INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—NETHERLANDS
Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation
Prepared by the Staff Representatives for the 2009 Consultation with the Netherlands
Approved by Ajai Chopra and Ranil M. Salgado
December 15, 2009

Contents

Page

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................4
I. Staff Appraisal ........................................................................................................................5
II. Economic and Financial Situation.........................................................................................7
A. Real Activity and Inflation........................................................................................7
B. Financial Institutions .................................................................................................8
Banks..................................................................................................................8
Insurance and pension funds ..............................................................................8
C. Households and Corporations ...................................................................................9
D. Public Sector ...........................................................................................................10
E. External....................................................................................................................11
III. Macro-Financial Linkages .................................................................................................13
IV. Cross-Border Spillovers.....................................................................................................15
V. Macro Outlook ....................................................................................................................16
A. Central Scenario ......................................................................................................16
Prospects for 2009 and 2010 ............................................................................16
Medium and long-term prospects ....................................................................17
B. Risks ........................................................................................................................18
VI. Key Policy Issues...............................................................................................................18
VII. Restoring Health to the Financial System ........................................................................19
A. Troubled Assets and Capital Adequacy ..................................................................20
B. Regulatory and Supervisory Response ....................................................................21
C. Exit Strategy ............................................................................................................21

2
VIII. Fiscal Policy ....................................................................................................................22
A. Short-Term Fiscal Policy ........................................................................................22
B. Fiscal Sustainability ................................................................................................23
C. Measures to Achieve Sustainability ........................................................................24
D. Fiscal Rules .............................................................................................................27
IX. Structural Reforms .............................................................................................................27
Analytical Note 1. Dutch Housing Markets: What Went Up Will Come Down? ...................51
A. Models of House Prices ..........................................................................................52
B. Is There a Housing Bubble? ....................................................................................54
C. Risks from a Potential House Price Correction .......................................................61
D. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................62
References ........................................................................................................64
Analytical Note 2. Macro-Financial Linkages in the Netherlands ..........................................65
A. Financial Conditions Index (FCI) ...........................................................................66
B. Is There a Credit Crunch? .......................................................................................68
C. Impact of Credit on GDP Growth ...........................................................................70
D. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................70
References ........................................................................................................72
Analytical Note 3. The Crisis and Potential Output in the Netherlands ..................................73
Analytical Note 4. Capitalization of the Dutch Banking System ............................................78
Analytical Note 5. Long Run Fiscal Sustainability in the Netherlands ...................................82
A. Recent Fiscal Developments and Outlook ..............................................................82
B. Fiscal Sustainability Has Deteriorated ....................................................................83
C. Measures to Achieve Sustainability ........................................................................88
Tables
1.
Basic Data ....................................................................................................................29
2.
General Government Accounts, 2003-10 ....................................................................30
3.
Financial Soundness Indicators, 2003-2009 ................................................................31
4.
Indicators of External and Financial Vulnerability, 2003-09 ......................................32
5.
Headline Support for Financial and Other Sectors and Upfront Financing Need .......33
6.
Summary of State Interventions in Major Financial Institutions .................................34
7.
Policy Responses to the Recommendation to Improve Labor Supply.........................37
Figures
1.
International Comparisons of Financial Markets .........................................................38
2.
Real Sector Developments ...........................................................................................39
3.
Comparative Economic Performance ..........................................................................40
4.
External Competitiveness ............................................................................................41
5.
Trade Openness and Spillovers ....................................................................................43
6.
Comparative Financial Institutions ..............................................................................44

3
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Financial Indicators ......................................................................................................45
Financial Stability Indicators .......................................................................................46
Monetary Conditions ...................................................................................................47
Tax Comparisons .........................................................................................................48
Selected Labor Market Indicators ................................................................................49

Text Box
1.
External Competitiveness ............................................................................................12

4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Netherlands has proven markedly vulnerable to the global crisis given its large
financial sector and strong trade and financial linkages. Amid collapsing exports and
investment, staff expects GDP to contract by 4¼ percent in 2009, but expand modestly by
¾ percent in 2010, with subdued inflation. The outlook is unusually uncertain, but the risks
seem roughly balanced. The authorities broadly agreed, though their baseline forecast is
somewhat less sanguine, owing to a more pessimistic view of the external environment.
External competitiveness is adequate.
The financial sector has been hit hard. While the mortgage and housing markets have been
relatively stable so far, banks have suffered major losses, particularly from foreign troubled
assets and sizeable declines in asset prices, requiring massive state intervention.
There was agreement that state interventions in the financial sector have been broadly
appropriate and consistent with a sound “fix-it-and-exit” approach. Measures have
included capital injections, nationalization, and government guarantees. While systemic risks
have been addressed effectively and risk-weighted capital ratios are above required minima,
building up equity to levels deemed more adequate in recent regulatory reform proposals and
brisker lending to support the economic recovery may require banks to tap considerable extra
capital. Officials concurred that reforms in regulation and supervision—including at the
European level—and executive compensation should further buttress the financial system.
The consensus was that the fiscal position has weakened considerably. Large fiscal
deficits of 4½ percent of GDP and 6 percent of GDP are expected in 2009 and 2010,
respectively, reflecting the cyclical downturn, as well as structural relaxation. Public debt has
surged as a result of the ongoing budget relaxation and the financial sector assistance. Staff
views the fiscal relaxation as appropriate as part of an EU-wide fiscal stimulus, but, owing
also to higher estimates of long-run aging pressures, the estimated fiscal sustainability gap
has risen substantially to about 8 percent of GDP.
Ambitious fiscal consolidation is contemplated from 2011 onward, as recovery firms.
The authorities have already announced measures totaling 1¾ percent of GDP to be
implemented, if enacted by parliament, from 2011, including an increase in the retirement
age to 67 years. Moreover, working groups have been set up to formulate by spring 2010
proposals for savings of up to 20 percent of budget expenditure and tax reforms. Plans to
embed the SGP in Dutch law could usefully strengthen the commitment to deficit reduction.
Staff supported these moves and recommended steps to moderate spending increases in
pension, health- and old-age care.
Further structural reforms would alleviate the adverse impacts of the crisis and
population aging on growth. The authorities endorsed the need to increase labor
participation, especially for female and elderly work, and to boost productivity through
innovation and enhancement of competition in product markets.

5
I. STAFF APPRAISAL
1.
The Netherlands has been dealt a severe blow by the global crisis. Owing to its
large financial sector as well as sizable foreign trade and financial exposures, real GDP will
suffer an unprecedented fall in 2009 and only a modest recovery is expected in 2010. Risk
factors appear to be balanced. The crisis has also led to a sizable permanent loss of potential
output. Despite this, activity is now well below potential, leading to a rapid decline of
inflation. External competitiveness remains adequate.
2.
The financial sector has been hit hard and the fiscal situation has deteriorated,
compounding long-term aging pressures. Although the mortgage and housing markets
appear relatively stable, banks have suffered major declines in asset quality, profits, and
capital, while lending conditions have tightened. The fiscal position has weakened
considerably, because of the cyclical downturn, sizable stimulus to buoy economic activity,
and massive financial sector bailout. Aging weighs down heavily on fiscal sustainability (and
it could also further lower potential growth in the longer-run).
3.
The authorities’ interventions in the financial sector have been apt, but bank
capital should be strengthened. Additional capital, equity in particular, will be required
because of the likely losses associated with the ongoing recession, the need to augment
existing capital buffers, and an expected intensification of lending when the crisis subsides.
Tightening of prudential requirements for capital should occur gradually so as not to stiffen
already tense credit conditions. Steps envisaged by the authorities to permit accelerated, but
judicious, lending in support of the budding economic upturn appropriately include proactive
use of opportunities for market access to improve quality of capital with a higher proportion
of equity and suitably restricting dividend payments. In addition, further measures together
with the EU should ameliorate counter-cyclicality of bank capital, and transparency and
robustness of valuation.
4.
Going forward, the financial system should be bolstered by regulatory and
supervisory reform. In particular, higher risk-weightings and capital requirements for
resecuritizations and high-LTV-ratio mortgages as well as reduction of incentives for high
LTV loans, such as limitations on mortgage interest deductibility are desirable. In addition,
better data on and stress testing of risks emanating from house price movements would be
useful, in light of associated large exposures by both banks and households, while
appropriate capital standards for securitizations could be introduced favoring “clean” transfer
of risks under “true sale” operations. Cross-country supervision and resolution should be
strengthened at the European level, broadly in line with the de Larosière proposals.
5.
It is not too early to prepare for the eventual exit from financial sector support
measures. A thorough assessment of the impact of removing or curtailing exceptional access
to liquidity support, deposit insurance, and deposit guarantee programs would help determine
the appropriate timing and speed of the exit to avoid disruptions to affected institutions and

6
markets. In addition, institution-specific restructuring and divestment plans for the large
entities in which the state has injected equity or quasi-equity should be completed.
6.
The accommodative budgetary stance envisaged by the authorities for 2009-10 is
appropriate, but the composition of expenditure increases is a concern. A continuing
fiscal relaxation is warranted in light of sizable negative output gaps expected to persist over
the medium term and the still quite fragile prospects for economic recovery. However, the
significant contribution of recurrent spending to the ongoing fiscal loosening will prove
difficult to reverse when growth picks up.
7.
At the same time, the sizable weakening of the budgetary position calls for a
strong and credible commitment to fiscal consolidation after 2010. The fiscal
sustainability gap is much larger than estimated in recent years, owing to an upward revision
in aging-related budgetary costs as well as the crisis-induced deterioration in government
deficit and debt. Thus, staff supports the authorities’ intention to tighten fiscal policy starting
in 2011, provided growth firms, with the eventual aim to erase the sustainability gap—
gradually, but with sufficient frontloading to lend credibility to the endeavor. Accordingly,
fiscal adjustment targets for 2012-15 and supporting measures should figure prominently in
the coalition agreement that will emerge from the 2011 elections, as part of an overall exit
strategy.
8.
The twin pillars of fiscal consolidation are expenditure retrenchment and taxbase broadening. Aging will push up public spending and there is only limited scope to raise
tax rates, given associated deadweight losses and international tax competition. Moreover,
expenditure-based consolidations are generally more durable, and efficiency enhancements
are key to reduce spending without jeopardizing public service provision. In this regard,
pension, health and old-age-care reforms are crucial to containing—particularly agingrelated—expenditure. This includes raising the retirement age (as is currently planned
pending parliamentary approval), and relying more on means-testing and second pillar
pensions. Also, an increase in user fees could restrain health-services demand, while
significant savings in long-term care are possible with a tighter definition of entitlements.
Sustained productivity increases in health- and long-term care would contain corresponding
spending pressures. The authorities’ recent proposals (¶51) and ongoing review of public
spending go in the right direction.
9.
Improvements to Dutch trend budgeting should reduce its procyclicality and
augment its flexibility to deal with severe recessions. Expenditure ceilings should
permanently exclude cyclically sensitive outlays and be revised if actual growth deviates
substantially from its potential, thereby allowing for discretionary fiscal impulses in case of
sharp contractions, without forcing a breach of the ceilings.
10.
Renewed momentum with structural reforms would alleviate the adverse
impacts of the crisis and population aging on growth. Building on past progress, labor

7
market reforms should aim to increase participation further (including reforms of the tax and
benefit systems and increasing the retirement age), while productivity should be boosted
through reforms directed at strengthening innovation and competition. As noted, pension and
health-care reforms are also required to support fiscal sustainability.
11.

The next Article IV consultation will be held on the standard 12-month cycle.
II. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION
A. Real Activity and Inflation

12.
The Netherlands entered a deep recession in mid-2008 driven by the global
crisis. The Dutch economy was particularly exposed given its relatively large financial sector
and strong global trade and financial linkages (Figure 1 and ¶s 28, 29). Thus, while growth
attained 2 percent in 2008 overall thanks to a large carryover from 2007, it turned negative
already in 2008:Q2. The contraction
300
15
Unemployment and Vacancies
intensified until mid-2009, resulting in an
unprecedented 5 percent fall by 2009:Q2
12
250
(reduced to 3¾ percent in 2009:Q3, year-on200
9
year). From the demand side, the recession
was spawned by collapsing exports and
6
150
investment, amid inventory buildup and nearrecord declines in capacity utilization and
3
100
confidence (Figures 2 and 3). With output
shrinking fast, unemployment began to grow
0
50
late in the year, reaching 3½ percent by
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
September 2009. Government-subsidized
Unemployment rate (NLD, % labor force)
temporary reduced-hours schemes have
Unemployment rate (Euro area, % labor force)
suppressed somewhat the unemployment
Unfilled vacancies (RHS)
rate, but enterprises’ reluctance to shed labor
Sources: Global Insight; and IMF, WEO.
so far has played a larger role.
13.
Inflation picked up in 2008 but turned down markedly in 2009 (Table 1). It
remained below the euro area average in 2008—given the relatively slow pass-through of
raw materials prices—and fell sharply in mid-2009 with significant cuts in electricity and gas
tariffs. Despite the economic slack and declining inflation, wages are expected to increase by
around 3 percent in 2009 as labor agreements were largely set before the crisis unfolded.

8
B. Financial Institutions
Banks
14.
Profitability, asset quality, and capital suffered major declines with the global
financial crisis.


Financial Stress in the Netherlands remains elevated.
In 2008, the system experienced a
20
massive loss, reflecting mainly
Financial Stress Index 1/
large realized and valuation losses,
15
but also lackluster efficiency, with
NLD
USA
staff costs a long-standing structural
UK
10
problem. The bulk of the losses
DEU
JPN
came from U.S. subprime or other
toxic assets and asset price declines. 5
In 2009, revenue and profits have
remained weak and large
0
restructuring costs, including for
staff cutbacks, are likely. These
-5
trends are expected to persist in
2005M1
2006M1
2007M1
2008M1
2009M1
Source:
IMF,
WEO.
2010.

20

15

10

5

0

-5

1/ A positive value implies strain.



Over 2008, the systemic Basel capital ratio contracted from 13.2 to 11.9 percent, with
a similar deterioration for the Tier 1 capital/risk-weighted assets ratio (Table 3). The
tangible common equity/total assets ratio (TCE/TA) declined slightly to 3.2 percent,
despite a considerable infusion of public capital. Liquidity shrunk sizably across the
system, while gross derivative exposure doubled to about 8 times capital. In 2009:H1,
the Basel and Tier 1 capital ratios improved significantly, due mainly to deleveraging.
The TCE/TA ratio rose at the five major banks, but with great variations among them.

15.
Except for Rabobank, major banks’ ratings have been cut repeatedly since
October 2008. Both ABN AMRO and ING were downgraded, most recently in May, and
remain on negative outlook. By contrast, Rabobank, a conglomerate of cooperative banks
with a less international and risky asset profile, has retained AAA rating.
Insurance and pension funds
16.
Insurance sector profits and solvency also declined sharply. The drop in equity
prices and interest rates, coupled with falling new insurance origination, have led to much
lower profits and solvency ratios in 2008-2009:H1 and major insurance companies were
downgraded. Aegon and SNS have needed government support since late 2008. Both have
now raised equity from the market and intend to start repaying the government in 2009.

9
17.
Similarly, pension funds suffered a major deterioration. Faced with the double
whammy of lower interest rates (which increase the value of their liabilities) and dropping
asset prices, the average funding ratio collapsed in 2008. Indeed, 300 out of the nearly
400 funds ended below the minimum funding ratio of 105 percent, compared to only 2 at the
beginning of 2008. All of them have submitted recovery plans. Funding ratios have improved
markedly in 2009 reflecting equity market buoyancy (in November, 118 funds remained
below the minimum fund ratio).
160
140

Underfunding of Dutch Pension System

25

130

Shares (percent)

Funding ratios (percent)

30

Impact of Different Scenarios on Pensions
Funds' Funding Ratios

150

120
110
100
90
80
70

20
15
10
5

60
50

0

80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130

70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 >
130
Funding ratio (percent)

Stock exchange index
6% interest rate
4% interest rate
2% interest rate
End 2008

Source: Netherlands Bank.

5% interest rate
3% interest rate
1% interest rate

Source: Netherlands Bank.

C. Households and Corporations
18.
Households are confronted with falling net worth and rising unemployment.
Household net worth has been falling as a result of a decline in financial asset and home
prices (the former now partly reversed), possible reduction of pension indexation, and
income loss from rising unemployment. Younger households with low income have
collectively no net worth and those with high LTV or payment/income ratios are at elevated
risk of default.
Netherlands: Household Assets and Debt by Age Cohort and Income Group
(In thousands of euros)
14

12

12
Assets
Debts

10

Assets
Debts

8

6

6

6

4

4

4

2

2

2

0

0
<40

40-60
Age

Source: Netherlands Bank.

>60

Assets
Debts

10

8

8

Income >35K

Income 20-35K

Income <20K

12
10

14

14

0
<40

40-60
Age

>60

<40

40-60
Age

>60

10
19.
Nevertheless, the Dutch mortgage market is relatively stable. Limited land
availability and generous interest deductibility reduce the likelihood of sharp house price
corrections, while large transaction costs deter speculation. Banks have first charge at
default, full recourse against the borrower, and often maintain collateral against mortgages in
separate investment/insurance accounts. Moreover, a hefty fraction of mortgages are covered
by a state guarantee fund. While full interest deductibility for one house does encourage large
mortgages, mortgage default rates are extremely low.
20.
The housing market also does not appear out of kilt, albeit with caveats. Home
prices have been declining since late 2008,
20
Corporate Credit Growth
and are now about 5 percent lower than a
15
and Consumer Confidence
year ago. Also, some raw indicators point to
10
overvaluation. However, taking account of
5
existing regulatory constraints, which tend
0
to cause higher prices, staff analysis and
-5
work by other institutions shows that house
-10
prices are broadly in line with fundamentals
Grow th of corporate credit (percent)
-15
(Analytical Note 1—AN 1), though this
Consumer confidence (percent balance)
-20
result is sensitive to choice of the initial
-25
period of estimation. Overall, a severe
2000Q1 2001Q3 2003Q1 2004Q3 2006Q1 2007Q3 2009Q1
contraction of house prices is assessed to be
Source: DNB Overview of Financial Stability, May 2009.
a medium intensity vulnerability.
21.
Firms entered the crisis with solid balance sheets, but vulnerabilities are rising.
Corporate bankruptcies are predicted to climb significantly in 2009. As Dutch corporations
are more dependent on bank lending than eurozone, U.S., or U.K. counterparts—with loans
to non-financial corporations totaling over 60 percent of GDP—their recovery from the
recession and future investments may be comparatively lagging.
D. Public Sector
22.
The fiscal position has deteriorated
sharply in 2008-09 (Table 2). The general
government (GG) surplus rose to almost one
percent of GDP in 2008, buoyed by spending
moderation and strong gas revenues. However,
GG debt surged to almost 60 percent of GDP, as
a result of financial sector bailout programs,
largely accounted for as financing transactions on
the assumption that disbursements will be
recouped once the economy recovers. The fiscal
balance is projected to turn a large 4½ percent of
GDP deficit in 2009, amid falling revenues—

8

Fiscal Balance
(In percent of GDP)

4

0

-4
Netherlands
France
Italy

Belgium
Germany
Finland

-8
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Sources: WEO and IMF staff estimates.

2010

11
from the collapsing output—and soaring expenditures. The spending surge is associated with
a stimulus package introduced in early 2009 to mitigate the impact on economic activity of
the global crisis (¶44), but was also in part already enshrined in the 2008 medium-term
budget.1 Together with a contraction in potential output (¶31), swelling outlays imply a
substantial decline in the robust balance.2 At the same time, population aging remains a
millstone on long-term fiscal sustainability (¶47).
Evolution of Robust Balance
(In percent of potential GDP)
2007

2008

2009

2010

Structural revenue excl. property income

43.4

43.3

42.3

42.0

Structural primary expenditure

44.7

45.6

46.7

47.1

Robust balance
Of which: stimulus package

-1.4
…

-2.2
…

-4.4
0.7

-5.0
0.2

Memorandum item:
Headline fiscal balance (percent of GDP)

0.3

0.8

-4.5

-5.9

Sources: Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.

E. External
23.
Sizable current account surpluses and a range of indicators suggest adequate
competitiveness (Box 1 and Figure 4). During 2007–08, the current account surplus hovered
around 7½ percent of GDP and is projected to decline to the 6¾–7 range during 2009–10, as
decelerating import demand does not fully offset contracting exports, lower average gas
prices, and continuing trend erosion in the terms of trade. In the medium term, the current
account is expected to remain in significant surplus, with the important financial sector and
old-age pre-funding boosting the Dutch savings rate.

1

Expenditure ceilings for 2009-10 were formulated in the 2008 medium-term budget on the basis of projections
for inflation and growth far higher than now expected.

2

Robust balance is the structural primary balance excluding property income (mainly gas revenue).

12
Box 1. The Netherlands: External Competitiveness
A range of indicators and the sustained large current account surplus suggest a comfortable
competitiveness margin has been maintained:

REER measures—using different cost or price indices—have basically moved sideways
(around the 2003-2007 averages), following
REER measures have remained broadly flat...
the appreciation between 2001-03. Unit labor 115
115
costs have fallen or remained flat in recent
Index (1999=100)
110
years largely on par with competitors (Figure 110
4), and low inflation has helped to contain the
105
105
REER appreciation.

Exporter profitability has continued to
improve. Profitability in the tradable sector is
proxied by the ratio of unit labor cost in
manufacturing (ULCM)-based REER to the
REER using the industry deflator (also a
proxy for labor’s income share). This
measure suggests a continued improvement in
relative profitability (or decline in labor’s
income share) in manufacturing since 2002—
more so than in Germany and in contrast to
Italy for which this gauge pointed to
deteriorating profitability/competitiveness.

Pre-crisis export growth was relatively
high and market share has grown (Figure 4).
With export growth of around 15½ percent
during 2002-08, export growth has exceeded
the euro area average of under 12 percent.
However, re-exports (which account for
around half Dutch exports by value) have
been important in driving the growth in the
overall market share.

100

100

95

HICP
ULC, total economy
ULC, manufacturing
GDP deflator

90

95

90

85
85
Jan1994 Jan1996 Jan1998 Jan2000 Jan2002 Jan2004 Jan2006 Jan2008
...while labor's income share in manufacturing has fallen. 1/
120

120
Index (1999=100)

110

110

100

100

90

Netherlands
France
Germany
Italy

90

80

80

70
Jan1995 Jan1997 Jan1999 Jan2001 Jan2003 Jan2005 Jan2007

70

Source: European Commission; and staff calculations.
1/ Proxied by the ratio of ULMC-based REERs to industry price deflatorbased REERs.

Multilaterally consistent CGER
Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate Estimates Using CGER
methodologies suggest that the real
(Level relative to equilibrium in percent; minus indicates undervaluation)
exchange rate is broadly in
CGER Methodology
CA/GDP
equilibrium. While there is some
2014
CA/GDP
divergence, the average of the methods
ERER 3/
WEO
Norm 2/
MB 2/
ES 4/
2008
indicates that the real exchange rate is
largely in line with fundamentals. The
Netherlands
0.7
1.0
-11.9
7.5
6.7
5.7
medium-term current account (CA)
Germany
0.0
3.0
-13.0
6.4
4.9
3.8
surplus is close to the CA norm, which
1/ CGER (Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues). Values between itself largely reflects the Netherlands’
10 and +10 mean the real exchange rate (RER) is close to balance.
International Monetary Fund, 2008, Exchange Rate Assessments: CGER
financial center role as well as a high
Methodologies (available at www.imf.org). CGER estimates based on data
saving rate, influenced in part by the
available in July 2009.
2/ Macroeconomic balance approach.
robust second pillar pension system.
3/ Equilibrium real exchange rate approach.
CGER assessments going forward may
4/ External sustainability approach.
be affected by crisis-related changes in
the relationships underlying the approaches.

13
III. MACRO-FINANCIAL LINKAGES
24.
Private lending, especially for mortgages, has slowed down substantially, the
result of deleveraging and cyclical weakening. Recession and poor producer confidence
have dampened credit demand, while mounting conservatism of banks in the face of losses,
soaring bankruptcies, and the triggering of adverse covenants in existing loans have weighed
down on credit supply. Staff analysis detects emergence of a credit crunch from late 2007
(AN 2). However, as demand for credit has started declining faster than supply since
2008:Q2, any credit crunch may mutate soon into a credit contraction. Weak demand and
supply conditions, monetary policy actions, and increasing spreads for longer-term bank
funding were reflected in the substantial lowering of short-term interbank and corporate loan
interest rates since late 2008, with only a small decline in longer-term rates (Figure 7).
25.
Lending conditions have tightened substantially, especially for fixed-rate loans.
Three-quarters of all banks reported tougher lending standards for corporates at end-2008,
and the proportion has grown in 2009. Those for residential mortgages hardened markedly
from the second half of 2008, with over 80 percent of banks restricting credit.
26.
Financial tightening is likely to reduce significantly economic growth. The share
of the financial sector in GDP at 7½ percent is higher than in most EU countries. Thus, a
financial contraction may materially hurt GDP growth. Adverse wealth effects could be a key
channel in this regard. Notably, high household indebtedness, elevated loan-to-value ratios,
and frequent mortgage-equity-withdrawal could exacerbate the consequences of tighter credit
standards and falling house prices for consumption, inducing increased precautionary
savings. Staff estimates the cumulative negative direct impact on 2008–10 growth of
prevailing financial conditions at 3½ percentage points.
27.
The vulnerability of the financial system and real economy to house price
developments seems manageable. As noted above (¶19), several factors restrict the
potential for steep house price corrections. Furthermore, econometric estimates point to a
limited impact on GDP of a house price downturn (AN 1). Though highly leveraged
households and banks’ exposure to real estate developments could amplify the adverse
consequences for economic activity, the impact on financial institutions would be lessened
by the strong legal standing of creditors and extensive collateralization of mortgages.

14
Netherlands: Macro-Financial Linkages
The financial cycle has turned, whic h is estimated to reduce GDP growth as much as
3 percentage points through end-2009.
5

5
Contributions to Financial Conditions Index
(Percentage points of y/y real GDP growth)

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

-1

-1
-2

-2
AIBOR
Sto ck in dex

-3

Ba nki ng s ecto r risk
R EER

-3

Ove ral l FCI

-4

-4
1996Q1

1998Q3

2001Q1

2003Q3

2006Q1

2008Q3

A disequilibrium model suggests that signs of a credit crunch have appeared over the past couple
of years.
0.05

9.2

Percentage by which demand exceeds supply
0.04
0.03

Volume of credit, in log
(right scale)

8.8

0.02
Excess demand
(left scale)

0.01
0

8.4

-0.01
-0.02
8.0

-0.03
Excess supply
(left scale)

-0.04

7.6
-0.05
1996Q2 1997Q2 1998Q2 1999Q2 2000Q2 2001Q2 2002Q2 2003Q2 2004Q2 2005Q2 2006Q2 2007Q2 2008Q2 2009Q2

Sources: IMF staff estimates.

15
IV. CROSS-BORDER SPILLOVERS
28.
Extensive trade linkages have deepened the severity of the global crisis in the
Netherlands. Its trade openness is relatively large, even accounting for substantial reexports. Export composition and direction also suggest special vulnerability to the global
recession. Notably, the largest share of Dutch exports (over 75 percent) are to hard-hit
Europe; and more than half (machinery and transport equipment, chemicals) are highly
sensitive to the global investment collapse (Figure 5). Accordingly, Dutch exports are
expected to decline by around 12 percent in 2009.
Dutch Banks Claims Abroad

29.
Cross-border financial links of the
(As of end-June 2009)
Netherlands are also far-reaching. The
US$ Billion Share (Percent)
Dutch banking system has a relatively high
Total
1,637
100.0
share of foreign claims (around 30 percent of
Advanced countries
1,366
83.5
Germany
174
10.6
total assets), which makes it quite susceptible
Belgium
152
9.3
to a further deterioration in conditions abroad.
UK
197
12.0
US
267
16.3
Most of these external exposures are to
Other
576
35.2
advanced countries in Europe. Around
EMCs and developing
271
16.5
Brazil
12
0.8
one-third of foreign claims relate to just the
Mexico
13
0.8
United States, the United Kingdom, and
Poland
34
2.1
Romania
10
0.6
Germany. Simulating the impact of a shock in
Russia
16
1.0
one (or more) of these countries and the
Turkey
20
1.3
4
0.3
associated “domino effects” suggests that gross UAE
Other
161
9.8
losses for Dutch banks could be potentially
Source: BIS.
large (up to 25 percent of GDP).
Spillovers to the Netherlands from International Banking Exposures

Shock Originating From
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
UK and US
UK and DEU
US and DEU
UK, US, and DEU
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
UK and US
UK and DEU
US and DEU
UK, US, and DEU

Magnitude 1/

Deleveraging
Need 2/

Dutch Lenders'
Losses
(percent GDP)

Impact on Credit
Availability
(percentage points)

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.4
0
0
79.7
0
62.6
100

5.5
2.7
1.4
9.6
4.3
7.5
11.9
12.6
6.2
2.9
21.5
11
19.9
25

-12
-4.8
-0.1
-24.4
-6.3
-15
-29.8
-31.1
-15.6
-0.7
-59.4
-26.8
-56.9
-61.6

Source: Staff calculations based on BIS and IFS data.
1/ Magnitude denotes the percent of claims that default.
2/ Deleveraging need is the amount that needs to be raised through asset sales in response to
the shock in order to meet the minimum capital requirement, expressed in percent of total
assets.

16

Spillovers from the Netherlands
(Lenders’ losses due to Dutch default, in percent of GDP)

[0,1]
(1,2]
(2,4]
(4,10]
No data
Contagion from a shock in the Netherlands is largely contained to Europe: most
adversely affected is Belgium, followed by Switzerland, France, Ireland,
Portugal, Austria, and the United Kingdom. It would also take a high default
rate (50 percent in the map) for losses to reach significant levels.

V. MACRO OUTLOOK
A. Central Scenario
Prospects for 2009 and 2010
30.
The economic contraction (y-o-y) is expected to continue through mid-2010,
albeit at a slower pace. Staff forecast a fall
1
in real GDP this year of 4¼ percent and a
Projected Real GDP Grow th, 2009 (Percent)
tepid expansion of ¾ percent next year.
0
Accordingly, output will turn sharply below
-1
potential. Despite signs of improvement,
with a 0.4 percent real GDP increase in
-2
2009:Q3 over Q2, recovery is likely to take
-3
firm root only in the second half of 2010.
Private consumption is projected to remain
-4
frail in the near term as households face
-5
diminishing net worth, rising
unemployment, and tighter credit. Similarly -6
FRA
ESP
NLD
EA
UK
DEU
investment is likely to stay weak, owing to

17
large excess capacity, sluggish domestic and external demand, and stern lending conditions.
Fiscal stimulus measures and large automatic stabilizers will however help reduce the
downside for consumption and investment. The unemployment rate is expected to rise to
about 6½ percent in 2010, and inflation to slow to around 1 percent this year and next. The
authorities generally agreed with the staff’s outlook. Though their projections were
somewhat more pessimistic owing to less sanguine views on the external environment, they
acknowledged that the latter was improving faster than in their forecast.
Medium and long-term prospects
31.
The supply potential of the economy has probably been severely curtailed by the
crisis. Potential growth may run considerably lower than before the downturn in the near to
medium term, owing to the large contraction in investment, likely rise in structural
unemployment (possibly discouraging labor force participation as well) and a deceleration in
total factor productivity if financing constraints and increased risk aversion curb research and
development. Potential growth is expected broadly to return to its pre-crisis trend of around
2 percent over the medium term, but leaving a permanent decline in the level of potential
output—5 percent by 2014 (AN 3) when the output gap is anticipated to close.
Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework

Real GDP growth
Output gap (percent of GDP)
Consumer price inflation (year average)
Employment growth
Unemployment rate (Eurostat definition)
Current account balance (percent of GDP)
General government balance (percent of GDP)
Robust balance (percent of GDP)
General government debt (percent of GDP)

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2.0

-4.2

0.7

0.6

2.8

-1.9

-1.8

-2.0

1.7

2.1

2.6

-1.5

-0.9

2.2

0.9

1.0

1.0

1.2

1.3

0.0
1.5

1.7

-0.7

-2.4

-0.3

0.3

0.7

1.1

2.8

3.8

6.6

6.1

5.9

5.3

4.5

7.5

7.0

6.8

6.9

7.1

6.8

6.7

0.8

-4.5

-5.9

-5.3

-4.1

-2.7

-1.2

-2.2

-4.4

-5.0

-4.2

-3.1

-2.2

-1.4

58.2

58.9

63.9

67.9

70.1

70.5

69.0

Source: Dutch authorities, and IMF staff estimates.

32.
In the longer run, a rapidly aging population could lower potential growth
further. Imminent population aging will squeeze working-age cohorts, while slowing down
trend productivity. Maintaining potential growth will therefore require boosting labor force
participation and reforms to enhance productivity (¶56).

18
Long-Term Scenario
Prospects for labor force participation/employment and productivity growth imply a
significant drop in per capita income growth.
1995-2000

2000-05

2005-10

2010-20

2020-30

2030-40

1.3
-0.5
-0.1
0.7

1.3
-0.4
-0.1
0.8

(In percent)
Productivity growth 1/
Demographic contribution 2/
Employment rate contribution 3/
GDP per capita growth

1.7
-0.1
1.9
3.5

-1.2
-0.2
2.1
0.8

0.6
-0.2
0.5
0.9

1.4
-0.4
0.7
1.7

Sources: WEO; Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS); Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB).
1/ GDP per employed. Projections assume a continuation of the most recent trend.
2/ Change in the share of population 20-64 years.
3/ Employed as a share of population 20-64 years.

B. Risks
33.
The outlook is unusually uncertain and the risks are roughly balanced.
Unparalleled interventions
Real GDP Growth: Risks to the Forecast
internationally have reduced the “tail6.0
6.0
risk” of a systemic collapse, and global
Growth and Risk Balance
(75 and 85 percent confidence intervals, percent)
financial conditions have improved,
4.0
4.0
but remain fragile. Accordingly, the
2.0
2.0
main risks around the central
projection include deviations from the
0.0
0.0
baseline in: (i) lending and financial
-2.0
-2.0
conditions; (ii) housing and equity
prices; (iii) external demand; (iv) oil
-4.0
-4.0
prices; and (v) size/effect of monetary
-6.0
-6.0
and fiscal policy measures.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Upside/downside risks stemming from
The chart includes the risks to the projections of growth (-4.2 percent in
these factors are deemed equally
2009 and -0.7 percent in 2010) based on historical forecast errors
increased by a factor of 20 percent to reflect increased uncertainty.
probable, but with uncommonly
Source: IMF staff estimates.
pronounced dispersion.
VI. KEY POLICY ISSUES
34.
Against this background, securing the recovery and long-term sustainability are
the key policy priorities. In the near term, actions should focus on restoring health to the
financial sector and an appropriately accommodative fiscal stance to support resumption of
growth. These policies should be couched in a longer-run framework strengthening financial
stability, ensuring fiscal sustainability, and renewing the momentum of structural reforms to
boost potential output.

19
VII. RESTORING HEALTH TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
35.
There was agreement that bank support actions are broadly appropriate and
consistent with those by other industrialized countries (Tables 5, 6). The enlargement of
deposit insurance and liquidity extension on full allocation basis were in accordance with
EU-wide measures. Despite its nationalization, the authorities are not interested in long-term
state ownership of Fortis and aware of the competitive distortions it may cause. The
injections of capital in the form of preferred shares, linking preferred dividends to equity
dividends, restrictions on equity dividends, and built-in incentives for quick redemptions are
consistent with a sound “fix-it-and-exit” approach (Table 6). ING’s toxic asset carve-out is
also apt, although much depends on how the eventual disposal of the assets is managed.
36.
The authorities are encouraging sound compensation policies broadly in line
with the recent G20 recommendations. Staff welcomed efforts to create a voluntary private
sector code of conduct, linking remuneration and bonuses to long-term performance and
establishing compensation committees of independent directors to develop explicit corporate
policies and prepare annual compliance reports. The objective is to discourage risk taking
deemed excessive from a social perspective, while providing incentives for effective
management and good governance (and pursuing distributional fairness through taxation).
37.
Supervisors’ approach to under-funding of pension funds is also sensible,
although structural reforms may be required. The authorities’ decision to permit five
years for restoring required funding is prudent. The DNB has promptly evaluated the
recovery plans of about 340 pension funds. The plans involve sizable additional employer
contributions, changes in contribution policies, and reduced or no-inflation indexation. Still,
a long-term improvement in the funding ratio is contingent on a recovery in asset markets
and a gradual rise in interest rates. Moreover, the preponderance of (nominally) definedbenefit plans is accompanied by the increasing role of risk-sharing arrangements (e.g.
through contingent no-indexation clauses). A more balanced mix of defined-contribution and
-benefit plans could thus be a strategic option.
38.
Staff argued that, while these actions have addressed systemic risks effectively,
more capital may be necessary.


Risk-weighted capital ratios are above regulatory minima, but Dutch banks—like
several European counterparts—have relatively low equity. The authorities’ stress
tests under fairly extreme shocks suggest losses of about €47 billion in 2009-10 for
the banking system and major insurers—which are sizable but contained relative to
the banks’ asset base. All institutions would remain above required Tier 1 riskweighted capital ratios

20


However, even under less grave shocks, the financial sector is still likely to
experience significant losses, given the impact of the unprecedented recession,
eroding equity levels. Thus, brisker lending when the economy recuperates,
enhancement of existing
12
capital buffers, and building
Bank Capital to Asset Ratio (2007, percent)
up equity to levels
10
considered more adequate in
8
recent regulatory reform
proposals (AN 4) may
6
require considerable
additional equity capital.
4
Several banks have already
2
raised market-based equity
and debt funding. The state’s
0
commitment to restoring
USA
UK 1/
ESP
FRA
JPN
DEU
NLD
Source: IMF, GFSR.
intervened banks to health
1/ 2006 data
and the ongoing restructuring
and divestment of non-strategic businesses should further improve these entities’
market access over time, ensuring that extra capital may be tapped without sizable
government injections.
A. Troubled Assets and Capital Adequacy

39.
Supervisors concurred that continued efforts towards clean-up and
capitalization are key to allow banks to support the recovery. Staff emphasized that
domestic stress testing should continue to center on a comprehensive review of capital needs
and viability on an institution-by-institution basis, taking into account the impact of the
ongoing recession on capital. The authorities confirmed their intention to require timely
remedial measures from banks that appear vulnerable under stressed conditions and consider
public support with appropriate burden-sharing by shareholders and unsecured creditors.
40.
In the same connection, staff endorsed the authorities’ actions to facilitate the
expansion of bank lending when credit demand picks up. Supervisors are taking steps to
permit acceleration of lending in support of the budding economic upturn urging institutions
to raise additional equity capital (also in anticipation of tightening capital standards) and
long-term funding and limit appropriately dividend pay-outs. Consensus was that further
actions in concert with the EU and Basel committee are needed to improve the countercyclicality of bank capital (¶41), and transparency and robustness of valuation. While broadly
supportive of a stronger EU or global standard of capital adequacy, the authorities
highlighted the need to recognize the low risk rating of Dutch banking assets and avoid large
regulation-induced deleveraging.

21
B. Regulatory and Supervisory Response
41.
To buttress the financial system, the authorities are exploring some options
proposed by staff to improve regulation and supervision. These include: (i) higher riskweightings and capital requirements, as well as better diligence, for resecuritizations,
complex, illiquid, or lower-rated exposures, and high-LTV-ratio mortgages; (ii) reduced
incentives for high LTV loans, such as limitations on mortgage interest deductibility; (iii)
lowering of industry-wide LTV ratios or other risky exposures through code-of-conduct and
similar collaborative exercises; (iv) better data on and stress testing of risks emanating from
house prices; (v) for securitizations, appropriate capital standards favoring clean transfer of
risks through “true sales” rather than transactions involving complex support arrangements
from originators; and (vi) enhancements of the supervisors’ powers of resolution.
42.
Concerning cross-country supervision and resolution, the authorities are
supportive of measures broadly in line with the de Larosière proposals (dLp). Their
principal concern is that, absent effective EU-level supervision, deposit insurance, and fiscal
burden-sharing (preferably pre-funded but certainly pre-committed), improvements in
supervisory cooperation alone may not suffice. On the make-up of the future European
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), the authorities strongly favor an integrated financial
sector entity, rather than separate banking, insurance, and securities supervisory bodies. Also,
while complying with the decisions of the EC competition authority, supervisors believe that
a special unit to deal with financial sector competition issues in light of public interventions
to stem systemic crises would be useful, since, in their view, present EC conditionality could
place EU banks at a competitive disadvantage.
C. Exit Strategy
43.
The authorities intend to prepare a phased exit strategy from the heavy public
support of the financial sector. The enhancements to liquidity expansion, deposit insurance,
and loan guarantees will be withdrawn in concert with the rest of the EU. Unwinding of
systemic short-term liquidity and confidence-building measures is likely to occur first,
followed by the phasing out of some guarantee schemes, while the disposal of equity and
impaired assets will be a more prolonged process. Officials accepted that it would be
valuable to assess already now the impact of removing these programs, thereby tailoring the
timing and speed of the exit so as to ensure that markets and institutions concerned remain
robust and sufficiently informed to withstand their phasing out. In addition, the authorities
are developing institution-specific restructuring and divestment plans for the large entities in
which the state has injected equity or quasi-equity, though full divestments could take
3-5 years. The exit strategy has also a fiscal dimension (¶48, 49).

22
VIII. FISCAL POLICY
A. Short-Term Fiscal Policy
44.
Amid a massive economic downturn, 6
90
General
Government
Accounts
policy makers have shifted priority to
4
(In percent of GDP)
80
support growth through fiscal policy.
2
Following GG structural surpluses in 2006-08,
70
0
the 2009-10 budgets envisage a decline in the
-2
60
robust balance of 2¾ percent of GDP from
-4
2008 to 2010. Fiscal impulses of 2½ and
50
-6
½ percent of GDP are estimated respectively
-8
40
for 2009 and 2010. Discretionary stimulus
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
measures provide for unemployment
Government debt (RHS)
alleviation; investment in infrastructure, housing,
Structural balance (% potential GDP)
Fiscal balance
and the environment; and transfers, subsidies and
Primary balance
Robust balance
tax allowances for businesses, especially small
Sources: WEO, and IMF staff estimates
and medium-sized ones.
45.
Staff endorsed the relaxation pursued by the authorities for 2009-10, as part of
an EU-wide fiscal stimulus package. Indeed, a stimulative fiscal policy is both indicated
from a cyclical perspective—given negative output gaps envisaged for 2009-14 as well as the
uncertainty still surrounding the economic recovery in 2010—and feasible—given the
comparatively favorable initial public debt burden. Rollover risks are limited by the long
average maturity of public debt. The structural loosening executed for 2009 and planned for
2010 by the government also fits the broadly harmonized discretionary easing implemented
by most EU members (the effectiveness of demand-enhancing measures in the Dutch
medium-size, open economy would be limited if done in isolation).
46.
Nonetheless, the authorities shared staff concerns about the composition of
expenditure increases. Fiscal loosening should be designed to minimize the negative impact
on the long-term budget position. Thus, it should rely on actions that can be implemented
swiftly and clawed back quickly once growth prospects improve. The measures taken by the
Dutch authorities that are part of the stimulus package proper fulfill largely such
requirements. However, those emanating from the broader spending surge (¶22) seem less
susceptible to fast retrenchment, being largely made of recurrent outlays. Spending cuts are
under study in the context of the required medium-term fiscal correction (¶51).

23
B. Fiscal Sustainability
47.
There was agreement that the long-term fiscal position has worsened
considerably (AN 5). Besides the sizable
16
Fiscal Sustainability Gaps 1/
structural fiscal relaxation in 2009-10 to prop
14
(Percent of GDP)
up aggregate demand, the global crisis has led
12
to below-the-line operations in support of the
10
financial sector (which do not increase the
deficit but add to public debt), and a
8
deterioration in potential output. Given also
6
expected increases in aging-related spending
4
(almost 9 percent of GDP over 2011-60,
2
mostly on account of pensions, health- and
0
old-age-care), staff estimates that the GG
IRL UK ESP NLD FRA BEL AUT DEU SWE ITA
robust balance after 2011 consistent with longSources: ECFIN Sustainability Report 2009, and staff estimates.
term sustainability will need to be permanently 1/ECFIN's estimate of the Dutch gap is 6.9 percent of GDP, but
w ith an structural primary deficit in 2010 of 1½ percent of GDP
higher than in the no-measures path by
compared to staff’s 2½ percent of GDP.
8 percent of GDP—the fiscal sustainability
gap.3 4
48.
Thus, the authorities viewed a strong and credible commitment to fiscal
consolidation as crucial. If fiscal sustainability and eventual solvency of the government
come into question, interest rates would rise and the economic recovery as well as the
authorities’ ability to support the financial sector would be hampered. To avoid these risks
and as part of the overall exit strategy (¶43), the authorities concurred that, with
parliamentary elections in 2011, clear identification of time-bound fiscal adjustment targets
for 2012-15 and supporting measures to be enshrined in the coalition agreement that will lead
to the formation of the new government will be essential. Since front-loaded fiscal
retrenchment is desirable for intergenerational equity and to contain the size of the required
tightening, and output remains below potential through 2014, the government’s objectives of
reducing both the output and the fiscal sustainability gaps have to be balanced.
49.
Specifically, the 2010 budget memorandum (BM) envisions gradual tightening of
fiscal policy from 2011, provided growth has firmed. Officials observed that they planned
structural fiscal consolidation of about ¾ percent of GDP per year (perhaps less in 2011,
3

The sustainability indicator used is based on the intertemporal budget constraint (see AN5), and is consistent
with the S2 measure of the EC (Sustainability Report 2009, pp148-149).

4

If the corrective measures already announced by the government (about 1¾ percent of GDP) are enacted, the
sustainability gap would be reduced accordingly. In addition, the gap could also turn out to be less if the large
external current account surplus unwinds as a rising number of retirees draw down their accumulated pensions,
thereby raising consumption based tax revenues as a share of output over the long run. But the size of this effect
is quite uncertain.

24
given the lingering effects of the crisis) until the headline deficit fell below the 3 percent of
GDP ceiling under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), likely by 2013. Staff endorsed this
adjustment, which is also consistent with EC recommendations. The objective will be
pursued flexibly, with the option to delay somewhat the headline adjustment in exchange for
structural measures (such as increasing the retirement age), which improve significantly
fiscal sustainability, but have only a modest short-run impact on the government balance.
Consolidation will continue after the headline deficit is brought under the SGP threshold—
possibly at a more measured pace, with a view to close the sustainability gap within a
reasonable time frame, which staff also found agreeable.
Illustrative Optimal Annual Fiscal Adjustment Paths Under a Quadratic Loss Function 1/ 2/
Loss Function Weights
Alpha 3/

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Beta 4/
Structural primary balance (percent of GDP)

1
0
1
7
1

1
1
0
1
7

2.3
5.7
-3.7
-1.9
5.4

3.3
5.7
-3.7
-1.3
5.7

4.0
5.7
-3.7
-0.8
5.9

4.5
5.7
-3.7
-0.2
6.0

5.0
5.7
-3.7
0.2
6.1

5.3
5.7
-3.7
0.7
6.1

5.5
5.7
-3.7
1.1
6.2

5.7
5.7
-3.7
1.5
6.2

5.8
5.7
-3.7
1.8
6.2

5.9
5.7
-3.7
2.1
6.2

Memo item:
Variable weights 5/

-1.6

-0.7

0.2

1.1

2.0

2.9

3.8

4.7

5.5

6.2

Source: IMF staff calculations.
1/ The plausible adjustment path in the fiscal sustainability panel figure corresponds to the variable weights fiscal
adjustment path in this table.
2/ Structural primary balance in 2010 = -2.4 percent of GDP; structural primary balance target to close sustainability
gap after 10 years = 6.2 percent of GDP; structural primary balance target to immediately close sustainability gap =
5.7 percent of GDP; fiscal multiplier is taken to be 0.8; output gap in 2010 = -1.8 percent of GDP.
3/ Weight on output gap.
4/ Weight on sustainability gap.
5/ Alpha is assumed to decline over time from an initial value of 7, while Beta rises at the same pace from an initial
value of 1.

C. Measures to Achieve Sustainability
50.
The consensus was that adjustment should focus on expenditure retrenchment
or tax-base broadening. The government’s economic footprint is already elevated and
prevailing tax rates leave little upward room (Figure 10). Indeed, pressures from international
tax competition may even lead to cuts in corporate taxation, while labor market reform may
entail a reduction of marginal tax rates, since relatively large tax wedges on earned income
discourage work. Efficiency enhancements, on the other hand, could reduce government
expenditure without jeopardizing public service provision (¶53).
51.
The authorities have put in place a comprehensive approach to identify options
for fiscal consolidation. The government has already announced a package of measures
equivalent to about 1¾ percent of GDP when implemented. These include a phased increase
in the retirement age, caps on mortgage-interest-deductibility for high-priced homes, and

25
savings in the provision of medical and long-term care services. In addition, 19 working
groups have been set up to formulate by Spring 2010 proposals for savings of up to 20
percent of budget expenditure. Another group is tasked with reexamining tax policy within
the same time-frame. The aim is to select the most effective options to reduce credibly
existing budget imbalances. In this connection, the authorities’ proposal to embed the SGP in
Dutch law could usefully strengthen the commitment to deficit reduction.
52.
The authorities view pension reform as key to contain the impact of aging on
public finances. The authorities confirmed their intention to raise the retirement age from
65 to 66 starting in 2020 and 67 in 2025, but noted stiff political opposition. Staff suggested
consideration also be given to means-testing the generosity of basic benefits, while
strengthening dependence on second-pillar pensions. These measures could be supported by
intensified efforts to increase labor participation rates in order to broaden the base for
funding pensions. The authorities have already moved in this direction by abolishing tax
incentives for early retirement, with the aim to raise the effective retirement age.
53.
There was agreement that savings in health-care could make a considerable
contribution to fiscal sustainability. The authorities recognized that health-care expenditure
continues to rise rapidly, despite the 2006 reform. Most of the projected surge in health-care
spending over the long run is due not to demographic changes, but to expensive advances in
medical technology and real income growth, given high income elasticity of health-services
demand. Thus, staff argued that an increase in user fees could moderate demand growth,
although care should be taken to prevent overburdening the chronically ill. Tighter definition
of entitlements in long-term care could spawn savings in an area that has not been touched by
the 2006 reform and where aging pressures will be strong. On the supply side, productivity
increases in health- and long-term care of ½ percent a year (which has been achieved in some
OECD countries) would lower significantly projected rises in spending. Officials expressed
support for domestic and international benchmarking to identify best practices.
54.
The authorities could also consider a reduction in the maximum duration of
unemployment benefits. At 38 months, it is high by international standards. Cutting this to a
more common 18 months should preserve an adequate safety net, while strengthening
incentives for job-seeking and the fiscal position.

26

Netherlands: Fiscal Sustainability, 2011-60
(Percent of GDP)
6

6

Robust Balance

4

4

2

2

0

0

-2

-2

Plausible adjustment
1/

-4

Immediate full
adjustment

-6
-8

-4
-6
-8

No measures

-10

-10

-12

-12
2011

2021

10

2031

2041

2051
10

Overall Balance

5

5
0

0

Plausible adjustment
1/

-5
-10
-15

-10
-15

Immediate full
adjustment

-20

-5

-20

No measures

-25

-25

-30

-30

-35

-35
-40

-40
2011

2021

2031

2041

2051
700

700

Public Debt

600

600

500

500

400

400

300
200

-100

200

Plausible adjustment
1/

100
0

300

No measures

100
0

Immediate full
adjustment
2011

-100
2021

2031

2041

2051

Sources: CPB: Ageing and the Sustainability of Dutch Public Finances (2006), ECFIN: The 2009 Ageing
Report, and Staff calculations.
1/ The plausible adjustment scenario envisages the sustainability gap being closed by 2020.

27
D. Fiscal Rules

Fiscal stance (in percent of GDP) 1/

55.
Staff recommended refinements to existing trend-based budgeting to attenuate
its procyclicality and clarify conditions for resetting expenditure ceilings. Cyclically
sensitive outlays, such as unemployment
4.0
benefits and nontax revenues, should be
Pro-cyclical
Counter-cyclical
permanently removed from the
fiscal tightening
fiscal tightening
3.0
expenditure ceilings to prevent
1996
2.0
undesirable cuts in other spending during
recessions. In addition, such ceilings
2004
1.0
2005
ought to be updated in response to
1999
2000
2003
0.0
significant changes in potential growth or
2002
1997
2006
1998
large deviations of actual growth from its
2008
-1.0
2007
trend. This would allow for discretionary
-2.0
stimulus measures in case of sizable
downturns, without forcing a breach of
-3.0
Counter-cyclical
Pro-cyclical
2001
the ceilings, thereby enhancing their
fiscal loosening
fiscal loosening
-4.0
credibility. Similarly, the 2 percent GG
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
deficit trigger for fiscal tightening could
Output gap (in percent of GDP)
be made more flexible so that it does not
1/ Fiscal stance is measured by the change in the robust balance
apply when the economy is contracting by
more than a specified threshold—which would be consistent with the SGP. The authorities
generally agreed, noting, however, that adding excessive flexibility to the fiscal rule could
weaken its usefulness as a disciplining device.
IX. STRUCTURAL REFORMS
56.
Staff encouraged renewed momentum with structural reforms in light of the
likely impacts of the ongoing crisis and population aging. Much has been accomplished in
50
recent years, including reform of
Weekly Hours Per Worker, 2008
health-care and disability. However,
40
since the current crisis will have
long-lasting, possibly permanent,
30
effects on growth and increase the
fiscal sustainability gap, the case for
accelerating productivity-enhancing 20
structural reforms is strong. With
10
the impending aging problem,
progress is particularly urgent in
0
labor taxation, social benefits, and
NLD DEU FRA BEL DNK IRL SWE ESP AUT GBR USA FIN ITA GRC
employment protection—to curtail
Source: OECD.
disincentives to female,
disadvantaged youth, and elderly work. Indeed, labor force utilization in hours is

28
comparatively low, reflecting widespread part-time female work and low elderly
employment (Figure 11).
57.
In this connection, the authorities pointed to some promising initiatives. They
have set a participation target of 80 percent by 2016, and have established the Dutch Labor
Market Participation Commission to identify reform priorities to invigorate the labor
markets. The Commission submitted its recommendations in June 2008, having identified
steps to stimulate longer working lives. Staff and authorities generally concurred with the
analysis and approach of the Commission and the government will institute some specific
measures to boost participation (Table 7). Notably, those include reforms of the tax and
benefit systems.

29
Table 1. Netherlands: Basic Data
Land area (2007)
Population (2006)
Population characteristics and health:
Life expectancy at birth (2006)
Fertility rate (2006)
Infant mortality rate (2006)
Population per sq. km. of land area (2006)
National accounts 2007
Private consumption
Public consumption
Gross fixed investment
Stockbuilding
Exports of goods and nonfactor services
Imports of goods and nonfactor services
Nominal GDP (at market prices)

41.5 thousand sq. km.
16.3 million
76.4 (male), 81.7 (female)
1.7 children/woman
4.96 per 1,000 live births
483 persons
(In billions of euros)

(In percent of GDP)

263.2
141.3
111.6
-1.2
421.3
376.6
559.5

2003

47.0
25.3
19.9
-0.2
75.3
67.3
100.0

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Proj.

Proj.

2009

2010

(Annual percentage change; unless otherwise indicated)
National accounts (constant prices)
Private consumption
Public consumption
Gross fixed investment
Total domestic demand
Exports of goods and nonfactor services
Imports of goods and nonfactor services
Net foreign balance 2/
Gross domestic product

-0.2
2.9
-1.5
0.4
1.5
1.8
-0.1
0.3

1.0
-0.1
-1.6
0.5
7.9
5.7
1.9
2.2

1.0
0.5
3.7
1.4
6.0
5.4
0.9
2.0

-0.3 1/
9.5 1/
7.5
4.0
7.3
8.8
-0.5
3.4

1.7
3.7
4.8
2.3
6.7
5.1
1.6
3.6

1.3
2.0
4.9
2.7
2.7
3.7
-0.5
2.0

-2.5
2.5
-10.7
-3.2
-9.8
-9.2
-1.2
-4.2

0.2
1.5
-0.9
0.6
1.0
0.8
0.2
0.7

Output gap (in percent of potential output)

-1.6

-1.1

-0.9

0.6

2.4

2.8

-1.9

-1.8

Prices, wages, and employment
Consumer price index (HICP)
GDP deflator

2.2
2.2

1.4
0.7

1.5
2.4

1.7
1.8

1.6
1.6

2.2
2.7

0.9
0.7

1.0
1.0

2.7
1.9

1.6
-1.5

0.9
-0.8

1.8
-0.5

1.7
0.2

2.6
1.1

2.6
1.4

2.6
1.5

Hourly compensation (manufacturing)
Unit labor costs (manufacturing)
Employment
Unemployment rate (in percent)
Personal sector
Real disposable income
Household savings ratio 3/

-0.6
3.7

-1.4
4.6

-0.4
4.7

1.5
3.9

3.7
3.2

1.7
2.8

-0.7
3.8

-2.4
6.6

-0.3
6.3

2.2
7.8

0.4
6.7

-1.2 1/
5.4

2.9
6.4

1.5
6.7

-13.3
5.6

1.3
6.6

External trade
Exports of goods, volume
Imports of goods, volume
Terms of trade
Merchandise balance (percent of GDP)
Current account balance (percent of GDP)

7.4
2.3
0.8
6.8
5.5

7.0
7.4
-0.4
6.7
7.5

6.1
5.7
0.5
7.4
7.3

8.7
10.1
-0.3
7.2
9.3

6.5
6.8
-0.3
7.0
7.6

3.1
4.4
-0.1
6.5
7.5

-11.7
-9.5
2.1
5.4
7.0

1.0
0.8
-0.6
5.3
6.8

Public sector accounts (percent of GDP)
Revenue
Expenditure
General government balance
Structural balance
Primary balance
Structural primary balance
General government gross debt

43.8
46.9
-3.1
-2.0
-0.5
0.6
52.0

44.3
46.1
-1.8
-0.6
0.7
1.8
52.4

44.6
44.8
-0.3
-0.3
2.1
2.1
51.8

46.5 1/
45.9 1/
0.6
0.4
2.9
2.6
47.4

45.9
45.6
0.3
-1.1
2.1
1.2
45.5

46.7
45.9
0.8
-1.0
2.9
1.1
58.2

45.1
49.6
-4.5
-4.0
-2.1
-1.7
58.9

44.7
50.6
-5.9
-4.7
-3.6
-2.4
63.9

Sources: Dutch official publications; IMF, IFS; and IMF staff estimates.
1/ The introduction of the new health insurance scheme in 2006 caused a significant shift in health care expenditure from private to public
consumption, thereby lowering private and raising public consumption growth without changing overall GDP. In a related vein, government
revenues rose and private disposable income fall, without affecting the financial position of the public sector or households net terms. This is
because public expenditure for health care also rose, while the fall in private disposable income was offset by a similar fall in private health
consumption, which is now taken care of in the public domain.
2/ Contribution to GDP growth.
3/ In percent of disposable income.

Table 2. The Netherlands: General Government Accounts, 2003–10
(In percent of GDP)

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Proj.

Proj.

Revenues 1/

43.8

44.3

44.6

46.5

45.9

46.7

45.1

44.7

Tax revenues and social security contributions

37.4

37.5

37.6

39.1

38.9

39.1

38.3

38.3

Tax revenues

23.6

23.6

24.6

25.0

25.4

24.6

24.8

23.9

Social security contributions

13.8

13.9

12.9

14.1

13.5

14.5

13.5

14.4

6.4

6.8

7.0

7.4

7.0

7.6

6.8

6.4

Nontax revenues
Expenditure 1/

46.9

46.1

44.8

45.9

45.6

45.9

49.6

50.6

Direct expenditure

29.1

28.6

28.1

29.4

29.6

29.7

32.4

32.5

Compensation of employees

10.1

10.0

9.6

9.3

9.2

9.1

9.9

9.9

Goods and services (excluding capital formation)

7.3

7.2

7.1

7.3

7.2

7.4

8.0

7.8

Fixed capital formation

3.6

3.2

3.3

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.7

3.9

Social benefits in kind
Transfers

8.2

8.2

8.1

9.5

9.8

9.8

10.8

10.9

15.2

15.0

14.4

14.3

13.8

14.1

14.9

15.8

1.7

1.7

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.5

1.6

Other transfers

13.5

13.3

12.9

12.9

12.4

12.7

13.4

14.2

Households

10.9

10.7

10.2

10.3

9.8

10.0

11.0

11.5

Corporations

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.3

Rest of the world

2.1

2.2

2.4

2.3

2.3

2.3

2.0

2.4

Interest

2.6

2.5

2.4

2.2

2.2

2.1

2.4

2.4

Fiscal balance

-3.1

-1.8

-0.3

0.6

0.3

0.8

-4.5

-5.9

-3.6

Memorandum items:
Primary balance

-0.5

0.7

2.1

2.9

2.1

2.9

-2.1

Structural balance (in percent of GDP) 2/

-2.0

-0.6

-0.3

0.4

-1.1

-1.0

-4.0

-4.7

Robust balance (in percent of GDP)

-1.3

-0.2

0.6

-0.1

-1.4

-2.2

-4.4

-5.0

Gross Debt

52.0

52.4

51.8

47.4

45.5

58.2

58.9

63.9

Output gap

-1.6

-1.1

-0.9

0.6

2.4

2.8

-1.9

-1.8

Sources: The Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), Ministry of Finance, and Fund staff calculations and estimates.
1/ The introduction of the new healthcare system in 2006 did not affect the overall balance, but permanently increased both revenue and expenditure by 1.6 percentage points of
GDP.
2/ The calculation of the structural balance is based on the standard methodology which uses fixed elasticities with respect to GDP. Biases can occur, in particular in the context
of asset price boom and busts (as discussed for the Netherlands in SM/04/296), which especially affected 2000-03. Progressiveness in the tax system can also result in an
overstatement of structural adjustment when GDP growth is high.

30

Subsidies (including EU)

31
Table 3. Netherlands: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2003-2009
(In percent; unless otherwise indicated)
Indicator
Regulatory capital-to-risk-weighted assets
Regulatory Tier I capital-to-risk-weighted assets
Bank capital to assets
Net open position in equities to capital

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

12.3
9.6
4.30
59.9

12.3
9.9
3.90
79.6

12.6
10.3
4.20
80.6

11.9
9.4
3.00
91.1

13.2
10.2
3.30
83.2

11.9
9.9
3.2
31.1

13.3 2/
11.2 2/
3.5 3/
30.0 2/

Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital 1/
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans 1/

24.3
2.0

19.2
1.5

15.7
1.2

12.2
0.8

...
...

...
...

...
...

Return on assets
Return on equity
Interest margin to gross income
Noninterest expenses to gross income

0.5
14.8
60.5
75.5

0.4
16.8
58.9
70.5

0.4
15.4
54.1
70.1

0.4
15.4
51.4
74.0

0.6
18.7
52.0
78.3

-0.4
-12.5
187.8
230.6

0.0 2/
-0.5 2/
70.2 2/
116.4 2/

Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans (percent)
Total
Residents
Deposit takers
Central Bank
Other Financial Corporations
General Government
Non Financial Corporations
Other Domestic Sectors
Non residents

100.0
74.0
14.6
1.1
9.2
3.0
17.4
28.8
26.0

100.0
73.7
15.1
0.9
10.2
2.8
16.3
28.5
26.3

100.0
68.7
1.3
1.2
12.8
3.1
18.1
32.3
31.3

100.0
63.2
1.6
0.9
12.1
2.7
16.5
29.5
36.8

100.0
59.7
2.0
1.2
10.0
2.4
17.5
26.6
40.3

100.0
64.4
3.0
1.2
10.9
2.7
19.3
27.3
35.7

100.0 2/
67.1 2/
3.3 2/
2.3 2/
10.9 2/
3.8 2/
20.2 2/
26.6 2/
32.9 2/

Residential mortgage loans to total loans

25.2

25.1

28.6

26.0

24.1

24.9

23.8 2/

...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

41.0
54.7
4.3
0.1
0.1
1.1
0.3
0.9
0.2
1.8

35.2
59.8
5.0
0.1
0.1
1.2
0.4
0.9
0.2
2.2

33.7
60.5
5.9
0.1
0.1
1.2
0.5
1.0
0.3
2.7

30.2
61.6
8.2
0.2
0.1
1.9
0.7
1.6
0.4
3.5

42.7
49.9
7.4
0.1
0.1
2.7
0.9
1.5
0.4
1.8

44.2 2/
45.1 2/
6.3 2/
0.1 2/
0.1 2/
2.2 2/
0.6 2/
1.3 2/
0.3 2/
1.4 2/

308.3
61.6
102.6

341.5
64.3
109.7

330.2
67.3
123.8

314.0
65.1
128.9

326.1
63.7
134.7

378.5
62.9
117.9
30.4

395.8 4/
64.3 3/
116.5 3/
49.7 2/

259.0

264.0

301.0

326.0

262.7

209.5

...

...
...
...

...
...
...

...
...
...

...
...
...

2.0
151.0
283.0

290.0
92.0
25.0

309.0 3/
65.0 3/
18.0 3/

Contingent and off-balance-sheet accounts to total assets

Geographical distribution of credit (percent of total)
Domestic Economy
Advanced economies
Emerging markets and Developing countries
Africa
Of which: Sub- Sahara
Central and Eastern Europe
Commonwealth of independent states and Mongaolia
Developing China, including China
Middle East
Western Hemisphere
Assets of financial entities (percent of GDP)
Banks
Insurers
Pension funds
Investment funds
Average solvency ratio of insurers (percent)
No. of pension funds with
Funding ratio < 105 percent
Funding ratio 105 - 130 percent
Funding ratio > 130 percent
Source: Data provided by the authorities.
1/ Three largest credit institutions.
2/ Second quarter for 2009 data.
3/ First quarter for 2009 data.
4/ August for 2009 data.

32
Table 4. Netherlands: Indicators of External and Financial Vulnerability, 2003-09
(In percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

External indicators
Exports goods and services
(Annual percent change, in U.S. dollars)

17.8

17.0

9.0

12.9

17.5

16.9

-12.4

Imports goods and services
(Annual percent change, in U.S. dollars)

23.6

17.9

9.7

10.5

16.8

13.8

-14.9

Terms of trade goods (annual percent change)
Current account balance

0.8
5.5

-0.4
7.5

0.5
7.3

-0.4
9.3

-0.3
7.6

0.4
7.5

-0.4
7.0

Portfolio investment, net
Foreign direct investment, net

-2.3
-3.1

3.4
0.3

-3.4
-1.6

4.1
-4.3

-5.1
-4.0

12.0
-13.2

3.8
-8.5

Official reserves (in billions of euros)

17.1

15.9

17.3

18.2

18.3

20.5

21.97

Foreign assets of the banking sector
(In billions of euros)

446

502

587

723

832

714

685

Foreign liabilities of the banking sector
(In billions of euros)

396.9

447.1

506.0

605.9

737.4

593.8

597.8

Official reserves in months of imports

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.6

Exchange rate (per U.S. dollar, period average)

0.88

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.73

0.68

0.76

Financial market indicators
Public sector debt (Maastricht definition)
Government bond yield
Government bond yield (real)
Stock market index
Spread of government bond yield with Germany

52.0
4.1
1.9
337.7
0.05

52.4
4.1
2.7
348.1
0.06

51.8
3.4
1.9
436.8
0.02

47.4
3.8
2.1
495.3
0.02

45.5
4.3
2.7
515.8
0.07

58.2
4.2
2.0
245.9
0.24

59.9
3.6
3.3
295.7
0.30

Sources: Data provided by the authorities; and IMF, IFS.

33
Table 5. Headline Support for Financial and Other Sectors and Upfront Financing Need
(As of August, 2009; in percent of 2008 GDP; average using PPP GDP weights) 1/

(A)

Purchase of Assets
and Lending by
Treasury 2/
(B)

(C)

Liquidity Provision and
Other Support by
Central Bank
(D)

Advanced North America
Canada
United States 5/

0.0
5.2

10.9
1.5

13.5
10.6

1.5
8.1

10.9
6.9

Advanced Europe
Austria
Belgium
France 6/
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy 7/
Netherlands
Norway 8/
Portugal 9/
Spain 10/
Sweden 11/
Switzerland
United Kingdom 12/
European Central Bank

5.3
4.8
1.4
3.8
2.1
5.9
0.6
3.4
2.0
2.4
0.8
1.6
1.1
3.9
…

0.0
0.0
1.3
0.4
3.3
0.0
0.0
11.2
15.8
0.0
3.9
4.8
0.0
13.8
…

30.1
26.4
16.4
18.0
6.2
198.1
0.0
33.6
0.0
12.0
15.8
47.5
0.0
53.2
…

…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
21.0
…
…
13.9
24.9
19.0
8.5

8.9
4.8
1.6
3.7
5.4
5.9
0.6
14.6
15.8
2.4
4.6
5.2
1.1
20.0
…

Advanced Asia and Pacific
Australia
Japan 13/
Korea 14/

0.0
2.4
2.3

0.7
11.4
5.5

8.8
7.3
14.5

…
1.9
6.5

0.7
0.8
0.8

Average
G-20
Advanced Economies
In billions of US$
Emerging Economies
In billions of US$

2.2
3.4
1,160
0.2
22

2.7
4.1
1,436
0.3
38

8.8
13.9
4,638
0.1
7

9.7
7.6
2,804
13.5
1,581

3.7
5.7
1,887
0.4
47

Capital Injection

Guarantees 3/

Upfront Government
Financing 4/
(E)

Sources: FAD-MCM database; Monetary Authorities; International Financial Statistics; and World Economic Outlook, April 2009.
1/ Amounts in columns A, B, C and E indicate announced or pledged amounts, and not actual uptake. Column D shows the actual changes in
central bank's balance sheet from June 2007 to June 2009. While the expansion of central bank balance sheet is mostly related to measures
aimed at enhancing market liquidity as well as financial sector support, it may occasionally have other causes. It may also not fully capture some
other types of support, including that arising from changes in regulatory policies. For the euro zone countries, see the ECB line. Averages for
column D include the euro zone as a whole.
2/ Column B does not include Treasury funds provided in support of central bank operations. These amount to 0.5 percent of GDP in the U.S.,
and 12.8 percent in the U.K.
3/ Excludes deposit insurance provided by deposit insurance agencies.
4/ This includes support measures that require upfront government outlays. It does not include recoveries from the sale of assets acquired
through interventions.
5/ Estimated upfront financing need for 2009-10 is $990 bn (6.9 percent of GDP), consisting of the allocated amount under Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP; $510 bn); Treasury purchases of GSE preferred stocks ($400 bn); and Treasury support for Commercial Paper Funding Facility
($50 bn).
6/ Support to the country's strategic companies is recorded under (B); of which €20 bn will be financed by a state-owned bank, Caisse des
Depots and Consignations, not requiring upfront Treasury financing.
7/ It does not include the temporary swap of government securities for assets held by Italian banks undertaken by the Bank of Italy.
8/ Excluding asset accumulation in Sovereign Wealth Fund, the balance sheet expansion during the period was only 4.5 percent of GDP.
9/ A maximum amount of €20 bn (12% of GDP) is allocated to both the guarantee scheme and the reinforcement of core capital, with the latter
not exceeding €4 bn.
10/ Cabinet approved guarantees for bank debt up to €100 bn. Another €100 bn can be extended, if needed. Bank Restructuring Fund, for which
the current legislative framework provided €9 billion, could potentially be increased to up to €99 billion through debt issuance.
11/ Some capital injection (SEK50 billion) will be undertaken by the Stabilization Fund.
12/ Estimated upfront financing need is £289 bn (20 percent of GDP), consisting of Bank Recapitalization Fund (£56 bn), Special Liquidity
Scheme (£185 bn) and financing for the nationalization of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley (£48 bn).
13/ Budget provides JPY 3,900 bn (0.8 percent of GDP) to support capital injection by a special corporation and lending and purchase of
commercial paper by policy-based financing institutions.
14/ In 2009, KRW 8 trillion will be provided from the budget to support for SMEs.

Table 6. Netherlands: Summary of State Interventions in Major Financial Institutions
Institution
ABN AMRO/Fortis

Type of State
Intervention

Additional capital
strengthening actions of
€4.4 billion, of which
€1.4 billion is a debt to
equity swap, is pending
see letter Ministry of
Finance to Dutch
Parliament of
19 November 2009.

Restructuring

Background

Restrictions on
dividends, bonuses.
Certain decisions by
the Managing Board
of ABN Amro/Fortis
are likely to require
approval by the
State in her capacity
as shareholder.

The restructuring involves
consolidating the Dutch banking and
insurance operations of former Fortis
and ABN AMRO, divestment of most
insurance activities, and
reconstructing remaining banking
operations under a new state-owned
bank called ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
Legal separation of original ABN
AMRO parts to be owned by the
Dutch state and RBS is expected to
be complete at the end of 2010:Q1.
The authorities intend to divest ABN
AMRO Bank N.V. The creation of the
envisaged merger of ABN Amro and
Fortis requires the prior completion of
the so-called EC Remedies
transaction i.e. a sale of a sizeable
Dutch SME portfolio to a third party.
The capital consequences of this
transaction have been taken into
account during the assessment of the
sufficiency of the additional
€4.4 billion capital strengthening.
Furthermore, talks are under way with
several potential buyers of other
divestible units, with Fortis Corporate
Insurance NV already sold to Lloyds
of London.

ABN AMRO was in the process of
being acquired by a consortium
including Royal Bank of Scotland,
Fortis, and Santander. In October
2008, Fortis experienced financial
problems and was rescued,
divided and nationalized by the
Benelux states. The Dutch
authorities are now attempting to
separate Fortis’ Dutch banking
and insurance operations from the
rest of Fortis, separate
Fortis’share of ABN AMRO,
integrate the two, streamline and
eventually privatize it.

34

(i) Acquisition of Fortis’
Dutch operations,
including Fortis’ share of
ABN AMRO for
€16.9 billion; (ii) a bridge
loan to Fortis of
€34 billion, (iii) state
guarantee of €5 billion
bond issue by Fortis, (iv)
assumption of credit risk
in a mortgage portfolio of
€19 billion through a
capital release
instrument of €1.7 billion
and mandatory
convertible note of
€0.8 billion.

Conditions Imposed

Table 6. Netherlands: Summary of State Interventions in Major Financial Institutions
Institution
ING Bank

Type of State
Intervention

ING has agreed with the
Dutch state to facilitate
early repayment of the
capital injection, for
which ING intends to
repurchase €5 billion of
Core tier 1 securities in
December 2009. ING will
pay additional fees for
the IABF.

Restructuring

Background

(i) Two Board
members with veto
rights over
fundamental
decisions on
acquisitions,
investments, capital
raising and
remuneration; (ii)
scrap the final 2008
dividend; (iii) grant
additional credits of
€25 billion to the
private sector; (iv)
restrict bonuses; (v)
pay a step-up
coupon if it declares
ordinary dividends.

Restructuring is based on the final
restructuring plan filed with EC
(published 26 October 2009). Besides
the earlier this year presented Back to
Basics programme to streamline the
company and reduce risk, costs and
leverage, ING will divest all insurance
and management activities over time.
ING will eleliminate double leverage
and significantly reduce balance
sheet. ING will also divest ING Direct
USA. ING will create a new company
in the Dutch retail market out of part
of its current operations, by combining
the Interadvies banking division
(including Westland Utrecht and the
mortgage activities of NationaleNederlanden) and the existing
consumer lending portfolio of ING
Retail. All restructuring will take place
over the years 2010-2013.

ING faced significant financial
problems stemming from global
crisis, valuation losses, an overextended business empire. Unlike
ABN AMRO/Fortis transaction,
ING remains a principally privately
owned and managed bank.

ING has plans for a €7.5 billion rights
issue to finance repayment and cover
charge for additional IABF payments.

35

(i) A capital infusion of
€10 billion through
8.5 percent non-voting
preferred shares; (ii) a
facility under which
80 percent of profits or
losses on ING’s illiquid
Alt-A MBS portfolio
would be passed to the
state for a fee; (iii) ING
can issue up to
€10 billion in
government-guaranteed
bonds (€2 billion placed
in March 2009).

Conditions Imposed

Table 6. Netherlands: Summary of State Interventions in Major Financial Institutions
Institution

Type of State
Intervention
(i) capital injection of
€750 million by way of
interest-bearing
securities with equity-like
features,

Aegon NV

Indirect capital infusion.
The state will lend
€3 billion to AEGON's
largest shareholder,
Association AEGON,
which has 34 percent
voting rights through
common and preference
shares. Association
AEGON to purchase
from AEGON 750 million
non-voting securities at
€4 per security, with the
option to repurchase
250 million before the
end of 2009 at
100 percent instead of
150 percent penalty (for
repurchase after 2009).

Restructuring

(i) Restrictions on
executive
compensation and
dividends; (ii)
incentives for early
repayment similar to
ING; (iii) a parallel
capital infusion of
€500 million by
Stichting Beheer
SNS REAAL.

No major restructuring intended.

Background

36

SNS REAAL

Conditions Imposed

37
Table 7. Netherlands: Policy Responses to the Recommendation to Improve Labor Supply
Timeline

Policy Response

2009

General
- Reduce Unemployment Fund (AWF) premium for employees to 0 percent

2008
2008
2009
2009

2009
2009

2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010

Women
- Increase supplementary combination tax credit (ACK)
- Establish Part-time Plus Task Force
- Convert supplementary combination tax credit into income-based supplementary
combination tax credit (IACK)
- Phase out transferability of general tax credit over 15-year period
Older workers
- Convert premium exemption into a targeted temporary premium discount for older
unemployed workers
- Introduce bonus for continuing to work after reaching the age of 62
- Increase statutory retirement age from 65 to 67
Vulnerable groups
- Implement employment scheme to facilitate the creation of jobs for those receiving
benefits under the Work and Social Assistance Act (‘participation jobs’)
- Conclude agreements with the 39 regions of the Regional Registration and
Coordination Centers (RMCs) to address school drop-out levels
- Introduce a stricter definition of ‘appropriate work’ in the Unemployment Insurance Act
(WW)
- Introduce earned income tax credit
- Introduce temporary wage cost subsidy for long-term unemployed under the age of 50
(STAP)
- Introduce integrated services at the regional Locations for Work and Income
- Introduce budget for municipalities to promote labor market participation
- Introduce Investment in the Young Act (WIJ)
- Adjust income benefits for young disabled persons under the Invalidity Insurance
(Young Disabled Persons) Act (Wajong)

Source: Annual Progress Report 2009, The Netherlands, in the context of the Lisbon Strategy.

38
Figure 1. Netherlands: International Comparisons of Financial Markets
(2008, in percent of GDP)
80

500

Stock Market Capitalization

Bank Assets

450

70

400
60
350
50

300

40

250
200

30

150
20
100
10

50

0

0
UK

FRA

EA

DEU

NLD

UK

FRA

NLD

EA

DEU

800

250

Bonds, Equities, and Bank Assets

Debt Securities
700
200

Public
600

Private

500

150

400
100

300

200
50
100

0

0
NLD

EA

FRA

DEU

Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report.

UK

UK

NLD

FRA

EA

DEU

39
Figure 2. Netherlands: Real Sector Developments
6.0

15

Real GDP growth
(Annual growth rates, percent)

Contributions to Growth
(Annualized quarterly growth, percent)

4.0

10

2.0
5
0.0
0
-2.0
-5
Netherlands

-4.0

Net Exports
Change in inventories
Investment
Private Consumption
Public Consumption
GDP

Germany
Euro Area

-10

USA

-6.0

-8.0
2000Q1 2001Q3 2003Q1 2004Q3 2006Q1 2007Q3 2009Q1

-15

70

4.0

35

Confidence Indicators and Growth

2007Q1

2007Q3

2008Q1

2008Q3

2009Q1

Output Gap
(In percent of potential GDP)

30
3.0

25
20

2.0

60
15

1.0

10
5

0.0
50

0

-1.0

-5
-10

-2.0

-15
40
-20

Consumer confidence 1/

-25

Industrial confidence 1/

Germany
Euro Area
USA

-4.0

Industrial production growth 2/

-30

Netherlands

-3.0

PMI (right scale) 3/

-35
2005M1

30
2006M1

2007M1

2008M1

-5.0

2009M1

Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, WEO; and IMF staff estimates.
1/ Percent balance.
2/ Percent.
3/ PMI: Manufacturing (SA, 50+=Expansion).

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

40
Figure 3. Netherlands: Comparative Economic Performance
...with private consumption declining more than
the euro area average...

Read GDP in the Netherlands declined sharpy as
in other euro area countries...
8

8

Real GDP
(Annual percent change)

Real Private Consumption
(Annual percent change)

6

6

4
4
2
2
0
0

-2

Netherlands
France
Germany
Euro Area

-4

Netherlands 1/
France
Germany
Euro Area

-2

-6

-4
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

..and exports declining declining in line with the
euro area average

... and business investment....
20

20

Real Business Investment
(Annual percent change)

15

15

10

10

5

5

0

0

-5

-5

Netherlands
France
Germany
Euro Area

-10

-15

Real Exports
(Annual percent change)

Netherlands
France
Germany
Euro Area

-10

-15

-20

-20
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Sources: Global Insight; Netherlands authorities; and IMF, WEO.
1/ The consumption growth in 2006 is adjusted for the health care reform. The reform of the health care system at the beginning of
2006 resulted in a shift of health care expenditures of about euro 8.0 billion (1.5 percent of GDP) from private to public consumption,
distorting private consumption downward by about 3 percentage points in 2006.

41
Figure 4. Netherlands: External Competitiveness
Nominal exchange rate appreciation has reversed the
recent real depreciation.

The unit labor costs have been falling or roughly
flat in recent years..
20

120

Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing
(Annual growth rates, in percent)

15

Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates
115
Real Effective Exchange Rate (NULC-based)

10

Nominal Effective Exchange Rate

110

Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI-based)

5
105
0
100
-5
95

-10
Netherlands
All competitors
Euro competitors
Non-euro competitors

-15

90

-20
1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

Exports are performing roughly on par with
previous cycles.

140

85
1995

8

Exports of Goods and Services 1/
(Trough=100)

135

125

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Aggregate market share data, though difficult to
interpret, do not point to particular difficulties.
Export Market Shares (In percent)

1983Q1
1987Q2
1998Q4
2002Q1
2005Q1

130

1997

6
Nominal exports in percent of the EU market

120

Nominal exports in percent of the world market
115
4

110
105
2005Q1
100

2

95
0

2

4
6
8
10
12
14
Quarters around cyclical troughs

16

18

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Sources: CPB; OECD, Economic outlook; IMF, IFS, DOT, and WEO.
1/ Troughs were identified using the methodology of Harding and Pagan (2002), "Dissecting the Cycle: A Methodological
Investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics.

42
Figure 4. Netherlands: External Competitiveness (concluded)
Export market share has tended to decline in many countries, partly reflecting the expansion of exports
from many emerging market countries such as China & India. On a comparative basis, the Netherlands
is performing well among European countries.

2

Export Market Shares
(2002-2008 average of annual percent changes)

0
-2
-4
-6
Netherlands

Belgium

France

Germany

Italy

Spain

UK

Reexports have registered particularly strong growth.

50

Domestically Produced Exports and Re-exports
(Annual growth rates, in percent)

40

Domestically produced exports
Re-exports

30
20
10
0
-10
1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2004

2006

2008

And the current account is significantly in surplus.

10

Current Account Balance
(Percent of GDP)

8

6

4

2

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

Sources CPB; IMF, IFS, DOT, and WEO.

1998

2000

2002

43
Figure 5. Netherlands: Trade Openness and Spillovers
90
Netherlands Export Shares
(Average 2005-08, percent)

80

Exports
(Average 2002-08, % share)

70
17%
60

38%
15%

50
40

12%

18%

30
20

Machinery & transport equipment
Chemicals & related products

10

Mineral fuels, lubricants, & related materials
Food, drinks & tobacco
Other

0
EU

EA DEU BEL UK FRA USA CHN JPN CAN HKG
115

25
Export Growth Comparisons
(Percent)

Real Effective Exchange Rates
(NULC-based, 2005=100)
110

20

105
15
100
10
95
5

Netherlands
Euro Area
France
Germany

90

0
NLD
FRA
NLD - avg

EA
DEU
Euro Area - avg

-5
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Sources: EIU and IMF; DOT and IFS.

2007

2008

85

80
2002M1

2003M7

2005M1

2006M7

2008M1

2009M7

44
Figure 6. Netherlands: Comparative Financial Indicators
140

180
160

Spreads on 5-Year Sovereign CDS
(In basis points)

Sovereign Spread with German 10-Year Bund
(In basis points)
120

140

100

120
100
80

Netherlands
Belgium
France
Germany
UK

Netherlands
Belgium
France
UK

80

60

40
60
20

40

0

20
0
1/3/07 6/3/07 11/3/07 4/3/08 9/3/08 2/3/09 7/3/09
130
120

Stock Indices
(1/3/07 = 100)

-20
1/3/07 6/3/07 11/3/07 4/3/08 9/3/08 2/3/09 7/3/09
700

Corporate Bond Spread Over Sovereign Bond
(In basis points)

600
110
500

100
90

400

Netherlands
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
UK

80
300

70
60
50
40

Netherlands
Belgium
France
Germany
UK

30
1/3/07 6/3/07 11/3/07 4/3/08 9/3/08 2/3/09 7/3/09

Source: Thomson Financial/DataStream.

200

100

0
1/3/07 6/3/07 11/3/07 4/3/08 9/3/08 2/3/09 7/3/09

5.0

2.0
600

300

200

Government Interest Rates
(percent)

10 year
3 month

1.0

0.0
1/1/07
3/1/07
5/1/07
7/1/07
9/1/07
11/1/07
1/1/08
3/1/08
5/1/08
7/1/08
9/1/08
11/1/08
1/1/09
3/1/09
5/1/09
7/1/09
9/1/09
11/1/09

1/1/07
3/1/07
5/1/07
7/1/07
9/1/07
11/1/07
1/1/08
3/1/08
5/1/08
7/1/08
9/1/08
11/1/08
1/1/09
3/1/09
5/1/09
7/1/09
9/1/09
11/1/09
Equities (1/1/2007 = 100)

100

80

Stock Indices
5000

4.0

500
4000

400
3000

AEX
2000

Euro Stoxx 50
(right-scale)
1000

1/1/07
3/1/07
5/1/07
7/1/07
9/1/07
11/1/07
1/1/08
3/1/08
5/1/08
7/1/08
9/1/08
11/1/08
1/1/09
3/1/09
5/1/09
7/1/09
9/1/09
11/1/09

1/1/07
3/1/07
5/1/07
7/1/07
9/1/07
11/1/07
1/1/08
3/1/08
5/1/08
7/1/08
9/1/08
11/1/08
1/1/09
3/1/09
5/1/09
7/1/09
9/1/09
11/1/09

120

60
120

40
80

20
40

0
0

1/1/07
3/1/07
5/1/07
7/1/07
9/1/07
11/1/07
1/1/08
3/1/08
5/1/08
7/1/08
9/1/08
11/1/08
1/1/09
3/1/09
5/1/09
7/1/09
9/1/09
11/1/09

6.0

1/1/07
3/1/07
5/1/07
7/1/07
9/1/07
11/1/07
1/1/08
3/1/08
5/1/08
7/1/08
9/1/08
11/1/08
1/1/09
3/1/09
5/1/09
7/1/09
9/1/09
11/1/09

45

Figure 7. Netherlands: Financial Indicators
240

200

Credit Default Swap Spreads
(In basis points, 5 years)

ING
160
ABN Amro

ING

Rabobank

7.0

6.0

Interbank Money Market
Rates (percent)

5.0

3.0

2.0

1.0
Overnight
3 month

0.0

100

80
Sovereign Spread
(basis points)
300

4.0
60

3.0
40

20

0

Source: Thomson Financial/DataStream and Bloomberg.
250

Spread with Bund, 10Year

200

3 mo. interbank - 3 mo.
TBill (RHS)

150

100

50

0

46
Figure 8. Netherlands: Financial Stability Indicators
(In percent)
…and the financial positions of private pension and
insurance companies have deteriorated.

Banks' capitalization and profitability have declined
sharply...
200

14

400
Pension funds cover ratio

0.65

Insurers: solvency ratio (RHS)
0.45
13

150

350

100

300

50

250

0.25

0.05

12

-0.15
Capital adequacy ratio
11

-0.35

Return on Assets (RHS)

-0.55

10

-0.75

0

200

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

House prices have declined recently, and credit
growth has slowed.

Households debt has trended upwards while
nonfinancial corporations have reduced leverage.
150

18
House prices

16

140

Private sector credit

Corporates: Debt to equity
Households: Debt to GDP

14
130
12
120

10
8

110

6

100

4

90

2
80
0
70

-2
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2000

Sources: Global Insight; data provided by the authorities; and IMF, IFS.

2002

2004

2006

2008

47
Figure 9. Netherlands: Monetary Conditions

Monetary conditions tightened in recent months with the sharp decline in inflation.
6.0
Euro Area Interest Rates
(In percent)
5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0
3-month money market rate (percent)

1.0

Main refinancing rate (percent)

0.0
1/99 8/99 3/00 11/00 6/01 1/02 9/02 4/03 11/03 7/04 2/05 9/05 5/06 12/06 8/07 3/08 10/08 6/09

6.0

110
Indicators of Monetary Conditions
Real short-term interest rate (percent)

4.0

105

MCI (Deviation from long-term average, percent)

2.0

100

0.0

95

-2.0

90

-4.0
1994M1

85
1996M1

1998M1

2000M1

2002M1

Sources: Global Insight; and IMF, IFS.
1/ An increase implies less accommodative conditions.

2004M1

2006M1

2008M1

Source: OECD.
1/ 2006 data.
2/ 2008 data.

0
Luxembourg

Ireland

Germany

Japan

Portugal

UK

5

Ireland

10
Austria

15

Greece

20
Spain

25

Denmark

30
USA

Corporate income tax rate (2009, percent)

Austria

35
OECD

45

Netherlands

Finland

OECD

Sweden

Portugal 2/

EU 15

Greece

France

EU 15

Japan

USA

Greece 1/

Ireland

OECD 1/

Germany

Portugal

UK

Luxembourg

Spain

Netherlands

EU 15

Austria

Finland

Italy

France

Belgium

Sweden

Denmark

50

Italy

UK

40

Luxembourg

Italy

Netherlands

Finland

Sweden

Belgium

Denmark

60

Spain

Germany

Belgium

France

USA

Japan

48

Figure 10. Netherlands: Tax Comparisons

60

Tax revenue (2007, percent of GDP)

40

30

20

10

0

70

Top marginal personal income tax rates for employees (2008, percent)

50

40

30

20

10

0

49
Figure 11. Netherlands: Selected Labor Market Indicators
The employment rate is above the European
average when measured in workers...

...but it is low when measured in hours, partly
reflecting women participating part-time.
80

80

Employment Rate
(Hours worked, average 2006-08)

Employment Rate
(Persons, average 2006-08)
70

70

60

60

50

50

40

40

30

30
ITA USA BEL FRA GRCSWE ESP IRL FIN GBR DEU NLD DNK

BEL FRA DEU ITA USA NLD SWE ESP IRL GBR FIN DNK GRC

Minimum wages are moderate.

Wage dispersion is compressed.
0.8

5
Wage Dispersion
(90th percentile over 10th)

Minimum Wage to Average Wage
(2008, Percent)

4
0.6

3
0.4
2

0.2
1

0.0

0
DNK

SWE

ITA

Source: OECD.

NLD

DEU

FRA

GBR

USA

FRA

BEL

GBR

NLD

JPN

USA

50
Figure 11. Netherlands: Selected Labor Market Indicators (concluded)
Unemployment benefits are fairly generous.
80

Women participate largely part-time.
120

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits
(In months)

Female Participation in Labor Force ( In percent)
100

Share of full-time
Share of part-time

60
80

40

60

40
20
20

0

0
DNK FRA NLD NOR SWE DEU JPN GBR ITA USA

DNK BEL NLD DEU SWE GBR FRA USA JPN ITA

EPL on regular contracts is moderate.

The effective retirement age is low.
72
70

4
2008 OECD Employment Protection Index
(0-6 from least to most restrictive)

Effective Retirement Age
(Years, average for 2002-07)

68
66

Men
Women

3

64
62

2

60
58
1
56
54
52

0
FRA ITA NLD DEU GBR DNK NOR USA SWE JPN

Source: OECD.

FRA NOR DEU BEL ITA NLD SWE DNK JPN GBR USA

51
ANALYTICAL NOTE 1. DUTCH HOUSING MARKETS: WHAT WENT UP WILL COME DOWN?1
1.
After an extended period of rapidly increasing prices and vigorous activity,
residential real estate markets in the Netherlands have started cooling down. House
prices fell 5.3 percent in September 2009 compared to the same period last year while the
number of units sold fell by a third (Figure 1-1). If history is any guide, the current downturn
might turn out to be rather severe. Since the 1970s, Dutch house prices have gone through
one major cycle that peaked in the second quarter of 1978. That downturn lasted 29 quarters
and, when the trough was reached in the third quarter of 1985, real house prices were
50 percent down relative to their peak (Figure 1-2).
2.
How long will the current downturn last and how severe will it be? To answer the
question, this note summarizes various models that have been used in previous studies to
assess house price movements in the Netherlands and compares these models to understand
the key differences.
Figure 1-1. Netherlands: Housing Market Activity, 1995-2009 1/
120

25
Units sold (RHS)

100

Prices (LHS)

20

80
15
60
10
40

5

20

2009 March

2008 May

2007 July

2006 September

2005 November

2005 January

2004 March

2003 May

2002 July

2001 September

2000 November

2000 January

1999 March

1998 May

1997 July

1996 September

1995 November

0
1995 January

0

Source: Statistics Netherlands/Dutch Land Registry Office.
1/ Prices are measured by a transaction-based index, with base year 2005, for all owner-occupied dwellings. Units sold are expressed in
thousands. Both series are at monthly frequency and are seasonally adjusted.

1

Prepared by Deniz Igan.

52

Figure 1-2. Netherlands: House Prices, Rent, and Income, 1970-2009
160

1.4

140

1.2

120
1
100
0.8
80
0.6
60
0.4
40

Nominal price index (LHS)
Real price index (LHS)
Price-to-income ratio (RHS)

20

0.2

Price-to-rent ratio (RHS)

0
1970:2 1972:2 1974:2 1976:2 1978:2 1980:2 1982:2 1984:2 1986:2 1988:2 1990:2 1992:2 1994:2 1996:2 1998:2 2000:2 2002:2 2004:2 2006:2 2008:2

0

Source: OECD.

A. Models of House Prices
3.
The acceleration of house prices in the 1990s is not out of sync with income and
rent developments. A common rule-of-thumb used to assess whether the observed
movement in house prices is in line with underlying economic factors (‘fundamentals’) looks
at price-to-income (PIR) and price-to-rent (PRR) ratios. Application of this rule reveals that
the episode in the late 1970s was characterized by a steep increase followed by a sharp
decline in both metrics. While house prices have accelerated in the 1990s, the increases in
PIR and PRR have been more modest, suggesting that at least part of the increase in prices
can be explained by the movement in fundamentals.
4.
Use of income and rent as benchmarks reflects the rationale behind the two
main strands of house price models: housing as a consumption good and as an asset.


In the first model, housing is treated as a durable consumption good and house price
determination is analyzed in a demand-supply framework. Supply factors such as land
availability and zoning restrictions are generally assumed to be rather inelastic in the
short run, and hence the supply curve slopes upward. Demand factors, e.g. credit
availability and income, are assumed to be subject to non-stationary shocks. As a
result, house prices are not stationary either and, in this simple supply-demand
framework, house prices and demand-side factors would be in a cointegrating
relationship the exact characteristics of which depend on the elasticities of supply and

53
demand. To put it more precisely, the inverse demand function for housing services is
given by
log h d   log p   log y  z
where h d is housing services demanded, p is real house price, y is real disposal
income, and z is a vector of other demand factors. Demand factors basically include
variables affecting intertemporal decision-making as housing is durable. In particular,
expectations about future earnings (permanent income), ease of consumptionsmoothing through credit availability, and costs/benefits associated with owning a
home (user cost) are important components that could generate a shift in demand. The
user cost takes into account the interest paid on mortgage, taxes, maintenance, and
capital gains, and is obtained as
uc  p(i    t  p e / p)
where i is the real after-tax mortgage interest rate,  is the rate of depreciation, t is
the property tax rate, and p e / p is the expected rate of house price appreciation.
The real estate literature commonly uses past rates of house price appreciation as a
proxy for expected house price appreciation, namely adaptive expectations.
For simplicity, the supply function is assumed to be inelastic.2 Hence, housing
services supplied are given by

log h s  log h s
where h s is the housing stock. In equilibrium, the market-clearing house price is
log p 



2

 log y  log h s  z
.


The second model borrows from the finance literature to value housing as an asset. In
the absence of frictions and credit restrictions, the no-arbitrage condition should hold,
implying that returns to housing, i.e., market rent, r , should equal user cost of
owning. More precisely,

In the case of the Netherlands, this is a common assumption due to high population density, limited
undeveloped land, and strict zoning laws. Empirical support for this assumption is provided by van Rooij (1999)
and Swank et al. (2002), who find that price elasticity of housing supply is considerably low.

54
r
p e
 i  t 
.
p
p

5.
While these two models are akin, their implementations may deliver different
results. Any empirical analysis implementing either the “price-to-income” or “price-to-rent”
models would use similar sets of variables, which most obviously contain income and
interest rates. While many studies rely on this general framework, variations that may seem
unimportant at first glance might lead to very different assessments of the deviation of
observed prices from fundamentals. Thus, we focus next on a group of recent studies to
highlight such differences and discuss their sources.
B. Is There a Housing Bubble?
6.
Recent studies have arrived at different conclusions on the existence and extent
of misvaluation in the Dutch residential real estate market. The Netherlands Bureau of
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) reported an overvaluation of 10 percent as of 2003. 3 Using
data up to 2004, an IMF country report concluded that there was no significant deviation
from fundamentals.4 The OECD arrived at a similar conclusion, namely that the probability
of Dutch house prices reaching a peak and starting to decline in 2006 was low.5 The CPB
published an update of their analysis in 2008 showing that any (over-) valuation gap had
disappeared as of 2007. 6 In contrast to these assessments of no misalignment, the April 2008
World Economic Outlook (WEO) report deemed that the Netherlands was second among
advanced economies in terms of house price overvaluation.7 Table 1-1 summarizes the
methodologies and original findings of these studies. As anticipated, all use a subset of the
variables discussed above, yet the estimations of misvaluation range from 0 to 30 percent.

3

CPB Document No. 81.

4

IMF CR No. 05/225.

5

OECD WP No. 488.

6

CPB Document No. 200.

7

IMF WEO April 2008.

55
Table 1-1. Is There a Dutch Housing Bubble?
Methodology

Data

Conclusion

CPB Document No. 81
(2005) and No. 200 (2008)

Real house prices modeled
as a function of real
disposable income, real
long-term interest rate, real
other financial assets of
households, and total
housing stock

1980-2007; annual

Overvaluation of
10 percent in 2003
shrunk to 0 in 2007

OECD WP No. 488 (2006)

Probability of real house
prices peaking modeled as
a function of the lagged
moving average of long
rate, moving average of real
house price increase, and
the share of residential
investment in GDP

1970-2005; quarterly

Probability of a real
house price peak
happening in 2006 less
than 10 percent

IMF CR 05/225 (2005)

Real house prices modeled
as a function of real
disposable income and real
mortgage interest rate

1974-2004; quarterly

No sign of deviation
from fundamentals at
the end of 2004

IMF WEO (April 2008)

House price growth
modeled as a function of
affordability (lagged ratio of
house prices to disposable
income), growth in
disposable income per
capita, short-term interest
rates, credit growth, and
changes in equity prices
and working-age population

1970-2007; quarterly

Cumulative house price
gap (increase not
explained by
fundamentals) around
30 percent

Sources: CPB, OECD, IMF.

7.
To assess the current house market situation and understand the reasons for the
different results, we update these studies with the most recent data. Our first aim is to
assess whether the ongoing downturn has changed any earlier findings of overvaluation
significantly. To this end, we consider in the next paragraph the OECD’s “probability of a
house-price-peak” model and in paragraph 9 the three other models that explain house prices
directly. Our second aim is to determine the key sources underlying the differences in the
reported conclusions. Since we use the same data source to construct our database spanning a
common period at the same frequency (from 1970Q1 to 2009Q2) and apply the same
estimation technique, at least to the three “direct house price” models, the results would only
differ because of the choice of variables. These are presented in paragraph 10.

56
8.
Estimates of the probability of house prices peaking in 2010 indicate that the
risk of a pending house price correction is small (Figure 1-3). Adopting the methodology
in OECD WP No. 488 (2006), we model the probability of the house price cycle reaching a
peak through the course of the subsequent year as a function of the lagged moving average of
the nominal long-term interest rate, moving average of real house price appreciation, and the
share of residential investment in GDP. More precisely, we estimate the following equation
using probit:
prob( peakt )  c  b1

hpt  hpt 1
rinv
3
 b2
 b3
e.
lirt 5  lirt  6  lirt 7
gdp
2

The peak in the late 1970s is picked out fairly well, while there is no sign of a peak in the
most recent period. Obviously, this finding should be taken with a grain of salt given that
there is only one peak in the sample period, which could limit the performance of the model.8
Yet, it is interesting to notice that the robust house price appreciation in the second half of the
1990s had already decelerated by the early 2000s. Hence, overall, the “probability of a price
peak model” suggests rather strongly that the Dutch housing market is going through a soft
landing rather than being at the verge of a collapse.
Figure 1-3. Netherlands: Predicting House Price Peaks 1/

10

1

8

0.9

6

0.8

4

0.7

2

0.6

0

0.5

-2

0.4

-4

0.3

-6

0.2
Real house price: q-o-q percent change (RHS)

-8

0.1

Probability of a peak (LHS)

-10
1970q1

1973q1

1976q1

1979q1

1982q1

1985q1

1988q1

1991q1

1994q1

1997q1

2000q1

2003q1

2006q1

0
2009q1

Sources: IMF staff estimates.
1/ A peak occurs when real house prices fall over a period of at least six quarters after having registered a cumulative increase of at least 15
percent over a period of six quarters.

8

In the original study, it is also pointed out that the model performs better in countries with more volatile house
price dynamics.

57
9.
Turning to the three other models, they indicate that the current downturn has
already wiped out any overvaluation that might have existed before. Indeed, all three
models suggest that there might be slight undervaluation in the housing market as of 2009Q2.
On the other hand, gap estimates, while remaining close from one model to the other, include
both positive and negative values when base period is set in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
In other words, it is possible that house prices might be undershooting in the short run while
they appear to be mostly in line with fundamentals from a long-run perspective.9
10.
Also, the reason why the three models have delivered different conclusions in
past studies seem to lie crucially on the choice of the base year.10 Table 1-2 shows the gap
between the actual and predicted house prices, both cumulative and at a specific point in
time, for the three models of interest under a range of base period choices and two different
estimation techniques (OLS and VECM). Assessment of misalignment is highly sensitive to
the base period one considers, not only across models but also for the same model. There is
more variation from one model to the other when cumulative gaps are calculated while, at a
given point in time, the prediction errors from the three models are rather close to each other.
Figure 1-4 demonstrates the importance of the base year choice further and explains why
WEO finds significant overvaluation by looking at the cumulative gap since the late 1990s
while CPB reports slight overvaluation disappearing a couple of years ago.
While there may not be a unique “correct” base year for Dutch house prices, the
11.
early seventies used in this study are a plausible base. To provide guidance in such a
choice, one option is to take a long-term perspective and evaluate cumulative changes from
the start of the analysis period. In that case, taking 1971 as the base year, the estimates of
misalignment range from -4 to 1.2 percent. The other option is to evaluate the trend in house
price changes: there has been a marked deceleration since the early 2000s, which might
suggest that house prices have reached an equilibrium level. Taking 1999 as the base year
gives estimates ranging from -18.7 to 3.7 percent. To achieve robustness to the choice of base
year, one could calculate the average gap estimate over various periods, e.g., the average
misalignment from 1998 to 2001 ranges from -12.1 to -2.4 percent. All in all, to select the
very early seventies as a base, as done in this study, appears justified.
The finding that there is no significant overpricing in Dutch house prices can be
12.
reconciled with the examination of PIR and PRR through interest rate movements. By
taking interest rate movements into account, in addition to other variables, the econometric
models can explain much of the changes in house prices. Then, intuitively, when PIR and
PRR are adjusted for these movements by dividing with the mortgage interest rate, the
9

These results may change slightly once the preliminary data for 2009 are revised.

10

Recall that we have already ruled out all differences coming from data source and coverage issues as we use
the same series to estimate the models.

Table 1-2. Misalignment in House Prices
Cumulative gap between actual and predicted house prices
OLS

VECM

Period start date

Period start date

1971

1979

1989

1999

1971

1979

1989

1999

CPB Document No. 81 (2005)
and No. 200 (2008)

-0.98

-6.09

11.58

-18.69

0.36

-6.50

3.40

-5.35

IMF CR 05/225 (2005)

1.17

11.50

62.36

0.93

0.03

4.58

-3.51

-2.61

IMF WEO (April 2008)

-1.58

-9.39

24.93

3.73

-3.97

-13.27

-4.18

-13.11

Gap between actual and predicted house prices
OLS

VECM

Point in time (second quarter)

Point in time (second quarter)

2006

2008

2009

2004

2006

2008

2009

CPB Document No. 81 (2005)
and No. 200 (2008)

-0.99

-1.77

-0.92

-5.12

-0.08

0.12

-0.73

-1.02

IMF CR 05/225 (2005)

0.26

-0.10

-1.06

-4.35

0.29

0.55

-1.14

-1.73

IMF WEO (April 2008)

-0.34

0.26

-0.85

-3.17

-0.73

-0.14

-2.67

-1.94

Source: IMF staff estimates.

58

2004

59
Figure 1-4. Sensitivity of Overvaluation Assessment to Base Year Choice
350

Base year: 1971
act ual

300

CPB
IMF
WEO

250

200

150

100

50
1971q2
300

1975q2

1979q2

1983q2

1987q2

Base year: 1989

1991q2
200

1995q2

1999q2

2003q2

2007q2

Base year: 1999

250
150

200
100
150

50
100

50
1989q4 1993q1 1996q2 1999q3 2002q4 2006q1 2009q2

Source: IMF staff calculations.

0
1999q4 2001q3 2003q2 2005q1

2006q4 2008q3

60
increase in the 1990s should become less pronounced. Indeed, looking at “adjusted” PIR and
PRR, the “bubble” in the second half of 1970s is still detectable while the recent rise is less
dramatic and actually the ratios are flattened in the 2000s (Figure 1-5).
13.
Expectations of future price increases, while important, are not the main driver
of house prices, further weakening bubble arguments. In simple OLS regressions,
inclusion of past house price appreciation explains a large proportion of the changes in PIR
and PRR. A common argument in the real estate literature is that house price appreciation
expectations are adaptive, which implies that expectations could lead to a bubble. To assess
whether this is the case, we estimate a vector-error correction model with three variables: real
house prices, real disposable income, and mortgage interest rates. By enforcing a
cointegrating relationship, this estimation takes into account the adjustment necessary to
return to long-run equilibrium when short-run deviation occurs because of e.g. expectations
of high house price growth. The dynamic forecasts suggest a gradual stabilization, in line
with the other models used, rather than an abrupt turn in house prices (Figure 1-6).
Figure 1-5. Adjusting Price-to-Income and Price-to-Rent Ratios by Mortgage Interest Rates
250

300

250
200

200
150

150

100
100

Price-to- in come ratio (R HS)

50

Price-to- rent r atio (RH S)

PIR adjusted by mortgage interest rate

PRR adjusted by mortgage interest r ate

50
Average PIR , whole period

Average PR R, whole perio d

Average PIR , early pe riod

Average PR R, ear ly period

Average PIR , latte r per iod

Average PR R, latter p eriod

0

0

1970q2 1975q1 1979q4 1984q3 1989q2 1994q1 1998q4 2003q3 2008q2

1970q2 1975q2 1980q2

Source: OECD, IFS, and IMF staff calculations.

1985q2

1990q2

1995q2

2000q2 2005q2

61

Figure 1-6. Dynamic Forecast of Real House Prices

80

100

120

140

Forecast for hp_r

2009q1

2010q1
95% CI

2011q1

2012q1

forecast

Source: IMF staff etimates.

C. Risks from a Potential House Price Correction
14.
House price cycles have been shown to lead cycles in credit and real activity,
hence house price gyrations might have important implications for growth.11 From a
historical perspective in the Netherlands, the house price boom in the 1970s and the
following bust in the first half of 1980s could give some indication on how large the impact
on real economic activity of a house price correction can be. From peak-to-trough (1978Q31985Q3), real house prices fell 50 percent, or 9.4 percent at an annualized average rate.
During the same period, average annualized real GDP growth was 1.4 percent compared to
3 percent in the other periods. Particularly striking was the sharp slowdown in private
consumption expenditures, which virtually remained flat while the average growth rate over
the rest of the periods was 2.8 percent. In the current episode, house prices have declined
4.8 percent by 2009Q2 from their peak in 2008Q1.
However, based on VAR analysis, a correction in house prices in the Netherlands
15.
is expected to inflict only moderate harm on economic activity The extent to which house
price developments pose risks for the overall economy can be analyzed in a multivariate
11

See, for instance, Igan et al (2009).

62
framework to take feedback effects into account. Estimation of a six-variable VAR
(including real GDP, private consumption, residential investment, CPI inflation, nominal
short-term interest rate, and real house prices) suggests that the impact on real GDP of a onestandard-deviation drop in house prices is likely to be small (around 0.2 percentage points)
and short-lived (with real GDP bouncing back in less than a year).
16.
Findings from VARs on other developed countries suggest that the Netherlands
is actually one of the least vulnerable economies. The estimated potential impact on real
GDP of a 10 percent decline in house prices is the fourth smallest after Austria, Italy, and
Norway. The value added share of the construction sector and the contribution of residential
investment to GDP are low in the Netherlands relative to other OECD countries, which could
explain why economic activity is estimated to be affected less by a negative house price
shock.
Yet, several other factors, not included in the VAR, are not favorable for the
17.
Netherlands and may augment its vulnerability to house price shocks. Such factors
include, the indebtedness of households and the banking sector’s (and other financial
institutions’) exposure to real estate. Household indebtedness has been increasing, with
outstanding mortgages and consumer credit growing from 100 percent of GDP to 185 percent
of GDP between 1998 and 2008. The highly leveraged household balance sheets, in addition
to wealth effects, could amplify the overall impact on consumption and income of house
price shocks.12 On the financial sector side, a growing portion of residential mortgages have
been securitized and held in special purpose vehicles (Figure 1-7). This could create risks
that may spread through the financial system quickly. Finally, mutually reinforcing feedback
effects from mortgage lending to house prices could also exacerbate the consequences for the
macroeconomy of a house price shock. Indeed, macro-financial linkages are assessed to be
strong in the Netherlands (see AN2) and lending conditions have tightened significantly
following the financial crisis and the downturn.
D. Conclusion
Dutch house prices appear to be broadly in line with long-term fundamentals
18.
although declines cannot be ruled out in the short run. Assessments of house price
misalignments are highly sensitive to assumptions on the base year at which prices are
assumed to be initially aligned with fundamentals. With this caveat in mind and under the
12

One could actually argue that the prolonged slowdown in the first part of the 2000s was triggered by
circumstances that bear close resemblance to today. Between 1995 and 2000, house prices had doubled while
the stock market index had tripled. These asset price booms were accompanied by increased lending, especially
in the form of mortgage loans. When the asset prices turned/slowed down in 2000-01, the deterioration in
household balance sheets contributed to the overall decline in economic activity. For instance, the DNB
estimates that mortgage equity withdrawal added almost 1 percentage point to GDP growth in 1998-2000 and
subtracted 0.5 percentage points in 2001-03.

63
reasonable assumption that house prices were properly aligned in 1971, Dutch house prices
as of 2009Q2 are estimated to be at the level that would be implied by changes in a range of
economic variables that determine housing behavior, whether housing is treated as a
consumption good or as an asset. This result is further supported by dynamic forecasts that
take expectations of future house price changes into account.
19.
The impact of further declines in house prices on real activity can be more
significant than evaluated by standard models. While a multivariate framework
encompassing major macroeconomic factors delivers small estimates for the potential impact
on GDP of a house price downturn, highly leveraged households, banks’ exposure to real
estate developments, and growing securitization in the financial sector could amplify the
adverse consequences for economic activity. Such vulnerabilities should play a prominent
role in policy discussions and decisions.
Figure 1-7. Netherlands: Residential Mortgages by Holder, 1996-2008
(In percent of total)
100

80

60

40

20

0
1996Q3 1997Q2 1998Q1 1998Q4 1999Q3 2000Q2 2001Q1 2001Q4 2002Q3 2003Q2 2004Q1 2004Q4 2005Q3 2006Q2 2007Q1 2007Q4 2008Q3
Monetary-financial institutions
Source: DNB.

Special purpose vehicles

Pension funds

Insurance corporations

Collective investment schemes

64
References
Hofman, David, 2005, “House Prices in the Netherlands,” IMF Country Report 05/225,
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Igan, Deniz, Alain Kabundi, Francisco Nadal de Simone, Marcelo Pinheiro, and Natalia
Tamirisa, 2009, “Three Cycles: Housing, Credit, and Real Activity,” IMF mimeo.
Kranendonk, Henk, and Johan Verbruggen, 2008, “Are Houses Overvalued in the
Netherlands?” CPB Document No. 200, The Hague: Centraal Planbureau.
Swank, Job, Jan Kakes, and Alexander Tieman, 2002, “The Housing Ladder, Taxaton, and
Borrowing Constraints,” DNB Working Paper No. 2002/9, Amsterdam: De
Nederlandsche Bank.
Van Rooij, Maarten, 1999, “De Huizenprijsontwikkeling in Nederland: Een Analyse en de
Economische Effecten,” DNB Working Paper No. 583, Amsterdam: De
Nederlandsche Bank.
Verbruggen, Johan, Henk Kranendonk, Michiel van Leuvensteijn, and Michel Toet, 2005,
“Welke Factoren Bepalen de Ontwikkeling van de Huizenprijs in Nederland?” CPB
Document No. 81, The Hague: Centraal Planbureau.

65
ANALYTICAL NOTE 2. MACRO-FINANCIAL LINKAGES IN THE NETHERLANDS1
1.
The impact of the global financial turmoil on the Netherlands has been
somewhat uneven so far. While the banking system has suffered from considerable declines
in profitability, asset quality, and capital, credit availability has been less affected with loans
to the private sector just slightly tapering off (Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-1. Netherlands: MFI Loans to the Private Sector, 2000-2009
(millions of euros)
1200000

1000000

800000

600000

400000

200000

0
2000Q1

2000Q4

2001Q3

2002Q2

2003Q1

2003Q4

2004Q3

2005Q2

2006Q1

2006Q4

2007Q3

2008Q2

2009Q1

Source: DNB.

The important questions are how deep the problems in the financial sector
2.
remain and to what extent they will be reflected in the broader economy. Financial
distress could continue either due to the delay in recognition of losses and recapitalization or
to second-round shocks working through macro-financial linkages, e.g. rising unemployment
and declining profits leading to further loan defaults. Because of this second channel through
which the financial system could remain under strain, feedback effects between financial
developments and the real sector should be taken into account in the assessment of the
potential impact of financial sector difficulties on the macroeconomy.
3.
As for the first question, the Dutch financial system, until recently, has been
under historically high levels of distress. We examine the evolution of the financial stress
index (FSI), a composite of several variables measuring strain in the banking sector,
1

Prepared by Deniz Igan.

66
securities markets, and foreign exchange market.2 After peaking at the end of 2008, FSI for
the Netherlands has been declining in 2009 (Figure 2-2). This trend could point out to the end
of stress in the financial sector, however, the FSI is still well above pre-crisis levels at 1.7,
namely almost two standard deviations from average conditions. In other words, while the
worst might be over, the Dutch financial system does not appear to be out of the woods yet.
Figure 2-2. Netherlands: Financial Stress Index 1/
20

20
Average for other advanced countries

15

15

Netherlands

10

10

5

5

0

0

-5

-5

-10
1999q1

-10
1999q4

2000q3

2001q3

2002q2

2003q1

2004q1

2004q4

2005q3

2006q3

2007q2

2008q1

2009q1

Source: IMF staff calculations (see Ravi, Danninger, Elekdag, Tytell, 2009, "The Transmission of Financial Stress from Advanced to Emerging
Economies," IMF WP).
1/ Financial stress index (FSI) incorporates banking sector beta, the spread between commercial paper and government bonds, the spread
between short- and long-run rates, stock market return volatility, sovereign debt spread, and exchange rate volatility. A value of zero implies
neutral financial market conditions while positive values imply financial strain. A value of 1 or higher has in the past been associated with a crisis.

Moving to the second question, the analysis points out to potentially large
4.
spillovers to real economic activity from the financial turmoil. We use three techniques to
assess the potential impact of continued difficulties in the financial markets. First, we
calculate a VAR-based financial conditions index (FCI) that incorporates the impulse
responses of GDP to several financial variables. Second, we estimate a disequilibrium model
of credit demand and supply. Third, we assess the impact of credit on GDP growth using
various estimation techniques. These techniques reveal important macro-financial linkages in
the Netherlands.
A. Financial Conditions Index (FCI)
The FCI relies on VAR analysis to account for the feedback loop between
5.
macroeconomic and financial factors. The VAR includes real GDP, CPI inflation, banking
2

For details of construction and a discussion on the performance of the FSI, see Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Lall
(2008), “Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries,” Chapter 4 in WEO October 2008.

67
sector risk (measured by the beta estimated in a CAPM), three-month AIBOR (Amsterdam
Interbank Offered Rate3), real effective exchange rate, stock price index, and house prices.
The FCI is then calculated as the cumulative impulse response of real GDP to each of these
variables. The cumulative impulse response is further standardized so that a value of 1
corresponds to a total impulse from the financial conditions included in the VAR to GDP in
the magnitude of 1 percentage point (annualized). It should also be noted that, with this
standardization, a decline in the FCI from, say, 2 to 1 would be expected to reduce GDP
growth by 1 percentage point, while the contribution (impulse) from the FCI to growth might
still be positive. In other words, both the level of and the change in FCI have a direct
interpretation in terms of impact on GDP growth.
6.
According to FCI estimates, deteriorating financial conditions have already
shaven more than 2 percentage points off GDP growth. A rapid decline in the FCI has
started at the end of 2007 and the index entered negative territory at the end of 2008, standing
at -2.5 in 2009Q2 (Figure 2-3). The analysis also indicates that this negative impact may
continue and potentially get larger. In particular, impulse responses suggest a cumulative
3.6 percentage point decline in GDP growth by end-2009 from end-2007 owing to the
decline in financial conditions.
7.
Changes in stock prices and interbank lending interest rates, and, to a lesser
extent, banking sector risk, account for most of the movement in the FCI. The
contributions to the FCI from stock prices and interbank lending rates have both turned
negative. As the liquidity crisis of 2007-08 has impacted immediately stock prices and
interbank lending, this finding suggests that the turmoil has already taken its direct toll on
GDP growth. Yet, the indirect effects of the crisis (those acting via bank stability) are still
working their way through the system. In particular, the contribution to the FCI by banking
sector risk, though still positive, has been declining and is predicted to turn negative in the
coming quarters. This could be indicative of bank-specific problems, e.g., banks being forced
to deleverage, which could lead to a “credit crunch.” Next, we look into this possibility in
more detail.

3

The series for AIBOR was discontinued with the adoption of the euro. Hence, the series used for 1999
onwards is the EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate).

68

Figure 2-3. Netherlands: Financial Conditions Index
Banking sector risk
Stock index
Overall FCI

AIBOR
House prices

REER

5

5
(percentage points of y/y real GDP growth)

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

-1

-1

-2

-2

-3

-3

-4

-4

-5
1993Q3

-5
1996Q1

1998Q3

2001Q1

2003Q3

2006Q1

2008Q3

Source: IMF staff calculations.

B. Is There a Credit Crunch?
8.
It is important to establish whether a decline in credit represents a “credit
crunch” to determine the appropriate policy actions. A decline in credit is not uncommon
following a financial crisis. But, while the distinction between a “credit crunch,” driven by
the supply side, and a “credit contraction,” driven by the demand side, is hard to make in
practice, the policy implications are very different. In a “credit crunch,” financial
intermediaries would be unable or unwilling to meet the demand for credit. Hence, there
might be a strong justification for use of public funds to recapitalize banks and restore
financial sector stability in order to help financial intermediaries perform their function
better. In a “credit contraction,” on the other hand, deteriorating economic outlook and
falling confidence deter investment and consumption plans, and as a result, push demand for
credit downward. Therefore, policy actions should support businesses and households,
although recapitalizing the banks would still be important so as to allow them to be ready to
resume lending once credit demand improves.
9.
The results from the analysis of supply of and demand for loans point to a credit
crunch in 2007-09. We estimate a disequilibrium model based on a system of equations for
the supply of and demand for credit. The supply equation includes money supply (M3), stock
price index, income, interest margin, and loans lagged by two quarters. The demand equation
includes lending rate, income, and loans lagged by two quarters. Plotting the difference
between the residuals from the supply equation and the residuals from the demand equation
suggests that there has been increasing excess demand for credit since the second half of

69
2006 (Figure 2-4). At its peak, demand for credit exceeded supply of credit by more than
6 percent in 2008Q2. By construction, positive values on the left scale indicate excess
demand not being met, and when this coincides with a flat and/or declining volume of loans,
a “credit crunch” could be in effect. Thus, the disequilibrium model gives signs of a “credit
crunch” occurring in the Netherlands starting at the end of 2007, abating for a couple of
quarters, and gaining strength at the end of 2008.4
10.
The situation, however, has somewhat changed starting in the second half of
2008, with the demand for credit declining faster than the supply of credit. More
precisely, excess demand has been on a downward trend. If this trend continues, the
indications of a credit crunch that emerged in 2007Q4 might disappear soon. As this process
would be driven by a faster decline in demand, the “credit crunch” could become a “credit
contraction.” However, bank deleveraging (para. 7) could prolong “credit crunch” conditions.
Figure 2-4. Netherlands: Excess Supply of / Demand for Credit
9.2

0.06
Percentage by which demand exceeds supply

0.04

Excess demand
(left scale)

Volume of credit, in log
(right scale)

8.8

0.02

8.4

0

-0.02
8.0
-0.04
Excess supply
(left scale)
-0.06
1991Q2 1992Q3 1993Q4 1995Q1 1996Q2 1997Q3 1998Q4 2000Q1 2001Q2 2002Q3 2003Q4 2005Q1 2006Q2 2007Q3 2008Q4

7.6

Source: IMF staff estimates.

4

One caveat is that the series used in the analysis is not corrected for securitizations which could impart a
downward bias on credit growth. On the other hand, the series does not distinguish existing loan commitments
which could distort credit growth figures upwards.

70
C. Impact of Credit on GDP Growth
Econometric analysis using alternative techniques reveals that lagged credit
11.
growth might be a significant contributor to Dutch GDP growth. Policymakers worry
about a “credit crunch” because lack of credit might lead to decline in consumption and
investment, and hence, to a slowdown in GDP growth. Accordingly, we estimate the impact
of loan growth on output in a simple framework where change in GDP is regressed on its
own lags and lagged values of growth in bank credit to the private sector. Endogeneity is
obviously a concern when regressing output growth on credit growth: the mutual feedback
effects between the two variables are apparent. To address this concern, we estimate the
relationship using OLS as well as instrumental variables and VAR.5 In all specifications,
credit growth is positively and significantly associated with output growth (Table 2-1). The
estimated coefficients are also consistent across specifications, suggesting that a 10 percent
drop in the credit growth rate would be associated with around a 1.6 percentage points
decrease in the output growth rate. Thus, in the Netherlands, concerns about financial sector
developments affecting the rest of the economy appear to be justified.
D. Conclusion
Financial conditions in the Netherlands have tightened, cutting down credit
12.
supply and weighing down output growth. Declining banking stability has contributed to
the deterioration of financial conditions although the bulk of the latter has so far come from
the direct impact of liquidity shocks and market response to the global crisis. There is some
evidence that the contribution by banking sector risk is turning negative. Accordingly, credit
supply has been limited.
13.
These findings give support to the large recapitalization package introduced by
the authorities. Going forward, provided that there are no further shocks, the feedback from
real to financial activity is likely to shift the driving forces in the credit market from the
supply side to the demand side. Hence, the next policy step should be devising a gradual exit
strategy from the heavy public interventions in the financial sector, while restoring consumer
confidence and encouraging business activity through targeted fiscal measures and structural
reforms, and ensuring that the banks remain sufficiently capitalized to be able to meet
demand for credit when it starts rising.

5

Admittedly, this econometric approach is still too simple to capture all possible endogeneity and omitted
variable biases. Hence, the results should be interpreted with caution.

Table 2-1. Impact of Credit on GDP
OLS

Dependent variable: GDP growth

GDP growth, lagged
GDP growth, lagged twice
Credit growth
Credit growth, lagged
Credit growth, lagged twic e
Constant
Number of observations
R-squared

Coefficient

Std. Error

0.331
0.105
0.078
0.128
-0.008
0.000

0.120
-0.133
0.047
0.047
0.049
0.001

72
0.34

IV (Instrument credit growth with own lags)
t-stat
2.75
0.79
1.67
2.70
-0.17
-0.25

p-value
0.01
0.43
0.10
0.01
0.87
0.80

Coefficient Std. Error
0.233
-0.031
0.365

-0.002
72
0.09

0.169
0.205
0.197

0.002

t-stat
1.38
-0.15
1.85

-0.80

p-value
0.17
0.88
0.06

0.42

VAR
Coefficient Std. Error

t-stat

p-value

0.360
0.148

0.117
0.127

3.08
1.17

0.00
0.24

0.135
-0.001
0.000

0.046
0.048
0.001

2.93
-0.02
0.24

0.00
0.99
0.81

72
0.36

Source: IMF staff estimates.

71

72
References
Cihak, Martin and Petya Koeva Brooks, 2009, “From Subprime Loans to Subprime Growth?
Evidence for the Euro Area,” IMF Working Paper No. 09/69.
Jafarov, Etibar, 2009, “Financial-Real Sector Linkages in Finland,” in Finland: 2008 Article
IV Consultation IMF Country Report No. 09/39, Washington, DC.
Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla. 1997, “A Credit Crunch? Finland in the Aftermath of the Banking
Crisis,” IMF Staff Papers, No. 44, pp. 315-27.
Swiston, Andrew, Tamim Bayoumi, and Koshy Mathai, 2008, “A U.S. Financial Conditions
Index: Putting Credit Where Credit is Due,” IMF Working Paper No. 08/161.

73
ANALYTICAL NOTE 3. THE CRISIS AND POTENTIAL OUTPUT IN THE NETHERLANDS1
1.
An accurate assessment of potential output is particularly important (and
particularly difficult) under the current circumstances. In the near term it is fundamental
for monetary and fiscal policy formulation; and in the long run it is key to assessing the
sustainability of public finances and asset prices. The usual challenges to measuring
unobservable potential output are exacerbated under the current circumstances of large
output declines and far more-than-usual uncertainty about the outlook but mis-measurement,
resulting in policy mistakes, could prove very costly.
2.
The crisis will impact supply potential through declines in labor and capital
contributions and, possibly, through declines in total factor productivity (TFP). Higher
levels of longer-term unemployment are likely to increase NAIRU, and participation rates
may decline with discouraged worker effects or use of early retirement options. Capital
accumulation will slow with the fall in investment and a higher rate of obsolescence amid
economic restructuring and firm closures. Reduced investment and greater regulation may
also reduce the pace of innovation; although firms also have stronger incentives to restructure
and enhance efficiency. Higher public debt could put upward pressure on interest rates, and
higher tax burdens in the future may reduce incentives to work and invest, which would both
be a drag on growth. There may, however, be some offsetting effects on potential output. As
a response to the crisis, fiscal stimulus will cushion the slowdown and expenditure on
infrastructure; reduced wealth might induce greater labor market participation; and the
financial crisis might facilitate political consensus for potential-output-enhancing structural
reforms.
3.
A recent OECD study finds that extreme financial crisis can permanently reduce
potential output by around 4 percent. The study (looking at OECD countries over the
period 1960-2002) finds that a financial crisis negatively and permanently affect potential
output by around 1½–2½ percent on
Cummulative Reduction in Potential Output
average, but with the magnitude
By 2010
Medium-Term
increasing with the severity of the crisis.
OECD (OECD, 2009)
2
2.75 (by 2017)
The empirical findings are consistent
Euro area (EC, 2009)
2.7
4 (by 2013)
with recent estimates of the losses in
Euro area (IMF, 2009)
2.2
>6 (by 2014)
The Netherlands
3 1/2
>5 (by 2014)
potential output following the crisis in
the OECD, the Euro area, and individual
Sources: OECD, EC, IMF Staff Estimates.
country studies.2
1
2

Prepared by Yougesh Khatri and Esther Perez Ruiz.

See “Beyond the crisis: medium-term challenges relating to potential output, unemployment and fiscal
position,” chapter 4 of OECD Economic Outlook, OECD, 2009; European Commission (2009): “Impact of the
current economic and financial crisis on potential output,” European Economy, Occasional Papers 49,
June 2009; and World Economic Outlook, IMF, October 2009.

74
4.
In our baseline—as with most recent studies—growth in the medium term
returns to the pre-crisis potential. Dislocations and restructuring in the financial sector
could however prove to be a persistent drag on growth and, in the longer term, adverse
demographics are also likely to constrain potential growth (see the recent EC Aging Study,
2009).
5.
Various staff estimates for the Netherlands suggest that the level of potential
output is falling considerably, in line with the euro area.


We primarily employ the standard production function approach (PF) to estimate
potential output (as favored by the US CBO, EC, and OECD), but also utilize three
statistical detrending (or “smoothing”) methods for comparison (the production
function approach also requires “smoothing” the labor and TFP series). To address
the well understood end-point problems associated with smoothing, we extend the
series using our baseline forecast through 2014. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter—
probably the most commonly used smoothing method—is sensitive to the smoothing
parameter (λ) chosen, so we settle on the standard parameter for annual data (HP-100)
and an alternative suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (HP-RU). We also use the ideal
band-pass or Ouliaris filter (BP-Filter) which selects components of time-series with
periodic fluctuations between 6 and 32 quarters.



The PF and the smoothing methods yield a relatively narrow range of estimates for
the path of potential output in the pre-crisis period, but estimates diverge for the
forecast period 2009-2010. The baseline projection for potential growth assumed in
this staff report (Table 3-1) is based on a smoothed version of the PF methodology.
The production-function-based output gaps are similar to those recently reported by
the OECD and EC, but the differences also widen for 2009-2010 reflecting the
sensitivity to assumptions on labor, capital and TFP; and differences in growth
forecasts.



Recent potential growth, pre-crisis, seems to be around 2 percent. This is down from
previous estimates of 2¼ percent (IMF, 2006; CPB, 2006). Looking forward, our
baseline forecast is that the crisis will reduce overall output by around 10 percentage
points (relative to the pre-crisis trend) over the medium term and potential output is
projected to decline by around 5 percent. We however expect growth to eventually
revert to its recent potential (around 2 percent) by 2014.



Estimates of the potential output and the output gap going forward depend critically
on the assumptions about the future path of labor and capital inputs and TFP—all
particularly uncertain—and thus are only indicative. Our estimates suggest that two
thirds of the reduction in near-term potential growth is attributable to the decline in
the contribution of capital, due to the collapse in investment and higher rate of
depreciation in the aftermath of the crisis. In addition, structural unemployment is

75
expected to increase substantially (by 1.3 percentage points between 2008 and 2014),3
reflecting hysteresis effects whereby the long-term unemployed lose skills and
become detached form the labor market. There are both upside and downside risks to
these projections. Structural unemployment could end up being higher than assumed
here if future consolidation measures result in higher tax wedges. On the other hand,
further ease of EPL regulations could help reduce the incidence of long-term
unemployment. However, substantial progress in this area seems unlikely.
Table 3-1. Netherlands: Potential Output and Output Gap Estimates
Growth (percent)
1990-95 1996-2001 2002-2007 2008-10(p)

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

3.4%

3.6%

2.0%

-4.2%

0.7%

Potential Growth (percent)
0.8
2.0
2.1

1.7

0.3

0.5

Real GDP (actual/proj)

2.4

3.7

2.0

Production Function

2.9

3.1

1.9

HP-100
HP-RU
BP-Filter

2.7
2.6
2.6

2.9
3.3
3.3

1.8
1.8
1.8

1.1
0.6
0.5

1.6
2.0
2.3

1.4
1.6
1.7

1.2
1.0
1.0

1.1
0.4
0.4

1.0
0.4
0.2

OECD (2009)
EC (2009)
CPB (2006)

2.9
2.5

3.3
2.7

1.9
1.7
1.8

1.5
1.2

1.6
1.7

2.0
1.7

2.2
1.7

1.7
1.1

0.8
0.7

2008
2.4

2009
-2.2

2010
-2.0

Production Function

-0.5

Output Gaps (percent of potential GDP)
2006
2007
0.6
2.1

HP-100
HP-RU
BP-Filter

1.8
1.4
1.1

2.2
2.0
1.9

0.8
1.0
1.0

-5.2
-4.5
-4.5

-0.3
0.3
0.5

OECD (2009)
EC (2009)

0.6
0.8

2.0
2.8

1.9
3.0

-4.7
-2.7

-5.8
-3.1

Sources: OECD, EC, CPB, IMF and IMF staff calculations.



3

The revisions to potential output here do not factor in the effect from changes in labor
force participation or changes in trend productivity. While such effects may be
important, they are difficult to quantify and their sign is uncertain. As already
mentioned, wealth erosion may encourage labor participation. On the other hand, with
high unemployment, discouraged workers may exit the labor force. Another uncertain
factor affecting the direction of participation is the response of migration flows to the

This is consistent with the projected increase in actual unemployment rate of 3.1 percentage points over the
same period and the assumption that about 2 5 of the increase in unemployment becomes structural
unemployment. This elasticity, which is specific to the Netherlands, is equal to the impact of a unit increase of
unemployment on its long-term component (0.62) times the share of long-term unemployment that translates
into structural unemployment (2 3). See OECD (2009): “Adjustments to the OECD’s method of projecting the
NAIRU.”

76
economic downturn. Similarly, the impact of the recession on trend productivity is
ambiguous. The crisis may raise aggregate productivity as the least productive
activities are abandoned, but could also have an adverse impact on its trend as firms
and the government cut back on R&D spending.

77
Figure 3-1. Netherlands: Potential Output, Output Gaps, and Output Losses
6%

4%

Potential Growth Estimates
(In percent)

3%

4%

Output Gap Estimates
(In percent of potential)

2%
1%

2%

0%
-1%

0%
-2%
-3%

-2%

PF-a=.6
HP_100
HP_RU
BP_filter
OECD
Output growth
EC

-4%

-4%
-5%
-6%

-6%
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006

-7%

4%

600

Contributions to Potential Growth: Production
Function Approach,
(In percentage points)

4%

PF-a=.6
HP_100
HP_RU
BP_filter
OECD
EC

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Medium-term Output Loss
(GDP in constant prices, in billions of euro)

550
3%
500

3%
2%

450
2%
400

1%
1%

350
0%
Labor

Capital

TFP

real GDP
Pre-crisis trend
Actual and projected GDP
Potential GDP

300

-1%
1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

Source: WEO, and IMF staff calculations.

2008

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

78
ANALYTICAL NOTE 4. CAPITALIZATION OF THE DUTCH BANKING SYSTEM1
1.
In the summer of 2009, the DNB carried out a severe stress test of most of the
banking system and major insurers. The stress test covered the largest 15 banking and
insurance groups in the Netherlands, while medium and small insurance companies also
applied a macro scenario or carried out sensitivity analyses. Pension funds did not participate
in the test.
2.
The DNB test scenario envisaged a severe and prolonged recession even more
severe than the Great Depression (although that lasted a much longer period). Under
such a scenario, over 2009-10 GDP shrinks by 6.3 percent, unemployment rises to
9.7 percent, stock market (AEX) drops by 50 percent, and house prices by 30 percent. The
stress test envisages losses on home mortgages comparable those incurred in the mid-1980s
averaging 1.4 percent in two years, and of 4 percent on commercial lending, a multiple of
the levels attained in earlier (much shallower) recessions during the past decades. Altogether,
losses of participating large banks and insurers amount to €47 billion over 2009-10, roughly
double the losses realized during 2008, with the banks’ average Tier-1 ratios declining from
11 percent at end-2008 to 7 percent in 2011. Still, all banks meet the current regulatory norm
of Tier-1 capital of 4 percent. In the macro stress test, life insurers suffer most due to the
assumed low long term interest rate of 2 percent p.a. which increases insurance liabilities and
guarantees extended to policyholders, and losses on mortgage and equity investments, that
are only partly offset by the increasing value of government bonds. Non-life insurers are
relatively unaffected. The largest insurers’ average solvency ratio declines from 200 percent
at end-2008 to 160 percent after two years, that for medium-size life insurers would drop to
160 percent, on average, while the average solvency ratio of non-life insurers would decline
from 320 percent to 290 percent. All these ratios are still on average well above the minimum
requirements. Small, mostly non-life insurers remain unaffected.
Data limitations and the ongoing restructuring make analysis of the financial
3.
situation of individual major Dutch banks extremely complex. With the break up of
Fortis in 2008, past balance-sheet of Fortis is no longer relevant for Fortis Nederlands. With
the takeover of ABN AMRO and 100 percent acquisition of Fortis Nederlands, both
institutions are unlisted, and it is difficult to obtain comprehensive and comparable
information about their financials. The pre-takeover ABN AMRO is half-way into a legal
separation and transfer of its units to the three buying banks. The Dutch state has acquired
Fortis’ Dutch banking and insurance operations and thus Fortis’ share of ABN AMRO, and is
in the process of divesting major portions of both and then integrating these units. This
restructuring and divestments thus makes any projection of their revenues and earnings from
2008 data prone to considerable error without extensive study and active help from the
authorities. Rabobank is an unlisted cooperative bank and only publishes annual data that are
1

Prepared by Hemant Shah.

79
useful for such purposes. ING Groep is a holding company with both insurance and bank
business, and as detailed in the Staff Report, is also engaged in a massive restructuring, and
has divested several business units during 2009. The ongoing restructuring and staff
retrenchment are adding large one-time gains and losses to Fortis, ABN AMRO, and ING,
while the uncertainties about full cost of compliance with specific remedies required by the
EU competition commission remain large All this makes it exceedingly difficult to do a
meaningful stress test on these individual institutions in 2009 without a large amount of
institution-specific data and active involvement of the authorities.
Therefore, staff have carried out a rough check of DNB’s stress test at the
4.
systemic level. First, since the DNB’s stress test scenario is obviously dire, and final
conclusions about loan losses for mortgage and commercial portfolios at 1.4 percent and
4.0 percent over 2009-10 are rather large—we keep them unchanged.2 Second, the stress
scenario assumes a severe equity market shock of -50 percent. In addition, while bond prices
could decline due to credit risk in this scenario, they still increase due to falling interest rates.
Specifically, we assume that the combined effect is -5 percent for corporate debt (i.e. losses
on corporate debt are slightly larger than loans, even after possible gains due to lower interest
rates) and +5 percent on sovereign debt. We also hypothesize a loss rate of 10 percent on
non-mortgage retail credits. Finally, we assume that banks earn a “normal” return of about
0.65 percent of earning assets, before loan losses and write-offs and the level of earning
assets remains unchanged—both of which are somewhat conservatively biased.3 The results
of this rough cross-check are presented in Table 4-1.

2

According to the detailed analyses of one large private bank made available to staff, current loan loss rates on
the mortgage loans are under 5 basis points and, under the stress scenario, would rise substantially but only to
about 35 basis points. While this may seem counterintuitive, these losses are derived from a detailed matrix
considering the degree of collateral available, extent of repayments already made, the distribution of borrowers’
income, and the banks’ claims on defaulters’ future income. Loan loss rates on commercial loans of 4 percent,
allowing for, say, 20 percent collateral and 20 percent recovery of uncollateralized debt could imply NPL rates
of 6¼ percent or more. Though the stress scenario is indeed severe, looking at past NPL rates that have
generally been under 1 percent, staff does not consider a higher NPL or loan loss rate.

3

The recent past is not a useful indication of banks’ future profitability. Dutch banks have traditionally had low
margins on relatively low risk lending. This weakness had been recognized and even prior to the crisis, most
banks had embarked on a major cost reduction drive through better technology, branch consolidation and staff
cuts. In 2007, net return on total assets was 0.62 percent after loan losses. It has of course been negative in
2008. Assuming that banks would take further measures to cut costs and raise some margins in response to
increasing risks, our ROA assumption is conservative. Similarly, if banks were to reduce overall lending in
response to this stressed scenario, which would seem reasonable, their losses would be lower.

80

Table 4-1. Cross-Check on DNB Stress Test
2008

For 2009-10

(Millions of
euros)

Loss Rate
(Percent)

Loss Amount
(Millions of
euros)

473,617
67,969
274,472
27,963

-7.10
-7.10
-7.10
-3.29

(33,627)
(4,826)
(19,488)
(920)

1,922,005
20,654
2,786,680

-3.29
-7.10

(63,234)
(1,466)
(123,560)

-7.10
-7.10

(32,698)
(8,523)
(41,221)

0.65

36,227
(46,112)

Earning Assets
Financial assets
Held for trading
Designated at fair value through profit and loss
Available for sale
Held to maturity
Loans and receivables
Derivatives-Hedge accounting
Total earning assets (A)
Liabilities
Deposits from central banks
Financial liabilities
Held for trading
Designated at fair value through profit and loss
Total liabilities (B)

96,989

460,536
120,046
2,897,230

Net earnings before loan losses and write-offs (C)
Net income (A-B+C)
Total equity
Equity required for 4 percent of earning assets
Potential shortfall

97,509

51,397
111,467
(60,071)

Source: DNB Statistical Bulletin (for 2008 data) and IMF staff estimates.

5.
The results show that our rough cross-check yields losses of the order of
€46.1 billion for the entire banking system. In the DNB’s stress test, the coverage of the
banking system is slightly over 90 percent and about 90 percent of the financial system is
attributed to banks, with around 10 percent to insurers. Thus, the result of the staff’s topdown stress test estimate is very close to the overall results of the bottom-up stress tests by
individual institutions. The losses under this extreme scenario would reduce systemic equity
to €51.4 billion from €97.5 billion. In addition, if global regulators were to reach a consensus
on raising equity requirements to a 4 percent minimum in terms of the TCE/TA ratio, the
Dutch banking system would need altogether about €60.0 billion in new capital under the

81
severely stressed exercise conducted by the DNB, given an initial TCE/TA ratio of
3.2 percent.4
6.
However, even under a less grave scenario than assumed by the DNB, the
financial sector is likely to need significant additional capital. This would be required to
support brisker lending when the economy recuperates, enhance existing capital buffers, and
build up equity in response to the likely increase in levels considered adequate by regulators.
Banks have already demonstrated capacity to raise market-based equity and debt funding.
The state’s commitment to restoring intervened banks to health and the ongoing restructuring
and divestment of non-strategic businesses should further improve these entities’ market
access over time, ensuring that extra capital may be tapped without sizable government
injections.

4

The Dutch authorities correctly point out that despite the discussion of a 4 percent equity norm at G-20 and
other fora, this is not as yet settled regulation. Most discussions also recognize the need to phase such tightening
of capital requirements over a suitably long period of time. In any case, imposition of such requirement could
affect the Dutch banking system disproportionately, given the current low risk weighting, and could cause
significant deleveraging as well as increased risk profile. As of 2008, risk-weighted assets amounted to
€1,089 billion, compared to earning assets of €2,787 billion, and total assets of €2,995 billion.

82
ANALYTICAL NOTE 5. LONG RUN FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS1
1.
This note provides an updated assessment of fiscal sustainability in the
Netherlands. The latest estimates of aging pressures from ECFIN are incorporated in the
analysis, as well as the implications of the recent weakening in the fiscal position. We
conclude that there has been a marked deterioration in fiscal sustainability, and the
sustainability gap is much larger than previously estimated. Measures to help erase the
sustainability gap are briefly discussed, as well as optimal fiscal consolidation paths.
A. Recent Fiscal Developments and Outlook
2.
While the fiscal balance remained robust in 2008, public debt increased sharply
as a result of financial sector bailout measures. The headline surplus rose by ½ percentage
point to ¾ percent of GDP, while the structural deficit stayed at one percent of GDP in 2008.
However, the global financial turmoil necessitated large public assistance to several financial
institutions, particularly recapitalizations and provision of liquidity. These measures added
about 15 percentage points to gross public debt, as a result of which the debt stock—which
would otherwise have declined—surged from 45½ percent of GDP in 2007 to 58¼ percent
of GDP in 2008. On the assumption that all the government disbursements will be recouped
as the financial sector recovers, they have largely been treated as financing transactions, and
the effect on the fiscal deficit and net debt is negligible.
The fiscal situation has deteriorated significantly in 2009, with further
3.
worsening expected in 2010. A sharp contraction in GDP together with structural relaxation
imply that the headline fiscal balance is expected to deteriorate to a deficit of 4½ percent of
GDP in 2009 (a 5¼ percentage points drop). Of this deterioration, 3 percentage points are
estimated to be structural in nature, with the remainder reflecting the operation of automatic
stabilizers. Moreover, the headline fiscal deficit is expected to decline further to almost
6 percent of GDP in 2010, with the structural deficit increasing by ¾ percentage point to
4¾ percent of GDP. The authorities plan to begin consolidation in 2011, by which time it is
hoped that a global recovery would have taken root.
As a result, the starting point to assess sustainability is markedly worse than
4.
staff and authorities had envisaged in 2008. Even as recently as the November 2008
Stability Program, the authorities had expected a structural surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP in
2009, considerably better than staff’s latest projection of a structural deficit of 4 percent of
GDP.

1

Prepared by Daniel Kanda

83
B. Fiscal Sustainability Has Deteriorated
5.
Recent ECFIN baseline estimates of aging pressures for the Netherlands are in
the relatively high range in comparison with other European countries. From 2007 to
2060, aging pressures are estimated to add 9.4 percent of GDP to fiscal expenditures in the
Netherlands, well above the median of 5.3 percent of GDP across the European Union. The
increase for the Netherlands is composed of increased pension expenditure of 4 percent of
GDP, larger long-term care expenditure of 4.7 percent of GDP, higher health-care
expenditure of one percent of GDP, and reduced education and unemployment-benefit
expenditures of 0.2 and 0.1 percent of GDP, respectively.
20

20
Change in Expenditure Due to Aging, 2007-2060
(In percent of GDP)

15

Pension

Health

Care

Education

15

Unemployment benefits

10

10

5

5

0

0

-5

-5
PL EE LV IT DK SE FR AT PT BG HU DE UK SK LT CZ FI BE IE ES NO NL RO MT CY SI EL LU

Source: DG ECFIN, The 2009 Aging Report, and IMF staff calculations.

These baseline estimates are sensitive to the underlying assumptions used. In
6.
particular, the assumptions on immigration
100
100
have a significant influence on the
Net
Immigration
90
90
projections. The baseline scenario assumes
(Thousands of persons)
80
80
that average annual net immigration over
70
70
2010-60 is about 9,500 persons, which is
60
60
among the lowest in share of population
50
50
(0.06 percent) in the EU27, and also below
40
40
inflows in recent years. In comparison, an
30
30
alternative scenario with zero immigration is
20
20
projected to add 1.4 percent of GDP to the
10
10
increase in aging related spending over
0
0
2011-60. Roughly speaking, therefore, an
1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

84
increase in annual immigration flows by 1,000 would reduce the buildup of aging pressures
by about 0.15 percent of GDP. In contrast, however, an analysis of the benefits of
immigration carried out by the CPB in 2003 is more pessimistic, finding little or even
negative fiscal benefits to the Netherlands from recent immigration.2
33

33

Aging-Related Expenditure Under Different Scenarios, 2007-60
(In percent of GDP)

31

31

29
29
27
27

25
23

25
Baseline
High life expectancy (1 year)
Zero migration
Higher employment rate (+1pp)
Higher employment rate for older w orkers (+5pp)
Higher labor productivity

23

21

19

21
19
17
15

2007

2011

2015

2019

2023

2027

2031

2035

2039

2043

2047

2051

2055

2059

Sources: DG ECFIN, The 2009 Ageing Report, and IMF staff estimates.

7.
The sustainability indicator used is based on the general government
intertemporal budget constraint. This is the same approach used by the Dutch authorities,
and is also the S2 sustainability indicator used in the EC’s sustainability reports.3 The
sustainability gap is the defined as the constant change to the primary balance (in percent of
GDP), over an infinite horizon, such that the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. In
turn, the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied if the discounted sum of future primary
surpluses is sufficient to offset the intital debt stock. Assuming that GDP grows at a constant

2

Roodenberg, H., R. Euwals, and H. ter Rele, 2003, “Immigration and the Dutch Economy,” CPB Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Analysis, The Hague.
3

See van Ewjik, C., N. Draper, H. ter Rele, and E. Westerhout, 2006, “Ageing and the Sustainability of Dutch
Public Finances,” CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Analysis, The Hague; and European Commission,
2009, “Sustainability Report 2009.”

85
rate and given a constant discount rate, some algebraic manipulation yields the following
formula for the sustainability gap, as calculated in period 0:
t


1 g  
S 0  r  g  D0   
 Pt 
t 0  1  r 



Where S 0 , r , g , D0 , Y0 , and Pt , represent the sustainability gap in percent of GDP in period 0,

discount rate, GDP growth rate, initial debt stock in percent of GDP in period 0, GDP in
period 0, and primary surplus in percent of GDP in period t , respectively.
8.
Staff’s estimate of the sustainability gap has increased substantially. This reflects
the deterioration in the fiscal position since the last Article IV mission, as well our use of the
new ECFIN baseline estimates that are higher than the authorities’ previous estimates of
aging pressures. Consistent with previous exercises, the starting year for the analysis is taken
to be 2011. Staff project that, as a result of the recent fiscal deterioration, in 2011 the
structural primary balance will be 4½ percent of GDP lower than assumed in the
sustainability analysis in the 2008 Staff Report. Given that deterioration, and higher estimates
of aging pressures, the estimate of the sustainability gap has increased by 5½ percentage
points to 8 percent of GDP.4 5 While higher pension payments would also increase tax
receipts on pension income, this offers only a small offset to the increase in the sustainability
gap. However, the sustainability gap could turn out to be less than 8 percent of GDP if the
large external current account surplus unwinds as a rising number of retirees draw down their
accumulated pensions, raising consumption-based tax revenues over the long run as share of
output. But the size of this effect is quite uncertain however.

4

This assumes that the outlays for financial sector bailout—including any additional interest payments from the
debt issued for this purpose—are fully recouped. With zero recoupment of these outlays the sustainability gap
increases to 8½ percent of GDP.

5

In comparison, ECFIN estimates the fiscal sustainability gap at 6.9 percent of GDP, but with an estimated
structural primary deficit in 2010 of 1½ percent of GDP compared to staff’s estimate of 2½ percent of GDP.

86
Changes to Assessment of Fiscal Sustainability (Percent of GDP)
Previous

Current Difference

Structural primary balance in 2011

2.2

-2.4

-4.6

Increase in age-related spending (2011-60)
Of which: Pensions
Other

5.5
2.5
3.0

8.8
4.0
4.8

3.3
1.5
1.8

Increase in tax on pension income (2011-60)

1.5

2.7

1.2

Sustainability gap

2.6

8.0

5.4

Sources: CPB: Ageing and Sustainability of Dutch Public Finances (2006), ECFIN:
2009 Ageing Report, and staff calculations.

9.
Absent corrective measures, public debt is projected to exceed 500 percent of
GDP by 2060 in view of the large sustainability gap. Alongside, the robust deficit (i.e. the
structural primary deficit excluding property income) is projected to increase by 6 percentage
points to 11 percent of GDP, while the overall fiscal deficit deteriorates by 31½ percentage
points to 36¾ percent of GDP as interest payments consume an ever-increasing share of
fiscal expenditure. In contrast, immediate full adjustment implies that gross debt is driven to
zero by 2023, with a notable buildup of government assets thereafter to help defray the longrun costs of aging.
While immediate full adjustment on the scale required is implausible, delaying
10.
adjustment requires a higher long-run primary surplus target to ensure sustainability.
Staff estimate that phasing in the adjustment over a 10 year period requires structural
measures totaling about 8½ percent of GDP for sustainability, while adjustment over a 4-year
period would require measures totaling about 8¼ percent of GDP.

87

Netherlands: Fiscal Sustainability, 2011-60
(Percent of GDP)
6

6

Robust Balance

4

4

2

2

0

0

-2

-2

Plausible adjustment
1/

-4

Immediate full
adjustment

-6
-8

-4
-6
-8

No measures

-10

-10

-12

-12
2011

2021

10

2031

2041

2051
10

Overall Balance

5

5

0

0

Plausible adjustment
1/

-5
-10
-15

-10
-15

Immediate full
adjustment

-20

-5

-20

No measures

-25

-25

-30

-30

-35

-35

-40

-40
2011

2021

2031

2041

2051

700

700

Public Debt

600

600

500

500

400

400

300
200

-100

200

Plausible adjustment
1/

100
0

300

No measures

100
0

Immediate full
adjustment
2011

-100
2021

2031

2041

2051

Sources: CPB: Ageing and the Sustainability of Dutch Public Finances (2006), ECFIN: The 2009 Ageing
Report, and Staff calculations.
1/ The plausible adjustment scenario corresponds to the variable weights scenario in Table 5-1, and
envisages the sustainability gap being closed by 2020.

88
C. Measures to Achieve Sustainability

11.
The 2010 Budget Memorandum envisages that significant consolidation will
begin in 2011. Ahead of this, the authorities have already identified a package of measures
(phased increase in the retirement age to 67 years, capping mortgage interest deductibility for
high-priced homes, reduction in health-care allowances, and savings in the provision of
medical services), to be implemented from 2011 onward, which is expected to yield savings
of 1¾ percent of GDP over the long run. However, the total from these efforts falls well short
of the adjustment needed, so more measures will need to be identified, including in
subsequent years. One area that could be considered is a reduction in the maximum duration
of unemployment benefits, which at 38 months is high by international standards. Staff have
suggested cutting this to 18 months.
12.
Measures to directly contain the impact of aging on the public finances should be
a key plank of efforts to secure sustainability. In this regard, pension reform is critical. The
OECD notes that the state pension has not been changed since it was set up in 1957, even as
life expectancy has increased by more than 6 years and a strong second-pillar pension system
has been built up. Also, it is relatively generous by international standards, at about
31 percent of average earnings compared to an average 22 percent for neighboring countries.
The decomposition of the projected buildup in pension pressures indicates that the increase
arises from a pronounced increase in the old-age dependency ratio, which is projected to be
partly offset by tightening of eligibility rules. However, more could be done, including by
gradual reduction of benefits as well as improvements in the employment ratio. In addition,
the rise in the old-age dependency ratio could be limited by raising the retirement age.
13.
The authorities do not dispute the need for such measures. Indeed, they have
already moved in this direction by abolishing tax incentives for early retirement. They have
also announced the intention to raise the retirement age from 65 to 66 in 2020 and to 67 in
2025. These measures could also be supported by intensified efforts to increase labor
participation rates and immigration in order to increase the base for funding pensions.
Consideration could also be given to reducing or means-testing the generosity of pensions,
while strengthening dependence on the second pillar pension.
Major health sector reform in 2006 has increased competition in the sector, but
14.
more is needed to contain the rise in health-care expenditures. The reforms harmonized
the basic health insurance package, increased consumer information on premiums, facilitated
the switching of insurance providers, blocked insurance companies from refusing coverage
on the basis of pre-existing conditions, and mandated that all acquire insurance. This has
intensified competition amongst insurers, leading to increased mergers and some downward
pressure on premiums. However, expenditure pressures are still significant, and the 2009
Spring Memorandum pointed to a sharp rise in expenditures (notably payments to medical
specialists). There are also concerns that mergers of insurance companies will ultimately
reduce competition. Thus sustained vigilance will be needed to keep a lid on health costs.

89

Netherlands: Decomposition of Spending Expenditure Projections, 2007-2060
60

2.5
Pension expenditure (% GDP)

50

Dependency ratio (%)
Benefits ratio (%)

2.0

Inverse employment rate (RHS)
40

Eligibility ratio (RHS)
1.5

30
1.0
20

0.5

10

0

0.0
2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040 2043 2046 2049 2052 2055 2058

Sources: DG ECFIN, The 2009 Ageing Report, and IMF staff estimates .

15.
Moreover, eligibility, entitlements, and arrangements for old-age care will also
need reform, as this is an area where aging pressures will be substantial. The projected
increase in long-term care spending for the Netherlands is by far the highest in the EU, which
suggests that reforms drawing on lessons from other EU countries could yield substantial
savings.
The pace of consolidation will reflect the balancing of the government’s twin
16.
stated objectives of reducing both the output and the fiscal sustainability gaps. Given
the large negative output gaps projected in 2009-10, the intention to delay consolidation until
2011 implies essentially that a zero weight is placed on the sustainability gap over the short
run. Beyond that horizon, however, different government preferences will lead to different
consolidation paths. Table 5-1 illustrates various consolidation paths assuming the
authorities’ preferences are governed by a quadratic loss function, with the different paths
reflecting different weights on the output and sustainability gaps.

90
Table 5-1. Illustrative Optimal Annual Fiscal Adjustment Paths Under a Quadratic Loss Function 1/
Loss Function Weights
Alpha 2/

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Beta 3/
Structural primary balance (percent of GDP)

1
0
1
7
1
Memorandum item:
Variable weights 4/

1
1
0
1
7

2.3
5.7
-3.7
-1.9
5.4

3.3
5.7
-3.7
-1.3
5.7

4.0
5.7
-3.7
-0.8
5.9

4.5
5.7
-3.7
-0.2
6.0

5.0
5.7
-3.7
0.2
6.1

5.3
5.7
-3.7
0.7
6.1

5.5
5.7
-3.7
1.1
6.2

5.7
5.7
-3.7
1.5
6.2

5.8
5.7
-3.7
1.8
6.2

5.9
5.7
-3.7
2.1
6.2

-1.6

-0.7

0.2

1.1

2.0

2.9

3.8

4.7

5.5

6.2

Source: IMF staff calculations.
1/ Structural primary balance in 2010 = -2.4 percent of GDP; Structural primary balance target to close sustainability gap after
10 years = 6.2 percent of GDP; Structural primary balance target to immediately close sustainability gap = 5.7 percent of GDP;
Fiscal multiplier is taken to be 0.8; Output gap in 2010 = -1.8 percent of GDP.
2/ Weight on output gap.
3/ Weight on sustainability gap.
4/ Alpha is assumed to decline over time from an initial value of 7, while Beta rises at the same pace from an initial value of 1.

17.
A plausible adjustment path could be one where the weight placed on the
sustainability gap rises over time. This would be consistent with a relatively moderate pace
of consolidation, where the sustainability gap is erased over a 10-year horizon. The
“plausible adjustment” path shown in the panel chart on fiscal sustainability corresponds to
variable weights on the sustainability and output gaps, respectively increasing and decreasing
over the 2011-2020 period (see Footnote 4 of Table 5-1).

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—NETHERLANDS
Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation—Informational Annex
Prepared by the European Department
December 15, 2009

Contents
I.
II.
III.
IV.

Page

Fund Relations ..................................................................................................................2
Staff Analytical Work, 2000-07 ........................................................................................4
Past Fund Policy Recommendations and Implementation................................................6
Statistical Issues ................................................................................................................7

2
Appendix I. Netherlands: Fund Relations
(As of October 31, 2009)
I.

Membership Status: Joined December 27, 1945; Article VIII.

II.

General Resources Account:
Quota
Fund holdings of currency
Reserve position in Fund

SDR Million
5,162.40
4,091.21
1,071.24

Percent of Quota
100.00
79.25
20.75

III.

SDR Department:
Net cumulative allocation
Holdings

SDR Million
4,836.63
4,885.68

Percent of Allocation
100.00
101.01

IV.

Outstanding Purchases and Loans: None

V.

Latest Financial Arrangements: None

VI.

Projected Obligations to Fund (SDR million; based on existing use of resources
and present holdings of SDRs):

2009
Principal
Charges/interest
Total
VII.

Forthcoming
2010
2011
2012

2013

0.36
0.36

0.36
0.36

0.03
0.36

0.36
0.36

Exchange Rate Arrangements:

The Netherlands’ currency is the euro, which floats freely and independently against other
currencies.
VIII.

Article IV Consultation:

Discussions for the 2009 Article IV consultation were held in Amsterdam and The Hague
from October 22–November 2, 2009. The staff report for the 2008 Article IV Consultation
(IMF Country Report No. 08/171, June 2008) was considered by the Executive Board on
May 21, 2008. The Article IV discussions with the Netherlands are on the standard 12-month
consultation cycle.

3
IX.

Exchange Restrictions:

The Netherlands maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on payments and transfers
for current international transactions, except for restrictions maintained solely for security
reasons. These measures are established by European Union regulations and have been
notified to the Fund pursuant to Executive Board Decision No. 144-(52/51).

4
Appendix II. Netherlands: Staff Analytical Work, 2000–09
Fiscal Policy
o
o
o
o
o
o

Long Run Fiscal Sustainability in the Netherlands, Analytical Note 5, 2009 Staff
Report.
Volatility of Tax Revenues in the Netherlands, IMF Country Report No. 06/284.
Budgetary Policymaking in the Netherlands, IMF Country Report No. 05/225.
Recent Fiscal Developments in the Netherlands, IMF Country Report No. 04/301.
Medium-Term Fiscal Policy, IMF Country Report No. 02/123.
Health Care Reform, IMF Country Report No. 02/123.

The Financial Sector
o
o
o
o

o
o
o

Dutch Housing Markets: What Went Up Will Come Down?, Analytical Note 1, 2009
Staff Report.
Macro-Financial Linkages in the Netherlands, Analytical Note 2, 2009 Staff Report.
Capitalization of the Dutch Banking System, Analytical Note 4, 2009 Staff Report.
House Prices in the Netherlands: Determinants, Concerns, and Considerations
Related to Phasing Out the Tax Deductibility of Mortgage Interest Payments, IMF
Country Report No. 06/284.
The Financial Sector in the Netherlands: A Health Check and Progress Report on the
FSSA Recommendations, IMF Country Report No. 05/225.
House Prices in the Netherlands, IMF Country Report No. 05/225.
Second Pillar Pensions, Stock Market Returns, and Labor Demand, IMF Country
Report No. 03/240.

Labor Markets
o
o
o
o

Wage Bargaining in the Netherlands, IMF Country Report No. 03/240.
Inactivity and Poverty Traps, IMF Country Report No. 02/123.
Reform of the Disability Program, IMF Country Report No. 02/123.
The Labor Income Tax Credit in an International Perspective, IMF Country Report
No. 01/96.

Growth, Productivity, and Related Cyclical Issues
o
o
o

The Crisis and Potential Output in the Netherlands, Analytical Note 3, 2009 Staff
Report.
Potential Growth and Total Factor Productivity in the Netherlands, IMF Country
Report No. 06/284.
The External Competitiveness of the Dutch Economy: A Short Note on Evidence from
both Aggregate and Disaggregate Data, IMF Country Report No. 05/225.

5
o
o
o
o

Long-Run Household Consumption Equilibrium in the Netherlands, IMF Country
Report No. 05/225.
Recent Productivity Trends in the Netherlands, IMF Country Report No. 04/301.
Estimating Potential Growth and Output Gaps for the Netherlands, IMF Country
Report No. 03/240.
Dealing with Cyclical Tensions, IMF Country Report No. 00/88.

Appendix III. Netherlands: Past Fund Policy Recommendations and Implementation
Implementation

Fiscal Policy: Staff endorsed the authorities’ pre-crisis target of achieving a
structural surplus of 1 percent of GDP by 2011, but also encouraged the
authorities to seize opportunities for faster consolidation, given an estimated
sustainability gap of 2¼ percent of GDP in 2011. Other recommendations
include closer coordination between the central government and the local
governments, and refinements to enhance the transparency and reduce the
procyclicality of the fiscal framework (e.g., reporting of tax expenditures in the
budget and their inclusion in the expenditures ceiling, and exclusion of
unemployment benefits from the expenditure ceiling).

Fiscal consolidation of 1¼ percentage points of GDP, in structural terms, was
achieved during 2003–08. The authorities improved coordination between
various levels of government, excluded interest payments from the
expenditures ceiling, lowered the “signaling value,”1 introduced fixed funding of
the FES. They have also recently removed unemployment benefits from the
expenditure ceilings.

Labor Market: Past recommendations included tightening unemployment
benefits, abolishing fiscal incentives for early retirement, reducing inactivity
traps, reassessing disability entitlements, and liberalizing employment
protection legislation.

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits was lowered to 38 months—
which however remains high in international comparison. Tax/benefit
incentives for early retirement were eliminated, inactivity traps attenuated, and
disability rights tightened. Recommendations not yet taken on board include:
(i) reducing the still high effective tax rate on second family workers, in part
through faster elimination of the imputation of the general tax credit to the
primary worker; (ii) tightening access to the disability scheme by the young;
(iii) stricter enforcement of work availability requirements for the partially
disabled and unemployed; (iv) extension of the new more severe rules for
periodic reassessment of disability status to those aged 45 and over; and (v)
further easing the dismissal system and aligning the rate of accumulation of
severance payments for workers aged 50 and over with that of other workers.

Product Market: The Fund has generally supported the authorities’ own
liberalization program, including the regional unbundling of the energy market,
the reduction in required licenses and permits, and, more generally, the efforts
to increase competition and reduce the cost of doing business.

The stringency of product market regulation has gradually decreased,
reflecting continued simplification in barriers to entrepreneurship. However,
retail distribution should be further liberalized by phasing-out the restriction on
shop-opening hours, easing zoning regulations and facilitating the entry of
large retail stores.

Financial Sector: the 2004 Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA) and
subsequent Article IV consultations have recommended passage of a new
Financial Supervision Act, clarifying the framework for financial sector
supervision and the authority of the minister, improvements in security
settlement systems, introduction of the new regulatory framework for pension
funds, establishment of a Financial Stability Division, expanding stress testing
models, strengthening the AML-CFT framework, reducing mortgage interest
deductibility, introducing a mortgage code of conduct to help contain high LTV
mortgages.

The authorities have implemented most of these recommendations. Prudential
supervision is consolidated at DNB, while market conduct supervision is
entrusted to AFM. A Financial Stability Division has been established at DNB
and pension regulation has been overhauled. DNB has been conducting
stress tests regularly as well as improving the stress test framework. There is
still only partial progress regarding mortgage interest deductibility, which has
not been fully phased out but the authorities have made small reductions.
Similarly, the mortgage code of conduct has been strengthened, but it has not
been very effective in reducing the high LTV ratio. A modification of the Code
is under discussion which would include an explicit LTV ratio guideline.

1

The “signaling value” is the fiscal balance ratio to GDP below which corrective measures must be taken to avoid breaching the Maastricht criteria. It has been
reduced to 2 percent from 2½ percent of GDP.

6

Past Staff Recommendations

7
Appendix IV. Netherlands: Statistical Issues
(As of December 3, 2009)
I. Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance
General: Data provision is adequate for surveillance.
National accounts: As a one-off matter, a number of institutional reforms had a significant
impact on national account and other data in 2006. Most importantly, the reform of health
care insurance caused a significant reclassification of private consumption into public
consumption. This shift had a big impact on the growth rates of the components concerned,
but overall GDP was not affected.
II. Data Standards and Quality
Subscriber to the Fund’s Special Data
Dissemination Standard since June 11, 1996.

Data ROSC is available.

8
Netherlands: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance
(As of December 3, 2009)
Date of
Latest
Observation

Date
Received

Frequency Frequency Frequency
of
of
of
Data /7
Reporting /8 Publication
/8

Exchange Rates

Current

Current

Daily and
Monthly

Daily and
Monthly

Daily and
Monthly

International Reserve Assets and Reserve
Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities /1

10/09

12/03/09

Monthly

Monthly

Monthly

Reserve/Base Money 2/

10/09

12/03/09

Monthly

Monthly

Monthly

Broad Money 2/

09/09

12/03/09

Monthly

Monthly

Weekly
and
Monthly

Central Bank Balance Sheet

10/09

12/03/09

Monthly

Monthly

Monthly

Consolidated Balance Sheet of the
Banking System

09/09

12/03/09

Monthly

Monthly

Monthly

Interest Rates /3

Current

Current

Daily and
Monthly

Daily and
Monthly

Daily and
Monthly

Consumer Price Index

11/09

12/3/09

Monthly

Monthly

Monthly

Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and
Composition of Financing /4—General
Government /5

Q2 2009

09/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and
Composition of Financing /4—Central
Government

Q2 2009

09/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

Stocks of Central Government and Central
Government-Guaranteed Debt /6

Q2 2009

09/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

External Current Account Balance

Q2 2009

09/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

Exports and Imports of Goods and
Services

Q3 2009

11/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

GDP/GNP

Q3 2009

11/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

Gross External Debt

Q2 2009

09/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

International Investment Position 7/

Q2 2009

09/09

Quarterly

Quarterly

Quarterly

Memo Items:
Data Quality—
Methodological
Soundness /9

Data Quality—
Accuracy and
Reliability /10

O, O, LO, O

O, O, O, O, O

LO, LO, LO, O

LO, O, O, O, O

O, O, O, O

O, O, O, O, O

O, O, O, O

LO, O, O, O, O

1/ Includes reserve assets pledged of otherwise encumbered.
2/ Pertains to contribution to EMU aggregate.
3/ Both market-based and officially-determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.
4/ Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing.
5/ The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state
and local governments.
6/ Including currency and maturity composition.
7/ Includes external gross financial asset and liability positions vis-à-vis nonresidents.
8/ Daily (D); weekly (W); monthly (M); quarterly (Q); annually (A); irregular (I); and not available (NA).
9/ Reflects the assessment provided in the data ROSC (published on January 10, 2008, and based on the findings of the mission that took place
October 3-17, 2007) for the dataset corresponding to the variable in each row. The assessment indicates whether international standards concerning
concepts and definitions, scope, classification/sectorization, and basis for recording are fully observed (O); largely observed (LO); largely not
observed (LNO); not observed (NO); and not available (NA).
10/ Same as footnote 9, except referring to international standards concerning (respectively) source data, assessment of source data,
statistical techniques, assessment and validation of intermediate data and statistical outputs, and revision studies.

Statement by the IMF Staff Representative
January 11, 2010
1.
This statement summarizes developments in the Netherlands since the issuance
of the staff report. The additional information does not change the thrust of the staff
appraisal.
2.
Staff has raised the projections for GDP growth in 2009–11. This is the result of
continuing improvements in the outlook for the major advanced countries and revised
estimates indicating slightly stronger growth in Q3 2009.


The latest data indicate that quarterly GDP growth in Q3 2009 was 0.5 percent,
slightly higher than the earlier estimate of 0.4 percent, reflecting slightly higher
expansion of exports, personal consumption and government spending. On this basis,
we have revised our 2009 GDP growth projection to -4.0 percent from -4.2 percent.



GDP growth for both 2010 and 2011 is now projected at 1.3 percent (compared to
earlier projections of 0.7 percent and 0.6 percent respectively), owing mainly to a
more sanguine outlook for the larger European economies.



At the same time, the unemployment rate forecast for 2010 has been lowered from
6½ percent to 5 percent (Eurostat definition).

3.
The authorities’ main think-tank—the CPB—has also revised its 2009–10 GDP
growth projections upward. 2009 GDP growth is expected at -4.0 percent (-4¾ percent
earlier), while 2010 growth is projected at 1.5 percent (zero percent earlier). The central
bank, however, is less optimistic, and for 2009, 2010, and 2011 it is projecting growth of
-4 percent, 0.7 percent, and 1.2 percent, respectively.
4.
Consumer price inflation is rising from recent lows, house price deflation is
moderating, and unemployment was stable in October. Harmonized inflation rose to
0.7 percent (12-month change) in November from a recent low of -0.1 percent in July. It is
now above the 0.5 percent euro area rate for November. House prices dropped 4.7 percent in
November 2009 (12-month change), down from a 5.2 percent decline in October. The
unemployment rate (Eurostat definition) was 3.7 percent in October, unchanged from
September and well below the euro area average of 9.8 percent.
5.
Financial institutions have repaid significant amounts of state support. ING paid
back €5 billion out of the total assistance of €10 billion, SNS returned €185 million out of
€750 million, and Aegon repaid €1 billion out of €3 billion.

Statement by Age Bakker, Executive Director, and Ester Barendregt,
Senior Advisor to the Executive Director for the Kingdom of the
Netherlands—Netherlands
January 11, 2010
Introduction
The Netherlands authorities thank staff for their appraisal of the Dutch economy as well
as the informative exchange of views during the meetings.
The Dutch economy, as many others, has gone through a turbulent and challenging
period. With its relatively large and international financial sector, the Netherlands was
highly exposed to the global financial distress. Being an open economy, the country was
particularly affected by the adverse economic developments following from the financial
crisis.
For this governmental period, which started in 2007, the government based its budgetary
framework on an estimated annual trend growth of 2 percent. It planned to improve the
structural balance from a deficit of 0.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to a surplus of 1 percent
in 2011. The budget memorandum for 2009, drafted right before the collapse of Lehman,
still envisaged this budgetary path to be on track, foreseeing a surplus of 1.2 percent of
GDP.
The financial crisis and the following deep recession have thoroughly changed the
economic landscape. Negative growth was recorded for four quarters. Growth returned to
positive numbers (quarter-to-quarter) in the third quarter of 2009 and is expected to
further pick up. However, the outlook for the budget is exceptionally negative by Dutch
standards: the budget deficit has increased sharply and is expected to rise further to 6
percent of GDP in 2010. In these circumstances, and against the backdrop of continued
fiscal challenges related to ageing, measures have been taken to curb the deficit and a
fundamental review of all government spending programs and the tax system is
underway. These steps underline the government’s commitment to the continued
sustainability of Dutch public finances.
Response to the crisis
In the exceptional economic and financial climate, the government has taken a range of
measures to address the immediate challenges which the crisis posed.
First, large-scale financial sector interventions were made (mostly in 2008), driven by the
need to maintain financial stability, totaling over EUR 80 billion (adding to the public
debt, although it is expected that these interventions will be mostly recouped when the
economy recovers). Second, the government decided to let automatic stabilizers do their
work, disregarding the normal deficit limit of 3%, and outlays for unemployment benefits
were allowed to increase without undertaking compensating measures. Third, temporary
and focused stimulus measures were taken as part of a coordinated European response.
The combined effect of the stimulus measures and automatic stabilizers amounts to an
increase of the budget deficit by EUR 50 billion over 2009 and 2010.

2

Economic outlook
It seems that the worst is behind us. Several indicators, including increased confidence
among consumers and producers, point to improving economic conditions. At the same
time some effects of the crisis may have a lagged impact in 2010, such as rising
unemployment and deteriorating public finance. The most recent projections of the
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) are slightly better than staff
forecasts for 2009 at -4 percent, and show a more substantial improvement for growth in
2010 at 1.5%. This more optimistic outlook is driven by the stark turnaround in world
trade figures since mid-2009.
There are a few specific issues with respect to the economic outlook which merit
attention.
First, the impact of the economic crisis on unemployment has been more modest than
expected, so far. The government, in response to the crisis, has subsidized temporary
reduced working hours arrangements, stimulating companies to keep employees while
obliging them to invest in their education. The Netherlands being a knowledge-based
economy dependent on highly educated labor, and labor market conditions being tight
before the crisis, companies are hesitant to lay off employees. In this respect they were
helped by an improved economic outlook and better than anticipated profitability, caused
partly by lower incidental remunerations and fewer hours worked. Also, a stronger than
expected discouraged worker effect is noticeable. Consequently, unemployment forecasts
have been revised downward substantially, for 2009 to 5 percent (national definition,
which is 1- 1.5 % higher than the ILO definition) and for this year to 6.5 percent.
Second, after considerable private wealth loss in 2009, private wealth is expected to
recoup in 2010, contributing to consumption growth. The wealth loss in 2009 was due to
substantial equity losses and a moderate decline in house prices. With the recent upward
movement in stock prices and with house prices, as explained in staff’s analytical note,
broadly in line with fundamentals the outlook for private wealth is more positive for
2010.
Third, staff’s analysis points to a credit crunch since 2007 and the likelihood that
financial tightening may reduce economic growth in 2008-2010. We have our doubts
about the firmness of these conclusions, since our statistics indicate that the year-on-year
growth of loans granted by banks to non-financial institutions from mid-2007 through
2008 has been unusually high. That said, the Dutch authorities recognize the importance
of a healthy credit market for restoring economic growth, and they have taken measures
to stimulate granting of bank loans, especially to small and medium enterprises.
Fiscal exit and structural reforms
The dramatic deterioration of the fiscal situation has prompted the Dutch government to
present a supplementary policy agreement in March 2009, accompanying the fiscal
stimulus measures described above. The agreement sets out a medium-term framework

3
for stabilizing the economy in 2010, starting fiscal consolidation in 2011, and for further
improving the budgetary position thereafter.
The Netherlands has a well-tested set of budgetary rules in place. These credible and
transparent rules will be instrumental in achieving the necessary fiscal consolidation in
the coming years. Moreover, the government has recently submitted to Parliament a
Deficit Reduction Act to speed up the budgetary adjustment. This new rule, to be
enshrined in national law, ensures progress towards medium-term objectives agreed in
the context of the European excessive deficit procedures.
Staff recommends refinements of Dutch fiscal rules to attenuate their procyclicality. We
agree that excluding cyclically sensitive outlays from the expenditure ceilings can be
helpful. However, we fear that formalizing exceptional circumstances in which
discretionary stimulus is allowed, may lead to increased political pressures. Since Dutch
budgetary principles prescribe that the rules cannot be changed during the game (the
governmental period), staff’s recommendations are taken into consideration by a highlevel advisory group on the budgetary policy framework for the next government.
For the fiscal exit the government is firmly committed to implement the
recommendations in the framework of the European excessive deficit procedure. To this
effect the government has put in place a strategy to reduce the deficit below the 3 percent
threshold value by 2013 and to further improve the budgetary position towards agreed
medium term objectives thereafter. Concrete measures undertaken by the government
include the decision, in line with staff’s recommendations, to withdraw the stimulus
measures in 2011, provided that the economy has sufficiently recovered from the crisis
(the latest economic forecasts indicate that this is likely the case). In addition,
expenditure cuts of 0.3% of GDP are foreseen for 2011. Furthermore, the government
intends to moderate wages in the public sector.
The government agrees with staff’s assessment that the fiscal sustainability gap has
increased considerably over the last years, due to the crisis and higher than expected
increases in ageing-related spending. In this respect the government has proposed a
sustainability package, amounting to 1.3% of GDP. First, the pension age will be
increased from 65 to 66 years in 2020 and to 67 in 2025, giving employees and
employers sufficient time to prepare. Privately funded pension plans (the second pillar)
will also disburse 2 years later at the age of 67. Second, public reinsurance of healthcare
will be phased out so that health insurers will bear greater risks, thus improving cost
effectiveness. Third, mortgage-interest-deductibility for high-priced homes will be
abolished above a certain cap. These measures will help to reduce the sustainability gap,
which staff estimates at 8% of GDP.
However, the government agrees that more fundamental reform will be needed to
maintain long-term sustainability. To that end, the government has engaged in a
Fundamental Budgetary Review. Twenty working groups will make proposals for
savings of up to 20 percent of budget expenditure. Such an approach has been very
successful in the eighties in achieving a substantial reduction in the size of the public

4
sector. The working groups cover all areas of government policy, including housing,
labor market, innovation, energy and safety. They are complemented by a study on the
structure of the tax system. In this fundamental budgetary review, there are no taboos. In
order to stimulate creativity and a critical attitude, working groups are chaired by current
or former top-ranking officials from a different policy field. Moreover, each working
group has an obligation to work out at least one scenario that could result in budgetary
savings of 20 percent in their area. Working groups are expected to report in spring 2010,
so that results can be incorporated in the preparations for the 2011 national budget where
possible.
Financial sector situation and exit
The global financial crisis has hit the Dutch financial sector hard, and the authorities have
had to take exceptional measures to maintain financial stability. We are pleased with the
constructive remarks by staff on the Dutch approach.
Staff expresses concerns that Dutch banks – like several European counterparts – have
low equity capital relative to unweighted assets. In our view, this can be largely explained
by the use of IFRS accounting in Europe, which obliges banks to consolidate more assets
on their balance sheet than their American peers who report according to US GAAP (the
denominator of the capital ratio is therefore larger for European banks). Moreover, the
risk-weighted capital level of Dutch banks remains well above the regulatory minimum.
Nevertheless, the authorities agree that banks should continue to increase the level and
quality of capital. Positive developments in this respect are that recent capital issuances,
disinvestments and ‘derisking’ have already increased the BIS ratio by approximately 2
percent between 2008 and the third quarter of 2009. Moreover, after the large losses
incurred in 2008, profitability has stabilized at break-even point in 2009.
The Dutch authorities envisage a phased and tailor-made exit strategy for the financial
sector interventions. Systemic liquidity support should be unwound first, followed by
guarantee schemes and then government participations and schemes for toxic assets. This
would make the transition more gradual and thus help maintain financial stability.
More specifically, the following is envisaged. Government guarantees for bank bonds
with a maturity of up to five years will be phased out gradually, striking a balance
between continuing the facility as a back-up option and preventing extended support for
unsustainable business models. The Dutch facility was recently extended until 30 June
2010, with an increase in the guarantee fee to create a gradual and price-based exit.
Although the facility is expected to close in 2010, the further design, timing and
sequencing of exit strategies will depend on market developments. A revival of
alternative funding sources such as the covered bond market and securitization markets
could accelerate the withdrawal of public support. Furthermore, exit strategies will need
to be coordinated with other EU countries.
Capital injections and asset facilities have been designed in a flexible manner and contain
institution-specific exit conditions and price-based incentives, such as increasing fee
structures. A timely repayment of capital injections is desirable, but repayment should be

5
sustainable from a prudential perspective and should not endanger credit supply to the
real economy. Dutch banks have recently repaid a significant part of the received
government support, partly by issuing new equity which demonstrates the regained
market access. End 2009, ING, AEGON and SNS REAAL repurchased respectively € 5
billion, € 1 billion and € 185 million of state owned Core Tier 1 securities.
As for acquired institutions (Fortis Bank Netherlands / ABN AMRO Bank Netherlands,
insurance company ASR), the government is committed to re-privatize these as soon as
possible. As a precondition, the institutions should first be able to obtain medium term
financing at reasonable cost and markets should be sufficiently stabilized. The sale of
Fortis Bank Netherlands / ABN AMRO Bank Netherlands is not expected before 2011.
Finally, the government will ensure that any exit strategies are communicated to market
participants well in advance. Clarity is an important condition to further improve market
access of financial institutions, and credible exit strategies require realistic deadlines.
Staff welcomed our authorities’ efforts to create a voluntary private sector code of
conduct. Under this code, remuneration is to be based on long-term performance;
compensation committees are to develop explicit corporate remuneration policies. It is
worth mentioning that the code introduces a relative cap on executive remuneration. This
relative cap requires that executive remuneration should remain below the average
remuneration of the relevant peer group.