FITNESS CHECK OF STATE AID RULES
2. TARGETED CONSULTATION FOR THE EVALUATION
OF THE GUIDELINES ON STATE AID FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENERGY 20142020 (EEAG)
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Commission launched the State aid modernisation with the objectives to: 1) foster
sustainable, smart and inclusive growth in a competitive internal market; 2) focus Commission's ex
ante scrutiny on cases with the biggest impact on the internal market; and 3) streamline the rules
and provide for faster decisions. In view of these objectives, the Commission has since 2013
revised a number of State aid rules, including the State aid Guidelines for environmental protection
and energy (EEAG).
In January 2019, the European Commission announced its intention to prolong seven sets of State
aid rules for a period of two years and launched a comprehensive policy evaluation in the area of
State aid(“Fitness Check”). Part of this exercise is the evaluation of the State aid Guidelines for
environmental protection and energy to reflect if the current rules are still fit for purpose.
Besides the general public consultation on the fitness check of EU State aid rules, this targeted
consultation aims to ask supplementary questions in order to gather stakeholders’ views on the
implementation of the State aid Guidelines for environmental protection and energy and the
provisions applicable to aid for environmental protection (and energy) (Section 7) of the General
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) and to receive insights about potential gaps, overlaps or
excessive regulatory burden.
You are kindly invited to reply to a set of 19 Questions. Please make sure you use the save button
as you proceed with the questionnaire to avoid losing information that was already inserted especially in the case of questions with open replies. At the end of the survey you will have an
opportunity to provide broader, more general comments and to upload documents, which you
consider as relevant.
The Commission will publish an analysis of the results of the Fitness Check and examine possible
follow up actions at the beginning of 2020.
ABOUT YOU
Public, Your personal details (name, organization name and size, transparency register number,
country of origin) will be published with your contribution.
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Language of contribution: English
First name / surname: Dutch authorities: Interdepartementaal Staatssteun Overleg
(ISO)
I am giving my contribution as: Public authority
Organization name: Dutch authorities: Interdepartementaal Staatssteun Overleg
(ISO)
Scope: National public authority
Organization size: National public authority
Transparency register number: not relevant
Country of origin: The Netherlands
E-mail (this won’t be published): You will receive our e-mail address separately.
Please describe the main activities of your organization, if applicable: This response
reflects the views of the Dutch ‘Interdepartementaal Steun Overleg (ISO)’. The ISO is
a central State aid coordination body composed of all Dutch ministries and
representatives of the regional and local authorities.

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Please describe the relevance of State aid rules for you: The ISO is a central State aid
coordination body composed of all Dutch ministries and representatives of the
regional and local authorities who have to comply with the State aid rules. The ISO is
chaired by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy. The Minister of
Economic Affairs and Climate Policy is responsible for competition policy in the
Netherlands
How would you best describe the nature of your understanding and involvement in
matters related to State aid rules? The ISO is a central State aid coordination body
composed of all Dutch ministries and representatives of the regional and local
authorities who have to comply with the State aid rules and therefore have a broad
knowledge and experience with the State aid rules.
Publication privacy settings: Public
I agree with the personal data protection provisions

EFFECTIVENESS
In this section, we would like your opinion on the extent to which the State aid Guidelines for
environmental protection and energy (EEAG) and the provisions applicable to aid for environmental
protection (which include provisions on energy) (Section 7) of the General Block Exemption
Regulation (related GBER provisions) have achieved their objectives and delivered results.
1.

Based on your experience, to what extent have the EEAG and the corresponding GBER
provisions (e.g. tendering, technological neutrality, market integration) been effective in:
(To a large extent, to some extent, not at all, I do not know)
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Enabling the deployment of renewables while lowering societal costs and reducing the
amount of aid needed?
Facilitating the integration of renewable energy into the electricity market?
Ensuring financing of support schemes to renewable energy sources, while limiting
negative impacts on the competitiveness of EU firms?
ensuring that capacity mechanisms were necessary and cost-effective in providing
security of supply and least-distortive to competition and intra-EU trade?
ensuring that capacity mechanisms did not negatively impact the objective of phasing
out environmentally harmful subsidies including for fossil fuels?
ensuring that in cogeneration and district heating the most cost-efficient projects could
be realised?

To a large extent.
In the Netherlands the main aid instrument for renewables (the SDE+) is an operating (feed-in-tariff)

subsidy. Producers receive a guaranteed payment (subsidy) for the energy they generate from
renewable sources. The production of renewable energy is not always profitable because the cost of
production is higher than for fossil energy. SDE+ compensates only for the difference between the
cost price of renewable energy and the market value of the energy supplied: the unprofitable
component. The amount of the subsidy depends on the technology used and the amount of
renewable energy produced. Cornerstones of the SDE+ are 1) one budget for all technologies taken
together: the budget is distributed to project applications involving the lowest production costs
(base amount) first in order to achieve the most cost efficient production of renewable energy); 2) a
phased release of funds: each round of applications is divided into several phases. This phased
release of funds maximizes cost-effectiveness of renewable energy production; 3) a maximum base
amount: for each technology there is a maximum base amount and a maximum number of full-load
hours per year above which no subsidy is paid. Technologies that are able to produce renewable
energy for the maximum base amount or less are eligible for aid in the SDE+ scheme and finally 4) an
open category: an applicant can also apply for a lower subsidy than the maximum base amount for
the technology in question. This allows applicants to tailor their subsidy application more closely to

their specific project. The amount of subsidy applied for in the 'open category' must be lower than
the maximum phase amount in the SDE+ and higher than the base price for energy.
The main difficulty experienced in the past years in applying EEAG and GBER in the case of subsidies
for renewables has been the fact that, although the basis tenets of the aid scheme did not change
and fitted very well in the basic principles of the EEAG and GBER, any change or increase in budget
necessitated a complete scrutiny of the aid scheme, which resulted in risks for the planning and
release of the new scheme and hence in attaining the policy goals for the energy and climate
transition. We would welcome an open minded approach where the necessary state aid scrutiny
would be limited to fundamental changes of a scheme and not every aspect of it. This would make us
more flexible in adjusting the system to developments in technology or markets.
At the moment, new and urgent policy measures to combat climate change are being developed,
new mechanisms for stimulating greenhouse gas reduction technologies are being explored: the
present guidelines do not provide a proper basis to fit such a broadening of the scope. EEAG and
GBER work with terms and definitions e.g. on stimulating production of renewables or improving
energy efficiency. There is no framework for a mechanism based solely or primarily on greenhouse
gas reduction as such. More specifically, we are now developing a new measure with new
characteristics:
1. Broadening of the scope of our SDE+-scheme, to include greenhouse gas reduction
technologies that do not produce renewable energy (e.g. CCS)
2. Competition between technologies based on €/tCO2 instead of €/kWh, to ensure fair
competition;
3. In the calculation of the unprofitable component for greenhouse gas reduction technologies,
the base energy price will become the floor price which includes the ETS price for
greenhouse gas emissions.
In the framework of such a broader support scheme the limitations on aid for energy-efficiency
measures to a maximum of five years (EEAG pt. 149), provide an obstruction since this is a much
shorter period than currently envisaged for other technologies. We would welcome a change to the
EEAG and GBER that will help such an approach.

2.

Based on your experience have Member States created a level playing field for imported
and domestically produced biofuels and/or biomass energy when providing support (for
instance by supporting a specific type of domestically produced biofuels and/or biomass
energy, but not other types of biofuels and/or biomass energy with similar costs or
greenhouse gases emissions)?
Yes.
Please explain (max 1000 character(s): in the SDE+ scheme there is a level playing field
for different types of biomass. The origin of the biomass does not matter. For wood pellets
we have sustainability criteria, which include the total CO2-emissions in the supply chain.
This is based on the production, transport and use of the biomass and builds on the
BIOGRACE model.

3.

Based on your experience, to what extent has the GBER ensured public support for waste
recycling while limiting the amount of aid to the minimum and limiting distortions of
competition to the minimum?

To some extent.
Please explain (max 1000 character(s):
Article 47 of the GBER helps to support waste recycling projects. Article 47 states that:

The eligible costs shall be the extra investment costs necessary to realize an investment leading to better or
more efficient recycling or re- use activities compared to a conventional process of re-use and recycling
activities with the same capacity that would be constructed in the absence the aid.
The reference to be used creates in practice some difficulties. For the waste recycling
company that has a certain way of recycling as its core business, there is mostly no
realistic alternative investment as meant in point 73 of the MESK. Therefore it seems more
effective to be able to compare the aid initiative (and eligible costs) of the beneficiary with
the situation what otherwise would happen with the waste (disposal in an environmentally
unfriendly manner), instead of what the waste recycling company would otherwise invest
in. Incineration of the waste could then for example be a realistic alternative scenario. Also
difficult are projects in which the recycling process leads to the creation of more than one
feedstock, whereby the recycling process might also create feedstocks that can serve as
feedstock for chemical processes in industry as well as as fuel for energy purposes (the
latter not being allowed to support).
More detailed feedback: article 47, point 3 of the GBER mentions: “The recycled or re-used
materials treated…”. We think this should be: “The materials to be recycled or re-used…”
since the materials won’t be disposed of if they have been recycled or re-used. Point 5 of
this article is difficult to read and control, and for the beneficiary to substantiate.
4.

Based on your experience, to what extent has Article 39 GBER allowed aid through financial
instruments for energy efficiency measures in buildings while limiting distortions of
competition at the level of the financial intermediary and the funds involved?
(To a large extent, To some extent, Not at all, I do not know)
To some extent.
Please explain (max 1000 character(s):
To some extent, although art.39 GBER focuses on a fund and a fund manager and sets out
several conditions that make solutions possible for non-undertaking end-users difficult.
We would prefer more possibilities to help owner-occupants (citizens) to take energyefficiency measures through various constructions where people are helped out with
various steps to be taken in this process.
Moreover, for owners Associations of an apartment building with a small amount of
dwellings to be property of a private landlord (e.g. 30%), it would be preferable the owners
Association can rely on the rules for owner-occupants because it is one association. To set
different rules for the members of the owners Association is not helpful to reach the
environmental goals to take more energy-efficiency measures, esp. in dwellings.
Furthermore it would be helpful if the first loss (art.39.8 sub c GBER) can be more than
25%. We see no problem in terms of distortion of competition, considering all the other
conditions for a fund, to raise the first loss to a maximum of 50%.

5.

Based on your experience, has State aid granted under the EEAG or the GBER generally
achieved the relevant climate and environmental protection objectives while maintaining a
competitive internal market?
(To a large extent, To some extent, Not at all, I do not know)
To a large extent.
Please explain (max 1000 character(s):

To a large extent. However maintaining a competitive internal market means that the principle that
state aid should not be granted for or linked to relocation of jobs or activities between Member
States is important. Energy and environmental investments in a non assisted area should not be
hampered because of (too) high aid intensities for energy and environmental investments located
in assisted areas.
6.

Based on your experience, has State aid granted under the EEAG or the GBER generally
achieved the relevant energy objectives while maintaining a competitive internal market?
To a large extent. However:

The State aid framework needs to be reformed so that it contributes to and does not counteract the
development towards a fossil-free society as well as the implementation of the Paris Agreement .
This includes enabling Member states with better tools to combat climate change, including
improving the public financing tools at a level necessary for enabling the transition of the fossil
fuels based industry into more climate friendly technologies, such as CC (U) S . In line with this,
the framework must also contain a phasing out of aid harmful to the fossil-free society, while
ensuring European industry stays internationally competitive in its transition towards a sustainable
and climate-neutral economy.
In such a climate adaptation of the State aid framework, it is necessary that regions and sectors in
Europe are not left without the possibility to participate in the necessary transition, enabling crossborder infrastructure and transport involved with the carbon neutral economy. It should neither
bring about unbearable financial burden to the local population nor to industries in their transition
to a fossil-free society nor have unacceptable impact on areas such as energy security, and would
enable just transition of the workforce to other areas of activity. In such a climate adaptation of the
State aid framework new forms of projects caused by the circular economy concept should be
taken on board. Better design and use of products and better re-use of materials already in
circulation will reduce the consumption of fossil resources and thus emissions.
We would suggest a possible new State Aid tool in the form of a Guideline or Notice based on Art.
107 (3)(c) enabling Member states to take the political decisions necessary to pursue climatefriendly goals, including to support new value chains and structures and new employment
possibilities as a substitute for the ending of functioning value chains .

7.

Based on your experience, have there been any unexpected or unintended results from the
implementation of the EEAG and the corresponding GBER provisions?

To some extent. The main bottleneck in the implementation is the requirement in the definition of
environmental protection which states that the environmental protection should be realized by the
beneficiary’s own activities.

For the purposes of these Guidelines the following definitions apply:
‘environmental protection’ means any action designed to remedy or prevent damage to physical surroundings or
natural resources by a beneficiary’s own activities, to reduce the risk of such damage or to lead to more efficient use
of natural resources, including energy-saving measures and the use of renewable sources of energy
However in some cases the environmental protection is realized by the activities of other
stakeholders/undertakings, who are not the direct beneficiary of the aid. In some cases
environmentally friendly investments realized by the (potential) beneficiary of the aid only remedy
or prevent damage to physical surroundings or natural resources or lead to more efficient use of
natural resources, through other companies or consumers not benefitting directly from the aid. A
new definition of environmental protection should take this into account.

8.

Are there sectors (at NACE 4 level and products (at Prodcom 8 level) which, were included
in the list of eligible sectors and products for reductions under section 3.7.2. of the EEAG
(c.f. Annex 3 and Annex 5 of the EEAG), but which, according to your experience, were not
particularly affected by the financing costs of renewable energy support and therefore were
not put at a significant competitive disadvantage?
(Yes, No, I do not know)
NO
If you replied Yes to the question above, please list those sectors and subsectors and
substantiate your answer (max 1000 character(s)):

9.

Are there sectors (at NACE 4 level) or products (at Prodcom 8 level) which, according to
your experience, were particularly affected by the financing costs of renewable energy
support and therefore were put at a significant competitive disadvantage, but were not
included in the list of eligible sectors for reductions under section 3.7.2. of the EEAG (c.f.
Annex 3 and Annex 5 of the EEAG)?
(Yes, No, I do not know)
NO

If you replied Yes to the question above, please list those sectors and subsectors and substantiate
your answer (max 1000 character(s)):
10. Based on your experience, have the minimum own contributions of the full electricity
surcharges of 15 % of the full renewable surcharge, and 4 % and 0.5 % of the Gross Value Added
of the undertaking concerned (see points 188 and 189 of the EEAG) been adequately set to ensure
a sufficient financing basis for the underlying energy policy?
(Too high, Too low, Adequate, I do not know)
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15% of the full renewable surcharge:
4% of the Gross Value Added:
0,5% of the Gross value Added:

Please substantiate your answer: (max 1000 character(s)):
Not relevant:
In the Netherlands there is no specific surcharge for financing renewable energy support,
because this would be inconsistent with the Dutch budget rules with its strict separation of
government’s revenues and expenditures. Therefore the specific restrictions as mentioned
above for this type of surcharge are not relevant for The Netherlands.
11. Based on your experience, have the reductions in electricity surcharges given to energyintensive users (EIUs) created market distortions?
(Yes, No, I do not know)
Please substantiate your answer: (max 3000 character(s)):
No, the European level playing field was not distorted.
12. Based on your experience, what impact have reductions granted to energy intensive users
had on renewable energy charges and other relevant charges paid by non-energy intensive
industrial consumers and households?
(Excessive, Adequate, I do not know)

Please substantiate your answer: (max 3000 character(s)):
In the Netherlands from 2013 the energy tax is increased by a separate surcharge which
however must be considered as a regular increase of the energy tax. According to the
Dutch budget rules there is a strict separation between fiscal revenues and government’s
expenditures. The existing reductions in the energy tax are fully granted in the surcharge
as well. As a result 50% of the fiscal income comes from households and 50% from
industries.
13. Based on your experience, has the higher aid intensity allowed under point 78 of the
EEAG been adequate to address the double market failure linked to the higher risks of
innovation and the environmental aspects of the project without creating unnecessary
distortions of competition?
(Yes, Not adequate (too low aid intensity), Not adequate (too low aid intensity), I do not
know)
Please substantiate your answer: (max 1000 character(s)):
As for point 78 a: However maintaining a competitive internal market means that the principle
that state aid should not be granted for or linked to relocation of jobs or activities between Member
States is important. Energy and environmental investments in a non assisted area should not be
hampered because of (too) high aid intensities for energy and environmental investments located
in assisted areas.
The Commission should take into account that more developed industrial areas in Europe have
higher costs when investing in innovation and environmentally friendly projects than less
developed industrial areas.

EFFICIENCY
In this section, we would like to know your opinion about the efficiency of the EEAG and the related
GBER provisions.
14. Based on your experience, to what extent are the different compatibility conditions and
methodologies included in the EEAG and the GBER related provisions sufficiently clear and
easy to apply:
(Yes, No, I do not know)
In general terms? YES, however. For several years we see complex projects being
proposed that fit our policy goals of climate and energy transition but where the own
activities of a beneficiary do not in itself lead to environmental protection such as
defined in (19) of the EEAG. E.g. the aid helps to finance investments in certain
infrastructure but the environmental protection comes into existence when consumers
benefit from energy savings or efficiency. The general rules regarding energy
infrastructure do not always apply. Therefore, the GBER-section concerning the aid for
environmental protection should be extended in order to grant aid for investments that
will contribute to the EU’s environmental and climate goals. Recently the Commission
approved public support for the installation of CO2 capture technology. Companies will
be able to use excess waste CO2 instead of using primary energy sources that produce
CO2. This will benefit the environment not only by means of energy saving but as well
as by disposing the waste CO2.
As regards the methodology for calculating eligible costs for investment aid to go
beyond standards, in the absence of standards and early adaptation to standards under
Article 36 of the GBER and points 73 to 75 of the EEAG? YES. However we would like to
mention that Opex costs caused by the temporary shut down of a running production
process, because of an investment under article 36 GBER, are not eligible. In cases
where a rapid energy transition is necessary because of climate goals, it sometimes is

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inevitable that running production processes temporary have to shut down in order for
a new investment to take place. Could the Commission reflect on this?
As regards the criteria for limiting bidding processes for renewables to specific
technologies (see EEAG point 126 and GBER Article 42.3)? To a certain extent: during
the notification process of the SDE+ in 2014 we were able to use the arguments
provided for in article 42.3 for the special regime regarding wind off shore.
As regards the methodology for calculating eligible costs for investment aid to
renewables and co-generation (CHP) projects? I do not know
As regards the methodology to assess proportionality of aid based on levelized cost of
energy (see point 131 of the EEAG and Article 43, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the GBER)? I
do not know
As regards the provisions for demonstration projects (as defined in point 19 paragraph
45 of the EEAG) and for the new and innovative renewable energy technologies (see
Article 42.4 of the GBER)? In the Netherlands aid for demonstration projects as defined
in point 19 paragraph 45 of the EEAG is not often being granted. For new and
innovative renewable energy technologies often investment aid (article 41 of the GBER)
is being granted. Operational aid is granted based on a separate approval of the
Commission, not the GBER. Article 41 is not specifically suited for innovative
technologies, but mostly it works. Problems may occur when defining the reference
technology (is the innovation more environmentally friendly), especially when
innovation is aimed at cost reduction. Because of our operational aid scheme, some
technologies may be considered standard, but may still not have a sound business case
if cost reduction is realized. In these cases investment aid is not easy to apply (no
extra costs relative to the counterfactual scenario). We would appreciate a definition of
“small installation” in article 41, point 6, sub c, of the GBER.
As regards the methodology to assess eligible costs for energy-efficiency investment
aid under Article 38 of the GBER? Although the definition of energy efficiency causes a
lot of discussion (only energy savings in the company, or also in the production
chain/indirect savings?), the methodology to assess eligible costs works fine for simple
cases. Problems occur when companies choose more complex ownership constructions
to realize an energy efficiency project. In some sectors, for example industry, we see
more and more that companies would like to invest in environmental protection
measures in a way that does not affect their balance. This has several advantages for
the company, among which a better return on total invested capital and better
financing conditions due to a better equity position (solvency). Investments that affect
their balance would make them less attractive to financers. These companies are,
however, willing to invest in environmental protection measures.

For example: Company A has a heat surplus. Company A would like to invest in a measure to store
that heat, so it can use the heat later on in another process in the same facility. However, they
want to do so off-balance. Therefore they establish a new undertaking B, together with the
developer C of the heat storage facility. Company A takes a minority interest in company B. The
new undertaking will invest in the heat storage facility. Company A will buy the heat from
undertaking B and will pay a yearly fee for that. In this way, company A realizes energy-efficiency.
The eligible costs in the case of energy efficiency are the extra investment costs necessary to
achieve the higher level of energy efficiency, according to article 38 of the GBER. Point 72 of the
EEAG further details this by mentioning that the eligible costs for environmental aid are the extra
investment costs in tangible and/or in intangible assets which are directly linked to the
achievement of the common objective. The GBER and EEAG furthermore define environmental
protection as any action designed to remedy or prevent damage to physical surroundings or natural
resources by a beneficiary's own activities, to reduce risk of such damage or to lead to a more
efficient use of natural resources, including energy-saving measures and the use of renewable
sources of energy.
If we apply this to the above mentioned example:
Company A is the party that realizes a higher level of environmental protection, because heat from
their processes that otherwise would leave the chimney is used later on, preventing heat

production later on. However, company A does not invest in tangible or intangible assets, so
cannot be directly supported. Company B invests in tangible assets but cannot be supported either:
the aid does not increase its own level of environmental protection, but the level of environmental
protection caused by the activities of company A. We consider this a coordination failure and would
like to be able to support these types of projects. We would think that due to the yearly fee
company A pays to company B, we can be certain that company A will indeed increase its own level
of environmental protection due to the investments made by company B. It therefore seems fair to
compensate company B for the otherwise unprofitable investments in tangible assets, but article 38
of the GBER does not offer a sound basis for that. The next question would be , whether the fact
that company A takes a minority interest in company B is relevant? An example where this is not
the case, is for example when energy service companies invest in energy efficiency measures.
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As regards the compatibility conditions (in particular the full passing on, the leverage
condition, the conditions imposed on the financial intermediaries) for energy efficiency
projects in buildings (see paragraphs 4 to 10 in Article 39 of the GBER)? The conditions
imposed on the financial intermediaries are quite numerous. Furthermore, in art.39.8
sub c, GBER the maximum of 25% first loss should be raised in order to make more
projects possible (we refer to the answer under point 4).
As regards the compatibility conditions for aid for Resource Efficiency (section 3.5.1 of
the EEAG read in combination with section 3.2 of the EEAG)? In the climate adaptation
of the State aid framework new forms of projects caused by the circular economy
concept should be taken on board. Better design and use of products and better re-use
of materials already in circulation will reduce the consumption of fossil resources and
thus emissions.
As regards the compatibility conditions (in particular the “state of the art” requirement,
the “polluter pays principle” and the “treatment of the waste of others”) for waste
management projects under 47 of the GBER and section 3.5.2 of the EEAG? We refer
to the answer under question 3.
As regards the methodology for calculating eligible costs for waste management
projects under Article 47 of the GBER and section 3.5.2. of the EEAG? . We refer to the
answer under question 3.
Other (please specify)
Please explain (max 5000 character(s):

In addition, as regards the calculation of maximum aid for investments in energy efficient district
heating or cooling, the wording of article 46 GBER poses a problem: Art 46, point 6, GBER
(investment aid for energy efficient district heating and cooling) states that:
“The aid amount for the distribution network shall not exceed the difference between the eligible
costs and the operating profit. The operating profit shall be deducted from the eligible costs ex
ante or through a claw-back mechanism.”
The term operation profit is defined in de GBER as:
“the difference between the discounted revenues and the discounted operating costs over the
economic lifetime of the investment, where this difference is positive. The operating costs include
costs such as personnel costs, materials, contracted services, communications, energy,
maintenance, rent, administration, but exclude depreciation charges and the costs of financing
if these have been covered by investment aid. Discounting revenues and operating costs using
an appropriate discount rate allows a reasonable profit to be made”.
This seems to suggest that, in calculating the maximum (investment) aid, the aid itself has to be
taken into account when looking at the eligible costs, which is difficult to do. Could this point be
clarified e.g. do they only strictly relate to financing such as bank fees or legal costs? There is no
definition of costs of financing in the GBER.
15. Based on your experience, how do administrative costs incurred by the aid application
under the EEAG and GBER related provisions compare with the actual amount of compensation
received?

The simplification of the calculation of the eligible costs for investment aid in the GBER
(without having to calculate operational costs and benefits) certainly helped to lower
administrative costs incurred by the aid application. We suggest that this simplification
could also be applied to articles 48 and 56 of the GBER.
Please rate from very low (administrative costs representing less than 1% of the actual
amount of compensation received) to very high (administrative costs representing more
than 20% of the actual amount of compensation received):
The administrative costs differ a lot, depending on the aid scheme that is applied and the
maximum subsidy that is available per project. As an example, the DEI+ scheme has an
administrative burden of 1-2% of the available budget. More than 5% would be
unacceptable in the Netherlands.
Proportion of administrative costs in total actual amount of compensation received: (Very
low (less than 1%, Low (between 1% and 5%), Intermediate (between 5% and 10%), High
(between 10% and 20%), Very high (more than 20%), I do not know
No remarks
Please explain (max 1000 character(s):

RELEVANCE:
16. Based on your experience, have the EEAG and GBER adequately addressed recent
market developments or technological changes such as:
(Yes, No, Partially, I do not know)
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Storage: No
Zero subsidy bids:
Repowering:
Renewable energy power purchase agreements:
Renewable self consumption and/or active consumers:
Citizens energy communities and/or renewable energy communities:
Hydrogen, synthetic fuels and low carbon gas: No
Alternative fuel infrastructure (publicly accessible or dedicated infrastructure):
Low or zero emission vehicles:
Carbon Capture, Storage and/or Utilisation: Partially.
Nearly-zero-energy building:
Smart energy technologies (e.g. in buildings):
Energy services (e.g. energy performance contracting):
Advanced technology for water reuse (e.g. membranes and UV):
Other (please specify): advanced biofuels, biobased feedstocks/circular economy, heat
networks/storage/exchange; electrification technologies (no)

Please explain (max 1000 character(s):
Storage
Without prejudice to the fact that public support for some energy infrastructure does not
always constitute state aid, the definition of energy infrastructure is too narrow and does
not fit current developments, to be able to support investments in innovative (large scale)
energy storage and flexibility for the energy system in cases where the R&D framework is
not applicable. The restriction in article 48 that aid can only be applied in assisted areas
does not help to stimulate necessary initiatives that constitute state aid either. The
Innovation Fund seems to have a broader scope than the GBER and EEAG.
Hydrogen
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GBER and EEAG do not have sufficient possibilities to support investments in other
sustainable energy carriers like hydrogen and ammoniac, though hydrogen is expected to

play an important role in realizing a carbon neutral economy. State aid for green hydrogen
production is not addressed in the EEAG.
Carbon Capture, Storage and/or Utilisation
For carbon capture and storage (CCS) the provisions in the EEAG are clear. Carbon capture
and utilization (CCU) is also an important measure to realize the CO2-reduction goals but is
not mentioned at all in the EEAG or GBER. There are 2 possible situations for CCU:
- the delivery of CO2 as a raw material to be used in products, whereby a net CO2reduction takes place because the CO2 has been captured in the product for a long period
of time;
- the delivery of CO2 whereby the CO2 replaces the use of fossil fuels, like natural gas. In
these cases emission of CO2 is reduced, as for example is the case with delivering CO2 to
greenhouses.
Article 36 of the GBER does not apply in a lot of cases, because a company capturing CO2
with the purpose of utilization by another company, does invest in tangible assets to
capture the CO2, but does not realize an environmental effect by its own activities, as the
definition of environmental protection requires. The environmental effect of the aid would
be realized by the change in behaviour of another company that uses the CO2, for example
greenhouses using the captured CO2 instead of the use of natural gas to produce their own
CO2. The public support of CO2-capturing measures for purposes other than permanent
storage should be made possible under the State aid framework.
Electrification technologies
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Operational aid for electrification technologies that reduce CO2-emissions, such as heat
pumps and electric boilers, is not adequately addressed in the EEAG. They technically do
not fall under renewable energy sources nor energy efficiency options.
The limitation of 5 years operational aid for energy efficiency options impedes market
development of these technologies by operational aid, if they have large investment costs
(such as in industry).
Advanced biofuels
The EEAG offers clear possibilities for support of advanced biofuels. Article 41 of the GBER
offers possibilities for support only for biofuels which are not subject to a supply or
blending obligation. Reason for this is that a supply or blending obligation may provide
sufficient incentive for investments in these types of renewable energy. We feel that this is
too strict in the case of advanced biofuels, certainly when there are no specific quantities of
specific biofuels defined in the blending obligation in place. We see that new, advanced
biofuels are too expensive and cannot compete with common fuels (first generation). We
would like to see also possibilities for investment aid in the GBER for these cases where
advanced biofuels are more expensive than first generation biofuels or when no alternative
is available yet.
Biobased feedstocks/circular economy
Using biomass for energy production is covered by article 41 of the GBER. Biomass can
also be used to make materials or feedstocks that can substitute fossil feedstocks. By doing
so (and by planting new biomass) a significant reduction of CO2-emissions can be achieved
compared to the use of fossil feedstocks (to be proved by a life cycle analysis). However,
the investment in a biobased production process will in many cases remedy the direct
environmental impact of the activities of other companies in the producti0n chain, such as
natural gas suppliers, while the CO2-emissions from the chimney of the investing company
will not really change. The environmental effect will in the end be realised by use of the
product produced. This does not fit with the definition of environmental protection.
Therefore aid under GBER or MESK is not allowed.

In both cases (energy production and biobased materials) the material will (in the end) be
converted into CO2. Biomass as energy source will be burned in a boiler or engine,
biobased materials will at the end of their life cycle be burned in a waste incineration plant
or composted. Preferably we would like to cascade biomass; i.e. first use the fractions with
the highest added value, for example for materials, and then use the remaining fractions
for energy production. This does not occur in the market automatically. Reason for this is
the cost price of the biobased materials that is a lot higher than the cost price of the fossil
based alternatives. Take for example plastics. Fossil based plastics cost about €8501450/ton, bioplastics €2000-5000/ton, depending on the quality and application
possibilities. Another example is the use of rapeseed to produce proteins instead of using
animal proteins. Moreover, point 15 sub a of the EEAG states that the Guidelines do not
apply to the design and manufacture of environmentally friendly products, machines or
means of transport with a view to operating with fewer natural resources. Reason for that
is according to footnote 14 that environmental aid is generally less distortive and more
effective if it is granted to the consumer/user of environmentally friendly products instead
of the producer/manufacturer of the environmentally friendly product.
Environmental aid for the company producing the biobased or environmentally friendly
product (in this case under article 36 of the GBER) would help them change their behavior
and invest in production processes for more environmentally friendly products.
Heat networks, heat storage and heat exchange
(Biobased and Waste) Heat and Power Plants connected to district heating networks or
Horticulture are recognized as a very good opportunity to increase the share of renewable
sources into energy systems. However, these plants are profitable only if a sufficient heat
demand is available throughout the year. On the other hand, these plants often have to
work for baseline operations and back-up boilers are used to supply the peak demand. To
extend the use of these plants and reduce costs, conventional fuel use and emissions, it is
necessary to integrate heat production and demand systems and combine them with
storage and sometimes even with a CO2 grid to achieve considerable cost effectiveness.
At this moment there are still many uncertainties regarding the use of Biomass and Waste
in heat and networks and storage. Since heating infrastructure has a particularly long
useful life, special care must be taken when considering huge investments in innovative
transport and storage solutions. Government support can play a decisive role. GBER does
not apply in most cases. Enhanced Government support is needed to invest in innovative
solutions and processes for more intelligent and efficient CO2 reduction by re-using heat.
17. To what extent do recent economic developments – such as the falling renewable
energy costs and possible changes to trade intensity and electro intensity of the sectors
concerned – impact the relevance of the rules which apply to reductions for energyintensive users (EIUs)?
(To a large extent, To some extent, Not at all, I do not know)
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Falling costs of renewable energy producers:
Changes to the trade intensity of the sectors listed in Annex 3 and 5 of the EEAG:
Changes of the electro intensity of the sectors listed in Annex 3 of the EEAG:
Other (please specify):

Please explain (max 3000 character(s): Simply put, falling renewable energy costs will
have an effect on the need for state intervention since it could lead to the conclusion that
market failures need not be corrected. Para 3.2.2. EEAG gives an adequate basis for such
an analysis. Member states much be critical regarding this point.
COHERENCE
In this section, we would like to know your opinion on the extent to which the EEAG and the
related GBER provisions are coherent with other EU policies and legislations.

18.Based on your experience, to what extent are the EEAG and the related GBER provisions
coherent with relevant EU policies and legislation such as:
(Yes, No, Partially, I do not know)
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Renewable Energy Directive: no remarks
Electricity Directive. This directive is under review. The latest text can be consulted on:
https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2016/
0380(COD)&l=en
Electricity Market Regulation This regulation is under review. The latest text can be
consulted on: no remarks.
https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2016/
0379(COD)&l=en : no remarks
Risk-preparedness Regulation This directive is under review. The latest text can be
consulted on: no remarks
https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2016/
0377(COD)&l=en
EU ETS Directive: No
Industrial Emissions Directive: no remarks
Alternative Fuels Directive: no remarks
Energy Efficiency Directive: no remarks
Energy Performance of Building Directive: we have not received information that EEAG
and GBER provisions are not coherent.
EU Waste legislation: no remarks
Water Framework Directive: no remarks
Air Quality Directive: no remarks
Birds Directive: NO
Habitats Directive: NO
ERDF Regulation: no remarks
Other (please specify):
Regarding the Birds and Habitats Directive: Some activities related to nature

(conservation ) are non economic in nature. Public funding thereof may therefore
not constitute State aid. However in case economic activities for nature goals would

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constitute state aid, the Commission is encouraged to provide for a proper base in the
GBER or otherwise.
Regarding the Renewable Energy Directive : we have not received information that
EEAG and GBER provisions are not coherent.
Regarding the Directives with no remarks: we have not received information that EEAG
and GBER provisions are not coherent.

19. Have the EEAG and GBER rules on exemptions or reductions from energy taxation
produced inconsistencies with other EU rules? (Yes, No, Partially, I do not know)
Energy Taxation Directive:
Other (please specify):
It seems that the Energy Taxation Directive gives more room to grant exemptions and
reductions than the EEAG rules allow. So, following the possibilities in this Directive
does not mean that state aid rules are automatically met. The restrictions in the EEAG
limit the application of the Directive. It would be ideal when strict application of the
Directive is considered as “no state aid”.
Please explain (max 1000 character(s)):

FINAL COMMENTS AND DOCUMENT UPLOAD
If there is anything else you would like to say which may be relevant for the evaluation of the EEAG
and the related GBER provisions, please feel free to do so:
(max 1000 character(s))

If you wish to attach relevant supporting documents for any of your replies to the questions above,
please feel free to do so.
Climate change is one of the largest global challenges the EU
faces. Living up to the Paris agreement means European climate
neutrality by 2050. This target must be accompanied by
concrete policy measures and all sectors have a role to play in
achieving it. There are opportunities for innovation, new
businesses and the creation of new jobs. Ambitious climate
targets can lead to economic growth even without the inclusion
of the benefits of avoided damage of climate change and
related adaptation costs.1
This transition means decarbonising the energy system and
building up a strong and competitive low-carbon industry based
on new technologies, fostered by innovation and green markets.
New coherent regulations on products and production will
accelerate the development of the circular economy, while more
stringent standards for vehicles and infrastructure will lead to
sustainable mobility. Circular agriculture should be accompanied
by redesigning the financial incentives in the Common Agricultural
Policy towards sustainability. Horizontally, the European budget
should become Paris proof and climate change should be a
cornerstone in foreign, trade and development relations of
the EU.
State aid rules should take this transition into account.

Please indicate whether the Commission services may contact you for further details on the
information submitted, if required.
Yes