FINAL
REPORT
Netherlands Provincial and Water Board Elections
20th March 2019

Democracy Volunteers
16th May 2019

Netherlands Provincial Elections and Water Board Elections
20th March 2019
Final Report on Election Observation
Mission Objectives
1. To objectively observe the electoral process in The Netherlands.
2. To advise the local councils and national electoral bodies on the results of the
observation for the improvement of electoral practice within The Netherlands.
3. Support local bodies and national election authorities with constructive feedback on
areas of concern so that they may consider remedial action.

Methodology
The mission deployed 6 observers in three teams of two. These were registered with The
Netherlands’s Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. These six observers were
accredited to observe across The Netherlands. They made 62 separate observations across eight
municipalities. This allowed the observer team to also assess four separate Provinces; North
Holland, South Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland. The municipalities and the number of
observations were:









Amsterdam:
Arnhem:
Delft:
Leiden:
Nijmegen:
Rotterdam:
The Hague:
Utrecht:

14
6
2
8
6
10
5
11

All observers received a written and verbal briefing in advance of the deployment. Each
observation was conducted in pairs to allow for objective observation and the observers then
agreed their opinions of the electoral process before submitting data. The observations
generally took between thirty and forty-five minutes per polling station, with the observers
asked to ensure that they saw the entire process, which included staff greeting electors on
arrival at the polling station. This happened on every occasion.
The organisation of polling stations was extremely well run across the area of observation.
Voters could clearly see how to access voting and staff were trained to manage the process.
Polls were generally open from 7.30am to 9pm. The teams were asked to observe an opening
as well as a closing of a polling station and tour polling stations throughout the day.
Counting began almost immediately, based in the polling stations, before results were
transmitted to the central count for checking. The team also attended three of the central
counting pilots on the Thursday morning, in The Hague, Rotterdam and Zoetermeer.

1

Our observer team and electoral experts met with a number of professional and political
interlocutors whilst in The Netherlands and we have also included some of the feedback on
these meetings in our conclusions.

The Core Team
Dr John Ault FRSA FRGS (United Kingdom) was the Head of
Mission for the Netherlands Provinical and Water Board elections
and is the Executive Director of Democracy Volunteers.
John has worked in elections throughout the UK and the United
States since the 1980s. He has observed on behalf of the
OSCE/ODIHR in parliamentary elections as far afield as Kazakhstan
and is a former chair of the UK’s Electoral Reform Society. He has
also been elected to local government in the UK as well as being
appointed to the South West Regional Assembly.
He has observed numerous elections for Democracy Volunteers
including the Norwegian parliamentary elections, the UK general election in 2017, the Finnish
presidential and Dutch elections in 2017 and 2018. He has also been a consultant on the subject
of electoral and parliamentary reform in Moldova.
He is an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Exeter and has previously lectured at
Canterbury Christ Church University and the University of Manchester. He specialises in
elections and campaigns and has published a number of books on the subject, including his
doctoral thesis on electoral campaigning.

Joshua Wakeford (United Kingdom) was the Media Officer of the
Dutch Provincial elections and is the Press Officer for Democracy
Volunteers and an experienced observer with the organisation.
Joshua has just completed his final year at the University of
Manchester. Joshua’s role as Press Officer includes handling our
communications with the media, sharing the findings of our
deployments with the public and raising, where appropriate, the
profiles of missions.
His previous deployments include the 2017 UK General Election,
several local elections in the UK, and international deployments in Norway, Finland, Sweden
and the Republic of Ireland.

2

Thomas Fidler (United Kingdom) is a PhD History student with the
University of Exeter and a borough Councillor in South East England.
An observer with Democracy Volunteers since its inception, he served
as a media and administrative assistant for the organisation, as well as
co-ordinator for foreign organisations that have observed elections in
the UK.
Having observed several cycles of elections in the United Kingdom
and led several teams on the ground, he has also been involved in the
organisation of observation missions in France, Sweden, the Republic
of Ireland and the Isle of Man. He has a particular interest in identity politics in the Celtic world
with current projects exploring Cornwall and the Isle of Man.
Harry Busz (United Kingdom) is a recent graduate, having gained
a BSc in Human Geography at Cardiff University and an MA in
International Relations from Exeter University. He has participated
in multiple domestic and international observations such as the 2019
UK local elections in Northern Ireland, the provincial and Water
Board elections in The Netherlands and the recent UK parliamentary
by-election in Newport, Wales.
During his time at university, he wrote his undergraduate
dissertation on voter behaviour in the 2016 EU referendum in the
South Wales Valleys after choosing to study both political and
electoral geographies. His master’s degree focussed on the ideologies and key political elites
behind the referendum result in the context of political cleavages in UK politics. Now working
in economic development and regeneration in local government, Harry has also written briefing
papers for Democracy Volunteers whilst acting as the editor of the organisation’s sister
website, The Election Observer.
FUNDING
All of the 6 observers deployed to The Netherlands for the observation of the 20th March
parliamentary elections did so at their own cost, or they were supported from general funds of
the organisation. This was arranged by Democracy Volunteers, and this covered their travel to
The Netherlands, accommodation and internal transport. No finance was sought, or received,
from any party, whether internal or external to The Netherlands, for the observation, writing of
the Preliminary Statement or this Final Report. Our observations are wholly independent of
any institution.

3

The Electoral System
Elections in the Netherlands take place for five levels of government: The European Union,
the state, the twelve provinces, the twenty-one water boards, and the 355 municipalities, as
well as the three public bodies in the Caribbean Netherlands. Since universal suffrage was
introduced within the Netherlands, elections have taken place on the basis of an open party list
system of proportional representation (PR)1, with preferential voting. This open ballot structure
means voters can select the list candidate they prefer and do not have to vote for the first
candidate on a party’s list. Instead they can select a candidate lower down the list. Moreover,
voters can also cast a blank vote which is included in the turnout despite no preference for party
or candidate having been expressed. With the single exception of the Senate, which is made up
of 75 members elected by the States-Provincial based on the population size of each province,
following the provincial elections, all elections within the Netherlands are directly elected.2
Every Dutch citizen aged 18 or over has the right to vote 3 in elections for the European
Parliament, the House of Representatives, and the provincial and municipal elections. All
voters casting a vote must show identification, which must not have been expired by more than
5 years on election day. Non-Dutch and non-EU citizens are entitled to vote in municipal
elections provided they have legally resided in the Netherlands for at least five years. Whilst
EU citizens living in the Netherlands are, however, entitled to vote in municipal elections and
European Parliament elections straight away.4 Everyone entitled to vote receives a polling card,
which is taken with the voter to the polling station on the day. There are two different systems;
the call-to-vote card (oproepkaart) or a voting pass (stempas). These two cards are now
synonymous – all voters can vote at any polling
station within their municipality, though there
are some exceptions during water board
elections. Although voting machines had been
used for some years, a concern over their
security has caused a return to the ballot paper
and the red pencil, with electronic voting
banned in 2007 and electronic vote counting

1 Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy & Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek (2008), ‘The Dutch Political System

in a Nutshell’, p. 22 (online)
2 https://english.kiesraad.nl/elections/elections-of-the-senate
3 Voting is not compulsory
4 Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy & Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek (2008), ‘The Dutch Political System
in a Nutshell’, p. 24 (online)

4

stopped for the 2017 general election. To vote, voters
manually mark the box of the candidate they wish to
vote for on the ballot paper with a red pencil.
For all elections, polling is organised on the basis of
municipalities,

with

each

municipal

executive

responsible for the organisation of the elections5. In
each municipality there are multiple voting stations,
all of which open at 7:30am and close at 9:00pm,
usually in the form of communal buildings such as
churches and schools. There is a three-person
committee at the polling station, whose duties include
collecting polling cards and handing out ballot papers.
There is official recognition that Family Voting is an issue and attempts are made to limit it.
Previously by law, no fewer than 25% of the total number of polling stations must have been
in buildings accessible to voters with a physical impairment and be in an easy location for such
voters6. This was now increased to an aspirational, if not enacted expectation, that 100% of all
polling stations should be accessible to those with physical disabilities. Moreover, these voters
have the right to additional assistance to vote from a person of their choosing, although the
OSCE notes that the ‘interpretation of this provision varied in some jurisdictions with
assistance only possible from an election official’7. Additionally, although there is no
prevention in law on the right to vote for those with mental disabilities, unlike voters with
physical disabilities they are not allowed assistance in the voting booth.
Provincial Elections
For the upcoming provincial elections, the aforementioned is similarly the case. Voters are
entitled to vote in provincial elections providing they are a resident of the province concerned
on nomination day, possess Dutch nationality, and are 18 years or over on election day.
Voters elect the members of the States-Provincial in the twelve provinces of the Netherlands
in elections which take place every four years. Unlike a general election, a snap election for
5 Kiesraad, ‘Elections of the provincial council’ (online), Available at: https://english.kiesraad.nl/elections/elections-of-the-

provincial-council
6 Ibid.
7 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2017), ‘The Netherlands Parliamentary Elections 15 March 2017,
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report’, p. 2

5

provincial elections is not possible; instead after an early resignation of a Provincial-Executive,
a new one has to be formed on the basis of the existing party-political make-up of the StatesProvincial8.
The results of the provincial elections are calculated for each province. A quota, the number of
votes that entitles a party to one seat, is established once the number of valid votes is known.
It is worked out by the number of valid votes divided by the number of seats in a province;
therefore, the higher the turnout the higher the quota, increasing proportionally. In provincial
elections, any leftover votes for each party are distributed using the ‘highest average method’
or D’Hondt method in order to allocate the remaining seats. This method uses the highest
average number of votes per seat, calculated by the number of votes divided by the number of
seats9, with the first available seat going to the party with the highest average number of votes
per seat and so on until all the remaining seats have been awarded. It is worth noting that due
to the D’Hondt method parties previously were able to link their lists together so that their
leftover votes are included together, thus increasing their chances of acquiring an available
seat. This was usually between two smaller parties and a result of close political views.
However, this has recently been abolished.
The results are announced by ANP Netherland National News Agency on the evening of
election day itself.

8 Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy & Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek (2008), ‘The Dutch Political System

in a Nutshell’, p. 22 (online)
9 Number of seats as derived from the quota.

6

Water Board Elections
The Dutch water boards (waterschappen
or hoogheemraadschappen) are regional
governmental

bodies

tasked

with

managing water barriers, waterways,
water levels, water quality, and sewage
treatment in their respective regions10.
There are presently 21 water boards in
the Netherlands, many of which cover
several municipalities and can even
cover areas in two or more provinces.
Water boards within the Netherlands are
given importance due to the significance
of flooding, in particular, in the country.
Flood control is a national priority due to
the fact that approximately 26% of the
Netherlands is at or below sea level, there is historical precedence for coastal and river flooding,
and there remains about two-thirds of the country vulnerable to flooding in an increasingly
densely populated Netherlands. Water boards regulate how much and in which areas public
money is spent on, for instance, maintaining water quality through wastewater treatment and
maintaining the area’s flood defences.
Dutch water boards hold elections, levy taxes, and act independently of other government
bodies. Each have an elected general administrative body (hoofdingelanden), an executive
board11 (hoogheemraden) elected from the hoofdingelanden, and a chair (dijkgraaf) appointed
by the government for a period of six years.
The 2019 Dutch water board elections will take place on the same day as the provincial
elections, the 20th of March. Similarly, to other elections in the Netherlands, the water board
elections have an open party list system using proportional representation. Residents aged 18
and over can vote, and elections take place every four years. Since 2015, residents now vote in
person rather than by post over a period of two weeks, as had occurred prior the 2015 water
10 Dutch water boards are not responsible for the water supply to the general public and are therefore not considered a utility.
11 The hoogheemraden traditionally represent five types of water users: the local population (residents), industry (factories

and industrial buildings), municipalities (urban areas), farmers (agricultural land), and public parks.

7

board elections. Unlike other elections, however, only the board members of the ‘inhabitants’
category are directly elected, with board members representing the other three categories
(agriculture, nature, and commercial) appointed by representing organisations, such as the
Chambers of Commerce, which would represent the commercial category.
Changes to counting
The counting of the votes in the Netherlands is done immediately after the polling stations close
at 9pm, and is normally completed locally by the municipality.
The 2019 provincial and municipal elections trialled Central Counting for the counting of votes
at municipal level at one or more locations in 76 municipalities. After the polling stations
closed, the number of votes were counted only per party to determine a preliminary result for
each party and, compared to the normal procedure, all the ballots were sealed and then
transported to a central location the day after (Thursday 21st of March) where a new team
counted the number of votes per candidate. The introduction of this trial has been argued for in
order to create a more transparent, controllable, and trustworthy counting process. The need
for a change is reasoned to be due to: a belief that counting should be done by a separate team
and not the same polling station staff who have worked from 7:30am to 9pm; that Central
Counting could be conducted in buildings with the necessary facilities, and that it lessens the
likelihood of a recount. It has been contended that earlier trials of Central Counting in the
Netherlands since 2014 have shown that it gives a more transparent and trustworthy result but
comes at the cost of increased organisation and expense.
The Minister of the Interior believes the aforementioned benefits outweigh the extra
organisation and cost. Following on from the 2019 trial in vote counting, it is planned that an
amendment12 in the Elections Act to incorporate Central Counting will come into force before
the 2021 parliamentary elections13 14.

12 Amendment currently being written
13 Factsheet on the Central Counting of votes provided by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
14 Temporary Experimentation with Ballots and Centralised Vote Counting Act provided by the Ministry of the Interior and

Kingdom Relations

8

Results of the Observation
The observers answered the following questions in order as they progressed with each
observation at each polling station:

Q1. Is the Polling Station clearly
signposted from the pavement?

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 1: In only 76% of cases were polling stations properly signposted from the street.
Generally, signage was good but many polling stations often had small signs which were not
obvious.

Q2. On entering the Polling Station is it
clear where the voter should report to?

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 2: In 92% of cases, observers did not identify problems with where voters should
report. In some buildings multiple polling stations were distributed around several parts of
buildings making it potentially challenging to find the relevant area.

9

Q3. Was it clear how disabled voters
would access the Polling Station?

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 3: 76% of observations indicated that access to the polling station was clear.
Another 5% suggested that the disabled access was available however this was not clearly
signposted. 19% identified other issues which included the clarity of signposting, the
positioning of polling booths, and accessibility within the buildings themselves.

Q4. Did the polling staff ask to see your
ID on arrival?

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 4: 18% of presiding officers did check the ID of observers on arrival. 79% did
not. Staff were invariably welcoming to the observers. 10% of the time observers had their
details recorded concerning their attendance whereas in 90% of cases no evidence of the
observation mission’s presence remained.

10

Q5. Are there three staff on duty in the
polling station as you arrive?

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 5: 95% of polling stations had the required three members of polling staff on duty
when observers arrived at the polling station.

Q6. Is the Ballot Box clearly sealed with
cable ties/locks seals etc.?

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 6: In 97% of occasions the ballot boxes were correctly sealed. On one occasion
both ballot boxes, both for the Provincial elections and for the water board elections were
unsealed. On another a padlock was available but simply rested on the top of the box.

11

Q7. Each Polling Booth should be
equipped with a small poster explaining
how to vote, how to fold the ballot and a
red pencil.

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 7: Generally, this rule was well observed but on some occasions some parts of
the polling booth equipment was missing.

Q8. Are there any political leaflets in
sight or on the way to the polling booth.
This can include lists of councillors etc.

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 8: We saw no evidence of political activity in polling stations. We also noted, in
the case of The Hague, that the polling station in the council building had been moved
compared to 2018. This meant that any lists of councillors were no longer in sight in the polling
area.

12

Q9. Each polling booth should be
equipped with a small poster about the
secrecy of the ballot.

Yes

No

Other

QUESTION 9: Democracy Volunteers consistently sees evidence of ‘family voting’ in
western democracies and we feel The Netherlands tries, by use of the below poster, to
discourage and help the public, and staff, identify it.
We generally saw these posters on display across the areas of observation but more work could
be done to ensure they are in place.

13

Q10. Was there evidence of 'family
voting' in the polling station?

Yes

No

QUESTION 10: In 11% of polling stations, our observer team identified so-called ‘family
voting’. The observer group observed some 1956 voters enter polling stations during their
observations. This meant that only 0.4% of voters were affected, or involved, in family voting.
This is significantly lower than we see in other Western European countries such as the UK.
There is insufficient evidence to suggest that this was associated with any particular ethnic
group.

Q11. Overall how do you rate the quality
of this polling station

Very Good

Good

Bad

Very Bad

QUESTION 10: Observers were asked for an overall rating of the polling station they had
attended. 68% of polling stations were reported to be ‘Very Good’, 23% ‘Good’, 6% ‘Bad’,
and 3% ‘Very Bad’.

14

CONCLUSIONS
There are six areas that the observer team felt that the Dutch authorities should consider further
action following the observation on 20th March. They were:







Accessibility to Polling in the Netherlands
Proxy Voting
The Ballot Paper
Central Counting
Dual Elections
Queuing

Accessibility to Polling in the Netherlands
Previously, the requirement in the Netherlands was that 25% of all polling stations should be
accessible to voters with disabilities. However, this commitment has now been replaced to
require all polling stations to be accessible. It is clear that, in practice, this is not the case. Of
62 polling stations observed in the Netherlands, our observers found 15 (24%) to be
inappropriate for use by disabled voters. Accessibility issues at these polling stations included:
staircases or steps; narrow entranceways; heavy doors; tall booths, and tight spaces within the
polling station.

Figure 1, in a Rotterdam polling station, shows two polling clerks
wearing green tabards in order to identify themselves to voters.

The necessity for all polling stations
to be accessible is somewhat
alleviated by the ability for voters in
the Netherlands to cast their ballot at
a large number of polling stations.
Further, all polling stations in the
Netherlands are mapped online, with
indications for voters based on how
accessible they are. In providing this
information, consideration should be
given to how accessible they are for
voting. Many buildings were in theory
accessible, but rooms were too small
to be used as polling stations which
are practical for disabled voters.

In addition, the large size of the ballot
papers was also something of a barrier to accessibility. Our observers found the process of
voting – from a voter receiving their ballot paper to placing it in the ballot box – took a
considerable length of time in comparison to other systems. The ballot paper appeared difficult
for voters to unfold and refold, even for those without a disability.
Voters with physical disabilities are able to receive assistance from polling station staff only.
Those with mental disabilities may also seek assistance from polling station staff, although,
15

unlike for those with physical disabilities, it is not permissible for polling station staff to enter
booths with voters with non-physical disabilities.
Our observers witnessed several cases of voters being assisted in the process of voting. Our
observers found the green tabards (pictured above) to be an extremely useful way for polling
station staff to make themselves clearly identifiable to voters. This may be an effective way to
discourage family voting, as other voters can clearly see that anyone being assisted in voting
is being done so in an official capacity, and thus assistance does not lead to the impression that
voting together is permissible.
Proxy Voting
Proxy voting is defined by the OSCE Election Observation Handbook (2010) as:
‘Where a person receives a ballot on behalf of another person and votes on their behalf, usually
with their prior knowledge. In some jurisdictions, proxy voting is permitted, providing that the
proper documents have been completed15.’
Although legal in many countries, proxy voting is highly vulnerable to electoral fraud. This is
due to the high levels of trust one must place in one’s proxy, with no assurance that the proxy
will act faithfully on their wishes when casting their ballot paper. Furthermore, the practice
leaves an election open to issues surrounding the potential buying of votes by fraudulent actors
and vote gathering, although there is no suggestion of this through our observations. Finally,
the use of proxy votes necessarily ends a citizen’s ability to cast a secret ballot, which is crucial
to abiding by Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which seeks
to protect the ‘free expression of the will of the electors16.’ As such, proxy voting can be seen
to undermine the secrecy and equality of any vote.
In the Dutch context, voters are eligible to appint a proxy to vote on their behalf by signing the
reverse of their voting pass (stempass) and simply handing this to their proxy. Through this
process the voter’s pass ‘has thus been converted into a certificate of authorisation17.’ In
addition to this, the proxy must supply an identity document belonging to the voter, although
no prior application, or justification, is required to cast a ballot in this way. Each proxy is
allocated two authorisations in any given election, contributing to the liberal nature of this
process18. Throughout the population, eighty-four per cent of voters believe proxy voting
should be allowed, with only nine per cent being against it19.
The frequency of proxy voting in The Netherlands has been historically high with fluctuations
in the prevalence between elections and between different economic, social and religious
groups20. As noted by the OSCE, after attending the 2017 parliamentary elections, the way this
15 OSCE/ODIHR (2010) Election Handbook. 6th edn. Available online at:https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections
16 ICCPR (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Available online at:

https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
17 (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Section L14 p.57, 2019)
18 Jacobs, B. & Pieters, W. (2009) Electronic Voting in the Netherlands: from early Adoption to early Abolishment.
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design V.
19 Schmeets, H. (2011) Many Dutch vote by proxy. Available online at: https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2011/09/manydutch-vote-by-proxy
20 van der Kolk, H. (2014) Over het aantal volmachtstemmen.

16

allows voters to participate in elections is ‘at odds with the OSCE commitments and other
international standards21.’
Although it was generally agreed during multiple meetings held between Democracy
Volunteers and Dutch interlocutors that the practice holds general support from Dutch citizens,
its widespread use is worrying. It was believed that around thirty per cent of votes cast by proxy
were done so under the conditions where the voter had not specified which political party or
candidate, he/she wished to vote for. Discussions were also held concerning the benefits of the
practice regarding increasing voter turnout, especially whereby particular sections of the
population would otherwise be unable to participate due to employment, for example in fishing
communities. Yet it was noted that the prevalence of the practice was high and that there were
likely to be some citizens misusing the system.
Throughout polling day Democracy Volunteers observers identified numerous cases of formal
proxy voting where voters attended with the relevant documentation to cast up to two proxy
votes on behalf of others.
The Ballot Paper
The size of the ballot papers in The Netherlands continues to be of concern for the observer
group, especially in the context of an election where two ballots are issued to each voter for the
two elections being conducted. As we identified in 2018, ‘Ballot Papers in The Netherlands are
the largest our observers have seen in Europe despite the electoral system being very similar to
others used in other parts of Europe.’22 We believe the size of the ballot, in this case, creates
several challenges associated with its size. They are:






Queueing can form in some polling stations due to lengthy periods in the booths
The secrecy of the ballot is challenged because voters can be seen choosing sections of
the ballot
Ballot boxes are very large and heavy
Environmental concerns about the scale of the ballot paper
Counting is much lengthier and ballots are cumbersome when bundled.

As we have previously reported, when observing the municipal elections in 2018, ‘Norway
uses a very similar open list voting system for its parliamentary elections, as can be seen in our
report from September 2017. Norway uses a system by which the elector chooses the party
ballot of their choice, in secret, and then casts a vote on that one ballot for the candidate of their
choice. This is conducted behind a curtain to ensure secrecy. If authorities, parties and the
public are exercised, as they seem to be, concerning the size of the ballot, this could be one
solution, worthy of further research 23.’

21 OSCE/ODIHR (2017) The Netherlands: Parliamentary Elections 15 March 2017. OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment

Mission Final Report. Available online at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/netherlands
22 https://democracyvolunteersdotorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/netherlands-mear-2018-final-report.pdf
23 Ibid.

17

We understand from meetings with the Ministry of the Interior that tests were conducted during
the municipal merger elections in November 2018, and a letter will be sent to the lower house
of parliament suggesting methods of improving the ballot paper in the future.
However, we also feel that, as well as the possibility of evaluating the efficacy of the
Norwegian method of voting, the Dutch authorities should also consider assessment of the
Finnish voting methodology. Democracy Volunteers observed both the Finnish presidential
elections in January 2018 and parliamentary elections in April 2019. Finland uses the same
system of open list voting as The Netherlands.

Figure 2 The ballot paper in Finland allows the voter to simply write the number of their choice, and the polling booth is
equipped with a large list of candidates

However, instead of a large ballot paper, as in The Netherlands, a large list of numbered
candidates is displayed in each polling booth. Once the voter has chosen their preference they
simply mark the number of their preferred candidate on the ballot paper, in the central circle.
This means that ballot papers are much more manageable, queueing is almost never seen, the
process of counting is considerably quicker, and the extra costs of large ballot boxes and the
increased costs of printing can be reduced. Indeed, in Finland all ballot papers are the same
across the country as the voter is only expected to write down the number of their preferred
candidate.
Centralised Counting
As part of our deployment, Democracy Volunteers were keen to observe the piloting of
centralised counting the day after polling. Transferring ballot boxes from each polling station
to a central counting location is a familiar practice elsewhere, and is the accepted process in
18

the United Kingdom. The current system in use in The Netherlands requires polling station
staff to count ballots in each polling station at the close of poll.
Concerns have been raised that this system is not sufficiently transparent, with little attendance
from parties, or the public, to observe the counting process. Further concerns were raised in
our meetings with interlocutors regarding the accuracy of counting from tired polling staff,
who were required to count votes following a long period of administering the voting process
during polling day. The intended consequence of counting the day after polling day in a
centralised location was to have:




A more transparent counting process
A more controllable counting process
A more trustworthy result24

However, from our observations, Democracy Volunteers felt the potentially beneficial
objectives were undermined somewhat by the conducting of a preliminary count in polling
stations at the close of poll (which were then made public), giving a close indication of the
result. In relation to transparency, this meant the initial handling and counting of ballots
continued to take place in the relative secrecy of the polling station, in the presence of just a
small number of polling staff with very few, if any, outside observers. In addition, the final
counting of votes in the centralised location was also poorly attended by the public, observers
or parties as it would take a considerable number of trained observers to provide effective
oversight of hundreds of counters conducting their work. This lack of attendance is potentially
as a result of the announcement of a preliminary result on the previous evening, reducing
interest in the final count. This is also important for public confidence in the process. If an
occasion arises whereby the final count of votes is somewhat different to the preliminary results
published previously, this is likely to lead to the questioning of the legitimacy of the process.
The central counts did seem to
identify notable discrepancies in
the counting from the previous
evening so this would suggest that
the counting was improved when
conducted the next day. We felt
the layout of the counting also
allowed administrators easy
access to all the counters working
at small tables but did not lend
itself to transparent assessment.

Figure 3 Count centres took a standard form with small groups of counters
sat around numerous tables. This was difficult to evaluate for independent
observers or any public attending.

24 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs Briefing

19

Figure 4 Ballot boxes in Rotterdam arrived overnight and were stored in a large holding area. They were brought into the
counting hall, opened and counted.

In Rotterdam, concerning logistics, a large number of counters recruited for the process in the
centralised counting location did not arrive as expected on the day. In order to increase the
number of counters, those who did arrive were encouraged to ask people they knew whether
they were available to help in counting. It was unclear what precipitated this necessity for extra,
untrained, staff. This decision to bring in new staff was concerning given the absence of
training and political vetting for these staff.
The counting of ballots at Zoetemeer was generally well organised and well conducted. On
arrival staff recorded the team’s names and explained the process to them, giving them a tour
of the counting centre, this was also done in The Hague. Staff explained that all ballot boxes
had arrived overnight and had been stored securely but that in some municipalities the incorrect
ballot papers for the water board elections had been used, particularly in those that are situated
on the borders of multiple water board areas, which was causing some difficulties. The use of
different coloured vests to denote the different roles of staff was effective and along with the
system of red and green flags allowed for ballots to be moved around and counted efficiently.
However, limited space meant that there was insufficient room to easily move between tables
and that ballots were often counted on the floor. Counting staff communicated to us that they
thought that the size of the ballots contributed to this problem as there was often not enough
space on the tables. Each table counted one party at a time from their ballot box apart from
when counting smaller parties. When questions were raised regarding the validity of ballots,
senior staff were quick to respond and well prepared with the appropriate information.

20

At two count venues, whilst being made extremely welcome by staff, observers were escorted
throughout their observations which, we would argue, limits their capacity to act independently
and make their own observations undisturbed.
Finally, and perhaps the most concerning aspect of the central counting process, was the
absence of transparency concerning the tabulation process which happened once the votes had
been counted manually. Although there was no evidence of foul play, one of the significant
benefits of unimpeded observation is the independent evidence that the process is transparent.
In the case of Den Haag the process of tabulation was conducted behind closed doors with a
security guard preventing access to the room where it took place. We would therefore question
how this afforded greater transparency than counting in polling stations where this information
can be seen and then transmitted.
Dual Elections
As with 2018, two separate elections were being conducted on the same day. As part of our
interlocutor discussions we discovered that this was welcomed by the water boards as there
was a belief that the Provincial elections being held on the same day would increase turnout.
This may well be the case but observers noted on numerous occasions some confusion in
polling stations concerning which ballot box to place the ballot paper in. Oddly, the colour
coordination of box and ballot, which would have been a logical way of ensuring ballots were
placed in the correct box, meant that blue ballots were placed in non-blue boxes. This was
commented on by a number of electors to our observer group.
Another, arguably more challenging, aspect of voting in a dual election on the same day is that
the boundaries for the water boards were not always contiguous with those for Provincial
voting. This meant, bearing in mind voters are generally encouraged, and aware, that they can
vote at any polling station in their municipality, that on numerous occasions voters were issued
with a provincial ballot but not a water board ballot because they were not in the correct polling
station for both. This caused confusion at times and staff were effectively powerless to assist
voters other than to issue them with the provincial ballot and ask them to go to another polling
station for the water board election.
Queueing
Observers noted the popularity of central polling stations and the convenience that is offered
by polling in railway stations and other central areas. Indeed, the observer group believes this
contributes to increased turnout. However, at busy times it also leads to challenging waiting
times for voters – we observed waiting in excess of 30 minutes at times at some polling stations.
We note this but feel that this is partly caused by the size of the ballot paper as much as any
other aspect of the voting process.

21

Figure 5 The polling station at Bibliotheek (#20 and #123), in Rotterdam, was especially busy in the early evening when we
attended. Hundreds of voters were waiting in line to vote and with limited polling booths this made the process extremely slow
for voters.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
Accessibility to Polling in the Netherlands
100% accessibility at polling stations is a stated objective of the Dutch Government and
electoral administrators. This is a positive and appropriate decision, but one which is difficult
to deliver, in reality. Many public buildings can be retro-fitted with ramps and equipment to
facilitate access but this is not always the case. In some cases, polling booths which were
designed for access were located in such a way that they were not accessible. Some polling
stations were in extremely large buildings with long walks from the front door to the polling
booths. These would limit access to those who have mobility issues if not a disability. However,
we would recommend the following:
R1 More consideration should be given to accessibility issues when choosing the
location of polling stations and/or the rooms within polling stations where voting
occurs25.
R2 All polling stations should be fitted with at least one polling booth which is lower
for wheel chair access.
R3 At least one polling booth should be fitted with a light.
R4 Ensure that all polling booths are positioned in such a way that access is obvious
and wide to allow ingress by the voter.
R5 If the ballot continues to be so large we would recommend that magnifying glasses
are available as the print can be quite small.
R6 The online map of polling stations should be kept up-to-date with detailed
information regarding the practicalities of voting in each station. By being specific
about the limitations in each station, voters will be able to make an informed choice
about which polling station is their nearest and most appropriate to attend. Polling
stations which are inaccessible for a voter with one disability may be entirely accessible
for another.
Proxy Voting
After several meetings with our Dutch interlocutors ahead of the election, and observing
polling stations across the country, Democracy Volunteers would make the following
suggestions concerning proxy voting:
R7 Increase the mobility of ballot boxes – In order to reduce the impact of proxy voting,
an increased number and mobility of ballot boxes is recommended. This would aid in
easing the voting process for citizens who could normally not reach a polling station
due to work commitments or have a lack of mobility. This is especially recommended
for prisoners as proxy voting is their only option at the present time.

25 Some councils give information about accessibility online. However, this assumes that some of those accessing polling

stations have full access to the internet to research this.

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R8 Reduce the number of permissible authorisations – so that each proxy presently
being allowed two certificates of authorisation, should be reduced to just one. This
could help to discourage the practice and reduce overall cases.
R9 Pre-election voting methods – By allowing citizens to vote prior to the election, for
example through the implementation of early voting at set locations, proxy voting could
be reduced.
R10 Advanced checks – By ensuring advanced notice and the provision of a citizen’s
justification to vote via proxy, the practice could be reduced.
The Ballot Paper
Whilst the size of the ballot paper has become normalised and accepted by voters in The
Netherlands, we continue to be aware that electoral administrators have indicated their ongoing
concerns about this aspect of the electoral process. In 2018, we recommended ‘that Norway
uses a very similar open list voting system for its parliamentary elections, as can be seen in our
report from September 2017. Norway uses a system by which the elector chooses the party
ballot of their choice, in secret, and then casts a vote on that one ballot for the candidate of their
choice. This is conducted behind a curtain to ensure secrecy. If authorities, parties and the
public are exercised, as they seem to be, concerning the size of the ballot, this could be one
solution, worthy of further research26.’ Indeed, we are aware that in November the Dutch
government acted on this advice and trialled the ‘Norwegian’ model. However, we have one
further recommendation:
R11 We suggest that an opportunity be found, ahead of the 2021 elections, to trial the
Finland model of voting. We would be happy to redeploy to monitor the effectiveness
of this system in the Dutch context.
We believe this trial could be potentially transformational in the way elections are administered
in The Netherlands seeing how change to the electoral system, making the ballot paper
universal, smaller and more accessible as well as being simpler to count and bundle. It could
even dispense with the necessity of the large central counts which are presently becoming more
likely.
Central Counting
Central counting appeared to present significant logistical challenges to councils, primarily in
the recruitment of staff and ensuring their attendance at the counting venue. We felt the various
counts we attended were public and accessible. However, a number of challenges occurred to
the team of observers, these especially focused around transparency. We therefore suggest the
following as a way forward with central counting if this becomes the norm in Dutch elections.
R12 Only trained staff should be allowed to count at the central counts.
Venues were often in remote areas, without easy access for local residents, who could more
readily attend their local polling station.
R13 Venues should be more central and accessible.

26 https://democracyvolunteersdotorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/netherlands-mear-2018-final-report.pdf

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Observation, whether by the public or observers did not make the process transparent, as
counting would take place with pre-sorted piles. This was because the preliminary count had
occurred the night before, and so the central count was, in essence, a recounting of the votes
from the night before.
R14 Consider the polling day count at the polling station as simply being a verification
of the vote to check the tally of those ballots issued and those deposited in the ballot
boxes.
Or
R15 Dispense with counting in polling stations and hold counting at central venues on
the night of the election, or the day after, with entirely new staff or the same ones the
day after. Any arising issues could be discussed with those that have conducted polling
the previous day.
We were also concerned about the access to the process for observers. Whilst we were given
complete access on polling day to the voting process and to ministry and municipal officials
that were available, we felt that the restrictions placed on observation access should also be
addressed.
R16 Accredited observers should be given unrestricted, and unescorted, access to the
counting process.
R17 Accredited observers should be given access to the tabulation process so that the
process can be analysed independently.
Whilst we understand these central counts were simply pilots we also believe the layout of the
count could also have been something that could have been piloted. Looking at Figure 6, below,
it could be possible to arrange the counting in such a way as to make counting more transparent.
R18 Consider different layouts of central counting centres to allow greater transparency
for observers, parties and the electorate.

25

Figure 6 Counting in the Republic of Ireland allows parties, observers and the public clear ways of observing the counting
process conducted by the counting staff - we believe this could lead to even greater transparency in The Netherlands

Dual Elections
Whilst we appreciate the benefits previously identified of a combined poll for the Provincial
and water board elections in terms of turnout, we believe there was some, if not extensive,
confusion between the two votes. In some cases, voters, because of their own status, were
afforded just the vote for the water board and other occasions they were only issued with a
Provincial ballot paper because they had entered a polling station which crossed boundaries
between the water boards but were within one Province. We also identified issues where voters
had clearly been issued with the incorrect ballot (as was the case in Zoetermeer). This both led
to some annoyance at times and some inconvenience for the elector, but also potentially ballots
being wasted as they were cast in the wrong area. We would recommend, when possible;
R19 Elections for areas which are not coterminous, or do not have the same electorate,
should be conducted on separate days.
Queuing
Although staff are numerous and well trained in polling stations, a combination of the process
for checking ID and scanning can lead to a slower throughput of voters than we see elsewhere.
However, the single largest cause of the bottlenecks at polling stations is caused by a
combination of the size of the ballot paper, which can lead to voters spending over 5 minutes
in a polling booth. This can also be exacerbated by the lack of booths in some of the central
polling stations such as those at railway stations. Most polling stations do not have a significant
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problem with queueing but where we observed it there could be some sensible improvements
as electoral authorities will be aware of those stations where there is a larger than average
footfall of voters.
R20 Large footfall polling stations should be equipped with more polling booths. As
generally polling stations are issued with a set of three, with one having a lower table,
this could simply be done.
OTHER COMMENTS
We would like to thank the officials at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs,
Rotterdam City Council and the Association of Water Boards, as well as polling staff for their
helpful and prompt assistance in facilitating the election observation as the system was both
clear and simple to navigate.
The briefing held at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs, which explained the
electoral system and voting process to observers, was especially helpful and we would like to
thank those staff at the Ministry who facilitated this meeting especially for their help.
We would also like to thank the UK’s embassy to The Kingdom of the Netherlands for their
assistance and for arranging a briefing for us.

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APPENDIX A - INTERLOCUTORS
Netherlands Institutional Interlocutors
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Eric Stokkink (Department Head of Democracy)
Reinier Fleurke (Policy Officer)
Tycho Laan (Policy Officer)
Wouter Jongpier (Policy Officer)
Electoral Council
Melle Bakker (Secretary-General)
Petra Kingma (Senior Judicial Advisor)
Association of Water Boards (Verenigingssecretaris Unie van Waterschappen)
Esther Boer
Ilona Elfferichj
Municipal Institutional Interlocutors
Rotterdam City Council
Astrid Dragt - van Luipen
Elin Waning-Dedert
Jeroen Postma
Amsterdam City Council
Arnhem Municipal Council
Delft Municipal Council
Den Haag Municipal Council
Leiden Municipal Council
Nijmegen Municipal Council
Utrecht City Council
Zoetermeer Municipal Council
Other Interlocutors
UK Embassy to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
Andre Batenburg (Political Attaché)
Ellen Gale
Stefan Kirchner (Head of Policy)

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