EN

EN

1. INTRODUCTION
Democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are founding values of the European
Union1. They
economic
competitiveness, social cohesion and stability across the continent and around the world2. The
essence of democracy is that citizens can freely express their views and participate in
democratic life, choose their political representatives, and have a say in their future. Citizens
should be able to form their own opinions in a public space where different views can be
expressed, where they have a right to disagree and to change governments through elections,
free from interference, either foreign or domestic. With the wealth of local, regional, national
and European elections, the EU and its Member States represent one of the deepest democratic
experiences in the world. European democracy and the rights and freedoms associated with it
are at the core of our open and transparent societies.
But democracy also has its challenges and its enemies. Authoritarian regimes see it as a threat,
whether at home or abroad. This has resulted in some such regimes adopting a conscious policy
to undermine the democratic process in the EU. They aim at undermining democratic
institutions, put pressure on the media and reduce the space for civil society. This can range
from attempts to exploit societal division and stoke mistrust of, and disillusionment with,
established institutions, to weakening the democratic voice of citizens and civil society3,
engaging in information manipulation and disinformation, and direct distortion of election
campaigns4. Recent experience shows how quickly those wishing to foment hatred in our
society can seize on new opportunities, and the need for the EU to be in the vanguard of
countering such destructive forces5.
Interference from outside the EU in our democratic process, including by the use of proxies,
has received increasing political attention, at both national level and in the EU institutions. The
Commission shares many of the concerns expressed by the European Parliament6, including
on the need for a coordinated EU strategy against foreign interference and information
manipulation7. Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of democracy, and independent and
transparent electoral processes are vital to a competitive electoral environment to ensure
the integrity of elections and their results. There is increasing evidence of cases
such as lawmakers hacked ahead of elections, covert lobbying via proxies, fake research issued
to whitewash human rights records, and websites purporting to be independent media platforms
while covertly facilitating political interference campaigns. The Russian war of aggression
against Ukraine, which is also a war on democracy and on all the values for which the EU
1
2
3

4

5
6
7

Article 2 TEU.
Article 8 TEU, Article 21 TEU.
Civil society organisations are frequently referred to as non-State, not-for-profit, non-partisan and nonviolent structure, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals. Operating from the
local to the national, regional and international levels, they can comprise urban and rural, formal and informal
organisations.
Key trends identified are attempts to undermine trust in or attachment to democratic institutions and
representative democracy, attempts to remove democratic checks and balances, destabilisation of electoral
campaigns, pressure on free media and the civic space, and the illegal use of spyware against democratic
actors.
COM(2023) 772 final.
On 1 June 2023 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on foreign interference in all democratic
processes in the European Union, including disinformation (2022/2075(INI).
See: Commission response to European Parliament resolution on foreign interference in all democratic
processes in the EU, including disinformation.

1

stands, has further intensified the risk of outside interference. A recent Eurobarometer survey
shows that 81% of people surveyed in the EU believe that foreign interference in our
democratic systems is a serious problem that needs to be addressed8.
The EU has increasingly acknowledged the need to be proactive in safeguarding democracy,
and in strengthening the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. Work on
the measures put forward by the Commission in 2020 in the European Democracy Action
Plan9 is well under way, helping to strengthen democratic resilience by promoting election
integrity, protecting media freedom and pluralism, and strengthening the fight against
disinformation, foreign information manipulation and interference. This Communication sets
out how the Commission, in close cooperation with the High Representative, has worked on
all these fronts through key legislation and other political initiatives, bolstering societal
resilience from within and the direct engagement of citizens10.
At the same time, the EU has responded to the different risks of foreign interference in a variety
of ways. This includes addressing risks affecting economic security, due to the involvement
in the internal market of actors associated with third countries not primarily motivated by
market rationales. Steps have included a proposal for a new tool to counter the use of economic
coercion by third countries11, rules on screening foreign direct investments where security or
public order might be at risk12, as well as measures in the field of cybersecurity13, research
security14 and countering hybrid threats15. In particularly serious circumstances, to respond to
threats or risk of threats to the fundamental interests of the Union and the objectives of the
common foreign and security policy, the EU has imposed restrictive measures under EU
sanctions regimes16.
This Communication introduces the defence of democracy package announced in the
2022 State of the Union address. The package centres on a legislative proposal aiming to
enhance transparency and democratic accountability by shedding light on covert foreign
influence, as well as to improve the functioning of the internal market through common
standards for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. The
proposal has been developed through an extensive public and stakeholder consultation and a
fully-fledged impact assessment.
The upcoming European elections will be a crucial test case for the resilience of our democratic
processes. The package includes a targeted recommendation to promote free, fair and resilient
elections, and to protect them from cyberattacks and other efforts to distort or manipulate our
democratic and electoral environment.

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

Flash Eurobarometer 528
.
COM(2020) 790.
COM(2022) 404.
COM(2021) 775 final. The aim of this legal instrument is to deter third countries from restricting or
threatening to restrict trade or investment to bring about a change of policy in the EU in areas such as climate
change, taxation or food safety.
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct
investments into the Union.
.
An EU approach to enhance economic security (europa.eu).
JOIN/2016/018 final; JOIN/2018/16 final; 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. Council conclusions on a
See for example the media-related restrictions in Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending
Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the
situation in Ukraine.

2

The Commission also works with Member States to promote and protect a civic space where
an active and independent civil society and citizens are provided with the enabling conditions
and tools to become more engaged. This can contribute to making our democracies more
resilient. This builds on investment already made and using new avenues for citizen
participation in the public sphere as boosted by the Conference on the Future of Europe and its
follow up17. A dedicated recommendation sets out ways to promote the engagement and
effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making
processes.
The defence of democracy package is part of a set of initiatives which represent a proactive
approach to uphold EU values. Since 2020, the Commission has examined the situation in
Member States in its annual Rule of Law Reports. The anti-corruption18 and ethics19 initiatives
put forward in early 2023 also seek to protect democracy from the corrosive impact of
corruption, including from foreign actors. The recent Joint Communication on combating
hatred20 aims to step up the EU action against hatred and promote an inclusive, diverse and
democratic Europe. The Commission has been implementing strategies to combat
discrimination, which also promote equal opportunities for inclusive participation and
engagement21. The 2022 report on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights22
focused on the civic space and its role in protecting and promoting fundamental rights. Putting
people and their rights at the centre of the digital transformation are also core principles in the
EU approach to digitalisation and technological advancement23. This approach is also at the
work worldwide to support and
promote democracy and the universal values of human rights and the rule of law in line with
the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024)24. In all its actions, the EU
commits to engage with organisations which respect democratic values and fundamental rights,
as enshrined in Article 2 of TEU and in the Charter.

2.

ENSURING TRANSPARENCY OF FOREIGN INTEREST REPRESENTATION
IN THE EU DEMOCRATIC SPHERE THROUGH HARMONISED
REQUIREMENTS

The EU is open to the world and actively engaged with partners across the globe. Transparent
and open exchanges across countries and cultures and access to information are part of our
identity and are mutually beneficial at all levels. Governments, public authorities and political
17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24

The Conference on the Future of Europe was itself a bold statement on deliberative democracy by the
European institutions: a broad and deep grass-roots consultation with citizens, including the highly
-added to our representative
democracy and which amplifies the role available to civil society to play an active part in our democracy.
See also the Commissi
-up communication: COM(2022) 404 final.
Communication on the fight against corruption, JOIN (2023) 12 final, with accompanying proposals COM
(2023) 234, HR(2023)108 and JOIN(2023)13.
Communication on a Proposal for an interinstitutional ethics body COM(2023) 311 final.
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council No place for hate: Europe united against
hatred, COM(2023)772 final.
The Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, the EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025, the EU Roma strategic
framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030, the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, the
Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030.
A thriving civic space for upholding fundamental rights in the EU, COM(2022) 716 final.
See European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles.
EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024).

3

actors from outside the EU have the possibility to present their views and may try to have these
views reflected in the democratic debate and influence policies on various issues. When they
do this via entities that represent their interests, the legitimacy of such interest representation
rests on its transparency and accountability.
There is however a growing concern in the EU that the openness of our societies can be
exploited: interference by foreign governments seeking to manipulate public opinion and
distort the democratic debate poses a threat to the EU democracies25. This risk has increased
due to a dynamic threat landscape, and third country governments can make use of public
resources to carry out wide-ranging and sustained influence campaigns26, sometimes covertly,
and to promote their political and geopolitical interests at the expense of domestic
constituencies. Comparable data about this phenomenon in the EU is scarce. This also results
in limited accountability and oversight. Instilling transparency and openness in the way that
foreign interests are represented is the best way to protect the integrity of our democratic space
and to prevent foreign interference27. More broadly, a political and institutional system based
on integrity, transparency and accountability in public life is the best guarantee against
corruption28, and public bodies should seek the highest standards of transparency as an
important part of broader efforts to tackle corruption.
Interest representation activities are increasingly used by third country governments alongside
formal diplomatic channels and processes29 to promote their policy objectives. The
transparency and reporting requirements for interest representation activities are currently
regulated in different ways, and to different extents, in Member States. Some national laws
make it compulsory to register while others rely on self-regulation. In substance, the rules may
differ, for instance in terms of the types of activities and entities caught by obligations. Given
that interest representation is an increasingly cross-border activity, an EU response is
necessary to prevent the emergence of additional obstacles in the internal market and the
risk of a patchwork of regulatory landscapes. Fragmentation imposes additional costs and
creates legal uncertainty, with providers required to invest in separate compliance steps and
adapt to the various requirements of the different EU jurisdictions. Without EU action, Member
States address the identified risks and threats to democracy unilaterally30, undermining the
internal market, and facilitating attempts by third countries to use diverging rules to their
advantage when they seek to covertly influence our democratic process.
The Commission is therefore putting forward a proposal for a harmonised approach to
remove obstacles in the internal market and equip the EU with transparency tools that will
enable it to defend democracy, remain an open society and protect fundamental rights, in
particular freedom of expression and access to information. It aims to ensure a common high
level of transparency and democratic accountability across the EU in relation to lobbying
campaigns provided as a service, as well as similar activities performed by entities on behalf
25

26

27
28
29

30

In Flash Eurobarometer 522
43% of Europeans referred to propaganda and/or false
or misleading information from a non-democratic foreign source and covert foreign interference in the policy
and economy of their country as amongst the most serious threats to democracy.
Estimating the amounts effectively spent by third countries in Member States and across the EU with the
purpose of interfering with democratic processes is difficult due to the nature of those activities, which are
by definition covert. A clearer overview on amounts spent by third countries on interest representation in the
EU should be available once this Directive is implemented.
Flash Eurobarometer 528
.
COM (2023) 800 final.
OECD (2021) Lobbying in the 21st Century which
making processes and negotiations at the international level is blurring the lines between lobbying and
diplomacy.
Some Member States are looking into introducing national rules of various types. See SWD(2023) 661.

4

of a third country government that are attempting to influence the development, formulation or
implementation of public policy or legislation, or of public decision-making processes. As such
it will also contribute in the medium term to a better understanding and public awareness of
the magnitude, trends and actors involved in such activities. This would allow EU citizens and
public authorities to understand the motivation behind them and to see which third countries
invest in influencing democratic debate and the decision-making processes in the EU.
The Commission proposal would enhance the integrity and openness of public debate by
ensuring that when third countries seek to influence EU democratic processes through
intermediaries, this is done in a transparent manner. Freedom of expression and association, as
well as academic freedom and the freedom of scientific research, are paramount to the
democratic debate and should not be significantly affected by the limited and proportionate
transparency requirements foreseen. It is up to service providers to decide which services they
want to offer. Funding received by civil society organisations or others from a third country
government that is unrelated to an interest representation activity would not be covered by the
requirements. The proposal also includes comprehensive safeguards to ensure that entities
subject to the transparency requirements would not be stigmatised, nor incur consequences for
the mere fact of being registered31.
The proposed Directive32 focuses on interest representation activities, i.e. activities carried
out with a view to influencing democratic processes, that are of an economic nature and which
are carried out on behalf of third countries. It would cover all entities engaging in an activity
seeking to influence the development, formulation or implementation of policy or legislation,
or public decision-making processes, in the EU. This could include lobbying and public
relations companies, think tanks, civil society organisations, private research institutes, and
public research institutes offering research services, as well as consultants and in-house
lobbyists, carried out on behalf of third countries with a view to influence public life and the
democratic process in the EU33. When this happens, the fact that a foreign government is behind
the activity needs to be transparent. The proposal specifically excludes activities such as
diplomatic representation or legal representation in a trial34.
The Directive would apply in a fair, and non-discriminatory manner, with minimal
administrative formalities. It would subject the entities within its scope to mandatory, but
limited and proportionate, registration requirements. Member States would be asked to
establish, or adapt existing, national registers to ensure the transparency of interest
representation activities. Such registers should have simple and clear access requirements to
facilitate registration and enforcement. To limit administrative burden, Member States
would be invited to ensure that entities having to register can re-use data already submitted in
other national registers ('Once Only' principle), where possible. Information on the registration
obligations and formalities established by this Directive should be available via the Single
Digital Gateway35 which sets up a one-stop shop to give businesses and citizens information

31

32
33

34
35

The proposed directive would cover all interest representation activities on behalf of third countries,
irrespective of the entity involved. Inclusion in the register should therefore not result in any negative
labelling or questions of the credibility or legitimacy of the entity concerned, thereby significantly reducing
the risk of stigmatisation.
COM(2023) 637.
While the provision of media services would not fall within the scope of application of the proposed
Directive, interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third country entities by media service
providers would be covered.
This is without prejudice to restrictive measures imposed under an EU sanctions regime.
Established under Regulation (EU) No 2018/1724.

5

about rules and procedures in the Single Market.36 The most important elements of the
registered data would be publicly available, allowing for transparency and enhanced public
scrutiny, in full compliance with EU data protection rules37.
38

and guidelines from the Venice Commission of
the Council of Europe , the Directive would also include safeguards to avoid registration
requirements being misused to limit fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of
expression or of association, academic or artistic freedom, or to unduly restrict the civic space.
First, independent supervisory authorities would be empowered to request limited records
in duly justified cases only, and in a proportionate manner. The supervisory authority should
have clearly defined and circumscribed powers, and should be competent for supervision and
enforcement activities, including to ensure that no adverse consequences arise from
registration. Secondly, there should be proportionate administrative fines for noncompliance, subject to judicial review and effective remedies, to avoid potential chiling
effects. The proposal would also create a cooperation framework for the exchange of
information between supervisory authorities.
39

Full harmonisation for matters falling within the scope of the proposed directive would
prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing additional requirements within the
framework of the harmonised rules. This would further limit the risk of divergent and
potentially disproportionate and repressive national rules and practices40. At the same time, in
line with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States would remain free to establish rules for
areas not covered by the Directive, for example rules on contacts between their public officials
and interest representatives.
This proposal would be a key first step in tackling foreign interference based on a framework
that will harmonise transparency requirements in the internal market and allow an overview of
th
It is a targeted and proportionate response to
current concerns. Its implementation, and in particular the effectiveness and proportionality of
the rules, would need to be kept under review and a timely assessment made as to whether
revisions or further steps are needed, including as regards the scope of intervention 41 and as
well as a reflexion on the possibility of creating a Union level portal connecting national
registers. In parallel, the Commission will continue to monitor and support reforms in Member
States to ensure the transparency of lobbying. The Rule of Law reports recognise this to be key

36

37

38
39
40

41

To further limit administrative burden, administrative cooperation and exchanges of information between
the national authorities, as well as the supervisory authorities and the Commission, should take place through
the Internal Market Information (IMI) system established under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012for
areas. A targeted revision of this Regulation is also part of this package.
Registered entities may request that all or part of the information provided is not made publicly available
where there are overriding interests that justify withholding publication, including fundamental right
considerations, where for instance, the publication of such information would endanger the entity or its
employees or partner associations.
Judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), C-78/18,
EU:C:2020:476.
Venice Commission Report on Funding of Associations CDL-AD(2019)002.
For example, Member States would be prevented from requiring the entities fall within the scope of the
and in their publications and other press material the information that they are organisations in receipt of
support from abroad.
Broadening the scope of this proposal to all interest representation on behalf of any entity would affect an
estimate of 3.5 million entities.

6

element of fostering integrity, transparency and accountability in public life42. The Commission
will also organise regular stakeholder group meetings to touch base on the application of the
rules.
At EU level, the EU Transparency Register43 covers activities carried out by interest
representatives with the objective of influencing the formulation or implementation of policy
or legislation, or the decision-making processes of the EU institutions. Citizens and interest
groups can use it to look at the potential influence of interest representatives towards decisionmakers, thereby promoting ethical and transparent interest representation. It is supplemented
by a code of conduct, as well as by internal transparency measures in the EU institutions
concerning meetings and other interactions with lobbyists44. Although it has a different scope
compared to the proposed Directive45, the EU Transparency Register already covers activities
of foreign influence when carried out by foreign entities without diplomatic status, or any
entitites that lobby the EU institutions on behalf of third countries46. Once the outcome of the
discussions between the European Parliament and the Council on the proposed Directive is
clear, the Commission will consider how to best address issues such as double registration and
whether to develop possible links between national registers under the Directive and the
Transparency Register.
The proposed Directive would complement the rules that apply to digital services under the
Digital Services Act and to advertising service providers and publishers under the proposal on
political advertising, both of which have a different scope47. Concrete preventive measures
proposed in the European Research Area to create awareness about foreign interference and
build resilience across the sector, building on the Toolkit on Tackling Research and
Innovation Foreign Interference48, are also complementary. It is also in line with standards
at international level49. The Commission will also support actions such as the exchange of best
practice in relation to informing citizens, building resilience and engaging actively with the
topic of interference in the European democratic sphere, including training, media literacy,
awareness-raising and critical thinking. The Commission has also put in place a set of actions50
rations preparing reforms, anticipating future trends and
42
43
44
45

46

47
48
49

50

The Commission addressed recommendations in this area to a number of Member States in its annual Rule
of Law reports in 2022 and 2023.
Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European
Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register.
Transparency Register (europa.eu).
The Transparency Register is a general lobby register that covers interest representation activities directed
at the EU institutions. It makes no differentiation for interest representation on behalf of third countries. The
register does not apply to lobbying activities directed at public authorities of Member States. Its legal
architecture is also different: contrary to the mandatory national registers envisaged by the proposal, the
Transparency Register is generally voluntary, even though the EU institutions do require prior registration
for certain types of activities.
This would include law firms, professional consultancies or standalone lobbyists hired by third country
governments or public authorities to lobby the Union institutions, as well as any entities such as foreign
agencies, investment funds and public-private structures without diplomatic status. Those actors would be
expected to register and provide information in relation to their activities and, in the case of intermediaries,
declare on the register their clients, and provide an indication of the annual amounts generated by the
activities.
See section 3.1 below.
Staff Wo
Notably the Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying developed by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2009) and Council of Europe Recommendation on the
legal regulation of lobbying activities in the context of public decision-making (CM/Rec(2017)2, 22 March
2017).
COM(2023) 667 final, Enhancing the European Administrative Space (ComPAct)

7

strengthening administrative cooperation which support democractic structures. There is also
support for efforts at national level to further reforms that reinforce democractic structures and
processes51.
With this proposal, the Commission seeks to contribute to setting standards, not only in the
EU, but also on a global scale, on how to address covert foreign influence in a coherent,
balanced and proportionate way, fully respecting fundamental rights. By focusing on
transparency and democratic accountability and by introducing targeted rules accompanied by
strong safeguards, the approach strikes a balance between the exercise of fundamental rights
and the public interest.
Understanding and taking action to tackle the phenomenon of foreign interference has been
gaining ground globally. Some jurisdictions outside the EU such as Australia, the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom have introduced or are preparing frameworks to
regulate the transparency of foreign government influence by means of specific disclosure and
registration requirements applicable to lobbying on behalf of foreign governments.
Other jurisdictions have adopted
which go beyond transparency
requirements and have been found to be in violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. The
aim of such laws has been to restrict the civic space by stigmatising and intimidating certain
civil society organisations and human rights defenders which often rely on funding from
abroad, including from the EU and curtailing their activities. For example, the Russian
society organisations through intrusive inspections, direct oversight over programmes and
events, and the threat of dissolution and of taking criminal proceedings against non-compliant
organisations and their members even when foreign support is fully transparent. The label of
under such laws undermines the financial stability of an organisation, due to
the heavy fines imposed on those who do not abide by its rules. It also harms its credibility, as
it carries with it connotations of spying, which can in turn incite violence against members of
targeted civil society organisations online and offline
undemocratic and have been found to violate international laws and standards52.
Not all risks of foreign interference are associated with state actors. Some non-state entities
may also use similar tactics to promote actions that directly contravene EU values, such as
actions designed to amplify polarisation and incite hatred. This is particularly true online, as
evidenced recently in an explosion of violent extremist, hateful and divisive content.
The Commission strongly encourages Member States to remain vigilant and share information
with one another and at EU level on such non-state entities, even if they are not linked to, or
proposed recast of
the Financial Regulation includes adding a new ground of exclusion from EU funding for
discrimination, hatred or violence. The new ground would be applicable for
funds disbursed in direct and indirect management, even in the absence of a final judgment at
51
52

Technical Support Instrument / Reform Support (europa.eu).
In June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights issued a judgement in the case Ecodefence and Others
v Russia, in which the Court said the law violated the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Venice Commission has also issued related opinions:
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=3271. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and
the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council have also on several occasions expressed similar
concerns over the legislation, calling on Russia to stop the harassment, criminalisation and imprisonment of
human rights defenders, the forced dissolution of human rights organisations, and lift the severe restrictions
on the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association. The EU and its Delegations has also
strongly condemned this law, see: EU-27 Declaration on the 10th anniversary of the Law on Foreign Agents,
July 2022.

8

national level. In addition, the Commission is introducing internal awareness-raising
measures and developing internal working methods to ensure increased scrutiny in the
selection of projects53.

3

TAKING THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY ACTION PLAN FORWARD

The European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) adopted in December 2020 aims to strengthen
the resilience of EU democracies, identifying key actions to address the areas where our
systems and citizens are most vulnerable. These actions seek to better protect the integrity of
elections, safeguard media freedom and media pluralism, and fight disinformation 54. The
Action Plan also recognised that a healthy democracy relies on meaningful and inclusive citizen
engagement exercises and an active civil society, not only at election time, but on an ongoing
basis, and that engaged, informed and empowered citizens and a vibrant civil society are vital
to guarantee the resilience of our democracies, including resilience to foreign interference.
Taking stock of the state of implementation of the actions under EDAP55, this section highlights
areas where the EU can be proactive in the face of existing and evolving challenges.
3.1

Protecting election integrity and promoting democratic participation ahead of and
beyond the 2024 European elections

Free and fair elections are at the very core of our democracy. If left unaddressed, risks to the
and integrity of elections.
Together with this Communication, the Commission is putting forward a Recommendation
on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the European Union and enhancing the
European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament56. It
is addressed to Member States, European and national political parties, foundations and
campaign organisations in the context of the preparation of elections in general and with regard
to the upcoming European elections in particular. It aims to promote high democratic standards
for elections in the EU, supporting high turnout, inclusive participation, easy and equal exercise
of electoral rights and resilient electoral processes. To this end, it includes specific
recommendations to support voter turnout and inclusive participation, with a particular
focus on gender equality and addressing the needs of specific groups57.
There is a constant need to step up the cybersecurity of election technology. The
Recommendation sets out specific proposals to ensure the security, integrity and resilience of
elections and election-related entities and infrastructure, in light of the requirements established
by the revised Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS2 Directive)58
53
54
55
56
57

58

See Fifth Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2022) 745,
13.12.2022).
This also includes foreign information manipulation and interference.
See also Annex for a detailed overview and more information.
C(2023) 8626.
The Recommendation takes into account specific groups including persons with disabilities, younger voters
and mobile citizens and those susceptible to marginalisation. In addition, as announced in the Strategy for
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021) 101, 3.3.2021), the Commission has
prepared a Guide of good electoral practice addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities.
Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity
across the Union.

9

and the Directive on the resilience of critical entities 59. Building on a first experience from
201960, a new EU tabletop exercise took place on 21 November 2023 with the participation of
the Commission, European Parliament, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and Member States.
The NIS Cooperation Group should also continue the review of the Compendium on
Cybersecurity of Election Technology, to ensure it keeps pace with the evolving threat
landscape.
In addition to the direct risk posed to election infrastructure, the intentional and coordinated
manipulation of the information environment by foreign state actors likewise poses a threat to
democracy and security. There are numerous reports of large-scale coordinated efforts
combining different tactics, techniques and procedures, such as the use of fake social media
the spread
of disinformation including through manipulated audio-visual content such as deepfakes61, or
opaquely targeting voters to influence them and manipulate the outcome of elections.
Additionally, information manipulation can occur in concert with activity in other domains,
such as cyber threats in the case of hack-and-leak operations. To this end, and building on the
Eurobarometer data, the Recommendation puts forward a series of measures to protect
election-related information from manipulation and disinformation62.
A free and fair democratic debate relies on legality and fair play. Surveillance tools may be
used by public authorities, under certain conditions, for reasons of national security, but the
use of spyware to gain political advantage is very different. The recommendation stresses
that surveillance tools should never be used to interfere with the democratic debate and
deploying such tools to target political actors and journalists for political gain is unacceptable.
The Commission has always made clear that the notion of national security should be
interpreted in accordance with the criteria laid down by EU case law. The country chapters of
the Rule of Law report cover this issue insofar as the functioning of institutional checks and
balances is concerned. There are also strong safeguards against the use of spyware against
media, journalists, and their families in the proposal for a European Media Freedom Act63. The
European Parliament has set up an important strand of work on spyware with a Committee of
Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA
Committee). In its resolution of June 2023 the Parliament strongly condemned the illegal use
of spyware, calling on action at both national and EU level 64. The Commission is preparing a

59
60

61

62

63
64

Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities.
A first EU tabletop exercise was organised in April 2019 to test how effective Memb
response practices and crisis plans were and to identify ways to prevent, detect and mitigate cybersecurity
incidents that may affect the European elections.
Deep fakes are understood to be images, audio or video content generated or manipulated by artificial
intelligence systems that appreciably resemble existing persons, places or events and would falsely appear
to a person to be authentic. The AI Act proposal - COM(2021)206 - would ensure the labelling of AI content
and the disclosure of its origin.
In a Eurobarometer survey in which respondents were asked to rate the most important aspects of free and
fair electoral campaigns, the strongest responses concerned (i) debates and campaigns avoiding hate speech,
manipulation and lies; (ii) the need for candidates and political parties to have equal opportunity to access
the media and (iii) voters knowing who finances candidates and political parties. See Flash Eurobarometer
COM(2022) 457 final.
P9_TA(2023)0244 Investigation of the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware
(Recommendation).

10

non-legislative initiative clarifying the boundaries and the interplay between EU law, in
particular the data protection and privacy acquis, and national security65.

Other recommendations include the use of campaign pledges and codes of conduct by political
parties to encourage election integrity and fair campaigning; efforts to ensure the
transparency of political advertising; and promoting the observation of elections as an
efficient means of encouraging citizens to actively engage with the electoral process and
65

See: Commission response to the European Parliament Recommendation following the investigation of
alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus
and equivalent surveillance spyware.

11

improve public trust in elections. It also touches upon the funding of political parties and
foundations, with a view to limiting any risk of covert foreign influence, including by means
of covert donations, to distort the level playing field in the electoral process.
The recommendation builds on the decisive steps taken by the Commission since 2020 to
address identified loopholes and to ensure citizens can form their own judgments and make
electoral choices in a public space where a plurality of views can be expressed, free from
interference, be it domestic or foreign.
When it comes to the digital sphere, the rules under the Digital Services Act 66 set out the
responsibilities of online platforms and search engines in addressing the risks related to civic
discourse and electoral processes stemming from the functioning, design or use of their
services, including through disinformation, inauthentic use or tactics involving artificially
generated content. The rules also provide for more transparency and support people to take
informed decisions about the information they see online. In addition, the regulation on
transparency and targeting of political advertising67 will allow for better public scrutiny
and accountability in relation to political advertising services, including through a European
public repository for online political ads, and introduce stricter conditions around the use of
personal data for the targeting and delivery of political adverts. To address the risk of foreign
interference, it will also prohibit sponsoring political advertising by non-EU actors three
months before elections or referenda. The role of European political parties and political groups
in the European elections is also recognised. In 2021, the Commission also proposed a revision
of the rules on the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations68.
The proposal aims at giving European political parties more possibilities to fulfil their role in
building and nurturing a truly European political sphere, while at the same time protecting their
action from foreign interference. The enforcement of these rules is a top priority for the
Commission. When it comes to the Digital Services Act, the Commission is supervising and
enforcing the application of the rules by very large online platforms and search engines.
Although the organisation of national elections is a Member State competence, it is informed
by international standards, and governed by this broader framework of EU law. Reinforced
mutual support and cooperation among Member States is now well established, centred on
the work of bodies such as the European Cooperation Network on Elections, also drawing on
. In preparation
of the European Parliament elections, the Commission organised a high-level event on
elections in October 2023 bringing together Member States, EU institutions, NGOs, and
academia to put forward ideas on supporting voter turnout, the resilience of the electoral
systems and fair and inclusive elections across the Union.
A Joint mechanism for electoral resilience was launched in January 2022, aiming to build
capacity in Member States to address risks to elections, through expert exchanges, in particular
on disinformation and cyber-related threats. The mechanism has also been used to support the
preparation of the compendium on e-Voting and other ICT Practices69, in addition to targeted
exchanges on how to ensure parity of treatment and balanced media coverage during elections.

66
67

68
69

EUR-Lex 32022R2065 EN EUR-Lex (europa.eu).
COM(2021) 731 final. A provisional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council was
reached on 6 November 2023. Formal adoption is expected for early 2024. While the full set of rules will
apply 18 months after entry into force, provisions such as the non-discrimination clause and the definitions
will apply immediately, ahead of the European elections.
COM(2021) 734 final.
Compendium on e-Voting and other ICT Practices.

12

Exchanges between national parliaments could also be a valuable way to share experience and
the Commission will support such exchanges.
The EU has refined its external electoral observation methodology in recent years, including
through common guidelines based on international standards, that consolidate its capacity to
tackle the use of new technologies in the electoral process. Good practices are regularly
discussed within the European Cooperation Network on Elections and in the context of the
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.
The EU does not act in isolation. Under EDAP, the Commission has continued its efforts to
help build resilience in third countries, with a view to better equipping societies and public
authorities with the means to respond to common external threats to the democratic process.
Such efforts are a priority in EU enlargement policy70. The EU also facilitates international
cooperation on electoral matters between EU networks, partner countries and international
organisations such as the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the OSCE71. The European
External Action Service conducts election observation missions in close coordination with
other international and regional observation organisations. It complements these activities with
dedicated support to governments, civil society and independent media to help build resilience
against and prevent, deter and respond to foreign information manipulation and interference
(FIMI), including through insights into how FIMI has been used in electoral contexts. EU
action has also included participation in the two Summits for Democracy72 and financial
support for capacityimmediate neighbourhood73.
3.2

Strengthening media freedom and pluralism

Russ
journalists play in informing citizens about the reality on the ground. The Russian authorities
have engaged in a systematic crackdown on and censorship of independent media, which
remains essential to fight propaganda.
Under EDAP, t
sides of the same coin. As part of this vision, the Commission proposed key new initiatives to
improve the safety of journalists74 and to protect journalists and human rights defenders and
others from abusive lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)75. The anti-SLAPP
directive brings a system of powerful procedural safeguards for cross-border SLAPP cases,
70

71

72

73
74
75

In the
revised enlargement methodology, progress made on reforms related to upholding fundamental
values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are key for determining the overall pace of the
accession process.
The EU has funded electoral assistance projects of over EUR 380 million over the last ten years. These
country actions are supported by global democracy programmes, including the Team Europe Democracy
Initiative (TED), launched in December 2021, which coordinates action by the EU and Member States. The
programme for Women and Youth in Democracy Initiative supports civic and political participation around
the world, notably in areas like election observations and democratic reforms.
The EU participation in the Summits for Democracy in 2021 and 2023 provided the occasion to reinforce
alliances for democracy and to showcase the work done by the EU to support democracy globally. For more
information see Annex.
Examples include a project to support electoral reform in the Western Balkans, running until mid-2024
(budget of EUR 1.715 million), implemented by ODIHR.
C(2021) 6650, 16 September 2021.
COM/2022/177 final and C/2022/2428 of 27 April 2022. On 30 November, the European Parliament and
the Council reached a provisional political agreement on the anti-SLAPP directive. The Commission is
working closely with Member States to support them in implementing the anti-SLAPP Recommendation.

13

which equip courts to deal with abusive litigation and act as a deterrent to potential new SLAPP
cases. The directive includes rules that allow the early dismisal of such cases and provide
effective remedies for SLAPP victims. Together with the related recommendation, the rules
form a strong package of measures to fight SLAPP and protect public participation and the
freedom of expression in the EU. The Commission also proposed to harmonise certain aspects
of national rules related to media services under the European Media Freedom Act. The
proposal aims to address fragmented national regulatory approaches related to media freedom
and pluralism and editorial independence and to ensure the free provision of media services
within the internal market. It also puts a focus on the independence and stable funding of public
service media as well as on the transparency of media ownership and of the allocation of
state advertising, two key objectives under the EDAP. Under the new provisions, Member
States would also have to look at the impact of national measures and media concentrations on
media freedom and pluralism. When it comes to the dissemination of media content in the
online environment, the European Media Freedom Act proposal builds on the horizontal
framework established by the Digital Services Act.

The Commission also assesses media freedom and pluralism in its annual rule of law report.
The report covers in detail developments in Member States as regards topics such as the
independence of national media regulatory authorities, the transparency of media ownership,

14

the fairness and transparency of state advertising, the governance of public service media, and
the frameworks in place to ensure the safety of journalists. This exercise is based on constant
dialogue with the relevant Member State authorities and stakeholders and has resulted in a
number of reforms being initiated at national level76.
The m
is a key driver of editorial integrity and media
independence77. The Commission has stepped up its support for media resilience since the
adoption of the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan (MAAP) in December 202078, in
particular with measures boosting private investments in news media. The MAAP called to
bundle actions and support to the news media sector by offering better access to loans,
enhancing media collaborations and proposing the setup and implementation of a data space
for media.
The Commission has also strengthened funding to news media organisations. The Creative
Europe programme 2021-2027 has devoted around EUR 75 million for projects and initiatives
supporting media pluralism, journalism and media literacy. Actions include monitoring of
media pluralism, support to media councils, to a media freedom rapid response mechanism and
to specific sectors such as investigative journalism or local reporting. As the demand for
financing exceeds the available resources under Creative Europe, the Commission will
continue seeking ways to support these sectors79.
As the EU strengthens support and protection for media freedom within the EU, it does so also
abroad, with a particular attention to the neighbourhood80
of
aggression against Ukraine, the EU has allocated funding to supporting journalists and the
media in Ukraine to a value of EUR 30 million. Support for Russian independent media has
also been increased and needs to be sustained in the long term81.
A provisional political agreement was reached between the European Parliament and the
Council on the proposed anti-SLAPP directive. Co-legislators are also shortly expected to
reach agreement on the European Media Freedom Act. The implementation and enforcement
of the new rules will be key next steps. Member States should also continue working for the
full implementation of the recommendation on the safety of journalists and the anti-SLAPP
recommendation. Several cases of abusive lawsuits launched by, or on behalf of, third countries
also underscore the importance of strong EU-wide rules to curb SLAPPs and protect the
democratic space.

76
77

78
79
80

81

See COM(2023) 800 final.
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1634 of 16 September 2022 on internal safeguards for editorial
independence and ownership transparency in the media sector (C/2022/6536). See also the Communication
on European Media Industry Outlook COM(2020) 784 final.
COM(2020) 784 final.
See Annex for more details and examples of financing.
Under the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme 2021-2027, an estimated EUR 185
million are earmarked for support to independent media and harnessing digitalisation worldwide. The new
Financial Framework Partnership Agreement on Protecting Independent Media was launched in October
2023 to provide sustainable support to NGOs that work to protect independent journalistm and fight
disinformation across the world.. In the context of enlargement, numerous regional programmes support
media freedom and pluralism, such as the Western Balkan media programme with a budget EUR 40.5
million. See annex for further information.
The Commission launched this year a call for proposals for a pilot project supporting exiled independent
media and journalists from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia that have relocated and are working from the
Member States so that they can continue producing content and distributing it to their audiences without
editorial interference.

15

3.3

Countering disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference

information manipulation and interference, in particular from foreign actors, has been a priority
of the EU in recent years82.
Such manipulative influence operations and disinformation campaigns seek to undermine
democratic debate and exacerbate societal division. Such operations are often well-funded,
state-sponsored and carried out by hostile actors and, as such, constitute a security threat to EU
democracies83. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlighted and heightened the
risk to the European information space, with the Kremlin increasingly engaging in
disinformation campaigns and foreign interference operations and using them as a strategic and
coordinated instrument to threaten security, democracy and support its war of aggression84.
The conflict in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel has also triggered
widespread disinformation and hate campaigns85. This is exacerbated by digitisation,
including design features of online platforms that allow to disseminate disinformation with
unprecedented speed and efficiency, as well as new tools powered by artificial intelligence able
to be used by malicious actors.
When asked how often they believed they were exposed to disinformation, 35% of respondents
which they were most frequently targeted (64%), followed by television (36%), online
newspapers and news magazines (22%) and video-sharing websites (21%)86.
Under the EDAP, the EU has stepped up efforts to improve its capacity to react to this new and
evolving threat landscape both domestically and internationally. Existing cooperation has
been strengthened within the Commission, between the EU institutions and services and
beyond, involving relevant stakeholders in civil society, academia and private industry, as well
as international partners. The EU has stepped up its strategic communication response to
disinformation through
Network against Disinformation (NaD). The
EEAS-managed Rapid Alert System (RAS) has continued to provide common situational
awareness and share effective approaches to responding to the threat of FIMI 87 with Member
States, EU institutions and international partners. Initiatives include detection, active pre- and
debunking, and targeted campaigns addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a
comprehensive and constant reaction to Russian state-sponsored disinformation around its war

82

83
84

85

86
87

As well as the EDAP itself, see the work of the European Parliament Special Committee on Foreign
Interference in all Democratic Processes; and Council conclusions on Foreign Information Manipulation and
Interference (18 July 2022); Complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats (10
December 2019); and strengthening resilience and countering hybrid threats, including disinformation in
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (15 December 2020).
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/countering-disinformation/tackling-disinformation-information-work-eeasstrategic-communication_en?s=2803
Allegations that EU sanctions are the reason for food shortages and attempts to abuse the UN Security
Council to engage in information manipulation are only two examples that illustrate how such activity can
target the international community and international cooperation.
The Commission is currently negotiating a new a new Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech
online, with a view to establish it as a code of conduct under the DSA in early 2024. It should help improve
prevention and anticipate a rising threat of hate speech before content has gone viral.
Flash Eurobarometer 522
For an overview of the Rapid Alert System, see: Rapid Alert System | EEAS (europa.eu). For an overview
on the Network against Disinformation, please consult: DG COMM Management Plan 2022 .

16

of aggression against Ukraine88. The results have been shown in the ability to be effective in
addressing challenges more rapidly and in a more coordinated manner. This has also made a
broader contribution to democratic resilience.
International cooperation has been strengthened with support to the G7 Rapid Response
Mechanism89 and close cooperation with NATO has continued, with FIMI highlighted as one
of the key security threats for EU-NATO cooperation90. The EU-US Trade and Technology
Council and the EU-US Summit statement of October 2023 gave further impetus to close
transatlantic cooperation on the threat, in particular to advance on the strategic cooperation and
enhancing interoperability of approaches to tackle FIMI91. The EU has also made effective use
of its diplomatic tools to counter FIMI and foreign interference, most notably through the
adoption of restrictive measures imposed on individuals and media outlets involved in
information manipulation and interference following the war of aggression against Ukraine.
This has been complemented by the development of a reinforced EU Toolbox to counter
foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) 92 which offers a common
analytical framework and methodology to collect systematic evidence of FIMI incidents to help
improve the understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures used to manipulate and
interfere93. This complements the work of the EEAS StratCom Task Forces to raise awareness
and build capacity, support EU Delegations and conduct outreach to civil society. The objective
neighbouring information environments94.
ensure more accountability for online platforms. 52% of Europeans think that online
platforms should do more to prevent the spread of false and misleading information 95. The
Digital Services Act obliges providers of very large online platforms and of very large online
search engines to regularly assess the systemic risks their services may present to society,
including to the freedom of expression, or the risk of their services being used as a tool for
disinformation campaigns, not least in view of protecting electoral processes96. As a key way
to mitigate such risks97, they are invited to participate in establishing voluntary codes of
88

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

97

This includes social media communication and campaigns to de-bunk Russian disinformation on sanctions,
food and energy security with a total of more than 10 million impressions in 2022. In the Member States,
Commission Representations have been tailoring responses to local contexts with flagship initiatives like the
-disinformation
network and led a successful de-bunking campaign in collaboration with Bulgarian fact checkers, while in
Vilnius the Representation teamed up with independent journalists to produce inspiring videos about
Ukrainian refugees successfully integrating into Lithuanian society. See also: EUvsDisinfo.
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2022elmau/2022-05-06-rrm-data.pdf.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january2023.
US-EU-statement-final.pdf (europa.eu)
Set out in EDAP, this was based on the tasking in the Strategic Compass, see:
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interferencethreats_en.
The EEAS also provides insights into how FIMI targets specific groups, and underlines the harmful impact
of such manipulation to society:
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/fimi-targeting-lgbtiq-people_en.
Flash Eurobarometer 522
The Commission reinforced efforts to tackle harmful and illegal content online, specifically in the context
of unprecedented period of conflict and instability. See Commission Recommendation of 20.10.2023 on
coordinating responses to incidents in particular arising from the dissemination of illegal content, ahead of
Under the DSA, services need to adopt all necessary mitigation measures and are subject to public scrutiny
and independent audits.

17

conduct and crisis protocols. An example is the ambitious new Code of Practice on
Disinformation signed in June 2022 by a wide range of signatories98. Importantly, the Code
also comes with a solid monitoring framework and a Transparency Centre to ensure
transparency and accountability. In January and September
including online platforms, reported on progress, providing an unprecedented level of
information on the way they implement their commitments to fight disinformation.
In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the Commission is carrying out a pre-election
dialogue and collaboration with online platforms and other signatories of the Code. In
addition, the work within the Code is also focusing on addressing harmful potential of the new
AI-powered tools that could be used in disinformation and foreign interference campaigns.
Concluding the negotiations on the proposed AI Act is a priority in this context, as it would put
in place the necessary guardrails and transparency on the use of AI99.
In order to empower citizens to make informed decisions, the Commission supports a broad
range of innovative projects to fight disinformation under various EU programmes, in
particular by civil society organisations and education and training institutions, or with the
involvement of journalists, with a view to promoting media and digital literacy and helping
citizens identify disinformation, both within the EU and beyond100. As part of the Digital
Education Action Plan (2021-2027), the Commission published Guidelines for Teachers and
educators on tackling disinformation and promoting digital literacy through education and
training101. Likewise, both Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps have dedicated
funding for grassroots projects promoting media literacy102.
In parallel, the EU has supported community-led initiatives to fight disinformation through
reinforced fact-checking, such as the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)103 and
the development of the European Code of Standards for Independent Fact-Checking
Organisations104. This has proven to be instrumental in fighting disinformation related to the
war of aggression against Ukraine105. As part of its broader mission to fight disinformation,
EDMO has set up a special European elections task force dedicated to detect early signs of
potentially dangerous disinformation campaigns that might spread across the EU and
coordinate dedicated media literacy activities. The task force 106 will also provide its expertise
to European institutions in the framework of the preparation to the European elections.

98
99

100
101
102
103
104
105

106

This followed Commission Guidance on Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation of 26 May
2021 (COM(2021) 262 final): https://disinfocode.eu/. To date there are over 40 signatories.
In this context, the Commission is planning to launch an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Pact seeking the
voluntary commitment of industry to anticipate the AI Act and start implementing its requirements ahead of
the legal deadline, see: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-pact.
See Annex for details.
COM/2020/624 final.
See also section 3.4 and more details and examples under Annex.
https://edmo.eu/.
https://eufactcheckingproject.com/ by the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN).
EDMO established a dedicated Task Force, fostering collaboration among practitioners and leading to the
identification of more than 2 000 disinformation instances related to the Ukraine war through fact-checks
and the publication of reports and investigations on emerging and trending narratives.
EDMO Task Force on 2024 European Elections.

18

In parallel, the High Representative is advancing work on further strengthening the
-ofInformation Sharing and
Analysis Center on FIMI . This is an integral part of the FIMI Toolbox to enable a stronger
common situational awareness and further develop the common methodology for collecting
systematic evidence on FIMI and putting in place a trusted framework for exchanging
information between the relevant stakeholders, also bringing the defender community together
to systematically collect and share information on FIMI incidents. It also follows up on the
Strategic Com
The Commission
will also continue to strengthen its own capacity to detect, monitor, analyse and tackle
disinformation activities, carried out both at EU and national level. Under Horizon Europe,
more than a third of the over EUR 300 million support for research on democracy was
mobilised for funding research and innovation to better detect and understand foreign
information manipulation and interference, and other undue influences on political decisionmaking107. In future, it would be important to maintain this level of ambition and capitalise on
the lessons learned.

107

(2023), includes EUR18 M to finance up to 6 projects to
address research gaps concerning FIMI. Overall, between 2021 and 2024 Horizon Europe has mobilised over
EUR 100 M for research on foreign interference or very related issues like undue influence on political
decision making, disinformation, digital literacy.

19

Civil society actors are at the forefront of the fight against disinformation and uncovering
foreign interference, including through grassroots initiatives and the expert community
working to analyse and counter FIMI and disinformation. A strong involvement of civil society
is key for assessing quickly and efficiently the constantly evolving threat landscape, the actors
and tools they use.
independent community. Research and awareness-raising focused on disinformation and
foreign interference inside the EU, notably using the data generated by Code of Practice on
Disinformation and its transparency and access to data provisions. To support the work of factchecking in the implementation of the Code of Practice and to ensure high professional
standards and independence of fact-checkers, the Commission will also continue to fund
training activities to back up the Code of Professional Integrity of the European Fact-Checking
Standards Network (EFCSN).
3.4

Inclusive civic engagement and participation for European democratic resilience

Strengthening the links between people and the democratic institutions that serve and represent
them is the bedrock for democratic resilience. A strong, safe and enabling civic space and
engaged, informed and empowered citizens are an essential guarantee for the resilience of our
democracies, whether at election time or beyond108. In the recent Eurobarometer, almost nine
in ten respondents (87%) saw civil society (associations, NGOs) as important in promoting and
protecting democracy and common values, including in terms of fostering a well-informed and
pluralistic democratic debate. The data also shows that more than half of respondents think
there is a need to increase the engagement of civil society organisations in the decision-making
process at the national level (56%) and the European level (54%). Around two-thirds of
respondents are in favour of an increased engagement of citizens in the policy-making process
at the national (68%) and European level (66%)109.
Empowering citizens and civil society organisations, and providing them with appropriate tools
for civic engagement, are cross-cutting priorities across the different pillars of the EDAP, as
well as in the Charter and the Rule of Law Reports. A wide range of funding opportunities has
also been made available to boost citizen participation, civic engagement and trust in
democracy, most notably under EU programmes such as the Citizens, Equality, Rights and
Values programme; Creative Europe; Erasmus+; and Horizon Europe. Technical assistance for
administrative reform in the Member States under the Technical Support Instrument110 has also
been deployed to build capacity in public administrations and public authorities for
participatory practices. Incorporating citizen engagement into policy design and
implementation had also been a priority under the partnership principle of EU cohesion
policy111. The Conference on the Future of Europe provided valuable experience on how to
108

109
110
111

A recent working paper highlights that civic engagement at local levels can contribute not only to economic
ublic
institutions. See
Horizon Europe has also continued to support research to develop a better understanding of
innovation,
including civic engagement and deliberative democracy initiatives.
Flash Eurobarometer 528
.
The total allocations under this instrument amounts to EUR 864 m for the period 2021-2027.
The partnership principle makes cohesion policy close and recognisable to EU citizens. Engagement of
partners is essential for ensuring transparency and democratic accountability of public investments. The
Commission and the OECD ran a pilot project to explore how to apply innovative citizen participation
methods to cohesion policy, focusing on five authorities across Europe. Follow-up projects were launched
in July 2022 in six Member States. See Annex for further examples of actions.

20

strengthen citizen engagement in policy-making by implementing deliberative processes. It
also contributed to boosting democratic resilience, leading to the implementation of a new
phase of citizen engagement with European Citizens Panels now embedded in the European
-making process.
In parallel, increasing support and funding under EU programmes has also been dedicated to
promoting media and digital literacy, equipping people of all ages with the tools to navigate
work, and have a critical understanding of different types of media, including social networks,
so that they are able to make informed decisions. As the possibilities to engage online are
widening and becoming more commonplace, online hate speech can deter people from
expressing their views and participating in online discussions. Fostering a respectful, enabling
a safer environment in which to express their views is a priority. To this end the Commission
has proposed an initiative to extend the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime112.
This will complement the regulatory framework under the Digital Services Act, the Framework
Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of
criminal law113 and the efforts under the Code of conduct on tackling illegal hate speech114.
New and meaningful methods of citizen participation, deliberation and engagement, across
all generations, can reinforce representative democracies. These forms of participation offer
complementary ways for citizens to actively participate in the democratic debate and contribute
to policyl traditions and
specificities. Experiences with participatory and deliberative democracy, whether at the local,
national and pan-European levels, demonstrate that these practices can help to bridge existing
gaps between citizens and decision-makers and bring together diverse groups of people to
develop collective recommendations. Building on the Conference on the Future of Europe, new
ways to ensure citizens are given this closer role in EU policy-making115 have been set up.
These forms of engagement complement established practices of involving citizens in policymaking processes at EU level, such as public and stakeholder consultations, regular dialogues
with stakeholders, or transparency and access to information and documents rules. To
strengthen the participation of stakeholders in different stages of policy-making processes, the
Commission has adopted Better Regulation Guidelines setting out the principles it follows
when preparing new initiatives and proposals and when evaluating and monitoring the
implementation of existing legislation116.
Education plays a major role in forging appetite for citizen engagement and participation and
the attachment to democratic values. Promoting and protecting European democratic values is
a central dimension of the European Strategy for Universities adopted in 2022, as higher
education institutions contribute to promoting active citizenship, tolerance, equality and
diversity, openness and critical thinking. Erasmus+ (2021-2027) promotes participation and
through multiple funding streams, in the EU
Member States and beyond. The promotion of inclusive participatory democracy is one of the
guiding principles of the EU Youth Strategy (2019-2027)117. The 2023 Citizenship Package
recognises the importance of c

112
113
114
115
116
117

COM(2021) 777 final.
Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law.
Code of conduct on tackling illegal hate speech online.
COM(2022) 404.
Better Regulation Guidelines.
See Annex for more details.

21

rights 118, and voter education for promoting political participation, as well as building
resilience to disinformation among citizens.
Civil society organisations are one of the main pillars of a functioning democracy. They act
as watchdogs for democratic foundations and institutions. They hold governments to account
and help protect and promote fundamental rights and the rule of law by assisting individual
people and communities and helping to promote their interests. They also empower individuals
to take part in matters of public interest and overall help in growing meaningful public
participation.
The Commission engages with civil society organisations in policy-making on many fronts.
Consultation and dialogue enable civil society organisations and human rights defenders to
Have Your Say portal is the entry point
for consultation119 and makes it possible for all interested parties to contribute to initiatives
before and after adoption120. Civil society organisations are part of the partnership with regional
and local authorities and economic and social partners, which allows them to be involved
throughout the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of EU-funded Cohesion policy
programmes.
The Commission has also established regular dialogues with civil society actors in different
policy areas providing for more effective communication and involvement in policy-making.
Structural civil society dialogue takes place through forums and platforms, covering a broad
range of policy areas121. Representations of the Commission in the Member States are
important local actors for citizen engagement. They have organised thousands of events,
-hoc participatory events, notably during the Conference
on the Future of Europe, where more than 6000 events were organised in the Member States
gathering more than 700 000 participants in total. This can be expanded and complemented by
other initiatives to connect to the local level122.
Protecting, supporting, and empowering civil society organisations and human rights defenders
is at the core of the
work on ensuring a thriving civic space as underlined in the 2022
Report on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights123. The report highlights
the importance of ensuring that civil society organisations and human rights defenders work in
an enabling, safe and supportive environment. The 2022 Rule of Law Report set out how the
operation of civil society organisations without unjustified interference is based on EU case
law124 and European standards,125 and the reports provide an overview of the steps taken in
118
119
120

121

122
123
124
125

Guide to EU citizenship
2023, is a useful tool in this context intended to further advance awareness of EU citizenship.
Have your say (europa.eu)
By providing general feedback or sharing views or knowledge during an Open Public Consultation or Call
complemented by targeted consultations. There are
also opportunities to place formal complaints before the Commission if a breach of EU law is suspected,
while the European Ombudsman can investigate complaints from individuals and organisations about
maladministration by the institutions, bodies and agencies of the EU.
Some such examples include the Permanent Anti-racism Civil Society Forum, the Disability Platform, and
n place to facilitate
dialogue and the exchange of best practices and information among its members, two thirds of which are
civil society. See COM(2022) 716 final, p. 31.
One example is the Building Europe with Local Councillors initiative. https://building-europe-with-localcouncillors.europa.eu/index_en.
COM(2022) 716 final.
Judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18.
See in particular Recommendation Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
the legal status of non-governmental organisations in Europe.

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Member States to improve the situation for civil society organisations. Examples include
simplifying registration procedures, setting up structures to assist civil society organisations,
and revising rules on the operation and access to funding of civil society organisations. The
2022 and 2023 Rule of Law Report made specific recommendations to a number of Member
States. In addition, in September 2023 the Commission put forward a proposal for a legislative
initiative on cross-border activities of associations126, which will aim to remove barriers in the
single market to enable associations to thrive in the single market, will complement action
taken in the current package.

To further foster citizen participation and empower civil society organisations and human
rights defenders to participate in policy-making and complement other actions taken at EU
level, the Commission is putting forward a Recommendation on promoting the engagement
and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policymaking processes127. The Recommendation aims to promote the participation of citizens and
civil society organisations in public policy-making and to help build democratic resilience in
the Union. The Recommendation also aims to facilitate the promotion of civic engagement and
126
127

Single market Proposal for a legislative initiative on cross-border activities of associations (europa.eu)
COM(2023) 516 final.
C(2023) 8627.

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the protection of democracies and respect for fundamental rights in Member States. It
encourages Member States to ensure effective and inclusive participation of citizens and civil
society organisations128 in policy-making processes, with a wide representation of the different
groups and instances in society, thus reducing exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination,
and to support capacity-building of citizens, civil society organisations and public
administrations, in both traditional and emerging public spaces. The Recommendation also
draws on the lessons of the Conference on the Future of Europe and the ongoing work of the
Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy, in line with the established
standards and good practices of co-creation and deliberative democracy129. Acknowledging the
need to ensure a common level of protection and engagement of civil society organisations
across the Union (and beyond), it encourages Member States to create and maintain an enabling
environment for civil society organisations and human rights defenders, allowing them to
effectively engage in such policy-making processes. The Recommendation also proposes a list
of measures Member States should take to protect and support civil society organisations and
human rights defenders to safeguard a thriving civic space.
Financial support is essential for a thriving civil society. The EU already provides ample
funding opportunities for civil society organisations to build their capacity and to implement
projects that help foster EU values. One fundamental requirement for EU funding is respect for
EU values. Respect for EU values already features as part of the grant agreement every
beneficiary of EU funding must sign and the Commission has worked on guidelines to set out
more clearly the consequences breaches of EU values have for beneficiaries. The Commission
is also rolling out pilot projects on reinforcing checks and verification procedures for budgetary
programmes in relevant spending areas that entail higher risk of abuse and disrespect of EU
values. Member States should put in place effective mechanisms to apply the same approach
when managing EU funds. The Citizens Equality Rights and Values programme (CERV) is
focused heavily on supporting civil society organisations to protect and promote EU values and
rights. The Commission will continue to ensure a targeted allocation of funding to priorities
under the EDAP and mobilise dedicated funding from a range of the available EU Programmes
promoting election integrity and media pluralism. To make it easier to navigate through the
different programmes, the Commission will further improve and promote the tool it has put in
place on available funding with simple search functionalities so that relevant information about
funds on democracy can be accessed easily and quickly130. The Commission and the EEAS
will continue to pro-actively engage with citizens and civil society organisations on the ground
via the Commission Representations in Member State capitals and EU Delegations around the
world to increase awareness and improve information sharing on the available opportunities
under the various EU programmes. Figure 5 provides a brief overview of possibilities offered
under EU Programmes, and other possibilities are available under EU structural funds and the
Technical Support Instrument (for example to fund civil society and build capacity and
institutional/administrative infrastructure for deliberative civic engagement and political
participation).

128

Generally understood as non-State, not-for-profit, non-partisan and non-violent structures, through which
people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals. Operating from the local to the national, regional and
international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations, in line with

129

The Commission is also drawing up internal guidelines establishing principles and providing a toolbox for
participatory and deliberative formats and practices. This will include a Charter of Principles for successful
citizen engagement. See also: Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy.
Funding & tenders (europa.eu).

130

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4

CONCLUSION

In July 2019, President von der Leyen called for a new push for European democracy, with a
greater say for Europeans and a greater effort from the EU to nurture, protect and strengthen
our democracy. This translated in the December 2020 European Democracy Action Plan,
which made a major contribution to fight against disinformation and information manipulation
and to protect fair elections and media freedom and pluralism.
EU has had to face a succession of
major geopolitical, economic, climate and health crises. The way the EU has managed to
respond to these crises has shown that it can rely on its strong liberal democracy, trust in its
institutions, and respect for our common principles and values. However, these crises have also
shown the threat of foreign interference and the risks from a highly volatile international
context: some actors have devoted huge resources to the goal of undermining democracy and
trust in our institutions.
This Defence of Democracy package aims to reinforce this action ahead of the elections to the
European Parliament. This package answers these challenges, in full respect of our
fundamental rights and values, also building on the lessons learned from the Conference on the
Future of Europe. The Commission looks forward to the full engagement of the European
Parliament and the Council to make decisive progress on all legislative proposals in the
democracy area before the European parliamentary elections; and for the wide circle of national
actors involved, public and private, to ensure the implementation of the European Democracy
Action Plan and of this new Defence of Democracy package.

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