incidences of de-risking and ensure
that AML obligations are not being used as a reason to exit particular sectors or
groups.
The Netherlands (including BES Islands) should require all obliged entities, to take
adequate measures to implement TFS without delay and report any actions taken
to the competent authorities.
The Netherlands should address all technical deficiencies that inhibit effectiveness
in the BES islands (e.g., no requirement for obliged entities to assess risk).

Options for raising awareness of AML/CFT obligations and providing training for
DNFBPs in the BES islands should be considered by the Netherlands authorities.

316. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.4.
The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R.9-23, and elements of R.1, 6, 15 and 29.

Immediate Outcome 4 (Preventive Measures)

317. Considering the relative materiality and risk in the Netherlands, the implementation
of preventive measures by the relevant sectors is weighted as follows:
•

•

•

Most heavily weighted: Banking, larger payment service providers and emoney institutions, TCSPs (other than domicile providers), VASPs and the real
estate sector (other than real estate agents);

Moderately weighted: Asset management (including includes the broader
securities sector and investment management activities), money transfer
offices, domicile providers, real estate agents, notaries, lawyers, DPMS, and
accountants; and
Lower weighted: Casinos, financial leasing, lending, life insurance and
pension funds.

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318. As noted in Chapter 1, the banking sector in the Netherlands is highly concentrated
with three banks covering over 80% of the retail and commercial market. In terms
of asset size, the banking sector accounts for half of the financial sector. The
Netherlands has a large, well-developed asset management sector, with
approximately 90% of the managed assets of investment firms coming from
professional clients, including pension funds. The TCSP sector consists of trust
offices and domicile providers. the number of trust offices has reduced substantially
since 2018, but the trust office sector is identified as high risk for ML and TF in the
Netherlands NRAs, although domicile providers are lower risk and subject to lighter
AML/CFT obligations. The volume, speed and cross-border nature of transactions
in large payment institutions make them vulnerable for misuse by criminals for
ML/TF purposes. Transaction monitoring is a key focus for DNB, which collects
transaction data from all MVTS on a quarterly basis. Virtual Assets (VAs) are defined
as high risk in the ML NRA. Although VASPs have been recently regulated in the
Netherlands, not all VASP activities as defined by the FATF are currently within
scope of Dutch legislation. The Netherlands also strengthened its general AML/CFT
legislation in 2018, which introduced new obligations for all obliged entities; some
smaller obliged entities in certain DNFBP sectors are still adapting to these
requirements.

319. The conclusions under IO.4 are based on written documentation (including
processes and procedures, case examples and statistics) provided by the Dutch
authorities, meetings with DNB, AFM, other supervisors and relevant authorities.
The Assessment Team also met with a small number of representatives from
relevant sectors and some industry groups. These meetings included small, medium
and large banks, which in total represent a significant share of the market in terms
of assets, MVTS providers, asset managers, VASPs, lawyers, notaries, accountants,
TCSPs (trust offices), real estate agents and casinos.

Understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations
FIs

320. Most FIs in the Netherlands have a good understanding of ML risk, particularly
banks, payment service providers and e-money providers. Risk understanding has
improved in larger payment institutions following significant efforts by DNB to
increase awareness. Understanding of risk in smaller FIs is generally less developed,
but adequate.
321. Many of the large banks’ risk assessments link to group-wide/global risk
assessments, but also include a focus on the specific risks present in the
Netherlands. This provides a comprehensive understanding of the local and global
risks they are exposed to. In 2019, 85% of all banks and 100% of PSPs completed a
Systematic Integrity Risk Analysis (SIRA) according to DNB. A SIRA covers a wide
range of integrity risks, such as ML, TF, bribery and corruption, and privacy and
data-related breaches. Fifteen percent of the banks had not yet completed a SIRA.
This mainly concerned Dutch branches of banks headquartered abroad (EU or nonEU), which rely solely on the risk assessment produced by their head office, rather
than having a risk assessment tailored to context of the Netherlands.

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322. Most FIs take account of factors such as customer type, products, transaction types
and volumes as part of their SIRAs. Banks and large FIs also develop a number of
comprehensive scenarios that form their overall risk appetite. Many of the large FIs
contributed to the NRA, either directly or through professional bodies, and
recognise the risks presented. The NRA is generally seen as a high level policy
document. Larger FIs met by the Assessment Team articulated a much more
sophisticated view of risk including the types of legal persons and sectors
considered as high risk (e.g., professional football clubs and certain types of
foundations and church communities). A thematic study of transaction monitoring
with a specific focus on TF carried out by DNB in 2018 shows that banks SIRAs
contained a limited set of scenarios related to TF. Understanding of TF is generally
basic across all regulated sectors in the Netherlands, particularly with regard to
transaction monitoring.

Box 5.1. Bank SIRA process involving all lines of the orgnisation
DNB observed how the SIRA process in a bank is the responsibility of all lines
within the organisation. At the bank in question, working groups are formed per
business unit, in which employees discuss possible ML/TF risks and the likelihood
of these risks occurring. The working groups assess, inter alia, the likelihood that
certain ML scenarios could allow a customer to launder money through the bank
or that international sanctions could be circumvented by the use of the bank’s
products or activities in certain countries. Using a pre-defined scoring model, the
Compliance department, together with Risk Management department, then
assesses what the impact would be on the bank if a scenario were to materialise.
The sessions lead to a matrix of probability and impact of gross risks. Business
departments including the audit and compliance functions then assesses the level
of control of the various risks. The matrix of gross risks and control measures then
provides an overview of net risks and control gaps.
The result of this exercise is discussed in detail with the management board and it
is examined whether the gross and net risks fall within the institution’s risk
appetite. The management board then decides whether risks should be reduced or
avoided and what further measures should be taken.

323. Most FIs have a good understanding of their AML/CFT obligations, although this is
lower in the insurance sector, which lags behind other sectors. Risk understanding
has improved in recent years. This is due to investigations by DNB, guidance and
awareness-raising and high profile failings in two major banks, which led many FIs
to reassess their systems and controls. The authorities note that from 2017
onwards, banks have been paying more attention to controlling non-financial risks
such as ML/TF risk and these risks are increasingly regarded as an integral part of
their overall risk management framework.

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VASPs

5

324. Registered VASPs have a good understanding of their risks and obligations. This
follows significant interaction and scrutiny over the last year as part of the DNB’s
registration process. In some cases, policy makers from other parts of the financial
sector (e.g., payments institutions) have joined newly registered VASPs in order to
strengthen their compliance capabilities. In other cases, DNB has required VASPs to
make adjustments to their processes as part of their registration conditions (e.g., to
develop more specific risk assessments and for supervisory board members to
enhance understanding and risk through training). All VASPs complete SIRAs,
drawing on multiple sources, including the NRA, guidance from the supervisor and
engagement with the VA trade association.

DNFBPs

325. DNFBP’s risk understanding varies depending on sector and size of entity, but is
generally basic. All DNFBPs met during the onsite were aware of the NRA and its
risks, but some expressed that these risks were not relevant to their businesses.

326. The sole land-based casino and larger trust offices have a good understanding of
risk and AML/CFT obligations, but a number of deficiencies have been found in
medium and smaller trust offices in recent years. Notaries generally understand
their ML obligations, except where it comes to identifying BOs, as they often opt for
“pseudo BOs” such as trust offices employees that act as formal directors, instead of
taking all necessary steps to identify the ultimate BO. This is particularly the case
when offshore and complex legal structures are involved. This is an issue, since the
notaries will often register this BO information in the BO register as part of the
services they provide to legal persons during their lifecycle (e.g., company
formation, change in control). This information can subsequently be used by other
obliged entities as part of their CDD processes. Notaries also do not see real estate
transactions as a higher risk, despite certain real estate transactions featuring as
high risk in the NRAs and referenced during many of the discussions the Assessment
Team had with the authorities and private sector. 51 Understanding of risk and
AML/CFT obligations in the real estate sector is generally low and many outsource
compliance to third parties. Understanding of AML/CFT obligations amongst
domicile providers is also low. The authorities have found that some carry out
regulated activities that they do not think are regulated and as a result do not apply
required AML/CFT mitigating measures. Understanding of risk and obligations
amongst lawyers and accountants is generally sufficient and, given the nature of
their business, largely relates to offshore businesses and tax crime issues.

327. Supervisors, including professional bodies, have provided guidance to assist their
sectors’ understanding of ML/TF risks and obligations. However, some smaller
DNFBPs do not find this practical. This is problematic for sectors where there are
no trade associations (e.g., domicile providers), which often provide additional
information and training and is demonstrated in a lack of understanding of
AML/CFT obligations.
51

For example, in its Beleidsregel Integriteitbeleid ten aanzien van zakelijke
vastgoedactiviteiten DNB refers to professional real estate transactions as having a high
risk of fraud and ML.

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BES Islands
328. FIs and the sole trust office on the BES Islands have a basic understanding of risk,
which is largely based on the NRAs and guidance provided by the supervisors. FIs
and the trust office supervised by DNB understand their obligations and most firms
met during the onsite described the generic risks, such as drug and human
trafficking, and understood their general obligations. With the exception of trust
offices, DNFBPs are exempt from a requirement to take measures to identify and
assess ML/TF risks for obliged entities. Notwithstanding, the DNFBPs met by the
Assessment Team had a reasonable understanding of generic risks.

Application of risk mitigating measures
FIs

329. FIs met during the onsite have AML programmes and frameworks that are
appropriately designed to mitigate ML/TF risks. Interviews during the onsite
revealed a strong knowledge of FIs role in the AML/CFT framework and
commitment to ensure the financial system is not used to facilitate financial crime.
Most large banks have clearly articulated roles for AML/CFT staff, including
ownership of AML/CFT risk and issues at board level.

330. Large banks’ policies and procedures generally reflect the risks and context of the
Netherlands, but only approximately 17% of banks state that their SIRA leads to the
formulation of their AML/CFT policies and procedures. This is concerning and
suggests a misalignment between the risk understanding and implemented
measures. There are increasing examples of de-risking including in relation to
VASPs and trust offices. This suggests banks are more inclined to set risk appetites
that remove certain groups of customers, rather than implementing mitigating
measures in line with the identified risks of individual customers.

331. Almost all FIs have integrated risk mitigation measures into their day-to-day
operations and most rely on technology and automated systems that can be adapted
easily to emerging risks. Most FIs categorise customers by risk, however the
authorities have noted in some cases, customers are categorised as low risk by
default, despite having high risk characteristics. Many banks in the Netherlands now
refuse large cash deposits, which mitigates risk and also aligns with the profile of
the Netherlands, which is one of the most cashless societies in the world.

332. Some of the larger banks have ongoing remediation programmes underway and
most of the banks and larger FIs have invested heavily in compliance staff in recent
years. Measures to effectively mitigate risks in line with the expectation of the
authorities will take some time for banks with large remediation programmes.
Large and smaller FIs suggested it is becoming more challenging to recruit
appropriately qualified compliance staff in such a competitive environment.

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VASPs

5

333. VASPs are applying mitigating measures commensurate with their risks and the
authorities have seen a considerable professionalisation of AML/CFT frameworks
during the registration process. Prior to registration, various issues needed to be
addressed by many of the firms, including a lack of policies for TFS screening,
insufficient risk analyses, wanting to apply simplified CDD with insufficient
justification and lack of independent compliance functions. DNB engaged in various
outreach activities to help address this and registered VASPs now have stronger
measures in place.

DNFBPs

334. Mitigation measures applied by DNFBPs vary considerably. Some larger
international DNFBPs (e.g., auditing and accounting firms) implement a
sophisticated risk-based approach, and assess risk-based on factors such as the
client’s country, whether the client is a PEP, etc., and classify customers in order to
conduct CDD in accordance with risks. Smaller DNFBPs apply basic CDD measures
and are much less risk-based. Often CDD is limited to identifying and verifying
documents at the customer acceptance stage.

335. Most licensed trust offices have policies and procedures in place that are designed
to mitigate ML/TF risks. In some cases these are insufficient to effectively mitigate
and manage potential integrity risks.

336. The one casino in the Netherlands takes robust risk-based mitigation measures.
These include comprehensive identity verification checks at the customer
registration stage, transaction limits for newly registered customers and large-scale
monitoring systems. Online casinos recently became subject to AML/CFT
obligations through the Remote Gambling Act (October 2021) and there is no
information at this stage on the extent that they are implementing these obligations.

337. The NOvA and other professional bodies provide training, including on AML/CFT.
Most law firms that carry out Wwft activities have an office policy and
approximately 44% have a compliance officer. Notaries generally implement
mitigating measures, although they believe they are more limited in terms of when
they can refuse customers, because of their statutory obligation to provide services.

338. Many other DNFBPs do not have appropriate risk policies and procedures in place.
In response, several supervisors produce risk policies and templates to assist
institutions fulfil this obligation.

339. The authorities invest significantly in providing guidance to mitigate risks and many
private sector participants referred to the ability to contact the authorities with
questions. Several authorities have dedicated helpdesks for this purpose and the
smaller DNFBPs see this as a useful source of information and advice. As with the
banking sector, there are signs of de-risking amongst DNFBPs.

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BES Islands
340. FIs in the BES Islands categorise their customers based on risk; however, they often
fail to fully acknowledge relevant risks as articulated in the NRAs and focus on their
Wwft BES obligations. As a result, the inherent ML/TF risks will not be properly
addressed by internal control measures. Generally, most FIs and trust offices on the
BES Islands conduct entity-level risk assessments, but have a challenge when it
comes to applying a risk-based approach on customer level, which tends to result in
over compliance. DNFBPs except for trust offices are not required to take measures
to identify and assess ML and TF risks. Notwithstanding this, some DNFBPs met by
the Assessment Team had undertaken a risk assessment.

Application of CDD and record-keeping requirements

341. Interviews with all FIs suggested that they understand their CDD obligations. There
was a mixed understanding in relation to record keeping requirements, with some
FIs stating they kept records longer than required, and often the DNB finds that
some BO information is missing.

342. FIs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and carrying out
CDD, including online only banks. However, some FIs including banks generally
struggle to identify BO information, particularly when complex international
structures are involved. The AFM finds that in a number of investigations with
customers who have complex legal structures, FIs regularly fail to identify and
verify the BO and DNB finds that in practice banks find it hard to (fully) comply with
identifying and verifying BOs in certain cases.

343. Much of the onboarding process is done electronically for standard customers, but
handled manually in cases were certain flags are raised (i.e., a non-standard
customer). DNB noted that some banks and PSPs had procedures where customers
were almost all placed in the low-risk category by default. This has led to
inappropriate CDD measures being applied, including transaction monitoring.
Furthermore, DNB has found that in some institutions, customers that are identified
as low risk for ML are automatically categorised as low TF risk with no TF analysis
being carried out. As part of their remediation programmes, several banks are now
reviewing their legacy customers to ensure they are appropriately categorised and
subject to commensurate CDD measures. This is a significant undertaking and in
some cases leads to the retrospective submission of a number of UTRs. The below
chart summarises the percentage of banks that establish a risk profile for their
customers prior to providing services.

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Box 5.2. Percentage of banks that establish a risk category or profile for
customers prior to providing services (2019)

5

344. DNB has found similar results for PSPs in terms of categorising customers as low
risk. Furthermore, in response to the annual risk questionnaire, only 8% of PSPs
indicate that they have a risk appetite with verifiable indicators and/or limit values.
PSPs appear to be aware of their exposure to TF and DNB has noticed that MTOs are
increasingly paying attention to certain customer groups, such as charity
foundations and foundations with a religious background. This is in line with the TF
risks identified in the TF NRAs.

345. FIs met by the Assessment Team exit customers when there is reason to do so, but
this is rare. Exit records are often not maintained or do not clearly demonstrate why
the customer was exited. One bank explained that it was very challenging to exit
customers and described how a court had intervened when they tried to exit a
customer that would not provide additional information. This type of intervention
may increase banks’ reluctance to accept certain groups of customers on a
wholesale basis.

VASPs

346. VASPs met by the Assessment Team explained their CDD processes and record
keeping obligations. All used blockchain analytics software to monitor and analyse
ongoing customer transactions and some take a risk-based approach in terms of
applying transaction limits on new customers. Corporate customers generally have
to provide source of wealth, UBO information, structural information and explain
the purpose of account. All VASPs met during the onsite had robust record keeping
processes in place.

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DNFBP
347. The majority of trust offices categorise customers based on risk and have risk
appetites in place. Customer files are reviewed on an ongoing basis and since a
change to the regulations in 2018, customer files are supplemented with more in
depth risk-related information. However, DNB still finds examples of incomplete
CDD files in trust offices. For example, when accepting a customer, the trust office
must describe the integrity risks associated with the provision of services and the
extent to which they are mitigated in conjunction with each other. Often these
descriptions are not complete as it is a fairly new requirement. The land-based
casino has strong CDD measures in place and records are maintained on all
customers. Individuals who fail to provide appropriate CDD information are banned
from the casino and customers exited for CDD failings are reported to the FIU-NL.

348. With the exception of trust offices and land-based casinos, most DNFBPs
understand CDD as identifying the customer and checking the presence of
documents. Most of these DNFBPs assume that banks’ CDD processes are more
advanced and the CDD the DNFBPs do duplicates that of the banks. Real estate
agents often outsource their CDD requirements and appear to have little
understanding of what this fully entails, despite being ultimately responsible for the
process. Most DNFBPs struggle to identify BOs and in some cases too often only
identify pseudo BOs, which is particularly troublesome in the case of notaries.
Notaries, lawyers and accountants met during the onsite all described compliant
CDD processes. All DNFBPs met during the onsite understand their record keeping
obligations but there were different responses regarding how long records needed
to be kept for. Furthermore, BFT has found that correct data is not always recorded.
CDD failings found by the authorities are summarised below. The failings for
domicile providers are consistently high, which is a concern given their role in the
TCSP sector.

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Table 5.1. Number of CDD shortcomings detected per sector
DNFBPs
Casino 52
Real Estate Agents
DPMS
Lawyers
Notaries
Accountants
Trust Offices
Domicile Providers
Total

5

2016
302
6
1
8
5
26
16
364

2017
220
7
2
9
2
23
15
278

2018
127
16
8
9
2
16
28
206

2019
107
79
9
7
4
15
2
144

349. Many DNFBPs met during the onsite explained processes for exiting customers, but
very few could provide examples where this had been done in practice. Where
customers had been refused it was usually for lack of information. Notaries are
subject to a ministerial duty and can only refuse to provide services in certain
specific cases, for example, where it is clear there is a frontman or sham structure.
This is a concern given the role notaries play in real estate transactions and
company formation.

BES Islands

350. The Assessment Team met one FI that explained their CDD processes and record
keeping requirements. The authorities suggest that CDD processes within banks are
generally based on the standards deployed by their internationally operating
mother companies. Smaller credit institutions have difficulties when it comes to
well-qualified staff, resulting in (sometimes less than) basic CDD processes. Life
insurance companies have CDD processes in place commensurate to their risk
profile.

351. In terms of DNFBPs, most CDD omissions in the BES Islands concern incomplete
data on natural persons. Omissions relating to incomplete BO information for real
estate agent customers are found sporadically by the BTWwft. This is a significant
concern given the risk of ML in this sector.

52

Data for shortcomings by casinos is not available.

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Application of EDD measures
FIs
352. Implementation of EDD measures varies amongst FIs, depending on their size and
international exposure, but is generally done well. Most FIs have formulated policies
and measures for entering or continuing a business relationship with a PEP and this
includes automated screening systems, which screen on a regular, if not daily basis.
DNB’s annual questionnaire shows that 66% of banks have specific business rules
for PEPs in regard to transaction monitoring. AFM has found that investment
institutions formulated too few concrete processes for PEPs, although in practice
they generally complied with obligations to identify them. They also found that only
approximately half of insurance intermediaries have procedures to determine if a
customer is a PEP, which is low given the longstanding requirement for them to do
so. DNB has found that PSPs often still need to outline what concrete steps need to
be taken to manage PEP relationships.

353. DNB carried out a thematic review between 2015 and 2017, focussing on
correspondent banking. This review found that most banks were not sufficiently
complying with their obligations. Since the thematic review, DNB has noted that
banks increasingly recognise the risks of correspondent banking, are drawing up a
risk appetite and taking the necessary control measures to mitigate the risks. Banks
met by the Assessment Team noted that in many cases they had reviewed
correspondent banking relationships in recent years and terminated some of these,
particularly in higher risk jurisdictions.

354. Many FIs are using new technologies and this appears to have increased during the
COVID-19 pandemic, particularly for onboarding. Several FIs referred to measures
they were piloting or implementing in terms of artificial intelligence and machine
learning. In these cases, robust risk analyses were performed and any pilots were
operating alongside existing systems. One of the FIs expressed frustration that they
could not get a view from the authorities on whether specific systems would be in
line with supervisory expectations and were concerned that they were investing
resources to improve effectiveness, without confidence they would meet the
expectations of the authorities.

355. FIs in the Netherlands are subject to the EU wire transfer regulations and have
established systems in place to comply with these regulations. The annual integrity
risk questionnaire shows that 51% of banks monitor transactions based on
transaction characteristics and 23% of banks refused transactions due to
insufficient information from either the payer or the payee. FIs in the Netherlands
use a range of automated systems and vendor services to monitor the various TFS
lists. DNB notes that banks generally carry out this screening and report any match
to the relevant bodies. This is not always the case with PSPs, and some small scale
MTOs manually screen lists. Branches of insurers (life and non-life) operating in the
Netherlands by means of a notification must also screen their relations against the
National Terrorism List and the EU lists and DNB believe they are largely compliant
with this. FIs apply EDD in the case of customers or transactions in higher risk
countries and often use sources such as the Transparency International Corruption
Index.

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5

CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES

356. Banks use various lists and sources to identify and maintain their understanding of
high risk countries and integrate this into their customer acceptance and ongoing
CDD processes. MVTS providers generally use the FATF list of high-risk and other
monitored jurisdictions and have appropriate controls in place. This is important
particularly as a small number of MVTS providers make and receive payments from
higher-risk jurisdictions. Other FIs consult lists provided by the authorities, as well
as the FATF, and many have automated processes to flag customers and
transactions from high-risk jurisdictions.

VASPs

357. VASPs interviewed implemented some EDD measures, including PEP screening,
request more information from higher risk customers and monitor customers and
transactions against TFS lists.

DNFBPs

358. Trust offices generally apply EDD measures effectively. DNB finds that in some cases
of PEP exposure, the BO is checked without identifying and verifying all
‘relationships’ that might be PEPs. Automated systems are used for TFS screening
and automated transaction monitoring is increasingly being used. DNB’s 2019
annual survey found that 56 trust offices operated target companies in sanctioned
countries and often the risks of TFS are insufficiently described in risk assessments.
EDD measures for customers in higher risk countries are generally robust and
involve things such as considering the purpose of the transaction. However,
notaries carrying out transactions to high-risk countries on behalf of their clients,
are not able to disclose information on the customers to the FIs because of
professional secrecy. This is an issue that is currently being considered at the
ministerial level as some banks have threatened to close notary third party accounts
in cases where they are unable to fulfil EDD requirements.

359. The land-based casino applies EDD measures to PEPs and customers from high risk
countries. Most DNFBPs met during the onsite had very few PEP customers, but
were able to explain measures taken to identify and apply mitigating measures,
which largely relates to requiring senior management agreement to take on the
client. Smaller obliged entities in other sectors, including lawyers, notaries and real
estate agents often ask customers to self-declare if they are PEPs, rather than
automatically screening names against lists. It is not clear the extent to which the
self-declarations are scrutinised to determine if the declarations are accurate. There
was also general knowledge in terms of requirements for clients from high-risk
countries, but it is unclear how well measures are applied in practice and the
authorities do not have a strong view on this. This is a concern, particularly in
relation to domicile providers as many of their customers are from other countries,
making it more difficult to identify PEPs. As previously mentioned, most real estate
agents outsource compliance but gave examples during the onsite of where highrisk situations had led them to take additional measures, including forgoing sales.

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360. Casinos, real estate agents, DPMS and legal professionals (those who are not also
providing services as a trust office) are exempted from the obligation to report
frozen assets under TFS to a supervisory authority. The Netherlands states that this
exemption is based on the TF NRAs as there are no TF risks identified in these
sectors. The Assessment Team does not consider these exemptions as risk-based, as
the implementation of TFS is not a risk-based requirement and all relevant
requirements should apply equally to all obliged entities (i.e., it is a rules-based
requirement). Accordingly, the Assessment Team considers this a deficiency that
impacts effectiveness.

BES Islands

361. Banks in the BES Islands generally follow the same processes as banks in
continental Netherlands in relation to PEPs, correspondent banking and TFS
monitoring. This includes using automated customer screening and transaction
monitoring software. Some FIs make use of PEP lists they have drawn up
themselves, or rely on the local knowledge of their staff with open source checks.
DNFBPs met by the Assessment Team were able to describe processes for
identifying PEPs and identifying customers from high risk countries. During onsite
interviews, the Assessment Team regularly heard that everyone in the BES Islands
know each other and this was why certain EDD obligations were not always fulfilled.
With the exception of trust offices, DNFBPs and VASPs implementation of TFS
without delay is not supervised.

Reporting obligations and tipping off

362. Obliged entities must submit objective and subjective UTRs (see IO.6). Compliance
with reporting requirements is heavily monitored and appears to be a significant
focus for most supervisors. Overall, firms met by the Assessment Team understood
and implement their reporting obligations adequately. However, it is not clear this
applies equally across all sectors, as UTR filing is low by some DNFBPs such as
lawyers.

Table 5.2. Submitted UTRs by obliged entities
Type of obliged entities
Auditors
Lawyers
Banks
Investment institution/companies
Life insurance brokers
Money transfer offices
Payment service providers - PSPs
Dealers in Precious stones
Undertakings for Collective Investment
in Transferable Securities
Life insurers
Real estate agents
Civil-law notaries
Gambling casinos
Providers of remote gaming services
Trust and company service providers

2016
1 260
12
13 599
4
0
36 0234
12 315
396

2017
1 155
10
22 789
6
0
279 950
29 669
471

2018
1 879
21
67 524
59
1
248 630
42 959
502

2019
2 502
42
147 952
69
0
199 199
151 576
729

2020
2 466
21
245 148
273
0
194 894
227 987
726

2021*
2 453
12
227 025
214
4
239 946
335 134
710

0
2
140
529
2 666
n/a
0

0
3
159
486
3 228
n/a
240

0
1
169
784
4 110
n/a
206

0
5
221
1 285
4 724
n/a
192

3
9
246
1 060
3 764
n/a
146

7
17
196
964
2 949
233
78

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Safe custody services
Providers of services for the exchange
between virtual currencies and fiduciary
currencies
Providers of custodian wallets
Exchange institutions

FIs
5

0

0

0

0

52

30

280
n/a
0

0
n/a
3

0
n/a
360

0
n/a
562

7 066
243
491

171 958
101 427
353

*Covers the period up to November 2021.

363. FIs are aware of their responsibilities to report UTRs. In general, reporting has
increased since 2017, and this is particularly the case for FIs supervised by the AFM
(see Table 5.2). The AFM believes this is partly due to legislation, but also increased
awareness of obligations across the sector.

364. Foreign banks based in the Netherlands are sometimes confused by the difference
between UTRs and STRs as they operate based on procedures from their parent
companies. DNB notes that some banks do not report transactions that are rejected
(for both incoming and outgoing transactions). Most FIs automate the UTR objective
indicators, which mainly relate to transactions over certain monetary amounts.
Many banks are improving transaction monitoring as a way to improve the
efficiency and are submitting a significant number of UTRs from historic
transactions as part of remediation exercises (see IO.1 for a case study related to a
private-private sector initiative to better identify UTRs).

365. The quality of transaction monitoring systems and business rules is still insufficient
to recognise all the subjective unusual transactions for some MVTS providers. This
is an area of focus for DNB, which has seen improvements in transaction monitoring
of subjective indicators since providing guidance in 2017 and 2018, and as a result
of its investigations.

366. All FIs appear to be aware of their tipping-off obligations. In banks and large PSPs,
reporting is done by compliance departments, which adds as an additional
protection as there is little involvement of front line staff once the initial reporting
query has been raised.

367. Many banks met during the onsite expressed concerns that despite the increased
focus on reporting and the fact they are submitting more UTRs, they see few tangible
results in terms of reducing crime, feel that only a small number of reports are
disseminated to LEAs (see Table 3.1) and they do not receive feedback from FIU-NL.

VASPs

368. VASPs are aware of their requirements to submit UTRs and tipping-off obligations.
Reporting has been a key area of focus of DNB and they have noticed a large spike
in UTR numbers following thematic work in this area. One VASP felt the
requirement to file objective UTRs (i.e., threshold reporting) for transactions over
EUR 15 000 was too low given their typical customer activity. This is concerning
given the risks associated with VASPs, which are set out in the NRAs. This view was
not echoed by any other obliged entity.

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DNFBPs
369. Trust offices met during the onsite are aware of their reporting obligations and
submit UTRs. The number of UTRs submitted by the sector has increased in recent
years and obliged entities explained that UTR submission was a key focus of DNB.
The quality of reporting across the trust office sector varies and sometimes the level
of detail in reports is insufficient. As with FIs, DNB finds that responsibility for
reporting in trust offices is often allocated to the compliance department and is
therefore separate from the account managers who have contacts with customers.
This significantly reduces tipping-off risks and trust offices met during the onsite
were all aware of their responsibilities in this regard.

370. Reporting by other DNFBPs has also increased in recent years, but is still not
sufficient compared to the size of the sectors. Most DNFBPs met during the onsite
submitted an UTR, but in one case a real estate agent had paid his compliance
company to submit one on his behalf. This practice is concerning to the Assessment
Team as agents may be influenced in their decision to submit an STR because of the
cost incurred for each UTR. Notwithstanding, the authorities note that
developments in the commercial real estate sector are positive. The supervisors
note that there are relatively few problems in terms of objective UTRs, but a lack of
knowledge and expertise on ML and TF makes it hard for some obliged entities to
file subjective UTRs. Very few UTRs have been submitted by lawyers. In 2019, only
22 firms from more than 5 000 had submitted a UTR. This figure appears low for
the size and risk profile of the sector. The authorities explain this is due to the fact
that only a small number of lawyers carry out activity subject to AML/CFT
regulation. Most obliged entities could explain tipping-off requirements to a basic
extent.

BES Islands

371. Most UTRs in the BES Islands are submitted by FIs. The large FI met by the
Assessment Team submitted approximately 500 UTRs per year. All obliged entities
from the BES Islands met during the onsite were able to explain the process for
submitting UTRs and their tipping-off obligations. Unlike in the Netherlands, UTRs
must be submitted manually and it was felt that this process was very time
consuming (up to three hours per UTR), and may deter reporting.

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Table 5.3. Submitted UTRs by obliged entities in BES Islands
Type of obliged
entities

2016

2018

2019

2020

2021*

Auditors

2

1

2

0

0

Lawyers

0

2

0

0

0

974

905

931

701

1 593

1

0

0

0

0

Banks

1 109

Payment service
providers

5

2017

Customs

121

41

46

25

97

35

Dealers in precious
stones

2

4

4

18

6

9

Real estate agents

5

1

2

0

1

0

Civil-law notaries

30

8

21

23

22

24

0

2

1

0

2

1 031

98

1 000

827

1 663

Gambling casino
Total

1 287

*Covers the period up to November 2021.

Internal controls and procedures
FIs

372. Banks and other large FIs interviewed by the Assessment Team demonstrated a
positive AML/CFT compliance culture, primarily driven by recent large settlements
for major banks and reputational concerns. DNB has observed a greater
understanding of AML/CFT compliance at the senior and board level in larger FIs.
Some of the banks met by the Assessment Team use external parties for auditing
and there are doubts about their independence and quality of work. The same
applies to PSPs. Furthermore, DNB observes that the second-line and third-line
functions in insurers often still fulfil their monitoring role insufficiently. All FIs met
during the onsite provide comprehensive training to staff on AML/CFT measures.
Dutch and foreign MVTSs operating in the Netherlands have training programmes
for their employees and agents. Most FIs screen their employees and the extent
depends on the position in question and often includes requiring a certificate of
good conduct. Several of the large banks are part of financial groups and put in place
or follow global standards and do not find any issues in relation to sharing of
information within the group. DNB and AFM have not been informed of situations
where difficulties have arisen, but are in discussions with some institutions about
sharing suspicious transaction information within the group where they encounter
conflicting local legislation in other EU member states.

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VASPs
373. VASPs met during the onsite had robust controls and processes in place,
commensurate with their size. Some had hired compliance professionals from the
financial sector and commissioned external partners to deliver specific compliance
training. Process manuals were in place and scrutinised by DNB as part of the
application process. One of the VASPs met felt there was a risk in some firms that
the compliance function did not keep up with growth of businesses. This is
something DNB will need to keep under review in the future, particularly as there
is increasing competition for compliance staff across the financial sector.

DNFBPs

374. Governance requirements were tightened for trust offices in 2018 and include a
requirement to have independent compliance and audit functions and separate
board members responsible for each. Most trust offices outsource this function to
external parties. The trust office sector professional body Holland Quaestor (HQ)
provides training for trust offices and requires its members to undergo a certain
amount of training each year. Only 16 trust offices are members of HQ, but these are
mainly the larger trust offices and according to HQ data account for 70% of the
commercial market share. Most trust offices have a procedures manual, which is
also a requirement under the Wtt 2018, but DNB finds these do not always
adequately identify all integrity risks or include appropriate control measures.

375. The land-based casino has robust policies and procedures that are well
documented. Staff undergo training, including how to recognise suspicious
behaviour. Notary offices are peer reviewed once every three years, covering all
civil notary requirements including AML/CFT controls and processes. Some
notaries have policies and procedures in place according to the BFT, but the level of
implementation of policies and controls is unclear. Accountants are also peer
reviewed and findings tend to be similar. Larger institutions under BTWwft
supervision have manuals, regulations or internal programmes which enable staff
to be alert to the obligations arising from the Wwft.

376.

Medium and larger sized law firms met during the onsite had compliance functions
within their organisations. Often these firms provided several services, including
notarial services and the compliance department covered all areas. These firms
were also subject to external auditing and had ongoing training for staff. Smaller
obliged entities in sectors such as real estate, accountancy and DPMS have basic
manuals or internal programmes depending on their size, but not all have
compliance arrangements in place. The authorities did not provide sufficient
information to determine how well all DNFBPs are applying internal controls and
procedures.

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BES Islands

5

377. FIs in the BES Islands generally have compliance function and audit arrangements,
despite challenges with attracting appropriately skilled staff. Audits are generally
carried out by the parent company’s internal audit company once every 2-3 years.
There are some cases where compliance officers are located away from branches.
Many FIs have training programmes and some use third parties to deliver this
online. With regards to DNFBPs, available training is not always appropriate and
does not specifically cover BTWwft requirements. DNFBPs do not generally attend
training and there is no training provider in the BES Islands for DNFBPs. Until
recently, civil-notaries did not have to share files for review by the supervisor. This
is a concern given their role in real estate on the islands.

Overall conclusions on IO.4
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Understanding of AML/CFT risks and obligations varies across FIs and DNFBPs.
This is generally high for banks, larger FIs and VASPs, but lower for DNFBPs,
particularly domicile providers and real estate agents. Understanding of TF risks
is lower across all sectors.
Implementation of mitigation measures varies across sectors. They are generally
stronger in larger banks and FIs that have automated systems, governance
processes and three lines of defence models. Mitigating measures are weaker in
most DNFBPs, particularly in some higher risk areas such as the provision of TCSP
activities.

Identifying BO remains difficult for many obliged entities, including larger FIs.
This regularly leads to pseudo BOs being identified, particularly by notaries. EDD
measures are usually applied, although it is concerning that in the insurance
intermediary sector only half of obliged entities have systems to identify PEPs and
a significant number of PSPs have not identified concrete steps to deal with PEPs.
Notaries do not provide FIs with information on clients they are performing
transactions on behalf of because of professional secrecy.
Although customers’ screening against international TFS lists is not a requirement
stemming from the FATF Standards, those DNFBPs with automated processes
tend to do this as a matter of course. Obliged entities are generally aware of their
reporting and tipping-off obligations. Reporting in some sectors remains low and
some FIs requested more feedback from FIU-NL on the UTRs they are submitting.
There is some concern that despite submitting an increasing number of UTRs, they
do not see this corresponding to significant outcomes.
The Netherlands is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.4.

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Chapter 6. SUPERVISION
Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key Findings
FIs and VASPs
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

The Netherlands has a strong licensing framework to ensure criminals and their
associates are not beneficial owners or hold controlling interests in FIs. A robust
set of checks exist to ensure persons holding key functions are fit and proper.
Individuals are reassessed, as appropriate, and action is taken to remove
individuals from management positions when necessary. A robust registration
process also exists for some VASPs, but not all VASP activities in the Netherlands
are subject to registration and supervision.
The Netherlands recognises the existence of underground banking through
unlicensed payment services and hawala networks, but does not currently allocate
sufficient supervisory resources to address this.

DNB and AFM have a good understanding of ML/TF risk, which is increasingly data
driven and supported by a comprehensive risk analysis questionnaire that all
obliged entities must complete on an annual basis.
DNB and AFM apply risk-based supervision and, DNB in particular, has been
innovative with the use of data and technology in order to deliver more effective
supervision. This has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the
frequency of supervision in some cases is low.

The Netherlands has a range of enforcement measures and DNB and AFM are able
to impose fines of up to 20% of a FI’s annual turnover in the most serious cases.
DNB and BFT have imposed more formal measures than informal measures for
AML/CFT breaches; however, other supervisors rely heavily on informal
measures, which are not published. In the few cases where significant settlement
cases were concluded and published, this resulted in a deterrent effect across the
industry.
The Dutch authorities generally require remediation plans to be put in place in all
cases where they find AML/CFT deficiencies. These are followed up, even when
they are imposed with informal measures. This allows the authorities to ensure
actions are being remedied.

All supervisors produce a range of guidance and invest significantly in outreach
with supervised sectors. However, several private sector representatives
suggested that some of the guidance is better suited for large institutions and
could be more specific.

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DNFBPs
1. With the exception of trust offices and casinos, there is no legal requirement for
DNFBPs in the Netherlands to be licenced or registered for AML/CFT purposes.
Lawyers must become members of the Netherlands Bar. Notaries are appointed
by the authorities and both notaries and accountants are required to be members
of professional bodies.

2.
6

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

Despite illegal trust activity in the Netherlands being identified as high risk, there
has been little enforcement action in this area and insufficient resources are
currently allocated to address this issue.
Understanding of sector risk by DNFBP supervisors varies. Understanding of
individual trust offices is strong and DNB risk profiles these entities in a similar
way to FIs. The BTWwft has sector coordinators, which produce sector
descriptions listing the ML/TF risks in the sectors it supervises. BFT supplements
its understanding of risk through engagement with professional bodies.

Most DNFBP supervisors do not apply an appropriate frequency and intensity to
their supervision programmes. Although efforts are being made to better develop
risk-based approaches, supervision is generally carried out on a reactive basis.

Professional bodies in some sectors carry out peer reviews in agreement with the
supervisor. Where incidences of AML/CFT failures are found during peer reviews,
they can be escalated to the BFT and can lead to formal and disciplinary measures.
However, the number of escalations is low and does not appear in line with the
obliged entities’ level of understanding and levels of compliance with their
AML/CFT obligations.
With the exception of trust offices, DNFBPs implementation of TFS without delay
is not supervised. The same deficiency applies to DNFBPs and VASPs in the BES
Islands.
Some DNFBP supervisors rely heavily on warning letters and other informal
measures, including where unlicensed activity is identified. In such cases, it can
take more than a year for cases to escalate to formal action to prevent them from
continuing to operate.

BES Islands
1.
2.
3.

There are no entry controls for VASPs in the BES Islands and the authorities do
not know of any operators located on the islands. There are also no entry control
requirements for DNFBPs in the BES Islands.
Understanding of risk in the BES Islands is generally good and this is made easier
by the small number of entities in the jurisdiction.

Supervision is usually done in blocks of 2-3 weeks annually. There is generally
good coverage of the population and DNB’s last supervisory visit to the islands
was in October 2021. However, the BTWwft has never reviewed the files of the
island’s civil law notaries, since they did not have the legal powers to do this until
1 July 2021. This is a concern given the role of notaries in the high risk real estate
sector. BTWwft plans to review these files in 2022.

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Recommended Actions
1.

The Netherlands should extend licensing or registration and supervision to all
VASP activities covered by the FATF Standards.

3.

The Netherlands should ensure that all DNFBP supervisors have robust measures
in place to ensure that they are able to identify criminals and their associates and
prevent them from owning or controlling legal entities in the regulated sectors.

2.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

The Netherlands should strengthen measures, including increasing resources, to
tackle unlicensed activity, including underground banking and the provision of
illegal trust offices.
The Netherlands should consider additional legislation and other measures to
reduce the ability of companies providing TCSP services to restructure their
operations in order to circumvent stricter regulation.
The Netherlands should improve its understanding of risks in all DNFBP sectors
in order for resources to be allocated appropriately and ensure effective risk based
supervision.

The Netherlands should assess the effectiveness of peer review supervision, to
determine whether findings align with the ML/TF risk profile of the sectors they
supervise.

The Netherlands should ensure that appropriate resources are available to all
supervisory authorities, so that they can conduct risk-based supervision with
varying levels of intensity. AFM and DNB should consider if all firms they
supervise are subject to appropriate frequency of supervision.
Supervisory authorities should ensure that obliged entities fully comply with their
obligations to identify BOs in legal persons or other arrangements that are part of
complex international structures in order to limit the identification of senior
officials as pseudo BOs to a minimum.

Supervisory authorities should make full use of the powers available to them,
tailored to each specific case, and rely less on informal measures when significant
AML/CFT violations are identified. All DNFBP supervisors should ensure they
have appropriate enforcement policies so there is clarity when specific
interventions should be applied.

10. The BTWwft should subject the notaries on the BES Islands to appropriate
supervision as a priority.

11. The Netherlands should require all obliged entities to take adequate measures to
implement TFS without delay and ensure supervisors monitor compliance with
this requirement in their respective sectors. The authorities should maintain
statistics on the extent obliged entities adequately freeze and report frozen funds
or assets from designated individual or entity without delay.
12. The Netherlands should continue to produce high quality guidance and ensure this
is relevant for smaller entities. This guidance should cover areas where there are
identified gaps in knowledge, including in terms of understanding of ongoing CDD
measures.
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378. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.3.
The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R.14, 15, 26-28, 34, 35 and elements of R.1 and 40.

379. The weighting given to the different financial and DNFBP and VASP sectors
regarding supervision is the same as applied for preventive measures (see IO.4 and
Chapter 1 for further details).

6

380. The conclusions in IO.3 are based on: statistics and examples of supervisory
activities and actions provided by the Netherlands; guidelines and guidance issued
by the supervisors, documents used to monitor the different reporting sectors;
discussions with the DNB, the AFM, DNFBP supervisors, as well as representatives
of a broad sample of FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs (including from the BES Islands).

381. The Netherlands has several authorities responsible for supervision of FIs, VASPs
and DNFBPs. The relevant supervisors are summarised in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 in
Chapter 1. The Assessment Team focussed most heavily on measures for the
supervision of banking, MVTS and trust offices, given their materiality and risk in
the Netherlands. VASP supervision is at an early stage in the Netherlands and it is a
relatively small but growing sector. With this in mind, the Assessment Team focused
significantly on the licensing activities and early stages of supervision. Real estate,
payment services and the legal and accounting sector were also an area of
significant focus given their key gatekeeping role. Pensions, life insurance and many
of the activities supervised by the AFM are lower risk. The same applies to the casino
sector and appropriate weighting was given to these activities. The Netherlands also
supervises for AML purposes activities that are not within the scope of the FATF
standards (e.g., tax advisors, dealers in vessels, kitchen and bathroom dealers and
car dealers). These sectors were not considered as part of the evaluation.

Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision)

Licensing, registration and controls preventing criminals and associates from
entering the market
FIs
382. The Netherlands has a robust legal framework for the licensing of FIs. All FIs must
be licenced by DNB, AFM or the European Central Bank (ECB) before they can
operate in the Netherlands. DNB also supervises a small number of firms that are
exempt from licensing and registration requirements (e.g., advice on capital
structures, financial leasing, commercial lending and safe custody).

383. Depending on the type of institution, a legal person is assessed for licensing by DNB
and/or the AFM. Both authorities work together on joint assessments, follow the
same process and use the same substantive criteria. All FIs operating in the
Netherlands must have a physical presence and must be registered with the CoC,
unless they are from another EU member state operating under passporting
arrangements.

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384. Licensing processes for FIs include comprehensive fitness and propriety checks for
policymakers (including supervisory and executive board members) and key
function holders. Criminal records are obtained through the OM and where there is
an indication that the applicant has a relevant criminal background, or is associated
with criminals, additional checks are carried out. This involves searching open
source information, as well as consulting iCOV. Applications are submitted through
the Digital Supervision Portal and approximately 25% of applicants are interviewed
by DNB as part of this process. AFM conducts a small number of interviews as part
of the application process including for insurance intermediaries, which self-declare
that they meet AML/CFT requirements. In 2021, approximately 13% of applicants
in the investment firm and investment institutions sector were subject to
interviews. The number of interviews carried out by AFM as part of licensing
appears low, despite the sectors being lower risk than some other FI sectors.

385. Controllers are subject to reputation assessments (fit and proper tests) and must
obtain a declaration of no objection from supervisors before they can hold a
controlling interest in an obliged entity. The same applies when an applicant for a
qualifying holding is a legal person. Reputation assessments apply to those with a
direct or indirect holding of at least 10% of the issued share capital, or the ability to
exercise, directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the voting rights or of comparable
control. The authorities also require FIs to declare all BOs that hold a 1% interest or
more or 0.5% where the FI is a credit institution. In certain higher risk cases, the
authorities ask for details on holders of less than 0.5% and do so in all cases where
a fund structure has a holding interest. Where the BO holds a controlling interest
and is located in another jurisdiction, supervisors require a certificate from a CoC
and criminal records checks of the policymakers of the BO from their home
authorities.

Table 6.1. Natural persons assessed by DNB, per sector
Sector
DNB
Payment institutions, including
currency exchange offices

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

88

105

41

347

275

124

Credit institutions*, including branches
located in the Union
Credit institutions - second level
Insurance undertakings
Insurance undertakings - second level
Pension funds

258

169

98

280

203

74

71
208
72
472

56
196
49
427

43
183
40
410

51
303
31
557

49
342
33
713

21
91
9
206

Trust offices

144

99

135

179

170

103

-

-

-

-

110

70

Life insurance intermediaries
[excluding banks and insurers 54]
Investment firms

838

1 023

915

827

955

932

211

102

105

190

260

251

Investment institutions

0

3

17

2

6

4

VASPs
AFM53

*Covers the period up to June 2021
53
54

AFM carries out fitness and priority checks separately.
Under the Wfm BES, DNB issues licences to these FIs and conducts assessments of persons.

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386. Approximately 5% of applicants are not fit and proper, but some applicants
withdraw their application during the process where additional information is
requested and where it becomes clear that the supervisor has concerns. The figures
for AFM are slightly lower. The below case study summarises an instance where a
license application was withdrawn.

Box 6.1. Licence application withdrawn

6

In 2018, DNB received an application for a licence to provide payment services.
The party concerned wished to act as an online money transaction office. The
institution proposed two directors, which were subject to an assessment. During
the preliminary investigation it was discovered that one of the proposed directors
was involved with companies related to so-called Ponzi schemes. DNB made
further inquiries via the FEC about any other signs of involvement with financial
and economic crime. In addition, a report providing an overview of the equity and
income of the directors was requested via the Information Exchange on Criminal
and Unexplained Wealth (iCOV). The Police and FIU-NL (on the basis of the request
made via the FEC) shared relevant information on both directors at the request of
the DNB and an iCOV report provided an overview of a criminal network.
During the assessment interviews with the directors, one proposed director
stepped down. The institution continued the licence application process by
proposing another director. When it became apparent that DNB intended to issue
a negative decision concerning the newly proposed director - primarily because of
his fitness - the institution’s board decided to withdraw the licence application in
full. Consequently, the payment service provider did not enter the Dutch financial
market.

387. The fitness and propriety of individuals is reassessed when there are material
changes, including adverse media reports calling into question the suitability of
individuals. For example, DNB carried out 10 reassessments in 2019 and AFM
completed seven.

388. The Netherlands recognises underground banking through unlicensed payment
services as presenting a high ML/TF risk. Hawala networks were noted in several
discussions with the authorities and the private sector during the onsite visit. The
authorities receive numerous signals of unlicensed activity in the financial sector,
but usually try to address these through informal means (warning letters,
information letters and information requests). 55 There have only been two formal
interventions for illegal FIs (one for illegal banking activity and one of illegal
payment activity), neither resulting in a fine. There are also a number of payment
services that have registered as being exempted from licensing because the amount
of payments they process are below the EU’s Payment Services Directive threshold
and are only domestic, but on investigation DNB has discovered that they are
processing payments above the exemption threshold and to non-resident
customers.
55

DNB has received 41 signals of illegal payment service providers since 2016, of which 33
were issued warning letters.

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389. There are currently 4.9 FTEs working on unlicensed activities across all sectors
regulated by the AFM and 2.3 FTEs working on unlicensed activity across all sectors
regulated by DNB. The Assessment Team does not consider this to be adequate to
deal with the risk posed by the number of unlicensed and illegal operators operating
across the financial sector and recommends that the resource levels, particularly in
DNB, should be increased given it is now also responsible for dealing with
unlicensed VASPs operating in the Netherlands.

BES Islands

390. Licensing and registration for FIs in the BES Islands is largely the same as in
continental Netherlands. In addition, the propriety of policy makers is re-tested
every three years, or before if there is a reason to suspect the person is no longer fit
to hold their position.

VASPs

391. Since May 2020, DNB is responsible for the registration of some VASP activity
defined by the FATF Standards. These services are custodian wallet providers and
fiat to virtual asset exchanges (and vice versa), as required by the 5th European
Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

392. The same market entry process for FIs applies to VASPs, including robust fit and
proper assessments for all board members, day-to-day policymakers (including
supervisory and executive board members) and controllers. There were 27 VASPs
registered in the Netherlands at the end of the onsite and 216 fit and proper
assessments had been carried out. No applications were rejected, but a number of
applicants withdrew their applications, in one case where the applicant was being
investigated as part of an ML investigation.

DNFBPs

393. There is one licenced casino in the Netherlands, and it is wholly owned by the Dutch
Government. Ten policyholders were subject to fit and proper checks in 2019 and
criminal records and certificate of good conduct as part of this process. Fitness and
propriety of policy holders has only been a requirement since 2018 and the casino
submits fit and proper reports on its policy holders annually. The Ksa is satisfied
with the reports and there have not been any removals from positions based on this
process.

394. There are also 10 licenced online gambling operators, which are licenced by Ksa and
provide a range of gambling activities. Policy holders from online gambling are
subject to fit and proper checks and must provide a certificate of good conduct.
There are a number of illegal online gambling sites. Since April 2021, the Ksa has
legal power to instruct banks and payment providers not to process transactions
for these illegal sites and can impose a fine of EUR 820 000 or 10% of the bank’s
turnover in the preceding financial year if they ignore this instruction. No
instructions had been issued at the time of the onsite. The Ksa has issued a number
of fines to illegal online gambling sites, but often these fines are not realised because
the operators are based outside the Netherlands. Because of an exemption by the
Netherlands authorities, all other games of chance are exempt from AML/CFT
licensing, registration and supervision.
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395. Some DNFBPs in the Netherlands are licensed or registered by the relevant
competent authorities and SRBs as outlined in Table 6.2. There are varying
standards in the approaches taken to licensing across the various DNFBP sectors.

Table 6.2. DNFBP licensing/registration arrangements
Obliged entity
Casinos
Real Estate Agents
DPMSs
Lawyers

6

AML/CFT Supervisor
Ksa
BTWwft
BTWwft
Local Bar Presidents

Civil Law Notaries

BFT

Accountants (Auditors)
Legal Advisors
Tax Advisors
Trust Offices
Domicile Providers

BFT
BFT
BFT
DNB
BTWwft

License/Registration
Licensed by Ksa
Membership of the Netherlands
Bar.
Appointed by the Ministry of Justice
and Security and registered with
KNB
Register to NBA
Licensed by DNB
-

396. Robust controls are in place for trust offices including the requirement to be
licensed by DNB. These requirements were strengthened in recent years, due to the
perceived high risk nature of the sector. Fit and proper checks are carried out on
policy-makers, supervisory board members and BOs with shares of 10% or more in
the organisation. The authorities could not provide figures on how many
applications are rejected on fit and proper grounds, but indicate that rejection
rarely occurs as applicants usually withdraw once there is an indication that their
application may be rejected.

397. Illegal trust office activity is a significant issue and there are several initiatives
underway to mitigate this risk, including the “FEC Project on Illegal Trust Service
Providers” project as described below in Box 6.2. One of the main issues in the sector
is trust offices avoiding stricter regulation by DNB by disaggregating their activity
into services that are carried out separately and are therefore not licensed and
subject to lighter touch supervision (e.g., domicile provision). Although it has been
illegal to separate services in this way since 2019, it is difficult to detect. However,
the authorities have had some success by working together to identify those
involved in this activity. DNB and BTWwft, which supervises domicile providers,
have begun collaborating by exchanging signals and information in order to try and
identify illegal trust service providers. DNB participates in the FEC project and
recently imposed a fine for illegal trust activity of EUR 361 500 56. However, as
mentioned above, the Assessment Team does not consider the resources for
tackling illegal trust activity as sufficient.

56

A fine of EUR 236 500 for the natural person involved, and a fine of EUR 125 000 for the
legal person involved.

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Box 6.2. FEC project on illegal trust activities
DNB, in collaboration with FEC partners FIOD, OM and Tax and
Customs Administration, set up a targeted project to tackle illegal
trust service providers. Trust offices that previously had licenses
from DNB, but had given up their licenses, were the target of the
project. DNB received signals that some of these offices were
continuing to provide services despite no longer being licensed. This
information was analysed and shared amongst partners. At the time
of the onsite, cases were being researched in more detail and
followed up by the FIOD.

398. Lawyers are registered by the NOvA, which maintains a register of all individuals
admitted to the Netherlands Bar. Lawyers must provide the Bar with a certificate of
good conduct, which is issued by the Ministry of Justice and Security and takes
account of criminal records. NOvA believes that AML/CFT requirements only apply
to a small number of lawyers, based on the self-declaration lawyers are required to
submit annually indicating if they have carried out services within the scope of the
Wwft.

399. Accountants are required to be registered or members of a professional body (NBA)
and must provide certificates of good standing as part of the registration process.
Notaries are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and Security. Appointment
requires positive advice from the Admissions Committee for the Notarial Profession
and from the Committee of Experts for the Notarial Profession and no objections
against the appointment from the BFT and KNB. After receiving this information,
the notary is appointed. Registration with the professional bodies mainly focusses
on professional capability rather than fitness and propriety and registrants are not
screened for criminal convictions. However, certificates of good conduct can also be
requested as part of ongoing supervision. There are no licensing or registration
obligations for other DNFBPs.

BES Islands

400. There are no entry controls for VASPs in the BES Islands and the authorities do not
know of any operators located there. There are also no entry control requirements
for most DNFBPs in the BES Islands. Trust offices are required to be licenced. The
Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Saint Eustatius
and Saba maintains a public register of all lawyers, who must provide a certificate
of good conduct as part of the registration process.

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Supervisors’ understanding and identification of ML/TF risks
FIs

6

401. AFM and DNB have a good understanding of the inherent risks to the financial
sector. This is informed through a range of information including NRAs, the SNRA,
annual questionnaires, supervisory results and documents published by
organisations, such as the Ministry of Justice and Security’s National Coordinator
for Counterterrorism and Security. The key threats identified by supervisors align
with the NRAs and include TBML, underground banking and VAs. Lower risks
include life insurance and pension funds. Both supervisors participated in the
development of the NRAs through expert interviews and provided case studies and
typologies from the financial sector.

402. AFM and DNB work with other authorities and engage with the private sector to
inform their understanding of ML/TF risks and proactively disseminate to obliged
entities information on what it identifies as the highest risks. Work on individual
sectors is also carried out to enhance the understanding of the specific risks. For
example, DNB collects quarterly transaction data from all money transfer offices.
This information is used to construct risk profiles of transactions, customers, and
networks to ensure the risk profile of the sector and individual institutions is up to
date.

Box 6.3. Maintaining risk understanding and providing guidance
Several public incidents (FIFA corruption, Panama Papers, FinCen
Leaks) prompted DNB to analyse the exposure of Netherlands’
obliged entities to high profile financial crime issues. A questionnaire
was circulated (in this case, to banks and trust offices), and the
answers were assessed and risk determined on that basis. The risk
in the trust office sector was determined to be high by DNB so it
decided to investigate the sector and subsequently published
questions and answers about the risks of providing TCSP services to
customers with links to these high-profile international incidents.

403. DNB has a robust system in place for categorising individual firm risk. It recently
moved to a new methodology Actualisatie Toezicht Methodologie (ATM), which
aligns with the methodology used by the ECB for Single Supervisory Mechanism for
banking supervision in the EU. The approach is largely driven by the obliged
entities’ responses to an annual questionnaire, which focusses on inherent risks and
control measures. This is overlaid with additional information, such as outcomes
from previous supervision, signals and incident reports and information from
foreign supervisors. All firms are categorised by impact class, scores from the
annual questionnaire and a range of supplementary information. AFM has a similar
approach to categorising firm risk. It also uses an annual questionnaire, which
focusses on inherent risk and control measures, as input for a quantitative model
that generates AML/CFT risk scores. These risk scores, together with outcomes on
previous supervision and professional judgement of supervisors most familiar with
specific entities, serve to select entities for supervision. Like DNB’s questionnaire,
inherent risks include product risk, geographical risk and are tailored for each
sector. Both supervisors use interactive dashboards to analyse the data.

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VASPs
404. DNB carried out a comprehensive assessment of the VASP sector as part of its
preparation for supervising VASP activity in the Netherlands. This involved
consulting with the private sector, considering the NRA findings and engaging with
other authorities, such as FIU-NL and LEAs. DNB uses the same ATM methodology
to assign a risk rating to individual VASPs regulated in the Netherlands. The first
annual questionnaire has been submitted by VASPs and DNB is using a dashboard
to identify the highest risk firms for supervisory activity in 2022. Risks identified so
far include a lack of compliance expertise within the VASP sector and the internal
controls of VASPs not in line business expansion.

DNFBPs

405. There are varying levels of understanding of risk by DNFBP supervisors. The
approach for trust office activity is the same as for other sectors supervised by DNB
and is generally strong.

406. Understanding of the gambling sector is also reasonably strong, in part due to the
small size of the sector and the fact that the Ksa has knowledge of all participants.
The Ksa relies more on the SNRA for its risk understanding as casinos and games of
chance are not covered in the NRA, despite casinos and other games of chance being
cited as the highest risk in the Netherlands in a 2017 report. 57 The MoF and MoJ
have undertaken two reviews of the games of chance sector (2017 and 2020). On
the basis of these reviews, the ministries exempted all physical gambling except for
casinos from AML/CFT supervision as they believe that these activities present low
ML/TF risks.

407. For other DNFBP sectors, risk understanding is less developed. Sector risk
assessments are largely based on the NRA and general risk guidance documents.
This is supplemented by other information including signals of non-compliance in
specific entities. Most DNFBP supervisors also participate periodically in a Wwft
Supervision Meeting and other projects and fora where some aspects of risk are
discussed (e.g., Consultation Team on Non-Reporting Entities, and the Obliged
Entities Committee).

408. The NOvA circulated its first annual risk questionnaire in 2020 to its members in
order to understand risks of non-compliance. The form includes questions on
AML/CFT compliance, including whether the entity has performed activities that
are in scope of the Wwft within the year. At the time of the onsite the responses to
the questionnaires had not been used to inform the AML/CFT supervision strategy
of local bar presidents, and the process of carrying out follow-up had not concluded.

57

Identifying and Assessing the Risk of Money Laundering in Europe research project, which
was co-funded by EU Commission and involved the Netherlands MoF and MoJ.

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409. The BFT has supervision arrangements with several professional bodies. Feedback
from some of these bodies assists with its understanding of sector risk. For example,
the accountancy professional body produces annual reports on the outcomes of the
audits they carry out annually to accountants. In general, the majority of the audits
result in a compliant or largely compliant result and it is unclear what emerging risk
themes arise from this information. The BFT has identified inherent risks that apply
across the sectors it supervises. The following are seen as higher risk entities: sole
traders, newly established entities, unorganised entities (not members of
professional bodies), entities with low UTR reporting behaviour and entities with
customer portfolios with increased risk. It is unclear how the feedback or indicators
informs BFT’s supervisory strategy or leads to the targeting of resources to higher
risk activity given that most of its supervision relates to investigating signals,
including cases escalated as a result of peer reviews.

410. The BTWwft has five sector coordinators that have produced sector descriptions
including on real estate agents, domicile providers and dealers in precious metals
and stones. The sector descriptions contain examples of client, product, service,
transaction/delivery channel and country/geographic risks applicable to the sector.
The sector coordinators, gain knowledge from non-compliance of firms highlighted
through triggers, FATF reports, information of the AMLC and engagement with the
private sector. The sector descriptions are used as a guide for the supervisor to
identify risks in individual firms, but are not used to determine a collective view of
the risk across the sectors the BTWwft supervises, or to inform its supervision
strategy and associated factors such as resource allocation.

411. Due to the size of the sectors and regulatory limitations (e.g., no registration
requirements for most obliged entities) risk understanding for most DNFBPs is
developed at sector and sub-sector levels. This is largely based on the NRA, signals
from law enforcement and other authorities on potential non-compliance with
obligations. At the time of the onsite, the Netherlands Tax Authority was working
on a risk dashboard to assist BTWwft in developing its understanding of sectors,
sub-sectors and obliged entities.

BES Islands

412. Supervisors in the BES Islands have a good understanding of risk. In 2019, AFM
developed a Wwft BES risk model which allows them to conduct risk-based
supervision and in 2020, developed a dashboard providing insights into individual
firms and their inherent risks.

413. AFM and DNB annually request information from FIs and service providers in the
BES Islands with respect to risks of ML, TF and compliance with sanctions
regulations. On the basis of this risk questionnaire, AFM and DNB obtains insight
into these various risks existing at the level of the individual institution. All FIs and
service providers must complete the risk questionnaire.

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Risk-based supervision of compliance with AML/CFT requirements
FIs
414. DNB and AFM apply a risk-based approach to supervision. Both authorities produce
annual supervision plans. The plans prioritise the highest risk areas and enable
them to effectively allocate supervisory resources. DNB moved to a new supervisory
approach (ATM) in 2021, focussing more on risk analysis and available data. The
new approach has two main categories: (i) scheduled supervisory activities (both a
basic and a risk-based programme); and (ii) unscheduled supervision activities
(supervision requests and unforeseen supervision activities, e.g., Panama Papers).

415. Scheduled supervision includes a basic and risk-based programme. The risk-based
programme includes institution-specific (on-site and off-site) investigations for
firms with higher risk profiles and (on-site and off-site) thematic work where
information (e.g., data, intelligence or events) suggests there may be a sector-wide
issue. Part of the risk-based programme also involves monitoring mitigation plans,
where deficiencies have previously been identified. AFM also divides its approach
between institute specific and thematic supervision and includes follow-up on
remedial plans. DNB has approximately 60 staff across three financial crime
supervision teams, which cover all sectors (228 entities). This has grown from
approximately 30 since 2015, due to additional responsibilities and increased
supervision. DNB believes further resources are needed in order to intensify
integrity supervision and has requested this from the Minister of Finance. The AFM
has 13 people responsible for AML supervision, this appears low given the number
of organisations it supervises.

Box 6.4. Following up on remedial action plans

In 2017, DNB imposed an instruction and a fine on a bank for not
reporting unusual transactions to the FIU-NL. In addition to the
formal measures, the institution also had to draw up a recovery plan
for the transaction monitoring and CDD process. DNB held 2-monthly
meetings with the bank to monitor progress. In 2018, DNB carried
out two validation studies. During the first validation study the
deficiencies were found to be partially resolved, and in the second
validation study the identified deficiencies had been fully resolved.

Institute specific investigations

416. DNB and AFM conduct off-site and on-site investigations. An off-site investigation
can serve as a stand-alone investigation or can be the first phase of an on-site
investigation. Since the start of the COVID-19 crisis in March 2020, all DNB on-site
investigations have been conducted remotely. High risk banks are generally subject
to a detailed assessment (“deep dive”) every 3-5 years and medium risk banks 5-7
years. However, the three largest banks (covering 82% of the banking sector) have
been subject to more intensive supervision in recent years as part of monitoring
agreed remediation programmes. Up to five years for a detailed assessment into
high-risk banks appears to be too infrequent and is possibly due to resource
constraints. AFM has conducted 25 on site and 187 offsite investigations during
2020 and 2021.

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417. Investigations generally focus on firms’ risk assessments, policies and procedures,
client files and completion of CDD, training manuals, transaction data, transaction
monitoring and UTR reporting. Particular focus is placed on the design of a risk
control framework and operational implementation. The supervisors choose the
approach, including the specific on-site and off-site activities, most effective for the
nature, scope and purpose of each investigation. The duration of visits by DNB
varies from 3-4 weeks for standard investigations, but have taken up to three
months in some cases. The inspection duration for AFM is much shorter. The
number of onsite inspections for some sectors, such as life insurers and registered
managers of investment institutions is low, which is in line with the risk profile of
these sectors.

Table 6.3. Onsite inspections
Sector
DNB
Banks
Insurers
Payment institutions
MTOs
Exchange institutions
EMIs
Safe custody service providers
AFM
Licensed (managers of) investment
institutions
Registered (managers of) investment
institutions
Investment firms
Life insurance intermediaries
Total

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

13
3
4
3
-

17
7
4
3
-

16
3
8
5
-

7
2
2
5
3
1
4

3
1
4
3
1
-

-

1

1

10

2

4
1
3
4

-

4

3

3

-

2

1
2
26

3
39

14
5
55

12
49

9
7
30

2
16

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

36
10
20

7
42
1

88
32
32

2
5
2

13
4
4

14
36
10

-

13
-

4
-

2
-

4
1

3
2

1

11

2

9

15

22

-

-

-

-

18

59

67

3
77

22
5
185

9
10
39

26
8
93

36
3
185

*Covers the first half of 2021.

Table 6.4. Offsite inspections
Sector
DNB
Banks
Insurers
Payment
institutions
MTOs
EMI’s
AFM
Licensed (managers of) investment
institutions
Registered (managers of) investment
institutions
Investment firms
Life insurance intermediaries
Total
*Covers the first half of 2021.
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Thematic investigations
418. Thematic on-site investigations involving several institutions take DNB
approximately one year to complete, with approximately six weeks available for
each institution to be investigated. Thematic investigations can be the result of
several risk drivers including incidents such as the Panama Papers, indications of
risks in publications such as the SNRA, signals from other authorities or based on
analysis of data from the annual questionnaires. For example, AFM conducted a
thematic review in 2019 on transaction monitoring and mandatory reporting. This
was in response to the 2018 risk questionnaire which showed that 27% of
investment firms, 16% of (managers of) licensed investment institutions and 35%
of registered (managers of) investment institutions had no automated or manual
system to monitor customer transactions.

419. The number of onsite inspections has reduced significantly due to the COVID-19
crisis. This has led to more intensive offsite supervision and also meant more
innovative use of data (e.g., the use of dashboards and outlier detections),
particularly by DNB, in order to continue to maintain the intensity of supervision in
higher risk entities.

Box 6.5. DNB anomaly detection model
Anomaly detection is a method to select potentially interesting customers
(outliers) from a large dataset. The algorithm used is the isolation forest (a tree
based model). This model works particularly well for large datasets. To give an
approximation, the last time the model was used on a dataset consisting of over
300 million transactions and around 7.5 million clients.

VASPs

The underlying thought is that some data points (clients) exhibit behaviours that
the vast majority of clients do not. The outlier detection creates an overview with
characteristics and scores of customers compared to other customers. The high
scoring clients, the clients who have the largest change to be an outlier, are then
selected for further in depth analysis by the supervisor instead of the manually
selected files. The outlier detection model leads to more interesting files being
identified and is a more risk-based way of doing research.

420. DNB has three FTEs responsible for supervising VASPs. The same risk-based
approach for FIs applies to VASP supervision. However, at the time of the onsite, the
focus was mainly on the registration of firms and ensuring they understand their
obligations. DNB is also harnessing blockchain analytics as part of its supervisory
approach and has invested significantly in training employees involved in the
supervision of VASPs. At the time of the onsite, one thematic investigation involving
offsite inspections of 17 VASPs had taken place on the subject of reporting
obligations, which resulted in a significant increase in UTRs across the sector.

DNFBPs

421. The Ksa conducts offsite and onsite supervision of the one casino (with several
branches) since 2016. Supervision has focussed on understanding of obligations
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following legislative change (AMLD4), CDD identification and verification,
monitoring funds and source of wealth. Until January 2021, there was only one
person responsible for AML/CFT supervision and enforcement. This number has
now increased to three people due to the Ksa taking on responsibility for online
gambling platforms.

6

422. DNB supervises licensed trust offices in a similar way to FIs, including the review of
risk frameworks. Trust offices have a similar risk categorisation model as FIs and
those with the highest risk receive the most supervisory focus. As mentioned
previously, high risk activities include servicing conduit companies. There are
between 30-40 high risk trust offices from a population of 154. Trust offices in the
highest risk category are subject to continuous DNB integrity supervision. High risk
trust offices are subjected to a deep dive investigation every two years.
Investigations are often a combination of onsite and offsite supervision and can take
up to 4-5 weeks with 3-4 days onsite.

Table 6.5. Trust office inspections
Activity
Onsite (thematic and institute specific)
Offsite (thematic and institute specific)

2016
9
40

2017
18
-

2018
16
8

2019
14
13

2020
10
21

423. DNB also conducts thematic reviews in the trust office sector and recently carried
out an assessment of 21 trust offices that had not been inspected in the past three
years58. DNB’s thematic reviews can take up to eight weeks depending on the scope
and number of firms included.

Box 6.6. Thematic investigation in the trust offices sector
DNB defines a “whitespot” as a trust office that has not been
supervised by DNB for at least three years. As there is a relatively
large number of whitespots, DNB opted for an investigation where a
large number of trust offices can be assessed.

In order to find out as efficiently as possible what the level of
compliance is, and thus the potential integrity risk, an offsite was
conducted into the integrity policies at trust offices that qualify as
whitespots. Over a period of four months, DNB investigated 21 trust
offices, allowing it to risk score these institutions for more focused
supervision. The desk-based exercise found that of the 21
institutions, nine (43%) scored “poor” and two (10%) scored “good”
in terms of the policies they had in place. Overall, 52% presented a
risk with regard to the set-up of the integrity policies. The
investigation resulted in the revocation of the licence of one trust
office. The nine trust offices which scored “poor” are the subject of a
follow-up investigation.
58

The assessments of 21 trust offices as part of the thematic review are also reflected in table
6.5

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424. Other DNFBP supervisors do not classify their entities/professions based on risk,
instead their investigations are mostly based on reactive signals from outside
sources (e.g., LEAs) and lack of resources drives this supervisory approach.

425.

The NOvA has 11 local Bar presidents responsible for supervision. Approximately
10% of law firms in their region are inspected annually, but not all are inspected for
AML/CFT purposes. Onsite inspections take approximately two hours each. The
NOvA carried out a thematic review of 50 firms in 2019/2020 and covered a
number of areas (e.g., CDD, UTRs). The firms were selected on the based on whether
they indicated they carried out activity covered by the Wwft. The NOvA found that
the majority of firms reviewed as part of the thematic work executed proper CDD
and carefully considered whether UTRs should be reported to FIU-NL.

426. The BFT estimates it is responsible for the supervision of approximately 49 000
(junior) notaries, independent legal advisers, accountants, and other entities, such
as tax advisors. BFT has supervisory arrangements with the Association of
Registered Accountants (SRA) to coordinate peer reviews in their sector and there
is a legal requirement for notaries to be peer reviewed by the KNB every three years
on the implementation of legal requirements and office procedures, including
AML/CFT compliance. Element of the peer review rated insufficient can be
remediated by the obliged entities by an improvement plan, which is followed up.
More serious failings from the peer review audits can be escalated to the BFT for
formal or disciplinary action. A large majority of audits are compliant or largely
compliant. Again, this appears to be out of line with the risk profile and
understanding of AML/CFT obligations in the sector. The BFT has approximately 15
FTEs and carries out reactive investigations based on signals from other authorities
(e.g., FIU-NL). There have been between 20 and 45 of these each year since 2016.

427. The BTWwft supervises over 100 000 entities, including those that carry out
activities in higher risk sectors (e.g., real estate), and activities that are not covered
by the FATF Standards (e.g., vehicle traders sector). There are 30 FTEs that cover
AML/CFT supervision across all sectors. The BTWwft has a three pillared approach:
signal-based inspections, thematic inspections, and risk-based selections of firms
identified in the supervised sectors. The thematic inspections and risk-based
selections are currently determined by the sector coordinators’ understanding and
judgement. The introduction of a risk dashboard, which was being developed at the
time of the onsite, should enhance the BTWwft’s ability to select areas and entities
of focus in a more advanced way. Since 2016, BTWwft has carried out thematic work
in the real estate sector (mainly in holiday homes), but there have been no thematic
reviews specifically aimed at other sectors within scope of the FATF Standards. The
BTWwft carries out approximately 1 100 investigations a year, around half of which
are onsite. Approximately half of these are focussed on entities that fall outside the
scope of the FATF Standards.

428. There is currently no explicit obligation for DNFBPs other than trust offices to
screen their clients and transactions against PF and TF sanction lists. Since there is
no obligation, supervisors have no remit to supervise compliance, nor can they
apply sanctions or remedial actions for non-compliance. As noted under IO.11, in
relation to PF TFS, many DNFBPs interviewed during the onsite visit indicated that
they do screen their clients against sanctions lists. The Assessment Team considers
that the lack of an explicit obligation to perform sanctions screenings and a
supervisory framework to monitor compliance may impact the timely
implementation of TFS.
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BES Islands
429. Approximately three AML/CFT supervisors from DNB (two FTEs in total) visit the
BES Islands three times a year for one week of supervision. These visits are aimed
primarily at Bonaire. The last visit to Saba and St Eustatius was in 2017, as
supervision in these islands takes place on a five-year cycle.

6

430. The BTWwft supervises all DNFBPs in the BES Islands, except for casinos and trust
offices. Generally, the BTWwft visits the BES Islands annually for 2-3 weeks and
carries out onsite investigations. These investigations are conducted by four
inspection officers in pairs. At the time of the onsite, the BTWwft had not reviewed
the files of the two notaries in the BES Islands who act as gatekeepers for real estate
and company formation. Before 1 July 2021, the BTWwft did not have powers
enabling it to carry out these types of reviews. Now that the powers are in place, the
Assessment Team believe this should be a priority given the risks associated with
notaries and their main activities. DNB conducted onsite inspections in 2017 to the
two casinos and one trust office in the BES Islands.

431. The same absence of a requirement for DNFBPs except trust offices in the
Netherlands for TFS screening, exists for all DNFBPs and VASPs in the BES Islands.

Remedial actions and effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions
FIs

432. DNB and AFM widely employ remedial actions where they identify failures in
compliance in line with their joint enforcement policy. Reports with remedial
actions are issued to obliged entities after most DNB investigations. The supervisors
place significant emphasis on following up on remedial action plans and in
significant cases generally require FIs to report on progress on a quarterly basis.
Remediation is also followed up in subsequent investigations. Several large banks
currently have extensive longer term remediation plans in place, which are often
based on measures imposed by DNB. In some cases the banks have engaged third
parties to assist them in monitoring progress against these plans. In recent years,
the authorities have placed significant emphasis on improving firm culture as a way
of setting the right tone from the top and stressing the importance of compliance.
Often remediation plans include root cause analysis of failures resulting from poor
compliance culture. Remedial actions are used alongside, and as part of, formal and
informal enforcement action.

433. DNB and AFM, have a joint enforcement policy and can impose several types of
formal and informal measures depending on a number of factors, including severity
of violations, culpability and compliance orientation of the FI in scope, supervisory
history of the FI (i.e., outcome of previous investigations and/or measures imposed
in the past), similar cases, and if remediation is already underway. Informal
measures include a compliance briefing or a warning letter. Formal actions include:
an instruction; order subject to a penalty; administrative fine; disqualifying
policymakers from exercising their profession; and a public warning. An
administrative fine has a punitive character. All other formal and informal measures
are remedial in nature.

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434. When DNB finds AML/CFT failings, it develops an intervention strategy taking into
account the enforcement policy factors mentioned above. Most intervention
strategies include a proposal to impose sanctions or other enforcement measures.
Before formal enforcement measures are imposed, the FI is notified. At this point,
the FI often begins remediation or may have already begun doing so. Supervisors
are required to include the scope of remedial actions being undertaken by the FI as
part of the decision making on whether or not to impose an enforcement measure.
If an FI demonstrates that it is willing and able to remediate the violations within a
reasonable timeframe, DNB often does not apply immediate enforcement measures.
In cases where an informal measure is being imposed (i.e., no formal enforcement
measure is imposed), the failing is not made public and the name of the firm is not
published, except in exceptional cases. Formal measures are largely preceded by
informal measures. This can create a delay in resolving issues and preventing the
continuation of violations. The authorities also described how in some cases it had
taken over one year to follow-up on unanswered warning letters. DNB can apply
formal and informal measures and has done so in some cases.

6

Table 6.6. Number of formal and informal measures applied by DNB (excluding trust
offices) and AFM
2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*
AFM
(Q1 –
Q3)

Informal

DNB

AFM

DNB

AFM

DNB

AFM

DNB

AFM

DNB

AFM

Compliance briefings
Instruction letters on
compliance with
standard
Warning letter
Conversation on
compliance with
standard
Information letter on
compliance with
standard
Formal 59
Instruction or intended
instruction
Order subject to a
penalty, or intended
order subject to a
penalty
Administrative fine, or
intended administrative
fine
Revocation of license,
or intended revocation
of license
Report to public
prosecutor

2
0

1
0

3
0

1
9

5
0

0
1

6
0

0
5

3
0

1
4

DNB
(Q1
and
Q2)
1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

2
0

3
0

4
0

64
0

3
0

31
12

4
0

32
6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

73

0

141

0

108

4

0

3

1

1

1

7

1

0

3

1

4

2

0

0

1

1

2

0

1

2

3

0

6

4

0

2

0

1

0

7

0

9

0

1

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

*DNB data covers the period up to June 2021.
59

DNB figures are imposed formal measures. AFM figures include intended formal measures.

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435. The Wwft was amended in July 2018 allowing DNB and AFM to impose higher fines
than previously available, including up to 20% of a firm’s annual turnover if the
amount is higher than twice the upper limit of the third fine category (i.e., more than
EUR 10 million). The below table outlines the current fine categories. In practice,
the largest fine imposed to date is less than 5% of a firm’s annual turnover.

Table 6.7. Fine categories as of July 2018

6

Fine category
1
2
3

Basic
EUR 10 000
EUR 500 000
EUR 2 000 000 /
2500 000

Minimum
EUR 0
EUR 0
EUR 0

Maximum
EUR 10 000
EUR 1 000 000
EUR 4 000 000 /
5 000 000

436. Recent legislative changes also permit the publication of all formal measures. These
developments have had a positive effect in terms of dissuasiveness, but the number
of formal measures imposed remains low, particularly by AFM. DNB and AFM do not
have powers to take criminal enforcement action for AML/CFT failings. However, in
the case of serious violations, DNB and the AFM refer cases to a Steering Team on
Supervision (which includes DNB, AFM, FIOD and the OM). The Steering Group then
decides on the most appropriate action for the particular case (administrative fine
or prosecution). Under Dutch law, an administrative and a criminal sanction cannot
be imposed in the same case. The Steering Group has considered 68 DNB cases since
2016, dealt with 53 cases under administrative law, and 15 cases under criminal
law (this includes trust offices and VASPs). Five AFM cases have been considered
since 2019 and all of these have been dealt with under administrative law.

437. Two recent high profile settlement cases against two of the largest FIs in the
Netherlands have had a significant impact on the prioritisation of AML/CFT
compliance across the banking sector. This has also had a cascading effect on other
sectors and was frequently mentioned by private sector representatives met by the
Assessment Team. Although the amounts of the settlements are large (EUR 775
million and EUR 480 million, respectively), they relate to AML/CFT failings that
occurred over a number of years, with the banks receiving repeated warnings and
enforcement measures from DNB, which did not have the required impact. The
below case study highlights one of these cases.

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Box 6.7. Settlement involving major bank
In September 2018, a large bank entered into a settlement agreement
with the Dutch Public Prosecution Service following a criminal
investigation which revealed that criminals had laundered money
through its accounts due to serious shortcomings in its AML/CFT
framework and culpable money laundering. The shortcomings
identified resulted in clients being able to use their bank accounts for
ML practices over several years.
Dutch financial crime prosecutors stated that the bank had violated
AML/CFT laws “structurally and for years” by not properly vetting
the BO of client accounts and by not identifying associated unusual
transactions.

The OM started its investigation in 2016 after identifying a pattern of
violations. They cited four case examples where the bank’s accounts
were used for criminal activities, most notably for bribes paid by a
telecommunications company in Uzbekistan.

VASPs

The bank agreed to pay EUR 775 million to settle the case.

438. The same DNB process for remedial and punitive measures applies for VASPs. Due
to the early nature of the regime, no remedial actions have been imposed to date.
DNB has issued informal warning letters to businesses operating as VASPs that had
not applied for registration. DNB has also issued a public warning in relating to one
illegal VASP and is considering enforcement action in other cases.

DNFBPs

439. Apart from the trust office sector, there is significant variation in terms of the
application of remedial actions applied by supervisors in other sectors. Informal
measures are applied in many cases and mainly to apply for failures in reporting
UTRs. The application of remedial actions are not always applied consistently by
different supervisors.

440. DNB applies the same approach to remedial and punitive measures for trust offices
as for FIs. A number of informal and formal actions have been imposed on trust
offices in recent years following thematic reviews.

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Table 6.8. Formal and informal measures applied by DNB to trust offices
2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

Compliance briefings

0

1

1

0

1

0

Instruction letters on compliance with standard

0

0

0

0

0

0

Warning letter

0

0

2

0

3

0

Conversation on compliance with standard

0

0

0

0

0

0

Information letter on compliance with standard

0

0

0

0

0

0

Formal*
Instruction or intended instruction

14

9

5

6

6

2

Order subject to a penalty, or intended order
subject to a penalty

5

5

3

6

5

0

Administrative fine, or intended administrative fine

3

3

2

4

7

4

Revocation of license, or intended revocation of
license

3

3

3

1

0

0

Report to public prosecutor

1

2

0

0

0

0

Informal

6

*DNB data covers the period up to June 2021.

441. The Ksa has imposed fines on illegal land based and gambling providers. The
amounts of fines imposed for illegal online gambling sites appear appropriate, but
less than half of these have been recovered in practice.

442. The BFT can fine a percentage of a firm’s turnover for AML/CFT failings. Fines range
from 1% to 5% depending on the gravity, duration and culpability. In cases where
4 or 5% is considered, the supervisors liaise with the OM to determine whether a
criminal prosecution should take place instead. The NOvA states that local bar
presidents prefer to use disciplinary law rather than administrative law when
AML/CFT failings are identified. NOvA also states that lawyers see disciplinary
measures as more serious than other measures such as administrative law
sanctions because of the reputational damage they cause. Disciplinary measures
include a reprimand, suspension and disbarment, as opposed to administrative law,
which includes an administrative fine and order subject to penalty. Both
disciplinary and administrative measures can be published. Approximately 7% of
complaints registered with the NOvA led to disciplinary measures. Since 2016, there
have been 24 disbarments, 45 suspensions, and 19 administrative measures which
include AML/CFT failings. The case below demonstrates the use of disciplinary
measures to address failings including poor CDD measures. Although disciplinary
action by the Bar presidents can have a significant impact on lawyers, they are
infrequent and not always proportionate or dissuasive.

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Box 6.8. Disciplinary case for a lawyer
On 23 December 2019, the Hague Board of Discipline suspended a
lawyer for 26 weeks with an additional eight weeks suspended for
two years subject to no further breaches.

The violations of the lawyer included failure to conduct CDD,
providing money management services, taking funds into custody
without a reasonable purpose, misuse of a client trust account,
making improper cash payments to his client and failure to report
UTRs.

The lawyer’s client was declared bankrupt in 2011. Shortly after, the
individual was given EUR 50 000 as a deposit for a new project.
Instead of receiving the money in his own account, the client asked
the lawyer to receive the payment in order to disguise it and ensure
the funds were not subject to bankruptcy measures. The lawyer
agreed and accepted the funds into the trust account of his own office.
In the period between 2013 and 2016, the lawyer used funds to pay
mortgage debts for his client amounting to EUR 30 000, made a EUR
5 000 cash payment to his client and paid 15 000 into an account for
his client and disguised this as a loan.

443. Other formal measures available to DNFBP supervisors are the ability to impose
performance improvement plans and cease and desist orders. Performance
improvement plans involve a letter to the reporting entity with an instruction that
has to be followed within a certain timeframe or that the entity has to improve
internal procedures. In case a reporting entity fails to comply, a cease and desist
order can be imposed.

444. When a cease and desist order is not followed by the obliged entity within the given
time limit, this can result in a financial penalty. In practice, informal warning notices
and other informal measures are heavily relied on by some supervisors and formal
measures are only applied to a limited extent. The BFT imposes more formal
measures than informal measures. These are mainly performance improvement
plans and can be a result of an issue being escalated by one of the professional
bodies it has agreements with.

Table 6.9. Fines imposed on DNFBPs
Illegal Land based
betting
Illegal online betting 60
Real Estate Agents
60

Number

2016
1

2017
0

2018
2

2019
1

2020
1

Amount
Number
Amount
Number

373 750
0
0
21

0
7
907 000
22

37 300
5
1 322 000
18

11 056
11
3 480 000
10

86 528
2
600 000
1

Fines imposed include to non-Dutch entities. Approximately half of the fines imposed have
been recovered.

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DPMS
Lawyers
Notaries
Accountants

Amount
Number
Amount
Number
Amount
Number
Amount
Number
Amount

2016
26 250
0
0
0
0
1
10 000
23
175 140

2017
29 400
1
10 000
0
0
1
6 000
6
126 222

2018
32 100
2
7500
0
0
2
51 000
16
146 133

2019
12.200
1
1000
0
0
1
8 500
20
212 995

2020
20.000
4
100 000
0
0
3
129 300
0
0

BES Islands

6

445. Most AML/CFT failings in the BES Islands are addressed through informal measures
and any fines that have been imposed are very low.

Impact of supervisory actions on compliance
FIs

446. The authorities believe that FI compliance culture, particularly in banks, has shifted
as a result of guidance and other measures and the aforementioned high profile
settlement cases against two of the largest Dutch banks. Awareness of the role of
AML/CFT gatekeeper was relatively low until 2015, but in recent years has
improved considerably. Obliged entities are now aware of their responsibilities and
there are recognised improvements. DNB and AFM monitor and validate
remediation plans that have been put in place. Although this can be seen as resource
intensive, it provides confidence to the authorities that the plans are properly
executed and the intervention has delivered results.

447. There has been a significant increase in the number of UTRs submitted to FIU-NL
between 2017 and 2020 (see IO.4). Furthermore, there was a gradual increase in
the number of TFS reports between 2015 and 2020. DNB attributes this to the wideranging thematic reviews that took place from 2016 onwards, as well as the large
settlement cases. For example, following the major settlements, the supervisors
observed many institutions carrying out bank-wide CDD remediation projects,
investing in new technology for CDD and transaction monitoring and significantly
expanding their first and second-line defence functions.

DNFBPs

448. Since 2016, DNB has seen a number of licensed trust offices cease trading (238 in
2016 to 162 in 2020). Although there are several factors that may have contributed
to this reduction, DNB attributes some to the outcome of stricter regulations and
more intense supervision of obligations. DNB sees improvements in the sector, but
still finds that CDD is often not carried out sufficiently.

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449. In general, DNFBPs supervisors are not able to provide figures on the impact of their
supervisory interventions, but often an increase or decrease in UTRs is referred to
as a proxy. The BTWwft reports that in 2018 more than 60% of the re-inspections
carried out, the obliged entity had rectified identified issues. In just under 40% of
the cases, violations were repeated. In more than 10% of the cases, the violations
were so serious that the case was referred to a penalty payment officer for a fine to
be considered.

BES Islands

450. Supervisors often see a direct impact of their supervision through monitoring, due
to the small number of entities on the islands. Formal measures such as instructions
were not able to be published before July 2021, undermining the deterrent effect of
formal interventions.

Promoting a clear understanding of AML/CFT obligations and ML/TF risks
FIs

451. DNB and AFM undertake a range of outreach activities. This includes publishing
newsletters, organising seminars, issuing AML/CFT policy documents, and
publishing Q&A’s on a range of issues such as transaction monitoring and integrity
risk of football. Both supervisors communicate to a wide population through
monthly digital newsletters that set out legislative changes, risks that have been
observed in various sectors and best practices. The newsletters are also used to
provide generic feedback on investigations.

452. DNB and AFM publish a supervision agenda on an annual basis listing the primary
financial market risks and the main supervision focus. DNB and the AFM are active
members of the FEC. This is a partnership of public and private parties cooperating
in various projects, including the FEC-OM real estate project. More recently, a TF
and Serious Crime Task Force was established to cooperate with banks to exchange
information and establish typologies, allowing FIs to more easily identify unusual
transactions. DNB acts as an observer in these task forces. Both supervisors work
closely with the various sector professional bodies, who disseminate information to
their members.

453. Both supervisors provide guidance for all sectors they supervise. However, FIs met
during the onsite commented that guidance could be more specific and provide
more detailed examples of good practices in complying with AML/CFT obligations.

VASPs

454. DNB has undertaken significant outreach with the VASP sector to enhance its
understanding of the Dutch VASP population and ensure VASPs understand their
AML/CFT risks and obligations. This outreach began in advance of DNB taking on
supervisory responsibility for VASPs. DNB has also held outreach sessions with
obliged entities, produced guidance on its website and has sent five newsletters to
over 13 00 subscribers.

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DNFBPs
455. DNFBP supervisors invest a significant amount of resources in engaging with
sectors to ensure they understand their AML/CFT risks and obligations, such as
through presentations, guidelines, Q&A documents and good practice documents.

6

456. Extensive guidance has been produced for all DNFBP sectors. However, some
entities met during the onsite noted that the guidance could be more detailed,
particularly for smaller entities. BTWwft provides risk matrices for each
supervising sector to promote a clear understanding of risks. The matrices provide
generic risk indicators for client identity, service, transaction and country risk.

457. DNB, BFT, BTWwft and NOvA all have help desks enabling entities to ask questions
via website, email or telephone. Many obliged entities met during the onsite
appreciated the ability to easily contact the supervisors with questions.

BES Islands

458. Many of the communications produced for obliged entities in the Netherlands also
apply to the BES Islands. Specific outreach activities are also conducted, including
seminars, preparation of guidelines, and frequently asked questions. DNB has
developed a website specifically for the Caribbean Netherlands. In 2021, DNB
published the Good Practices Wwft BES, a guidance specifically aimed at the
institutions on the BES and the local risks and regulations.

Overall conclusion on IO.3
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

DNB and AFM supervise FIs, VASPs and trust offices and have robust entry
controls in place to ensure controllers and senior managers are fit and proper.
However, despite having a significant number of illegal operators, including
underground banking and illegal trust offices, there is a lack of resources to
address the problem.
Understanding of risk by DNFBP supervisors is generally less granular than that
of DNB and AFM. Although certain aspects of risk based supervision have been
introduced by some DNFBP supervisors, major improvements are needed to
ensure effective risk-based supervision is applied across all DNFBP sectors.

The recent high profile settlement cases against two of the largest FIs in the
Netherlands have had a significant impact on the prioritisation of AML/CFT
compliance across FIs and more broadly. While this is a noteworthy development,
the duration of these AML/CFT failings over several years is indicative of a lack of
dissuasiveness of earlier interventions.

Some supervisors rely heavily on warning letters and other informal sanctions,
even for more serious breaches of regulation, including unlicensed activity. This
does not always have a deterrent effect and means that issues may go unaddressed
longer than they would if formal measures were applied.
The Netherlands is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.3.

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Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key Findings
1. The Netherlands CoC commercial register contains comprehensive basic
information on all legal persons established in the Netherlands. Since September
2020, all newly created legal persons must also register BO information on the
CoC’s BO Register. Existing legal persons have until 27 March 2022, to register BO
information. At the time of the onsite, only 27% of existing legal persons had
registered BO information in the BO register.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

A notarial deed is required for the establishment of most legal persons in the
Netherlands and there are clear requirements for legal persons to provide
accurate and up-to-date information and to notify the register of changes. All
registrations are checked by CoC for completeness and consistency with the
Personal Records Database, company register and documents provided. When
inaccurate information is submitted by notaries, this is not followed up with the
notary who submitted it.
As noted under IO.1, authorities have launched initiatives aimed at identifying and
assessing ML/TF risks of legal persons. These include thematic projects conducted
by FIU-NL (e.g., on NPOs), AMLC (Offshore and No Shelter), and FEC (rogue
foundations). However, these initiatives do not provide a clear and comprehensive
overview of the risks posed by legal persons. The result is that authorities and
obliged entities have an inconsistent understanding of the main ML/TF risks
related to the different types and sub-types of legal persons in the Netherlands.
Legal arrangements, such as trusts, cannot be set up under Dutch law (with the
exception of mutual funds). The Netherlands recognises foreign trusts established
under the law of other jurisdictions and estimates there are approximately 15 000
legal arrangements operating in the Netherlands.

The Netherlands relies on FIs and DNFBPs as gatekeepers to prevent the misuse
of legal persons and arrangements and to improve the quality of the data in the BO
register by reporting discrepancies. Given that many recent fines and other
sanctions imposed on obliged entities (including high profile fines against the
largest FIs) relate to CDD failings, including failure to properly identify BOs, it is
not clear how effective this measure is ensuring the accuracy of information in the
register.
Aside from dissolving legal entities, no sanctions are imposed for failing to provide
correct or up-to-date basic information. Sanctions for failure to submit financial
statements have been imposed, but these are not dissuasive given the remaining

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7.

7

8.

CHAPTER 7. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS

high levels of noncompliance. No cases of providing incorrect BO information that
is punishable have been detected so far.

The Netherlands allows, under strict circumstances, obliged entities to accept
senior managing officials as so called ‘pseudo BOs’. Although this option is only
meant as a last resort, obliged entities will often make use of it as soon as it is clear
that there is no natural person with more than 25% of the shares, voting rights or
ownership interest in that entity, without further verifying if there are no natural
persons owning or controlling the legal person by other means. This is likely to
occur more often in high risk, complex international constructions, such as conduit
companies. This practice has led to cases where notaries identify trust office
employees who act as nominee directors as the pseudo BOs (and apply EDD
measures such as an examination into their source of wealth on them), while the
ultimate BOs may remain unknown.
There are several deficiencies in the BES Islands, including a lack of a requirement
for legal persons or arrangements to hold BO information.

Recommended Actions
1.

2.

3.
4.

As noted in IO.1, the Netherlands should undertake analysis and produce a clear
and comprehensive overview of the risks posed by legal persons. This should
include a refined assessment of the risks of foundations, making a distinction
between the different purposes for which this legal form is used (charitable, noncharitable, STAK, etc.) and the potential ML/TF risks of the legal form of church
communities. The authorities should follow-up on the findings of the reports on
illegal trust offices and on conduit companies.

Authorities should consider proportionate enforcement action against notaries
who fail to submit accurate basic and BO information to the CoC registers. The
Netherlands should continue its efforts to ensure the BO register is populated with
accurate information on the BOs of legal persons active in the Netherlands,
including giving targeted guidance in order to limit the registration of senior
directors as ‘pseudo’ BOs to an absolute minimum.
The Netherlands should continue efforts to complete the legislative process and
start registering the BOs of trusts and similar legal constructions.

The NL should take measures to reduce the risk of ML abuse by conduit
companies. 61 These measures should include gaining a better understanding of the
61

The term “conduit company” refers not to the strict legal definition of the Wtt 2018, but to
companies with features that are typical for a conduit company. Typically, a conduit
company would be a Dutch legal entity, with little or no real presence in the Netherlands,
that is part of an international structure and that has been set up for tax, financial or legal
purposes. Conduit companies often have substantial balance sheet positions and/or have
significant amounts of money flowing through them coming from or going to foreign
entities that are part of the same structure.

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5.
6.

| 169

ML/TF risks of conduit companies, strengthening financial reporting obligations
and reviewing the possibility to register senior managing directors of a conduit
company (‘pseudo’ BOs) and strengthening safeguards if found that this is
misused for concealment of the ultimate BOs.

The Netherlands should ensure that sanctions are proportionate and dissuasive
for failure to submit and maintain accurate information on CoC registers,
particularly in cases involving intent.
The Netherlands should require legal persons in the BES islands to hold BO
information and ensure this is available to competent authorities in a timely
manner and should ensure legal persons are complying with their CoC register
obligations.

459. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.5.
The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R.24-25, and elements of R.1, 10, 37 and 40. 62

460. The Assessment Team’s findings on IO.5 are based on discussions with Netherlands
authorities and obliged entities, and information provided by the authorities
including the NRA and case studies.

Immediate Outcome 5 (Legal Persons and Arrangements)

Public availability of information on the creation and types of legal persons and
arrangements
461. Information on the creation and types of legal persons is publicly available through
the CoC website and several other sources. The CoC website provides user-friendly
instructions on the requirements to establish and register a Dutch legal person and
register a foreign legal person that seeks to establish a branch office or commercial
undertaking in the Netherlands (in both Dutch and English). This site includes stepby-step guides and forms (primarily to be filed by civil law notaries).

462. Most legal persons must register their basic and BO information in the CoC company
register (Handelsregister) and BO register respectively. This includes foreign legal
persons that have a branch office or commercial undertaking in the Netherlands, of
which there are 8 000 registered with the CoC in the company register.

62

The availability of accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is
also assessed by the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information
for Tax Purposes. In some cases, the findings may differ due to differences in the FATF and
Global Forum’s respective methodologies, objectives and scope of the standards.

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463. The requirement to register BO information is relatively recent as it came into force
in September 2020. At the end of the onsite, the BO register contained BO
information on approximately 27% of all existing legal persons. Existing legal
persons (created before September 2020) have until end March 2022 to register BO
information at the CoC. Newly created legal persons (established after September
2022) must provide this information upon establishment at the CoC. All changes to
basic and BO information must be entered on the register within one week of the
change. Obliged entities, which have the obligation to check the information in the
BO register when performing CDD, that find discrepancies between information in
the BO register and other information collected in the course of CDD are required
to report the discrepancies to the CoC. Based on interviews with obliged entities,
they are submitting these discrepancy reports regularly.

464. Private limited companies are the most common type of legal person and make up
approximately 60% of all legal persons (see table 1.2 in Chapter 1 for a complete
overview of legal persons in the Netherlands). Legal arrangements such as trusts
cannot be created in the Netherlands with the exception of mutual funds, but foreign
trusts and legal arrangements can and do operate within the jurisdiction. Foreign
legal arrangements in the Netherlands are subject to strict tax legislation and the
Tax and Customs Administration collects relevant information. The Dutch
authorities have estimated that there are approximately 15 000 legal arrangements,
including mutual funds, in operation in the Netherlands.

BES Islands

465. Legal persons in the BES Islands are created in the same way as the continental
Netherlands and basic information must be registered in the company register.
There is no requirement for legal entities to hold BO information or to register BO
information in a central BO register. As in the continental Netherlands, obliged
entities in the BES Islands need to register, identify and take reasonable measures
to verify the identity of BOs as part of CDD obligations.

466. Bonaire has its own company register and there is a joint register for Saba and St.
Eustatius. The company registers are publicly available, but at the time of the onsite
were unavailable online due to a technical issue. LEAs require a subpoena to access
non-public information, shareholders decisions or other information deposited at
the company registry. Although the authorities suggest this is a straightforward
process, and this information is available on a timely basis when needed, it does
increase the time required to obtain the information. Express trusts cannot be
established in the BES Islands, although foreign trusts are recognised and do exist
in the jurisdiction. Mutual funds can be created in the BES Islands, but according to
the tax authority there are currently no open mutual funds in operation. Open
mutual funds are required to register with the AFM. Bonaire has 42 private
foundations, a specific type of legal person that does not exist in the Netherlands,
which has features that pose specific risks for ML/TF, including:
•

•

no prohibition to distribute profits for private purposes (unlike ‘ordinary’
foundations);
possibility to create a legally non-binding set of written wishes or a (to a
certain degree) legally binding document with ‘instructional authority’ for the
board by means of a private deed, e.g., the BO itself can be appointed; and

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•

| 171

ability to receive or make tax-free donations/distributions not taxable with in
the Caribbean Netherlands with withholding tax or income tax, provided that
effective management of the private foundation is located outside of the
Caribbean Netherlands and the receiver is not a resident of the Caribbean
Netherlands.

Identification, assessment and understanding of ML/TF risks and
vulnerabilities of legal entities

467. As noted in IO.1, the Netherlands does not have a comprehensive assessment of the
ML/TF risks associated with the different types of legal persons including
vulnerabilities due to their features and the way they are used. As a result, the ML
NRA does not identify any heightened ML risks with particular types of legal
entities, although certain unusual situations (e.g., directorship in more than 50 legal
entities or board changes in a short period of time) are mentioned. The TF NRA
notes that foundations in general are more vulnerable than other entities to TF
abuse, but does not differentiate between the different uses of foundations (e.g.,
charitable and non-charitable).

468. The Dutch authorities have undertaken various initiatives that focus on specific
legal persons and arrangements and their associated ML/TF risks. The initiatives
include AMLC analysis on the frequency that certain types of legal persons appear
in criminal investigations, a public-private partnership project by the FEC on rogue
foundations, FIU-NL typology work on NPOs and a report commissioned by the
Ministry of Finance on illegal trust services. Offshore companies involved in the
purchase of real estate are identified as high risk and the AMLC “Offshore Project”
was established to gain further insight into this area. In addition, the AMLC “No
Shelter” project was established to better detect the existence of (legal or illegal)
service providers engaged in ML/TF through concealing (international) company
structures. The use of domicile addresses has been identified as a higher risk for BO
concealment. The Dutch authorities and some obliged entities also identify
foundations, limited partnerships and church communities as presenting a higher
risk for ML and TF, but certain measures such as voluntarily seeking an ANBI-status
and/or CBF-seal for charitable foundations are partial risk mitigation measures (see
IO.10 for more information on the charitable ANBI status and CBF seal for
fundraising). In addition, the use of complex structures involving any type of legal
entity and the amount of conduit companies active in the Netherlands pose ML/TF
risks.

469. Legal arrangements such as trusts cannot be established in the Netherlands, with
the exception of mutual funds. There are currently around 2 800 open mutual funds
registered with the AFM, and up to 15 000 legal arrangements in operation in the
Netherlands. The Netherlands recognises foreign trusts and maintains information
on foreign trusts holding real estate in the Netherlands. The Dutch authorities also
have an understanding of the investments of legal arrangements operating the
Netherlands through DNB’s supervision of trust offices. In addition, obliged entities
have to register, identify and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of BOs
of legal arrangements, including foreign legal arrangements as part of their CDD
obligations. The Wtt 2018 requires that trust offices identify the BO of the trust and
conduct a risk analysis and CDD on trusts that they manage.

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BES Islands
470. Competent authorities understand the risk of legal persons in the BES Islands and
have identified abuse of legal entities purchasing real estate as the key risk in the
NRA.

Mitigating measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons and arrangements

7

471. The Netherlands places significant emphasis on notaries as gatekeepers for
preventing the misuse of legal persons. Most legal persons must be created with the
use of a civil-law notary. However, notaries have a legal ‘ministerial duty
(ministerieplicht)’ to offer the full range of notarial services to the public and must
accept all customers, unless there is a sound reason not to do so. In practice, notaries
almost never refuse services to clients, including for drafting deeds for the
establishment of a company. A notarial deed is not required for the establishment
of church communities or partnerships (or other legal entities) without legal
personality, such as limited partnerships. During the onsite visit, the Assessment
Team heard of instances in the misuse of certain types of legal persons in order to
avoid the notarial gate-keeper. For example, some obliged entities met during the
onsite gave anecdotal accounts of massage parlours and other cash intensive
businesses being set up as church communities. As a result, the assessment team is
concerned that the ministerial duty of notaries to provide services conflicts with
their role as gatekeeper to refuse or exit customers on CDD grounds. Moreover, the
possible remaining vulnerabilities due to less mitigation measures for church
communities and some other legal entities could negatively impact the Netherlands’
effectiveness.

472. The Netherlands introduced the Judicial Agency for Testing, Integrity and Screening
(JustisTRACK) automated information system in 2011. This information hub is
managed by the Ministry of Justice and Security and continuously monitors the
integrity of legal persons, including the directors and affiliated persons or legal
persons. The system uses several data sources to automatically screen persons
registered in the CoC and issues risk reports to LEAs and investigative/supervisory
bodies who can initiate investigations when enhanced risk situations are identified
(e.g., directors with criminal history are listed as company directors). Not all
supervisory bodies have access to the reports. This is a weakness and should be
addressed in order to strengthen the capabilities of the smaller regulators.

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Box 7.1. JustisTRACK
JustisTRACK provides risk notifications and network drawings on the entire
network of natural persons, undertakings and legal persons involved in a legal
person. This information is used to identify and analyse the risk of abuse of legal
entities, for use by supervisors and LEAs. JustisTRACK can also provide knowledge
and expertise on the abuse of legal entities and financial economic crime.
Authorities—such as some supervisors, Tax and Customs Administration, LEAs,
Customs, and the OM—can receive the TRACK reports.
Every year there are an average of 1.4 million changes in the company register of
the CoC. These changes are the starting point of an investigation by JustisTRACK in
the automatic analysis. On average there are approximately 400 000 changes that
lead to a trigger in the system Radar annually. Ultimately, more than 2 000 of these
signals are examined by a JustisTRACK analyst because they indicate enhanced risk
of abuse of a legal entity. Indicators include involvement in bankruptcies or
dissolutions, involvement of natural persons with antecedents, or multiple board
changes or changes of address in a short period of time. An indicator on its own is
never sufficient to identify a risk, but a signal is further examined when a
combination of indicators is used.

473. Customer due diligence measures performed by obliged entities are also seen as a
key mitigation measure in the prevention of the misuse of legal persons that are
clients or related to clients of obliged entities. Obliged persons are required to
identify and verify the identity of the client, including their BOs. The information
required includes the nature of business and personal details of directors, and
source of assets if necessary. Although obliged entities are not permitted to rely
solely on the BO register to identify the BOs of their clients, almost all participants
interviewed during the onsite mentioned the register as one of their main sources
of BO information. In practice, the absence of a fully populated BO register makes it
more difficult for obliged entities to identify and verify BOs, especially in the case of
complex group structures, such as conduit companies. The AFM notes that its
investigations into obliged entities show that they regularly fail to complete the
identification and verification of the real BO for customers with complex legal
structures.
474. A further weakness in the system is that notaries too often make use of the legal
possibility to identify senior management as “pseudo BOs”, rather than more
rigorously assessing if there are no natural persons owning or controlling the legal
person by other means, as part of their CDD when creating companies. This issue of
excessive qualification and registration of senior management as pseudo-BOs by
notaries has also been publicly flagged by the trust office sector, who have seen the
persons they appointed to provide director services, registered as pseudo-BO.

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475.

476.
7

CHAPTER 7. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Trust offices play an important role as a gatekeeper, particularly given that they
service an important share of conduit companies and other customers that originate
outside the Netherlands looking to set up a legal person in the Netherlands. Stricter
regulation and supervision by DNB on trust offices since 2018 has led to an
improved implementation of BO obligations by licensed trust offices. However a
part of the trust sector has reacted by restructuring their business models to
circumvent this stricter regulation and supervision, leading to an “illegal trust office
sector” with an estimated marked share of 15%. These illegal trust offices are less
likely to properly implement BO-obligations or report unusual transactions and are
more likely to attract clients who want the BO of the structures they set up in the
Netherlands to remain unknown.

The Dutch authorities recognise this problem and the Ministry of Finance is
carrying out in-depth research on possible solutions. As well as undertaking some
activities, such as the FEC project of Trust Offices (see 6.2) to mitigate these issues.
In the interim, this remains a significant risk and the Assessment Team considers
this to have an important impact on the effectiveness of the system. It also
undermines confidence in licensed trust offices that fulfil their obligations and
places them at a competitive disadvantage. DNB investigates signals it receives
about illegal trust offices. In most cases, these signals are addressed through
informal action such as warning letters and requests for information. Between 2016
and 2021, out of 82 investigated signals that led to interventions, only eight resulted
in formal enforcement measures.

477. Private and public limited liability companies are required to keep a register of BOs
and shareholders and beneficiaries of shares. Foundations must register all their
beneficiaries internally. These requirements are not monitored so there is no way
to determine the extent to which companies are compliant with this obligation.
However, obliged entities are required to obtain this information as part of CDD
process and provide it to LEAs when requested in a criminal investigation.

478. Bearer shares can no longer be issued in the Netherlands. A number of bearer shares
remain in circulation, but the Dutch authorities are unable to quantify the exact
number. Holders of existing bearer shares can still receive their registered shares if
they present their former bearer shares to the issuing company before 1 January
2026. The authorities believe this is a low risk since the holder of the bearer shares
has lost all rights under those shares. In addition, in 2018, the authorities estimated
on the basis of research undertaken by the Tax and Customs Administration that
only 75 public limited liability companies held bearer shares at that time.

BES Islands

479. The secretary of the commercial registry supervises legal persons’ compliance with
the BES commercial register obligations. The CoC Bonaire performs checks to make
sure procedural obligations are met and may ask for further documentary evidence
of the stated data. The CoC Bonaire contains a large number of sleeping companies
due to the complexity of officially dissolving companies. As of 1 November 2021, the
CoCs in the Caribbean Netherlands switched to a new IT system to improve the
quality of the information in the commercial register.

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Timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership
information on legal persons
480. Relevant authorities generally have good access to basic information and sources of
potential BO information on most types of legal persons created in the Netherlands;
however, a fully populated BO register and a more rigorous implementation of BO
obligations by obliged entities would significantly improve the quality and timely
access to BO information. Basic information on legal persons is available online and
instantly through the CoC company register. This information is publicly available
upon the payment of a fee. Basic information is provided directly to the Tax and
Customs Administration, JustisTRACK and the Statistics Bureau via a specialised
service channel and some obliged entities, such as banks that have a direct technical
link to the company register. The CoC regularly monitors this information through
automated and manual verifications and an external auditor reviews a sample every
three years. The most recent audit showed that 99% of authentic obligatory data is
legally correct, meaning that all mandatory fields are filled with information that is
consistent with the Personal Record Database, and the documents provided. This
suggests a high level of accuracy, but does not guarantee that the data is up-to-date.

481. It is expected that the CoC BO register will become the central resource for accessing
BO on most legal persons in a timely manner. As noted above, the register is
currently only partially populated (27% complete as of November 2021).

482. Obliged entities are required to collect and maintain basic and BO on their
customers and to verify this information against data held in the CoC BO register.
This information can be requested by FIU-NL and Wwft supervisors or subpoenaed
by competent authorities. The Dutch authorities explained that it is not common
practice for this information to be requested in this way due to the fact that relevant
information can often be retrieved via CoC and iCOV. The Assessment Team is of the
opinion that, although CoC and iCOV may contain information on who the directors
are or who declared the taxes of legal persons, this cannot be considered as
adequate, accurate and current BO information. Furthermore, the accuracy of BO
information held by obliged entities is unclear given the practice of too often settling
for pseudo-BOs and the fact that many of the recent failings identified by AML/CFT
supervisors relate to CDD (including incorrect BO information).

483. Almost all forms of legal persons are required to file annual tax returns with the Tax
and Customs Administration. For public and private limited liability companies, this
includes certain shareholder information, including the name, address, place and
country of residence, as well as income and loss statements. However, due to their
limited ‘real’ activities in the Netherlands (i.e., no or few employees and a low net
turnover), conduit companies (often in the form of BVs) often have minimal
financial reporting obligations – publishing only a limited balance sheet, without
explanatory notes, profit and loss accounts, management report or auditor's reports
– even though they hold large Foreign Direct Investment assets or significant
financial incomes, such as interest income and equity capital gains.

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484. The Dutch authorities presented case examples demonstrating that LEAs are able
to identify (foreign) legal persons used in ML schemes, and prosecute and convict
Dutch citizens involved in these schemes. However, the authorities encounter more
difficulties in identifying the ultimate BO of complex legal structures, especially
when foreign legal persons are involved. Investigative tools such as iCOV and
JustisTRACK allow LEAs to quickly gather information from different sources that
may contain indications of who is the BO of a legal person, but time is needed to
analyse this information or to conduct further investigations in order to
substantiate and confirm that the presumed BO is indeed the real BO.

BES Islands

7

485. Obliged entities in the BES Islands have the same requirements to obtain BO
information as part of their CDD obligations. These obligations are supervised by
competent authorities. Prior to 1 July 2021, BTWwft were not able to access civilnotary files to verify compliance with these obligations, and at the time of the onsite
had still not done so. This is an area of concern given the role notaries play in high
risk real estate transactions in the BES Islands.

486. The Dutch authorities have access to publicly available basic information on the
company register. However, a subpoena is required for non-public information,
which may reduce the ability of authorities to access this information in a timely
manner.

Timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership
information on legal arrangements

487. Open mutual funds that operate investment funds in the Netherlands are registered
with the AFM and some basic information (such as fund manager and date of
registration) is published on the AFM website. These funds are also registered with
the Tax and Custom Administration, which holds information on the participants
and beneficiaries that can be shared with competent authorities. Closed mutual
funds, of which the shares/interests cannot be traded freely, are typically used to
manage family assets. Although these funds are fiscally transparent (the assets are
attributed to the settlor or similar person who will be subject to taxation),
participants are not obliged to disclose their participation to the Tax and Customs
Administration. Participants must disclose the holdings, even if managed in a closed
fund, to the Tax and Customs Administration as part of their regular annual income
tax return. Mutual funds can be created without intervention of a notary and as with
foreign trusts and legal arrangements are not registered at the CoC. 63 Thus,
competent authorities have access to information sources that contain potential BO
information, but it is not always easy to understand the identity of the ultimate
controller, particularly in a timely manner.

63

Legislation to establish a BO register for legal and other similar arrangements is set up was
adopted on the 24th November 2021 and will also include mutual funds.

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488. It is not precisely known how many foreign legal arrangements are active in the
Netherlands, but the authorities estimate up to 15 000. There are 1 173 foreign
trusts serviced by Dutch trust offices. DNB is able to obtain information on these
trusts (e.g. investments, country of establishment) via the trust offices. For those
trusts that are not serviced by Dutch trust offices, LEAs must rely on international
information sources or international co-operation to obtain basic or BO information
of these legal arrangements.

BES Islands

489. Legal arrangements cannot be established on the BES Islands, with the exception of
mutual funds. According to the Tax and Customs Administration there are currently
no open mutual funds. There is no explicit prohibition of foreign trusts having
activities in the BES Islands, however, there are no indications that this is occurring
at a large scale in practice.

Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions

490. The Netherlands has the ability to impose significant sanctions for failures to
register changes to basic information and not maintaining BO information within
the company register, including when it is done with intent. These sanctions can be
applied to natural and legal persons and can result in prison sentences. At the time
of the onsite, these powers have not been used in a meaningful way.

491. The Economic Enforcement Office (BEH) of the Tax and Customs Authority is
responsible for detecting administrative violations relating to the company register.
The BEH investigates signals of incorrect entries to the register and legal entities
without any economic activity to the register from the CoC, Tax and Customs
Administration and other sources. The BEH makes a recommendation of action to
the CoC on the basis of its investigations. These recommendations usually call for
deregistering the entity and relate to (intentionally) incorrect registration in the
commercial register or because the legal entity is no longer active. Although the BEH
can impose a penalty or cease and desist order, it has not done so to date even
though there have been cases where false information was deliberately provided.
This is not a proportionate use of sanctions and is a significant deficiency given the
risk and context of the Netherlands as a financial centre.

492. Based on criteria set by the OM, the BEH also reports to the OM approximately 1
300 entities per year where registration violations pertaining to the obligation to
file financial statements have been identified. This figure (1 300) is pre-agreed
based on resource constraints, but usually BEH reports more legal entities to the
OM (e.g., 1 750 in 2021). Sanctions in these cases have been imposed, but range
between EUR 600 and 1 000. The Dutch authorities claim that these penalties
correspond with other administrative offences and are considered high by the
punished entities. Nevertheless, given the high number of remaining violations even
after receiving a reminder (only a small percentage of violations are being
sanctioned), the Assessment Team does not regard these sanctions as being
dissuasive.

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Overall conclusion on IO.5
1.

2.
7

3.

4.
5.

The Netherlands has a good understanding of the risk posed by the misuse of legal
persons and various authorities have undertaken different initiatives aimed at
identifying and assessing the ML/TF risks of legal persons in certain sectors.
However, there is no comprehensive view of the ML/TF risks related to the
different types of legal persons.

There is currently no central source where LEAs can have timely access to
adequate, accurate and current BO information on legal persons. In most
instances, LEAs combine information found in open sources and information hubs
such as JustisTRACK. Identifying BOs in a timely manner is hampered by the fact
that, in some cases, information is held or registered about pseudo BOs (senior
managing directors) and there is a lack of understanding by some obliged entities
on how to identify the ultimate BOs when complex legal structures are involved.
Criminal sanctions imposed for failure to register or update information in the
company register focus on failures by legal persons to file financial statements.
Given the high number of violations, sanctions are not considered dissuasive.
Sanctions for failure to keep the information company register accurate and up to
date mainly focus on dissolving registered legal entities that are no longer
economically active. For incorrect BO information, a cease and desist order and a
penalty can be imposed, and in cases with intent, a police report will be sent to the
OM for criminal sanctioning. At the time of the onsite, no serious violations have
been discovered concerning BO registration.
There are several deficiencies in the BES Islands, including a lack of timely access
to adequate, accurate and current BO information on legal persons. These
deficiencies are weighted appropriately based on the risk and context of the BES
Islands.
The Netherlands is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO.5.

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Chapter 8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key Findings
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The Netherlands has a robust legal framework for all forms of international cooperation. International co-operation with foreign counterparts, particularly EU
member states, is proactive, collaborative, and provided both upon request and
spontaneously. There is, however, a minor technical deficiency related to the
explicit legal basis for FIU-NL to provide co-operation to non-EU/EEA FIUs, but
this does not significantly impact effectiveness.

The Netherlands seeks and provides timely and constructive MLA and extradition.
While comprehensive statistics were not available, Netherlands provided
sufficient case studies to try to demonstrate the timeliness of its MLA and
extradition responses. Feedback from the FATF global network note that legal cooperation with the Netherlands is of high quality and timely. The vast majority of
MLA requests (received and sent) are within the EU. Simplified procedures within
the EU enhances co-operation with other member states in this regard. The
Netherlands has active co-operation on asset recovery and confiscation, which
was demonstrated by statistics and case studies.
The Netherlands’ international co-operation efforts to tackle crime and threats
involving VAs is particularly noteworthy, as demonstrated through case studies
and presentations during the onsite visit. The Netherlands cooperates extensively
and efficiently with foreign LEA counterparts, for example by exchanging technical
expertise and contributing to foreign investigations.

LEAs, OM and FIU-NL effectively engage in other forms of international cooperation to share information, including financial intelligence. This includes
participating in a range of international and regional bodies, bilateral co-operation
on strategic issues and providing training and sharing best practices with other
jurisdictions, for example on TBML. LEAs have a large network of liaison officers
posted in countries prioritised according to crime risks, including ML and TF.
Customs actively requests and provides information to/from EU and non-EU
countries.
FIU-NL works bilaterally and multilaterally with counterparts. FIU-NL also shares
relevant cross-border dissemination reports with other EU FIUs on an automated
basis, in line with EU requirements. The number of cross-border dissemination
reports by FIU-NL to its European counterparts is significant. Feedback from some
EU Member States note that these type of reports could benefit from more context.
However, FIU-NL provides further information and context to EU FIUs upon
request.

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6.
7.

8.
8

CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The Netherlands initiates and takes part in Joint Investigation Teams (JITs).
However, JITs cannot be established in the BES Islands and awareness among
LEAs could be improved in terms of when JITs or other international co-operation
tools are most appropriate.

Supervisors, LEAs, customs and other authorities cooperate efficiently with their
foreign counterparts, notably financial supervisors provide and participate in
special AML/CFT colleges. Other DNFBP supervisors and industry bodies focus
less on international co-operation for sharing supervisory information, although
some engagement with neighbouring countries, such as Germany and Belgium,
does take place.

The Netherlands has several channels for obtaining basic and BO information.
Foreign authorities have direct access to basic and some BO information for a
small fee. However, at the time of the onsite the BO register was only partially
populated and there was no direct access to basic information for legal entities in
the BES Islands due to technical problems. Formal measures are in place to ensure
non-public information can be obtained in a timely manner.

Recommended Actions
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

The Netherlands (as well as BES Islands) should continue to maintain and expand
its registration of statistics on international legal assistance, including specific
statistics for TF-related cases and asset tracing/seizure and confiscation. This
should include information on timeliness in responding to requests, so that it can
monitor effectiveness and make improvements where necessary.
FIU-NL should seek a dialogue on how the quality of cross-border dissemination
reports between EU FIUs can further improve their utility by recipient FIUs from
the EU.

The Netherlands should clarify in law the FIU-NL’s explicit legal basis to cooperate
and exchange information with non-EU/EEA FIUs.

DNFBP supervisors should engage more fully in international co-operation with
their foreign counterparts.
The Netherlands should raise the awareness of LEAs on the use of Joint
Investigative Teams (JITs) and when they are most appropriate, in order to
enhance their ability to proactively seek assistance in complex cases, in line with
ML/TF risks. The Netherlands should also amend its legislation so that LEAs in the
BES Islands have the ability to establish JITs.
The BES Islands should ensure that its CoC databases are fully operational in order
to facilitate timely access of basic information by foreign authorities.

493. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.2.
The Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this
section are R.36-40 and elements of R.9, 15, 24, 25 and 32.
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Immediate Outcome 2 (International Co-operation)
494. International co-operation is critical for the Netherlands given its position as a
global financial centre, transportation hub and the risks it faces as an origin, transit
and destination country for the production and trafficking of drugs (see Chapter 1).
The Netherlands considers international co-operation an integral part of its
domestic legal framework. It has developed a network of dedicated experts and
organisations to work closely together and lend their services internally as well as
externally. The Netherlands engages in a wide variety of international co-operation,
including on major international cases involving VA (see Boxes 3.9 and 8.3). The
Netherlands actively seeks and provides informal and formal assistance for cases
involving a transnational element, including during the intelligence phase, aided by
an overseas LEA liaison network. The Netherlands provides MLA and extradition in
accordance with the requirements set out in international treaties and domestic
legislation (see R.36-39) and prioritises these accordingly.

Providing constructive and timely MLA and extradition

495. The Netherlands provides timely and constructive responses to MLA and
extradition requests. Responses received by the FATF global network indicate that
the provision of MLA is of high-quality, and properly prioritised. Simplified
procedures within the EU enhance co-operation with EU member states, which
account for the vast majority of the Netherlands’ MLA requests. There is active cooperation on asset tracing and confiscation. This assessment was based on limited
statistics; case studies; feedback from FATF and FSRB delegations; and interviews
with relevant Dutch authorities.

Mutual Legal Assistance

496. The Department of International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (AIRS) of the
Ministry of Justice and Security is the central body for the assessment of MLA
requests to and from countries outside the EU. AIRS has clear domestic processes
and communication guidelines for registering and executing MLA extradition and
surrender requests, executing transfers of criminal proceedings and enforcing
criminal sentences. The decision to seek MLA is typically taken by the OM.

497. The procedure for executing MLA and extradition requests [including European
Arrest Warrants (EAWs), Investigation and Freezing Orders (EIOs)] depends on
whether the co-operation is with an EU or non-EU member state. MLA requests
from countries outside of the EU are sent through AIRS and then dispatched to the
relevant International Legal Assistances Centres (IRCs) in the Netherlands. An IRC
is an OM and LEA co-operation team and consists of one or two prosecutors,
assistants to the prosecutor, administrative staff and police officers, who work
together on MLA requests. The close co-operation between LEAs and prosecutors
on judicial MLA requests enhances the efficiency of the system. Requests from EU
member states, including EAWs and EIOs, are sent directly to an IRC.

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498. The National Uniform Registration System for International Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters (LURIS), is used for all incoming MLA requests, regardless of
whether they are received directly by the IRC or received first by AIRS. LURIS,
established in 2002, is managed by the Judicial Information Service, and facilitates
the timely execution of international requests through system alerts. A new case
management system with similar functionality, the Dutch International Assistance
System (DIAS), is soon to be introduced and will mitigate information security
concerns identified in the outdated LURIS system.

8

499. The total number of MLA requests received by continental Netherlands is steadily
rising. Between 2016 and 2021, the Netherlands received 23 373 judicial MLA
requests related to terrorism, ML, drug crimes and fraud. As indicated in the table
below, MLA requests experienced a slight decrease in 2020, coinciding with the
start of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Incoming judicial MLA requests for ML
represent 8.8% of all reported incoming requests. The offence of TF is not included
as a separate offence in the LURIS system, therefore the Dutch authorities are
unable to provide any MLA figures on TF alone. Moreover, the authorities only
reported MLA statistics for two predicate offences—drug crimes and fraud—as
more than 90% of all proceeds of crimes involve these two offences. Therefore, the
shortfall in statistics do not relate to areas of high risk in the context of the
Netherlands. With regard to non-EU countries, all MLA requests concerning asset
recovery are also registered in the LURIS system. The LURIS system is unable to
filter these requests from other MLA requests.

Table 8.1. Incoming judicial MLA requests for ML, TF, drug crimes and fraud
European Investigation Orders for terrorism

2016
N/A

2017
13

2018
32

2019
30

2020
21

2021*
27

Total
123

MLA for Terrorism (including TF)

54

44

21

25

29

41

214

Total for Terrorism

54

57

53

55

50

68

337

European Investigation Orders for ML

N/A

35

199

305

303

374

1216

MLA for ML

126

134

80

120

118

99

677

ML (MLA other)

9

10

16

28

36

56

155

Total for ML

135

179

295

453

457

529

2048

European Investigation Orders for Drug Crimes

N/A

218

632

624

625

481

2580

MLA for Drug Crimes

1225

1047

802

735

823

846

5478

Drug Crimes (MLA other)

80

70

57

71

82

82

442

Total for Drug Crimes

1305

1335

1491

1430

1530

1409

8500

European Investigation Orders for Fraud

N/A

294

945

1357

1279

1281

5156

MLA for Fraud

1704

1480

758

503

540

308

5293

Fraud (MLA other)

200

227

387

455

355

415

2039

Total for fraud

1904

2001

2090

2315

2174

2004

12488

Note: “MLA” includes all MLA requests that involve some kind of investigative measure that are not EIO,
also Prum DNA requests, request for European evidence warrant until 21/02/2016.
“MLA other” includes requests for transferring criminal proceedings, requests for European protection
order, requests for European supervision order, notification interception Annex C, transfer of criminal
proceedings and transit requests
“Fraud” entails forgery (ex Article 225 WvSr), deceit (Article 326 WvSr embezzlement (Article 321)
WvSr, tax fraud (Article 68, Article 69 and Article 69a General Act pertaining to national taxes)
*Covers the full year of 2021
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500. FATF jurisdictions that provided input related to the provision of MLA by Dutch
authorities for ML/TF-related cases reported, in general, a high level of co-operation
and quality responses, including on the timeliness of responses. Incoming MLA
requests (and other legal requests) primarily originate from EU member states
(85% of all incoming requests). Within the EU, most requests came from Belgium,
Germany, France, and Poland. Outside of the EU, the most frequent incoming
requests originate from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States
and Norway.

501. The Dutch authorities do not maintain clear statistics to demonstrate the timeliness
of executing MLA requests in practice. The Ministry of Justice’s internal guidelines
state that incoming MLAs should be handled within five working days, and outgoing
MLAs within three working days. When a concrete timeframe is mentioned in the
MLA request, the AIRS contacts the IRC to make sure the request has been executed.
If no time frame is stipulated, AIRS contacts the IRC within six months upon receipt
of the request.
502. Timeframes are faster under the EIOs regime, as they are set out in European law
(must be executed within 90 days following recognition, with a possibility to extend
by a maximum of 30 days). However, the authorities also do not maintain clear
statistics on EIOs, and are therefore unable to demonstrate what the timelines are
in practice. The authorities state that urgent requests can be processed within a
matter of days.

503. On average, the Netherlands reports that 20 MLA requests per year are denied
because of dual criminality or incompleteness. One of the main types of crime for
which no dual criminality exists relate to scam cases.

504. The Netherlands also provides a range of assistance for asset recovery, including
identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating assets. A request from a foreign country
may be made by means of a European asset freezing order (if an EU member state).
If the assets are outside the EU or there are reasons not to issue an asset freezing
order, for example the complexity of the case, application for legal assistance is
made through an MLA request. The Netherlands maintains statistics on pending
MLA requests registered since 2016. The Netherlands does not maintain statistics
on MLA requests with regard to the seizure of assets. Moreover, the LURIS system
does not make a distinction between requests concerning the seizure of evidence
and the seizure of proceeds of crime. There are currently 335 pending MLA requests
since 2016, including the seizing of assets or the levying of a prejudgment seizure.
These requests may include multiple objects and assets to be seized. This number
includes requests in which the (prejudgment) seizure was imposed but the case was
not yet finalised. Statistics on the number of finalised/executed MLA requests are
not available. The Netherlands provided the below case study to demonstrate the
timely response to a MLA request for seizure of property related to a foreign ML
investigation. In this example, the seizure took place on the same day that the MLA
request was received.

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Box 8.1. Seizure of a vessel upon a foreign MLA request

8

In December 2016, the Swiss authorities requested urgent assistance in freezing
an expensive yacht docked in the Netherlands. The yacht was worth EUR 100
million, and supposedly belonged to the son of the President of an African country,
who was under investigation for corruption and ML. The Netherlands established
a multidisciplinary team to execute promptly the Swiss request. They established
the legal ownership of the vessel, which was registered under the Cayman Islands
flag and under the name of a limited company established in the Marshall Islands.
Through open source information, they linked the vessel’s ownership to the
suspect. On the same day of the MLA request, the police seized the yacht. The Dutch
authorities also found a proper location to store the yacht, and the Swiss
authorities registered the seizure on the Cayman Islands. The Netherlands and
Switzerland reached an agreement to share the costs related to the maintenance
of the vessel. The Swiss authorities reached an out of court settlement with the
suspect and lifted the seizure.
505. Incoming and outgoing EU freezing orders and final EU confiscation orders (relating
to ML/TF/predicate offences) are annually reported to the EC. Therefore, the
Netherlands provided more detailed statistics on these EU orders, as compared to
finalised MLA requests. As evidenced in the table below, the Netherlands makes
regular use of the EU freezing and confiscation order regime.

Table 8.2. Incoming and outgoing EU freezing and confiscation orders
European Freezing Orders received
European Freezing Orders sent
Final European Confiscation
Orders - received
Value*
Final European Confiscation
Orders - sent
Value*

2017
6
32
22

2018
22
40
26

2019
28
68
30

2020
55
96
30

€ 126 665
20

€ 5 188 652
17

€ 513 435
20

€ 574 054
19

€ 27 843 057

€ 10 471 490

€ 124 076

€ 462 248

Note: *Estimated Value of the assets that have been confiscated at the time of the Confiscation Order

506. No statistics are maintained as to the number of requests on asset sharing and
recovery of proceeds involving foreign predicate offences or proceeds moved to
other countries. However, the Netherlands provided a case study (see Box 3.17
under IO.8) to demonstrate its effectiveness in asset sharing with foreign
counterparts.

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507. A European asset freezing order is transmitted through an IRC directly to the
competent foreign authority, which only needs to recognise and execute the order.
If further information is needed before the asset freezing order is transmitted, for
example about registration in a foreign register, it can be obtained quickly through
an Asset Recovery Office (ARO) request. IRCs can ask the judicial ARO for assistance,
and can call upon the expertise of accountants, asset tracers, civil law advisers and
the Asset Management Office, as well as specialised prosecutors and assistants to
the prosecutor. Both the police ARO and the judicial ARO are connected to, and
makes use of, the CARIN network.

508. The below table summarises the number of ARO requests and sent and received
since 2017. As indicated below, the Netherlands sends more ARO requests than it
receives, and the number of requests is largely static between 2017 and 2020.

Table 8.3. Number of judicial ARO requests
Year
Incoming requests
Outgoing requests
CARIN
Total requests

2017
114
437
1
552

2018
108
392
12
512

2019
111
333
18
462

2020
162
397
19
578

8

509. Different timeframes are set for the execution of ARO requests: eight hours for
urgent requests, one week for non-urgent requests if the requested information is
held in a database directly accessible by the LEA and in case the crime is mentioned
on the list of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JBZ, and 14 days for all other
cases. The Netherlands does not maintain statistics on the average timeframes met
to respond to ARO requests in practice, but notes that delays are rare.

510. The international transfer of sentences is governed by two acts: the WETS (for EU
member states) and the WOTS (for non-EU countries). These acts apply to Dutch
citizens and foreign prisoners in the Netherlands and Dutch prisoners abroad. The
WOTS and the WETS allow for an international transfer and enforcement of a
foreign sentence in a criminal case. The transfer of sentences falls under the
responsibility of the Minister of Justice and Security. The below table summarises
requests received and answered by the Dutch authorities between 2016 and 2021,
which primarily concern drug crimes as the underlying predicate offence. Of these
figures, two incoming requests pertained to TF and seven to ML.

Table 8.4. Incoming WETS and WOTS successful requests
All incoming WETS requests (EU)

2016
237

2017
274

2018
253

2019
314

2020
260

2021*
224

Total
1562

All incoming WOTs requests (non-EU)

98

56

32

37

15

9

247

Total

335

330

285

351

275

233

1809

Note: covers the period up to October 2021.

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511. Joint Investigation Teams are used in complex international criminal cases where
applicable and comprise of a legal agreement between competent authorities of two
or more states for the purpose of carrying out joint criminal investigations. An MLA
request is always used for the establishment of a JIT, which must be registered in
LURIS by the IRC where the request is received and sent to the OM. Requests to
participate from EUROJUST, EUROPOL or European Anti-Fraud Office must also be
sent to the national IRC. Between 2016 and 2020, the Netherlands received a total
of 15 requests for co-ordination meetings from EUROJUST on whether to establish
JITs. The Dutch authorities do not maintain detailed statistics on the number of JITs
established based on these co-ordination meetings. However, the below case study
demonstrates the Netherlands’ effectiveness in contributing to JITs upon request.

Box 8.2. JIT leading to arrests and seizures across several
jurisdictions
8

Extradition

On 21 November 2016, a JIT was established to investigate a ML ring
moving the proceeds from drug trafficking Europe to Morocco via
the Middle East. Unregulated financial channels (the hawala
system) were used to move the proceeds from this activity, which
were estimated to amount to over EUR 300 million. The work of the
JIT led to the arrest of 36 suspects in France, Belgium and the
Netherlands. Following the arrests, over EUR 5.5 million in cash,
EUR 800 000 in gold and two semi-automatic weapons and
ammunition were recovered.

512. The Netherlands has two types of extradition processes: accelerated and normal. If
the person consents to extradition, the accelerated procedure can be followed,
which means that the person sought will be extradited immediately without any
court proceedings. The normal procedure is primarily handled by the district court
and takes approximately three to six months. However, this also depends on
whether an appeal is lodged. If the extradition request is made under the EAW, the
court in Amsterdam is the central authority to decide on the request. As noted in
R.39, the Netherlands allows the extradition of Dutch nationals (under certain
conditions), even outside the EU framework. The below table summarises all
incoming extradition requests received during the assessment period. The case
management system LURIS does not distinguish between extradition requests or
international alerts issued for wanted persons. Therefore, the number of actual
extradition requests is lower than illustrated in the below table.

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Table 8.5. Incoming extradition requests (including international alerts for wanted
persons)
2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

Total
20

Extradition
ML

3

2

7

5

1

2

Terrorism (including TF)

20

10

12

16

18

11

87

Drug Crimes

26

36

27

41

27

39

196

Fraud

17

15

17

24

27

18

118

ML

6

5

2

1

3

2

19

Terrorism (including TF)

3

0

1

3

0

0

7

Drug Crimes

196

134

69

42

17

35

493

Fraud

78

32

48

6

6

4

174

Total

349

234

183

138

99

41

1044

European Arrest Warrants

*Covers the full year of 2021

513. As indicated in the above table, the total number of EAW extradition requests has
decreased since 2016. Most requests relate to drug-related crimes, which is in line
with the Netherlands’ risk profile. AIRS requires that extradition requests should be
processed in accordance with legal time limits in relation to provisional arrest, and
the initiation of judicial proceedings. No statistics, or case studies occurring during
the assessment period, were presented to demonstrate that these timelines are
followed in practice.

514. The Netherlands does not maintain detailed statistics on the percentage of
extradition ML/TF requests acceded, but states that the majority of requests are
executed. The authorities state that the most frequent reason to deny an extradition
request is due to the lack of a treaty or dual criminality, or for administrative
reasons (e.g., such as double registration or withdrawal by requesting countries).
From 2018-2021, a total of 6 434 extradition requests were received for all crimes.
From those requests:
•

168 Europeans Arrest Warrants were denied without an underlying reason
provided;

• 148 were withdrawn by the requesting country;

• four were denied based on a lack of dual criminality;
• one was denied on the basis of ne bis in idem. 64

515. Regarding the timeframes for executing arrest warrants, the timelines are set out in
European law and a decision must be made no more than 60 days following the
arrest of the person sought. Authorities indicated that most EAW requests are
executed within these timeframes. Given the EU framework, a warning is sent when
timelines are exceeded. The Netherlands has never received such a warning.
64

Whereby a person cannot be punished and subjected to several procedures twice for the
same facts.

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BES Islands
516. The Prosecutor’s office of the BES island is part of the Prosecutor’s Office Carib (OM
Carib, together with Curacao and Sint Maarten Aruba has a separate prosecutor’s
office) and this influences the execution of MLAs. The OM Carib has its own IRC, the
IRC Carib (Aruba excluded though there is close co-operation between IRC Carib
and Aruba). The IRC Carib functions as the Central Authority for the countries of
Curacao and Sint Maarten, whereas the Central Authority for MLA for the BES
Islands is in continental Netherlands. Within the Kingdom, MLAs from the
Netherlands to BES Islands are categorised as interregional MLAs, as are MLAs from
and between Curacao, Sint Maarten, Aruba and BES Islands. Within the Caribbean
region, the BES Islands receive the most MLAs from Aruba, Curacao and Sint
Maarten.

8

517. In regard to the BES Islands, incoming and outgoing MLA requests (and other legal
requests) to and from non-EU member states are executed through AIRS, which
subsequently transmits the request to OM Carib. MLA requests from/to EU member
states, including continental Netherlands, are sent and received directly via IRC
Carib. The IRC Carib then submits the request to the IRC OM in Bonaire, who further
assigns them to the Police. The IRC Carib uses its own numbering and a manual
system to register and monitor MLA requests, which is not connected to the LURIS
system.

518. The total number of incoming MLA requests for the BES Islands from 2017 to 2020
is 74, with most requests originating from continental Netherlands, followed by the
United States, and involve ML, asset recovery and homicide. These requests are
mostly minor requests, not relating to extradition. One extradition request was
submitted in the assessment period but did not relate to ML or TF. Insufficient
information was provided on the time frames of the execution of the requests.

519. As noted in the TC Annex (see R.40), JITs cannot yet be established in the BES
Islands. 65

Seeking timely legal assistance to pursue domestic ML, associated predicates
and TF cases with transnational elements

520. Outgoing MLA requests from the Netherlands to foreign countries operate under
the same system as incoming requests. Therefore, all structures, procedures and
instruments used above apply equally for outgoing MLA requests.

Mutual Legal Assistance

521. The Minister of Justice and Security is ultimately responsible for sending MLA
requests to countries outside the EU, particularly with non-treaty countries. In these
cases, AIRS, on behalf of the Minister of Justice and Security, assesses whether it is
possible or desirable to make an MLA request to a non-treaty country. If necessary,
AIRS may consult MFA and LEA liaison officers posted in that country before filing
the MLA request.
65

At the time of writing, the Code of Criminal Procedures for the BES Islands is being
modernised. Although it is unclear to what extent the JITs will be used by the BES, given
the proportion and size of the BES Islands, the modernisation will include a legal basis for
establishing JITs in the BES Islands.

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522. During the onsite, Dutch authorities emphasised the importance of seeking
international co-operation in the intelligence phase before and during ML and TF
investigations, as nearly all ML cases include a transnational element. Furthermore,
there is strong domestic co-operation in place on international co-operation
matters, including between law enforcement and judicial authorities. For instance,
there is a standing consultation structure in which the IRCs, AIRS and other
stakeholders meet to discuss operational problems and exchange expertise related
to MLA. These meetings are chaired by the national IRC and take place
approximately five times a year.

523.

In general, MLA requests sent abroad take considerable time to be responded to,
even with reminders sent every few months. With regard to EOIs, it is expected that
the time limits, as stipulated by EU law, are respected by the requesting state. AIRS
is responsible for tracking all outgoing MLA requests.

524. Most (75%) outgoing MLA requests are sent to EU member states. Within the EU,
requests are primarily sent to Belgium, Germany, Poland, Spain and France. Outside
of the EU, the Netherlands most frequently sends MLA requests to the United States,
Turkey, Surinam, Switzerland and Morocco. During the period between 2016 and
2021, a total of 4 765 outgoing MLA requests concerning ML or terrorism were
registered. The percentage of outgoing MLA requests related to ML (33.6%) is
significantly higher than incoming ML MLA requests (8.8%). Similar to incoming
requests, the Netherlands does not maintain statistics on TF MLA specifically but as
with incoming MLA requests, there appear to be significant increases in outgoing
MLA requests between 2020 and 2021 for some categories including MLA for
terrorism (including TF). The reason for this is not clear to the Assessment Team.

8

Table 8.6. All outgoing judicial MLA requests
European Investigation Orders for TF

2016
N/A

2017
26

2018
39

2019
49

2020
25

2021*
25

Total
164

MLA for Terrorism

69

46

18

20

11

23

187

MLA other for Terrorism

2

0

0

1

0

0

3

Total for Terrorism

71

72

57

70

36

48

354

European Investigation Orders for ML

N/A

244

539

481

458

437

2 159

MLA for ML

507

449

341

316

282

296

2 191

MLA other for ML

6

4

9

21

10

25

61

Total for ML

513

697

889

818

750

598

4 411

European Investigation Orders for Drug Crimes

N/A

207

392

413

391

346

1 749

MLA for Drug Crimes

1160

524

409

373

226

227

2 919

MLA other for Drug Crimes

14

9

1

29

28

25

106

Total for Drug Crimes

1 174

740

802

815

645

598

4 774

European Investigation Orders for Fraud

N/A

167

368

298

318

311

1 462

MLA Fraud

439

435

316

377

203

242

2 012

MLA other for Fraud

18

15

4

29

22

24

112

Total for Fraud

457

617

688

704

543

577

3 586

Note: MLA includes all MLA requests that involve some kind of investigative measure that are not EIO,
also Prum DNA requests, request for European evidence warrant until 22/02/2016.
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MLA “other” includes requests for transferring criminal proceedings, requests for European protection
order, requests for European supervision order, notification interception Annex C, transfer of criminal
proceedings and transit requests.
“Fraud” entails forgery (e.g., Article 225 WvSr), deceit (Article 326 WvSr embezzlement (Article 321
WvSr, tax fraud (Article 68, Article 69 and Article 69a General Act pertaining to national taxes).
*Covers the full year of 2021

8

525. Outgoing requests with regard to establishing a JIT are registered with the IRC and
approved by the Board of Prosecutor General. The OM is responsible to develop a
plan of action with the competent authorities of the participating countries. A
request to establish a JIT (with another EU member state) may be supported by
EUROJUST. For example, the Netherlands can forward initiations of a JIT to
EUROJUST, with a view to use the wider network of specialised LEAs in Europe.
During the assessment period, a total of seven JITs related to ML were established
at the request of the Netherlands. During the onsite interviews, it was noted that
LEAs would prefer to have more JITs established, where relevant, as almost all ML
investigations in the Netherlands include transnational elements. However,
generally, there appear to be divergent views within the Netherlands on when JITs
are the most efficient and practical way to cooperate in transnational criminal cases
and some representatives felt other mechanisms are more appropriate in some of
the cases where JITs are proposed. Due the divergent views, the Assessment Team
believes that the Netherlands should provide specialised and systematic training in
the use of international co-operation tools, including JITs, and further develop
circulars and other facilitative material for personnel dealing with extradition and
MLA and to enhance their ability to proactively seek assistance in complex cases, in
line with the Netherland’s ML/TF risk profile. Regarding the international transfer
of sentences, the Netherlands reported 986 requests to transfer sentences as
outlined in the table below.

Table 8.7. Outgoing WETS and WOTS requests
All outgoing WOTS requests (EU)

2016
19

2017
73

2018
54

2019
26

2020
31

Total
203

All outgoing WETs requests (non-EU)

132

134

135

189

193

783

Total

151

207

189

215

224

986

Extradition
526. During the period between 2016 and 2021, a total of 2 133 outgoing extradition
requests and EAWs were registered relating to ML, terrorism and the predicate
offences related to drug crimes and fraud. As indicated in the table below, the
Netherlands actively utilises both processes, making approximately 350 requests
per year via the EAW system and approximately 18 per year to non-EU jurisdictions.

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Table 8.8. Outgoing extradition and surrender requests concerning terrorism and
ML
2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021*

Total

2

3

1

2

5

4

17

Extradition
ML
Terrorism (including TF)

4

3

1

2

5

0

15

Drug Crimes

11

14

6

13

8

14

66

Fraud

3

1

1

2

5

1

13

European Arrest Warrants
ML

23

52

49

68

66

58

316

Terrorism (including TF)

199

17

18

222

3

0

459

Drug Crimes

135

121

133

182

178

137

886

Fraud

52

56

83

67

56

47

361

Total

429

267

292

558

326

261

2 133

Note: The Netherlands does not maintain statistics on TF extradition cases. These are included in the
category of “terrorism”.
* Covers the full year of 2021

BES Islands

527. The BES Islands have cooperated with authorities of other countries in various
criminal investigations in recent years. For instance, five MLA requests were sent to
countries outside Europe. In the period May 2017 to May 2020, a total number of
111 MLA requests were sent by the BES through IRC St. Maarten, with the largest
percentage of requests sent to Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. During the period
of the evaluation no outgoing extradition request was sent to continental
Netherlands.

Seeking other forms of international co-operation for AML/CFT purposes

528. Competent authorities actively seek non-legal forms of international co-operation
for AML/CFT purposes, particularly from European counterparts. The FIU-NL
actively seeks input via the Egmont Group. At the supervisory level, a number of
initiatives were taken by the Netherlands, primarily at the EU level. At the LEA level,
various Dutch authorities have deployed liaison officers abroad which may seek
international co-operation on behalf of the Netherlands but also provide
information and expertise when possible. All efforts by LEAs and supervisors are
aimed at contributing to effective foreign co-operation on combatting both ML and
TF.
529. FIU-NL attaches great importance to foreign co-operation, for which it has built an
extensive network. FIU-NL actively focusses on foreign co-operation with its FIU
counterparts, both in Europe and worldwide, at an operational and strategic level.
This co-operation focuses on sharing and obtaining information for the
interpretation of transactions. Strategic co-operation is aimed at exchanging
information as efficiently and effectively as possible. While the Assessment Team
notes a minor technical deficiency under R.40 with regard to the explicit basis of
FIU-NL to exchange information with non-EU/EEA FIUs, in practice FIU-NL shares
information with all FIUs that are members of the Egmont Group. FIU-NL has

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concluded 29 MoUs with foreign FIUs, where this is required by the foreign partner.
The FIU-NL cooperates most with European FIUs through the EU FIU Platform. The
below table summarises the number of outgoing FIU-NL requests for international
co-operation sought from foreign counterparts on ML/TF matters. FIU-NL seeks
most co-operation with FIUs from Germany, Belgium, Spain, the UK and Turkey.

Table 8.9. Number of outgoing FIU-NL requests
Year
2021*
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016

8

No. of outgoing requests
487
590
501
543
824
827

No. of foreign FIUs involved
73
85
79
76
86
84

* Covers the period up to 18 November 2021.

530. The FIOD, Police, KMar, and OM also maintain contacts with their foreign
counterparts. All parties also make use of an extensive liaison officer network, with
approximately 48 liaison officers posted in strategic countries and regions and is
steadily growing. These contacts are used in investigations and for the exchange of
knowledge and expertise. The Netherlands does not maintain statistics on informal
requests for co-operation via its liaison officer network. The below case study was
provided to demonstrate co-operation by Dutch authorities with foreign
counterparts to seize more than EUR 25 million in VAs. This case demonstrates how
the Netherlands effectively exchanges information with international counterparts,
and also leverages this information to pursue investigations and prosecutions.

Box 8.3. Seizure of VAs
In 2019, all servers of Bestmixer, a VA mixing service based in the Netherlands and
Luxembourg, were seized including user data, such as IP and email addresses. This
information was shared through Europol and has led to several criminal
investigations in various countries.

Since 2020, Dutch LEAs have cooperated on the analysis of financial information
used through encrypted communication. Based on this data, a significant amount
of wallets, including those linked to accounts at VASPs, have been criminalised
(thereby allowing for confiscation proceedings). Dutch LEAs were then able to
seize the funds in these accounts (EUR 25 million) and additional information on
the users and their transactions were collected. This information was actively
shared with other relevant jurisdictions. These cases are still under investigation.

531. LEAs also participate in a number of international bodies to seek and provide
information to facilitate their criminal investigations and to trace and
seize/confiscate assets. The main international bodies include: EUROPOL,
INTERPOL, EUROJUST, EMPACT, and the CARIN and ARO networks. The
Netherlands provided case studies demonstrating its exchange of information via
these international bodies.
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532. LEAs also use FCInet, a decentralised computer system that allows for searching and
matching data between participating countries by financial criminal investigation
services. FIOD, together with the UK’s HM Revenue and Customs, is responsible for
FCInet since 2016. For over five years, the Netherlands has invested in FCInet, which
is GDPR compliant, to ensure expeditious and secure data insights for financial
investigations. The advantage of FCInet is that the system includes data normally
inaccessible to foreign LEAs, but enables partners to identify relevant data in line
with privacy or data autonomy requirements. It is an intelligence instrument and
while there are no specific statistics on how many investigations are based on
information sought through this platform, the Dutch authorities state that they use
this platform as a standard tool.

533. All LEAs can also receive information requests directly from their foreign police
counterparts, in addition to receiving MLA requests through IRCs. If a so-called
police-to-police request is made for information involving the use of coercive
measures, the request must be forwarded to the OM. Requests must also be
forwarded to OM if special investigative powers must be exercised or if the
information obtained is to be used as evidence abroad. In these cases, the IRC
structure is directly involved. Between 2016 and 2020, a total of 6 969 incoming
police-to-police requests concerning ML or terrorism were registered.
534. During the period between 2016 and 2020, a total of 28 560 outgoing police
requests were sent by the Dutch Police to their foreign counterparts, of which 1 262
concerned terrorism, and 2 676 included ML.

Box 8.4. Police-to-police co-operation: COVID-19 Fraud
On 24 February 2020, a police-to-police message was received via Interpol by the
LIRC from the authorities in Hong Kong, China. A payment was made by a company
in Hong Kong, China to a Dutch account related to the purchase of facemasks. The
facemasks were not delivered and communication halted after the payment was
completed. On 25 February 2020, the Interpol message was forwarded to the
judicial ARO and IRC. Without a formal judicial request for legal assistance from
the authorities in Hong Kong, China (which would have taken too much time),
Dutch authorities could not freeze the Dutch account pursuant to Dutch law.
Accordingly, the Dutch authorities commenced an ML investigation and restrained
the Dutch account on the same day (25 February 2020). In close communication
with foreign authorities and the bank, the restrained amount was returned to the
account in Hong Kong, China.

535. Customs also requests information from EU and non-EU countries. Between 2015
and 2020, 100 requests were sent by Customs to its foreign counterparts. Customs
also requests information on seized and forfeited cash through the European
Customs Information System (CIS). Since 2016, Customs has transferred 247 cases
related to CIS notification to FIOD/Kmar for ML investigations (see IO.8).

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536. The Netherlands has a solid structure to co-operate internationally on asset
recovery matters. As previously noted, the police ARO acts as special contact point
for police-related asset confiscation, notably being requests for information, and
received a total of 578 incoming and outgoing requests related to information on
asset freezing and confiscation in 2020.

537. DNB and AFM both participate with their international counterparts on AML/CFT
supervision. At a policy level, both supervisors are involved in several international
fora such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the European Securities
and Markets Authority and the EBA.

8

538. DNB and AFM also participate in the EBA AML Standing Committee. This Committee
is composed of high-level representatives of all AML/CFT competent authorities.
The Committee, which convenes approximately every eight weeks, facilitates and
fosters the co-operation of competent AML/CFT authorities in the financial sector
across the EU. Both supervisors also have a co-operation agreement with the ECB,
which is involved in supervising the large banks under the Single Supervision
Mechanism. For non EU member states, DNB and AFM mainly rely on MoUs for
information sharing and co-operation. DNB has over 50 agreements covering a
range of regions and the AFM is a signatory of the IOSCO multilateral MoU
agreement. DNB shared or received information in 2019 (five occasions), in 2020
(13 occasions) and in 2021 (23 occasions) via bilateral contacts or information
requests with other supervisory authorities outside of the Netherlands.

539. In addition, the Netherlands provided a number of case studies, such as one
involving co-operation where formal measures were imposed on a FI with the
headquarters in the Netherlands, with a subsidiary in a third country; as well as
examples of working with other supervisors of entities with agents in the
Netherlands.

Box 8.5. MVTS with a foreign license active in the Netherlands through notified

agents

DNB conducted on-site examinations to an MVTS provider with a license in
another EU country that was active in the Netherlands through a branch office and
a network of registered agents. During the examinations, DNB established that
customer identification data was incorrectly recorded in several customer files and
other aspects of CDD were not being conducted. The on-site examinations at the
branch office and the agents revealed that none of the entities verified the origin
of the funds and the purpose and nature of customers’ transactions. Other issues
related to not filing UTRs and staff not being trained on their obligations. Following
several meetings with representatives of the institution’s head office abroad, the
branch office and the agents, DNB in 2018 ordered the institution to set up a
remedial programme to resolve the shortcomings, and to cease its activities until
that had been completed. The outcome of the investigation and information on the
board members of the MVTS provider was shared with the country authorities,
who took action and after some consideration revoked the license in 2019.

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540. DNB regularly organises and participates in international events including
supervisory colleges. For example, in 2019 DNB organised the first AML/CFT
college of supervisors of a Dutch FI that operates in several European Countries. In
2020, DNB organised AML/CFT supervisory colleges for three FIs and in 2021
organised AML/CFT supervisory colleges for ten FIs. Furthermore, in 2020, DNB
participated in seven AML/CFT supervisory colleges and 29 AML/CFT supervisory
colleges in 2021 by foreign AML/CFT supervisory authorities organised for FIs
operating cross-border (including in the Netherlands). DNB has also developed and
provided training and technical co-operation in recent years in order to share
knowledge and experience with various foreign supervisors within the context of
AML/CFT supervision. Furthermore, for the purpose of sharing knowledge and cooperation in the area of AML/CFT, DNB seconds staff members to foreign
supervisors of international organisations.

541. At present the AFM hosts six supervisory colleges, and participates in a number of
supervisory colleges. Moreover, between 2016 and 2020, AFM exchanged
information related to cross-border ML cases (as well as other forms of financial
crimes) on 51 occasions. No case studies were provided to demonstrate
effectiveness in this regard.

BES Islands

542. FIU-NL performs the functions in continental Netherlands and the BES Islands and
cooperates and provides information to its foreign counterparts in the same way it
does for the continental Netherlands. Moreover, FIU-NL also cooperates
internationally with regard to the Dutch Caribbean by using FCInet and by taking
part in several meetings together with the FIUs of Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten.
Together with other FIUs in the Caribbean, FIU-NL also drew up a Kingdom Risk
Analysis, based on a comparison of available information on reports of UTRs from
the different FIUs in the Kingdom.

543. Law enforcement agencies in the Netherlands also exchange information and
provide co-operation on behalf of the BES Islands. For example, KMar works with
the United States on issues specific to the region and LEAs at the BES co-operate
very closely together on non-legal issues as well.

544. The Customs Caribbean Netherlands is responsible for international co-operation
with other jurisdictions as it relates to customs. This is facilitated by the Convention
establishing the Caribbean Customs Organisation. However, this Convention was
only established in 2019 and there is no information available on incoming and
outgoing requests for co-operation before or after this Convention came into force.

545. DNB cooperates with the central banks of Curacao and Sint Maarten and Aruba and
participates in the Board of Kingdom Supervisors, together with those central banks
and the AFM. This co-operation includes harmonising to the largest extent possible
with the AML/CFT laws and policies on the islands, sharing information on specific
AML/CFT supervision cases that have a link with one or more of the islands and
sharing information on fit and proper testing of policy makers active in FIs that are
active on one or more of the islands.

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Providing other forms international co-operation for AML/CFT purposes

8

546. The Netherlands is committed to increasing and strengthening networks for
providing international co-operation for AML/CFT purposes. The different
authorities play an active role in initiatives and projects aimed at doing so at the
European and international level. For example, financial investigation was a key
priority for the Dutch Presidency of the EU in 2016 and resulted in several
initiatives and projects, which included strengthening co-operation between
member states in order to deliver better financial investigation results. The
Netherlands is also heavily involved in a range of other forums, such as the Global
Coalition against ISIS, and co-leads the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Foreign
Terrorist Fighters Working Group (FTF-working group). Amongst other examples
of international engagement, in 2017, the Head of FIU-NL was part of the team
tasked with setting up the Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership
(ECOFEL).

547. Co-operation between FIU-NL and other European FIUs is a strength. For example,
FIU-NL is active in EU co-operation initiatives such as the Europol Financial
Intelligence Public Private Partnership, and the EU FIU platform. The FIU-NL also
provides information to members of the Egmont Group of FIUs. On average the FIUNL receives approximately between 550-600 information requests per year from
Egmont members. Many of these requests come from European FIUs and FIU-NL is
generally able to respond to these requests within a few days, although there have
been exceptional cases where requests have taken several months. Since 2020, FIUNL has further improved the process of handling requests and incoming requests
are processed immediately. Depending on the request, FIU-NL starts an in-depth
analysis and/or will ask for additional information from obliged entities. This
additional analysis takes up to a maximum of 30 days. In the exceptional cases the
request cannot be met within the 30 day period, FIU-NL contacts the concerning FIU
to inform them.

Table 8.10. Number of incoming foreign FIU requests
Year
2021*
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016

No. of incoming requests
603
650
538
587
692
515

No. of foreign FIUs involved
79
77
80
88
83
83

* Covers the period up to 18 November 2021.

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548. FIU-NL works bilaterally and multilaterally with other European FIUs where a
cross-border component is involved in an investigation and also shares relevant
cross-border disseminations with other member states through FIU.net, which is a
requirement under European regulations. Given the EU Directive’s aim to compare
hits and promptly identify linkages, FIU-NL shares UTRs through this platform in an
automated manner. Feedback from some EU Member States note that these
dissemination reports are numerous and could benefit from more context. FIU-NL
provides further information and context to EU FIUs upon request. The Assessment
Team considers that the Netherlands should seek a dialogue on how the quality of
cross-border dissemination reports between EU FIUs can further improve so that
the reports are more useful for recipient FIUs.
549. FIU-NL has partnered with FIUs in other countries on strategically important issues
on several occasions. In 2019, for example, FIU-NL participated in joint analysis
with Austrian and Romanian FIUs, on human trafficking and forced prostitution
cases (see Box 3.7 under IO.6). During the Egmont Group Plenary in July 2019, an
International Financial Intelligence Taskforce was launched under the leadership of
FIU-Latvia on a sophisticated ML case. FIU-NL is one of the participating FIUs and is
using this information in its own analysis.

550. Dutch LEAs have a number of channels to provide international co-operation with
counterparts. The OM currently has two liaison officers in Italy and Spain and
several Dutch prosecutors have been involved in EU Projects in neighbouring
regions, including the Western Balkans. Part of the role of the liaison officers is to
ensure requests for information can be dealt with as quickly as possible and to
remove any barriers to information exchange that may exist. Furthermore, in 2016
the OM established a Bureau for International Affairs, which acts as an advisory
body in order to provide coherent responses to international matters. One of its
projects is to strengthen NL-UK law enforcement co-operation following the UK’s
withdrawal from EU AML/CFT and law enforcement mechanisms. The FIOD has an
extensive set of international contacts and also works through the Police and liaison
officers on specific matters. The FIOD/AMLC participates in EUROJUST and FCInet
and regularly partners EUROPOL and INTERPOL on investigations and information
sharing initiatives. Both the OM and FIOD/AMLC have participated in training and
provided technical assistance to strengthen the capabilities of their foreign
counterparts,

551. The Police, FIOD and KMar cooperate bilaterally through police-to-police networks
and are involved in several international partnerships. They also have strong
networks of liaison officers in a range of strategically important countries and
regions. These officers are vital in supporting international criminal investigations
and other projects. Both authorities also proactively participate in international
fora and have desks at EUROPOL and INTERPOL, which help to facilitate timely
international co-operation. LEAs are involved in several EUROPOL projects, such as
European Money Mule Action and European Multidisciplinary Platform against
Criminal Threats. KMar is also has a representative within the EU Agency for Law
Enforcement Training and takes part in various international seminars.

552. The Netherlands also has a long history of co-operation with neighbouring
countries, particularly Belgium and Luxembourg. As a result of the Benelux Police
Treaty, Dutch Police have access to the police registers of Belgium and Luxembourg.
The Benelux Treaty therefore provides powers to cross-border authorities to act
without a MLA request for further efficiency.
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553. Customs is able to cooperate with other authorities under several legal provisions,
including the Naples II agreement for mutual assistance and co-operation between
customs authorities. The Customs Information Centre (Douane Informatie Centrum,
DIC) exchanges information with the EC and is involved in various EU projects, such
as the EU Cash Controls Committee. It also has 39 bilateral agreements with a range
of countries allowing for sharing and requesting information. All agreements extend
to the BES Islands, but no information was provided on the extent to which they are
used. Customs has access to the EU’s CIS, but it is also not clear to what extent this
is used.

8

554. The KSA has MoUs with other gambling authorities and is a member of the member
of the GREF, a platform for European supervisors in the betting and gaming sector.
The NOvA is a member of the International Bar Association and the Council of Bars
and Law Societies of Europe and participates in its AML committee. DNB as
supervisor of trust offices has contacts with other EU supervisors of TCSPs on
specific cross-border cases. Other DNFBP supervisors and industry bodies focus
less on international co-operation for sharing supervisory information. The
BTWwft has one member of staff that focusses on maintaining contacts with
international counterparts and has led several meetings with neighbouring
countries, particularly Belgium and Germany, to share general knowledge and best
practice. The Netherlands states that BTWwft has also had contact with
neighbouring authorities on specific cases, but no case studies were provided to
demonstrate effectiveness in this regard.

555. Representatives from the BES Islands state that, although they are not part of
continental Netherlands, police requests are effectively dealt with by IRC Carib as it
participates actively in ARIN-CARIB.

International exchange of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal
persons and arrangements

556. The Netherlands shares basic and BO information on legal persons and other legal
entities as well as on legal arrangements with its international counterparts. Basic
information on legal persons and other legal entities is publicly available and easily
accessible. There is a small fee to access this information in certain circumstances.
Insofar as legal entities have registered this information in the BO register, the
following BO information is publicly available: the name, month and year of birth,
nationality, country of residence and nature and extent of beneficial interest held.
Other BO information such as address and copy of identification documents are only
available to competent authorities, such as OM, LEAs, FIU-NL and supervisory
authorities, who are able to share this information, where appropriate. As noted in
IO.5, at the time of the onsite visit, 27% of existing legal had populated the BO
register. Non-public BO information can also feature in requests received for MLA
and by the FIU-NL and LEAs via established formal arrangements (e.g., Egmont, EU
tax sharing information, EUROPOL and INTERPOL requests). The Netherlands CLO
has a specific MLA process for requests from third countries in order to ensure that
requests are not of a political nature or likely to violate human rights.

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557. The Netherlands actively seeks basic and BO information on foreign legal persons
and legal arrangements. Competent authorities request basic and BO information
from foreign counterparts in a number of ways. Where information is not publicly
accessible, this can be requested as part of outgoing MLA through the CLO, as part
of FIU-NL requests to other FIUs, or other formal mechanisms that individual
competent authorities are engaged with, such as the Joint International Taskforce
on Shared Intelligence and Collaboration.

558. Case studies demonstrated the exchange of basic and BO information. The Dutch
authorities were unable to provide exact numbers of foreign requests for BO
information to Dutch central, regional and other competent authorities.

BES Islands

559. Basic information on legal persons can be accessed publicly in the BES Islands.
There are two company registers in the BES Islands (one for Bonaire and a joint
register for St. Eustatius and Saba). At the time of the onsite the joint register was
not operational because of a technical issue. Non-public information held by the CoC
must be subpoenaed. Unlike continental Netherlands, the BES Islands do not have a
publicly accessible BO register. In line with continental Netherlands, obliged entities
need to register, identify and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of BOs
when conducting CDD, but there is no requirement for legal persons or
arrangements to hold BO information. The Dutch authorities were unable to
determine whether competent authorities in the BES islands exchange basic and BO
information with international counterparts.

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Overall conclusions on IO.2
1.

2.

8

3.

4.
5.
6.

The Netherlands seeks and provides constructive MLA and extradition. While the
Assessment Team was unable to assess the timeliness of MLA in practice,
responses reported by the FATF global network note that international cooperation with the Netherlands is of high quality and no significant issues were
raised about the timeliness of MLA and execution requests.

The Netherlands actively participates in a wide range of activities in order to
exchange financial intelligence, and LEA and supervisory information. FIU-NL
disseminates a significant number of cross-border dissemination reports to other
EU FIUs, however, some feedback suggests that this type of report could benefit
from more context.
The Dutch authorities have a large and continuously growing network of liaison
officers who assist with timely co-operation and information exchange. These well
working networks guarantee a high degree of informal co-operation especially
during the intelligence phase in international/cross-border investigations, to
locate appropriate channels for further information exchange and to speed up
processes when time constraints are critical.
Although the Netherlands has initiated some JITs, there appears to be a lack of
clarity when JITs or other mechanisms should be used and whether or not more
JITs should be initiated to deliver effective outcomes. Furthermore, there is no
legal basis for JITs to be established in the BES Islands.
Basic and some BO information on legal persons and other legal entities is publicly
available in the Netherlands and to some extent in the BES Islands. Where this is
not publicly available there are formal channels for foreign authorities to obtain
this in a timely manner.
The Netherlands is rated as having a high level of effectiveness for IO.2.

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE

This section provides detailed analysis of the level of compliance with the FATF 40
Recommendations in their numerical order. It does not include descriptive text on the
country situation or risks, and is limited to the analysis of technical criteria for each
Recommendation. It should be read in conjunction with the Mutual Evaluation Report.

Where both the FATF requirements and national laws or regulations remain the same,
this report refers to analysis conducted as part of the previous Mutual Evaluation in
2011. This report is available from on the FATF webpage.

Recommendation 1 – Assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach
This is a new Recommendation, which was not assessed in the 3rd round MER.

Criterion 1.1 – The Netherlands has identified and assessed its ML/TF risks through
two separate NRAs in 2017, and updated these assessments in 2020. The NRAs were
developed by the WODC (the Research and Documentation Centre) of the Ministry of
Justice and Security. The methodology was based on the ISO 31000 risk management
framework. These NRAs identify, analyse and categorise the ML/TF methods and
channels having the greatest potential risks, as well as the resilience of the policy
instruments (laws, regulations, etc.) aimed at prevention and mitigation of ML/TF.
The inputs were primarily qualitative (e.g., interviews and questionnaire responses),
and also included quantitative data such as statistics, inter alia, from the Central
Bureau of Statistics.
BES Islands: Separate NRAs were developed by the WODC for the BES Islands in 2018
and 2021. The NRAs assess the ML risks present in the Islands following the
aforementioned methodology. The authorities did not identify any signs of TF threats
when preparing the NRAs and therefore do not include any analysis on the TF threats
and vulnerabilities in the BES Islands. The inputs into the BES NRA were primarily
qualitative and predominantly based on experts’ opinions and estimates as there is
currently a lack of quantitative data on financial and economic crime on the BES
Islands. FIU-NL information has been used in the latest version of the BES NRA.

Sectoral risk assessments: AML/CFT supervisors continuously monitor risks in sectors
(see Core Issue 3.2). These sectoral risk assessments guide risk-based supervisory
activities.

SNRA: The European Commission (EC) is responsible for the preparation of an SNRA,
which identifies specific cross-border threats that could affect the EU’s internal
market (AMLD4, Art. 6). This SNRA identifies the parts of the internal market most
exposed to risks, the risks per relevant sector and the most common ML typologies.
The EC is required to update the SNRA every two years (AMLD, Art.4(1)).
Criterion 1.2 – The Ministers of Finance and Justice and Security are jointly
responsible for assessing national ML and TF risks in the Netherlands (Wwft, Art.1f;
Wwft BES, Art.1.14).

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Criterion 1.3 – The Ministers of Finance and Justice and Security are required to
jointly update and publish the results of the ML and TF NRAs at least every two years
(Wwft, Art. 1f).

BES Islands: The Ministers of Finance and Justice and Security are required to
periodically publish the results of the ML and TF NRAs (Wwft BES, Art. 1.14), which is
defined in an explanatory memorandum as every two years.

Criterion 1.4 – The NRAs (including for the BES Islands) are required to be published,
and are therefore available to competent authorities, SRBs, FIs and DNFBPs (Wwft,
Art.1f; Wwft BES, Art. 1.14). All NRAs have been published on publicly accessible
government websites in Dutch and English.

Technical compliance

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice and Security also present the
results of risk assessments in relevant coordinating bodies, including the Obliged
Entities Committee, the FEC and the Wwft Supervisors Consultations. In general, the
findings of the NRAs have been disseminated to FIs, DNFBPs and NPOs through
outreach and trainings. The findings of the sectoral risk assessments are incorporated
into guidelines or guidance documents, which were disseminated to FIs and DNFBPs.
Criterion 1.5 – The Netherlands demonstrates that it is allocating resources and
implementing measures based on the authorities’ understanding of ML/TF risks,
starting with its 2017 NRAs. A 2019 ML Action Plan was developed by competent
authorities based on the findings of the ML NRAs and covers both continental and
Caribbean Netherlands. The detailed measures aim to mitigate the ML residual risks
identified in the NRAs. This plan includes the allocation of additional resources in line
with the risks identified, such as extra funds to intensify the investigation of ML.
Progress reports to the ML Action Plan have also identified additional risk mitigation
measures, including for abuse of legal entities and trade based ML.

Concerning the risk-based allocation of resources and implementing measures for TF,
CFT is a part of the Netherlands’ overall CT policy and strategy. A TF Policy Statement
was approved in September 2020, and outlines measures to mitigate the four greatest
TF risks.

BES Islands: Based on the specific risks identified in the 2018 and 2021 NRAs, the
supervision of notaries and lawyers was enhanced, and amendments were
introduced, for example, to include dealers in construction materials as obliged
entities. 66 To tackle the risks identified, additional resources have been made
available to the KPCN and OMCarib.
Criterion 1.6 –

(a) A supervisor may grant an exemption from the obligation to identify and assess
ML/TF risks if an FI or DNFBP belongs to a sector in which the specific ML and TF
risks are “clear and understandable” (Wwft, Art.2b(4)). No sectors have been
exempted.

Issuers of electronic money (prepaid cards that can be exchanged with multiple
parties) are not required to conduct CDD, with the exception of transaction
monitoring, if the balance does not exceed EUR 150, cannot be reloaded, the electronic
money is used exclusively for the purchase of goods or services, and other conditions
are met (Wwft, Art.7.1). The issuing organisation is required to collect sufficient data
66

Dealers in construction materials are not covered in the FATF Standards.

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to verify whether the transactions fit the profile of the user of the balance (Wwft,
Art.7.2).
BES Islands: DNFBPs (except for TCSPs) are exempt from the following obligations
(Wwft BES, Art. 1.13):
•

•
•
•

Identifying and assessing its ML and TF risks;

Having in place policies, procedures and measures to mitigate ML and TF risks
identified in the NRA;
Designate a person to be responsible for ensuring compliance with the
AML/CFT obligations in the Wwft BES; and
Implementing group-wide policies and procedures.

According to the BES NRA these are not areas of proven low risk or occasional or very
limited activities and are therefore not considered risk-based.

(b) The Minister of Finance may grant an exemption from the Wwft obligations to FIs
and DNFBPs who perform activities on an incidental or very limited basis, proven that
there are low ML and TF risks (Wwft, Art.1c(1); Wwft BES, Art.1b(1)). No exemptions
have been issued. There is currently no decree that grants such exemptions to FIs and
DNFBPs in the BES Islands.

FIs and DNFBPs must perform enhanced CDD where higher risks are identified, such
as for identified high risk countries, large transactions and transactions with unclear
patterns, and for PEPs (Wwft, Art.8(4-9); Wtt, Art.33-36). In the BES Islands, FIs and
DNFBPs must perform enhanced CDD where higher risks are identified, including for
PEPs and correspondent banking (Wwft BES, Art.2.10).

Criterion 1.8 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) allows simplified due
diligence measures where low-risk has been identified (Wwft, Art.6; Wwft BES,
Art.2.8). Simplified due diligence is not permitted when the FI or DNFBP suspects ML
or TF (Wwft, Art.3(5)(c); Wwft BES, Art.2.3(c)).
Criterion 1.9 – Supervisors and SRBs are required to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs are
implementing their obligations under R.1 (Wwft, Art.1d).
BES Islands: Various supervisory authorities monitor compliance of FIs and DNFBPs
in the BES Islands (Decree on the Designation of Supervisory Authorities, Art. 1(b)).
Deficiencies exist related to risk-based measures under R.26 and R.28.
Criterion 1.10 –

a) FIs and DNFBPs are required to document their risk assessments (Wwft,
Art.2b(3); Wwft BES, Art.1.9; Wtt, Art.38(g) for most TCSPs).
b) FIs and DNFBPs must take measures to identify and assess ML and TF risks
related to customers, products, services, transactions, channels of supply, and

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Technical compliance

Criterion 1.7 – FIs and DNFBPs must conduct CDD in line with the identified ML and
TF risks of their customers, business relationships, products or transactions (Wwft,
Art.3(8); Wtt, Art. 33-36; Wwft BES, Art.1.8). At a minimum, risk sensitivity of FIs and
DNFBPs (in continental Netherlands) should be based on the risk indicators listed in
Annex I or III of AMLD4 (Wwft, Art. 3(9); Wtt, Art. 33(2) for trust offices). However,
FIs and DNFBPs in the BES Islands must, at a minimum, take into account the risk
factors designated by the Minister in a regulation (Wwft BES, Art.2.5(1)).

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX

geography (Wwft, Art.2b(1)-(3), Wwft BES, Art.1.9(2); Wtt, Art.14(3) and 26
for most TCSPs).

c) Risk assessments are required to be up to date (Wwft, Art.2b(3); Wwft BES,
Art. 1.9(3); Wtt. Art.14(3) for most TCSPs).

d) Risk assessments must be submitted to the supervisory authority upon
request (Wwft, Art.2b(3); Wwft BES, Art. 1.9(3); Wtt, Art.18 for most TCSPs).

In the BES Islands, these requirements do not apply to casinos, real estate agents,
DPMS, and legal professionals (Wwft BES, Art. 1.13).

The supervisory authority may grant dispensation from the aforementioned
requirements when ML and TF risks are “clear and understandable” (Wwft, Art.
2b(4); Wwft BES, Art. 1.9(4)). No such dispensations have been granted to date.

Technical compliance

Criterion 1.11 –

a) FIs and DNFBPs must have policies, procedures and measures in place to
mitigate and effectively manage ML and TF risks identified in the most recent
versions of the SNRA and NRAs (Wwft, Art. 2c; Wwft BES, Art. 1.10; Wtt, Art.
14(1-3) for some TCSPs). Such measures are subject to the approval of senior
management (Wwft, Art. 2c(3); Wtt, Art. 10; Wwft BES, Art.1.10(3)). In the
BES Islands, these requirements do not apply to casinos, real estate agents,
DPMS, and legal professionals. Deficiencies noted in c.22.1 also apply here.

b) FIs and DNFBPs must ensure that the aforementioned risk mitigation
measures, policies and procedures are systematically reviewed and, where
appropriate, adjusted (Wwft, Art. 2c(4); Wwft BES, Art. 1.10(3)). In the BES
Islands, these requirements do not apply to casinos, real estate agents, DPMS,
and legal professionals. Deficiencies noted in c.22.1 also apply here.

c) FIs and DNFBPs must perform enhanced CDD where higher risks are
identified (Wwft, Art. 8(1), Wtt, Art.33-36 for some TCSPs; Wwft BES,
Art.2.10(1)).

Criterion 1.12 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) allows simplified due
diligence measures where low risks are identified and criteria 1.9 to 1.11 are
generally met (Wwft, Art.6; Wwft BES, Art.2.8). Deficiencies noted under these criteria
related to BES Islands are applicable here. Simplified due diligence is not permitted
when the FI or DNFBP suspects ML or TF (Wwft, Art. 3(5)(c); Wwft BES, Art. 2.3(c)).

Weighting and Conclusion

The Netherlands demonstrates persistent efforts to identify and assess its ML/TF
risks. The NRAs primarily rely on qualitative inputs, which may impact the quality of
the conclusions on risks. Some sectors in the BES Islands are exempted from
AML/CFT requirements amid the existence of identified risks but this is considered a
minor shortcoming considering the materiality of these sectors in the broader context
of the Netherlands.

Recommendation 1 is rated as largely compliant.

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Recommendation 2 - National Co-operation and Co-ordination
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R.31, as some
co-ordination mechanisms were not used effectively and some co-ordination bodies
met infrequently.

Criterion 2.1 – The 2019 ML Action Plan was developed based on the findings of the
ML NRAs and covers both continental and Caribbean Netherlands. The ministers of
Justice and Security and Finance monitor the progress of the Action Plan and report
to the parliament every six months. A TF Policy Statement was also approved in
September 2020, which supplements a number of existing CT and CFT policies. As no
signs of TF threats were identified, no CFT policy has been developed for the BES
Islands.

Criterion 2.3 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) have a wide spectrum of
AML/CFT co-ordination bodies at the policy and operational levels. Top-down coordination between implementing authorities takes place through structural cooperation within the FEC and AMLC. A number of operational information hubs also
exist to facilitate information sharing across competent authorities [e.g., iCOV and
Justis(Track)]. Multidisciplinary co-operation between government parties and with
the private sector is a key characteristic of the Dutch AML/CFT system (see IO.1).
Similar policy and operational co-ordination bodies exist for the BES Islands.

Criterion 2.4 – CPF falls under the joint responsibility of the Minister for Foreign
Trade and Development Co-operation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the
Minister of Finance responsible for PF policy (Organisation Decree of the MFA, section
9.2). A number of public sector co-ordination bodies exist with countering PF in their
mandates (e.g., the Sanctions Act Consultation Meeting). Public-private co-ordination
bodies also exist to raise awareness with the private sector (see IO.1). These coordination and co-operation mechanisms cover the BES Islands.

Criterion 2.5 – The Netherlands coordinates to ensure the compatibility of its
AML/CFT requirements with Data Protection and Privacy rules through the European
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), its implementation act and through the
implementation of EU Directive 2016/680 (Wpg and Wjsg). All draft legislation
affecting the use of personal data must be submitted to Netherlands’ designated Data
Protection Authority (GDPR, Art.36(4)). Before the introduction of processes that
involve personal data, a Data Protection Impact Assessment must be conducted
(GDPR, Art. 35).

BES Islands: The BES Personal Data Protection Supervision Commission is responsible
for supervising the processing of personal data (Wbp BES, Art.49). Changes in
AML/CFT legislation are consulted with the Commission.

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Technical compliance

Criterion 2.2 – The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice and Security share
responsibility for AML policies. The Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice and
Security and the Minister of Foreign Affairs share the responsibility to coordinate CFT
policies pursuant to Organisation Decrees of the Ministries of Finance, Justice and
Security and Foreign affairs. These authorities are the same for the BES Islands.
Various co-ordination bodies exist to facilitate co-operation amongst AML/CFT
authorities to avoid duplication of efforts. For example, the Minister of Finance and
the Minister of Justice and Security share responsibility for AML policies and meet
regularly at a Ministerial Committee for ML. For CFT, the Ministers coordinate at the
Inter-ministerial Sanctions Consultation Meeting and the Joint Counter-Terrorism
Committee. See IO.1 for additional information.

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Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 2 is rated as compliant.

Recommendation 3 - Money laundering offence
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R.1 and 2.
Outstanding deficiencies related to effectiveness, particularly incomplete statistics
and the lack of information on types of predicate offences. Due to the lack statistics,
assessors could not establish whether sanctions were fully effective.

Technical compliance

Criterion 3.1 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) criminalises ML in line
with the requirements of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions (WvSr, Art. 420bis,
420ter, 420quater; WvSr BES Art. 435a, 435b, 435c). It criminalises the concealment
or disguise of the true nature, source, location, the disposition or movement of an
object, or the concealment or disguise of the person who has title to or possession of
the object, or the possession, acquisition, transfer, conversion and use of an object
which derives directly or indirectly from any offence (WvSr, Art 420bis; WvSr BES,
Art. 435a).
The mens rea element under the Conventions is satisfied by requiring that the
offender either knows (WvSr, Art. 420bis; WvSr BES, Art. 435a) or may reasonably
suspect (WvSr, Art. 420quater; WvSr BES, Art. 435c) that the object directly or
indirectly is the proceeds of any offence.

The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) criminalises the habitual commission of
the ML offence as a form of aggravated offence, corresponding to a higher sanction
(WvSr, Art. 420ter; WvSr BES, Art. 435c).

The term “object” is defined as “all tangible property and all property rights” (WvSr,
Art. 420bis; WvSr BES, Art. 435a2). Tangible properties are movable (e.g., cash, cars)
and unmovable goods (e.g., real estate). Property rights are rights that are
transferable or which intend to give its proprietor material benefit (BW, Art. 3:6, BW
BES, Art. 3:6). The Netherlands provided case law demonstrating that this definition
encompasses VAs.
Criterion 3.2 – Any offence (with the exception of misdemeanours) is a predicate
offence to ML (WvSr Art. 420bis, 420quater; WvSr BES Art. 435a, 435c). This
encompasses the full range of offences in the 21 categories of designated predicate
offences and more.
Criterion 3.3 – The Criminal Codes distinguish between offences and misdemeanours
(i.e., minor offences).The Netherlands and BES apply a threshold approach whereby
all offences in the Criminal Code are predicate offences to ML.
Criterion 3.4 – The ML offences extend to any “object” deriving directly or indirectly
from any offence, regardless of the value (WvSr Art. 420bis, 420quater; WvSr BES,
Art. 435a, 435c).

Criterion 3.5 – It is not necessary that a person is convicted of a predicate offence to
prove that property is the proceeds of crime (WvSr Art. 420bis, 420quater; WvSr BES
Art. 435a, 435c). ML is an autonomous offence and merely requires the OM to
establish that objects are likely to be directly or indirectly proceeds of any offence.
This does not require proving that an item of value originated from a specifically
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indicated offence (WvSr Art. 420bis). This interpretation is applicable also to BES
provisions.

Criterion 3.6 – The ML offence does not explicitly refer to the laundering of proceeds
generated by a foreign predicate. However, as the laundering refers to an object
deriving directly or indirectly “from any offence”, there is no limitation as to the
domestic or foreign origin of the predicate offence. The Supreme Court confirmed this
approach: ML provisions are, at a minimum, applicable to predicate offences that have
been committed abroad if the relevant conduct has been criminalised both under
Dutch law and the law of the country in which it took place
(ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZD1388 ruling of 1998).

BES Islands: There are no legal provisions (or case law) precluding the conviction of
the perpetrator of a predicate offense for acts of self-laundering (WvSr BES, Art. 435a,
435c).

Criterion 3.8 – It is possible to infer the intent and knowledge required to prove a ML
offence from the conduct itself and from objective factual circumstances. This was
demonstrated through case law and applicable to the BES Islands.

Criterion 3.9 – The criminal penalty for ordinary ML is imprisonment up to six years
or a fine of the fifth category (EUR 87 000) (WvSr, Art. 420bis). Habitual ML or ML
committed while exercising a profession or business is punished with imprisonment
not exceeding eight years, or a fine of the fifth category (EUR 87.000) (WvSr, Art.
420ter). Culpable ML (i.e., where the person had reasonable cause to suspect the
illegal origin of the objects) is subject to lower sentencing: up to two years
imprisonment or a fine of the fifth category (WvSr, Art. 420quater). Community
sentence up to 240 hours can also be applied for all ML offences (WvSr, Art. 9). The
different penalties (fine and imprisonment) can be imposed cumulatively (WvSr, Art.
9.3).

The simplified deliberate or culpable acquisition or possession of an object deriving
directly from serious offences committed by the offender, where no acts have been
conducted to conceal or disguise the criminal origin, is punishable with a term of
imprisonment not exceeding six or three months or a fine of the fourth category
(WvSr Art. 420bis1; WvSr, Art. 420quater1). The Assessment Team considers that
these penalties are not proportionate or dissuasive.
With the exception of the sentences provide in WvSr Art. 420bis1 and WvSr Art. 420
quarter1, the maximum sentences for ML offence appear dissuasive and
proportionate to Dutch standards when compared to the sentences for other criminal
offences, such as fraud and tax offences (six years' imprisonment or a fine of the fifth
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Technical compliance

Criterion 3.7 – Self-laundering is criminalised separately from the predicate offense.
However, Netherlands applies a different approach in relation to the sanctions
depending on the actions that would constitute the ML offense. If the actions consist
in concealing, hiding, transferring the proceeds of its own crime, although there are
no explicit legal provisions, according to Dutch authorities, the conduct will fall under
the ordinary definition of ML offense (WvSr, Art. 420bis; 420quater) and the person
can be convicted to a term of imprisonment up to three or six years and a fine of the
fifth category. Dutch case law supports this interpretation. If the action involves the
mere acquisition or possession, the conduct falls under the definition of WvSr, Art.
420bis1; Art. 420quarter1, and the person can be convicted to a term of
imprisonment up to six or three months and a fine of the fourth category.

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category), embezzlement (three years' imprisonment or a fine of the fifth category),
but significantly lower than in BES Islands.

Technical compliance

BES Islands: The criminal penalty for ordinary ML is imprisonment up to twelve years
or a fine of the fifth category [USD 56 000 (approx. EUR 45 500)] (WvSr BES, Art.
435a). Habitual ML is punished with imprisonment not exceeding sixteen years, or a
fine of the fifth category (WvSr BES, Art. 435c). Culpable ML is subject to lower
sentencing: up to four years’ imprisonment or a fine of the fourth category [USD 14
000 (approx. EUR 11 385)] (WvSr BES, Art. 435c). The Court can impose both fines
and custodial sentences, in combination with each other or apart (WvSr BES, Art.
17a(2)). The available sanctions for ML offences in the BES Islands are proportionate
and dissuasive.
Criterion 3.10 – Legal persons can be subject to criminal liability in the Netherlands
(including the BES Islands). The liability of the legal persons is not dependent on the
prosecution or conviction of a natural person and does not preclude parallel criminal
proceedings against the natural persons holding control (WvSr, Art. 51; WvSr BES,
Art. 53). While civil and administrative proceedings are also possible, it is not possible
to apply both criminal and administrative penalties for the same behaviour of the
same legal person (una via principle, Awb, Art. 5:44). An administrative authority will
refrain to impose an administrative fine if criminal proceedings have been instituted
against the same person for the same conduct. This may impact the dissuasiveness of
sanctions available for legal persons.

Administrative sanctions imposed on a legal person do not affect the validity of
criminal proceedings against the involved natural person, even when this natural
person had been held liable for paying the administrative sanctions imposed to the
legal person (ECLI:NL:HR:2021:219).

Sanctions available for legal persons are proportionate. If the fine category specified
for the offence does not provide for an appropriate punishment, legal persons may be
subject to a higher fine up to the maximum of the next fine category. ML is therefore
punishable with a fine of the sixth category (EUR 870 000). If more than one act or
crime is committed, fines can cumulate (WvSr, Art. 57, 58). If a fine of the sixth
category may be imposed for an offence and that fine category does not provide for
an appropriate punishment, a fine of up to 10% of the annual turnover of the legal
person in the financial year preceding the judgment or punishment order may be
imposed (WvSr, Art. 23(7); WvSr BES, Art. 27(7)).
Criterion 3.11 – The Netherlands (including the BES islands) criminalises ancillary
offences to ML through general provisions related to attempting, facilitating, assisting,
soliciting or inciting, aiding and abetting, and participating in an organisation to
commit offences (WvSr, Art. 45, 47, 48 and 140; WvSr BES Art. 47, 49, 50 and 146).

Weighting and Conclusion

The legal framework broadly covers the requirements of R.3 with minor
shortcomings related to the available sanctions for self-laundering and the inability
to apply both criminal and civil/administrative sanctions to legal persons.
Recommendation 3 is rated largely compliant.

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Recommendation 4 - Confiscation and provisional measures
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former R.3, as the scope of the legal privilege hindered appropriate access to
information and documents held by lawyers and other legal professionals.
Furthermore, the absence of more comprehensive statistics did not allow to conclude
that confiscation measures were applied in a fully effective manner.
Criterion 4.1 – The Netherlands can confiscate, upon conviction, proceeds and
instrumentalities of crime held by the offender and third parties (WvSr, Art. 33a and
36e; WvSr BES, Art. 35 and 38e). A confiscation order may be issued upon conviction
of any criminal offence (WvSr, Art. 33 and 36e; WvSr BES, Art. 35). Confiscation
provisions are therefore applicable to ML, predicate offences and TF:
a) Property laundered: The objects in relation to which the offence was
committed are liable to confiscation (WvSr, Art. 33a; WvSr BES, Art. 35);

b) Proceeds, including income or other benefits derived from proceeds, and
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in ML or predicate offences:
confiscation extends to objects used, or intended for use, or manufactured for
the commission of any offence, including ML and predicate offences.
Confiscation extends to objects or benefits obtained from the proceeds of
crime (WvSr, Art. 33, 33a and 36e; WvSr BES, Art. 35, 38e);

d) Property of corresponding value: The Netherlands has a value confiscation
regime that allows for the determination of the value of property laundered
and proceeds from any criminal offense and the confiscation of the equivalent
value. Confiscation also extends to proceeds from other criminal offences
where there are sufficient indicators that the offender committed them or
received profits from crimes, regardless of who committed them (WvSr, Art.
36e; WvSr BES, Art. 38e).

In continental Netherlands, objects are defined as property of any description,
whether corporeal or incorporeal (WvSr, Art. 33a(4)), whereas the definition in the
BES Islands refers to “all tangible property and all property rights” WvSr BES, Art. 35).
Both definitions refer to “all tangible property and all property rights”, which covers
property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal.
Proceeds held by third parties can be seized and confiscated if they knew or could
have reasonably suspected that the property was derived from a criminal act (object
confiscation, WvSr, Art. 33a (2); WvSr BES, Art. 35 (2)), as well as if they came in the
possession of a third party with the apparent intention of impeding or preventing
seizure, (WvSv Art. 94a (4 and 5) and WvSr, Art. 36e).
Criterion 4.2–

a) Identification, tracing and evaluation: Financial investigations are initiated in
all criminal investigations where suspicious flows of money or assets are
identified (Confiscation instruction 2016A009, Chapter 4). For offences,
punishable with a fifth category fine, a criminal financial investigation (SFO)
may be initiated independently of the investigation into the predicate offences

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Technical compliance

c) Property that is the proceeds of, used in, or intended or allocated for use in the
financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist organisations: The same
provisions apply to proceeds related to the financing of terrorism, a terrorist
act or a terrorist organisation (WvSr, Art. 33; WvSr BES, Art. 35).

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(WvSv Art.126 and WvSv BES, Art. 177a). In these cases, investigating officers
can obtain data or documents held by any person except the suspect, without
any further authorisation (WvSv, 126a). In a general criminal investigation
(including financial investigation), upon authorisation from the OM,
investigative officers can obtain data held by any person, including FIs and
DNFBPs (WvSv, Art. 126nc and 126nd; WvSv BES, Art. 177b). Furthermore,
an investigation into the assets of a convicted person may be initiated, where
necessary for value confiscation (WvSv, Art. 6:4:11(2)).

b) Provisional measures: Property subject to confiscation, and property that
could demonstrate unlawfully obtained gains can be seized (WvSv, Art. 94;
WvSv BES, Art. 119).

Technical compliance

For the investigation of offences punishable with a fifth or forth category fine,
including ML offences, property can also be seized for victim compensation
and for any value confiscation/payment that may be imposed upon
conviction. This prejudgement seizure is not limited to proceeds of the offense
(WvSv, Art. 94a). In BES Islands, a provisional seizure can be granted for
serious offences punishable with a minimum of four years of imprisonment,
or offences which may result in a sizeable amount of gain (WvSv BES, Art.
119a).
Seizing measures can be issued ex parte (WvSv, Art. 94(3) and 103; WvSv BES,
Art. 129a).

c) Preventing or voiding actions: In addition to the prejudgement seizure, assets
belonging to a third party can be seized if there are indications that the
objects, or part of them, came into the possession of the third party with the
apparent intention of impeding or preventing seizure (WvSv, Art. 94a.4-5;
WvSv BES, Art. 119a). The OM may declare null or fraudulent any legal act,
which an accused or convicted person has entered into within one year prior
to the commencement of the criminal investigation (WvSv, Art. 94d(2); WvSv
BES, Art. 119d(2)).
d) Appropriate investigative measures: LEAs can use all the appropriate
investigative measures provided in the WvSv and WvSv BES in the course of
a criminal investigation of ML, TF and predicate offenses. Investigative
powers for seizure of goods and assets are available during criminal
investigations. These may be applied during a parallel criminal investigation
into financial elements, for the purposes of confiscation (see R.31).

Criterion 4.3 – The rights of bona fide third parties are protected. Seizure based on
WvSv art. 94 and object confiscation based on WvSr art. 33a regarding assets held by
third parties is only possible if they had knowledge, or could have reasonably
suspected that property represented proceeds or instrumentalities of crime (WvSr,
Art. 33a(2) and (3) and WvSr BES, Art. 35(2) and (3)). Prejudgement seizure on third
party’s assets (WvSv, Art. 94a. 4 or 5) is only permitted when the third party has
knowledge, or could have reasonably suspected that assets came into the third party’s
possession with the apparent intention of impeding or preventing seizure. Any
affected person (including bona fide third parties) may challenge a seizing measure
(WvSv, Art. 552a and 552b), and this decision can be appealed. This also includes
filing a civil complaint against a convicted person (WvSv, Art.5:5:12, 6:6:26; WvSv
BES, Art. 150, 151). The OM has the competence to authorise the sale or destruction
of seized objects (WvSv, Art. 117).
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Criterion 4.4 – Within the OM, the LBA is responsible for coordinating and managing
prejudgement seized property. A specific LBA department—the AMO—manages
international and foreign assets. The OM decides whether to return, retain, sell or
destroy goods seized or confiscated, in consultation with asset managers working at
the LBA/AMO. A department within the Ministry of Finance is the statutory
depositary and manager of seized goods (Organizational Regulations for the OM 2012,
Art. 2; State Movable Goods Material Management Regulations).
BES Islands: OM BES decides on the disposal of frozen, seized or confiscated objects
(WvSv BES, Art. 142). The Registrar of the Court of First Instance of BES is the
designated custodian of seized objects (Bbiv BES, Art. 2.1). Seized objects are
managed by the custodian at the registry of the court (Bbiv BES, Art. 2.2) as per
decision of the OM BES (Bbiv BES Art. 13-17).

Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 4 is rated compliant.

Recommendation 5 - Terrorist financing offence

Criterion 5.1 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) implements the
obligation to criminalise the financing of the annexed treaty offences as per Art. 2.1(a)
of the TF Convention. The combined provisions of the Penal Code (WvSr, Art. 421, Art.
83; WvSr BES, Art. 435(e) and 84a) cover Art. 2.1(b) of the TF Convention. The TF
offences refer to the provision of “means” or “information” and provision or collection
of “objects”. These definitions cover funds and other assets (see c.5.3).
Criterion 5.2 In the Netherlands (including BES Islands), the TF offence covers the
deliberate collection, acquisition, possession and provision of objects which, wholly
or partly, directly or indirectly, serve to offer financial support for the commission of
a terrorist crime (WvSr, Art. 421; WvSr BES, Art. 435(e)). The Criminal Code lists the
serious offences that must be considered as terrorist crimes, which are in line with
the TF Convention (WvSr, Art. 83, WvSr BES, Art. 84a).

The TF offence does not explicitly cover the mens rea elements of “intent” and
“knowledge” on the use of funds. However, the authorities explained that the use of
the term “deliberate” covers the intent element under Art. 2 of the TF Convention. The
“knowledge” element is considered in Dutch criminal law as a more general
expression of the offender’s intention. The so-called “conditional intent” requires that
the offender knowingly accepts the significant likelihood that their actions will result
in financial support for terrorist acts (Explanatory Memo on the introduction of WvSr,
Art. 421).
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Technical compliance

In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former SR.II, as
the collection of funds was criminalised only if the perpetrator had acquired or
possessed them; partial criminalisation of the financing of the offenses set forth the
Annex to the TF Convention; limited criminalisation of the financing of an individual
terrorist; the attempt to finance a specific terrorist act was not criminalised. The FUR
concluded that the introduction of an autonomous TF offense in the Penal Code
(WvSr, Art. 421) largely addressed these deficiencies, bringing the overall level of
compliance to LC.

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While the TF offence does not refer to the financing of a terrorist organisation or an
individual terrorist, the Netherlands provided case law demonstrating convictions of
TF for the provision of support to an individual terrorist. However, the requirement
of conditional intent implies that there is a need to establish an intentional link to the
commission (or preparation) of a terrorist act. This is not sufficient to cover the
financing of an individual terrorist for any purpose.

Technical compliance

Furthermore, the Criminal Code criminalises the participation in an organisation
which has as its purpose the commission of terrorist offences (WvSr, Art. 140a, WvSr
BES, Art. 146a). The participation “shall also include the provision of financial or other
material support as well as the raising of funds or the recruitment of persons on behalf
of the organisation” (WvSr, Art. 140(4); WvSr BES, Art. 146a). The provision of
financial or material support to a terrorist organisation is therefore broadly
criminalised, regardless of whether the funds were specifically aimed at the
commission of terrorist acts. However, in 2017, a judgement by the Supreme Court
interpreted this provision as requiring that the financing of a terrorist organisation
under Art. 140a is punishable only if the financier is a member of the organisation.

Criterion 5.2bis – In the Netherlands (including the BES Islands), there is no specific
provision to cover the financing of the travel of individuals for the purpose of the
perpetration, planning, preparation, participation in terrorist acts, or for providing or
receiving terrorist trainings. However, the Netherlands provided case law to
demonstrate that the travel to conflict zones for participating in terrorist acts or
training was sanctioned as TF or as preparation of a terrorist offence (WvSr, Art. 46,
96(2)). As travelling to conflict zone was considered as either a terrorist offence or a
preparation for a terrorist offence, its financing is also punishable under WvSr, Art.
421 (WvSr BES, Art. 435(e)). In the BES Islands, there are provisions to criminalise
the preparation or facilitation of terrorist acts (WvSr BES, Art. 48a, 140a)).
Criterion 5.3 – The TF offence refers to the provision of “means” or “information”, or
the collection or provision of “objects” which serve to provide financial support. There
is no limitation as to their licit or illicit origin. The Criminal Code defines “objects” as
all tangible property and property rights (WvSr, Art. 420, 421; WvSr BES, Art. 435(e)).
The combined use of the terms “means”, “information” and “objects” covers all ways
in which financial and economic support is offered to commit acts of terrorism or acts
directly related thereto (Explanatory Memo, Art. 3.2 ). This is sufficient to encompass
the funds or other assets prescribed under the FATF Standards.

Criterion 5.4 – In the Netherlands (including the BES Islands), there is no
requirement that the objects were actually used to carry out or attempt a terrorist act,
or be linked to a specific terrorist act. It is sufficient that the offender was aware of
the significant likelihood that their acts could serve to provide support for the
commission of terrorist acts.
Criterion 5.5 – Intent and knowledge can be inferred from objective factual
circumstances, based on Supreme Court’s case law (ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AP2124;
ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT4094).

Criterion 5.6 – In the Netherlands (including BES Islands), TF offences are punishable
by a term of imprisonment not exceeding eight years or a fine of the fifth category
(EUR 87 000 in the Netherlands and USD 56 000, or approx. EUR 45 500 in the BES
Islands) (WvSr, Art. 421; WvSr BES, Art. 435(e)). The available sanctions for the
financing of a terrorist organisation are much higher: a maximum term of
imprisonment of fifteen years or a fine of the fifth category (WvSv, Art. 140a). In BES
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Islands, the maximum available penalty for the financing of a terrorist organisation is
a term of imprisonment of eighteen years (WvSv BES, Art. 146a). Moreover, in the
Netherlands for both offences, community service up to 240 hours can be imposed
(WvSr, Art. 9).

While fines and imprisonment penalties can cumulate (WvSr, Art. 9(3)), by using the
conjunction “or”, the provisions of the WvSr and WvSr BES explicitly admit the
possibility to impose only a fine for a TF offence. This affects the dissuasiveness of the
sanctions. If more than one act or crime is committed, fines can cumulate and the
maximum prison sentence can be increased by one third (WvSr, Art. 57, 58). These
sanctions (and in particular the possibility to apply only a fine) are not dissuasive.

Criterion 5.7 – Legal persons can be subject to criminal liability (see c.3.10). If a crime
is committed by a legal person, a penalty up to the sixth category (EUR 870 000) or
up to 10% of the annual turnover is possible. The liability of the legal persons is not
dependent on the prosecution or conviction of a natural person and does not preclude
parallel criminal proceedings against the natural persons holding control (WvSr, Art.
51; WvSr BES, Art. 53). While civil and administrative proceedings are also possible,
it is not possible to apply both criminal and administrative penalties for the same
behaviour of the same legal person (una via principle, Awb, Art. 5:44) (see c.3.10).
This may impact the dissuasiveness of sanctions available for legal persons.

Criterion 5.9 – In the Netherlands (including BES Islands), TF offence is a predicate
offence to ML (see R.3).

Criterion 5.10 – The TF offence applies regardless of whether the person alleged to
have committed the offence(s) is in the same country or in a different country from
the one in which the terrorist(s)/terrorist organisation(s) is located or the terrorist
act(s) occurred/will occur (WvSv, Art. 421; WvSv BES, Art. 435(e)).

Weighting and Conclusion

The Netherlands is generally compliant with R.5 with minor gaps in relation to the
scope of TF offences and the proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions.
Recommendation 5 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 6 - Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and
terrorist financing
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former SR.III.
Outstanding deficiencies included insufficient guidance on freezing obligations other
than FIs, insufficient supervision on TFS in FIs other than banks, the freezing
obligations under EU Regulation 881/2001 did not expressly extend to funds and
assets owned or controlled “indirectly”, and the freezing was not without delay in all
instances.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Technical compliance

Criterion 5.8 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) has ancillary offences
applicable in all crimes under the Criminal Code, including TF. This includes
attempting to commit an offence, participating as an accomplice, organising or
directing others and contributing to the commission of an offence by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose (WvSr, Art. 45, 48, 47, 140; WvSr BES, Art. 47,
50, 49, and 146)

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The Netherlands implements TF TFS through EU decisions and regulations,
complemented by domestic legislation. Both domestic legislation and EU legal on TFS
is applicable to the BES Islands (Sw, Art. 14 et seq.; Sanction Regulation BES, Art. 1).

Criterion 6.1 – In relation to designations pursuant to the UNSCRs 1267/1989/2253
and 1988:

Technical compliance

a) The MFA is the competent authority for proposing persons or entities for
designation to the UN Sanctions Committees (including the BES Islands) (Sw,
Art. 1c and 2, Sanction Regulations BES; BVO Protocol, Art. 1.1.3). It acts in
agreement with the Ministers of Finance and of Economic Affairs, Agriculture
and Innovation for designations pursuant to the 1988 Committee, and in
consultation with the Ministers of Finance and Justice for designations to the
1267/1989 Committee.

b) The BVO Protocol describes the mechanism for identifying targets for
designation. When the MFA is notified by the authorities of an
individual/entity suspected to be involved in terrorist activities, it convenes
the Asset Freezing Committee. The Committee includes representatives from
the MFA, Finance, Justice and Security, OM, the FIU-NL and AIVD. After
consulting with the Committee, the MFA can recommend the listing of a
person to the UN 1267 Committee, regardless of whether the individual has
been listed domestically. The authorities explained that the same process
would apply to 1988 designations; however, there is no reference to UNSCR
1988 in the BVO Protocol.

c) The BVO Protocol does not mention the evidentiary standard of proof set out
in UNSCRs 1267, 1989, 1988 and their successor resolutions for designation
proposals. The listing criteria are set out in the UNSCRs and corresponding EU
decision (2011/486) and regulation (753/2011). However, the EU decision
and regulation do not include information on the process for member states
to identify targets for designation based on UNSCR criteria.

d) The Netherlands authorities indicated that the MFA uses the approved
procedures and forms for the listing of individuals, groups or entities
prescribed by the relevant sanctions committee to propose a listing. However,
as no designation proposal has been made so far, there is no documentary
evidence available.

e) The MFA will make available to the 1267 Committee information supporting
the decision to place the person or entity on the UN list (BVO Protocol, Para.
3.2.2). This information must be sufficiently specific, and its source must be
indicated if possible. The status of the Netherlands as a designating state is
made known to the Committee.

Criterion 6.2 – As an EU Member State, the Netherlands (including BES Islands)
implements the requirements of UNSCR 1373 through EU and national measures.
a) At national level, the MFA is responsible for domestic designations, in
consultation with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice and
Security (Anti-Terrorism Sanctions Order 2007-II, Art. 2), including for
designations at the request of another country.

At the EU level, the Council is responsible for designating persons or entities
that meet the criteria set forth in UNSCR 1373 (EU Regulation (CR)
2580/2001, Art. 2(3); CP 2001/931/CFSP, Art. 1(4)). The Council can also

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designate persons, groups and undertakings associated with ISIL and AlQaida or related cells or groups (CD 2016/1693/CFSP).

b) At national level, the MFA is notified by either the AIVD or OM if persons or
entities are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. The MFA
convenes the Asset Freezing Committee and, if there are sufficient indications
that the persons or entities meet the criteria for designation in UNSCR 1373
(BVO Protocol, Art. 2.1), decides on the designation, which is presented for
approval to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the
Minister of Justice and Security (see c. 6.1(b)).
At EU level, proposals for listing can be submitted by Member States’
competent authorities (the MFA for the Netherlands) as well as by the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (CP 2001/931/CFSP,
Art. 1(4); CD 2016/1693/CFSP, Art. 5)).

The Council Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism
(COMET WP) prepares and makes recommendations for designations. This
includes assessing whether the information available meets the specific
criteria for designation under UNSCR 1373 (CP 2001/931/CFSP, Art. 1(2) and
CR 2580/2001, Art. 2(3)).

At the EU level, the EEAS or relevant Member State will carry out a preliminary
scrutiny of the proposal and gather relevant information, including additional
information from the requesting country (doc. 14612/1/16 REV 1 on
establishment of COMET WP, Annex II, Art. 3). Delegations have 15 calendar
days to review the proposal(s) and to forward the information to competent
national authorities. Exceptionally, the EEAS or a delegation may put forward
a request to shorten this deadline (doc. 14612/1/16 REV 1 on establishment
of COMET WP, Annex II, Art.8-9).

d) At national level, the evidentiary standard of proof for domestic designations
pursuant to UNSCR 1373 refers to “sufficient indications” that the person
belongs to the category of persons and entities referred to in UNSCR 1373,
and it is not conditional upon the existence of a criminal proceeding (BVO
Protocol, Art. 2.1).

At the EU level, the Council decides on the basis of precise information or
material supporting the decision taken by a competent authority, based on
serious and credible evidence or clues, or condemnation (CP 2001/931/CFSP,
Art. 1(4)). The proposals for designations are not conditional upon the
existence of a criminal proceeding.

e) In the Netherlands, there are no formalised procedures to request another
country to give effect to the actions initiated under the freezing mechanism.
The Netherlands indicated that the same procedure as the one for requesting
the EU to give effect to an asset-freezing measure at the recommendation of
the Netherlands would apply and that the designation proposal would be
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Technical compliance

c) At national level, the MFA determines whether the third country request is
supported by reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed designee meets
the UNSCR 1373 designation criteria (BVO Protocol, Art. 2.4). The BVO
convenes on a regular basis or ad-hoc basis in urgent cases. The time to
process requests from third countries depends on the time needed by the OM
and AIVD to compare the information received with their own information.

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communicated through Diplomatic Note Verbale. However, no supporting
document was provided as there has been no request to a third country in
recent years. At the European level, there is an alignment procedure that
allows for requesting non-EU member countries to give effect to the EU list.

Criterion 6.3 –

a) At national level, the AIVD, OM and other LEAs have the powers to collect and
solicit information to identify persons or entities (Wiv 2017, Art. 25 et seq.;
RO, Art. 124 Book 2; WvSv, Art. 126nc et seq.).

Technical compliance

At the EU level, all Member States shall provide each other with the widest
possible range of police and judicial assistance in matters related to
persons/entities that meet the criteria for designation, inform each other of
any measures taken, and cooperate and supply information to the relevant UN
Sanctions Committee (CP 2001/931/CFSP, Art. 4; CR 2580/2001, Art. 8; CR
881/2002, Art. 8).

b) While there is no explicit provision in sanction-related legislation to operate
ex parte, the General Administrative Law Act envisages the possibility to
operate without prior notification if the purpose of the administrative
decision can be achieved only if the interested party is not informed of it
beforehand (Awb, Art. 4.11(c)). The BVO Protocol explains that the measure
must be in place before the persons or entities concerned are alerted (BVO
Protocol, Art. 1.1.3). The publication of the freezing measure in the
Government Gazette and notification of the designated persons or entities
happens after the freezing measure is taken (BVO Protocol, Art. 2.5). At the EU
level, designations take place without prior notice (CR 1286/2009, Preamble,
para. 5).

Criterion 6.4 – The implementation of TFS pursuant to UNSCRs 1267/1989/2253
and 1988 occurs without delay. To overcome the delays in the transposition of
designations at the EU level, the UN designations are in force in the Netherlands from
the date of their publication by the UN and until the EU provisions enter into force
(Implementation (Bridging) Sanctions Order 2019, Art. 2). In relation to TFS pursuant
to UNSCR 1373, the decision to freeze funds takes effect on the day of publication in
the Government Gazette and must be implemented immediately (Anti-Terrorist
Sanctions Order 2007-II, Art. 2)

Criterion 6.5 – In the Netherlands (including BES Islands), the following provisions
are in place to ensure the implementation and enforcement of TFS:

a) Under the EU regulations, all natural and legal persons within EU member
states shall freeze without prior notice and delay the funds or other assets of
designated persons and entities (CR 753/2011, Art. 3 and 14; CR 881/2002,
Art. 2(1) and 11; CR 2580/2001, Art. 2(1a) and 10). The Netherlands also
applies these freezing measures to EU residents (Anti-Terrorism Sanction
Order 2002-II, Art. 1). The same obligation applies to everyone present in the
Netherlands, all Dutch natural and legal persons and all Dutch nationals
outside of the Netherlands (Sw, Art. 13, WED, Art. 1(2) and WvSr, Art. 2).

b) At the EU level, freezing actions for UNSCR 1267/1989/2253 and 1988 apply
to all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled
directly or indirectly by the designated person or entity or a third party acting
on their behalf or at their direction (CR 753/2011, Art. 3; CR 881/2002, Art.

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2(1)). This extends to interest, dividends, or other income or value accruing
from or generated by assets (CR 881/2002, art. 1.1; CR 753/2011, art. 1(a)).
There is no explicit reference to assets jointly owned, although this is covered
in non-binding EU Best practices for the implementation of restrictive
measures (para. 34) and EU Council Sanctions Guidelines (para. 55a).

For EU designations as per UNSCR 1373, the freezing obligation applies to all funds,
other financial assets and economic resources belonging to, or owned or held by the
designated person or entity (EU Regulation 2580/2001, Art. 2.1(a)). There is no
explicit reference to the freezing of funds or other assets controlled by, or indirectly
owned by, or derived from assets owned by, or owned by a person acting on behalf of,
or at the direction of a designated person or entity. However, this gap is largely
addressed as the European Council is empowered to designate any legal person or
entity controlled by, or any natural or legal person acting on behalf of, a designated
person or entity (EU Regulation 2580/2001, Art.2(3) (iii) and (iv)).

c) At national level, it is forbidden to directly or indirectly make assets available
to designated persons or entities or to provide financial services to them
(Anti-Terrorist Sanctions Orders 2007 and 2007-II, Art. 2). The non-binding
Guidance papers by Ministry of Finance Guidance on TFS and the DNB
guidance on the Wwft and SA explain that this must be applied very broadly.

At the EU level, for UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988, there is a prohibition for all
natural and legal persons to make funds or other resources available, directly
or indirectly, to or for the benefit of designated persons or entities (CR
753/2011, Art. 3(2) and 14; CR 881/2002, Art. 2(2) and 11). However, there
is no reference to entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
designated persons or entities, nor to persons or entities acting on behalf, or
at the direction of, designated persons or entities. The same prohibition
applies for UNSCR 1373 designations; however, this gap is largely mitigated
by the European Council power to designate any legal person or entity
controlled by, or any natural or legal person acting on behalf of a designated
person or entity (EU Regulation 2580/2001, Art. 2(3) (iii) and (iv)).

The non-binding EU Guidelines and Best Practices on TFS implementation clarify that
these provisions shall be interpreted very broadly.
d) At national level, designations are published in the Government Gazette and a
consolidated sanction list is published on the government website. There is
an additional notification system in place available only to those FIs and
DNFBPs who have subscribed, transmitting notifications immediately after
any modification to the national list. DNB informs subscribers of national and
international sanction lists through monthly newsletters. Subscription is open
to anyone through the DNB website. As the newsletter is issued monthly, the
changes to the list may not be communicated immediately. DNB transmits ad

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At national level, the Anti-Terrorist Sanctions Orders 2007 and 2007-II implementing
UNSCR 1373 apply to “all assets belonging to” the designated person or entity (Art.
2). The Guidance paper on TFS by the Ministry of Finance and the DNB Guidance on
Wwft and SA clarify that this includes assets derived or generated from funds or
jointly owned assets. The Guidance also refers to the application of freezing measures
whenever a relationship with a designated person or entity is established, and that
this should be interpreted as broadly as possible. However, this guidance is not legally
enforceable.

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hoc newsletters when new national listings are adopted, but this notification
may also occur with a delay. Several authorities provide guidance on the
implementation of TFS, through information available on their webpages as
well as guidance papers, newsletters, circulars and other policy statements.

Designations made pursuant to EU regulations are published in the Official Journal of
the EU. A consolidated sanction list is available on the EC website and updated after
any change to the list. However, there is a delay of a few days between the UN
designations and the publication by the EU. Guidance on the implementation of the
EU sanctions is available on the websites of the EC, the European Council and the
European External Action Service.

e) At national level, the obligation to immediately report positive matches (i.e.,
identified relationships with a designated entity/person) only applies to FIs
and TCSPs (Sw (Supervision), Art. 3). For other DNFBPs, there is no reporting
obligation. In the BES Islands, VASPs and all DNFBPs except TCSPs have no
obligation to report matches (Wwft BES, Art. 3:13).

Technical compliance

At the EU level, FIs and DNFBPs are required to report any assets frozen or
actions taken in relation to designed persons or entities (CR 2016/1686,
Art.10; CR 881/2002, Art. 5; CR 753/2011, Art. 5; EU Regulation 2580/2001,
Art. 4).

f) At the EU level, there are measures in place to protect the rights of bona fide
third parties when implementing the obligations under R.6 (EU Regulation
881/2002, Art. 6; EU Regulation 753/2011, Art. 7). However, there are no
similar legal measures at national level.

Criterion 6.6 –

a) The MFA is responsible for submitting delisting requests to the relevant UN
Sanctions Committees, if the Asset Freezing Committee considers that there
are no longer grounds for an asset freeze (BVO Protocol, para. 4). The BVO
Protocol and the Ministry of Finance’s Guidance on TFS explain how to submit
a delisting request directly to the UN 1267/1989 Sanction Committee.
However, there is no information in relation to requests to the 1988
Committee.
b) At national level, the Netherlands has procedures in place to submit delisting
requests to the Asset Freezing Committee (Ministry of Finance’s Guidance on
TFS, question 14; BVO Protocol, para. 4). In case of an EU listing, the MFA will
submit a delisting proposal to the EU. At the EU level, de-listing procedures are
available under Regulation 2580/2001.

c) At national level, a designated person can submit an objection to the MFA and,
if this is denied, can contest the decision before an administrative court (Awb,
Art. 6:4). It is possible to lodge an appeal against the decision of an
administrative court, with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the
Council of State (Awb, Art. 6:4 (3)).

At the EU level, designated persons and entities may institute a proceeding
before the EU Court of Justice (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Art. 263,
para. 4 and Art. 275, para. 2).

d) At national level, if a Dutch national or resident is designated pursuant to
UNSCR 1988, the MFA would notify him and inform him about the possibility
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to seek delisting through the MFA or the Focal Point mechanism under UNSCR
1730. At the EU level, persons designated pursuant to UNSCR 1988 would be
informed of applicable de-listing procedures (CR 753/2011, Art. 11; CR
881/2002, Art. 7a).

e) At national level, for designations pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989, the MFA
would notify the individual/entity of the possibility to seek delisting through
the MFA or the UN Office of the Ombudsperson (BVO Protocol, para. 3.2.2). At
the EU level, the same provisions mentioned under c.6.6d would apply.

f) At national level, persons inadvertently affected by a freezing measure can
object as per the procedure explained under c.6.6c, or contact the FIs where
the assets have been frozen. If an FI receives information that a match could
be a false positive, it shall contact the supervisor to discuss whether the
freezing can be lifted (Ministry of Finance Guidance on TFS, 1.5.5).
At the EU level, there are procedures to handle cases of mistaken identity (EU
Best Practices on the implementation of restrictive measures, para. 8-17).

g) At national and EU levels, the same procedures in place to communicate
changes to the list and provide guidance, as described under c.6.5d, apply to
delisting and unfreezing.

Weighting and Conclusion

There is a mechanism in place to implement TFS pursuant to relevant UNSCRs
without delay, through the national and EU frameworks. However, national
legislation does not always prescribe in detail how the existing provisions shall be
implemented and existing guidance only partially covers this gap. Furthermore, there
is no national obligation for some DNFBPs to communicate the assets frozen or
actions taken in compliance with TFS obligations. Communication of designations or
de-listings to FIs and DNFBPs does not always occur immediately.
Recommendation 6 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 7 – Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation
This is a new Recommendation, which was not assessed in the 3rd round.

The Netherlands implements PF TFS through EU decisions and regulations. The
requirements of UNSCR 1718 are implemented through CD 2016/849 and CR
2017/1509, while UNSCR 2231 requirements are implemented through CD
2010/413 and CR 267/2012. The EU regulations have direct effect in the Netherlands.
Where necessary, domestic legislation complements the EU framework, through the
North Korea Sanctions Order 2017 and the Iran Sanctions Order 2012.
Both domestic legislation and EU legal acts on TFS are applicable to the BES Islands
(Sw, Part 7, Art. 14 et seq.; Sanction Regulation BES, Art. 1).
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Technical compliance

Criterion 6.7 – At the EU and national levels, there are procedures to authorise access
to frozen funds, where necessary for basic expenses or for the payment of certain fees
(CR 753/2011, Art. 5; CR 881/2002, Art. 2a; EU Regulation 2580/2001, Art. 5 and 6;
BVO Protocol, para.3.1.2 and 3.2.2, Sanctions Order ISIS and Al Qaida 2016, Art. 5;
Sanctions Order Afghanistan 2011, Art. 2; Sanction Order 2007-II, Art. 3). The
Minister of Finance is the competent authority to consider these requests.

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Criterion 7.1 – UN designations are in force from the date of their publication by the
UN and until the provisions of the EU enter into force (Implementation (Bridging)
Sanctions Order 2019, Art. 2). This measure overcomes the transposition delays of UN
designations at the EU level. This is applicable to the BES Islands.
Criterion 7.2 – The Netherlands (including BES Islands) has identified authorities
responsible for implementing and enforcing TFS, as follows:

Technical compliance

a) The EU regulations require all natural and legal persons within the Member
States to freeze the funds and other assets of designated persons and entities
(EU Regulation 2017/1509, Art. 34; EU Regulation 267/2012, Art. 23 and
23a). They are directly applicable in the Netherlands. The Implementation
(Bridging) Sanctions Order 2019 allows for the implementation of the
freezing measure without delay (see c. 7.1).

b) The freezing obligation extends to all funds and economic resources
belonging to, owned, held or controlled by a designated person or entity (CR
2017/1509, Art. 34; CR 267/2002, Art. 23 and 23a). This includes funds or
other assets derived or generated from such funds (CR 2017/1509, Art. 2, CR
267/2002, Art. 1). There is no explicit mention to funds or assets jointly
owned. However, the non-binding EU Best practices for the implementation
of restrictive measures cover cases of joint ownership (para. 34). Finally,
there is no reference to funds or assets of persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of, designated persons or entities. However, these
situations are covered by the requirement to freeze funds or assets
“controlled by” a designated person or entity. Furthermore, the EU
regulations largely address this gap, by requiring the designation of any
person or entity acting on behalf or at the direction of designated persons or
entities (CR 2017/1509, Art. 34(5); CR 267/2012, Art. 23a (2)(c)). The nonbinding domestic guidance by the Ministry of Finance also explains that the
freezing measures shall be applied whenever a relation with a designated
person or entity is identified, and that this concept shall be applied very
broadly.

c) There is a prohibition for all natural and legal persons within EU Member
States to make funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly,
to or for the benefit of a designated person or entity (CR 2017/1509, Art. 34;
CR 267/2012, Art. 23 and 23a)).
d) As described under c.6.5d, all EU regulations are published in the Official
Journal of the EU. The EU maintains a consolidated list of designated
individuals on its website and updates it after any change to the list, of which
subscribers are informed of immediately by an automated e-mail. Guidance
on the implementation of EU sanctions, including on the freezing obligation,
is available. At national level, the list is published on several government
websites and there are subscriptions and newsletters to facilitate information
to the private sector, but this domestic communication is not always
immediate. Guidance papers are also available.

e) The EU regulations require all natural and legal persons within the Members
States to provide immediately any information to the EC and national
competent authorities to facilitate compliance with TFS pursuant to UNSCRs
1718 and 2231 (EU Regulation 2017/1509, Art. 50; EU Regulation 267/2012,
Art. 40). At national level, the same deficiencies noted under c.6.5e apply: in
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the Netherlands, besides FIs and TCSPs, there is no obligation to report
sanction matches and freezing measures to the supervisor (Sw, Art. 3). In the
BES Islands, there is no obligation to report for certain categories of FIs and
for all DNFBPs except TCSPs.

f) There are provisions in place to protect the rights of bona fide third parties
when implementing the obligations under R.7 in good faith (EU Regulation
1509/2017, Art. 54; EU Regulation 267/2012, Art. 42).

Criterion 7.4 –

a) At the EU level, petitioners of PF TFS can submit de-listing requests either
through the UNSCR 1730 Focal Point, or through their government (EU Best
Practices on the implementation of restrictive measures, para. 23). At national
level, if a Dutch national or resident is designated pursuant to UNSCRs 1718
and 2231 and approach the government for guidance, the MFA would inform
the person about the legal consequences of being listed and the possibility to
seek delisting through the MFA or the UNSCR 1730 Focal Point. Guidance is
also provided on delisting procedures at EU and UN level (Ministry of
Finance’s Guidance on TFS, p. 15).

b) At the EU level, there are procedures in place to deal with cases of mistaken
identity (EU Best Practices on the implementation of restrictive measures,
para. 8-17). At national level, persons inadvertently affected by a freezing
measures can contact the MFA through the general national government
website. Any questions relating to freezing measures are forwarded to the
MFA and answered within four weeks. However, this process is not explained,
which raises questions as to whether affected persons would be aware of it.

c) The EU regulations authorise access to funds or other assets in line with
relevant UNSCRs (CR 2017/1509, Art. 35-36; CR 267/2012, Art. 24-28). At
national level, the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Foreign Trade and
Development Co-operation are the competent authorities to assess and
authorise access to funds or economic resources (Iran Sanctions Order 2012,
Art. 3(3); North Korea Sanction Order 2017, Art. 5). The Ministry of Finance
Guidance on TFS refers to the Ministry of Finance as the competent authority
to authorise sanction exemptions (Chapter 1.8).
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Technical compliance

Criterion 7.3 – EU regulations require Member States to take all measures to ensure
that TFS are implemented, and have effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions
available for non-compliance (EU Regulation 2017/1509, Art. 55; EU Regulation
267/2012, Art. 47). At national level, FIs and trust offices shall take administrative
and internal control measures to comply with the sanction regulations. This includes
control of any match between the identity of a relation and designated persons or
entities, and the obligation to report immediately any positive match to their
supervisor (DNB or AFM) (Sw (Supervision) Regulation, Art. 2 and 3). Failure to
report is an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to six years,
community service or a fine of the fifth category (EUR 87 000) (WED, Art. 1(2) and
Art. 6) in European Netherlands and by imprisonment up to two years or a fine of the
fourth category (maximum USD 14.000) or the fifth category (USD 56 0000) for legal
entities (Wwft BES, Art. 6.1 WvSr BES Art. 27) in the BES Islands. However, for most
DNFBPs there is no obligation for mandatory screening systems or for reporting
information to their supervisor.

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d) The same mechanisms described under c.7.2d apply to delisting and
unfreezing communications. In cases where a reported freezing action is
determined by the Ministry of Finance not to be an “exact hit”, DNB or AFM
will communicate this immediately to the relevant FI. However, it is unclear
how this process would work for other obliged entities than those supervised
by DNB and AFM.

Criterion 7.5 – With regard to contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior
to the date on which the account became subject to TFS:

a) The EU regulations permit to add interests or other sums due on those
accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that
arose prior to the date when they became subject to the provisions of this
resolution, provided that these amounts are also frozen. (CR 2017/1509, Art.
34(9); CR 267/2012, Art. 29).
b) The EU regulations imposing TFS pursuant to UNSCR 2231 permit the
payment of sums due under a contract entered into prior to the designation
of such person or entity, provided that this payment does not contribute to an
activity prohibited by the regulation, and after prior notice is given to the UN
Sanctions Committee (CR 267/2012, Art. 25).

Technical compliance

Weighting and Conclusion

Through the EU and national framework, the Netherlands (including the BES Islands)
has a system in place to ensure the implementation of PF TFS without delay. However,
there are some minor shortcomings in relation to the extent of the freezing obligation.
There is a general obligation for all persons and obliged entities to implement PF TFS.
However, most DNFBPs have no obligation to implement a screening system or report
information to their supervisor. Since there are no obligations, there is also no
monitoring or sanctioning available for those DNFBPs.
Recommendation 7 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 8 – Non-profit organisations
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former SR.VIII. Outstanding deficiencies related to the lack of outreach initiatives for
NPOs outside the Central Bureau for Fundraising (CBF) seal mechanism and the lack
of co-ordination and information exchange mechanisms involving the CBF.

Criterion 8.1 – Dutch law does not provide for a definition of NPOs. Legal entities
corresponding to the FATF definition of NPOs usually take the form of a foundation
or an association. Foundations have no members and their purpose is to realise a
charitable objective. An association is a partnership between two or more members
to achieve a certain objective.

a) The Netherlands identify foundations and associations with charitable
purposes as the subset of NPOs falling within the FATF definition. Most NPOs
form a low risk of TF due to their membership of a sector organisation and
related self-regulation, good governance and transparency policies. However,
the 2017 and 2020 TF NRAs found the acquisition and/or financing via
foundations or other legal entities as the greatest TF risk. The Netherlands
used different sources of information to determine the subset of NPOs likely
to be at risk of TF abuse. These included the results of the 2020 TF NRA,
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quarterly terrorism threat assessments by the NCTV, TF investigations
involving NPOs, and public-private co-operation to compose a risk profile of
NPOs that could be abused (see c.8.5a). On this basis, the authorities identified
foundations with potential ties to jihadist groups as posing a higher risk of TF
abuse.

b) The 2020 TF NRA and some quarterly terrorism threat assessments, which
are publicly available include threats related to the potential abuse of NPOs
for TF. The main categories of threats identified in various threat assessments
were the abuse of NPOs operating in, or close to, areas where terrorists
operate; ML, fraud or TF risks related to the financing by foreign radical
groups to influence certain religious foundations in the Netherlands; abuse of
foundations to collect funding (e.g., for aid projects) in the Netherlands, to
finance TF in the Netherlands or abroad. The 2020 TF NRA also highlights the
same threats for NPOs.

c) There has been no recent formal review focussing specifically on the adequacy
of measures related to the subset of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. However, the
Netherlands considers the outcomes of regular TF threats analysis to identify
and address any weaknesses in the measures taken to protect NPOs from
potential TF abuse. Following the threat assessments, the government took
measures to increase transparency in the sector (see c.8.2a).

BES Islands: c.8.1(a)-(d): The Netherlands does not identify a high TF risk on the BES
Islands nor a TF risk within BES NPOs. Unless explicitly mentioned in the analysis, no
specific measures or actions have been taken or apply to the BES islands. No specific
subset of NPOs on the BES Islands has been identified as falling within the FATF
definition.
Criterion 8.2

a) The Netherlands has policies in place to promote accountability, integrity and
public confidence in the administration and management of NPOs.
JustisTRACK continuously monitors the integrity of legal persons, including
its directors and affiliated persons or legal persons. As it has no access to
information from government organisations in the BES islands, any analysis
on NPOs located in the BES Islands could only be performed based on publicly
available information. There are two certification systems rewarding NPOs
(including in the BES Islands) that fulfil certain requirements in terms of
transparency and accountability. The Tax and Customs Administration
delivers the ANBI (Public Benefit Organisation) status. The ANBI status
provides certain tax exemptions, with the objective to stimulate charity. NPOs
that want to raise funds can apply for a certification by the Netherlands
Fundraising accreditation agency (CBF). To qualify for ANBI status or CBF
recognition, NPOs have to fulfil standards regarding accountability, integrity,
and transparency. In the Netherlands, 32 762 foundations and 2 723
associations have an ANBI status (see IO.10), while in the BES Islands 12 out
of 717 associations and foundations have ANBI status. Only 630 organisations
have a CBF recognition. Finally, the Netherlands has introduced a “validation

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d) The Netherlands periodically reassesses information on the NPO sector to
ensure effective implementation of measures, through the quarterly threat
assessments by the NCTV, which also includes information and trends related
to the sector, and through the TF NRAs.

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system philanthropy”, compulsory for all ANBI organisations that includes a
code of conduct, a certification system and a central information portal.

b) The Netherlands has undertaken outreach programmes to raise awareness on
potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to TF abuse, in co-operation with the private
sector. Outreach to the donor community is carried out mainly through the
ANBI and CBF certifications, which signal the accountability and integrity of
NPOs. The Ministry of Finance organised a series of roundtables and publicprivate dialogue in co-operation with the Human Security Collective to
exchange on several issues, including TF risks. Roundtables have involved
Dutch association of banks (NVB), large banks, NPOs of different sizes, the
DNB and the Ministries of Justice and Security, Finance and MFA and the FIU.
The FIU-NL also held a presentation at the CBF on the risks of abuse on NPOs
in relation to TF. The roundtables have also involved some good faith NPOs
most exposed to TF threats. NPOs in the BES Islands have not been targeted
specifically, due to the low risk of TF.

Technical compliance

c) As described under c.8.2b, the authorities have worked closely with NPOs in
the development of best practices to address TF risks and vulnerabilities
(factsheet; roundtables). These initiatives involve NPOs vulnerable to
potential TF abuse.

d) The roundtables conducted by the Ministry of Finance, Ministries of Justice
and Security, MFA and the Human Security Collective promote a dialogue
between NPOs and the financial sector to mitigate unintended effects of TF
policies, such as de-risking, and encourage NPOs to use the official financial
channels. NPOs with annual revenues of more than EUR 500 000 are required
to conduct their transactions via regulated channels in order to qualify for the
CBF recognition.

Criterion 8.3 The Netherlands gives a prominent role to self-regulation and
government intervention is minimal and only where strictly necessary. There is no
public supervisory authority for the non-profit sector, but there is screening of NPOs
at different stages of their establishment.

All associations and foundations (including NPOs) must be established via a notarial
deed (Bw, 2:4). This step includes an obligation for the notary to perform CDD and
report any unusual activity to the FIU. Furthermore, NPOs must register with the
CoC’s Company Register, providing articles of the foundation, the location,
directors/supervisors, BO, and authorised agents (Hrw, Art. 5, 6, 9-17). There is also
an obligation to keep information in the Register complete and up-to-date (Hrw, Art.
19). The data in the Company Register is verified every three years (Hrw, Art. 41).

The JustisTRACK system by the Ministry of Justice (see c.8.2a) uses several data
sources to automatically monitor the integrity of legal persons registered at the CoC.
This system might identify some NPOs with a high TF risk, for example, in case
persons involved in the NPOs are on a terrorist sanction list or have criminal
antecedents. The certification systems for NPOs with ANBI status or CBF recognition
require them to fulfil accountability, integrity and transparency criteria. Tax and
Customs Administration continuously supervise organisations with ANBI status,
using a risk-profile based on prior experiences and input from the FIOD. CBF NPOs
are required to adhere to requirements set by an independent standard-setting
commission, which depend on the size and capacity of each organisation. There is an
annual review of the organisations under CBF supervision and an extensive review of

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each organisation every three years. However, for NPOs other than those with an
ANBI status or CBF recognition, there is no obligation to maintain financial
statements, record their transactions, or undertake similar measures to ensure
transparency in their operations, nor there is a supervisory mechanism in place. The
measures available do not appear to be risk-based and do not seem to target NPOs
most vulnerable to TF abuse.
Criterion 8.4

a) Many NPOs are part of a sector organisation, which monitors compliance with
their self-regulation obligations. The Tax and Customs Administration, CBF
and two NPO branch organisations signed a co-operation agreement to
synchronise the qualification system for ANBI-status and the CBF-recognition
and ensure a more effective and efficient control. However, this monitoring is
limited to the compliance with the terms of recognition and only applies to
the minority of NPOs that apply for ANBI status or CBF recognition. NPOs
without an ANBI-status or CBF recognition, or which are not part of any sector
organisation are not subject to additional monitoring, apart from the
measures mentioned in 8.3. Furthermore, there is no indication of any riskbased monitoring or supervisory action.

BES Islands: In case of failure to transmit information (on time or correctly) to the
commercial register, a maximum fine of USD 28 000 (approx. EUR 22 770) can be
imposed.
Criterion 8.5

a) There are several initiatives to enhance co-operation and information sharing
between authorities. In particular, the FEC has a programme on TF, to share
information and insights into networks and methods of financing of
individuals, including NPOs. The FEC TF Task-Force is a public-private
partnership initiative between the Police, the FIU-NL, the OM, FIOD and some
FIs. The FIU-NL also has a public-private information sharing “TF-platform”
with the four largest banks, which discuss suspected TF cases, including on
NPOs. Finally, the FEC also launched a “Rogue Foundations project”, where cooperation between the largest banks, the OM, the FIU-NL, Police and the
municipality of Amsterdam is used to compose a TF risk profile for NPOs.

b) The Netherlands has investigative expertise and capability to examine
suspected TF cases involving NPOs. The FIU-NL, FIOD and the OM have
appointed experts on TF and NPOs.
c) In the course of an investigation, investigative services can consult the data in
the Company Register, which includes the administration and management of
NPOs. Furthermore, they can request information provided by an NPO to the
Tax Administration or the CBF, to qualify for the two certifications.
Investigative services can also request NPOs’ financial statements. The

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b) A large part of sanctioning non-compliance within branch organisations is
dependent on CBF-recognition, ANBI status, or other labels. The ANBI-status,
the CBF-recognition or other existing labels can be revoked when the NPO no
longer meets the terms of recognition or the established code of conduct.
There are sanctions for non-registration or false registration to the
commercial and BO register of the CoC (see c.24.13). Legal entities whose
activity is contrary to the public order can be dissolved.

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general provisions allowing authorities to request and access information are
applicable also to obtain information from NPOs (see c.31.1).

d) As per the analysis under c.8.5a, there are appropriate mechanisms to ensure
that, when there is suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that a
particular NPO is involved in TF, this information is shared with competent
authorities. When a request for information is made on the basis of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, the OM must include in a timeframe in which the
request must be fulfilled. In case of urgent necessity, information can also be
requested verbally (WvSv, Art. 126nd(4)). LEAs can also send a LOvJ request
to the FIU-NL.

Criterion 8.6 The Netherlands has identified IRCs as point of contact to respond to
international requests for information regarding NPOs suspected of TF or
involvement in other forms of terrorist support. The general procedures for MLA and
co-operation are applicable to international requests for information on NPOs (see
R.37 and 40).

Technical compliance

Weighting and conclusion

The Netherlands has identified the subset of NPOs at higher risk of potential TF abuse,
as well as ways in which those organisations can be abused. There are several
outreach initiatives to raise awareness and promote accountability of NPOs, but they
are not part of a clear coherent policy and have not yet reached all the NPOs most
vulnerable to TF. NPOs are supervised and monitored to some extent, mainly through
self-regulation mechanisms. The supervision does not always focus on the
organisations most vulnerable for potential TF abuse and although many selfregulation obligations focus on the transparency of the financial situation, there are
few obligations or controls related to the financial situation of other NPOs. Since the
TF risk on the BES Islands is considered low, no specific NPO measures are taken. This
is considered a minor deficiency due to risk and materiality.
Recommendation 8 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 9 – Financial institution secrecy laws
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated compliant with the requirements of former
R.4.
Criterion 9.1 – There are no FI secrecy laws that inhibit the implementation of
AML/CFT measures in the Netherlands (including the BES Islands).
Access to information by competent authorities

The general provision for supervisors to obtain information is set out in General
Administrative Law (Awb, Art. 5:16). Authorities are able to obtain information from
any person necessary to exercise their functions (Wft, Art. 1(74)), but are prohibited
from using confidential data (data that can be traced to an individual) collected
through the course of their activities, or from a foreign supervisor, for any purpose
other than carrying out their functions under the acts. Supervisors are also prohibited
from sharing confidential information except where necessary to carry out their
functions under the act (Wwft, Art. 22 (1)).
Other competent authorities, including LEAs, have statutory powers to request
information from FIs (see R.29, R.31).

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BES Islands: Supervisors are authorised to obtain information under the Wwft BES
and BES Financial Markets Act. This includes power to enter premises and demand
information (Wwft BES, Art. 5.5; Wfm BES, Art. 7.7–7.11).
Sharing of information between competent authorities

Supervisors are able to share confidential information obtained through the course of
their activities with other domestic and foreign competent authorities (Wwft, Art,
22.a). There are no FI secrecy laws that inhibit this sharing.

BES Islands: Supervisors are authorised to share information obtained in the course
of their duties with other competent authorities domestic or foreign, except in certain
circumstances. This includes, where they have insufficient guarantees that the data or
information will not be used for another purpose (Wwft BES, Art 1.5 (2-4)).

Sharing information between FIs

There are no secrecy laws that restrict the sharing of information between FIs, where
this is required by R.13, 16 or 17. Subject to article 23 Wwft, FIs are required to share
information regarding the reporting of an UTR within their financial groups (Wwft,
Art, 23), unless the FIU-NL has indicated that this information must not be disclosed
(Wwft, Art. 23a, 23(6)).

Weighting and conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 9 is rated compliant.

Recommendation 10 – Customer due diligence
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with the requirements
of former R.5, as there were deficiencies in CDD measures for establishing BO and
keeping CDD information up-to-date.

In Dutch law, only natural or legal persons can act in legal transactions. Trusts or
similar legal arrangements can never be the customer in a legal transaction. In
continental Netherlands, FIs are required to conduct CDD on a trust or similar legal
arrangement (Wwft, Art. 3(3). There are deficiencies relating to the requirement to
identify and verify the indirect customers of legal arrangements in the Netherlands
and BES islands.
Criterion 10.1 – There is no explicit prohibition on FIs from keeping anonymous
accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names. Nevertheless, FIs are required to
perform CDD before establishing a business relationship or conducting a transaction
(Wwft, Art.5(1); Wwft BES, Art.2.4(2)). This includes obtaining and verifying the
identity of the customer and, in the case of legal persons, the BO.
a) Criterion 10.2 – FIs are not permitted to enter into a business relationship unless
CDD has been carried out (Wwft, Art.3(5); Wwft BES, Art.2.3(a)).

b) FIs must conduct CDD for occasional transactions in or from the Netherlands with
a minimum value of EUR 15 000, whether the transaction is carried out in a single
operation or in several operations that appear to be linked (Wwft, Art.3(5)(b)).
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BES Islands: Information sharing within financial groups is permitted when such data
and information relates to the prevention of ML and TF (Wwft BES, Art. 3.10).

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BES Islands: FIs must conduct CDD on all occasional transactions (Wwft BES,
Art2.4).

c) CDD must be conducted on transactions in or out of the Netherlands for customers
above EUR 1 000, where these transactions are defined as transfers of funds in
the Article 3.9 of Regulation (EC) 1781/2006 on information on the payer
accompanying transfers of funds (Wire Transfer Regulation).

BES Islands: All wire transfers in and out of the BES Islands are subject to CDD
(Wwft BES, Art. 2.3(1)(b)).

d) FIs are required to perform CDD if there are indications that the customer is
involved in ML or TF (Wwft, Art.3(5)(c); Wwft BES, Art.2.3(c)).
e) FIs are required to perform CDD when there are doubts about the veracity or
adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data (Wwft, Art.3(5)(d);
Wwft BES, Art.2.3(d)).

Technical compliance

Criterion 10.3 – FIs are required to identify and verify the customer’s identity (Wwft,
Art.3(2)(a) and 3.3; Wwft BES, Art 2.2(2)(a)). Identification must be verified using
reliable and independent sources (Wwft, Art.11(1-3); Wwft BES, Art. 2.12(1) Wwft
BES art. 2.2 (2)(b)).
Criterion 10.4 – FIs are required to establish whether any natural or legal person who
represents the customer is authorised to do so, and identify and verify the identity of
that person (Wwft, Art.3(2)(e); Wwft BES, Art.2.2(2)(e)-(f)).

Criterion 10.5 – FIs are required to identify BOs and take reasonable measures to
verify their identity (Wwft, Art. 3(2)(b); Wwft BES, Art.2.2(2)(b)). Documents that can
be used to fulfil this requirement are listed in the Wwft implementing regulation and
include an extract from the Commercial register or a deed or declaration, drawn up
or issued by a lawyer, civil-law notary, junior civil-law notary or comparable
independent legal professional practising in the Netherlands or in another Member
State (Art. 4(2); Wwft BES, Art. 2.12, 14 and BES ML/TF Regulation, Art 4.2).

Criterion 10.6 – FIs are obliged to understand and obtain information on the purpose
and intended nature of the business relationship (Wwft, Art.3(2)(c); Wwft BES,
Art.2.2 (2)(c)).

Criterion 10.7 – FIs are required to continuously monitor the business relationship.
This includes:

a) monitoring all transactions performed over the course of the relationship, to
ensure they are consistent with the institutions’ knowledge of the customer and
their business and risk profile, including where necessary, the source of funds
(Wwft, Art.3(2)(d); Wwft BES, Art.2.2 (2)(d)).

b) ensure that all data collected in the context of CDD is kept up-to-date (Wwft,
Art.3(11); Wwft BES, Art.2.2(6)). CDD must be performed by FIs in certain higher
risk situations, for example, if there are indications the customer is involved in
ML/TF, there are doubts about the accuracy of information previously obtained
or if the risk of an existing customer’s involvement in ML/TF gives cause to do so
(Wwft, Art.3(5) Wwft BES, Art.2.3).

Criterion 10.8 – In the case of legal persons and legal arrangements, FIs are required
to take reasonable measures to understand the customer’s ownership and control
structures. There is an explicit requirement for FIs to understand the nature of their

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customer’s business and monitor the business relationship and transactions to ensure
they align with their understanding of the customer’s profile (Wwft, Art. 3.2(c)(d);
Wwft BES, Art. 2.2(2)(d)).

Criterion 10.9 – FIs are required to identify customers that are legal persons or
arrangements and verify their identity on the basis of documents, data or information
from a reliable and independent source Wwft, Art 11(1). This includes:

BES Islands: All legal persons need to be registered, including their owners
and directors (Hrw BES, Art, 3-5). FIs are required to collect either a certified
extract from the CoC or from a comparable foreign registry, or a deed or
declaration drawn up by a lawyer or notary. This must include the name, legal
form and registration number (Wwft BES, Art. 2.12, BES ML/TF Regulation,
Art. 4(2-4)). FIs are required to identify and verify domestic and foreign legal
persons on the basis of documents, data or information from a reliable and
independent source. Foreign legal persons can be verified using similar
documents recognised for identification in the country of origin (Wwft BES,
2.12(1).

Criterion 10.10 – FIs are required to identify and take reasonable measures to verify
the BO of a legal person by collecting the following information:

(a)-(b) The identity of all natural persons that directly or indirectly ultimately own
or control the company by holding shares or voting rights that exceed 25% of
the company and natural persons who have actual control over the legal entity
(i.e., hold a decision making position) (Wwft Decree, Art. 3; Bwft BES, Art. 2).

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Technical compliance

a) An extract from the commercial register (if required to be registered with the
CoC) or a deed or declaration by a lawyer, civil-law notary, junior civil-law
notary or comparable, independent legal professional practicing in the
Netherlands or in another Member State (Wwft, Art. 11(2); Wwft Regulation
2018, Art. 4(2)). For customers that are foreign legal persons, FIs must verify
their identity on the basis of documents that are customary in international
commerce or that have been recognised by the law as a valid means of
identification in the State of origin of the customer. The information for all
legal persons must include the name, legal form, and, if it is registered with
the CoC, proof of existence through the registration number and the method
by which the identity was verified (Wwft, Art Art.33(2)(c)(1)(2)).
b) If the customer acts as a trustee of a trust or other legal arrangement, CDD
requirements apply and must enable the institution to establish whether the
customer is authorised to act as trustee of a trust or for the benefit of another
legal construct (Wwft Art 3 (2)(3)). In such cases, FIs must also collect
information on the objective and nature of the trust or other legal construct
and its governing laws. Legal persons and other legal entities established in
the Netherlands must register with the CoC and obtain a registration number
(Hrw, Art.9; Hrw BES, Art.5). Requirements to register include the details of
directors and persons charged with the day-to day management of the
business and the legal form (Hrw, Art.18). FIs may also collect information on
senior management when performing other parts of CDD, including when
determining the customer’s ownership and control structure or when
identifying the person acting on behalf of the customer.
c) The address of the registered office and a principal place of business (Wwft,
Art.33(2)(c); Wwft BES, Art. 2.12)).

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c)

In case no natural person is identified, or there is doubt as to whether the
person referred to under (a) and (b) is the BO, the identity of the natural
person belonging to the senior management of the legal person (Wwft Decree,
Art. 3; Bwft BES, Art. 2).

Criterion 10.11

a) FIs are required to identify and take reasonable measures to verify the
identity of BOs of trusts including the settlor(s), trustee(s), protector(s) and
beneficiaries (where it is not possible to identify the beneficiaries, the class of
person in whose main interest the trust is set up in or operates) and any other
natural person who ultimately controls the trust (Wwft Decree 2018,
Art.3(1)(e); Bwft BES Art. 2(1)(d)).
b) The obligations to perform CDD also apply to other legal arrangements (Wwft
Decree 2018, Art.3(5); Bwft BES, Art. 2(5)).

Technical compliance

Criterion 10.12 – In relation to life insurance policies, FIs are required to conduct
CDD as soon as the beneficiary is identified or designated. This includes:

a) registering the name of the person, if the beneficiary is a natural person or
legal person or legal construct mentioned by name (Wwft, Art.3a; Wwft BES,
Art.1.1(b) and Art.2.7(2));
b) obtaining sufficient information concerning the beneficiary to become
satisfied that the identity of the beneficiary can be established at the time a
payment when the beneficiary has been designated by characteristics, by
class, or by other means. For the BES Islands, this must take place at or before
the time of payment, or at or before the time when the beneficiary wants to
exercise his rights under the policy (Wwft 3a(1)(b); Wwft BES, Art.2.7);
c) verifying the identity of the beneficiary at the time of the payout (Wwft,
Art.3a(1)(b); Wwft BES, Art.2.7).

Criterion 10.13 – FIs must adapt CDD measures based on the ML/TF risks of their
customers, business relationships, products or transactions (Wwft, Art.3(8); Wwft
BES, Art.1.8 and 2.2). If the business relationship or transaction entails a greater risk
of ML/TF, enhanced measures must be applied. The inclusion of both ‘business
relationship’ and ‘transactions’ also covers life insurance beneficiaries (Wwft, Art.
8.1(a) Wwft BES, Art 1.1(b)).

Criterion 10.14 – FIs must identify customers and BOs when establishing a business
relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction. FIs are permitted to verify the
identity of the customer and BO after entering the business relationship if this is
necessary to avoid disruption, provided that this is done as soon as possible after the
first contact with the customer and the risk of ML/TF is low (Wwft, Art.4(3); Wwft
BES, Art.2.7(1)).
Criterion 10.15 – FIs are required to adopt risk management procedures concerning
the conditions under which a customer may utilise the business relationship prior to
verification (Wwft, Art. 2c(1); Wwft BES, Art. 1.10(1))

Criterion 10.16 – FIs are required to continuously monitor customer relationships
and apply CDD to existing customers in the situations referred to in c.10.2, including
on the basis of ML/TF risks (Wwft, Art.3(5)(e); Wwft BES Art.2.3(1)(c). Monitoring
must be based on the risk profile of the customer. Customer data must be kept up to
date (Wwft, Art. 3(8); Wwft BES, Art.2.2 (6). There are requirements to check if
customers who existed before legislative changes meet requirements (e.g. AMLD4

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and the revised Wwft BES), but there are no other specific requirements for existing
customers.

Criterion 10.17 – FIs must perform EDD where higher risks are identified (Wwft, Art.
8(1); Wwft BES, Art. 2.10(1)).

Criterion 10.18 FIs are permitted to perform simplified CDD when the risk of ML/TF
is low. In such cases, FIs must demonstrate that sufficient information was gathered
to determine that simplified measures are appropriate (Wwft, Art. 6.2; Wwft BES,
Art.2.8 (1)(2)). EDD must always be applied if the business relationship or transaction
entails a greater risk of ML/TF, or if it involves a customer from a jurisdiction
designated as higher risk for ML/TF by the EC (Wwft, Art.8(1)(a); Wwft BES,
Art.2.10(1).
Criterion 10.19 –

b) FIs must submit a UTR when the unusual nature of the transaction becomes
known, including when a relationship is terminated or if there is an indication
the customer is involved in ML/TF (Wwft, Art.16.1, 16.4(b); Wwft BES, Art.3.5,
3.5(4)b).

Criterion 10.20 – FIs and their employees are obliged to maintain confidentiality on
UTRs submitted to the FIU (Wwft, Art. 23(1). This obligation has priority over other
obligations. The Wwft does not, in any way, obstruct the performance of CDD being
postponed or abandoned if this would lead to the customer being tipped off. OM can
request information from an FI and indicate in the demand that it does not want the
customer to know of an investigation. It can also request that the customer
relationship and transactions be maintained until indicated otherwise (DNB
Guidance, p.59 and Explanatory Memorandum of the Wwft). In such cases, the
requirement to submit an UTR remains.

Weighting and Conclusion

While most of the CDD measures meet the FATF Standards, there is there is no specific
requirement for FIs to take into account when previous measures have taken place
when applying CDD to existing customers, other than if this took place before the
implementation of AMLD4 or the equivalent measures in the Wwft BES. This is a
minor deficiency.
Recommendation 10 is rated largely compliant.

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Technical compliance

a) FIs are not permitted to enter into a business relationship or conduct a
transaction for a customer until CDD has been carried out. Verification of
identity can take place after the business relationship is established to avoid
disruption, where there is low risk and provided verification takes place at the
first opportunity. Where a business relationship has already been established,
FIs are required to terminate the business relationship if it is unable to comply
with CDD measures (Wwft, Art.5(3); Wwft BES, Art. 2).4). FIs can also open
accounts (including securities accounts) providing these cannot be used
before verification has taken place and in the case of trust and legal persons,
before the beneficiary exercises their definitive rights (Wwft, Art.4(4); Wwft
BES, Art.2.7(1)(3)).

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Recommendation 11 – Record-keeping
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated as LC with the previous R.10 because of
ambiguity around the time required to retain records, a lack of explicit requirement
that records of transactions should be sufficient to permit reconstruction of
transactions sufficient for a prosecution and a lack of power to extend the retention
period if necessary.

Technical compliance

Criterion 11.1 – FIs are required to perform CDD to enable them to continuously
monitor the business relationship and the transactions conducted during the period
of that business relationship (Wwft, Art. 3(2)(d); Wwft BES, Art. 2.2(2)(d)).
Documents and data used in the course of performing CDD must be retained for five
years after the date of termination of the business relationship or up to five years after
completion of the relevant transaction (Wwft, Art. 33(1) and (3); Wwft BES). In the
BES Islands, there is no similar requirement for this information to be retained on all
transactions, as it is not covered by the requirements on the types of information that
must be retained (Wwft BES, Art. 2.2 and 2.13).
Criterion 11.2 – FIs are required to retain all CDD records for a period of five years
after the date of termination of the business relationship or after the completion of
the relevant transaction (Wwft, Art.33(1) and (3)). Additionally, FIs must maintain all
business records for seven years (AWR, Art.52; BES Tax Act, Art.8.86). However, this
only includes the information referred to in Annex B of the Wwft BES Act, which does
not cover all information as required by c.11.2 including transaction records or
correspondence.

Criterion 11.3 – FIs must retain the documentation and information referred to in
c.11.1 in a retrievable format. In relation to UTRs, FIs are required to retain all data
necessary for the reconstruction of a transaction for a period of five years from when
the UTR was submitted. The submitting FI must also retain a copy of the submitted
report and the notification of receipt from the FIU (Wwft, Art 34; Wwft BES, Art.
3.5(3)).

Criterion 11.4 – FIs are required to ensure that CDD information and transaction
records on UTRs are kept in an accessible manner and have systems in place to
promptly respond to requests from the FIU and supervisors (Wwft, Art. 33(3), 34(1);
Wwft BES, Art. 2.13, 3.5(3)).

Weighting and Conclusion

FIs in the BES are not required to retain all information required by c.11.2 including
transaction records or correspondence. This is a minor deficiency.
Recommendation 11 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 12 – Politically exposed persons
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with the requirements
of former R.6. Deficiencies related to requirements to determine PEPs’ source of
wealth, foreign PEPs residing in the Netherlands requirements and senior
management approval for existing business relationships. In addition, the definition
of close associate only covered those who were “publicly known”.
Criterion 12.1 – PEPs are defined as any natural person who holds or has held a
prominent public function, designated by order in council (Wwft, Art. 1.1), or holds or
has held a prominent office within or outside the public bodies in the BES islands

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(Wwft BES, Art. 1.1(o)). There is no distinction between foreign and domestic PEPs in
the Netherlands and the same measures that apply to domestic PEPs apply to foreign
PEPs.
In addition to performing CDD as set out in R.10, FIs are required to:

(a) have appropriate risk management systems, including risk-based procedures
in place to determine whether the customer or BO is a PEP (Wwft, Art. 8(5)(a);
Wwft BES, Art. 2.10(3));
(b) obtain senior management approval when establishing or continuing a
business relationship or conducting a transaction for a PEP (Wwft, Art.
8(5)(b)(1)). In the BES Islands, the decision is taken by a person approved by
the service provider. There is no requirement on the level of seniority of the
approved person (Wwft BES, Art. 2.10(3)).

(c) take appropriate measures to establish the source of assets and funds used in
the business relationship or transaction (Wwft, Art. 8(5)(b)(2)). In the BES
Islands, FIs are only required to establish the source of assets (Wwft BES, Art.
2.10(3)(b)).
(d) subject the business relationship to increased monitoring (Wwft Art,
8(5)(b)(3); Wwft BES, Art. 2.10(3)(c)).

Criterion 12.3 – Measures set out in criterion 12.1 and 12.2 also apply to family
members and close associates of PEPs (Wwft, Art. 8(8); Wwft BES, Art. 1.1(1)(o)).

Criterion 12.4 – FIs are required to take appropriate measures to determine if the
beneficiary or the BO of the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is a PEP. In such
situations, senior management must be informed prior to the payment of the
proceeds of the policy and the entire business relationship must be subject to
increased monitoring (Wwft, Art. 8(6)). While there is no specific requirement to file
a UTR when higher risks are identified, the general requirement to report UTRs
applies (see R.20).

BES Islands: FIs are required to apply the measures in c.12.1-12.3 to all customers,
including persons on whose behalf a transaction is carried out. In the event of paying
the benefits pursuant to a life insurance contract, this includes both the person who
pays the premium and the beneficiaries (Wwft BES, Art. 1.1(1)). FIs are required to
verify the identity of the beneficiary of a policy before the payment, or at or before the
time when the beneficiary exercises their rights under the policy (Wwft BES, Art. 2.7).
There is no requirement to inform senior management before payout. However, FIs
are required to obtain senior management approval prior to establishing the business
relationship.

Weighting and Conclusion

FIs must obtain senior management approval when establishing or continuing a
business relationship or conducting a transaction for a PEP. There is no strict
requirement to have senior management approval for establishing and continuing
PEP relationships in the BES Islands. This function can be designated to a person
authorised by the FI, but there are no requirements for this person to be senior. FIs
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Technical compliance

Criterion 12.2 – FIs must apply the same measures outlined in c.12.1 to domestic and
foreign PEPs, including taking reasonable measures to determine if the customer of a
BO is a PEP and adopting the measures in 12.1(b) to (d)).

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are required to determine source of assets when establishing or continuing a
relationship with PEPs. FIs in the BES Islands are not required to establish the source
of funds and there is no express requirement to inform senior management before
the payout of life insurance policies.
Recommendation 12 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 13 – Correspondent banking
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former R.7. Deficiencies related to the application of EDD to FIs headquartered in EU
Member States and there were no enforceable means in the case of pay-through
accounts.

Criterion 13.1 – FIs in the Netherlands must apply CDD measures to every customer,
including correspondent banking relationships (Wwft Art, 3). For cross-border
correspondent banking relationships this includes:

Technical compliance

a) collecting sufficient information about the relevant respondent institution in
order to obtain a complete picture of the nature of its operations. The FI
should use publicly available information to assess the reputation of the
respondent institution and the quality of its supervision.

b) assessing the procedures and measures implemented by the relevant
respondent institution to prevent ML and TF.

c) obtaining senior management approval prior to entering into a correspondent
banking relationship
d) defining the responsibilities of both credit institutions (Wwft, Art.8(4) a-d;
Wwft BES, Art.2.11(a-d)).

In the continental Netherlands, however, these provisions only apply to situations
where the respondent institution is outside the EEA. For correspondent banking
relationships within the EEA, a risk-based approach is taken (Wwft, Art. 8(1)).
However, this is not in line with R.13, which requires that the above measures be
applied to all cross-border correspondent banking relationships.

Criterion 13.2 – Regarding payable-through accounts, FIs must satisfy themselves
that:

a) the respondent bank has identified the customers who have direct access to
transit accounts and has verified their identity, that it constantly monitors
these customers;

b) they are able to obtain relevant customer information upon request (Wwft,
Art. 8.4(e); Wwft BES, 2.11(e)).

However, the requirements in the Netherlands only apply to correspondent banks
outside the EEA.

Criterion 13.3 – FIs are prohibited from entering into or continuing a correspondent
banking relationship with a shell bank or an FI known to permit shell banks from
making use of its accounts (Wwft, Art. 5(5); Wwft BES, Art. 4.22)).

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Weighting and Conclusion
FIs are required to take steps in line with R.13 for cross-border correspondent
banking relationships. However, the mandatory EDD measures regarding
correspondent banking relationships apply only to respondent institutions outside
the EEA. Even though similar deficiencies are not present in the BES Islands,
deficiencies in the continental Netherlands have been given significant weight as the
majority of the corresponding banking relationships exist within the EEA.
Recommendation 13 is rated partially compliant.

Recommendation 14 – Money or value transfer services
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former SR.V1. The same deficiencies identified in relation to the FI sector, applied to
MVTS (e.g., CDD measures for BO and keeping CDD information up-to-date).
Criterion 14.1 – MVTS are carried out by payment services providers, electronic
money institutions and banks. DNB licences institutions carrying out MVTS services
under the provisions of the Wft Art.2:3a (payment services providers), 2:10a
(electronic money institutions) and 2:12 (banks); Wfm BES, Art 2:1.

Criterion 14.3 – MVTS are regulated as other financial undertakings and are subject
to AML/CFT supervision by DNB (see R.26).

Criterion 14.4 – MVTS providing payment services through the use on an agent must
notify DNB and provide the agent’s details. If the details are confirmed to be accurate
by DNB, the agents are listed on a register (Wft, Art. 2.3c). MVTS activity in the BES
islands can only be carried out by money transfer offices, which must be licensed
(Wfm BES, Art. 2:1) Money transfer companies in the BES Islands must maintain a list
of their agents and branches and subsidiaries.

Criterion 14.5 – Agents of MVTS providers are subject to the requirements of the
Wwft (Wwft, Art. 1a (3)(j), including ensuring that their employees are aware of the
AML/CFT requirements and that they receive periodic training to recognise an
unusual transaction and carry out proper and complete CDD (Wwft, Art. 35; Wwft
BES, Art. 3.12).

Weighting and conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 14 is rated compliant.

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Technical compliance

Criterion 14.2 – Obliged entities carrying out MVTS must register with the DNB.
Carrying out MVTS activity without a licence is an economic offence that carries a fine
up to EUR 87 000, four years imprisonment or community service (WED, Art. 6).
Agents of MVTS providers must be notified to the authorities by the MVTS provider.
Obliged entities providing MVTS in the BES Islands must be licenced before carrying
out this activity (Wfm BES, Art. 2:1). Operating without a licence can be punished with
imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of the fifth category (up to USD 560 00)
(Wfm BES, Art. 9:1).

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Recommendation 15 – New technologies
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former R.8. There was no specific obligation to prevent the misuse of new technology
and potential shortcomings in provisions for ensuring effective CDD procedures in
the case of non-face-to-face transactions. Requirements on new technology have since
been amended to include new requirements relating to VAs. The Netherlands has
introduced measures to mitigate the risks associated with VAs. However, the
definition of VASPs is limited to two of the five activities included the FATF definition
of VASPs (custodian wallets and exchanging VAs for fiat currency) (Wwft, Art.1a(4)(l)
and (m)). This has a significant impact on a number of requirements in R.15,
particularly on registration, monitoring, mitigation measures, and the application of
enforcement measures. The Netherlands has assessed the risk of VA in the BES Islands
as low on the basis that no VASPs operate on the islands. Notwithstanding, there are
no requirements for VASPs in the BES Islands to implement preventative measures,
or for supervisory authorities to license/register and supervise VASPs.

Technical compliance

Criterion 15.1 – The Netherlands is required to produce an NRA every two years
(Wwft, Art.1f). The most recent assessment includes risks associated with new
technologies (Wwft, Art.1f). In the BES Islands, authorities are required to
periodically publish an NRA (Wwft BES, Art.1.14). The latest 2021 BES NRA suggested
that virtual currencies are not an ML risk.
FIs are required to take measures to identify and asses its ML/TF risks, and inter alia
take into account the risk factors related to the type products, services, transactions
and channels of supply (see c.1.10; Wwft, Art.2b); Wwft BES, Art.1.9).
Criterion 15.2 – FIs are required to:

a) keep updated risks assessments, which must take into account the risk factors
related to the type of product, service and delivery channel (Wwft, Art. 2b(2)
and (3); Wwft BES, Art. 1.9(3). There is no specific obligation to analyse the
risks before products are launched, but it is not possible to fulfil the
obligations in Art Wwft 2b (1-3) without analysing the risks beforehand.

b) have in place policies, procedures and measures to mitigate and effectively
manage the risks of ML and TF (Wwft, Art. 2c; Wwft BES, Art. 1.10).
Additionally, FIs are required to take adequate measures to prevent ML/TF
risks originating as a result of new technologies (Wwft, Art.2a(2); Wwft BES,
Art.1.8(2)).

Criterion 15.3 – In line with R.1, the Netherlands has:

a) Identified and assessed the risks of VAs and covered VASPs in the NRA,
particularly risks arising from anonymous transactions. VAs are assessed as
part of the NRA in the BES Islands, although no risks have been found.
b) Covered VASPs are obliged entities and subject to the requirements of the
Wwft (Wwft, Art.1a(4)(l) and (m)). DNB is the competent authority for
supervising VASPs compliance and is required to supervise in a risk-based
and effective manner, taking into account Article 48(6) to (8) of AMLD4
(Wwft, Art.1d(6)). There are no requirements for VASPs in the BES islands.

c) Covered VASPs are subject to the same requirements as FIs other than
financial undertakings as defined in the Wwft. They are required to take
appropriate steps to identify, assess, manage and mitigate their ML/TF risks
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as set out in c.1.10 and 1.11 and are subject to the same deficiencies. These
requirements do not apply to VASPs in the BES islands.

The definition of VASPs is limited to two of the five activities included the FATF
definition of VASPs. This is a major deficiency.
Criterion 15.4 –

a) Natural and legal persons that provide VASP activities covered by Dutch
legislation are required to register with DNB if they:
i.

ii.

offer professional or business services in or from the Netherlands for
exchanging VA and fiduciary currency.
offer professional or business services for virtual asset wallets in or
from the Netherlands (Wwft Art, 23b).

The obligation to register with DNB extends to parties established in the
Netherlands and abroad but operating in the Dutch market. It is prohibited
for anyone residing or established in a third country to offer professional or
business services for exchanging VA and fiduciary currency or virtual asset
wallets (Wwft, Art. 23g).

Criterion 15.5 – Failure by covered VASPs to register with DNB when carrying out
the activities in c.15.4a can result in proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (see R.35
for violations of the Wwft). DNB has carried out measures to identify covered VASPs
operating without a license, including a “webscraping” exercise.

Criterion 15.6 – DNB is the competent authority for the registration and supervision
of covered VASPs (Wwft, Art.1d(1)(a)). DNB is required to fulfil its task risk-based
and effectively (Wwft, Art.1d(6)). DNB has powers to supervise and ensure covered
VASPs compliance with AML/CFT requirements (Awb, Ch. 5). These powers are the
same as those available for FIs (see R.27) and include the power to cancel registration
in the case of non-compliance with the Wwft or Sw (Wwft, Art. 23d (3)).
Criterion 15.7 – FIU-NL has appointed a relationship manager for the VASP sector.
The relationship manager provides information to the covered VASPs on a continuous
basis and regularly attends meetings with the private sector. The relationship
manager provides information sessions (such as seminars/webinars), newsletters
and case examples to the private sector and is in regular contact with the supervisory
authorities.

BES islands: the FIU-NL monitors the transactions on the BES that can be related to
VASPs. The FIU-NL informs the obliged entities and the chain partners on the BES
Islands about certain red flags, signals related to VASPs.
DNB provides guidance on the obligations for covered VASPs, including on
transaction monitoring and reporting duties. In 2018 and 2019, DNB organised
seminars for VASPs and in 2020, organised a webinar on TFS compliance.

Criterion 15.8 – Competent authorities have a range of sanctions available, including
the ability to impose administrative and criminal sanctions and withdraw, restrict or
suspend a registration (see c.15.5).

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Technical compliance

b) Covered VASPs are subject to fit and proper requirements designed to prevent
criminals or their associates from holding, being the BO of a significant or
controlling interest, or holding a management function in a VASP (Wwft, Art.
23(h)1-4).

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Criterion 15.9 Covered VASPs are subject to the requirements set out in R.10-21 in
the same manner as FIs, and are subject to the same deficiencies.

a) For occasional transactions, CDD must be conducted where the transaction is
over EUR 15 000 for non-commercial customers (Wwft, Art. 3), this is a
significant departure from the FATF threshold of EUR 1 000.

b) For virtual asset transfers by entities defined as VASPs in the Netherlands:
(i)

(ii)

Technical compliance

(iii)

(iv)

Both originating and beneficiary covered VASPs must conduct
CDD under Article 3 Wwft, thereby obtaining the information
referred to in c.16.1.a. This information must be retained for up to
five years after the end of the relationship (Wwft, Art. 33(3).
VASPs must retain the information such that they can immediately
respond to requests from competent authorities (Wwft,
Art.33(4)).

VASPs are required to freeze the economic resources of
sanctioned persons and ensure the funds and economic resources
are not made available. In such cases, VASPs must notify the DNB
of the frozen funds (Sw, Art.10(2) l and m). The term ‘funds and
other resources’ also covers VAs.

VASPs are subject to the same obligations that apply to other FIs
when sending or receiving VA transfers on behalf of a customer.

Criterion 15.10 – TFS communication mechanisms in c.6.5(d), 6.6(g), 7.2(d) and
7.4(d) apply equally to covered VASPs.

Criterion 15.11 – The Netherlands has mechanisms in place to provide international
co-operation (see R.37-49). The mechanisms for international co-operation described
in R.37-40 apply to ML/TF through VA. DNB can exchange information about covered
VASPs in the same way it exchanges information about other obliged entities (see
c.40.12-16).

Weighting and Conclusion

The Netherlands employs a definition of VASPs, which only applies to VA to fiat
transactions (and vice versa) and custodian wallets. This definition does not cover all
activities included in the FATF definition, such as the exchange between one or more
forms of VAs. This is a significant technical deficiency. Furthermore, there is no regime
for VASPs in the BES Islands and the threshold for the application of CDD measures
for occasional transactions is higher than the threshold in the FATF Standards. These
deficiencies are heavily weighted by the Assessment Team and significantly impact
the overall rating of R.15.
Recommendation 15 is rated as partially compliant.

Recommendation 16 – Wire transfers
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated compliant with the requirements of former
SRVII.

Criterion 16.1 – FIs are required to ensure that all cross-border wire transfers over
EUR 1 000 or more are accompanied by: (a) the required and accurate originator
information (name, account number, address, official personal document number,
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customer ID number or date and place of birth), and; in the Netherlands (b)
beneficiary information (name and account number) (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.4;
Wfm BES, Art 4:19(1), Rfm BES, Art, 3.5)). If the transaction is not made from/to a
payment account, a unique transaction identifier is required rather than the account
number (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.4(3)). There are no requirements on
beneficiary information for FIs in BES Islands.
Criterion 16.2 The requirements in the Netherlands regarding batch files are
consistent with the FATF requirements regarding originator and beneficiary
information (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.6(1); Rfm BES, 3:7).
BES Islands: The requirements regarding batch files do not extend to information on
the beneficiary.

Criterion 16.3 – A de minimis threshold of EUR 1 000 applies to the application of
requirements in c.16.1. The requirements for the originator and beneficiary
information accompanying all transfers below EUR 1 000 are consistent with the
FATF Standards (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.6(2)).

BES Islands: FIs are required to carry out CDD on all occasional transactions including
cross-border transactions. There are no requirements to provide the beneficiary
information stipulated in c.16.3 (Wwft BES, 2.3 (1)(b)).

BES Islands: There is a general provision for FIs to investigate clients if there are
indications of ML/TF or if there are doubts about the reliability of the information
provided.

Criterion 16.5 and 16.6 – For domestic wire transfers (which in this case also
includes intra-EU wire transfers), ordering FIs need to provide only the payment
account numbers (or unique transaction identifiers) with the transfer. The ordering
FI must be able to provide complete information on the originator and the beneficiary,
if requested by the beneficiary FI, within three working days which is consistent with
the second part of c.16.5 and c.16.6. There is also a general obligation for FIs to
respond to requests from authorities on originator and beneficiary information (EU
Regulation 2015/847, arts.5, 14). FIs are also obliged to appoint a central point of
contact.

BES Island: FIs are only required to provide the account number or unique identifier
for domestic transfers (Rfm BES, 3:6(3)). In such cases the payment service provider
of the payer is required to make available complete information on the payer to the
FI of the beneficiary, no later than three working days after receipt of the request (Rfm
BES, Art. 3.6(4)). FIs are required to have procedures in place to ensure that it can
provide the information on the payer without delay to supervisors (Rfm BES, Art.
3:14).
Criterion 16.7 – Ordering and beneficiary FIs are required to retain information on
the originator and, in the Netherlands, the beneficiary for five years (EU Regulation
2015/847, Art.16; Rfm BES, Art. 3.6(2), 3:11)).

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Technical compliance

Criterion 16.4 - For transfers of less than EUR 1 000, originator information must be
verified where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting ML/TF, or the funds were
received in cash or anonymous e-money (EU Regulation 2015/847, art.6(2)); Wwft
BES, Art. 2.3(c-d)).

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Criterion 16.8 – The ordering FI is not allowed to execute the wire transfer if it does
not comply with the requirements set out in c.16.1-16.7 (EU Regulation 2015/847,
Art.4(6)).

BES Islands: Beneficiary FIs are required to refuse transfers of funds if information on
the payer is incomplete (Rfm BES, Art. 3:10). This does not apply to beneficiary
information.

Criterion 16.9 – An intermediary FI must retain with the cross-border wire transfer
all accompanying originator and beneficiary information (EU Regulation 2015/847,
Art.10).

BES Islands: Intermediary FIs are required to ensure that information about the payer
remains with the transfer (Rfm BES. Art 3:12). This does not apply to beneficiary
information.

Criterion 16.10 – FIs are not able to use ‘technical limitations’ to justify noncompliance with c.16.9.

Technical compliance

BES Islands: Where an intermediary payment service provider uses a payment system
with technical limitations, it must retain the information for a period of five years
(Rfm BES, Art 3:13(2)). However, there is no requirement for beneficiary information.

Criterion 16.11 – Intermediary FIs are required to take reasonable measures that are
consistent with straight-through processing, to identify cross-border wire transfers
that lack originator or beneficiary information (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.11).

BES Islands: There are no requirements for intermediaries to take reasonable
measures that are consistent with straight-through processing, to identify crossborder wire transfers that lack beneficiary information.

Criterion 16.12 – Intermediary FIs are required to have risk-based procedures for
determining: (a) when to execute, reject, or suspend a wire transfers that lack the
required originator and beneficiary information; and (b) for taking the appropriate
follow-up action (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.12).

BES Islands: Where a payment service provider receives a transfer with incomplete
payer information, it must refuse a transfer until it has received the missing details
(Rfm BES, Art. 3:10). Intermediaries are required to have measures in place to
consider whether to limit or terminate its relationship with a service provider if it
regularly fails to provide he required information about the payer (Rfm BES: Art 3:8).
However, these requirements do not extend to information on the beneficiary.

Criterion 16.13 – The beneficiary FI is required to detect whether the required
information on the originator or beneficiary is missing (EU Regulation 2015/847,
Art.7).

BES Islands: The payment service provider of the beneficiary must check whether the
fields for information on the payer in the messaging system or the payment and
settlement system used for the transfer of funds have been completed (Rfm BES, Art.
3:9).
Criterion 16.14 – The beneficiary FI is required to verify the identity of the
beneficiary of cross-border wire transfers of over EUR 1 000 and maintain this
information for five years (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.7, 16; Rfm BES, Art. 3:11).

Criterion 16.15 – Beneficiary FIs are required to have risk-based policies and
procedures for determining: (a) when to execute, reject or suspend a wire transfer

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lacking originator or required beneficiary information; and (b) the appropriate follow
up action (including reporting to authorities in cases of routine failure to provide
information) (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art.8).

BES Islands: The FI of the beneficiary must have procedures and measures in place to
consider whether or not to limit or terminate its relationship with the ordering or
intermediary FI, if it regularly fails to provide the required information about the
originator (Rfm BES, Art. 3.8). This does not extend to beneficiary information. There
is also no requirement for the procedures and measures to be risk-based or to include
adequate appropriate follow-up action, including to consider filing a report to
authorities.
Criterion 16.16 – The obligations listed above also apply to MVTS providers and their
agents in the continental Netherlands (EU Regulation 2015/847, Art. 2(1)).

BES Islands: MVTS providers are subject to the same requirements as FIs in relation
to CDD. The deficiencies highlighted throughout R.16 also apply to MVTS.

Criterion 16.17 –

BES Islands: MVTS providers are subject to the same requirements as FIs in relation
to CDD including the submission of UTRs.

Criterion 16.18 – All natural and legal persons in the Netherlands, including FIs, are
required to take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting
transactions with designated persons and entities when conducting wire transfers
(see R.6).

Weighting and Conclusion

Requirements are implemented through EU Regulation, which covers most of the
requirements for wire transfers. There are no requirements for FIs in the BES Islands
to send beneficiary information for batch transfers and FIs of beneficiaries are not
required to have risk-based procedures and measures in place where originator
information is regularly not provided. These deficiencies are not weighted heavily due
to the small size of the financial sector in the BES Islands.
Recommendation 16 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 17 – Reliance on third parties
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated non-compliant with the requirements of
former R.9. There were no requirements for the relying FI to retain ultimate
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Technical compliance

a) EU Regulation 2015/847 requires all payee and intermediary institutions to
take into account information from both sides as a factor when assessing
whether an UTR should be filed.
b) While there is no explicit requirement for the MVTS provider to file a UTR/STR
in any country affected by the transaction, taking into account 16.17(a) and
the EU permissions for intra-group sharing of STR data (see 18.2(b)), MVTS
providers are obliged to report in the countries of the ordering and beneficiary
sides of the transaction. In addition, relevant to EU passporting, compliance
officers must file an UTR/STR with the FIU of the EU Member State in whose
territory the MVTS provider is established (i.e., its headquarters) (EU
Directive 2015/849, Art. 33).

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responsibility for the CDD carried out by the third party or to obtain CDD records from
the third party. FIs were not required to be satisfied that third parties were regulated
or supervised.

Criterion 17.1 – FIs are not permitted to enter into a business relationship or carry
out an occasional transaction unless the CDD measures required in R.10 (a)-(c) have
been carried out (Wwft, Art.3(5); Wwft BES, Art.2.3). FIs can rely on third parties to
conduct these CDD measures, provided the third parties are regulated under the Wwft
or equivalent legislation (Wwft, Art.5(1); Wwft BES, Art. 2.6). The types of third
parties that an FI may rely on are listed in the Wwft (Art. 5.1(a)1-5); Wwft BES, Art.
2.6).

Technical compliance

a) FIs are required to have all identification and verification data and other
relevant documentation regarding the identity of the persons before entering
a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction (Wwft Art
5.1(c); Wwft BES, Art.2.6).
b) There are no specific provisions requiring FIs to satisfy themselves that
relevant documentation relating to CDD will be available upon request from a
third party. However, FIs must have all identification and verification data and
other relevant documentation regarding the identity of the customer and
where applicable, the BO, in its possession before entering into a relationship
or carrying out a transaction (Wwft Art, 5.1(c); Wwft BES, Art. 2.4 (2)(c)).

c) FIs can only rely on third parties that are subject to equivalent AML/CFT
legislation. Equivalence only applies for obliged entities in the Netherlands,
entities regulated for AML/CFT purposes in other EU and EEA Member States,
entities in States outside the EU designated by the Minister of Finance, and
obliged entities that form part of a group that complies with Dutch AML/CFT
requirements (Wwft, Art. 5(1)). The reliant FI must satisfy itself that third
parties are supervised or have measures in place to comply with CDD and
record-keeping obligations.
BES Islands: FIs can only rely on CDD carried out by a collective investment
scheme, life insurer, broker in life insurance, lawyers and notaries, credit
institution or money transaction office that has been issued a license pursuant to
the Financial Markets (BES Islands) Act and is supervised by DNB or AFM. Other
enterprises or categories of institutions designated by Governmental Decree can
also be relied on, but none have been designated to date (Wwft BES, Art. 2.6).

Criterion 17.2 – FIs are in certain cases permitted to rely on obliged entities
established within the EU/EEA. Reliance on obliged entities from EU states is not
based on ML/TF risks, but reflects the presumption that all EU member states
implement all harmonised AML/CFT provisions. Reliance can also be placed on
obliged entities in a state designated by the Minister of Finance (Wwft, Art. 5.1(a)(3)(4)). There have been no designations to date.
BES Islands: It is not possible to rely on institutions that are not established on the
BES Islands (Wwft BES, Art. 2.6 (a)).

Criterion 17.3 – FIs are permitted to rely on third parties that are part of the same
group (obliged entities in the Netherlands, or foreign branches or majority-owned
subsidiaries) that fully comply with the policies and procedures applicable at grouplevel, provided the following conditions are met:
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a) the group complies with obligations in the Wwft, which includes R.10-12 and
18 (Wwft, Art. 5(2)(b));

b) the group applies CDD measures, record keeping rules and AML/CFT
programmes at group level, which is supervised by a competent authority in
an EU Member State or other state designated by the Minister of Finance
(Wwft, Art. 5(2)(b)-(c));
c) FIs are only able to rely on third parties in the Netherlands, other EU member
states, or non-Member States that have equivalent CDD measures and there is
supervision of compliance with those provisions, or a branch of the institution
in the Netherlands if designated by the Minister of Finance.

BES Islands: There are no provisions that allow entities part of a financial
group to rely on each other. Accordingly, this criterion is not applicable.

Weighting and Conclusion

Recommendation 17 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 18 – Internal controls and foreign branches and
subsidiaries
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.15 and
R.22. Deficiencies related to requirements on internal controls not being fully
applicable to all FIs; employee training being limited in scope; no provision requiring
FIs to apply Dutch standards to branches and subsidiaries in the EU or EEA;
requirements to apply Dutch standards only applied to CDD and not to all AML/CFT
measures.

Criterion 18.1 – FIs are required to have in place policies, procedures and measures,
proportionate to their size, to mitigate and effectively manage the risks of ML and TF
(Wwft, Art. 2c; Wwft BES, Art. 1.10). These include:

(a) Having an independent and effective compliance function, where appropriate to
the nature and size of the FI. This includes the appointment of a compliance
officer, insofar as the FI has two or more senior managers. (Wwft, Art. 2d(1-2);
Wwft BES, Art. 1.11 (1-2)).

(b) Ensuring that employees are screened as relevant to their duties and taking into
account the risks, nature and size of the FI (Wwft, Art. 35; Bfm BES, Art 3.16).
Screening is not required in the BES Islands.

(c) Ensuring that employees are aware of their AML/CFT obligations and receive
periodic training to recognise unusual transactions and to carry out proper CDD
(Wwft, Art. 35; Wwft BES, Art. 3.12).

(d) Where applicable, and appropriate to the nature and size of the FI, having an
independent audit function to monitor compliance with the Wwft and the
performance of the compliance function (Wwft, Art. 2d(4)). FIs are responsible

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Technical compliance

FIs are permitted to rely on regulated third parties. There is no provision requiring
the reliant FI to satisfy itself that third parties are supervised or have measures in
place to comply with CDD and record-keeping obligations, however, FIs are required
to have CDD information in their possession before entering into a relationship or
carrying out a transaction. Deficiencies exists stemming from the assumption that all
EU member states apply adequate AML/CFT controls.

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for determining if it is appropriate to have an audit function and guidance has
been provided by the authorities to help determine this. There is no obligation for
FIs in the BES islands to have an independent audit function.

Criterion 18.2 –

(a) FIs are required to ensure policies, procedures and measures to manage the risk
of ML/TF are effectively applied by their branches or majority owned subsidiaries
with offices outside the Netherlands (Wwft, Art. 2f(2); Wwft BES, Art. 1.12(2)). FIs
that are part of a group are required to effectively implement the policies and
procedures applicable at group-level in so far as they comply with the Wwft
(Wwft, Art. 2f(1); Wwft BES, Art. 1.12). Group wide measures include policies and
procedures on information sharing within the group, to the extent that such data
and information relate to the prevention of ML and TF (Wwft Art. 2f(3); Wwft BES,
Art. 1.12(3)).

Technical compliance

(b) The policies and procedures required by Wwft Art, 2f must include provisions on
data protection and policies and procedures for group-wide information sharing,
to the extent that such data and information relate to the prevention of ML and
TF. FIs in the Netherlands are required to share information on UTRs within the
group, unless the FIU-NL provides otherwise (Wwft, Art. 23a; Wwft BES, Art
3.11(1))

(c) Policies and procedures on data protection and information sharing within the
group (Wwft, Art. 2f (3); Wwft BES, Art. 1.12(3)). In addition, there are legislative
measures in place for FIs to maintain confidentiality relating to UTRs and STRs,
including safeguards to prevent tipping-off (Wwft, Art. 23; Wwft BES, Art. 1.5,
3.10).

Criterion 18.3 – FIs are required to ensure that their foreign branches and majorityowned subsidiaries in non-EU member states apply AML/CFT measures consistent
with the Wwft, if the minimum requirements of the host country are less strict than
in the Wwft, insofar as the law in the host country does not prevent it (Wwft, Art.
2(1)). If the law of the host country precludes the application of the Wwft, the FI must
inform its supervisor and take measures to control the ML/TF risks (Wwft, Art. 2(2)).
If the foreign branch or majority-owned subsidiary is in another EU member state, the
FI must ensure that the branch or subsidiary complies with the provisions in that
member state transposing the provisions of AMLD4. However, this does not cover
AML/CFT measures in situations where the host country has not adequately
implemented AMLD4 or where the rules in the Wwft are stricter than the rules
required by AMLD4.
BES Islands: FIs other than MVTS must ensure that their branches and subsidiaries
carry out CDD that is equivalent to the measures in Wwft BES, Art. 2.2, and retain
records (Wwft BES, Art. 1.6(1)). If the application of these provisions are not
permitted in the host country, the FI must notify the supervisory authority and
implement measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk (Wwft BES, Art. 1.6(2)). However,
this does not include the full range of AML/CFT requirements in the Wwft BES.

Weighting and Conclusion

FIs must have policies, procedures and measures in place, proportionate to their size
and these must be applicable at group level. FIs in the Netherlands determine if they
need an independent audit function based on their size and complexity. It is not clear
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how this is consistently applied. There is no requirement for FIs in the BES Islands to
screen employees, have an independent audit function or to share UTR information
within their groups.
Recommendation 18 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 19 – Higher-risk countries
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.21. There
were no specific enforceable obligations for FIs to give special attention to business
relationships and transactions with persons from or in countries that do not or
insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations, or to examine the background and
purpose of unusual transactions. Existing countermeasures were also found to be
limited in scope.

BES Islands: FIs must conduct EDD if there is a higher risk of ML/TF (Wwft BES, Art.
2.10), including for business relationships or transactions when the customer is
resident or established in a jurisdiction posing increased risk of ML or TF. EDD must
also be applied to business relationships and transactions from countries identified
as having no effective AML/CFT systems on the basis of credible sources such as FATF
mutual assessments, detailed assessment reports, or published follow-up reports
(Rwft BES Annex D, para 3).
Criterion 19.2 – In addition to EDD, the Minister of Finance has the authority to issue
a regulation that would require FIs to apply countermeasures proportionate to the
risk, in line with INR.19 to countries identified in the delegated acts of the EC pursuant
to Art. 9 of AMLD4 (Wwft, Art. 9(2)). However, this authority does not extend to
jurisdictions called for by the FATF, unless that jurisdiction has also been designated
by the EC.
BES Islands: No equivalent provisions exist in the BES Islands.

Criterion 19.3 – The FATF public statements (the so-called black and grey lists) are
published on the websites of DNB and AFM after each plenary. FIs are informed of the
EC’s High-Risk Third Country list via the websites of the relevant supervisors
(including for the BES).

Weighting and Conclusion

FIs must apply EDD in high risk situations, including for business relationships or
transactions when the customer is resident or established in a jurisdiction designated
by the EC. The Netherlands has the authority to issue countermeasures independently
of any call by the FATF, so long as that jurisdiction has also been designated by the EC.
Recommendation 19 is rated largely compliant.

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Technical compliance

Criterion 19.1 – FIs must conduct EDD to business relationships and transactions
with natural and legal persons (including FIs) if there is a higher ML/TF risk (Wwft,
Art. 2b(2) and 8(1)). FIs must take into account, inter alia, countries designated by the
EC as a State where an increased risk of ML or TF exists (Wwft, Art. 8(1)(b)), as well
as the factors listed in Annex III of the AMLD4 (Wwft, Art. 8(2)). Annex III refers to
countries identified by credible sources, such as FATF mutual evaluations, detailed
assessment reports or published follow-up reports, as not having effective AML/CFT
system (AMLD4, Annex III, Art. 4).

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Recommendation 20 – Reporting of suspicious transaction
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the former R.13 and
SR.IV. Deficiencies related to the following: the 14 days period to report a suspicious
transaction did not comply with the requirement of prompt reporting; the definition
of TF did not include funds related to those who finance terrorism, limiting the scope
of the reporting obligation. Since then, the Netherlands has amended the Wwft
provisions on UTRs.
The Dutch reporting system is based on UTRs. The FIU-NL receives UTRs from obliged
entities. Based on its own analysis, FIU-NL can declare them suspicious and
disseminate them to LEAs.

Technical compliance

Criterion 20.1 – FIs are required to report unusual transactions to the FIU-NL. A
transaction must be reported immediately after its unusual nature has become
known. FIs shall use objective 67 and subjective indicators to determine the unusual
character. The subjective indicator is defined as “a reason to believe that the
transaction may be related to ML or TF” (Wwft, Art. 15 and 16; Annex 1 to Wwft
Decree 2018). The reference to transactions which “may be related to” ML or TF, is
sufficiently broad to cover transactions associated with all proceeds of a criminal
activity. A similar obligation exists in BES Islands (Wwft BES, Art. 3.5).
Criterion 20.2 – FIs are required to report all unusual transactions where there is a
reason to believe that they may be related to ML or TF, including attempted
transactions, regardless of the amount (Wwft, Art. 16; Annex 1 to Wwft Decree 2018;
Wwft BES, Art. 3.5; Rwft BES, Annex A).

Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 20 is rated compliant.

Recommendation 21 – Tipping-off and confidentiality
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.14.
Deficiencies included a protection from criminal liability without a good faith
requirement; a narrower protection from civil liability; the tipping-off prohibition did
not apply to FIs’ directors, officers and employees, nor to information in the process
of being reported.
Criterion 21.1 – Information provided “in good faith” (Wwft, Art. 16 and 17) cannot
serve as a basis for a criminal investigation or prosecution for ML/TF against the
reporting institution (Wwft, Art. 19(1)). Where there is a “reasonable assumption” to
report UTRs and respond to requests for information from the FIU-NL (Wwft, Art. 16
and 17), the reporting institution cannot incur criminal liability for breaches of its
duty of confidentiality (Wwft, Art. 19(2); WvSv, Art. 272). Protection from civil
liability applies when the information was provided “on the reasonable assumption”
that it implements Wwft, Art. 16 and 17 (Wwft, Art. 20(1)). For both criminal and civil
liability, this threshold requires that the institution has acted diligently in assessing
67

Objective indicators include a list of “automatic” criteria (e.g. specific types of transactions
above a certain threshold, transactions for the benefit of natural or legal persons residing
or established in high-risk countries, etc.).
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all facts and circumstances. This threshold is higher than the good faith
requirement. 68 This protection extends to employees who made the report or
provided information. The legal protection is available even if an institution or
employee did not know precisely what the underlying crime was, and regardless of
whether an illegal activity actually occurred.

BES Islands: Similar provisions exist in the BES Islands (Wwft BES, Art. 3.8 and 3.9).
However, in relation to criminal liability, there is no requirement for the information
to have been provided in “good faith” (Wwft BES, Art. 3.8(1)). The protection from
violation of the duty of confidentiality is subject to a “reasonable presumption” that
the information was provided pursuant to the obligations under Wwft BES, Art. 3.5 or
3.6 (reporting UTRs and responding to requests from FIU-NL). This goes beyond the
“good faith” threshold. The protection from criminal liability applies to directors and
employees of the FI.

In relation to civil liability, FIs can be held liable if “a plausible case is made that in
view of all the facts and circumstances the disclosure should not, in reasonableness,
have been made”. This requirement is not in line with FATF Standards, as FIs must be
protected whenever they report in good faith. Furthermore, there is no specific
provision extending the protection to directors or employees (Wwft BES, Art. 3.9).

BES Islands: Similar provisions exist in the BES Islands (Wwft BES, Art. 3.10 and 3.11).
However, the legal obligation does not cover directors or employees of an FI.

Weighting and Conclusion

FIs, their directors and employees are protected from criminal or civil liability when
submitting UTRs and other information to FIU-NL. However, this protection is subject
to certain offences and narrower conditions than the good faith requirement.
Furthermore, the protection from criminal liability in the BES Islands is not limited to
cases where the information was provided in good faith and the protection from civil
liability does not extend to directors or employees. Tipping-off provisions are in place,
but do not explicitly cover directors or employees in the BES Islands.
Recommendation 21 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 22 – DNFBPs: Customer due diligence
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with the requirements
of former R.12. Shortcomings related to the scope of the activity subject to CDD
measures for real estate agents, and the scope for TCSPs, and some exemptions of CDD
requirements for lawyers and notaries.

68

See also the 3rd round Netherlands MER, p. 178.

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Technical compliance

Criterion 21.2 – FIs and their employees must maintain confidentiality in relation to
UTRs and any requests for information received by FIU-NL, or whether the provision
of information resulted in an investigation (Wwft, Art. 23). There are specific
provisions allowing for consultation and information exchange amongst institutions
belonging to the same group, or between these institutions and their branches or
subsidiaries (Wwft, Art.23(6); Wwft BES Art.3.11).

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AML/CFT legislation for DNFBPs
DNFBPs, except trust offices, are subject to the same CDD requirements within the
Wwft as FIs. For trust offices, CDD measures in the Wtt apply (but some Wwft
provisions also apply).

DNFBPs, except for trust offices, in the BES Islands are exempt from a requirement to
put in place policies, procedures and measures to mitigate and effectively manage and
mitigate ML/TF risks. (Wwft BES, 1.13). Articles 2.14-2.19 Wwft BES apply to trust
offices in addition to the general requirements. Shortcomings in terms of scope
identified in c 22.1 affect all other criterion in R.22.

Criterion 22.1 - DNFBPs in the Netherlands are required to comply with the CDD
requirements set out in R.10 in the following situations:

Technical compliance

a. Casinos are required to conduct CDD when establishing business
relationships or engaging with customers in occasional transactions of more
than EUR 2 000 when entering a bet and paying out a prize (Wwft, Art.3(5),
3(7)), and to link the CDD information to transactions made by the customer
(Wwft, Art. 3(2)(d)).
BES Islands: Casinos are required to perform CDD when providing services
and performing occasional transactions above USD 3 000 (Wwft BES, Art.1.8
et seq., 2.2(2)(d)).

b. Natural persons, legal entities or partnerships acting as an intermediary with
transactions involving the real estate must perform CDD on the customer in a
real estate transaction (Wwft, Art.3(2)(a) and (13)).
BES Islands: There is no requirement for real estate agents involved in a
transaction to carry out CDD on both the buyer and seller.

c. DPMS are required to conduct CDD when they perform occasional
transactions above EUR 10 000 (in one or more transactions) (Wwft, Art.
3(6)). When acting as intermediaries, DPMS are required to perform CDD
when they enter into a business relationship or when conducting an
occasional transaction at or above EUR 15 000 (Wwft, Art. 3(5)).
BES Islands: DPMS are required to carry out CDD when they perform
occasional transactions above USD 11 000 (Wwft BES, Art.2.3(1)(b)).

d. When preparing or carrying out activities for their clients in relation to the
activities set out in c.22.1(d), lawyers, notaries, other independent legal
professionals and accountants are required to comply with the requirements
set out in R.10 (Wwft, Art. 3(5)). This equally applies the BES Islands (Wwft
BES, Art. 2.13), except when they organise contributions for the creation,
operation or management of companies. However, notaries can only refuse to
provide services in certain situations, for example, where there is evidence of
a sham structure or frontman.

e. TCSPs are required to comply with the requirements in R.10 in relation to the
activities set out in c.22.1(e) (Wtt, Art. 22; Wwft, Art. 3(5)). In the BES Islands,
providers of business addresses are not covered unless the service is provided
in combination with the provision of administrative and advisory services
(Wwft BES, Annex A, Art. 1.1).
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Criterion 22.2 - DNFBPs must comply with the record-keeping requirements in R.11
(Wtt, Art. 37 for trust offices in the Netherlands; Wwft, Art. 34).

Criterion 22.3 - DNFBPs are required to comply with the PEP requirements set out in
R.12 (Wtt, Art. 34 for trust offices). The deficiencies in R.12 apply to DNFBPs.

Criterion 22.4 - DNFBPs in the Netherlands and trust offices in the BES Islands must
take adequate measures to prevent the risks of ML/TF resulting from new
technologies (see R.15; Wtt, Art. 14)).

Criterion 22.5 - DNFBPs are required to comply with the same reliance on third party
requirements for FIs (see R.17). Trust offices are not permitted to rely on third parties
for CDD, unless the third party is part of the same group as the trust office (Wtt, Art.
23).

Weighting and conclusion

DNFBPs are required to comply with most of the CDD requirements set out in R.10,
11, 12, 15 and 17. Notaries can only refuse to provide services in limited situations.
DNFBPs, except trust offices, in the BES Islands are exempt from a requirement to
take measures to manage and mitigate risks. Furthermore, there is no requirement
for BES real estate agents involved in a transaction to carry out CDD on both the buyer
and seller.
Recommendation 22 is rated largely compliant.

In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.16.
Deficiencies noted for FIs also applied to DNFBPs. In addition, TCSPs providing a
registered office, business address for a legal entity on a standalone basis were not
subject to the reporting requirements, while real estate agents were only required to
report one part of the transaction, not both the buyer and seller.

Criterion 23.1 – Most DNFBPs are required to report UTRs to FIU-NL immediately
upon identification of suspicion. This applies to conducted and proposed transactions
(Wwft, Art.16). Notaries are not able to submit a UTR until a business relationship has
been established. Casinos are not subject to UTR requirements when they conduct
occasional transactions below EUR 2 000. This is a minor deficiency.
BES Islands: DNFBPs are subject to UTR requirements (Wwft BES, Art. 3.5).

Criterion 23.2 – DNFBPs (see c.22.1) are subject to the same measures as FIs as
described in c.18.1 and c.18.2. For trust offices the same measures apply to Wwftspecific requirements (e.g., compliance officer for Wwft-specific requirements).
Additionally, trust offices are subject to similar measures in the Wtt for Wtt-specific
requirements [Wtt, Art. 15 (audit and compliance function), Art. 67 (training)].
Measures described in c.18.3 also apply to DNFBPs, except for trust offices when the
Wtt is applicable (e.g., CDD, EDD and record keeping).

BES Islands: Trust offices are subject to the same requirements as FIs. Other DNFBPs
are not subject to the same requirements in c.18.1 and c.18.2, as they are not subject
to the requirements in Wwft BES, Art. 1.9 - 1.12 (Wwft BES, Art. 1.13).

Criterion 23.3 - DNFBPs are subject to the same requirements concerning high-risk
countries as FIs (Wwft, Art. 8(1); Wtt, Art. 33(1), 36). Therefore, the same deficiencies
as identified under R.19 are applicable (see R.19). Deficiencies in c.22.1 on the scope

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Technical compliance

Recommendation 23 – DNFBPs: Other measures

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of covered DNFBPs are also applicable. DNFBP supervisors (except for DNB) do not
communicate the FATF or EC lists on their webpages.
Criterion 23.4 - DNFBPs are required to comply with the same tipping-off and
confidentiality requirements as set out in R.21 (see R.21).

Weighting and conclusion

DNFBPs are required to comply with the requirements of R.20 although casinos and
real estate agents in the BES Islands are not required to conduct CDD in all situations
and notaries can only submit UTRs once a business relationship has been established.
With the exception of trust offices, DNFBPs in the BES Islands are not required to
comply with c.18.2 and 18.3. DNB communicates information to trust offices on
higher risk countries, while information is not adequately communicated to other
DNFBPs.
Recommendation 23 is rated largely compliant.

Technical compliance

Recommendation 24 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal
persons
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with the former R.33.
Deficiencies included the definition of the BO, and issues relating to the issuance of
bearer shares.

Criterion 24.1 – All companies and other legal persons and companies in the
Netherlands must be registered in the company register of the CoC (Hrw, Art. 5)
a) The different types, forms and basic features of these legal persons are set out in
several pieces of legislation:
•

Civil law entities with legal personality (limited liability):
o

•

Legal entities that do not have a legal personality:
o

•

Public legal person, Church Communities, Associations, Cooperatives
and Mutual Insurance Companies, Public limited liability companies
(NVs), Private limited liability companies (BVs), Foundations, Owners’
Associations, European Companies, European Cooperative Societies
and European Economic Interest Groupings.
Partnerships, General partnerships and Limited partnerships and
Shipping Companies.

Sole proprietorships.

b) The process for creating entities is set out in the legislation that describes the
different types and forms of legal persons and is supplemented by general civil
law articles. Legal entities with legal personality must be established by notarial
deed (BW, Art 2.4 and Wna Title V). Legal entities without legal personality are
established by contract or notarial deed. The basic and BO information that legal
entities are required to register with the Company Registry is set out in Hrw,
chapters 2 and 3 and books 2 and 5 of the Civil Code. Requirements for legal
persons and other legal entities to keep records of their BOs is set out in Wwft,
Art.10. This information is publicly available.
BES Islands: The different types, forms and basic features of legal persons are
described in several pieces of legislation, as is the process for creating these entities.

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Legal persons are created by notarial deed and other legal entities can generally be
established by contract or notarial deed.

Criterion 24.2 - The Netherlands assesses the ML/TF risk associated with all types of
legal persons, although it is not detailed. There is little distinction between different
types of legal persons and the risk they pose. The Netherlands have launched various
initiatives aimed at identifying and assessing ML/TF risks of legal persons. Following
these initiatives and particular features (e.g., less financial and internal controls for
most foundations), The Netherlands considers foundations the legal entity posing the
highest ML/TF risk. The ML/TF NRAs for the BES Islands do not assess the ML/TF
risks associated with the different types of legal persons.
Criterion 24.3 - The different types of legal persons that must register in the company
register is set out in Hrw, Arts 5 and 6. The details of basic information that must be
included is set out in Hrw, Art. 9. This includes trading names, date of commencement
and the party that owns the undertaking. Additional requirements for registration of
specific legal persons is included in Hrb, chapters 3 and 4. This includes:
•

•
•

Address of the registered office: art. 15 Hrb, Art.15),

List of directors for NV and BV (Hrb, Art, 22.1), for associations, foundations
(Hrb, Art. 28),

The public information on legal persons in the Company Registry can be accessed by
any person online, but some information is only available at a cost.

Criterion 24.4 - Legal persons must register the information mentioned in c.24.3 in
the company registry and keep it up-to-date (Hrw, Art. 19(1)).

BVs and NVs are the only legal persons that issue shares and must maintain an up-todate shareholder register at their premises (BW, Art. 2:85 and 2:194; BW BES, Art.
2:109 and 2:209). Cooperatives need to hold an updated list of their members (BW
Art. 2:61(d); BW BES, Art. 2:97(d)) and foundations must hold an up-to-date register
of all the persons to whom they made a payment of at least 25% of the total payable
amount in that year (Bw, Art 2:290). There are no specific obligations for other legal
persons.
BES Islands: Private foundations are not required to maintain a register of their
members

Criterion 24.5 - Newly created legal persons must file required information in the
Company Register within two weeks. There is also a general obligation to update the
Company Registry within a week of any change taking place (Hrw, Art. 19 and 20; Hrw
BES, Art. 7-8). Legal entities that are required to maintain a register of their
shareholders or members must keep the information accurate and up-to-date (see
c.24.4). However, there is no mechanism to ensure that these legal entities comply
with the obligation to keep the register of their shareholders or members accurate
and up-to-date.

Criterion 24.6 - Legal persons and other legal entities incorporated in the
Netherlands are required to obtain and hold up-to-date BO information (Wwft,
Art.10b). This information (including the nature and extent of the beneficial interest
held, and on the identity of the BOs) must be registered in the company register (Hrw,
Art. 15a and 19) and applies to all relevant types of legal persons, except:

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Technical compliance

basic regulating powers: these are detailed in the statutes which must be
communicated to the company register.

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•
•
•
•
•
•

listed limited liability companies complete subsidiaries (subject to EU transparency
requirements and low risk);
associations of proprietors (low risk);
informal associations with no legal personality, rights or obligations and not
allowed to own registered goods (such as real estate) (low risk)
public legal persons (low risk);
historical legal persons (very rare and low risk);
sole proprietorship (no legal entity nor legal personality and the only owner is the
sole proprietor and thus already known).

Technical compliance

Obliged entities must identify the BO of their clients (Wwft, Art. 3(2)(b) Wwft) and
cannot solely rely on the BO register (Wwft, Art. 3(15) Wwft). Any discrepancies
identified when identifying clients must be reported to the company register (Wwft
art. 10(c)).
BES Islands: there are no specific mechanisms to ensure that BO information is
obtained by legal persons or other legal entities or available in a specific location, but
the tax authorities hold some information (Belastingwet BES, Art. 5(1), (9) (10)). FIs
and DNFBPs covered by the Wwft BES are required to collect BO information as part
of their CDD procedures (Wwft, 2.2(2)(b)), which can be accessed by competent
authorities. However, competent authorities do not have access to data on which FIs
or DNFBPs hold the relevant BO information.

Criterion 24.7 - BO information held by legal entities must be accurate and up-to-date
(Wwft, Art, 10b (1)). This does not apply to legal entities in the BES Islands, as there
is no obligation to hold BO information. Obliged entities must keep BO information
up-to-date (Wwft, Art 3(11); Wwft BES, Art, 2.6 (6)).

Criterion 24.8 - The obligation to register basic and BO information to the company
register falls on the person who owns the company or each of the directors of the legal
person (Hrw, Art. 18(1); Hrw BES, Art. 5-6), which can include a legal representative
such as a director. Where this is not possible, the responsibility lies with an individual
in the Netherlands with responsibility for the day-to-day management of the legal
person (Hrw, Art, 18(2) and (3); Hrw BES, Art, 5(3)). There is no requirement for legal
persons and other legal entities to register BO information in the BES Islands.

There is no explicit obligation requiring natural persons resident in the Netherlands
to be authorised or accountable to provide basic or BO information directly to
competent authorities.

General AML/CFT obligations apply to DNFBPs, including lawyers and notaries (see
R.22). There is no explicit requirement for DNFBPs to provide basic and BO
information to competent authorities or to give further assistance, but LEAs can
subpoena information as part of a criminal investigation and the FIU-NL can request
BO information from FIs and DNFBPs (Wwft, Art. 17).
Criterion 24.9 - Obliged entities are required to retain all CDD data in an accessible
manner for five years after the date of termination of the business relationship or up
to five years after completion of the relevant transaction (Wwft, Art. 33(3); Wwft BES,
Art. 2.13). BO information must be retained for a period of 10 years after termination
of the registration of the legal entity (Hrb, Art. 51c), except in the BES islands where
there is no obligation to obtain BO information.

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Criterion 24.10 - Competent authorities, including LEAs, have powers to obtain
timely access to the basic and BO information on legal persons. This information can
be obtained directly through the company registry. Supervisors, LEAs and FIU-NL can
request information directly from obliged entities through their powers.

Criterion 24.11 - The issuance of bearer shares is prohibited since July 2019. Prior to
this, NVs were the only legal person that could issue bearer shares. For NVs listed on
a regulated market, bearer shares were de-materialised in 2011 requiring holders of
bearer shares to change them to regular registered shares at the issuing company, or
deposit and register their shares at a central institution or an intermediary.

The issuing NVs were required to change their articles of association to convert
bearer shares into registered shares and became the owner of the bearer shares that
were not presented or registered by the end of 2020. Holders of (former) bearer
shares can still receive their registered shares if they present their former bearer
shares to the issuing company before 1 January 2026, but have lost all rights under
those shares until presented.
BES Islands: Bearer shares in the BES Islands are prohibited (Bv BES, Art. 104(2)).

Criterion 24.13 - Sanctions are available for natural and legal persons that fail to
comply with the requirements in R.24. However, as noted above, not all requirements
are met. There is no obligation to obtain and hold up-to-date BO information and
register it in the company register for legal entities incorporated in the BES Islands or
other legal entities (e.g. associations, mutual insurance companies, church
communities) that are not required to maintain a register of their shareholders or
members. Therefore, sanctions are not available for these entities.
It is an economic offense to fail to register with the Company Register basic company
and BO information, accurately or in a timely manner (Wed, Art. 1(4)), Art. 6(1)(5);
and Hrw, Art. 47). This offense carries a fine of up to EUR 21 750 or imprisonment for
up to six months. Existing legal persons have until 27 March 2022 to fulfil this
obligation. Newly created entities since 27 September 2020 have to register their BOs
immediately.

Public and private limited liability companies are required to maintain the register of
shareholders and to keep it up to date (BW, 2:85, 2:194). Art. 2:61(b)(d) for members
of cooperatives; 2:290 BW for beneficiaries of foundations). Failure to comply
constitutes an economic offence (Wed, Art. 1(4), Art. 6(1)(5); Hrw, Art. 47). This fine
is up to EUR 21 750 or imprisonment for up to six months. Legal entities are also
required to maintain BO information, and in the process of registering the BOs it is
required to provide documentation on the nature and extent of the beneficial interest
held for each BO. This applies to nearly all legal entities.

BES Islands: Legal and natural persons are subject to various sanctions for failure to
comply with requirements, including a fine of up to USD 28 000 for the criminal act of
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Technical compliance

Criterion 24.12 - Nominee shareholding and directorships are not a recognised
concept in Dutch legislation but professionals offering a nominee-director services
are classified as ‘trustkantoren’, which is a Dutch word similar to TCSP and are
licensed under the Wtt (Art. 1.1). Non-professional natural/legal person can also be
nominee-director without having to comply with the Wtt obligations. There are also
no mechanisms that require nominee directors to disclose the identity of their
nominator to the Company Register or to obliged entities. Legal persons are
prohibited from providing trust services, unless licensed.

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deliberately submitting a false or incomplete statement to the company register (Hrw
BES, Art. 21).
Criterion 24.14 –

a) Basic information in the company registry is publicly accessible online,
including for foreign competent authorities. Some information is only available
at a cost.
b) Details on BOs, including shareholders, are included in the BO register. This
data is also publicly accessible, including for foreign counterparts at a cost.

FIU-NL can also exchange information (including information on shareholders) with
foreign counterparts (Wwft, Art. 13b and 16a; Wwft BES, 3.2) or other FIUs (see c.40.9
for deficiencies related to non-EU/EEA FIUs).

BES Islands: Basic information is not publicly available. Supervisors can share basic
information with foreign counterparts upon request (see R.40).

Technical compliance

c)

Competent authorities including the FIU-NL are able to share BO information
obtained using investigative powers with foreign counterparts (Wwft, Art. 17
and 22a; Wwft BES Art 3.6). LEAs can also share this information following a
request for legal assistance. In such cases, LEAs have the same powers to collect
information as they would have in a Dutch investigation into the same offences
(Sv, Art. 5.1.8).

Criterion 24.15 - The quality of assistance received from other countries in response
to requests for basic and BO information or requests for assistance in locating BOs
residing abroad is safeguarded by procedures used by the Central Liaison Office of the
Tax and Customs Administration and IRCs.
The Dutch authorities consider the following information in order to monitor the
quality of assistance received from other countries:
•

•
•
•

type of response from abroad (full or partial response);
grounds for refusal if information is not provided;

possible relevance of the information obtained (insofar as the competent
authority is able to assess this); and
completeness and clarity of the response.

Weighting and Conclusion

Information on the establishment of legal persons in the Netherlands is set out in
legislation and is publicly available. All legal persons must be registered on the
Company Register. A full assessment of ML/TF risks of all legal persons has not been
carried out. However, The Netherlands have launched various initiatives aimed at
identifying and assessing ML/TF risks of legal persons. Obliged entities are required
to keep BO information accurate and up-to-date in a central register, but minor
deficiencies exist. Nominee directors and nominee shareholders are subject to
AML/CFT obligations in some instances, which somewhat mitigates the overall risk.
Recommendation 24 is rated as largely compliant.

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Recommendation 25 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal
arrangements
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.34.
Deficiencies related to gaps in the BO definition of legal arrangements, the scope of
legal privilege hindering the possibility for LEAs to access BO information regarding
trusts held by some DNFBPs, the updating requirement for trust BO information being
insufficient to ensure it is accurate, complete and available in a timely manner.
Criterion 25.1 –

(b) There is no explicit requirement for custodians to hold basic information on other
regulated agents of, and service providers to, the Mutual Fund. Professional
trustees in the Netherlands are required to hold and maintain service records on
the trust, including for contracts entered into on behalf of the trust (Wtt, Art. 39;
Rfm BES, Art. 2.3). However, while this may to some extent cover the necessary
basic information, it does not extend to a requirement to always hold and
maintain basic information on all service providers to the trust.

(c) Professional trustees of express trusts are subject to the CDD requirements, and
required to maintain this information for at least five years after their
involvement with the trust ceases (Wtt, Art. 37(4); Wwft BES, Art. 2.19). However,
this only extends to trusts as defined by the Hague Convention, and therefore does
not cover other similar legal arrangements, including Mutual Funds.
69

Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition.

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Technical compliance

(a) Express trusts cannot be established in the Netherlands or in the BES Islands. For
“Mutual Funds”, which are a similar legal arrangement in the Netherlands, there
are no explicit requirements for custodians to obtain and hold adequate, accurate,
and current information on the identity of the participants, the administrator or
other natural persons exercising ultimate effective control. In some cases, Mutual
Funds are investment funds, subjecting them to registration and supervision by
the AFM (Wft, Art. 2:65). The Netherlands is party to the Hague Trust
Convention69 which means that foreign trusts as defined in the Convention are
recognised. Professional trustees in the Netherlands of such trusts are required
to carry out CDD measures on the express trust itself, which include determining
the BO (Wtt, Art. 30(3)(a)). In the BES Islands, similar requirements exist,
including for the trustee to be aware of the identity of the settlor of the trust and
BO of the trust (Wwft BES, Art. 2.18). However, it is not clear if this includes the
same identification and verification measures as required for the identity of the
BO of the customer. Beneficial owners include the settlor(s), the trustee(s), the
protector(s), the beneficiaries, or to the extent that the individual beneficiaries of
the trust cannot be determined, the group of persons in whose main interest the
trust is set up or operates, and any other natural person who ultimately controls
the trust through direct or indirect ownership or by other means (Wwft Decree
2018, Art. 3(e); Bwft BES, Art. 2(d)). However, the definition of beneficiaries of
the trust, when those individuals cannot be identified only relate to the group of
persons in whose main interest the trust is set up or operates, which is not in line
with the FATF Standards.

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Criterion 25.2 – The CDD information collected by professional trustees is required
to be up-to-date (see analysis on c.22.1 and c.10.7(b)). This also applies to service
records in the Netherlands (Wtt, Art. 39). Deficiencies noted in c.25.1 also apply.

BES Islands: Trust offices must continuously monitor their clients and the
transactions. (Wwft BES, Art. 2:17(d)). Service providers must take reasonable
measures to ensure that the data collected as a result of CDD is correct and up-to-date
(Wwft BES, Art. 2.2(6)).
Criterion 25.3 – FIs and DNFBPs are required to identify the BO of their customers,
including with respect to trusts and to take reasonable measures to verify whether
the customer is acting on its own behalf or on behalf of a third party (Wwft Art,
3(2)(f); Wwft BES, Art 2.2(2)(f)). The Wwft does not require trustees to disclose their
status. Although the CDD requirements may help ensure that this occurs, this does not
translate into an obligation on the trustee to disclose their status as a trustee. There
is no equivalent obligation for other types of legal arrangements.

Technical compliance

Criterion 25.4 – There are no legal restrictions on trustees providing competent
authorities or FIs and DNFBPs with any information relating to trusts, including
lawyers or notaries acting as trustees. For professional trustees, DNB is authorised to
request any person to provide information (Wtt, 43; Wfm BES, Art.7:8).

Criterion 25.5 – LEAs and FIU-NL have the necessary powers to obtain information
held by trustees (and persons in an equivalent position in another type of legal
arrangement), and other parties such as FIs and DNFBPs, in the course of their
investigations (see R.29, 30, 31). In addition, prosecutors can also require obliged
entities to produce information in the case of serious offences (WvSv, Art. 67(1)).
Supervisors also have the necessary powers to obtain information on trusts from FIs
and DNFBPs (see analysis on R.27, R.28).

Criterion 25.6 – The provisions for co-operation with competent authorities in other
countries described under R.37 and R.40 also apply to the exchange of information on
trusts and legal arrangements. There is currently no registry that holds basic
information on trusts or similar legal arrangements. Foreign competent authorities
can access the DNB’s public register of licensed trustees, which does not include
information on the individual trust or similar legal arrangement. Supervisors can,
under certain conditions, provide information obtained in the performance of their
tasks, including information collected on CDD, to foreign supervisors, subject to
certain safeguards (Wwft, Art. 22a; Wtt, Art. 56; Wwft BES, Art. 1.5(2)). For DNB, this
also extends to other foreign government authorities. FIU-NL can exchange
information (including information on trusts or other legal arrangements) with FIUs
in other EU/EEA member states (Wwft, Art. 13a, 13b and 13c; Wwft BES, Art. 3.2) (see
c.40.9 for deficiencies related to non-EU/EEA FIUs).

DNB may, under certain conditions, request information on behalf of foreign
supervisory authorities from another country which is a party to a treaty on the
exchange of information with the Netherlands (or which is subject to the same
binding act of an international organisation as the Netherlands) (Wtt, Art. 45).
However, this does not extend to the BES Islands. LEAs can share information
following a request for legal assistance, and have the same powers to collect it as they
would in a domestic investigation into the same offence (WvSv, Art. 5.1.8).

Criterion 25.7 and 25.8 – Trustees are subject to sanctions for failure to comply with
AML/CFT requirements, including for failing to grant competent authorities timely
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access to information regarding the trust referred to in c.25.1. However, available
sanctions in the BES Islands are not fully proportionate and dissuasive (see R.35).

Weighting and conclusion

Express trusts cannot be established in the Netherlands, although persons in the
Netherlands can act a trustee for trusts created under the law of other jurisdictions
and that foreign trusts can own property or otherwise operate in the Netherlands.
Obliged entities involved in the administration of foreign trusts are subject to
AML/CFT obligations. Mutual funds can be established and share similar features to
trusts. However, these are only subject to registration and supervision where they are
considered as investment vehicles. Trustees provided by obliged entities are subject
to sanctions, but in the BES Islands these are not proportionate or dissuasive.
Recommendation 25 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 26 – Regulation and supervision of financial institutions
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R.23.
Deficiencies related to the effective supervision of independent insurance businesses
and AFM supervision.

Criterion 26.2 – Almost all FIs, including Core Principles FIs, MVTS and currency
exchanges must be licenced by DNB or AFM before carrying out activities in the
Netherlands (Wft Art, 1(a) 4; Wfm BES Art, 1.5(2)). Institutions that provide the
services under art 1a (3) (a) are not licensed, but are registered. A physical presence
is required for FIs, except for banks registered in other EU Member states providing
services to customers in the Netherlands (Wfm Art, 3:15(1)(2); Wfm BES, Art 2:14(j)).
Banks must also have a licence from the ECB (Wft Art, 2:11(1)). Shell banks are not
permitted in the Netherlands (see c.13.3).

Criterion 26.3 – Supervisors prevent criminals from holding (or being the BO of) a
significant or controlling interest, or a management function, in FIs. Legal or natural
persons are prohibited from obtaining a qualifying holding in FIs or exercise any
control in relation to a qualifying holding in these FIs without a declaration of no
objection from DNB, AFM or the ECB (Wft, Art. 3:96; Wfm BES, Art. 3:30). A qualified
holding is defined as any direct or indirect holding of at least 10% of the issued share
capital or of a comparable holding, or the ability to exercise, directly or indirectly, at
least 10% of the voting rights or of comparable control (Wft, Art.1:1; Wfm BES, Art.
3:27 DNB and AFM are required to determine that persons in management functions
are fit and proper. This includes consideration of a criminal background (Wfm Art,
3:100; Wft BES, 3:30(1)).
Criterion 26.4 –

a) The Netherland’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) report was
conducted in 2017. Overall, the regulation and supervision of FIs was in line
with the core principles. The Netherlands complies with principles of banking,
insurance, and securities supervision. This includes the application of
consolidated group supervision (Wft, 3.6). The FSAP noted that group
supervision significantly improved, but some important powers for

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Technical compliance

Criterion 26.1 – DNB and AFM are designated to supervise and monitor FIs’
compliance with AML/CFT requirements (Wwft, Art 1d(1); Wwft BES, Art 1(1)(p)(1)
in conjunction with Article 1(b) Decree on the designation of supervisory authorities).

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX

comprehensive group supervision were not available. 70
b) Other FIs are subject to regulation and supervision under the Wwft and Wwft
BES, having regard to the ML/TF risks in the sector.

Criterion 26.5 – AML/CFT supervisors must perform their tasks in a risk-based and
effective manner, taking account of Article 48 of AMLD4 71 (Wwft Art, 1d(6)). This
includes basing the frequency and intensity of AML/CFT supervision of FIs or groups
on the ML/TF risks of the obliged entities and the jurisdiction.

BES Islands: The supervisory authority can conduct supervision relating to the
services in a risk-oriented manner (Wwft BES, Art. 5.8). There is no requirement
relating to frequency or intensity.
Criterion 26.6 – DNB and AFM must periodically review the ML/TF risk profile of
obliged entities, including the risks of non-compliance, when there are major events
or developments in their management and operations (Wwft, Art.1d(6)) This also
applies to financial groups.

BES Islands: There are no specific provisions for when supervisors should review the
assessment of risk for FIs.

Technical compliance

Weighting and Conclusion

There are minor shortcomings in the application of an RBA, including a lack of process
for determining frequency and intensity of supervision. There is no requirement to
consider and review the risk in the BES Islands but supervisors can conduct
supervision in a risk oriented manner.
Recommendation 26 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 27 – Powers of supervisors
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R.29.
Deficiencies related to the effective use of sanctions.

Criterion 27.1 – DNB and AFM have powers to supervise FIs’ compliance with
AML/CFT requirements, including in the BES Islands (Wwft, Art. 1d(1); Wwft BES,
Art. 5.4 & Art. 1(1)(p)(1) in conjunction with the Decree on the designation of
supervisory authorities, Art. 1).

Criterion 27.2 – Supervisors are authorised to enter all premises without consent
and to require inspection of business information and documents (Awb, Art. 5:15 &
5:17; Wfm BES, Art. 7:7 & 7:10 in conjunction with Wwft BES Art. 5.5(1)).
Criterion 27.3 – Supervisors are empowered to compel FIs to provide information
without the need for a court order. FIs are required to provide assistance as may
reasonably be demanded (Awb, 5:16 & 5:20; Wfm BES, 7:8 in conjunction with Wwft
BES Art. 5.5(1)).

Criterion 27.4 – Supervisors are authorised to impose sanctions in line with R.35 for
failure to comply with AML/CFT requirements. This includes powers to impose a
range of disciplinary sanctions, including the power to withdraw, restrict or suspend
an FI’s license (Wwft Chapter 4, Wft Art1:104(1); Wwft BES, Chapter 5).
70
71

IMF (April 2017) Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands : Financial System Stability
Assessment
EC Directive (EU) 2015/849

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Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 27 is rated compliant.

Recommendation 28 – Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.24.
Deficiencies related to secrecy issues preventing supervision of lawyers and on
effectiveness concerning the monitoring of DPMS, lawyers, accountants and illegally
operating casinos.
Criterion 28.1 -

Ksa is the designated supervisor for the only casino in the Netherlands for
AML/CFT requirements, and is required to perform its tasks in a risk-based and
effective manner (Wwft, Art. 1d(1)(f) & (6)). DNB is the designated supervisory
authority for casinos in the BES Islands (Decree on the designation of supervisory
authorities under the ML/TF (Prevention) Act BES, Art. 1(b)).

Criterion 28.2 &28.3 - The following institutions are responsible for the supervision
of the AML/CFT compliance of the obliged DNFBPs other than casinos:
The Netherlands
•
•
•
•

DNB: Trust offices (Wwft, Art. 1d(1)(a)).
BFT: Notaries, other legal professionals, accountants and TCSPs acting as a
formation agent of legal persons (Wwft, Art. 1d(1)(e)).
Deans (NOvA): Lawyers (Wwft, Art. 1d(1)(d)).
BTWwft: Real estate agents, DPMS acting as buyers, sellers and
intermediaries, and providers of postal addresses that are not covered by the
Wtt (Wwft, Art. 1d(1)(e)).

DPMS, when acting as intermediaries, are not supervised for AML/CFT compliance.
The BES Islands
•
•

•

DNB: Trust offices (Decree on the designation of supervisory authorities under
the ML/TF (Prevention) Act BES, Art. 1(b)).
BTWwft: Real estate agents, DPMS (including when acting as
intermediaries), notaries, other independent legal professionals, accountants
and (Decree on the designation of supervisory authorities under the ML/TF
(Prevention) Act BES, Art. 2), lawyers until July 1st 2021.
Deans (NOvA): Lawyers, as from July 1st 2021 (Wwft BES, Art. 5.4)

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Technical compliance

a) Casinos are required to be licensed by the Ksa (Wok, Art. 1(1)(a), 27g(1); Wok
BES I, Art. 1).
b) A holder of a permit, the persons determining or co-determining its policy and its
BOs must be reliable and suitable (Wok, Art. 4b). Although there are no legal or
regulatory measures to prevent the associates of criminals (besides the abovementioned persons) from holding (or being the BO of) a significant or controlling
interest, or from holding a management function or being the operator of a casino,
the Netherlands government is the sole shareholder of the only licensed casino.
Any privatisation could only be effected by law.

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Criterion 28.4 a) Supervisors have adequate powers to perform their functions, including, inter
alia, to enter all premises without consent, demand the presentation of or to gain
access to all records, documents or information relevant to monitoring
compliance, and obliged entities are required to cooperate (Awb, Chapter 5.2;
Wfm BES, Chapter 2 Art. 7:7 – 7:10).

b) DNFBPs must ensure that their employees and the executive policymakers are
screened, as relevant to the performance of their duties and taking into account
the risks, nature and size of the institution (Wwft, Art. 35). Tax advisors,
accountant, lawyers, notaries, and real estate agents have to provide their
supervisor with a certificate of good conduct when requested (Art. 35a Wwft).
Obliged entities from these sectors that register for a trade organisation or
professional body are usually required to provide certificate of conduct, which
include criminal records checks. However, this does not guarantee that DNFBPs
screen whether employees, including senior managers, are criminals or the
associate of criminals, as a degree of discretion is allowed in determining what
screening procedures are appropriate.

Technical compliance

BES Islands: For trust offices, officers who determine or co-determine the policy,
and persons entrusted with the supervision of the policy and general course of
the operations must be reliable (Wfm BES, Art. 3:4). This includes screening
whether the person has been convicted of a relevant crime within the last eight
years (Bfm BES, Art. 3:1-3:3).

Lawyers are required to register with the Common Court of Justice of Aruba,
Curaçao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. Screening measures
for lawyers include a requirement of integrity and a clean criminal record in the
past 10 years on matters relating to money/financial-economic offences,
information/confidentiality issues and integrity. A lawyer cannot be registered
without a certificate of conduct.
Notaries must provide a certificate of good conduct for accreditation (Wna BES,
Art. 9(c)). Certificates in the BES Islands include the same information as in the
Netherlands.
c)

No measures are in place for real estate agents, DPMS, accountants or other legal
professionals in the BES Islands.

Supervisors have adequate sanctions available for failures to comply with
AML/CFT requirements. However, available sanctions in the BES Islands are not
fully proportionate and dissuasive (see R.35).

Criterion 28.5 -

a) Supervisors are required to perform their tasks in a risk-based and effective
manner, taking into account Article 48(6) to (8) of AMLD4. This requires
supervisors, inter alia, to base the frequency and intensity of on-site and offsite supervision on the risk profile of obliged entities, and on ML and TF risks
in the country (Wwft, Art. 1d(6); Wtt, Art. 41(2)).
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BES Islands: Supervisors may, but are not required to, conduct supervision
relating in a risk-oriented manner for all DNFBPs, except casinos (Wwft BES,
Art. 5.8).

b) Supervisors are required to take into account the degree of discretion allowed
to the obliged entity, and appropriately review the risk assessments
underlying this discretion, and the adequacy and implementation of its
internal policies, controls and procedures (Wwft, Art. 1d(6); Wtt, Art. 41(2)).

BES Islands: This criterion is not met for DNFBPs, except for trust offices, as
they are not subject to requirements to carry out risk assessments or have
policies, procedures or controls in place (see c.1.10, c.1.11, c.23.2).

Weighting and Conclusion

Casinos are licensed and DNFBPs covered by the AML/CFT legislation are subject to
supervision. Supervisors have adequate powers and sanctions available, however,
there are some shortcomings in relation to screening to ensure criminals and their
associates are prevented from being accredited or holding a management function or
significant or controlling interest, including being a BO in a DNFBP. In addition there
are gaps relating to supervision in the BES Islands. Scoping issues mentioned in c.22.1
apply.
Recommendation 28 is rated largely compliant.

In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.26, due
to deficiencies related to the incomplete legal framework of FIU-NL and concerns with
its operational independence. Other deficiencies related to the access to, and security
of, data necessary to fulfil its tasks. In follow-up, the technical deficiencies on
operational independence and FIU autonomy were addressed, to be re-rated to
largely compliant.

Criterion 29.1 – FIU-NL is the national centre for the receipt and analysis of UTRs and
other information for the prevention and detection of ML, associated predicate
offences and TF, and dissemination of its analysis (including for BES Islands) (Wwft,
Art. 12-13, Art. 16; Wwft BES, Art. 3).

Criterion 29.2 – FIU-NL is the central agency for the receipt of disclosures filed by all
obliged entities. The reporting system is based on UTRs (see R.20). A set of subjective
and objective indicators define when a transaction shall be considered unusual, and
reported to the FIU-NL immediately after its unusual nature is known (Wwft, Art. 1516; Wwft BES, Art. 3.5). Indicators include the following:
•
•
72

A reason to believe that the transaction may be related to ML or TF (Wwft, Art.
15-16; Annex to Wwft Decree 2018; Wwft BES, Art. 3.5, Rwft BES, Annexes);
Objective indicators related to certain types of operations or thresholds. 72

The Annex to Wwft Decree 2018 includes a list of indicators for each reporting entity.
These include: cash transactions of EUR 10 000 or more, where cash is exchanged into
another currency or from small to large denominations; cash deposit of EUR 10 000 or
more in favour of a credit or prepaid card; credit or prepaid transactions of EUR 15 000 or
more, money-remittances of EUR 2 000 or more; transaction by or for the benefit of a

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Recommendation 29 - Financial intelligence units

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Criterion 29.3 – In addition to UTRs, FIU-NL is able to:

a) Request data or information from an obliged entity that submitted a UTR, or
from an institution which, in the opinion of FIU-NL, has data or information
relevant to its analysis of a transaction or business relationship (Wwft, Art.
17; Wwft BES, Art. 3.6).

b) Access, directly or indirectly, a wide range of financial, administrative and LEA
information to properly undertake its functions. FIU-NL also receives
information on cash declarations and disclosures from the Customs (see
c.32.6)

Criterion 29.4 – FIU-NL conducts:

a) Operational analysis: FIU-NL conducts its own analysis to determine whether
a transaction shall be declared suspicious. This includes checking information
provided in the UTRs, relevant databases, requesting additional information
to/from LEAs or obliged entities, or foreign FIUs (Wwft, Art. 13- 14, 17; Wwft
BES, Art. 3.2- 3.3, 3.6);

Technical compliance

b) Strategic analysis: FIU-NL conducts studies of ML and TF trends and
typologies (Wwft, Art.13d).

Criterion 29.5 – FIU-NL is authorised to disseminate information to LEAs (Wwft, Art.
13 (b), (d), (e) and (f) and Wwft BES, Art. 3.2 (d), (e) and (f)). The dissemination of
information is carried out through a secure database accessible to all LEAs.
Criterion 29.6 –

a) UTR data is classified as State Secret. FIU disseminations are classified as
police secret information governed under the Police Data Act (WPG, Art. 7 and
13.2). Information provided to comply with Wwft obligations is confidential
and cannot be used for any purpose other than what is required (Wwft, Art.
22; Wwft BES, Art. 1.5).
b) All staff members working for FIU-NL are enlisted in the Police. They are
subject to two screening processes: (1) for their appointment as police officer
(General Legal Status (Netherlands Police) Decree, Art. 8); (2) for the security
clearance needed as a staff member of the FIU-NL (Police Act 2012, paragraph
3.5.4).

c) A dedicated floor within the building of the Police is governing the physical
security in relation to the entry of non-FIU personnel into the premises of FIUNL. FIU-NL has its own IT system and may make use of the Police facilities
(Institutional Decree FIU-NL 2013, Art. 3(6)). Apart from the FIU-NL staff
members, only authorised technical staff members of the Police Services
Centre with specific clearances are able to gain access to FIU-NL databases,
for necessary technical maintenance only.

Criterion 29.7 –

a) FIU-NL is an administrative FIU, under the direct governance of the Minister
of Justice and Security and housed within the Police. The Minister of Justice
and Security is responsible for the overall management, organisation and

natural or legal person residing or established or having its registered office in a state that
has been designated as a state with a higher risk of ML or TF by the EC. A similar list of
indicators for each reporting entity is in place for the BES Islands (Rwft BES, Annexes).

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administration of the FIU. The general management of the FIU has been
delegated to the Head of FIU-NL (Institutional Decree FIU-NL, Art. 2(4)). The
Head of FIU-NL is appointed, suspended or dismissed by Royal Decree, upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and Security, in agreement with the
Minister of Finance (Wwft, Art.12(3); Wwft BES, Art. 3.1(2))). The Head of the
FIU-NL has the responsibility for the decisions to declare an unusual
transaction to be suspicious (Institutional Decree FIU-NL 2013, Art. 2(2)).

b) The FIU-NL is able to make arrangements or engage independently with
domestic competent authorities or foreign FIUs for obtaining information
(Wwft, Art. 13a, 13b, 13c, 17(3); Wwft BES, Art. 3.2). Furthermore, the Head
of the FIU-NL has the power to independently and exclusively negotiate on
and conclude MoUs and agreements with foreign FIUs or other relevant
partners (Institutional Decree FIU-NL 2013, Art. 2(2)(e)).

c) While FIU-NL is located within the Police, it is operationally independent and
autonomous. The Head of FIU-NL has full authority of FIU tasks (Institutional
Decree FIU-NL 2013, Art. 3 (2)). In addition, employees report to the Head of
FIU and the UTR database is only accessible by FIU staff (Institutional Decree
FIU-NL 2013, Art. 2 (7) and (8)).

Criterion 29.8 – The FIU-NL is a founding member of the Egmont Group of FIUs.

Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 29 is compliant.

Recommendation 30 – Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative
authorities
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated compliant with the requirements of former
R.27.

Criterion 30.1 – Various LEAs are responsible for identifying and investigating ML,
TF and predicate offences, including the OM, Police, and special investigation services,
including FIOD and KMar.
The OM is in charge of criminal investigations and prosecutions and responsible for
deciding which cases to pursue (WvSv, Article 132a and 141; RO, Art. 124).

The Police has investigators at national, regional and local levels (Police Organisation
Decree). The National Unit (LE) and the National Crime Squad (DLR) investigate
organised crime, including offences related to ML, TF, and environmental crimes
(Police Organisation Decree, Art. 6). Each Police region has competence to investigate
TF cases, and deals with other high priority investigations such as those related to
human trafficking, fraud, cybercrime and execution of MLA requests (Police Decree,
Art. 20-21). For complex cases, the regional police can investigate jointly with, or
transfer the case to the DLR and/or the Special investigation services. In addition,
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Technical compliance

d) The Minister of Justice and Security determines the budget of the FIU-NL in
agreement with the Minister of Finance (Wwft, Art. 12(2) and (4); Wwft BES,
Art. 3.1(4)). Once the budget is set, the Head of FIU has the authority to decide
on the use of financial resources (Institutional Decree FIU-NL 2013, Art. 2(3)
and (4)).

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there are specialised financial teams active within the Police that carry out their own
investigations or provide support to the mixed investigation teams.

The four Special Investigation Services conduct investigations on a range of predicate
offences, including fraud, ML, trafficking in human being, cybercrime and drug
trafficking. The FIOD is in charge of investigating and combating fiscal and financial
offences and ML, as well as TF. The other special services include the Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate, the
Intelligence and Investigation Service of the NVWA and the Investigation Department
of the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate (Special Investigative Services Act,
Art. 2-8).

BES Islands: The designated LEAs to investigate and prosecute ML, TF and predicate
offences are the OM BES, the KPCN and RST. The OM BES has a specialised ML public
prosecutor. Serious cross-border offences across Aruba, Curacao, St. Maarten and the
BES are handled by a Detective Co-operation Team (RST).

Technical compliance

Criterion 30.2 – All LEAs mentioned under c 30.1 can pursue parallel financial
investigations. Financial investigations are carried out in all criminal investigations
where suspicious flows of money and assets are identified, in order to confiscate
criminal gains and/or prosecute ML/TF. They are also conducted in all organised
offences (Confiscation instruction 2016A009, Ch.4).

For serious offences for which a fine of the fifth category can be imposed, the
instrument and procedure of a criminal financial investigation (SFO) may be
instituted, independently of the investigation into the predicate offences and in
parallel with general financial investigations. SFOs can be initiated during or after the
investigation of the predicate offence and can be continued after the predicate offence
investigation is closed (WvSv, Art. 126).
BES Islands: A criminal financial investigation is instituted in cases of an offence
punishable by a term of imprisonment of four or more years, or an offence that may
result in any monetary benefits (including ML offences) (WvSv BES, Art. 177a).
Similar to the Netherlands, the OM BES must submit an authorisation to the
examining magistrate for the KPCN or specialised services to conduct the
investigation.

Criterion 30.3 – All LEAs involved in the investigation of ML, TF and predicate
offences are also able to identify, trace and initiate the seizing of assets (WvSv, Art.
141-142).
BES Islands: The KPCN and RST investigate criminal offences and can proceed to
confiscation, upon authorisation from OM BES.

Criterion 30.4 – Customs may initiate a financial investigation where they detect an
unusual transaction or situation, or upon discovery of a violation in the obligation to
declare arising a suspicion of a criminal activity (WvSv, Art. 142; (Tax and Customs
Administration) Special Investigating Officer Order 2017, Art. 2). Customs’ enquiry
aims at identifying and tracing proceeds of crime, terrorist funds or any other assets
that may become subject to confiscation, and developing evidence for court
proceedings.
The Tax and Customs Administration conducts inspections against tax fraud, with the
FIOD conducting financial investigations into ML predicate offences.

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BES Islands: BES Customs can initiate a ML/TF investigation where they detect a
violation to file a declaration, or if they detect an unusual transaction or situation
[BAVPol (Decree on Extraordinary Police Officers) Tax and Customs Administration
CN, Art. 2].

Criterion 30.5 – (N/A) In the Netherlands and BES Islands, there are specialised units
with powers to investigate ML/TF offences arising from, or related to, corruption
offences. The Anti-Corruption Centre within the FIOD may conduct investigations into
corruption. The Police Internal Investigation Department has powers for
investigating allegations of corruption within the domestic civil service (including in
the BES Islands). Within the OM, specialised prosecutors focus on anti-corruption.
These anti-corruption units are equipped to also carry out ML/TF investigations and
confiscation investigations (including SFOs) in the context of a corruption
investigation.

Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 30 is rated compliant.

Recommendation 31 - Powers of law enforcement and investigative
authorities

Criterion 31.1 – LEA powers are set out in the Criminal Procedures Code (WvSv,
WvSv BES). The powers can be used in the context of ML, TF and predicate offence
investigations. Extended powers can be applied to investigate organised criminal
groups suspected to commit serious offences.
a) Production of records held by FIs, DNFBPs, and other natural or legal persons –
The OM can request and obtain documents and information in case of
suspicion of serious offences, including TF, and whenever there is a suspicion
of ML (WvSv, Art. 67(1), Art. 96(1), Art. 96a, Art. 126nc, 126nd, 126uc). Data
can also be requested from telecommunication providers (WvSv, Art. 126n,
126na, 126nb, 126ng and 126ni). Identification data can be requested and
obtained by investigative officers, without prior authorisation (WvSv, Art.
126nc).

In the context of an SFO (see Rec. 30.2), an investigative officer can order any
natural and legal person to provide insight into documents or data including
information on any assets that belong or have belonged to the subject of the
investigation (WvSv, Art. 126a, WvSv BES, Art. 177b).

The Netherlands provided sufficient case-law to demonstrate that legal
professional privilege (WvSv, Article 98 and 218) can be waived when letters
or other papers are the subject of the offence or instrumental in its
commission or when the court considers that the importance of establishing
the truth in an individual case outweighs the public interest served by legal
professional privilege.
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Technical compliance

In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former R.28. The main deficiencies were that the scope of legal privilege hindered the
ability of LEAs to locate and trace assets and property. The lack of statistics on
investigations also impacted effectiveness.

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In the BES Islands, the investigating officer may require a person to provide
data whenever there is a suspicion of a serious offence allowing for pre-trial
detention or if there are signs of a terrorist crime (WvSv BES, Art. 177s). When
a SFO is initiated, the investigating officer can request any information and
insight into the financial position of the person under investigation (WvSv
BES, Art. 177b).

b) Search of persons and premises – Regular investigative powers include the
power to search persons and places, including premises (WvSv, Art. 55a, Art.
126g(2); Police Act, Art. 7; WvSv BES, Art. 177p). The search of houses/places
of residence is subject to a prior authorisation by the OM or the examining
magistrate (WvSv, Art. 55a, 96, 96b, 96c, 97, 110, General Act on Entering).
The prior authorisation is not required in case of immediate danger.

Technical compliance

In the course of a SFO, the OM may request the search of a location or the
search of documents and data for the purpose of a seizure (WvSv, Art. 126b
and 126c, WvSv BES, Art. 177c).

c) Taking witness statements – The examining magistrate, OM and judge may call
for witnesses (WvSv Art. 180-191, 210-226, 260(1), 280; WvSv BES, Art. 243260, 421, 307) upon request or if necessary. Witness statements collected by
LEAs may serve as evidence in court (WvSv, Art. 344; WvSv BES, Art. 387,
382).

d) Seizing and obtaining evidence – LEAs have power to seize any object which
may constitute evidence or demonstrate unlawfully obtained gains (WvSv,
Art. 94-119a; WvSv BES, Art. 119, 119a). The special framework under an SFO
extends powers to LEAs to obtain documents and other information, or to
seize objects without any further authorisation (WvSv, Art. 126 and WvSv
BES, Art. 177a).

Criterion 31.2 – Police, special investigation services, including FIOD can apply a
range of investigative techniques for the investigation of ML, predicate offences and
TF, including:

a) Undercover operations (WvSv, Art 126h; WvSv BES, Art. 177m). In the
Netherlands, these techniques are applicable only to the offences listed in
WvSv, Art. 67(1), including all offences with a term of imprisonment of four
year or more, as well as to TF and the specific offences listed in Art. 67. As ML
offences are encompassed by Art. 67, whenever a suspicion of ML arises
during the investigation of any predicate offence, these investigative
techniques would be applicable.

b) Intercepting communications – upon request from the OM, the examining
magistrate can authorise the recording of confidential information, such as
conversations and telecommunication in a closed network. With this
authorisation the OM can order telephone taps (WvSv, Art. 126l and 126m;
WvSv BES, Art. 177o and 177q). Data on telephone traffic can be obtained by
the OM without authorisation of the examining judge (WvSv, 126n, WvSv BES,
Art.177r) In the Netherlands, these investigative techniques are applicable to
the offences listed in Article 67(1) – see analysis above-.

c) Accessing computer systems – In the Netherlands, access to computer systems
may be obtained in the context of a search of a place (WvSv, Art. 125i and
125j) or once a computer is seized (WvSv, Art. 94). Based on the level of

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intrusion on privacy, the order shall be given by the OM or the examining
magistrate. Upon authorisation from both the OM and the examining
magistrate, remote accessing to a computer can be granted (WvSv, Art.
126nba). In BES Islands, there are currently no provisions allowing for access
to computer systems.

d) Controlled delivery shall be authorised by the Board of Procurators General
(WvSv, Art. 126ff(2) and Art. 140a; WvSv BES, Art. 177y(2)).

Criterion 31.3 –

a) LEAs can automatically retrieve information on natural and legal persons
holding or controlling a bank account or any other banking products through
the Bank Information Referral Portal, if the bank is affiliated to the Portal.
Banks in BES are not connected to the portal. In the context of a SFO, the
investigative officer can order any person to provide information into the
financial position of the individual under investigation (WvSv, Art. 126a,
WvSv BES, Art. 177b), without any further authorisation from the examining
magistrate.

Criterion 31.4 – LEAs have access to the police database and other databases in
which FIU disseminations are stored (e.g., iCOV). In addition, they can request access
to information held by the FIU-NL. The FIU-NL cannot refuse to provide data when
the request relates to a serious threat, there is a reasonable suspicion that a person
committed an offence, or whenever the request is relates to the prevention or
detection of an offence (Bpg, Art. 2:13(2)).

Weighting and Conclusion

LEAs have wide powers to obtain access to all necessary documents and information
and a broad range of investigative techniques for their investigations. There are minor
shortcomings in relation to the ability to identify in a timely manner whether natural
and legal persons hold or control accounts. In the BES Islands, there are currently no
provisions to allow for access to computer systems.
Recommendation 31 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 32 – Cash Couriers
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with the requirements of
former SR IX. Outstanding deficiencies included the lack of disclosure requirements
for transportation by mail or cargo, concerns on the quality of data accessible to FIUNL and effective use of such information and effectiveness of sanctions.
Criterion 32.1 – Based on EU regulations, the Netherlands applies a declaration
system for the transportation of cash and BNI valued at EUR 10 000 or more, entering
or leaving the EU (EU Regulation 2018/1672, Art. 3), and a disclosure system for
transportation via cargo or mail (EU Regulation 2018/1672, Art. 4). In addition to the
EU regulations, the Netherlands imposes a disclosure obligation for all physical
transportation of cash, BNI and valuable goods of EUR 10 000 or more (Adw, Art. 3:4
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Technical compliance

b) There are measures in place to ensure that the information above can be
obtained without prior notification (WvSv, Art.126a (5), Art.126b; WvSv BES,
Art.177ka).

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX

and 3:5). The disclosure obligation is applicable from the moment of entry via an
intra-EU border or via air into the national airspace or by sea in the contiguous zone
(Adw interpretive note).

BES Islands: The BES Islands implements a declaration system for the transportation
of cash, BNI and valuable goods of USD 10 000 or more (Wwft BES, Art. 1.1h and Art.
4.2) and a disclosure system for transportation via mail or cargo (Wwft BES, Art. 1.1h
and 4.3) and transportation of documents that may indicate ML or TF.
Criterion 32.2 – Travellers entering and leaving the EU, shall submit a written
declaration form for incoming and outgoing transportation of cash and BNI valued
EUR 10 000 or more (EU Regulation 2018/1672, Art. 2 and 3) to Customs.
In the BES Islands, travellers carrying cash, BNI and valuable goods of USD 10 000 or
more shall submit a written declaration to Customs. (Wwft BES, Art. 4.2, 5.4).

Technical compliance

Criterion 32.3 – For the situations described under c.32.1 where a disclosure system
is used (inter-EU: transportation of cash/BNIs via cargo and mail; intra-EU: physical
transportation of cash, BNI and valuable goods of EUR 10 000 or more), a natural
person must make a disclosure to Customs upon request. The disclosure obligation is
fulfilled only if the information provided is correct and complete (EU Regulation
2018/1672, Art. 4; Adw, Art. 3:4 and 3:5; Wwft BES, Art. 4.3).

Criterion 32.4 – Customs are authorised to verify compliance with the obligation to
declare/disclose by inspecting persons, their luggage and means of transport (EU
Regulation 2018/1672, Art. 5). These powers can be used also in case of discovery of
a false declaration/disclosure or a failure to declare/disclose. Customs authorities can
conduct “an extensive cash control inquiry”, which includes questions related to the
origin and intended use of cash/BNI (Extensive Cash Control Inquiry Form). As the
failure to declare cash is also a criminal offence (Adw, Part 10.1), customs are
authorised to exercise criminal investigative powers (see R.31).

BES Islands: Customs have similar powers as in continental Netherlands, including the
right to entry premises, demanding additional information, inspecting identity,
information and documents (Wfm BES, Art. 7:7 - 7:10; Wwft BES, Art. 5.5(1-2); DAW
BES, Art. 1:3, 2:51, 2.66(2)). The obligation to declare includes an obligation to
provide information on the origin of the currency or BNIs and their intended use. As
the failure to declare cash or to do so correctly and completely is also a criminal
offence (Wwft BES, Art. 6.1(1)(2)), it shall be investigated by the KPCN.

Criterion 32.5– A false declaration or disclosure is subject to criminal sanctions. If the
offence is committed intentionally, imprisonment of up to four years or a fourth
category fine (up to EUR 21 750) could be imposed (Adw, Art. 10:1(6)). The
unintentional failure to declare or disclose cash or the failure to do so correctly and
completely is subject to a fine of the third category (up to EUR 8 700) (Adw, Art.
10:1(4) and (5)). In both cases, a tax penalty order (FSB) can be imposed directly by
the Tax and Customs Administration (AWR, Art. 76 and General Customs Decree, Art.
10:15). The FSB is an out-of-court criminal fine which could replace the imprisonment
sanction. As per the Customs internal guidelines, the amount of the FSB is equal to
10% of the total cash, up to a fine of the third category (EUR 8 700) or 30% of the total
cash, up to a fine of the 4th category (EUR 21 750) if the violation is committed
intentionally.
These sanctions apply for the sole offence of not declaring or disclosing. If there is any
suspicion of ML or TF, sanctions for ML or TF would apply.

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BES Islands: A failure to comply with the obligation to declare or disclose (including
providing correct and complete information) is punishable by imprisonment of up to
two years (if intentional) or six months (if unintentional), or a criminal or
administrative fine of the fourth category (USD 14 000) (Wwft BES, Art. 6.1, 5.11, 4.2
and 4.3). The criminal fine can be imposed to replace the imprisonment sanction. The
fine is equal to 10% or 30% of the total cash, based on whether the violation is
committed intentionally, up to a maximum of USD 14 000 (BES Customs Guidelines).
However, the maximum applicable fines are not proportionate or dissuasive.

Criterion 32.6 – Information about declarations, disclosures, and related information
gathered by Customs officials, is provided to the FIU-NL (EU Regulation 2018/1672,
Art. 9; Adw, Art. 1:33). Customs makes all cash declaration and disclosure details
electronically available to FIU-NL within four days via goAML (Agreement on the Cooperation between the Tax and Customs Administration and FIU-NL, Art. 3; Cash
Regulations, part 10.07.00, of the Customs Manual for Safety, Health, Economy and
the Environment on the cash application).

BES Islands: Customs is required to promptly transmit data from the declaration and
disclosure forms and reports on seizure of money to FIU-NL (Wwft BES, Art. 4.4). The
data is transmitted to the FIU-NL without delay through goAML (BES Manual on Cash
Transport).

BES Islands: Customs have exclusive access to information in cash applications, and
there is co-operation with the FIU-NL (which receives the declarations) as well as
with airport security staff. Security staff will notify Customs if any cash is found during
a security check.

Criterion 32.8– Competent authorities are able to temporarily restrain currency or
BNIs to ascertain whether there is evidence of ML/TF in cases where (a) there are
indications that the cash/BNI is related to criminal activity or (b) where false
declaration or false disclosure is made (EU Regulation 2018/1672, Art. 7). Customs
have the power to detain cash as long as the person subject to the
declaration/disclosure obligation has not provided the information required (Adw,
Art. 3:3). Furthermore, Customs have powers to seize and confiscate cash, if there is
a suspicion of a criminal offence (“Special Investigating Officer (Tax and Customs
Administration) 2017”, Art. 2).

BES Islands: Customs can confiscate cash/BNI when the discloser does not
immediately provide the information requested for declarations or disclosures, or if
there are doubts on the accuracy of information (Wwft BES, Art. 5.5). The same
powers apply when there is a suspicion of criminal activities (Wwft BES, Art. 4.2(2)
and 4.3(2)).

Criterion 32.9– EU Competent authorities can exchange information on declarations
and disclosures with third countries (EU Regulation 2018/1672, Art. 10 and 11).
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Technical compliance

Criterion 32.7– The Netherlands has mechanisms in place to ensure adequate coordination among relevant authorities (see R.2). Information on cash declarations
and disclosures is accessible to the FIU-NL, the AMLC, the Tax and Customs
Administration and iCOV. There is also co-operation between Customs and other
security staff operating at the airports, to ensure that information on any cash
obtained during a security check is notified to Customs. Whenever there is a suspicion
of ML or TF, the person/case is transferred to KMar or FIOD, which cooperate with
the Customs and the OM in the Cash Cooperative Venture (SVLM).

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Customs record and retain information included in declarations for five to seven
years, including declarations/disclosures above the threshold, false
declarations/disclosures and where there are suspicion of ML/TF. All documentation
acquired, including the declaration form, is retained. Various authorities (FIU-NL,
AMLC) can request this information for the purpose of international co-operation. In
the BES Islands, cash declaration information are shared with the FIU-NL (Wwft BES,
Art. 4.4).

Criterion 32.10– The Netherlands has safeguards in place to ensure that personal
data collected meet the GDPR requirements for the processing of personal data,
including confidentiality, minimum data processing, and purpose limitation. Customs
are also bound by a general obligation of secrecy (EU Regulation 952/2013, Art. 12).
Similar provisions are in place in the BES Islands (Wwft BES, Art. 1.5). These measures
do not restrict trade payments or the freedom of capital movements.

Criterion 32.11–In the Netherlands (including BES Islands), persons who transport
currency or BNI related to ML or TF may be subject to the penalties for false
declaration/disclosure (see c.32.5), or to the penalties for ML/TF offences. However,
these penalties are not sufficiently proportionate and dissuasive (see also R.3 and 5).
Such currency or BNI would be seized as described in R.4.

Technical compliance

Weighting and conclusion

The Netherlands has a domestic disclosure system to complement the EU regulation
on transportation of cash and BNI. However, there are some minor shortcomings in
relation to the proportionality and dissuasiveness of available sanctions (including in
the BES Islands).
Recommendation 32 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 33 – Statistics
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R 32, due to
deficiencies in maintaining accurate and complete statistics.
Criterion 33.1 – The Netherlands maintains the following statistics:

a) Number of UTRs received (broken down by sector). However, the total
number of FIU disseminations used by LEAs is not recorded, nor those
disseminations made by FIU-NL but left unattended. The FIU-NL collects
statistics on UTRs and disseminations made available to competent
authorities for BES Islands.

b) Number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions. However, this
information cannot be broken down by the type of ML (e.g., self-laundering,
third-party ML) or by predicate offence.

c) Value of seized objects, number and types of seized goods and value of
collected confiscations. However, confiscation information cannot be broken
down by the type of crime. Furthermore, the Netherlands does not maintain
statistics on the value of confiscation orders imposed by the Courts. Statistics
on seized and confiscated assets collected in the BES Islands are not
comprehensive.

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d) Incoming and outgoing MLA requests. However, this cannot be broken down
by predicate offenses, and specific MLA statistics for TF are not available (only
terrorism statistics are available).

Weighting and Conclusion

The Netherlands maintains statistics in all required fields; however, statistics cannot
be disaggregated by predicate offences or type of ML. Statistics on confiscation and
MLA, as well as statistics for the BES Islands, are not comprehensive.

Recommendation 33 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 34 – Guidance and feedback
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.25.
Deficiencies related to the issued guidance being too general, outdated, incomplete or
inaccurate. Feedback from FIU-NL was insufficient.
Criterion 34.1 –

Guidelines and feedback by authorities and supervisors

Most supervisors provide and update guidelines for obliged entities on AML/CFT
obligations set out in the Wwft and Sw. Feedback is provided to obliged entities during
regular consultations and in the context of public-private partnerships. Guidance is only
available to a limited extent in BES Islands.
FIU-NL is obliged to provide information on the prevention and detection of ML and
TF to business sectors, professional groups, supervisory authorities, the public, and
the OM (Wwft, Art. 13(f); Wwft BES, Art. 3.2(f)). Non-confidential information is
shared through its website and newsletters and confidential information is
distributed through GoAML and newsletters. Relationship managers are appointed by
FIU-NL in obliged entities to inform new developments and raise awareness. Publicprivate sector partnerships with several other banks strengthen the effectiveness of
reporting UTRs.

FIU-NL provides a special website, guidance, and feedback for obliged entities in the
BES Islands. Local liaisons officers maintain ongoing contact with obliged entities and
sector professional bodies.

Weighting and Conclusion

Guidance is available for most sectors and supervisors engage in outreach with
obliged entities. FIU-NL provides guidelines and feedback to a large extent, including
in the BES Islands. Some guidance is not updated regularly and is limited in the BES
Islands.
Recommendation 34 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 35 – Sanctions
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R.17.
Sanctions were used to a limited degree and fines for large organisations were not
dissuasive.
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Guidelines and feedback by FIU-NL

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Criterion 35.1 –
R.6 - TFS
Obligations to take administrative and internal control measures to comply with the
sanction regulations only apply to FIs and TCSPs. There is no such obligation for other
DNFBPs and thus also no sanctions.

Supervisors have different administrative sanctions available for violations of
provisions pursuant to rules laid down in accordance with Sw Article 10b, including:
•
•

Technical compliance

•

Instructions to follow a course of action (Sw, Art. 10ba)
Orders, subject to a penalty (Sw, Art. 10c)
Administrative fines (Sw, Art. 10d)

The amount of an administrative fine is determined by Order in Council (Sw, Art. 10e).
Administrative fines are grouped into three categories for FIs and DNFBPs, where the
basic amount vary from EUR 10 000 to EUR 2 000 000, and the maximum amount
varies from EUR 10 000 to EUR 4 000 000 (Sw, Art. 10e(2)). In case of repeat offences,
the amount of the maximum fine is doubled (Sw, Art. 10e(1)). Supervisors may also
impose a gain-based fine, in which an administrative fine can be imposed up to twice
the amount of the gain obtained by the offender as a result of the violation (Sw, Art.
10e(3)). Wwft BES, Art. 6.1 and WvSR BES, Art 27 are comparable to the WED as they
penalise administrative law standards.
Intentional violations of regulations pursuant to Sw Art. 2, 7 and 9 can be sentenced
to a maximum term of imprisonment of six years, community service or a fine in the
fifth category for intentional violations, and for violations without intent, detention
for a maximum of one year, community service or a fine in the fourth category (WED,
Art. 6).
BES Islands: For FIs, failure to comply with sanctions screening measures can lead to
imprisonment up to two years or a fine of maximum USD 14 000 or 56 000 for legal
entities (Wwft BES, Art.6.1; WvSr BES, Art.27). However, for most DNFBPs there is no
obligation for mandatory screening systems or for reporting information to their
supervisor. Since there are no such obligations, there is no monitoring and no
sanctions available.
R.8 – NPOs

Persons found guilty of TF can be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding eight
years or a fine of the fifth category (WvSr, Art 421).

There is no NPO supervisor who can impose sanctions for non-compliance with the
requirements of R.8. Most NPOs are part of a voluntary sector organisation, which
monitors compliance with their self-regulation obligations.
R.9 to 23 - Administrative sanctions (FIs, DNFBPs)

Supervisors have a range of administrative sanctions available to them for violations
of provisions in the Wwft, Wtt & Wwft BES, including:
•

•
•

Instructions to follow a course of action (Wwft, Art. 28; Wtt, Art. 47; Wwft BES,
Art. 5.9)
Orders, subject to a penalty (Wwft, Art. 29; Wtt, Art. 48; Wwft BES, Art. 5.10)
Administrative fines (Wwft, Art. 30; Wtt, Art. 48; Wwft BES, Art. 5.11)

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•
•
•

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Publication of decisions or warnings (Wwft, Art. 32e & 32f; Wtt, Art. 59 & 61;
Wwft BES, Art. 5.11 & 5.19)
Prohibit persons from holding a policy-making position in a FI or DNFBP in
the Netherlands (Wwft, Art. 32c; Wtt, Art. 53)
Revoke, amend or limit a license in a FI or trust office (Wft, Art. 1:104(1)(o) &
(q); Wtt, Art. 7(1); Wfm BES, Art. 2.14)

The amount of an administrative fine is determined by Governmental Decree (Wwft,
Art. 31; Wtt, Art. 49). Administrative fines are grouped into three categories based
primarily on the severity of the violation, where the basic amount ranges from EUR
10 000 to EUR 2 000 000 and the maximum amount ranges from EUR 10 000 to EUR
5 000 000 (Wwft, Art. 31(2-3); Wtt, Art. 49 (2)).
Violations of the most important provisions of the Wwft, Wtt and Wwft BES, are
subject to criminal sanctions (WED, Art. 1(1) and (2); Wwft BES, Art. 6(1)). Intentional
violations of the Wwft or Wtt can face imprisonment for a maximum term of two
years, community service or a fine in the fourth category, which for habitual offences
can be increased to a maximum of four years’ imprisonment and a fine of the fifth
category (WED, Art. 6).

Violations of the Wwft BES are punishable with a term of imprisonment for a
maximum of two years or a fine in the fourth category (Wwft BES, Art. 6.1). For
violations that are liable to punishment under the WED, the supervisor may either
impose an administrative fine or the OM may decide to prosecute. If the conduct
subject to an administrative fine is also a criminal offense, it will be submitted to the
OM, unless it has been provided by law or agreed with the OM that this may be waived
(Awb, Art. 5:44).
Criterion 35.2 –

FIs, DNFBPs

For criminal offences committed by a legal person, measures may be imposed on the
legal person and/or on the persons who have ordered the commission of the criminal
offence, and the persons who actually directed the unlawful acts (WvSr, Art. 51(1);
WvSR BES, Art. 53). This applies to both violations of the WED and administrative
sanctions posed by supervisors (Awb, Art. 5:1; Wwft BES, Art. 5.2).
TFS

The WvSR, WvSr BES and Awb is similarly applicable for administrative and criminal
sanctions for violations of the Sw or regulations laid down by or pursuant to the Sw.

Weighting and conclusion

The Netherlands has a range or sanctions including license revocation, administrative
and criminal sanctions and the publication of warning notices. Administrative and
criminal fines apply to FI and DNFBPs and natural persons within obliged entities
involved in an ML/TF offence, however, it is unclear in which cases the different type
of fines are applied. The levels of administrative fines for violations in the BES Islands
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Technical compliance

For violations of the Wwft BES, supervisors determine the amount of the
administrative fine (Bwft BES, Art. 8(1)). Administrative fines are grouped into four
categories ranging from USD 0 to a maximum of USD 500 000 (Bwft BES, Art. 6), which
is doubled for violations of the same offence within five years (Bwft BES, Art. 9).

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are not dissuasive, however, the reputational impact of receiving a fine acts as a
deterrent.
Recommendation 35 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 36 – International instruments
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R. 35 and
SR.I, due to deficiencies in the implementation of the Palermo, Vienna and CFT
Conventions and minor shortcomings on the implementation of UNSCRs 1267 and
1373. Further to amendments to its Extradition Act and the introduction of an
autonomous TF offence, the Netherlands was re-rated as largely compliant with both
recommendations in follow-up.

Criterion 36.1 – The Netherlands (including the BES Islands) is party to the Vienna,
Palermo, Merida and TF Conventions.

Criterion 36.2 – The Netherlands has broadly implemented the provisions of the
Vienna, Palermo, Merida and TF Conventions. There are minor deficiencies in relation
to the offences of simplified deliberate and culpable self-laundering, which are nonextraditable (see c. 39.1).

Technical compliance

Weighting and Conclusion

The Netherlands, including BES Islands, has ratified and broadly implemented the
provisions of the Vienna, Palermo, Merida and TF Conventions.
Recommendation 36 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 37 - Mutual legal assistance
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.36 and
SR.VI. Deficiencies related to the inability to provide assistance in searching and
seizing evidence of ML, for predicate offences other than transnational organised
crime or corruption; limitation to the ability to provide MLA due to shortcomings in
SR.II, and limitation in the access information and documents held by notaries,
lawyers and accountants by LEAs, due to the scope of legal privilege. Further to
amendments to the extraditable offences and the introduction of an autonomous TF
offence, the Netherlands was re-rated largely compliant with R.36 in the follow-up
process.

Criterion 37.1 – The Netherlands can provide a wide range of MLA in criminal
matters to foreign authorities, including international courts (WvSv, Book 5). Book 5
of WvSv provides the legal basis for international and European legal assistance in
criminal matters. Dutch authorities may provide legal assistance to foreign countries
regardless of the existence of a treaty or assurance of reciprocity, provided the MLA
request is not in breach of national law or goes against the public interest. MLA
includes performing or cooperating in investigative activities, establishing the
presence of criminally obtained assets, sending documents, dossiers or evidence,
providing information, serving documents, providing notices or communications to
third parties (WvSv, Art. 5.1.1), search and seizure (WvSv 5.1.8), confiscation (WOTS
Art. 13), although certain types of assistance are available only to countries with
which NL has a treaty relationship. The Netherlands is party to various multilateral
treaties, including the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters and its two additional protocols and the UN Convention against Transnational
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Organised Crime. It has also concluded bilateral treaties with, amongst others, the US,
Canada, Australia and Hong Kong, China. Judicial co-operation between EU member
countries is carried out through European Investigation Orders (EIO) (WvSv, Art.
5.4.1-5.4.31), which are sent directly to the IRCs.
MLA is not conditional upon the existence of a treaty. There are no formal time limits
in handling MLA requests. The Ministry of Justice’s internal guidelines state that
incoming MLAs should be handled within five working days, and outgoing MLAs
within three working days. In case a concrete time frame is mentioned in the MLA
request, the Department of International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (AIRS)
shall contact the IRC within reasonable time before the lapse of the time limit, to make
sure the request has been executed. If no time frame is stipulated, AIRS contacts the
IRC within six months upon receipt of the request. EIOs shall be recognised within 30
days of its receipt. The order must then be executed within 90 days of recognition,
with a possibility to extend it by a maximum of 30 days (EU Directive 2014/41, Art.
12).

Criterion 37.2 – The Minister of Justice is the central authority for MLA requests,
including in the BES Islands. AIRS handles the requests from outside the EU, while
IRCs send and receive MLA requests within the EU. ICRs are part of the OM: there are
10 regional IRCs, a national one and a specialised one in serious fraud, environmental
crime and asset recovery. The Netherlands uses a national system to register, monitor
and track MLA requests (LURIS). IRCs are set up for the purposes of timely
prioritisation and execution of MLA requests. AIRS has developed non-official internal
guidelines for the assessment and handling of MLA requests in a timely and
prioritised manner.

LEAs, including in the BES Islands, deal directly with MLA consisting of requests for
information that do not imply the use of coercive means or special investigative
powers (WvSv, Art. 5.1.7; WvSv BES, Art. 556).

BES Islands: AIRS will transmit to OM BES any MLA requests coming from outside the
EU. EU Requests, including from the Netherlands Caribbean Islands and from
continental Netherlands will be directly submitted to IRC Carib. The IRC Carib submits
the requests to the IRC OM in Bonaire, who further assigns them to the Police. The IRC
Carib is placed under the office of the Attorney General of Curaçao. The IRC Carib uses
its own numbering and a manual system to register and monitor MLA requests, and
it is not connected to the LURIS system.

Criterion 37.3 – The granting of MLA in both Netherlands and BES Islands is not
subject to unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions. Conditions for refusal
includes cases where the request would violate the principle of double jeopardy or
conflict with Dutch interests in a criminal prosecution; it would result in a flagrant
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Technical compliance

BES Islands: MLA includes conducting or rendering assistance with investigative acts,
forwarding documents, case files or items of evidence, providing information, or
serving or delivering documents or giving notices or notifications to third parties
(WvSv BES, Arts. 555-560). MLA can be provided to other states without the need for
an underlying treaty (WvSv BES, Art. 558). Some international Conventions ratified
by the Netherlands also apply to the BES (Council of Europe Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters and its First Additional Protocol, Council of Europe
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from
Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS 198), as well as the four conventions
analysed under Rec. 36). There is no formal time limits in handling MLA requests.

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violation of fundamental rights; there are reasons to assume it is connected to a
suspect’s religious, ideological or political convictions, his nationality, his race or the
population group he belongs to (WvSv, Art. 5.1.5 WvSv BES Art.559). For requests not
based on a treaty, the principle of dual criminality applies insofar as the investigative
powers that can be used to respond to an MLA request are the same envisaged under
the Dutch Criminal Code for the same offence (WvSv, Art. 5.1.8; WvSv BES 558.2).
Criterion 37.4 –

a) In general MLA requests cannot be refused on the sole ground that the offense
involves fiscal matters. When the execution of the MLA request is of relevance
to the State Tax Authorities, an authorisation from the Minister of Justice and
Security is required, which must be provided after co-ordination with the
Minister of Finance, (WvSv, Art. 5.1.5(7) and WvSv BES, Art. 560.2).

Technical compliance

b) There are no grounds for refusal based on secrecy or confidentiality
requirements, with the exception of a situation of legal professional privilege.
Any investigative results from an EIO cannot be provided, until there is a
definite court decision.

Criterion 37.5 – The Netherlands maintains the confidentiality of MLA requests
received, and the information contained therein. For the investigative measures
where there is an obligation to notify, a so-called “leave procedure” with the court can
be followed to withhold the notice in order to protect the confidentiality. (WvSv, Art.
5.1.10(3) and 5.1.11; WvSv BES, Art. 565, Art. 45). For EIO, a standard presumption
of confidentiality applies.
Criterion 37.6 – When MLA requests do not involve coercive actions or the use of
special investigative powers, dual criminality is not a condition and a wide range of
assistance can be given directly by LEAs (WvSv, Art. 5.1.7; WvSv BES, Art. 562).

Criterion 37.7 – Dual criminality is a condition to provide MLA that requires the use
of coercive actions or investigative powers (WvSv, Art. 5.1.8). The Supreme Court
clarified that it is sufficient that the conduct criminalised in the requesting state can
be classified as an offence in the Netherlands. When no identical criminal legal
provision exists in the WvSv, the executing Dutch authorities (AIRS, OM, Courts)
undertake the necessary efforts to establish double criminality by searching for a legal
provision in Dutch law that aims to protect a comparable legal interest, even if it is
named differently (Supreme decisions: NJ 1991/359, (paragraph 5.2), HR 30-082005, NJ 2005, 541 (paragraph 3.2) and HR 22-09-2009, NJ 2009, 462 (paragraph
3.3.3).
BES Islands: It is sufficient that the conduct criminalised in the requesting state can be
classified as an offence in the BES Islands (ECLI:NL:PHR:2016:952 (RO.14, RO.15).

Criterion 37.8 – In the execution of a request for legal assistance from a foreign state,
the same investigative powers which could be used in a Dutch investigation into the
same offences can be used (WvSv, Art. 5.1.8(1)) (see analysis under R.31).

Weighting and Conclusion
All criteria are met.

Recommendation 37 is rated compliant.

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Recommendation 38 – Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.38 due
to the shortcoming under SR II, and the scope of the legal privilege for LEAs to access
information held by notaries, lawyers and accountants. Furthermore, it was not
established that the Netherlands effectively froze and confiscated funds based on a
foreign request.

BES Islands: Similar provisions apply to the BES Islands (excluding EU Regulations)
(WvSr BES, Art. 35(1)b,c,e; WvSv BES, Art. 579, 579a to 579f, 581, 583, 591 and 591a).

Criterion 38.2 – There is no legal provision allowing the enforcement of foreign nonconviction based confiscation orders, including circumstances where the perpetrator
is not available by reason of death, flight, absence or the perpetrator is unknown.
However, the authorities provided case law to demonstrate that requests for the
tracing of assets, seizure and confiscation under non-conviction based proceedings
may be executed as part of MLA co-operation when based on a treaty (WvSv, Art.
5.1.1; WvSv BES, Art. 555; CoE CETS 198, Art. 23(5); ECLI:NL:HR:2013:586).
Criterion 38.3–

a) There are arrangements in place for coordinating seizure and confiscation
action with other countries. Netherlands is also a member of the CARIN and
ARO networks. The Dutch judicial ARO can be approached by foreign

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Technical compliance

Criterion 38.1 (a-e) – The Netherlands can take action in response to MLA requests
from foreign countries based on multilateral or bilateral agreements or an European
Freezing or Confiscation Order (EBB) to identify, seize and confiscate property or
proceeds from, instrumentalities used in, on intended for use in ML, predicate
offenses or TF. The same investigative powers and coercive measures for
identification and seizure that could be used in a Dutch investigation can be used in
the execution of a request from a foreign state, regardless the existence of a treaty
(WvSv, Art. 5.1.8). Authorities can conduct a criminal investigation with parallel
financial investigation or an SFO to trace the suspect’s assets and identify criminal
proceeds and instrumentalities, to the extent that the same investigative powers
could be applied to an investigation into the same acts under Dutch law (WOTS, Art.
13). The types of assistance provided in WOTS are available only to countries with
which the Netherlands has a treaty relationship. Property (both tangible and
intangible, as well as property rights) and property of corresponding value may be
seized at the request of a foreign state, if permitted under Dutch law (WvSv, Art. 94(2),
94a(2); WOTS, Art. 13, 13a and 13b). Seizure is only possible if it would also have been
applicable for the same offence committed in the Netherlands. On the basis of a treaty
request, confiscation orders can be issued based on an irrevocable foreign jurisdiction
order (WOTS, Art. 15, 18, 31 and 31a). For non-EU countries, the Netherlands can
identify, trace and freeze in response to foreign requests on a treaty basis or
regardless of the existence of a treaty relationship (WvSv Art. 5.1.8). However, a
request to enforce a confiscation order from a non-EU country can only take place on
the basis of a treaty (WOTS, Art. 2). The request to enforce a confiscation order shall
be submitted by the OM to the district court within two weeks (WOTS, Art. 18). Within
the EU, the Netherlands implements a mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation
orders (EU Regulation 2018/1805). These orders are recognised and executed
without delay and with the same speed and priority as for a similar domestic case (EU
Regulation 2018/1805, Art. 9).

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authorities with regard to MLA in the field of confiscation. The OM Carib and
IRC CARIB participates in the CARIN/ARIN networks.

b) The Netherlands has a national seizure authority to manage and dispose of
property frozen, seized or confiscated. The BES Registrar of the Court of First
Instance manages and disposes of seized or confiscated property (Seizure of
Confiscated Objects Decree BES, Art. 2).

Criterion 38.4– Confiscated property can be shared with other countries based on
bilateral and multilateral agreements, as well as with EU countries (EU Council
Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA). Agreements can also be made on a case-bycase basis (including for the BES Islands).

Weighting and Conclusion

There is a system in place to confiscate property laundered, criminal proceeds or
instrumentalities. Some limitations exist in relation to the enforcement of
confiscation orders outside a treaty or EU framework. There are no legal provisions
allowing the enforcement of foreign non-conviction based confiscation orders.
Recommendation 38 is rated largely compliant.

Technical compliance

Recommendation 39 – Extradition
In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated partially compliant with former R.39 due
to limitation in the extraditable ML offences for non-CoE members, or countries with
no extradition treaty; the lack of an obligation to prosecute a suspect domestically
where an extradition request is refused purely on the basis of nationality, and the lack
of statistics.

Criterion 39.1 – All offences punishable by a custodial sentence of one year or more
are extraditable (including BES Islands). While this threshold includes both ML and
TF offences, simplified deliberate and culpable self-laundering are not covered. (Uw,
Art. 5(1), 5(1)b, 51a, 51a(2); Uw BES, Art. 5(1)a, 5(1)b, 51a, 51a(2)). While there are
procedures in place to ensure the timely execution of the requests (Uw, Part B), there
are no prioritisation processes. There are no unreasonable or unduly restrictive
conditions for the execution of requests (Uw, Art. 9).

Criterion 39.2 – As a general rule, Dutch citizens cannot be extradited, but under
certain conditions extradition of Dutch nationals is allowed, even outside the EU
framework. Extradition of Dutch nationals is allowed for a criminal investigation and
if a guarantee is given that the execution of a possible custodial sentence can take
place in the Netherlands and that this sentence may be converted to Dutch standards
(Uw, Art.4(2)). A similar rule applies to surrender procedures within the EU. EU
countries can no longer refuse to surrender their own nationals, unless they take over
the execution of the prison sentence against the wanted person (Council Framework
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant). There is no legal obligation to initiate
proceedings for the purpose of prosecution of the offenses set forth in the extradition
request in case the request is denied purely on the basis of nationality, with the
exception of terrorism-related offences (WvSv, Art. 5.3.16). With regard to other
offences there is no legal obligation (aut dedere aut judicare) to initiate criminal
proceedings domestically. This principle also applies in case the extradition is denied
on the basis of nationality.

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Criterion 39.3 – Extradition requires dual criminality. It is not required that both
states use the same terminology, as long as they protect the same legal right in
essence. Mere technical differences in law would not pose an impediment to
extradition.

Criterion 39.4 – Simplified extradition mechanisms are in place. An accelerated
procedure allowing for immediate extradition without court proceedings is available
when the requested person consents. This procedure can be activated upon a request
for provisional arrest. The individual will be extradited within 20 days from his/her
consent (Uw, Art. 41- 45, Uw BES, Art. 41-45). Simplified procedures exist within the
EU for extradition based on a EAW (European Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA).
Extradition in this case does not require the dual criminality test for 32 categories of
offenses, including ML/TF (EAW, Art. 2).

Weighting and Conclusion

There is an extradition mechanism in place for ML/TF. Some minor shortcomings
remain in relation to the non-extraditable offence of simplified self-laundering and
the absence of legal provisions for national proceedings, where the refusal to
extradite is based solely on nationality.
Recommendation 39 is rated largely compliant.

Recommendation 40 – Other forms of international co-operation

Criterion 40.1 – Competent authorities are able to cooperate with their foreign
counterparts on ML, TF and predicate offences (including in the BES Islands).
Authorities cooperate with their foreign counterparts based on international treaties
and agreements. Authorities may also provide/receive assistance regardless of the
existence of a treaty or assurance of reciprocity, provided the request is not in breach
of national law or goes against the public interest (Art. 5.1.4(3) WvSv). Co-operation
with EU/EEA counterparts occurs within the EU framework. The Netherlands also
engages in international co-operation through its network of liaison officers
(including LEAs, OM and Customs), and through participation in multilateral fora,
such as Egmont, EUROPOL and INTERPOL. DNFBP supervisors partake in various
forms of co-operation. For financial supervisors’ international co-operation see
c.40.12-c.40.16.
Criterion 40.2 –

a) Competent authorities have their own legal basis for providing international cooperation. FIU-NL cooperate with foreign counterparts as outlined under c.40.9.
AML/CFT, supervisors cooperate pursuant to Art.27 of the Wwft (see c.40.12).
LEAs, OM and Customs cooperate with their foreign counterparts as outlined
under c.40.17.
b) There are no impediments for providing and/or requesting co-operation. Nothing
prevents authorities from using the most efficient means to cooperate.

c) Competent authorities have clear and secure gateways, mechanisms or channels
to facilitate, transmit and execute requests for assistance. The systems are

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Technical compliance

In its last MER, the Netherlands was rated largely compliant with former R.40, as there
was a lack of statistics to assess the effectiveness by LEAs and the broad scope of legal
professional secrecy introduced an unduly restrictive condition to exchange
information.

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protected and access is restricted. For example, FIU-NL has access to the Egmont
Secure Web for the exchange of information and to FIU.NET, which is incorporated
into EUROPOL. The OM cooperates with its counterparts through a number of
platforms, such as EUROJUST. The Police and FIOD use databases and encrypted
communication platforms for co-operation.

d) Competent authorities have processes in place to assess and prioritise requests
and ensure timely assistance is provided. For example, FIU-NL is required to make
use of all its powers and provide information “immediately” to its requesting
EU/EEA counterpart (Wwft, Art. 13a(5)). The OM must also ensure the speedy
execution of any legal requests it receives (WvSv, Art 5.1.6.). The MLA system
provides deadline warnings and a weekly overviews of pending requests. Where
supervisory requests are made under multilateral or bilateral mechanisms, all
agencies must work within set timeframes.

Technical compliance

e) Competent authorities have processes for safeguarding any information received.
For example, information received from foreign AML/CFT supervisors (including
DNFBP supervisors) (Wwft, Art. 22(a)) may not be used for purposes other than
the intended purposes, and may only be transmitted if a number of criteria are met
(Wwft, Art.22(2), Art.25; Wwft BES, Art. 1.5). Information received from foreign
LEAs are safeguarded and must be treated in line with the WvSv (WvSv, Art.5.1.3;
WvSv BES, Art. 557). See c.40.6 for more information.

Criterion 40.3 – Competent authorities have a range of bilateral and multilateral
agreements and MOUs to facilitate co-operation with foreign counterparts. Such
agreements are not required for Dutch authorities to provide assistance, but can be
established promptly if required by foreign authorities. However, a deficiency exists
regarding the legal basis for the FIU-NL to cooperate with its foreign non-EU
counterparts in the absence of a MoU (see c.40.9).

Criterion 40.4 – Most competent authorities provide feedback in a timely manner to
competent authorities, however, this is not systematic and inconsistent across
agencies. For example, FIU-NL must provide feedback to its EU counterparts (Wwft,
Art. 13a(4-5)). However, there is no explicit provision for FIU-NL to provide timely
feedback to non-EU/EEA countries, unless this is stipulated in an MOU. The
Netherlands states that FIU-NL may also cooperate with non-EU/EEA FIUs in
accordance with Egmont Principles but this is not set out in domestic law (see c.40.9).
Criterion 40.5 –

a) The fact that a request to LEAs involves fiscal matters is not a ground for refusal.
Unless provided by an applicable treaty, MLA requests related to tax, duties,
customs and exchange criminal offences are subject to an authorisation from the
Minister of Justice and Security which can be provided only after co-ordination
with the Minister of Finance. (WvSv, Art. 5.1.5(7) and BES WvSv, Art. 560.2). FIUNL is permitted to exchange information if the definition of an offence of a fiscal
nature in a requesting EU or EEA country differs from the definition in Dutch law
(Wwft, Art.13a(3)(b)). No restrictions apply to supervisors for the provision of
information or assistance of information on the grounds that the request is also
considered to involve fiscal matters (Wwft, Art. 22a; Wtt, Art. 56(1); Wft, Art. 1:65;
Wwft BES, Art. 1.5(2); Wfm BES, Art. 1.21(a)).

b) There are no financial secrecy laws inhibiting the implementation of AML/CFT
measures in the Netherlands (including the BES Islands) (see R.9).

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c) Competent authorities may provide assistance even if an investigation or
proceeding is underway, unless the provision of assistance could reasonable be
considered to impede this investigation or proceeding or would unduly harm the
interests of the natural or legal person concerned (Wwft, Art. 13a, 16a; 22(a); Wtt,
Art. 56(1); Wft, Art. 1:89; Wwft BES, Art.1:5(2) and Art.1:5(4)(c); Wfm BES, Art.
1.12(a)).
d) There are no restrictions that relate to the type and nature of requesting
counterparts (WvSv, Art. 5.1.5, 5.1.7; WvSv BES, Art. 556, 558).

Criterion 40.6 – Competent authorities are prohibited from disclosing confidential
information except where necessary or as required by law (Wwft, Art.22; Wtt, Art. 56,
Wft, Art. 1:89; Wwft BES, Art.1:5(1)-(2)). The bases for exchanging information also
stipulate that information obtained from foreign counterparts can only be forwarded
with permission (Wwft, Art.13b(2-3), Art.22a(2), Art.22b(3); Wtt, Art. 56(2-3); Wft,
Art. 1:90(2); Wwft BES, Art. 1.5(3-4) WFM BES, Art. 1:21(4-6)). Moreover, in line with
the Netherlands’ implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, the use of obtained
information or evidence is restricted to the purposes laid down in the request, unless
prior consent is given (Wjsg, Art. 39e and f; Police Data Decree, para 5).

BES Islands: As the GDPR does not extend to the BES Islands, the BES Personal Data
Protection Act protects personal information and applies to LEAs. Supervisors must
refuse to provide information if the requesting authority cannot protect the
information effectively (Wwft BES, Art.1:5(2)(d); Wfm BES, Art. 121(3)).

Criterion 40.8 – Most competent authorities are able to conduct inquiries on behalf
of foreign counterparts, and exchange with their foreign counterparts all information
that would be obtainable by them if such inquiries were being carried out
domestically [Supervisors: Wft, Art.1:51a-e for EU/EEA member states; Wft, Art.1:65
for non-EU/EEA member states; Wwft, Art. 22; Wtt, Art. 56; Wwft BES, Art.1.5; Wfm
BES, Art.1:18(2); LEAs: WvSv, Art.5.1.1, 5.1.7 and 5.1.8; FIU-NL: Wwft, 13a(5), for
EU/EEA member states only]. However, there is no explicit requirement for FIU-NL
to search databases on behalf of FIUs of non-EU/EEA countries.

Exchange of Information between FIUs.

Criterion 40.9 – FIU-NL is required to cooperate with the FIUs of other EU/EEA
member states on ML, associated predicate offences and TF (Wwft, Art.13a-b; Wwft
BES, Art.3:2(h)). FIU-NL is only required to “maintain contact with foreign
government-appointed bodies whose duties are comparable to those of the FIU-NL”
(Wwft, Art.13(h)). It is unclear if this requirement covers co-operation with nonEU/EEA countries, as the provisions related to EU/EEA member states explicitly
makes reference to AML/CFT co-operation. The Netherlands states that FIU-NL may
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

Technical compliance

Criterion 40.7 – The GDPR, Wpg and the Judicial Criminal Data Act provide rules for
the processing of personal data, including the lawfulness of data processing (GDPR,
Art.6), and the rights of the data subject (GDPR, Chapter III). Data processing of
personal information by FIs and DNFBPs falls under the scope of the GDPR, while data
processing of personal information by the FIU and LEAs falls under domestic
legislation (Wpg, Art. 17(a); Wjsg, Art.16a). Supervisors must refuse to provide
information if the requesting authority cannot sufficiently guarantee the protection
of confidential information (Wwft, Art. 22a(2)(d); Wtt, Art. 56(1)(f); Wft, Art.
1:90(1)(d)).

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX

also cooperate with non-EU/EEA FIUs in accordance with Egmont Principles but this
is not prescribed in domestic law.

Criterion 40.10 – There are no legal provisions to prevent FIU-NL from the provision
of feedback, upon request or whenever possible, to its EU/EEA FIU counterparts on
the use of the information provided by them, as well as on the outcome of the analysis
conducted on the basis of such information. While Egmont Principles require FIU’s to
provide such feedback upon request, there is no relevant requirement in domestic
law to provide feedback to non-EU/EEA FIUs (unless articulated in an MOU).
Criterion 40.11 –

(a)-(b) FIU-NL can exchange information (obtained directly or indirectly by FIU-NL),
spontaneously or upon request, with another FIU from an EU/EEA member state
(Wwft, Art.13, 13a,16(2); Wwft BES, Art. 1:5, 3:2). This includes powers relating to
the access of indirect sources (see c.29.3), and information requested from obliged
entities (see c.40.8). There is no equivalent legal basis for exchanging relevant
information with non-EU/EEA FIUs.

Technical compliance

Exchange of information between financial supervisors

Criterion 40.12 – AFM and DNB have a legal basis to cooperate with their foreign
counterparts (both EU/EEA and non-EU/EEA) pursuant to a range of provisions on
co-operation and exchange of information (Art. 22a(2)(b), Wwft, Art. 22b(1b);
22b(2)(b);Wwft, Art.27; Wft, Art.1.51-2; Wft, Art.1:65; Wwft BES, Art. 1.5(2)(b); Wfm
BES, Art. 1:21(3)(b)). If supervision is performed as part of an EU/EEA supervisory
college, information is exchanged amongst the established board of supervisors (Wft,
Art. 1:54b-1:54c). The Minister of Finance can also exchange information or
intelligence obtained during the DNB and AFM’s supervision of TFS with foreign
counterparts responsible for supervising TFS (including non-EU/EEA authorities)
(Sw, Art.10h), but this does not extend to the BES Islands.

Criterion 40.13 – As mentioned in c.40.12, the AFM and DNB can exchange
domestically available information, including information held by FIs, in a manner
proportionate to their respective needs with their EU/EEA counterparts without
additional agreements, and with their non-EU/EEA counterparts in compliance with
treaties or agreements on the exchange of information. This is applies to the BES
Islands.
Criterion 40.14 –

a) Regulatory information is generally not considered confidential and is therefore
available publicly in the Netherlands, including in the BES Islands. Should this type
of information be considered confidential (e.g., if individual institutions can be
identified), the legal basis for exchange of information described under c.40.12
applies.

b) Prudential supervision is regulated by the Wft (Netherlands) and Wfm BES (BES
Islands). The exchange of information as described in 40.12 applies.

c) The DNB and AFM gather AML/CFT information (e.g., internal procedures,
policies, CDD information, customer files, samples of accounts and transaction
information) in the course of their AML/CFT supervisory activities pursuant to the
Wwft and the Wwft BES. The regime for co-operation and exchange of information
as described in 40.12 applies.
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Criterion 40.15 – The DNB and AFM are authorised to conduct inquiries on behalf of
foreign supervisors (both EU/EEA and non-EU/EEA counterparts) relating to their
duties as supervisors in the Wft (e.g., for registration and licensing purposes) (Wft,
Art.1:52 for EU/EEA supervisors; and Wft, Art.1:68 for their non-EU/EEA
counterparts). There are no provisions in the Wwft that allow the AFM or DNB to
conduct inquiries on behalf of non-EU/EEA counterparts, and they cannot conduct
inquiries themselves in the Netherlands and the BES Islands.

Criterion 40.16 – Supervisors are forbidden from using or disseminating confidential
information in any other way than the use for which it was requested (Wwft,
Art.22(1); Wft, Art.1:90(2) and 1:93(3)). Supervisors cannot provide information
received from foreign supervisors to other domestic or foreign supervisors unless it
has received explicit confirmation from the foreign supervisor (Wwft, Art 22b(3) and
22a(3); Wwft. 1.5(3); Wfm BES, Art.1:21(2)).
Exchange of information between law enforcement authorities

Criterion 40.17 – LEAs and OM (including in the BES Islands) can formally exchange
information with other LEAs in other countries on the basis of a MLA request (WvSv,
Art. 5.1.4; WvSv BES, Art.555). For informal co-operation, information may be
exchanged when necessary for a proper execution of a domestic or foreign police task
(Police Data Decree, Art.5).

Criterion 40.19 – The OM can establish Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) with foreign
counterparts, including non-EU/EEA counterparts (WvSv, Art.5.2.1; Second
Additional Protocol ETS 182). There is no legal basis for OM BES to form JITs.
Exchange of information between non-counterparts

Criterion 40.20 – Competent authorities can exchange information indirectly with
international non-counterpart authorities provided this is necessary and
proportionate [Wwft Art.22a(2)(b) and 22b(2)(b); Wtt, Art. 56(1)(d); Wwft, Art.13a;
Wwft BES, Art.3:2. Wwft BES, Art. 1.5(2)(b), Art. 3:2; Wfm BES, Art.12.3(b)].

Weighting and Conclusion

Competent authorities have the powers to provide a wide range of international
assistance. There are some limitations in the BES Islands and the lack of an explicit
legal basis for FIU-NL to cooperate with non-EU/EEA FIUs in the absence of an MOU.

Recommendation 40 is rated largely compliant.

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Technical compliance

Criterion 40.18 – If an incoming foreign request for information is based on an
international treaty, the action will be complied with to the extent possible (WvSv,
Art.5.1.4). Requests for MLA outside conventions or agreements may be granted if
they are not contrary to a statutory requirement and does not violate public interest
(WvSv, 5.1.4(3) and 5.1.5). Requests may include the sharing of information, police
data and data from other competent authorities (WvSv, Art.5.1.1). Standard and
special investigative techniques can be used in foreign investigations (WvSv,
Art.5.1.8). This applies to the BES Islands. For EU co-operation, information and
intelligence can be provided by LEAs spontaneously (Police Data Decree, Art.5:3-5:8).

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Summary of Technical Compliance – Key Deficiencies

Compliance with FATF Recommendations
Rating

1. Assessing risks & applying a
risk-based approach

LC

Factor(s) underlying the rating
•
•

2. National co-operation and
co-ordination
3. Money laundering offences
4. Confiscation and provisional
measures
5. Terrorist financing offence
6. Targeted financial sanctions
related to terrorism & TF

C

•

LC

•

C

•

LC

•

LC

•
•
•

7. Targeted financial sanctions
related to proliferation

LC

8. Non-profit organisations

LC

•
•

•
•
•

9. Financial institution secrecy
laws
10. Customer due diligence

C

•

LC

•
•

11. Record keeping
12. Politically exposed persons

C
LC

•
•
•

13. Correspondent banking

PC

•

14. Money or value transfer
services

C

•

The NRAs primarily rely on qualitative inputs, particularly the NRAs of the
BES Islands, which may impact the reasonableness of the conclusions on
risks.
Some sectors in the BES Islands are exempted from AML/CFT requirements
amid the existence of identified risks.
All criteria are met.
There are minor shortcomings related to the available sanctions for selflaundering and the inability to apply both criminal and civil/administrative
sanctions to legal persons.
All criteria are met.

There are minor gaps in relation to the scope of TF offences and the
proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions.
National legislation does not always prescribe in detail how the existing TFS
provisions shall be implemented.
There is no obligation for some DNFBPs to communicate the assets frozen or
actions taken in compliance with TFS obligations.
Communication of designations or de-listings to FIs and DNFBPs does not
always occur immediately.
There are some minor shortcomings in relation to the extent of the freezing
obligation.
Most DNFBPs have no obligation to implement a screening system or report
information to their supervisor and there is no monitoring or sanctioning
available.
Outreach initiatives to raise awareness and promote accountability of NPOs
are not part of a clear coherent policy.
The supervision does not always focus on the organisations most vulnerable
for potential TF abuse and there are few obligations or controls related to the
financial situation of NPOs.
Since the TF risk on the BES islands is low, no specific measures are taken
towards the NPOs in the BES islands in terms of outreach, supervision,
information gathering and investigation.
All criteria are met.
There is no explicit prohibition on keeping anonymous accounts or accounts
in fictitious names, although other measures mitigate this in practice.
There is no requirement for FIs to take into account when previous measures
have taken place when applying CDD to existing customers, other than if this
took place before the implementation of AMLD4 or the equivalent measures
in the Wwft BES.
All criteria are met.
There is no strict requirement to have senior management approval for
establishing and continuing PEP relationships in the BES Islands.
FIs are required to determine source of assets when establishing or
continuing a relationship with PEPs. FIs in the BES Islands are not required
to establish the source of funds and there is no express requirement to inform
senior management before the payout of life insurance policies.
Mandatory EDD measures regarding correspondent banking relationships
apply only to respondent institutions outside the EEA.
All criteria are met.

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Recommendations

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE – KEY DEFICIENCIES

Recommendations

Rating

15. New technologies

PC

Factor(s) underlying the rating
•
•

16. Wire transfers

LC

•
•
•

17. Reliance on third parties

LC

•

Technical compliance

•
18. Internal controls and foreign
branches and subsidiaries

LC

19. Higher-risk countries

LC

•

20. Reporting of suspicious
transaction
21. Tipping-off and
confidentiality

C

•

LC

•

•
•

•
•
•

22. DNFBPs: Customer due
diligence
23. DNFBPs: Other measures

LC

•

LC

•
•
•

24. Transparency and
beneficial ownership of legal
persons

LC

•
•

25. Transparency and
beneficial ownership of legal
arrangements

LC

•

26. Regulation and supervision
of financial institutions

LC

•

27. Powers of supervisors
28. Regulation and supervision
of DNFBPs

C
LC

•
•
•
•

The Netherlands employs a narrow definition of VASPs, which does not cover
all activities included in the FATF definition.
The threshold for the application of CDD measures for occasional transactions
is higher than the threshold in the FATF Standards.
There is no regime for VASPs in the BES Islands.
There are no requirements for FIs in the BES Islands to send beneficiary
information for batch transfers.
FIs of beneficiaries are not required to have risk-based procedures and
measures in place where originator information is regularly not provided.
There is no provision requiring the reliant FI to satisfy itself that third parties
are supervised or have measures in place to comply with CDD and recordkeeping obligations.
There are deficiencies stemming from the general assumption that all EU
member states apply adequate AML/CFT controls.
FIs determine if they need an independent audit function based on their size
and complexity. It is not clear how this is consistently applied.
There is no requirement for FIs in the BES Islands to share UTR information
within their groups.
The Netherlands has the authority to issue countermeasures independently
of any call by the FATF. However, this only applies where the jurisdiction has
been designated by the EC.
All criteria are met.

Protection from criminal or civil liability is subject to certain offences and
narrower conditions than the good faith requirement.
The protection from criminal liability in the BES Islands is not limited to cases
where the information was provided in good faith.
The protection from civil liability in the BES Islands does not extend to
directors or employees.
Tipping-off provisions in the BES Islands do not explicitly cover directors or
employees.
Not all DNFBPs covered by the FATF Standards are required by legislation to
comply with the CDD requirements set out in R.10, 11, 12, 15 and 17.
Casinos and real estate agents in the BES Islands are not required to conduct
CDD in all situations.
With the exception of trust offices, DNFBPs in the BES Islands are not required
to comply with c.18.2 and 18.3.
Information on higher risk countries is not adequately communicated to
DNFBPs, other than trust offices.
A full assessment of ML/TF risks of all legal persons has not been carried out.
The concept of nominee shareholdings and directorships are not recognised
in Dutch law, but in practice both services can be provided and are not subject
to AML/CFT obligations.
Mutual funds can be established and share similar features to trusts.
However, these are only subject to registration and supervision where they
are considered as investment vehicles. Trustees provided by obliged entities
are subject to sanctions, but in the BES Islands these are not proportionate or
dissuasive.
There are minor shortcomings in the application of an RBA, including a lack
of process for determining frequency and intensity of supervision.
There is no requirement to consider and review FIs AML/CFT risk in the BES
Islands.
All criteria are met.
DPMS in the BES Islands are not subject to supervision when acting as
intermediaries.
There are some shortcomings in relation to screening to ensure criminals and
their associates are prevented from being accredited or holding a
management function or significant or controlling interest, including being a
BO in a DNFBP.

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TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE – KEY DEFICIENCIES
Rating

Factor(s) underlying the rating
•

29. Financial intelligence units
30. Responsibilities of law
enforcement and investigative
authorities
31. Powers of law enforcement
and investigative authorities

C
C

•
•

LC

•
•

32. Cash couriers

LC

•

33. Statistics

LC

•
•

34. Guidance and feedback
35. Sanctions

LC
LC

•
•
•

36. International instruments

LC

•

37. Mutual legal assistance
38. Mutual legal assistance:
freezing and confiscation

C
LC

•
•

39. Extradition

LC

•
•
•

40. Other forms of international
co-operation

LC

•

There are gaps relating to supervision in the BES Islands. Scoping issues
mentioned in c.22.1 apply.
All criteria met.
All criteria are met.
There are minor shortcomings in relation to the ability to identify in a timely
manner whether natural and legal persons hold or control accounts.
In the BES Islands, there are currently no provisions to allow for access to
computer systems.
There are minor shortcomings in relation to the proportionality and
dissuasiveness of available sanctions (including in the BES Islands).
Statistics cannot be disaggregated by predicate offences or type of ML.
Statistics on confiscation and MLA, as well as statistics for the BES Islands, are
not comprehensive.
Some guidance is not updated regularly and is limited in the BES Islands.
Administrative and criminal fines apply to FI and DNFBPs and natural
persons within obliged entities involved in an ML/TF offence, however, it is
unclear in which cases the different type of fines are applied.
The levels of administrative fines for violations in the BES Islands are not
dissuasive.
There are minor shortcomings in the non-extraditable nature of the offences
of simplified deliberate and culpable self-laundering.
All criteria are met.
Some limitations exist in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders
outside a treaty or EU framework.
There are no legal provisions allowing the enforcement of foreign nonconviction based confiscation orders.
Some minor shortcomings remain in relation to the non-extraditable offence
of simplified self-laundering
There are no legal provisions for national proceedings, where the refusal to
extradite is based solely on nationality.
There are some limitations in the BES Islands and the lack of an explicit legal
basis for FIU-NL to cooperate with non-EU/EEA FIUs in the absence of an
MOU.

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Technical compliance

Recommendations

| 287

TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE – KEY DEFICIENCIES

Technical compliance

288 |

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Glossary of Acronyms 73

AFM
AIRS
AIVD
Advw
Adw
AMLC
AML/CFT
AMLD
AMO
ARO
ATM
Awb
Bbiv BES
BEH
BES
BFT
BO
BODs
Bpg
BtWwft
Bv
BVO Protocol
BW
Bwft BES
CARIN
CBF
CBS
CDD
CIS
CJIB
CoC
CoE
CT
DLR
DNB
DRZ
DTN
EAW
EBB
73

DEFINITION
Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets
Department of International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
General Intelligence and Security Service
Advocates Act
General Customs Act
Anti-Money Laundering Centre
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
European Anti-Money Laundering Directive
Asset Management Office
Asset Recovery Office
Actualisatie Toezicht Methodologie
General Administrative Law Act
Decree on the safekeeping of seized objects BES
Economic Enforcement Office of the Tax Office
The islands of Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba
Financial Supervision Office
Beneficial owner
Special Investigative Services
Police Data Decree
Tax and Customs Administration AML/CFT Supervision Office
Private limited company
Protocol for instituting and discontinuing anti-terrorist asset freezing measures
Civil Code
BES Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Prevention) Decree
Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network
Netherlands Fundraising Regulator
Statistics Netherlands
Customer due diligence
European Customs Information System
Central Judicial Collection Agency
Chamber of Commerce
Council of Europe
Counter-terrorism
National Crime Squad of the Police
Dutch Central Bank
An agency of the Ministry of Finance, manages seized and confiscated goods
Terrorist Threat Assessments
European Arrest Warrant
European Freezing or Confiscation Order

Acronyms already defined in the FATF 40 Recommendations are not included into this
Glossary.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

Glossary of Acronyms

EC
ECB
EDD
EIO
FEC
FEC TFTF
FIOD
FIU-NL
FP
GDPR
Hrb
Hrw
Hrw BES
HSC
iCOV
IRC
IRC Carib
JITs
KMar
KPCN
Ksa
LBA
LCA
LE
LEAs
LIEC
LIRC
LBA
LP
MFA
MIT
NCTV
NOvA
NV
OM
OM BES
OM Carib
Rfm
Rfm BES
RST
SDD
SFO
SNRA
ST
Sw
UTR
Uw
Uw BES
Wab
WED
Wfm

European Commission
European Central Bank
Enhanced due diligence
European Investigation Orders
Financial Expertise Centre
FEC Terrorist Financing Task Force
Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service
Financial Intelligence Unit of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Specialist Office of the National Prosecution Service
European General Data Protection Regulation
Commercial Register Decree
Commercial register Act 2007
Commercial register Act for the BES Islands
Human Security Collective
Information Exchange on Criminal and Unexplained Wealth
International Legal Assistance Centre
International Legal Assistance Centre for the BES Islands
Joint Investigation Teams
Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
Dutch Caribbean Police Force
Netherlands Gambling Authority
National Authority for Seized Goods
National Confiscation Coordinator within the OM
National unit of the Police
Law enforcement authorities
National Information and Expertise Centre
National International Legal Assistance Centre
National Seizure Authority
National Office of the Public Prosecution Service
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Multidisciplinary Intervention Team
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
Netherlands Bar
Public limited company
Public prosecution office
Public prosecution office of the BES Islands
Public Prosecution Service of Curaçao, St Maarten and Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba
Financial Markets Regulation
Financial Markets Regulation BES
Detective Co-operation Team across the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao, St. Maarten and the BES.
Simplified due diligence
A criminal financial investigation for serious offences
European Supranational Risk Assessment
Steering Team for ML investigations
Sanctions Act 1977
Unusual transaction report
Extradition Act
BES Extradition Act
Accountancy Profession Act
Economic Offences Act
Financial Markets Act

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS | 291
Wfm BES
Wft
Wiv 2017
Wjsg
Wna
WODC
Wok
Wok BES
Wpg
Wtt
WvSr
WvSr BES
WvSv
WvSv BES
Wwft
Wwft BES

Financial Markets Act for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba
Financial Supervision Act
Intelligence and Security Service Act 2017
Judicial Records and Certificates of Good Conduct Act
Civil-law Notaries Act
Research and Documentation Centre
Betting and Gaming Act
Betting and Gaming Act BES
Police Data Act
Trust and Company Service Providers Supervision Act 2018
Dutch Penal Code
Dutch Penal Code for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure
BES Code of Criminal Procedure
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba

Glossary of Acronyms

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the Netherlands – ©2022 | FATF

© FATF
www.fatf-gafi.org

August 2022

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures The Netherlands
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report
In this report: a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML) / counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures
in place in the Netherlands as at the time of the on-site visit from 27 October to 18 November 2021.
The report analyses the level of effectiveness of the Netherlands’ AML/CTF system, the level of
compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and provides recommendations on how their AML/CFT
system could be strengthened.