The Hague Implementation Plan on Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Outcome Document of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters meeting on 11 January 2016
On 11 January 2016, the Netherlands hosted in EUROPOL HQ, a meeting of the Foreign Terrorist
Fighters (FTF) Working Groups of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) – co-chaired with
Morocco – and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL/Da’esh (GCCI) – co-chaired with Turkey.
Participants welcomed the hospitality of EUROPOL HQ and the co-chairs of the working groups
underlined the important role it plays as one of the international organizations maintaining and
developing relevant databases for collecting information on FTF.
In line with the conclusions derived from the United Nations (UN) Security Council Special Meeting of
the Counter-Terrorism Committee in Madrid on 28 July 2015 about “Stemming the Flow of Foreign
Terrorist Fighters”; relevant UN Security Council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2170 (2014),
2178 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2249 (2015) and 2253 (2015); relevant statements of the President of the
Security Council; “The Hague – Marrakesh Memorandum” adopted by the GCTF; the Joint Statement
by Partners in the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial of 3 December 2014 in Brussels, Belgium; the
members of the GCTF and GCCI FTF working groups and the international organizations that were
present today underlined their commitment to:
Full and speedy implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and UN Security Council
resolution 2178, including its information-sharing and countering violent extremism (CVE) provision,
and other relevant UN resolutions, in accordance with international law including applicable
international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, including
through the use of the Guiding principles for stemming the flow of FTF, derived from the Special
Meeting in Madrid;
Implementation of the relevant GCTF Good Practices Documents and the GCTF Initiative to Address
the Lifecycle of Radicalization to Violence and the work plans of the GCTF and GCCI FTF working
groups by their members as soon as possible;
Organization as soon as practicable of meetings of their respective FTF working groups to discuss and
carry forward the implementation of the respective work plans of the FTF working groups as well as
today’s conclusions;
Commitment to pursue the common goal and effort to effectively address the FTF phenomenon while
respecting the distinct nature and mandates of both working groups and underlining the need to avoid
duplication of efforts.

1

Participants are encouraged to:
1. Accelerate and intensify the exchange of information on FTF
1. Support the FTF Knowledge Hub under the GCTF FTF Working Group as a practical tool for
GCTF members to provide and exchange in-depth knowledge of the scope of the FTF threat,
including trends and dynamics.
2. Provide maximum and timely information to INTERPOL and relevant databases such as
EUROPOL where relevant, and/or others as applicable, before a FTF departs from his/ her
country of residence or nationality, before a FTF arrives in a transit country or before the FTF
has been sent back to his/her home country, and intend to discuss reciprocal sharing of lists of
known or deceased FTF.
3. Create an evidence-based list, within existing multilateral channels, of known individuals,
having the intent to commit a terror act, who cross borders frequently.
4. Identify national points of contact for sharing all relevant information pertaining to travel and/
or financial transactions by individuals suspected of having terror links or an intent to commit
a terror act.
5. Engage with the private sector (financial institutions, banks, airlines and travel agencies) to
encourage sharing of appropriate information, according to national law, with national, or as
appropriate, with regional or international law enforcement organizations.
6. Improve information exchange with and between participating states including their sharing of
appropriate biometric data, and where possible, in a standardized data exchange format (on
FTF) with INTERPOL and where applicable to other relevant authorities.
7. Work with INTERPOL and/or partner states, within means and capabilities and upon request,
to provide practical assistance to connect INTERPOL’s I 24/7 secure communications network,
which currently resides in the Member States’ National Central Bureaus, to their ports of
entry; to ensure that all ports of entry have access to relevant databases, including the Stolen
and Lost Travel Documents Database (SLTD), implemented on the first line for automated
(administrative) checks, to ensure a 100% coverage and Travel Documents Associated with
Notices (TDAWN), and to provide training to ensure effective timely and actionable information
sharing and implementation.
8. Invest in the GCCI Coalition website pages on FTF, as a practical tool for GCCI members.
9. Encourage authorities and organizations before granting refugee or migrant status to check
the personal data of all persons who cross borders against INTERPOL and relevant databases
for the purpose of ensuring the person has not planned, facilitated or participated in the
commission of terrorist act, as stated in UNSCR 1373.
10. Use of travel information, advance passenger information (API) and passenger name record
(PNR) data for traveler screening procedures to ensure early detection and dissemination of
information on security threat to civil aviation, in accordance with UNSCR 2178 and ICAO A37
declaration on Aviation Security.

2

2. Detect and intervene against FTF travel routes, use of documents and recruitment
1. Populate, enhance and regularly (daily) update the INTERPOL and other relevant databases
and information systems, while respecting the complementary principle, , with information on
travel of minors even if they are younger than 12 years of age, including travel routes and
recruitment networks and facilitate possible return to the country of origin of these minors as
appropriate and consistent with national law and international law obligations

and

commitments.
2. Populate, enhance and regularly (daily) update the INTERPOL and other relevant databases
and information systems, with information on FTF travel routes and recruitment networks, and
the production and use of forged or fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost identity documents
and other travel documents that have been invalidated by national authorities, in order to
confiscate these documents, and return the documents to the issuing country authorities.
3. Request INTERPOL and other relevant agencies to provide quarterly trends on FTF
interdictions and activities as reflected through the use of INTERPOL databases to INTERPOL
member states.
4. Improve and facilitate access to all relevant INTERPOL databases as appropriate, and improve
training for officers responsible for surveillance and travel processing.
5. Share information on FTF procurement or acquisition of weaponry (firearms and explosives)
and its materials through INTERPOL’s Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System
(iARMS) and other relevant databases.
6. Improve the detection and interruption of terrorist travel by strengthening information
exchange, using evidence-based travel risk assessment and fine tuning processes through
sharing good practice recommendations and guidelines. This work will be implemented by the
GCCI FTF WG (Strand 4 of its Action Plan).
7. Work through the GCTF to develop multilateral, regional law enforcement approach to disrupt
and dismantle human smuggling networks that exploit illicit travel and deter any corruption
that is helping to move foreign terrorist fighters across borders. The effort will focus on illicit
financing of human smuggling networks, communications capacity, false and stolen document
production, and use of social media, as well as other traditional transnational criminal methods
of operation.
8. Encourage participation in ICAO’s public key directory initiative to safeguard against document
fraud.

3

3. Disrupt the financing of FTF
1. Support implementation of Anti Money Laundering (AML)/ Counter Financing of Terrorism
(CFT) measures with a view to detecting FTF recruitment and travel through evidence-based
traveler risk-assessment as well as prevention of terrorist plotting where FTF could be
involved.
2. Actively support the work to counter the financing of terrorism carried out in the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF), Egmont Group, the UN and other multilateral fora, including the
Counter-Finance Working Group of the GCCI.
3. Examine legal frameworks with a view to strengthen targeted financial sanctions and the
combatting of terrorist financing and implementations thereof.
4. Exchange and publish regularly updated, national and regional Sanctions Lists, based on
UNSCR 1267 (2001), 1373 (2001) and 2253 (2015), of persons and organizations and provide
a portal/ list for banks and other financial institutions in order to facilitate their customer due
diligence check.
5. Share national designations of FTF, based on UNSCRs 1373 (2001) and 2253 (2015), by public
communication and notification through appropriate multilateral and bilateral channels.
Notified States would be encouraged to investigate whether the listed individual or entity has
assets in their jurisdiction and could investigate financial networks related to the individual or
entity with the consequence that the individual could be designated by the notified state where
applicable. The requesting authority could be notified of the outcome by the notified authority.
Both States could submit this person for designation on the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh)
and Al-Qaida Sanctions list. This UNSCR called for detailed information, including biometrics in
support of the UN-INTERPOL Security Council Special Notice.
6. Take steps to ensure that countries have laws and regulations in place which enable them to
prosecute and penalize the willful financing of travel or attempted travel of FTF in accordance
with UNSCR 2178 OP6(b) and FATF Recommendation 5. In order to tackle this phenomenon
sufficiently participants recognize the need for enhanced collaboration between financial
institutions, financial intelligence units and law enforcement agencies to ensure the successful
identification and prosecution of those involved in the financing of terrorism (FATF
Recommendations 29, 30, 31 and 40 and UNSCR 2253).
7. Maximize the use of targeted financial sanctions, in particular the freezing of assets in
accordance with UNSCR 1267, 1373 and 2253.
8. Identify methods and new tools of countering FTF funding in close cooperation with existing
law enforcement programs and relevant partners in the private financial sector, while
exploiting the central role and capabilities INTERPOL and other relevant databases can offer
where appropriate.
9. Provide as much relevant information as possible for the accurate and positive identification of
individuals and the information required by INTERPOL to issue INTERPOL UN Special Notices

4

and, where appropriate, photographs and other biometric data of individuals for inclusion in
those notices.
10. Sensitize the private sector to act against FTF modus operandi, communicate with the relevant
authorities in specific cases for instance where weapons and other military equipment (bullet
proof vests etc.), vehicles, hotel rooms and one-way flights, above a certain amount have
been paid by for instance cash or any other non-traceable method of payment, by known or
suspected FTF.
11. Request assistance through the appropriate channels, in case of a lack of capacity and
infrastructure for implementing these measures mentioned in this chapter. Donor countries
may decide to earmark their financial assistance for countering financing of terrorism projects.
12. Strengthen cooperation at the national level among intelligence, law enforcement, financial
intelligence units, border security and customs agencies in order to better trace, detect and
counter the financing of FTF. Develop strategies for making remittances to developing nations
more transparent and compliant with international banking laws and practices.
13. Develop strategies for making remittances more transparent and compliant with international
AML/CFT banking law and practices.

4. Support measures to facilitate the reintegration and de-radicalization of FTF
1. Implement the relevant GCTF Good Practices documents in national policies to facilitate the
reintegration and de-radicalization of FTF.
2. Address possible gaps in cases of extradition and mutual legal assistance requests regarding
FTF.
3. Explore how risk assessment tools can be used in the context of returning FTF to help identify
those individuals for whom reintegration, de-radicalization, or other off-ramp programs (as
alternatives to prosecution) might be appropriate, and make use of other relevant tools.
4. Take appropriate measures to prevent repeated travel of returning FTF (repatriated, extradited
or deported), including through facilitation of mutual legal assistance requests and sharing
information that could serve as evidence in criminal investigations.
5. Establish national reintegration, or other appropriate off-ramp, programs for returned FTF in
their country of origin.
6. Explore how to integrate rehabilitation mechanisms/ tools within a criminal justice response to
include the development of violent extremism off-ramps and alternatives to prosecution.
7. Explore and highlight differences in practices and procedures for the detention and
reintegration of FTF. This work will be implemented by the GCTF Detention and Reintegration
WG and the FTF WG, coordinated with the GCTF CVE WG.
8. Increase and streamline cooperation between private companies and law enforcement
agencies to disrupt the use of social media for propaganda purposes by terrorist organizations
including Da’esh/ ISIL.
5

9. Build trust between local authorities (including but not limited to law enforcement) and those
communities at risk of radicalization to violence, including by empowering those communities
and their leaders and, as appropriate, encouraging interested cities and other relevant subnational authorities to join the Strong Cities Network – the first global network focused on
building the resilience of local authorities against violent extremism.
10. Support the implementation of the White House CVE Summit’s Follow-On Action Agenda and
welcome the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism.

Means
States and organizations that have identified measures which have not been implemented yet, will
consider by which means and partners, implementation of such measures can be taken forward. The
UN, participating international organizations and the respective co-chairs of both FTF working groups
will, upon request, consider providing assistance in order to implement this plan.

Follow up
Participants encouraged the creation of a Joint High Level Network with membership limited to a
selected number of multilateral organizations and co-chairs of the respective working groups, to
promote the follow up to this document. Follow up with the Joint High Level Network would take place
upon the request of any interested state, on the margins of existing high level international
counterterrorism meetings. Focus will be on the sharing of information, the implementation of UNSCR
2178 and the identification of additional gaps and needed resources.
Members will encourage an annual review of UNSCR 2178 by the UN and to convene a ministerial
meeting, on the margins of UNGA 71, in New York, in September 2016.
The Joint High Level Network will report on the implementation of the outcomes at the annual review.

6