Budget Support
Financial Implementation,
Risk Assessment,
and Selected Poverty, Macroeconomic and Fiscal
Results

2015

DG DEVCO

Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 0
Part I - Financial Implementation ............................................................................................................ 5
1. Commitments ...................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Disbursements ..................................................................................................................................... 7
3. Fixed and Variable Tranches................................................................................................................ 8
4. Distribution by Sector and Income Group ........................................................................................... 9
5. Forecast 2015 Commitments ............................................................................................................ 10
Part II – Risk Management .................................................................................................................... 11
1. Risk Analysis....................................................................................................................................... 11
1.1. Risk Category Analysis ............................................................................................................... 11
1.2. Risk Dimensions Analysis........................................................................................................... 13
1.3. Risk Profile by Type of Budget Support Contract ...................................................................... 14
2. Mitigating Measures and Risk Response ........................................................................................... 14
Part III – Selected Macroeconomic and Fiscal Results .......................................................................... 15
1. Poverty and Inequality ...................................................................................................................... 15
1.1. Overview ................................................................................................................................... 15
1.2. Regional Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 16
2. Economic Growth and Macroeconomic Stability .............................................................................. 17
2.1. Overview ................................................................................................................................... 17
2.2. Regional Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 19
3. Public Financial Management, Corruption and Budgetary Transparency ........................................ 22
3.1. Public Financial Management ................................................................................................... 22
3.2. Corruption ................................................................................................................................. 24
3.3. Budgetary Transparency and Oversight .................................................................................... 25
3.4. Illicit Financial Flows .................................................................................................................. 26
Annex 1 – Selected regional and country indicators
Annex 2 – Budget support/non-budget support country group list

Abbreviations
AVR
BS
DCI
EDF
EITI
ENP-E
ENP-S
ESA
GGDC
HR
IBP
IFMIS
LIC
MIC
OCT
PAC
PEFA
PFM
RMF
SBC
SBS
SRC
WCA

Average
Budget Support
Development Cooperation Instrument
European Development Fund
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument East
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument South
Eastern and Southern Africa
Good Governance and Development Contract
Human Rights
International Budget Partnership
Integrated Financial Management Information System
Low Income Country
Middle Income Country
Overseas Countries and Territories
Pacific
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
Public Financial Management
Risk Management ramework
State Building Contract
Sector Budget Support
Sector Reform Contract
West and Central Africa

0

Executive Summary
This report on EU budget support coincides with important milestones in development policy. During
2015, the Financing for Development Conference and the Sustainable Development Summit will
present a new development agenda. Budget support remains uniquely well placed to respond to
development challenges as an effective aid modality. A review of budget support evaluations1
highlighted the contribution of budget support to service delivery, macroeconomic performance,
strengthened public financial management, transparency and oversight, and the fight against
corruption. Budget support was furthermore found to have lower transaction costs, and a greater
degree of alignment to government policies and processes than other aid modalities. Where
conditions allow for its use, budget support remains Europeaid's preferred modality. At the same
time, a close monitoring of results and risk management and mitigation, for example in relation to
corruption risks, remains essential.
The report provides an overview of the implementation of EU budget support programmes, risk
analysis based on the Risk Management Frameworks, and a review of selected poverty,
macroeconomic and fiscal developments in budget support countries.
As of 1 January 2015, provisional data shows on-going EDF, DCI, and ENP budget support
commitments for 240 operations in 84 countries and OCTs amounted to €11.2 billion. Of this
amount, € 1.3 billion was newly committed in 2014 and € 4.1 billion still remained to be disbursed. In
2014, €1.6 billion was disbursed as budget support, representing 21% of total Europeaid
disbursements. Disbursements and commitments were affected by a lack of payment credits and the
delay in the ratification of the revised EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement. Sub-Saharan Africa was the
largest recipient of budget support funds, followed by the Neighbourhood region.
The large majority of budget support programmes were Sector Reform Contracts (82%), most often
provided in support of the education sector. State Building Contracts (SBCs) represented 6%, and
Good Governance and Development Contracts (GGDCs) represented 4%, most of which are being
implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa. The remainder are general budget support (GBS) programmes
which pre-date the new budget support policy. The introduction of State Building Contracts has
allowed for resilience building and budget support interventions in fragile situations, for example in
response to the ebola crisis. At the same time, such contracts are subject to a higher degree of risk,
requiring appropriate risk mitigation.
Variable tranches remain an important part of budget support operations with planned variable
tranche shares for 2014 reaching on average 50% of total tranches, and substantially more in ENP,
Latin America, Caribbean and OCTs. However, timely variable tranche execution rates were relatively
low, highlighting the importance of further increasing indicator quality and strengthening the related
policy dialogue.
The risk management framework has proven its use in guiding the identification of country risks
specific to budget support and ensuring that risk mitigation actions are identified and monitored. The
1

"Synthesis of budget support evaluations", November 2014, study carried out on behalf of the European
Commission

1

methodology was strengthened with a more systematic review approach compared to the 2013 pilot
exercise. In February 2015, the DEVCO and NEAR budget support and financial assistance steering
committees adopted 87 Risk Management Frameworks showing an upward revision in risks
compared with the pilot exercise. Thirty-six percent of all budget support countries, representing
42% of total outstanding disbursements, now have an average substantial risk compared with 27%
for the pilot exercise. The increase is likely to be due to a combination of a more developed risk
coherence review methodology and increased risks, particularly in the West and Central Africa
region. The latter is now the region with the highest proportion of substantial/high risks followed by
Asia.
The relative importance of risk categories has remained relatively stable. Corruption and fraud risks
dominate, followed by developmental, public financial management, political and macroeconomic
risks. Developmental risks are largely driven by government effectiveness risks, which affect middleincome budget support countries as much as low-income budget support countries, but public policy
risks remain limited. Political risks are concentrated in West and Central Africa, Asia and
Neighbourhood budget support countries. Macroeconomic risks are most prevalent in West and
Central Africa and selected Caribbean countries. Developmental and corruption risks on the other
hand are important across all regions. Public Financial Management risks are less pronounced in Latin
America, Caribbean, Neighbourhood and Eastern and Southern Africa budget support countries.
The upwards revision in risks is also a reflection of the increase in the number of State Building
Contracts, which continue to be subject to the highest risk ratings. Political risks in countries that
benefit from Good Governance and Development Contracts continue to be assessed as
low/moderate.
Risk mitigation measures have been identified for all substantial/high risk areas. Looking ahead, it will
be important to ensure that these measures progressively target the most critical areas, include an
appropriate mix of short term actions and structural measures, based on a sound analysis of the
opportunities of risk mitigation.
Part III provides a summary overview of selected poverty, macroeconomic and fiscal country results
in budget support countries. Causality or attribution of country results to budget support is not
examined. A review of data comparing budget support with non-budget support developing
countries shows a clear trend of faster poverty reduction, less inequality, higher and less volatile
economic growth, lower fiscal deficits and debt levels, higher levels of investments, stronger public
financial management systems, more budgetary transparency, and a better control of corruption,
which nevertheless remains a key challenge.
Poverty figures have continued their downward trend, and more so in budget support countries,
where poverty is generally more prevalent. Importantly, this trend extends to all regions. Budget
support countries have, however, not made much progress in reducing inequality.
Economic growth in low-income budget support countries has barely suffered from the 2008-09
world economic crisis and has consistently outperformed budget support middle-income countries
since the crisis. Growth projections for 2016 generally revert to previous post crisis trend levels,
following a slowdown in 2014-15. However, this outlook is subject to much uncertainty due to
commodity price volatility, weak global trade growth, weak economic growth in important trading
2

partners, and reduced fiscal space, particularly in Africa. The sharp decline in oil prices during the
second half of 2014 could, if sustained, give a modest push to global growth and sizeable income
shifts from oil exporters to oil importers. The reduction in fiscal space means that domestic revenue
mobilisation efforts must be increased.
Finally, an important budget support portfolio requires effective management and oversight. Budget
support governance was further strengthened in 2014. The DEVCO Budget Support Steering
committee continued to provide strategic guidance on budget support programmes with an
increased focus on the more strategic cases. The newly created DG NEAR set up its own financial
assistance steering committee. The central DEVCO unit in charge of budget support policy and
methodology was strengthened to provide increased support to geographic units and EU delegations
on budget support programmes. A simplification exercise streamlined budget support procedures
and reporting requirements for low/moderate risk countries. As a result the Commission decided not
to pursue the creation of new regional support teams (hubs), originally envisaged to increase the
support to Delegations and geographical services in headquarters in managing their budget support
operations. The role of the regional teams was entrusted to the central unit in charge of budget
support policy and methodology.

3

4

Part I - Financial Implementation

The financial data in this chapter relate to EDF, ENI and DCI budget support operations, and should
be considered as provisional. Official data is provided in the Annual Report on the European Union's
Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation. Provisional data for
individual budget support countries is provided in annex 1.

1. Commitments
End 2014, on-going commitments on BS programmes amounted to €11.4 billion, of which €1.3 bn
newly committed in 2014. Of these ongoing commitments, €4.1 bn still remained to be disbursed
(RAL) as of 1st of January 2015. The level of new commitments in 2014 was about 50% lower than in
previous years due to the end of the 2007-13 multiannual financial framework and the delay in the
ratification of the revised EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement. For 2015, which marks the start of the new
2014-20 framework, new commitments are expected to rise again to €2.3 bn.

Number
of
Countries

Number of
BS
operations

ENP South

5

ENP East
West &
central Africa
East &
Southern
Africa
Caribbean
Latin
America
Asia

Region

BS commitment

Types of BS contracts

Total BS
commitment

of which
new BS
commitme
nt 2014

2

2,455.4

2

SRC/
SBS

GGDC

SBC

44

41

1

5

29

27

16

29

14

3

9

3

13

32

20

4

1

7

1

GBS

3

Total
Disbursed

To be
paid
after

2014

1/01/201
5

379.5

243.2

1,239.4

1,249.7

558.3

344.5

658.2

1,969.3

128.0

458.9

371.2

2,700.3

85.0

217.9

595.6

127.1

234.2

100.0
37.0

58.0
107.0

371.4
598.7

9

25

21

10

31

30

1

12

30

28

2

815.9
1,276.9

Pacific

8

11

9

1

1

110.1

1.0

16.3

49.9

OCTs

6

8

5

1

3

179.9

24.6

33.8

14.0

ENI On-Going

10

73

68

1

4

0

3,705.1

937.8

587.7

1,897.6

DCI On-Going

22

61

58

0

0

3

2,092.8

137.0

165.0

970.1

EDF On-Going

52

105

69

9

11

17

5,555.6

238.6

854.0

1,265.0

Total ALL OnGoing
Operations

84

240

195

10

15

20

11,353.5

1,313.4

1,606.7

4,132.7

596.0

5

The breakdown by region shows that the largest recipients of
budget support programmes are the Eastern and Southern
Africa (24%), European Neighbourhood South (22%), and
West and Central Africa (17%) regions. Neighbourhood East
and Asia each have 11% of ongoing budget support
commitments, followed by Latin America (7%), Caribbean
(5%), OCTs (2%) and Pacific (1%).
The average amount of BS commitments per country is about
€135 million with substantial differences between regions. In
ENP South and East countries, country BS commitments are
particularly large: on average €491 million and €250 million
respectively. Budget support in these regions is both concentrated in fewer countries, and represents
a higher share of total EU ODA disbursements in those countries.

Average size of the BS contracts per Type (in
million Euros)
Number
Type of
of OnAmount BS
Average
Contract
going BS
commitment
Size
programs
SRC/SBS
195
7,214.2
37.0
GGDC
10
421.8
46.9
SBC
15
1,369.3
91.3
GBS
20
2,348.2
117.4
All
240
11,353.5
47.5

The average size of a BS contract in 2014 was €48 million. The largest BS contracts are provided in
Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in ESA where the average BS contract amounts to over €80m.
End 2014, the average number of on-going BS programmes in BS countries totalled 2.8, compared
with 2.3 in 2013. Most regions are quite close to this global average except ENP with a significant
number of 7 BS programmes on average per country. While such a high number of programmes can
go against efficiency and concentration objectives, it nevertheless represents an important
reduction from the previous 8.8 BS programmes average.

6

Most BS contracts are Sector Reform Contracts (including former
sector budget support) with 82% of the total number of BS
programmes. State building Contracts increased from 4% in 2013
to 6% in 2014. Good Governance and Development Contracts
decreased from 5% to 4%, and former General Budget Support
programmes decreased from 10% to 8% as such programmes
are being closed. The majority of GGDC/GBS and SBC are
implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa. Annex 1 lists the countries
with GGDCs and SBCs. The average size of GGDCs (€47m) is close
to the overall average, SRCs are on average smaller (€37M), and
SBCs, which tend to respond to significant financing needs,
larger (€91M).

2. Disbursements
In 2014 an amount of €1.6 billion was disbursed, representing 21% of total Europeaid
disbursements. The level and timeliness of DCI and ENP disbursements was affected by the lack of
payment credits in 2014, which led to a number of delays relative to disbursements planned in
financing agreements.
Regions

BS Disbursements Executed 2010-2015 (in M€)
2010

2011

2012

2013

ENP-S
ENP-E

339

469

375

WCA
ESA

2014

2015
(forecast)

178

243

175

163

345

264

470

459

159

1,010

798

921

303

218

455

211

77

95

125

127

96

96

84

119

72

58

164

Asia

153

179

129

141

107

171

Pacific

19

14

8

8

16

26

OCTs

40

3

55

50

34

10

TOTAL ENI

339

469

375

341

588

439

TOTAL DCI

249

263

248

213

165

335

TOTAL EDF

1,280

892

1,079

956

854

746

Total

1,868

1,624

1,702

1,510

1,607

1,520

Caribbean
Latin America

BS Disbursements have remained relatively stable over the past 5 years and this trend is expected to
continue for 2015 with expected disbursements of €1.5 billion.
ENP saw an important increase in disbursements in 2014, largely due to the sizeable SBC
disbursement to Ukraine.

7

3. Fixed and Variable Tranches
The average planned variable tranche share in total tranche disbursements for 2014 was 50% and
is forecasted to rise to 53% in 2015. This is substantially higher than the average suggested in the BS
guidelines. Variable tranches are particularly large in ENP, Latin America, Caribbean and OCTs. ENP
BS countries tend to be characterised by higher risks (cf. part II), which can explain a higher variable
tranche share. This is not the case for Latin America and Caribbean BS countries, however. The use of
variable tranches for OCTs should be reduced given their special status.

Variable tranches can be useful in creating an incentive effect, particularly in weak policy
environments and when there is some stability over time in the indicators used, and in order to focus
the policy dialogue. Nevertheless, over-usage can put excessive weight on the selection, definition
and assessment of a limited number of indicators, and there is a trade-off with predictability.
Average variable tranche execution rates are relatively low. Compared to total potential
disbursements initially planned in financing agreements for 2014, actual 2014 disbursements
reached on average 73% of potential for the fixed tranches and only 49% for the variable tranches.
Execution rates vary substantially by region:

8

Actual disbursements can be lower than planned for a number of reasons: both tranches can be
affected by administrative delays, and non-disbursement or disbursement delays due to eligibility
concerns. Variable tranches can moreover be affected by reduced disbursements due to a number of
variable tranche conditions not being met in a timely manner. The relatively low share of timely
variable tranche execution highlights the importance of increasing efforts to ensure that indicators
abide by the SMART principles, and to strengthen the related policy dialogue.

4. Distribution by Sector and Income Group
Sector reform contracts covered a wide variety of sectors. Education is the most important sector
followed by Health and Agriculture/Food security. The latter is expected to increase further in
importance, considering the new BS programmes that are expected to be launched in 2015 under the
new multiannual financial framework (cf. section 5).

Lower Middle-Income countries are the largest
beneficiary of budget support, representing 51%
of the total amount of on-going commitments. In
this category, Morocco is by far the largest
beneficiary of budget support with 10% of the
total amount of all BS commitments. Low Income
countries represent 26% of the total amount of
commitments followed by Upper Middle Income
countries with 20%. Four High Income countries
(Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, St Kitts & Nevis,
and Uruguay) and the OCTs together account for 3
percent of total BS commitments. Compared to
2013, the breakdown between income groups
remained stable with no significant change. The
9

relatively low LIC share is partly a reflection of the smaller LIC group in general, the more so given
that an increasing number of LICs is graduating to MIC status, and of the smaller size of LICs.
Nevertheless, further effort is needed to increase the share of budget support going to LICs.

5. Forecast 2015 Commitments
Expected new 2015 commitments amount to €2.3 billion, shows a return to former levels of
commitments with the new multiannual financial framework. Fifty-six new BS programs are planned
for 2015 in 41 countries. The average amount of BS commitments per country is expected to increase
from €133M to €155 million with the new commitments planned for 2015.
BS expected new commitment in 2015
Region
ENP South
ENP East
West & central Africa
East and Southern Africa
Caribbean
Latin America
Asia & Central Asia
Pacific
OCTs
ENI On-Going
DCI On-Going
EDF On-Going
Total ALL Forecast

Operations

SRC/S
BS

GGDC

6
5
19
10
3
5
4
1
3
11
9
36

6
5
9
7
3
5
4
1
2
11
9
22

0
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
6

0
0
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8

Commitment
amount
expected
(€
million)
343
125
585
884
53
132
117
17
16
468
249
1,555

56

42

6

8

2,272

Number of
Countries

Number of
BS
operations

3
3
14
7
2
4
4
1
3
6
8
27
41

Types of BS contracts
SBC

Most BS contracts would remain Sector Reform Contracts,
representing 80% of the total number of new BS contracts
expected to be launched in 2015. State building Contracts
are expected to increase from 6% in 2014 to 8% in 2015,
and Good Governance and Development Contracts from 4%
to 5%. The majority of GGDC/GBS and SBC would continue
to be implemented in Africa. The average size of planned
new budget support contracts for 2015 is €41million,
somewhat below the previous average of €48 million.
The sector distribution of the new Sector reform contracts
expected to be launched in 2015 shows that agriculture/food security would increase in importance.
Bearing in mind the limited sample (56 new BS operations expected for 2015), the change
nevertheless reflects at least partially the change in sector priorities in the 2014-2020 programming
exercise, where sustainable agriculture and food security, education, energy and governance are
sector priorities, in line with the Agenda for Change.
10

Part II – Risk Management
The following risk analysis is based on the 87 Risk Management Frameworks (RMF) adopted by the
DEVCO and NEAR budget support and financial assistance committees in February 2015. The RMFs
were submitted by EU Delegations and reviewed by DEVCO, NEAR, EEAS, and ECFIN geographic and
thematic directorates. Compared with the pilot exercise, the RMFs have benefitted from the
experience gained with the pilot exercise and an extensive review process to ensure quality and
coherence.
The analysis below is based on the frequency of substantial/high risk cases. The RMF has a structure
consisting of 5 risk categories, each of which is a simple average of a number of underlying risk
dimensions. The total of 14 risk dimensions are assessed on the basis of a questionnaire that consists
of 44 questions. For important risks, mitigating measures are identified. The chapters below present
an overview risk and mitigating measures analysis, both from a geographic and a thematic
perspective.

1. Risk Analysis
Overall, risks have been revised upwards in comparison with the pilot exercise2. 36% of all budget
support countries have an average substantial or high risk compared with 27% for the pilot and
representing 42% of total outstanding disbursements. The increase is likely to present a combination
of a more developed risk review methodology compared with the pilot, and increased risks,
particularly in the WCA region. Bearing in mind the limitations of such a simple indicator, this result
continues to point to a reasonable risk profile given the Commission's response strategy of risk
mitigation rather than risk avoidance in its development policy. Furthermore, non-intervention can
increase risks and development failures in the long run. Risks should nevertheless be carefully
balanced with the expected benefits and risk of non-intervention, and risk mitigation measures must
be identified and implemented.

1.1. Risk Category Analysis
The charts below show that all risk categories have been revised upwards, with the exception of
the macroeconomic risk category, but the relative importance of the different risks has remained
broadly stable with corruption & fraud and developmental risks continuing to dominate, followed
by public financial management and political risks. The macroeconomic risk category continues to see
the lowest share of substantial/high risk cases. The increase is largely driven by the WCA region,
where the proportion of substantial/high risk cases increased from less than 40% to almost 70%,
making it the region with the highest level of identified risks, followed by Asia, ENP-E, ENP-S, Pacific,
ESA, Caribbean and Latin America.

2

Note that since the pilot, RMFs have been added for Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Madagascar and Costa
Rica, whereas the RMFs for Kenya, South Sudan, and Mayotte were discontinued.

11

The risk profile differs from region to region not only in terms of its level or risk but also in terms of
the relative importance of the 5 different risk categories. Political risk countries are concentrated in
WCA, Asia, and ENP with only a handful of substantial/high risk cases in other regions.
Macroeconomic risks are even more concentrated in WCA and selected Caribbean countries.
Corruption & fraud and developmental risks are pronounced in every region. Public Financial
Management risks are less pronounced in Latin America and ENP BS countries.

12

1.2. Risk Dimensions Analysis
In line with the risk category results, the underlying risk dimensions have generally seen upward
revisions but with broad stability in the relative importance of the risk dimensions. Government
effectiveness and corruption & fraud risks continue to dominate with almost 60% of
substantial/high risk cases, followed by the rule of law, external audit, procurement, and
vulnerability & exogenous shocks with almost 50% of substantial/high risk cases. Many of these
dimensions reflect compliance, enforcement and oversight functions.

Democracy, comprehensiveness of the budget, controls in revenue collection and budget execution,
and human rights are all characterised by between 30% and 40% of substantial/high risk cases.
Finally, insecurity and conflict, macroeconomic policies and the financial sector, public policy and
debt sustainability risk dimensions fall between 10% and 20%. The relatively low percentage in this
group of risk dimensions nevertheless requires close monitoring due to the high impact potential.
Compared with the pilot, the upward revision was most notable for the democracy, human rights,
procurement, and budget comprehensiveness risk dimensions.
The charts below show that all underlying risks dimensions contribute clearly to political and PFM
risk categories. Macroeconomic risks on the other hand are mostly affected by vulnerability and
the risk of exogenous shocks, and developmental risks are clearly dominated by government
effectiveness dimension. Whereas BS countries have broadly adopted sound macroeconomic
policies, limiting financial sector and debt sustainability risks, many remain vulnerable to exogenous
shocks due to the lack of diversification in their economies. The relatively low risk profile for public
policy is encouraging and suggests that public policy results are achievable despite important
government effectiveness constraints. A possible explanation is that public policy objectives take
such capacity constraints into account. Risk ratings suggest furthermore that such constraints are not
limited to low-income budget support countries, as in fact middle-income budget support countries
do not achieve lower risk ratings for the government effectiveness dimension.

13

1.3. Risk Profile by Type of Budget Support Contract
An analysis of the risk profile by type of budget support contract shows clearly how SBC countries
are characterised by a high degree of risk. There are no cases of countries with GGDCs, which are
subject to the fundamental values pre-condition, having a substantial or high political risk, and few
cases of substantial/high macroeconomic risks. In other risk categories, however, SRC countries
present a lower risk profile, particularly in relation to public financial management, which might be
explained by the fact that most GGDCs concern low-income countries, which tend to have higher
public financial management risks.

2. Mitigating Measures and Risk Response
The table below lists the most frequently identified mitigating measures for the five risk categories.
Measures tend to be relatively broad and should progressively be more targeted to critical elements.
Generally, the focus is on areas that are expected to have a more immediate impact. Other possible
measures such as enhancing transparency, accountability, or civil society participation in budgetary
and policy processes, are somewhat less frequent. Such longer term structural measures can usefully
complement shorter term measures focussed on the executive. Finally, further analysis, including
context analysis, is rarely proposed as a mitigating measure.
Types of Mitigating Measures
Political
Macroeconomic
Developmental
Public Financial Mngt
Corruption
Policy and Political Dialogue,
Policy dialogue, support
elections observations;
Policy dialogue; programming;
to anti-corruption
demarches; public statements;
thematic programmes;
PFM support, IFMIS,
institutions (incl.
sheltering HR activists; rule of
conditonality; statistics
WB/IMF dialogue; BS
PFM training support,
twinning with EU
law programmes; support to
support; Trade Agreement;
provision;
PEFA , conditionality,
institutions), civil
and structured dialogue with
civil service reform support;
conditionality; export
procurement
society support, control
civil society, population
aid effectiveness; support to
diversification support
transparency and
and oversight support,
outreach, field monitoring
EITI, transparency,
audits
PFM support; EITI; Rule
visits, support parliament, EU
decentralisation; results-based
of law support; Open
HR strategy, IfS, EIDHR, conflict
mngt, sector strategy costing
Governance Partnership
mngt support

Looking ahead, it will be important to ensure that mitigating measures target the most critical
areas, include an appropriate mix of short term actions and more structural measures, based on a
sound analysis of the opportunities of risk mitigation.

14

Part III – Selected Poverty, Macroeconomic and Fiscal
Results
This section presents poverty, macroeconomic and fiscal developments using a selection of key
indicators. Causality or attribution of country results to budget support is not examined. The graphs
are internal computations3 based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2015 database
and World Bank World Development Indicators October 2014 database. Other data sources include
the IBP's Open Budget Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the PEFA secretariat. Annex
1 provides more detailed country-by-country data.

1. Poverty and Inequality
1.1. Overview
Despite the downwards revision of growth
patterns since the 2008 economic crisis, poverty
figures have continued their positive trends
during the last decade, and more so in BS
countries, where poverty reduction is faster
than in non-BS countries. Overall, BS countries
are getting nearer the extreme poverty level of
non-BS countries, which is around 20 %.
BS countries have lower levels of inequality
than non-BS countries but levels of inequality
have remained largely unchanged. Recent IMF
and OECD studies4 show that increases in inequality not only threaten social and political stability but
also economic development.

Source: internal computations (weighted averages) based on WB WDI (online Data Mapper)
3

Poverty and inequality averages are population weighted. Macroeconomic averages are GDP weighted and the 2014 and 2015 data are
projections. India and China are excluded from the calculations due to their size.
4
See http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/inequality/ and http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm

15

1.2. Regional Analysis
Strong economic growth in Sub-Saharan BS countries has facilitated a decrease in poverty by close
to 10 percentage points over the last decade in the Eastern and Southern African region and about 5
percentage points in West and Central Africa. New poverty data for Tanzania and Uganda confirm this
positive trend. Both regions nevertheless continue to have much higher poverty levels compared with
other regions, and there are exceptions to the positive trend, in particular Madagascar, Zambia, and
the new data also points to an increase in poverty in Benin, due to low productivity. Furthermore,
Eastern and Southern Africa BS countries' rise in inequality is of concern and contrasts the West and
Central Africa experience in reduced inequality, particularly in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Niger,
Mali, and Sierra Leone. A study on inequality in Sub-Sahara Africa is ongoing to examine the
underlying factors of such divergent trends.

Asian BS countries have experienced the highest level of extreme poverty reduction in the shortest
period of time, a trend confirmed by new poverty data for India, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. Only
Bangladesh, Lao PDR and Nepal now have extreme poverty figures above 20%. According to a recent
IMF study5, the positive growth and great reduction in poverty levels are accompanied by a high and
5

"Asia's Quest for Inclusive Growth", IMF Working Paper Prepared by Chie Aoyagi and Giovanni Ganelli,
February 2015

16

increasing level of inequality in Asia. EU BS countries in Asia nevertheless perform reasonably well
with the second lowest levels of inequality compared with other regions. Lao PDR and Indonesia are
exceptions with high and rising inequality.
New WDI poverty data was recently published for most Latin American BS countries, confirming
both a trend of declining poverty and reducing inequality. Extreme poverty has been reduced to a
(weighted) average of 6%, but Honduras still has an important degree of extreme poverty estimated
at 18%. Inequality nevertheless remains the highest across regions with no Latin America BS country
achieving an income share of the poorest 20% that is above 5%.
Among Neighbourhood BS countries, with the exception of Armenia, all have achieved important
progress in reducing poverty as measured by the poverty headcount ratio measure of 2$ a day (PPP),
and only Georgia still has a considerable level of extreme poverty as measured by the 1.25$ a day
(PPP) poverty headcount ratio. ENP-East BS countries have the lowest levels of inequality and the
trend is towards a further decrease.

2. Economic Growth and Macroeconomic Stability
2.1. Overview
In the years following the economic crisis growth in EU BS countries has slowed compared with the
immediate pre-crisis years from 6-7% to around 5%. However, BS countries have demonstrated
more resilience and have been much less affected than non-BS countries which saw a much sharper
reduction. Low Income BS countries’ growth rates in particular have barely been affected and have
outperformed MIC BS countries consistently since the crisis, bearing in mind that growth in most LICs
was based primarily on factor accumulation rather than productivity growth.

Source: internal computations (weighted averages) based on IMF WEO data

For 2014 and 2015, growth patterns have gradually been revised downwards and the more positive
projections for 2016 are subject to much uncertainty due to commodity price volatility, weak
global trade growth, weaker economic growth in important trading partners, and reduced fiscal
space. Trade is growing at less than 3.5% compared with a pre-crisis average of 7% and below world
economic growth. Reduced growth in important trading partner countries such as China is reducing
external demand. Fiscal space is reducing particularly in African BS countries as evidenced by rising
17

fiscal deficits and debt (albeit less severe than for non-BS countries). Seven out of forty BS countries
for which WB/IMF Debt Sustainability Analyses are available are currently at a high risk of debt
distress6. Overall, BS countries nevertheless have lower fiscal deficits and debt levels than non-BS
countries.

Commodity prices are volatile and overall on a downward trend since 2011. Metals commodity
prices continued their declining trend during 2014, and agriculture commodity prices also declined
sharply following a short-lived rise early 2014. In the case of oil, the sharp decline in prices during
the second half of 2014 could, if sustained, lead to improved global growth in 2015 and sizeable
income shifts to oil importers from oil exporters. Oil exporters tend to have less diversified
economies than oil importers and they are therefore more affected although the fiscal impact can be
mitigated by a reduction in budgetary outlays for fuel subsidies. Oil importers, on the other hand,
should experience an increase in output, but can still be negatively affected where the economy is
reliant on exchanges with oil exporters (e.g. Caribbean dependency on Venezuela, or dependency on
remittances from Gulf countries). The decline in oil prices also provides a window of opportunity to
reform fuel subsidies or energy taxes (e.g. Indonesia, Ghana, and Bolivia).
The reduction in fiscal space means that domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM) efforts should be
increased, the more so given the likely future rise of debt servicing costs once interest rates start
increasing from historical lows. Another reason is that contingent liabilities, although difficult to
measure, are considered to be on the rise in emerging markets, which suggests that in emerging
countries, but possibly too in the frontier economies of Africa, fiscal risks are rising. It is therefore
encouraging that BS countries have gradually increased revenues excluding grants on average
(unweighted7) by close to 1 percentage point of GDP over the last three years, with some achieving
substantial increases of up to 9 percentage points8. At the same time public expenditure levels in BS
countries have stabilised at around 26% of GDP, which is below the level of public expenditure in
non-BS countries.

6

Burundi, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Samoa, Haiti
The reason for using unweighted averages (unlike other macroeconomic indicators which are weighted) is to
measure the average government effort, unbiased by the size of the countries. Public financial management
averages in chapter 3 are similarly unweighted for the same reason.
8
Lesotho (close to 9 percentage points); Mozambique, Malawi, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Mauritania (around 6
percentage points); and Bolivia, Nepal and Namibia (over 3 percentage points)
7

18

Source: EU calculations based on WEO

Current account deficits are increasing across BS and non-BS countries although deficits are expected
to stabilise in 2016. Higher current account deficits in BS countries are a reflection of higher, and
gradually increasing, investment levels of about 26% of GDP. Combined with a better
macroeconomic environment as evidenced by lower deficits and debt levels, this is likely to have
contributed to the improved growth performance of budget support countries.

2.2. Regional Analysis
The growth outlook for Sub-Saharan BS countries generally remains favourable. In ESA growth
figures are weighted down by low growth in
South Africa. Other ESA countries continue to
have positive growth outlooks, especially
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia,
and more recently, strong growth has
resumed in Malawi and Uganda. Impressively,
post-crisis growth in WCA BS countries is
higher than pre-crisis growth, led by strong
performance particularly in Côte d'Ivoire and
Rwanda but also in other countries. Growth is
nevertheless quite volatile in this region due
to various conflicts affecting particularly
C.A.R. and Mali, and the Ebola crisis (cf. box
1). Cabo Verde's growth outlook has improved following a period of stagnant growth, whereas
19

growth prospects for Ghana are expected to improve from 2016. The decline in commodity prices,
particularly oil, has a largely positive effect on the growth prospects of African BS countries, but with
some exceptions. Liberia, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone are all expected to see terms of trade
declines of over 10% in 2015.
Box 1: The Ebola Crisis in West Africa
A major development in 2014 has been the emergence of the Ebola virus in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The economic
impact of the epidemic is significant. Reduced economic output and disruption to both domestic and cross-border trade and
services has adversely affected both the fiscal accounts and the balance of payments. Although the various estimates of the
economic impact of the epidemic have been revised downwards, the latest estimates still suggest a significant impact (over
25 billion euro according to the latest World Bank estimates). In terms of fiscal impact, Liberia will likely be the most
affected, but all three economies will be affected to some degree by the following factors:


A decline in employment, especially in rural areas. In Liberia, it is estimated that about half of the heads of
households are unemployed, with devastating effects on the living conditions. The need to quarantine some areas
contributed to this by restricting movements to the workplace;

Food insecurity has increased, albeit in various degrees. Many households report fearing food shortages and
inflation has put basic commodities out of the reach of impoverished household.

The collapse of non-Ebola healthcare, closure of schools, etc.
In response to the crisis, the EU has provided significant amounts of Budget Support to Liberia (€30 million) and Sierra Leone
(€22.6 million). The possibility to start a Budget Support operation in Guinea is also being explored. The usefulness of Budget
Support as a crisis response is one of the main development lessons learned from the Ebola crisis.

A worrisome new trend is the built of fiscal imbalances in several SSA BS countries which has
heigtened vulnerability to growth shocks. Projected fiscal deficits for 2015 are particularly high for
Liberia, Niger, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, and Ghana. Debt sustainability analyses point to high risks
of debt distress in Burundi, CAR, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania. And 2014 was another
record year for the issuance of sovereign bonds in SSA with over 5.5 billion euro of new issues9. Such
bonds can alleviate funding constraints for much needed investments, but the increased resources
are not always put to productive use, and bonds can exacerbate vulnerabilities particularly through
exchange rate and refinancing risks given the back loaded repayment profiles of such bonds usually
denominated in US dollars. WCA BS countries have seen an increase in domestic revenue
mobilisation 2014 but ESA BS countries only slightly so.
Economic growth projections for Asian BS countries are positive except for Central Asia. All have
projected growth rates above 5% except
Pakistan where the outlook has nevertheless
improved with an expected 4.3% growth in
2015, and the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan
where growth projections have been revised
downwards substantially due to the weaker
Russian outlook. Growth has increased in
Nepal owing to good monsoons and growth
in services and public spending. Nepal's

9

2014 issuing Sub-Saharan countries are Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal

20

macroeconomic outlook has however recently been severely affected by a devastating earthquake.
Growth is expected to accelerate In Bhutan, joining Lao P.D.R. and Cambodia as the Asian BS
countries with the fastest growth rates of over 7%.
On the fiscal side, projected deficits are generally moderate with the exception of Vietnam, Lao
PDR, and Pakistan (where it is nevertheless improving). Debt in Bhutan is projected to rise fast due
to a large scale hydropower investment. Domestic Revenue Mobilisation remains particularly low in
this region.
Pacific BS countries generally suffer from volatile and low growth with the exception of resourcerich Timor-Leste where growth is expected to benefit from infrastructure spending. Vanuatu's
economy is projected to see an important GDP contraction due the devastating cyclone. Tonga’s
economy is projected to see temporary higher growth as post cyclone reconstruction takes place.
Faced with higher public expenditure needs but a narrow tax base, most Pacific BS countries
continue to rely heavily on concessional finance, with the exception of resource-rich Timor Leste,
which is substantially increasing public expenditure. Samoa remains at high risk of debt distress.
As a result of geopolitical factors growth in Neigbourhood BS countries has generally been revised
downwards, with an improved but uncertain outlook for 2016. In the East, Ukraine’s economy has
suffered heavily from conflict and is
expected to see a further decline of 5.5% in 2015 while its debt is
expected to double compared with
2012. Moldova and Armenia are also
expected to see contractions of close
to 1% of GDP. Georgia on the other
hand has so far managed to contain
the economic fallout of the crisis in
Ukraine, helped by stronger exports
to Europe and Russia. Azerbaijan is
projected to see a resumption of
growth following close to zero growht
in 2015. The outlook for the region is subject to much uncertainty due to the uncertain outlook for
Russia.
ENP-South BS countries' economies have suffered from political transitions and conflict. Growth is
nevertheless expected to improve in 2016, but structural bottlenecks and the weak fiscal situation,
particularly in Jordan, can still negatively affect the future outlook. Algeria’s revenues are expected
to see an important reduction as a result of lower oil prices, and as a result the fiscal deficit is
projected to increase sharply in 2015 to over 12%. Overall, ENP BS countries, particularly ENP-East,
have the highest level of domestic revenue mobilisation among BS countries.
Economic Growth is also decelerating in Latin American BS countries due to reduced external
demand and depressed domestic confidence. The main underlying factor is the end of the
commodity boom but growth is also undermined by a lack of domestic confidence and lost reform
momentum. Even countries that have previously performed well are expected to see important
reductions in growth: Columbia, Bolivia and Ecuador’s growth outlook has recently worsened due to
the sharp fall in oil prices. Uruguay’s growth prospects are undermined by the growth slowdown in
21

its two main trading partners,
Argentina and Brazil. Peru’s
economy is suffering from a
slowdown in exports and mining
investment, and Costa Rica from
reduced manufacturing activity
and weak public investment.
Paraguay’s
more
dynamic
economy is an exception to the
declining trend but it is vulnerable
to lower agricultural prices and
economic weakness among its
trading partners. On the fiscal front, domestic revenue mobilisation is largely stagnant.
Caribbean Budget support countries are generally experiencing sub-par growth and heightened
vulnerabilities due to Venezuala's economic stress. The Dominican Republic and Guyana
nevertheless continue to experience strong growth led by strong tourism flows for Costa Rica and
agriculture and extractives for Guyana. Vulnerabilities remain high with debt levels generally rising
and particularly high in Jamaica and Grenada. Jamaica is reducing public expenditure as part of a
debt reduction strategy and its sovereign bond spread has declined reflecting increase market
confidence. In Grenada, discussions with creditors on a comprehensive restructuring of public debt
have intensified.

3. Public Financial Management, Corruption and Budgetary
Transparency
3.1. Public Financial Management
The EU’s preferred means of assessing public
financial management performance is the Public
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
tool. Budget support has greatly facilitated the
adoption of the PEFA with virtually all BS
countries having undergone at least one PEFA
assessment10, whereas PEFA assessments for
non-BS countries only exist in 28 cases. The EU is
furthermore co-steering a process of revising the
PEFA framework, which is due to conclude in
2015. PEFA results continue to suggest progress across the different PFM dimensions11, albeit at a
slow pace as shown in the table. Notwithstanding the positive trend, continued support and close

10

As of mid-2014, 71 out of 77 BS countries had undergone at least one PEFA assessment
PEFA results are averaged by dimension. Regional PEFA ratings are unweighted averages and consider all
final PEFAs.
11

22

monitoring of progress in PFM will be needed. PEFA results suggest only modest progress and there
are can be setbacks.
This positive finding is echoed in a number of new studies and evaluations, which furthermore
looked at the contribution of budget support to public financial management results. A 2014
evaluation of budget support covering four Low Income Countries12 (i.e. Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania
and Zambia) noted a significant strengthening of PFM systems and some gains in transparency and
oversight, as well as in the legal and institutional framework for fighting corruption. Another 2014
study13 notes “strengthening of PFM systems appears to be one of the most common, positive
effects of BS across countries”. A 2014 study on PFM reforms in Sierra Leone14 noted “Since the end
of the civil war, the Government of Sierra Leone has made substantial progress in strengthening
public financial management. Improvements have been achieved across all aspects of the budget
cycle and are particularly notable with regard to budget execution functions.” A recent World Bank
working paper15 estimated that about 40 percent of the variation in the quality of PFM was
associated with certain country characteristics. Natural resource dependence and being a small
island are associated with weaker PFM. A high level of GDP, recent high economic growth, and
particularly programmatic political parties are associated with strong PFM. The paper also finds that
good PFM is associated with greater aggregate fiscal discipline and smaller differences between
budget plans and budget outturns (although not necessarily smaller fiscal deficits). However, it finds
no evidence that good PFM is associated with better health and education relative to public
spending, which might be due to the lack of complementary measures to improve service delivery
and/or to difficulties in measuring the efficiency of service delivery.
The following table presents the average PEFA dimension results for the latest PEFAs available,
showing that budget support countries present on average better PEFA results than non-BS
countries.
All BS
PEFA dimensions averages (latest)
Credi bi l i ty of the budget
Compr. & Tra ns pa rency
Pol i cy-ba s ed budgeti ng
Pred. & control Budget ex;
Accounti ng, Recordi ng & Rep.
Externa l s cruti ny a nd a udi t

Asia

WCA

EU BS Countries
ESA
CAR
PAC

LA

ENP-S

ALL
ENP-E NON-BS

71

10

16

13

8

6

9

4

5

28

C+
B
B
C+
C+
C

C+
C+
B
C
C+
C

C+
C+
C+
C+
C
C

B
B
B
C+
C+
C+

C+
B
C+
C+
C+
C

C+
C+
C+
C+
C+
D+

B
B
B
B
C+
C

B
B
B
B
B
C

B+
B+
B
B
B
C+

C+
C
C+
C
C
C

Source: Computations based on June2014 PEFA secretariat data. Public and Final PEFA results are considered

The ENP and LA regions with a higher share of MICs, generally have better PEFA results. WCA lags
other regions, but encouragingly has seen most improvements. ENP-E, Pacific, and to a lesser
12

Andrew Lawson, "Synthesis of budget support evaluations", November 2014
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, "Review of Budget Support Evaluations", Evaluation Study 2014/1,
http://www.oecd.org/derec/denmark/Review-of-Budget-Support-Evaluation.pdf
14
Heidi Tavakoli, Ismaila Cessay, and Winston Cole, "Success when stars align: Public financial management
reforms in Sierra Leone", WIDER Working Paper 2014/081, United Nations University, World Institute for
Development Economics Research, April 2014,
15
Verena Fritz, Stephanie Sweet and Marijn Verhoeven, "Strengthening Public Financial Management:
Exploring Drivers and Effects," Policy Reseach Working Paper 7084, (World Bank, November 2014)
13

23

extent ESA also saw improvements whereas progress was more limited in ENP-S and Asia. Since the
previous 2013 budget support pilot report, a number of new PEFAs have been undertaken for budget
support countries. For El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Botswana new repeat PEFAs show similar
broadly satisfactory results but no solid further improvements. Armenia and Georgia achieved
further improvements with solid PEFA scores as a result. Vietnam’s first PEFA showed a strong result
for external scrutiny and audit but weak on budget credibility.
PEFA indicators furthermore suggest that BS countries have made progress in strengthening tax
administration and achieve better results than non-BS countries. The average PEFA rating in
"Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities" and "Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer
registration and tax assessment" was significantly higher in BS countries when compared with NonBS countries.

3.2. Corruption
Fighting corruption requires improvements in a wide range of institutions and societal functions –
what Transparency International calls the
"national integrity system"16 – where
effective anti-corruption laws and agencies
and sound public financial management
are but a few of the necessary elements.
We can therefore expect significant
reductions in corruption to take a broad
effort for many years. The purpose of
budget support is, among other things, to
contribute to the strengthening of integrity
systems in order to reduce corruption and
fraud.

16

Cf. "National integrity system assessments," Transparency International,
http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/nis

24

The Worldwide Governance Indicators17 suggest a modest average improvement in the control of
corruption in budget support countries over the last decade. This positive trend has taken place
while non-BS countries saw a worsening trend.
Annex 1 shows that the improvement was most pronounced in the ENP-E and Pacific BS countries,
whereas Asia and ENP-S BS countries saw the least progress on average. Among BS countries,
notable improvers are Rwanda, Georgia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Barbados, Zambia, Cabo Verde, Algeria,
Vanuatu and Tonga. Some BS countries however, saw an important deterioration in their WGI
ratings, particularly Columbia, Dominican R, South Africa, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania.
The Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI)18, which rates countries on a
scale from zero for very corrupt to 100 for least corrupt, equally suggests a better performance for
BS countries, with an average 38 CPI result compared with 28 for non-budget support EU aid
recipients. Furthermore, CPI results have improved by an average 6 CPI points over the last decade
while it decreased by 9 points in non-budget support EU aid recipient countries. Excluding middle
income countries, the difference is much more pronounced with BS LICs improving by 4 CPI points
while in non-BS LICs the CPI worsened by 27 CPI points. Examples of recent CPI improvers are
Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire.
The 2014 synthesis of budget support evaluations in Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, South Africa,
Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia produced during the period 2010-201419 noted some gains in the legal
and institutional framework for fighting corruption. A combination of technical assistance, budget
increases facilitated by general budget support, and focussed policy dialogue contributed to
progress.

3.3. Budgetary Transparency and Oversight
While the 2014 Open Budget index results are not yet available, the existing 2012 data shows budget
support countries on average close to the threshold between ‘scant’ and ‘some’ information, but
above the non-BS country average. Furthermore, where repeat assessments are available, BS
countries have demonstrated progress albeit at a limited pace. The transparency related PEFA
indicators confirm a better transparency result for BS countries. However, in terms of the oversight
PEFA indicators, there is not clear difference between BS and non-BS EU aid recipients.

17

The Worldwide governance indicator on the control of corruption is a commonly used composite indicator
aimed at measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. Note
that WGI results should be interpreted with care as they are subject to important standards errors.
18
The perception of corruption in a country is a proxy for the level of corruption, which cannot be measured
directly. The perception of corruption is however sensitive for corruption scandals, political discussions, etc.
that are related to the level of corruption in a complex way.
19
"Synthesis of budget support evaluations", November 2014, study carried out on behalf of the European
Commission

25

Transparency

Oversight

Among regions, ENP-E is the most transparent according to repeat PEFA results , whereas ENP-S and
LA BS countries saw a reduction albeit it from a high level of transparency. WCA BS countries have
the lowest PEFA and OBI results but have made most progress. ESA and Asia BS countries have also
made progress according to both PEFA and OBI, but progress in Caribbean and Pacific BS countries
was more limited.
ENP-E BS countries also achieved the highest oversight related PEFA results and Asian BS countries
have made most progress in this area, albeit from a low basis. Other regions have made limited
progress and results remain particularly low in Pacific, Caribbean, and WCA BS countries.

3.4. Illicit Financial Flows
Illicit financial flows from developing countries concern the leakage of funds through corruption, tax
evasion, money laundering and other financial crimes, thereby undermining countries’ efforts to
mobilise domestic revenues. The EU supports a number of important initiatives to tackle such flows,
particularly in relation to transfer pricing, transparency and exchange of information for tax
purposes, and extractive industry transparency. The EU is the main contributor to two related IMF
trust funds, namely the Tax Policy and Administration Topical Trust Fund20 and Managing Natural
Resource Wealth Topical Trust Fund 21 . The EU is collaborating with the IMF on the development of a
Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment tool (TADAT) aimed at helping governments gauge
performance of their tax administrations and identify priorities for reform.
Regarding transfer pricing, the EU has been working closely with the UN Financing for Development
Office on the establishment of a United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing
Countries, and has launched a Tripartite Partnership with the World Bank and OECD to support
developing countries in their efforts to set up transfer pricing regimes. As part of this initiative, the
20

The Tax Policy and Administration Topical Trust Fund aims to deliver technical assistance to improve tax
policy and administration to countries in greatest need of revenue strengthening.
21
The Topical Trust Fund on Managing Natural Resource Wealth delivers medium- to long-term technical
assistance focusing on capacity and institution building. 80% of the funds are channelled to the following
modules: (1) extractive industries fiscal regime; (2) extractive industries revenue administration and (3) macrofiscal policies and public financial management.

26

EC supports several countries through
advisory and technical assistance to
improve their policy and legislation as
well as build up transfer pricing expertise
in auditing and monitoring. Concrete
results have been achieved in EU BS
countries (cf. box 2).

Box 2 – Transfer pricing results
Transfer pricing adjustments made as a result of audits carried
out on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in Colombia increased
such revenues by more than 50%; Ghana introduced new transfer
pricing regulations aligned with international standards; The
Rwanda Revenue Authority is designing an effective transfer
pricing regime; In Vietnam the enforcement of transfer pricing
legislation through tax audits resulted in overall revenue
adjustments of €54.4 million; Other countries and regional
projects are in the formative stages, including in Cambodia,
Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Zimbabwe and the ECOWAS region.

In order to strengthen cooperation in the
areas of tax transparency and information
exchange, the EU promotes the
participation in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for tax Purposes,
which now includes 125 countries. The implementation of standards for transparency and exchange
of information on request (EOIR) has led to positive results. For example, the EOI process was crucial
in South Africa for the collection of 58 million euro through a taxpayer settlement. Furthermore, an
important number of BS countries have committed to implementing the
new standard for the automatic exchange of financial information (AEOI) between tax authorities22.
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) aims at enhancing the transparency of
payments by extractive industries to its host countries, thereby helping to discourage corruption and
to tackle illicit financial flows, and contributes to reinforce public finance management systems since
countries have to disclose information about the revenues coming from extractive industries,
resulting in better accountability of the governments to its citizens. Most resource-rich countries in
which the EU has BS operations are implementing the EITI Standard (10 are compliant, 2 are
candidate, and the remaining are in the pre-candidate phase). Reports have shed light on numerous
gaps in revenue collection and distribution mechanisms leading to a vast body of recommendations
for improving government and company systems. For example, in Peru, the EITI process facilitated
the introduction of a new mining sector tax scheme which increased revenues. And in Trinidad and
Tobago the EU has supported the use of EITI standards to help defining measures to mitigate Climate
Change.

22

Colombia, Dominica, India, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay committed to
implement the new standard by 2017. Costa Rica, Grenada, Indonesia, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Samoa
committed to implement the new standard by 2018.

27

0

Annex 1: Selected Regional and Country Indicators23
R eg io nal Overview

A LL B S

ESA

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
11%
6%
20%
16%
55
50
3%
4%
2013
2014
2015

Real GDP growth (%)

4.7%
3.9%
Repeat only

PF M , T ransp arency ( PEF A )
Credibility of the budget
Comprehensiveness & Transparency
Policy-based budgeting
Pred. & control Budget ex;
Accounting, Recording & Rep.
External scrutiny and audit

Prev

Latest

Prev

Latest

Prev

Latest

All
latest

Prev

Latest

All
latest

5.1% 3.8%
Repeat PEFA

Latest

All
latest

5.6%
5.3%
Repeat only

Prev

All
latest

2.0% -3.1%
Repeat PEFA

Latest

All
latest

5.9%
5.3%
Repeat PEFA

Prev

All
latest

3.7% 3.2%
Repeat PEFA

Prev

Latest

All
latest

Prev

Latest

All
latest

Prev

Latest

All
latest

C+
C+
C+
C+
C
C
2008

C+
C+
B
C+
C+
C
2010

C+
B
B
C+
C+
C
2012

C+
C+
C+
C+
C+
C
2008

C+
C+
B
C+
C+
C+
2010

B
B
B
C+
C+
C+
2012

C+
C
C+
C
D+
D+
2008

C
C+
C+
C+
C
C
2010

C+
C+
C+
C+
C
C
2012

C+
B+
B+
B
C
C+
2008

B
B
B+
B
C
C+
2010

B
B
B
B
B
C
2012

B+
B
B+
C+
C+
C+
2008

B+
B+
B+
B
B+
C+
2010

B+
B+
B
B
B
C+
2012

C+
C+
C+
C
C
C
2008

C+
C+
C+
C
C+
C
2010

C+
C+
B
C
C+
C
2012

B
B
C+
C+
B
C
2008

B+
B
C+
C+
C+
C
2010

B
B
B
B
C+
C
2012

B
C+
B
C+
C+
C
2008

C+
B
C+
C
C
C
2010

C+
B
C+
C+
C+
C
2012

B
C+
C+
C
C
C
2008

B
C+
B
C+
C+
D+
2010

C+
C+
C+
C+
C+
D+
2012

35
00-06
-0.42

37
07-12
-0.36

39
51
2013 00-06
-0.37
-0.16

51
07-12
-0.11

51
16
2013 00-06
-0.21 -0.62

22
07-12
-0.56

24
27
2013 00-06
-0.59
-0.13

26
30
48
07-12 2013 00-06
-0.20 -0.22
-0.78

53
07-12
-0.67

50
32
35
2013 00-06 07-12
-0.57
-0.77 -0.78

38
39
2013 00-06
-0.68
-0.39

39
07-12
-0.27

44
22
2013 00-06
-0.31 -0.02

24
07-12
0.04

33
2013 00-06
0.04
-0.38

34
07-12
-0.24

2013
36%
7
-3%
26%
-3%
23%

2014
38%

2015
41%

2014
41%

2015
43%

2014
47%

2014 2015
34% 38%

2014
54%

2015
71%

2014
5%

2015
5%

2014
34%

2015
36%

2014
53%

2015
50%

2013
29%

2014
28%

2015 2013
30%

-3%
26%
-3%
23%

-4%
26%
-4%
23%

-4%
30%
-6%
26%

-4%
30%
-6%
26%

2015 2013
49% 33%
20
-5% -3%
26% 35%
-8% -4%
18% 29%

-3%
42%
0%
34%

-5%
42%
-1%
29%

-2%
19%
-1%
18%

-3%
19%
-1%
19%

-2%
28%
-4%
24%

-3%
28%
-5%
25%

-3%
25%
-2%
25%

-3%
24%
-2%
25%

39%
27%
27%

16%
32%
15%

5%
36%
4%

Revenue excl grants (%GDP)

23

2013
39%
4
-4%
29%
-6%
26%

3.5%

2013
44%
3
-5%
26%
-10%
17%

-5%
26%
-9%
18%

41%

4.7%

3.1%
3.5%
Repeat PEFA

-6%
36%
-5%
29%

3.2%

-9%
37%
-11%
29%

2013
41
1,140
154
163

2013
33%
6
-3%
43%
-2%
34%

2014
29
1,250
558
118
345
63%
75%
55%
658

2015

125
264

2013
32
1,278
215
141

79%

-3.3%

2013
6%
6
-3%
20%
-1%
19%

2014
30
1,277
63
76
107
49%
59%
57%
599

2015

117
170

2013
24
550
102
72

41%

5.5%

2013
32%
9
-2%
28%
-3%
25%

2014
31
816
100
118
58
84%
66%
31%
371

2015

132
164

2013
30
662

2015

14
8

2014
11
110
1
21
16
10%
50%
38%
50

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
4%
2%
12%
10%
52
46
4%
5%
2013
2014
2015

2013

2014

2015

3.4% 4.4%
Repeat PEFA

3.9%
5.0%
Repeat PEFA

4.8%

118
125

80%

3.4%

2013
52%
5
-3%
25%
-3%
26%

2014
25
596
141
127
54%
89%
74%
234

2015

53
96

2013
10
83

OC T

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
31%
19%
62%
53%
35
35
8%
8%
2013
2014
2015

358
178

2014 2015
44
2,455
380
343
325
175
243
84% 86%
47%
33%
1,239

Pacif ic

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
2%
4%
8%
4%
32
28
9%
9%
2013
2014
2015

585
159

2013
47
2,187

C arib b ean

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
52%
47%
4%
2%
77%
71%
18%
10%
41
40
40
39
6%
7%
7%
7%
2013
2014
2015 2013
2014 2015

37%

2015

Lat in A merica

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
52%
43%
76%
68%
43
45
7%
6%
2013
2014
2015

884
455

2013
2014
29
29
2,021 1,969
128
341
402
470
459
35%
121%
54%
371

A sia

0 0 - 0 6 0 7- 13
32%
24%
58%
50%
39
39
7%
7%
2013
2014
2015

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f co rrup t io n
WGI Control of corruption
M acro eco no mic manag ement , D R M
Gen. gov. gross debt (%GDP)
Reserve coverage (m. imports)
Gen. gov. net lend/borr (%GDP)
Gen. gov. expenditure (%GDP)
Current Account bal. (%GDP)

2015

EN P- East

Po vert y red uct io n & inclusive g ro wt h
Poverty headcount ratio ($1.25)
Poverty headcount ratio ($2)
Gini coefficient
Income share lowest 20%

3.9%

2013
2014
32
32
2,695 2,700
85
361
320
303
218
35%
41%
22%
596

EN P- So ut h

2013
256
10,779
1,718
1,510

2014
2015
239
11,353
1,339 2,272
1,558
1,518
1,607
50%
53%
74%
50%
4,133

WCA

F inancial Imp lement at io n
Nr BS programmes
Commitments (total)
Of which, new commitments
Disbursements Forecast (1st trim)
Disbursements
Planned variable tranche share (AVR)
Fixed tranche disbursed (%planned; AVR)
Variable tranche disbursed (%planned; AVR)
Disbursements outstanding (year end)

75%

3.5%

2013 2014 2015
11
8
163
180
17
25
16
26
55
38
10
50
34
30%
57% 42%
59%
92%
14

2013

2014

2015

Repeat PEFA
Prev

Latest

All
latest

2008

2010

2012

36
2013 00-06
-0.16

07-12

2013

2014

2015

The budget support financial data provided is provisional. Other data is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook and World Bank World Development Indicator databases of April 2015 and October 2014 respectively. Other data sources
include the IBP's Open Budget Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the PEFA secretariat. PEFA results are averaged by dimension. Regional PEFA ratings are unweighted averages and consider all final PEFAs. The country table
only shows published PEFAs. Poverty and inequality regional averages are population weighted (excl. India). Macroeconomic regional averages are GDP weighted and the 2014 and 2015 data are projections.

ESA
Botsw ana

Country table
F ina nc ia l Im ple m e nt a t io n
Nr B S pro grammes

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

112

Ethiopia

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

/

112

/

Lesotho

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

3

3

46

82

GGDC/SB C
Co mmitments (to tal)

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

/

1

GGDC

Of which, new co mmitments

0

Disbursements Fo recast (1st trim)

12

29

Disbursements

12

26

P lanned variable tranche share (A VR)

41%

Fixed tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

100%

Variable tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)
Disbursements o utstanding (year end)
B S Disbursements as % o f to tal ODA
P o v e rt y re duc t io n & inc lus iv e gro wt h

Madagascar

19

0

253

/

0

16

/

30

32%

0%

/
50

16

17

0

22

0
42%

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

2

SB C

82
0

100%

2 0 15

Malaw i

156

65
0

/

65

40%

0%

100%

0%

48%

/

0%

28

16

13

85%

19%

0%

60%

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

3

GGDC

78

/

Mauritius

12

0

0

0

38%

44%

100%

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

361

2 0 15

Nam ibia
2 0 13

2 0 14

3

/

2

378

/

76

Seychelles

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

3

Tanzania

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

2

2

5

342

342

South Africa

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

7

599

2 0 15

Uganda
2 0 13

2 0 14

8

0

619

175

Zam bia
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

3

3

175

421

421

2 0 15

GGDC

156

208

0
13

Mozam bique

210
0

41

41

22

27

3

44%

65%

0
27

56

68

41

53

9%

8%

16

0

24

/

16

20

/

8

52%

43%

0
2

2

2

1

41%

34%

1

0

90

48

53

72

48

0

0%

40%

20
114

114

109

10

20%

57%

0
174

0

0

0

22

51%

48%

0
22

0

0

0

0

27%

34%

0%

3%

86%

48%

0%

0%

0%

100%

0%

/

0%

9%

0%

27%

100%

0%

15%

39%

0%

13

103

27

30

20

1

53

220

0

70

0%

48%

69%

36%

82%

0%

24%

23%

0%

33

21%

2003

/

2009

2000

2005

2 0 11

2003

/

2 0 10

2001 2005

2 0 10

/

2004

2 0 10

2003

/

2009

/

2004

2 0 10

2000

2007

/

2000

2007

2 0 12

2000

2006

2 0 11

2002

2006

2 0 13

2003

2006

2 0 10

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 1.25)

/

/

/

55%

39%

37%

55%

/

56%

76%

82%

88%

/

75%

72%

/

/

/

75%

/

61%

/

32%

24%

/

0%

/

84%

68%

43%

26%

17%

9%

57%

52%

38%

65%

69%

74%

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 2)

/

/

/

86%

78%

72%

/

/

/

89%

93%

95%

/

91%

88%

/

/

/

90%

/

82%

/

/

/

/

2%

/

95%

88%

73%

43%

35%

26%

79%

76%

63%

85%

83%

87%

Gini co efficient

/

/

/

30

30

34

52

/

54

47

39

41

/

40

46

/

/

/

47

/

46

/

64

61

43

66

/

35

38

38

58

67

65

46

43

45

42

55

57

Inco me share lo west 20%

/

/

/

9.2%

9.3%

8.0%

/

/

/

4.9%

7.0%

6.5%

/

6.9%

5.4%

/

/

/

5.4%

/

5.2%

/

/

/

5.7%

3.7%

/

7.3%

6.8%

7.4%

3.1%

2.5%

2.5%

5.7%

6.1%

5.8%

6.2%

3.6%

3.6%

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Real GDP gro wth (%)

5.9%

4.9%

4.2%

9.8%

10.3%

8.6%

3.5%

2.2%

4.0%

2.4%

3.0%

5.0%

5.2%

5.7%

5.5%

3.2%

3.2%

3.5%

7.4%

7.4%

6.5%

5.1%

5.3%

5.6%

6.6%

2.9%

3.5%

7.3%

7.2%

7.2%

2.2%

1.5%

2.0%

3.9%

4.9%

5.4%

6.7%

5.4%

6.7%

P F M , T ra ns pa re nc y ( P E F A )

2009

2 0 13

2007

2 0 10

2007

2 0 12

2006

2008

2 0 11

2007

2 0 11

2006

2008

2 0 11

2009

2 0 11

2006

2 0 10

2 0 13

2008

2008

2009

2 0 12

2005

2008

Credibility o f the budget

C+

/

C+

B

B

/

C+

B

/

B

C+

/

B

/

C

A

B

/

B

C+

B

/

/

/

C+

C+

/

B+

C+

C

A

/

/

C+

C+

C

C

/

/

Co mpr. & Transparency

B

/

C+

C+

B

/

C

C

/

C+

C+

/

B

/

B

B

B

/

C+

C+

B

/

/

/

C+

B

/

C+

C+

C+

A

/

/

B

C+

C+

C

/

/

P o licy-based budgeting

B

/

C

B

B

/

B+

B+

/

B

B+

/

B

/

B

C+

B

/

B

B

B

/

/

/

C+

B

/

B

C+

B

B

/

/

B+

C+

C+

B

/

/

P red. & co ntro l B udget ex;

C+

/

B

C+

B

/

C

C

/

C+

C+

/

C+

/

C+

B+

B+

/

C

B

B

/

/

/

C+

B

/

C+

C+

C+

B+

/

/

C

C+

C+

C

/

/

A cco unting, Reco rding & Rep.

B

/

B

B

B

/

D

D

/

D+

D+

/

C+

/

C

A

A

/

C+

C+

C+

/

/

/

B

C+

/

B

C+

C+

B+

/

/

C+

B

B

C+

/

/

External scrutiny and audit

C+

/

B+

C

C

/

D+

C

/

D+

D+

/

C

/

D+

B

C+

/

C+

C+

C+

/

/

/

C

C

/

C

C+

C+

B+

/

/

C+

C

C+

B

/

/

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

62

51

50

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

28

47

52

/

/

/

/

28

47

46

53

55

/

/

/

36

45

47

87

92

90

51

55

65

48

36

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f c o rrupt io n

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

4
2 0 13

WGI Co ntro l o f co rruptio n

0.91

0.96

0.92

-0.67

-0.66

-0.50

-0.16

0.09

0.23

-0.03

-0.27

-0.69

-0.67

-0.44

-0.64

0.45

0.55

0.30

-0.53

-0.48

-0.65

0.18

0.33

0.30

0.26

0.27

0.39

-0.69

-0.53

-0.82

0.47

0.08

-0.12

-0.82

-0.88

-1.05

-0.79

-0.49

-0.39

M a c ro e c o no m ic m a na ge m e nt , D R M

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Gen. go v. gro ss debt (%GDP )

18%

14%

13%

22%

22%

22%

42%

46%

49%

34%

35%

35%

73%

62%

54%

54%

53%

54%

47%

55%

61%

24%

25%

26%

64%

65%

64%

31%

33%

35%

43%

46%

48%

27%

30%

35%

29%

31%

32%

Reserve co verage (m. impo rts)

9.8

/

/

0.5

/

/

5.0

/

/

2.1

/

/

2.1

/

/

4.7

/

/

2.5

/

/

2.5

/

/

3.7

/

/

3.8

/

/

4.5

/

/

4.8

/

/

3.1

/

/

Gen. go v. net lend/bo rr (%GDP )

5.4%

0.4%

0.7%

-1.9%

-2.6%

-2.9%

-2.5%

-2.4%

-1.5%

-4.0%

-2.4%

-4.0%

-9.1%

-5.8%

-4.3%

-3.5%

-3.4%

-3.4%

-2.7%

-8.4%

-6.5%

-4.4%

-5.2%

-4.8%

0.3%

3.3%

1.2%

-4.0%

-3.9%

-4.2%

-4.1%

-4.1%

-4.2%

-4.1%

-3.9%

-2.7%

-6.7%

-5.6%

-5.1%

Gen. go v. expenditure (%GDP )

32%

35%

34%

18%

18%

19%

63%

64%

61%

15%

14%

17%

49%

42%

41%

25%

24%

24%

35%

40%

36%

35%

38%

38%

36%

32%

33%

20%

20%

20%

32%

32%

32%

17%

17%

17%

25%

25%

23%

Current A cco unt bal. (%GDP )

10%

17%

18%

-6%

-9%

-7%

-4%

-7%

-5%

-6%

-2%

-3%

-2%

-5%

-3%

-10%

-7%

-6%

-40%

-35%

-41%

-4%

-7%

-10%

-15%

-22%

-19%

-10%

-10%

-10%

-6%

-5%

-5%

-6%

-8%

-9%

0%

0%

0%

Revenue excl grants (% GDP )

35%

35%

34%

15%

14%

14%

54%

56%

54%

10%

11%

12%

31%

32%

32%

21%

21%

20%

27%

27%

25%

33%

36%

37%

32%

31%

31%

18%

19%

19%

29%

29%

29%

13%

13%

14%

17%

18%

18%

WCA
Benin

Country table
F ina nc ia l Im ple m e nt a t io n
Nr B S pro grammes

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

2

GGDC/SB C
Co mmitments (to tal)

Burkina Faso
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

448

2 0 15

Burundi
2 0 13

2 0 14

3

1

1

448

42

GGDC
114

Of which, new co mmitments
16

Disbursements

30

25

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

SB C

90
0

Disbursements Fo recast (1st trim)

Cabo Verde

0
6

22

57
76

55%

79

16

79
9%

10
18

30%

2 0 13

2 0 14

0

1

GGDC

42

27

7

33

11

7

16
37%

2 0 15

Central African
Republic

9
57%

4

0

44%

35%

Fixed tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

100%

90%

100%

100%

Variable tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

66%

92%

50%

Disbursements o utstanding (year end)

11

27

12

B S Disbursements as % o f to tal ODA

42%

61%

23%

2 0 14

/

1

4

6
0

47%

0

/

2 0 13

2 0 14

4

354

Guinea-Bissau
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

4

/

1

354

/

0

/
/

/

17

48
0

17
70%

2 0 15

Liberia
2 0 13

2 0 14

3

2

SB C

142
0

30
0%

2 0 15

Ghana

SB C

30
30

11

P lanned variable tranche share (A VR)

2 0 13

SB C

27
3

5

2 0 15

Cote d'Ivoire

58
0

/

90
0
15%

100%

100%

86%

/

47%

9

0

0

68%

32%

19%

0%

/

0

/

10

20%

/

0%

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

SB C

18

84

18
86

Mali
2 0 15

10
10

15%

10

220

2 0 14

/

1

0

50
120

/

75

/

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

3

0

/
/

/

8

165

0

0
38%

Rw anda
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

6

5

2 0 15

292

127
0

4

0

30

18

GGDC

40
0

95
53%

Niger

2 0 15

SB C

220
0

30
35%

2 0 13

SB C

84
0

0

Mauritania
2 0 15

40
35

38%

235
0

17

37

22

54
39%

54
42%

40
28%

/

211%

100%

0%

100%

144%

0%

/

40%

91%

0%

87%

76%

209

8

0

0

16

24

37

49%

51%

52%

0%

39%

61%

67%

P o v e rt y re duc t io n & inc lus iv e gro wt h

2003

/

2 0 12

2003

/

2009

2002

2008

/

2003

2008

/

2002

2008

/

/

2006

2 0 12

2002

/

2 0 10

2001 2006

2 0 10

2000

2008

/

/

2008

2 0 11

2000

2006

2 0 11

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 1.25)

47%

/

52%

49%

/

44%

/

/

/

21%

14%

/

62%

63%

/

30%

35%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

61%

51%

51%

21%

23%

/

/

42%

41%

79%

72%

63%

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 2)

/

/

/

73%

/

72%

/

/

/

/

/

/

82%

80%

/

57%

59%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

82%

77%

79%

44%

48%

/

/

74%

76%

92%

87%

82%

Gini co efficient

39

/

44

43

/

40

/

/

/

51

44

/

44

56

/

41

43

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

40

39

33

39

40

/

/

35

31

52

53

51

Inco me share lo west 20%

/

/

/

5.8%

/

6.7%

/

/

/

/

/

/

5.2%

3.4%

/

6.2%

5.2%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

6.1%

6.5%

8.0%

6.2%

6.0%

/

/

8.1%

9.0%

4.8%

4.6%

5.2%

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Real GDP gro wth (%)

5.6%

5.5%

5.5%

6.6%

4.0%

5.0%

4.5%

4.7%

4.8%

0.5%

1.0%

3.0%

-36.0%

1.0%

5.7%

8.7%

7.5%

7.7%

7.3%

4.2%

3.5%

0.3%

2.5%

4.5%

8.7%

0.5%

-1.4%

1.7%

6.8%

5.6%

5.7%

6.4%

5.5%

4.6%

6.9%

4.6%

4.7%

7.0%

7.0%

P F M , T ra ns pa re nc y ( P E F A )

2007

2007

2 0 10

2009

2 0 12

2006

2 0 10

2 0 13

2006

2009

2 0 12

2008

2 0 11

2 0 13

2008

2 0 10

2008

2 0 10

2008

2009

2008

2008

Credibility o f the budget

C+

/

/

B

C+

/

B

C+

/

B+

/

/

/

D+

/

C+

/

/

B

C+

D+

D+

D

/

C+

/

D+

B

B+

/

B

/

/

C

/

D+

C+

B

/

Co mpr. & Transparency

C

/

/

B+

B+

/

C

C+

/

B

/

/

/

C

/

C

/

/

C+

C+

C

D+

D+

/

D+

/

C

C

B

/

C

/

/

C

/

C

C

B+

/

P o licy-based budgeting

B

/

/

B+

B+

/

C

B+

/

B

/

/

/

C

/

D

/

/

C+

B+

B

C

D+

/

C+

/

B

B

B+

/

B+

/

/

C+

/

B

B

B

/

P red. & co ntro l B udget ex;

C

/

/

C

B

/

D+

C+

/

B

/

/

/

C

/

C

/

/

C+

C

C

D+

D+

/

C

/

C+

C+

B

/

C

/

/

C

/

C+

C+

B+

/

A cco unting, Reco rding & Rep.

D+

/

/

C+

B

/

D+

B

/

C+

/

/

/

D+

/

C

/

/

C

C+

C

D

D

/

D+

/

D+

C

C

/

C

/

/

D+

/

C

C

C

/

External scrutiny and audit

D+

/

/

C+

C

/

D+

D+

/

C

/

/

/

D

/

D

/

/

C+

C

C

D+

D

/

C

/

D+

C

C

/

C

/

/

C

/

C

C

B

/

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

/

/

1

14

5

23

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

50

/

/

/

3

40

43

/

35

43

/

/

/

26

3

4

1

11

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f c o rrupt io n

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

/

/

/

2 0 13

00-06

0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

/

50

54

2 0 13

00-06

0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

8
2 0 13

WGI Co ntro l o f co rruptio n

-0.66

-0.66

-0.83

-0.13

-0.39

-0.58

-0.99

-1.15

-1.39

0.34

0.80

0.77

-1.18

-0.91

-1.04

-1.02

-1.05

-0.79

-0.20

0.01

-0.07

-1.02

-1.11

-1.33

-1.09

-0.55

-0.68

-0.51

-0.57

-0.73

-0.20

-0.58

-0.68

-0.91

-0.68

-0.57

-0.52

0.31

0.65

M a c ro e c o no m ic m a na ge m e nt , D R M

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Gen. go v. gro ss debt (%GDP )

30%

31%

32%

29%

28%

31%

33%

31%

27%

100%

112%

121%

51%

42%

42%

40%

36%

35%

55%

68%

70%

58%

61%

64%

27%

33%

40%

32%

31%

38%

72%

59%

62%

27%

36%

47%

29%

28%

29%

Reserve co verage (m. impo rts)

3.1

/

/

1.7

/

/

3.4

/

/

4.7

/

/

3.6

/

/

3.8

/

/

3.2

/

/

8.1

/

/

2.7

/

/

2.6

/

/

3.1

2.9

3.2

3.4

/

/

4.6

/

/

Gen. go v. net lend/bo rr (%GDP )

-2.1%

-1.9%

-2.5%

-3.9%

-1.9%

-2.6%

-1.7%

-3.4%

-2.3%

-9.0%

-8.3%

-7.8%

-6.3%

1.9%

-4.8%

-2.3%

-2.3%

-3.2%

-10.9%

-9.8%

-6.3%

-1.4%

-1.8%

0.1%

-4.7%

-4.5%

-9.5%

-2.9%

-4.0%

-4.6%

-0.9%

-3.6%

-1.3%

-2.6%

-5.6%

-8.0%

-2.6%

-3.6%

-2.0%

Gen. go v. expenditure (%GDP )

22%

22%

24%

28%

23%

25%

31%

30%

29%

33%

33%

33%

15%

16%

21%

22%

23%

23%

27%

28%

26%

14%

25%

24%

33%

31%

36%

24%

27%

27%

29%

31%

30%

28%

29%

33%

28%

27%

25%

Current A cco unt bal. (%GDP )

-16%

-8%

-12%

-7%

-6%

-8%

-18%

-18%

-13%

-4%

-9%

-10%

-3%

-6%

-11%

-5%

-3%

-2%

-12%

-9%

-7%

-14%

-10%

-11%

-28%

-32%

-40%

-5%

-8%

-6%

-25%

-28%

-15%

-15%

-18%

-27%

-7%

-12%

-11%

Revenue excl grants (% GDP )

19%

19%

19%

19%

19%

19%

13%

14%

14%

22%

22%

21%

6%

5%

6%

18%

19%

17%

16%

18%

18%

8%

10%

11%

25%

22%

22%

18%

18%

19%

33%

34%

34%

17%

19%

19%

16%

17%

18%

WCA
Senegal

Country table
F ina nc ia l Im ple m e nt a t io n
Nr B S pro grammes

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

Sierra Leone

2 0 15

2 0 13
1

GGDC/SB C
Co mmitments (to tal)

ENP-S

2 0 14

2 0 15

1

Togo
2 0 13
1

SB C
29

Of which, new co mmitments

49

34

20

60
0

Disbursements Fo recast (1st trim)

17

7

Disbursements

16

33

30

0
10

12

23

/

36%

Algeria
2 0 15

1

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

2

Jordan
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

8

9

Morocco
2 0 15

2 0 13
24

SB C

34

14

2 0 14

ENP-E

30

7

0

14

0

/

28%

Tunisia

44

44

318

0
0

6

7

4

0

35%

100%

11

329

1083

126

83

60

46

31

52

29

100%

79%

21

8

1196

254
160

69

115

100

77

65
87%

7

2 0 13

2 0 14

7

5

Azerbaijan

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

5

3

Georgia

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

9

7

Moldova

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

9

8

Ukraine

2 0 15
11

SB C

155

67%

Arm enia

2 0 15

GGDC

2
0

2 0 14

399

143

100

100

91

157

33

45

149

88%

54%

6
SB C

98

60

26

25

10

17

22

12

8

89%

100%

47

158

0
7

13

0

0

77%

74%

16

160

223

67

44

25

9

39

25

12

72%

69%

332

544

111

56

56

38

47

40

60

62%

58%

613
355

56

41

88

265

P lanned variable tranche share (A VR)

54%

Fixed tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

433%

240%

0%

/

45%

0%

97%

/

0%

100%

100%

87%

100%

12%

Variable tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

28%

100%

20%

0%

0%

58%

35%

71%

59%

0%

86%

101%

Disbursements o utstanding (year end)

0

0

19

34

200

690

124

75

31

135

184

233

B S Disbursements as % o f to tal ODA

59%

39%

0%

0%

45%

80%

83%

23%

0%

26%

61%

80%

140

96%

P o v e rt y re duc t io n & inc lus iv e gro wt h

2001 2005

2 0 11

2003

/

2 0 11

/

2006

2 0 11

2003

2008

2 0 10

2001 2007

/

2000

2005

2 0 10

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

/

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

2 0 11

2003

2008

2 0 10

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 1.25)

44%

34%

34%

59%

/

57%

/

53%

52%

/

/

/

1%

0%

0%

6%

3%

/

3%

1%

1%

11%

1%

2%

0%

0%

/

16%

14%

14%

6%

1%

0%

0%

0%

0%

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 2)

71%

60%

60%

82%

/

83%

/

75%

73%

/

/

/

11%

2%

1%

24%

14%

/

13%

8%

4%

43%

11%

16%

1%

2%

/

36%

32%

31%

25%

7%

3%

1%

0%

0%

Gini co efficient

41

39

40

39

/

35

/

42

46

/

/

/

39

33

34

41

41

/

41

38

36

33

31

30

19

33

/

40

41

41

35

35

31

29

27

25

Inco me share lo west 20%

6.6%

6.2%

6.0%

6.8%

/

7.8%

/

6.1%

4.8%

/

/

/

6.7%

8.5%

8.2%

6.5%

6.5%

/

6.0%

6.5%

6.8%

8.7%

8.9%

8.8%

12.2%

8.1%

/

5.7%

5.5%

5.3%

7.6%

7.3%

8.5%

9.1%

9.6%

10.2%

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

3.5%

4.5%

4.6%

20.1%

6.0% -12.8%

5.4%

5.2%

6.0%

2.8%

4.1%

2.6%

2.8%

3.1%

3.8%

4.4%

2.9%

4.4%

2.3%

2.3%

3.0%

3.5%

3.4%

-1.0%

5.8%

2.8%

0.6%

3.3%

4.7%

2.0%

9.4%

4.6%

-1.0%

0.0%

-6.8%

-5.5%

2007

2 0 10

2006

2009

2007

2 0 11

2 0 13

2006

2008

2 0 11

2007

2 0 12

Real GDP gro wth (%)
P F M , T ra ns pa re nc y ( P E F A )

2 0 11

2009

2 0 10

2008

2 0 14

2008

Credibility o f the budget

/

B

/

C+

C

/

D

C

/

/

/

/

C+

B

/

B

/

/

/

B+

/

B+

/

A

/

/

/

C+

/

B+

A

B+

B+

B+

B

/

Co mpr. & Transparency

/

C

/

B

B

/

D+

D+

/

/

/

/

B+

B

/

B

/

/

/

B+

/

B+

/

B+

/

/

/

B

/

A

B+

B+

A

B

B

/

P o licy-based budgeting

/

B+

/

C

C

/

C+

C

/

/

/

/

B+

B+

/

B+

/

/

/

B

/

B+

/

B+

/

/

/

B+

/

A

B+

B+

B+

B

B

/

P red. & co ntro l B udget ex;

/

C+

/

C

C+

/

D+

C

/

/

/

/

B

B

/

B

/

/

/

B+

/

B

/

B

/

/

/

C+

/

B

C+

B

B

C

C+

/

A cco unting, Reco rding & Rep.

/

C

/

C+

B+

/

D

D+

/

/

/

/

C

C

/

B

/

/

/

B

/

C+

/

B+

/

/

/

C+

/

B+

B

B

B+

B

B+

/

External scrutiny and audit

/

D+

/

C

C

/

D+

D+

/

/

/

/

C+

C+

/

C

/

/

/

C+

/

C+

/

C

/

/

/

C+

/

B

C+

C+

B

C

C

/

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

3

3

10

/

/

39

/

/

2

1

13

53

50

57

28

28

38

/

/

/

/

/

37

43

42

53

55

55

/

/

/

55

62

54

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f c o rrupt io n

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

/
2 0 13

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

11
2 0 13

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

WGI Co ntro l o f co rruptio n

-0.08

-0.52

-0.28

-0.93

-0.89

-0.90

-0.85

-0.98

-1.04

-0.68

-0.52

-0.48

0.20

0.19

0.09

-0.20

-0.34

-0.36

0.15

-0.15

-0.15

-0.61

-0.60

-0.47

-1.03

-1.09

-0.90

-0.61

-0.10

0.36

-0.75

-0.62

-0.74

-0.87

-0.92

-1.09

M a c ro e c o no m ic m a na ge m e nt , D R M

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Gen. go v. gro ss debt (%GDP )

47%

51%

52%

34%

39%

46%

49%

55%

55%

8%

9%

14%

87%

89%

91%

63%

64%

66%

45%

47%

54%

40%

44%

53%

14%

16%

22%

32%

35%

42%

24%

31%

48%

41%

71%

94%

Reserve co verage (m. impo rts)

3.4

/

/

2.4

/

/

1.9

/

/

34.2

33.5

31.6

6.7

6.7

6.6

4.3

4.5

4.6

3.3

4.0

4.2

5.4

4.8

4.5

9.0

9.7

8.5

3.3

3.0

3.1

5.2

4.9

/

5.2

4.9

/

Gen. go v. net lend/bo rr (%GDP )

-5.5%

-5.1%

-4.6%

-2.4%

-3.1%

-4.7%

-4.6%

-5.8%

-4.7%

-0.8%

-6.2% -12.5% -11.5% -10.0% -2.9%

-5.2%

-4.9%

-4.3%

-6.0%

-3.5%

-3.5%

-1.7%

-2.1%

-4.5%

1.4%

0.4%

-5.7%

-1.2%

-1.8%

-3.1%

-1.8%

-1.7%

-5.3%

-4.8%

-4.5%

-4.2%

Gen. go v. expenditure (%GDP )

28%

29%

28%

16%

16%

18%

26%

26%

25%

37%

39%

43%

36%

38%

29%

34%

33%

31%

30%

28%

27%

25%

26%

29%

38%

38%

35%

29%

30%

31%

38%

40%

43%

48%

45%

47%

Current A cco unt bal. (%GDP )

-11%

-10%

-8%

-10%

-8%

-13%

-7%

-6%

-5%

0%

-4%

-16%

-10%

-7%

-8%

-8%

-6%

-3%

-8%

-9%

-6%

-8%

-9%

-9%

17%

15%

5%

-6%

-10%

-11%

-5%

-5%

-5%

-9%

-4%

-1%

Revenue excl grants (% GDP )

20%

20%

21%

11%

10%

10%

18%

19%

19%

35%

34%

32%

21%

23%

24%

28%

27%

27%

30%

31%

30%

23%

23%

23%

39%

40%

38%

27%

26%

26%

35%

36%

/

44%

43%

/

ASIA
Country table
F ina nc ia l Im ple m e nt a t io n
Nr B S pro grammes

Bangladesh
2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

51

51

2 0 15

Bhutan
2 0 13

2 0 14

4

13

Cam bodia
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

3

10

59

59

India

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

323

Indonesia
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

2

323

261

Kyrgyz Republic

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

2

3

261

29

55

2 0 15

Lao PDR
2 0 13

2 0 14

2

26

Nepal

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

4

3

26

100

76

Pakistan
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

4

174

Philippines

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

4

2

174

56

Tajikistan

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

56

18

Vietnam

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

2

2

47

139

139

2 0 15

GGDC/SB C
Co mmitments (to tal)
Of which, new co mmitments

0

35
11

Disbursements Fo recast (1st trim)

7

10

Disbursements

6

0

0
4

4

4

3

48%

20%

2

8
-

41%

37

12

9

5

7
38%

0
90

1

54

37

2%

8%

0
44

29

0

21

0

43%

100%

11

26

10

6

6

6

10

11

P lanned variable tranche share (A VR)

58%

Fixed tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

0%

72%

51%

100%

/

100%

100%
/

Variable tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

0%

100%

31%

100%

0%

Disbursements o utstanding (year end)

41

3

34

113

60

B S Disbursements as % o f to tal ODA

0%

80%

20%

0%

0%

0
7

0

3

0

100%

/

4

0

60

25

25

17

14

13

0%

34%

/

59%

100%

/

32

10

50%

0%

0
22

10

11

10

57%

32%

0
19

-

4

-

8

53%

15%

0
17

3

2

3

5

10%

100%

0
6

11

5

13

14

0%

35%

53%

33%

/

100%

16%

0%

100%

103%

75%

27

125

31

24

100

52%

16%

28%

36%

54%
2009 2002

2008

30

33%

P o v e rt y re duc t io n & inc lus iv e gro wt h

2000 2005

2 0 10

2003 2007

2 0 12

/

2008

2 0 11

/

2005

2 0 12

2002

2008

2 0 11

2003

2008

2 0 11

2002

2007

2 0 12

2003

/

2 0 10

2002

2008

2 0 11

2003

2006

2 0 12

2003

2007

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 1.25)

59%

50%

43%

24%

10%

2%

/

21%

10%

/

42%

24%

29%

23%

16%

25%

6%

5%

41%

35%

30%

53%

/

24%

36%

17%

13%

23%

23%

19%

35%

12%

6%

40%

17%

2 0 12
2%

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 2)

84%

80%

77%

47%

30%

15%

/

51%

41%

/

76%

59%

67%

55%

43%

61%

19%

21%

75%

68%

62%

77%

/

56%

74%

56%

51%

45%

45%

42%

68%

37%

27%

69%

43%

12%

Gini co efficient

33

33

32

47

38

39

/

35

32

/

33

34

30

34

38

29

36

33

32

35

36

44

/

33

30

30

30

44

44

43

33

32

31

38

36

36

Inco me share lo west 20%

8.7%

8.8%

8.9%

5.4%

6.6%

6.8%

/

7.9%

9.0%

/

8.6%

8.5%

9.5%

8.1%

7.6%

9.3%

6.7%

7.7%

8.6%

8.0%

7.6%

6.5%

/

8.3%

9.4%

9.6%

9.6%

5.4%

5.6%

5.9%

7.9%

7.4%

8.4%

7.5%

7.4%

7.0%

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Real GDP gro wth (%)

6.1%

6.1%

6.3%

5.0%

6.4%

7.6%

7.4%

7.0%

7.2%

6.9%

7.2%

7.5%

5.6%

5.0%

5.2%

10.5%

3.6%

1.7%

8.0%

7.4%

7.3%

3.9%

5.5%

5.0%

3.7%

4.1%

4.3%

7.2%

6.1%

6.7%

7.4%

6.7%

3.0%

5.4%

6.0%

6.0%

P F M , T ra ns pa re nc y ( P E F A )

2006

2 0 10

2 0 12

2006

2009

2009

2 0 12

Credibility o f the budget

C

C+

/

B+

/

/

/

C+

/

/

C+

/

C+

/

C+

C+

C+

/

/

B

/

C+

/

/

/

C+

B

/

B

/

B

/

B

/

D+

/

Co mpr. & Transparency

C

C+

/

B+

/

/

/

C+

/

/

B+

/

B

/

B+

C

C+

/

/

C

/

C+

/

/

/

B

B+

/

C+

/

C+

/

B

/

C+

/

P o licy-based budgeting

C+

B

/

A

/

/

/

B+

/

/

C

/

B

/

B+

C+

B

/

/

C

/

C+

/

/

/

B

A

/

C+

/

C+

/

C+

/

C+

/

P red. & co ntro l B udget ex;

C

C

/

B

/

/

/

C

/

/

C+

/

C

/

C+

C

D+

/

/

C

/

C

/

/

/

C

C+

/

C

/

C

/

C

/

C+

/

A cco unting, Reco rding & Rep.

C

C

/

B

/

/

/

C

/

/

B

/

C+

/

C+

D+

C+

/

/

C

/

C+

/

/

/

B

C

/

D

/

C+

/

C+

/

C+

/

External scrutiny and audit

D+

D+

/

B

/

/

/

D+

/

/

C+

/

C+

/

B

D

C

/

/

C

/

D+

/

/

/

C

C+

/

D+

/

D+

/

C

/

B

/

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

42

48

58

/

/

/

11

15

15

60

67

68

54

51

62

8

15

20

/

/

/

43

45

44

38

38

58

48

55

48

/

/

17

10

14

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f c o rrupt io n

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 10

2 0 11

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 10

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2007

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 10

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2008

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 10

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2007

2 0 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

19
2 0 13

WGI Co ntro l o f co rruptio n

-1.30

-1.00

-0.89

0.62

0.78

0.82

-1.03

-1.16

-1.01

-0.40

-0.49

-0.56

-0.92

-0.67

-0.62

-0.99

-1.16

-1.12

-1.14

-1.20

-0.90

-0.54

-0.72

-0.68

-0.89

-0.96

-0.93

-0.57

-0.72

-0.40

-1.05

-1.11

-1.19

-0.66

-0.62

-0.53

M a c ro e c o no m ic m a na ge m e nt , D R M

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Gen. go v. gro ss debt (%GDP )

35%

34%

33%

89%

108%

116%

29%

30%

30%

66%

65%

64%

25%

25%

26%

46%

53%

59%

60%

63%

63%

31%

26%

24%

64%

64%

64%

39%

37%

35%

29%

28%

30%

52%

59%

62%

Reserve co verage (m. impo rts)

4.6

5.2

5.2

/

/

/

3.4

3.5

3.6

6.2

6.5

6.7

5.8

6.2

6.3

4.2

3.7

3.7

1.0

1.3

1.7

/

/

/

1.5

2.1

3.0

11.9

11.2

11.1

1.1

1.0

1.1

2.0

2.6

3.1

Gen. go v. net lend/bo rr (%GDP )

-3.4% -3.0%

-3.2%

-4.0%

-2.1%

-0.8%

-3.1%

-7.2%

-7.2% -7.2%

-2.0%

-2.2% -2.3%

-3.7%

0.2%

-4.3%

-5.6%

-3.8%

-4.7%

2.1%

2.2%

1.1%

-8.1%

-4.7%

-4.7%

-0.1%

0.5%

-0.9% -0.8%

0.1%

-1.8%

-5.9% -5.4%

-6.5%

Gen. go v. expenditure (%GDP )

15%

14%

14%

33%

31%

25%

21%

20%

21%

27%

27%

27%

19%

19%

17%

38%

36%

39%

30%

28%

27%

17%

19%

20%

21%

20%

20%

19%

18%

20%

28%

28%

28%

29%

27%

27%

Current A cco unt bal. (%GDP )

1%

0%

-1%

-22%

-22%

-26%

-12%

-12%

-10%

-2%

-1%

-1%

-3%

-3%

-3%

-15%

-14%

-17%

-29%

-25%

-20%

3%

5%

4%

-1%

-1%

-1%

4%

4%

6%

-3%

-9%

-7%

6%

5%

5%

Revenue excl grants (% GDP )

10%

10%

10%

/

/

/

14%

15%

15%

20%

19%

19%

18%

18%

17%

31%

28%

28%

17%

18%

18%

17%

19%

19%

13%

14%

15%

18%

19%

19%

25%

25%

25%

23%

20%

20%

-3.8% -2.4%

LA
Country table
F ina nc ia l Im ple m e nt a t io n
Nr B S pro grammes

El Salvador
2 0 13

2 0 14

2

53

2 0 15

Ecuador
2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

52

95

Honduras

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

/

3

93

/

128

Bolivia

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

8

11

126

218

CAR

Colom bia
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

3

66

66

Costa Rica

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

8

126

Guatem ala

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

/

13

/

Paraguay

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

54

93

Peru

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

3

89

93

93

Uruguay
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

11

Barbados

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

4

11

46

Dom inica

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

4

1

46

8

Grenada

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

1

8

8

7

2 0 15

GGDC/SB C
Co mmitments (to tal)
Of which, new co mmitments

0

Disbursements Fo recast (1st trim)

12

11

Disbursements

9

1

P lanned variable tranche share (A VR)

100%

0
23

31

18

12

9

100%

100%

10

0

30

/

0

23

/

7

100%

85%

77

20

21

29

42

21

13

83%

59%

0

42

0

22

20

0

0

34%

100%

0
21

8

21

4

100%

52%

0
4

/

0

/

3

100%

100%

0
13

17

13

7

7

39%

100%

14

23

40

14

12

13

20

10

100%

47%

0
4

3

4

3

39%

100%

0
3

9

24

3

8

100%

56%

0
16

5

2

5

1

27%

100%

0
0

0

5

0

6

/

48%

Fixed tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

/

/

0%

83%

/

100%

/

/

80%

/

80%

/

59%

Variable tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

8%

44%

34%

16%

0%

0%

39%

46%

27%

100%

0%

45%

191%

Disbursements o utstanding (year end)

24

30

68

114

62

9

24

18

20

3

27

1

1

B S Disbursements as % o f to tal ODA

10%

59%

37%

51%

0%

67%

23%

66%

42%

50%

93%

29%

99%

0

/

P o v e rt y re duc t io n & inc lus iv e gro wt h

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

2 0 11

2002

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2006

2 0 11

2003

2008

2 0 12

2003

2008

2 0 12

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 1.25)

13%

5%

3%

12%

6%

4%

26%

15%

16%

22%

10%

8%

10%

9%

6%

5%

2%

1%

18%

13%

14%

8%

4%

3%

9%

5%

3%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 2)

22%

13%

9%

23%

13%

8%

40%

27%

29%

33%

18%

13%

20%

18%

12%

9%

5%

3%

/

/

/

17%

12%

8%

21%

12%

8%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Gini co efficient

51

47

42

55

51

47

59

56

57

60

51

47

54

56

54

50

49

49

54

55

52

56

51

48

54

47

45

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Inco me share lo west 20%

2.7%

4.7%

5.7%

3.0%

3.7%

4.3%

2.2%

2.8%

2.6%

1.5%

3.0%

3.3%

3.3%

2.9%

3.3%

3.4%

4.2%

4.2%

/

/

/

3.2%

4.0%

4.1%

3.5%

4.2%

4.2%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Real GDP gro wth (%)

1.7%

2.0%

3.6%

5.4%

4.3%

4.9%

4.6%

3.4%

3.4%

3.5%

3.8%

3.7%

4.0%

5.8%

2.4%

3.8%

4.4%

3.3%

2.8%

0.0%

-0.3%

0.8%

-0.9%

1.1%

2.4%

2.4%

1.5%

1.5%

P F M , T ra ns pa re nc y ( P E F A )

2009

2.5%

4.6%

2 0 13

2 0 10

1.9%

2.8%

3.1%

3.3%

6.8%

2005

2009

2 0 11

2 0 13

2009

2009

2 0 10

4.0%

4.0%

14.2%

4.4%

2 0 10

2 0 13

2008

2 0 11

2009

2 0 12

2 0 10

Credibility o f the budget

B

/

A

/

/

/

B+

B+

B+

B

/

/

B

/

/

/

B+

/

/

B

B

B

B

/

B

/

/

/

D+

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

C

/

Co mpr. & Transparency

B

/

C+

/

/

/

C

B

B+

B

/

/

B+

/

/

/

A

/

/

B

B

C+

C+

/

A

/

/

/

B

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

B

/

P o licy-based budgeting

B

/

B

/

/

/

B+

C+

C+

C

/

/

B+

/

/

/

B+

/

/

B

B

B

C+

/

B+

/

/

/

B

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

C+

/

P red. & co ntro l B udget ex;

B+

/

B

/

/

/

C+

C+

C+

B

/

/

B

/

/

/

B

/

/

C+

C+

C

C+

/

B

/

/

/

B

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

C+

/

A cco unting, Reco rding & Rep.

B+

/

B+

/

/

/

B

B

B

C

/

/

B

/

/

/

B+

/

/

C

C+

C+

C+

/

B

/

/

/

C+

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

C+

/

External scrutiny and audit

C

/

C

/

/

/

C

D+

C+

D+

/

/

C+

/

/

/

B

/

/

C

C

C+

C

/

B

/

/

/

D+

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

C

/

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

37

37

43

39

31

31

12

11

53

7

13

12

61

61

58

45

47

50

46

50

51

/

/

/

67

65

57

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f c o rrupt io n

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

/
2 0 13

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

/
2 0 13

WGI Co ntro l o f co rruptio n

-0.44

-0.27

-0.35

-0.84

-0.81

-0.61

-0.83

-0.83

-0.95

-0.67

-0.53

-0.59

-0.19

-0.31

-0.44

0.51

0.56

0.59

-0.63

-0.56

-0.58

-1.35

-0.90

-1.04

-0.30

-0.28

-0.44

0.88

1.22

1.34

1.30

1.47

1.61

0.54

0.71

0.69

0.61

0.40

0.41

M a c ro e c o no m ic m a na ge m e nt , D R M

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Gen. go v. gro ss debt (%GDP )

55%

56%

59%

24%

30%

34%

45%

46%

48%

33%

32%

36%

36%

38%

41%

36%

40%

42%

25%

24%

25%

17%

21%

23%

20%

21%

21%

62%

63%

64%

96%

100%

103%

74%

77%

78%

108%

107%

107%

Reserve co verage (m. impo rts)

3.0

2.8

2.8

1.8

1.7

1.7

3.6

3.3

3.2

15.9

16.8

18.5

7.5

7.6

7.5

5.8

5.5

5.2

4.6

4.4

4.1

5.4

6.6

6.4

15.8

16.0

15.7

13.1

13.6

13.4

3.8

3.6

3.5

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.4

3.6

3.7

Gen. go v. net lend/bo rr (%GDP )

-3.7%

-3.5%

-4.4%

-4.6%

-5.2%

-5.4%

-7.6%

-4.3%

-2.7%

0.7%

-3.2%

-4.5%

-0.9%

-1.4%

-3.2%

-5.6%

-6.0%

-5.8%

-2.1%

-1.9%

-2.3%

-1.5%

-0.5%

-1.1%

0.7%

-0.1%

-1.7%

-2.4%

-3.4%

-2.8%

-12.9% -9.0%

-7.2%

-2.7%

-3.4%

-3.5%

-7.3%

-6.4%

-3.0%

Gen. go v. expenditure (%GDP )

22%

21%

22%

44%

44%

39%

31%

29%

28%

39%

42%

39%

29%

30%

30%

19%

20%

20%

14%

13%

13%

24%

24%

25%

22%

23%

23%

33%

34%

33%

46%

43%

41%

32%

33%

33%

28%

31%

28%

Current A cco unt bal. (%GDP )

-6%

-5%

-4%

-1%

-1%

-3%

-10%

-7%

-7%

3%

1%

-3%

-3%

-5%

-6%

-5%

-4%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-2%

2%

0%

-2%

-4%

-4%

-5%

-5%

-5%

-4%

-9%

-9%

-5%

-13%

-13%

-13%

-27%

-24%

-17%

Revenue excl grants (% GDP )

18%

18%

18%

40%

39%

39%

22%

24%

24%

39%

39%

38%

28%

28%

28%

14%

13%

14%

12%

11%

11%

21%

21%

23%

22%

21%

22%

30%

30%

30%

33%

34%

35%

28%

28%

28%

20%

20%

22%

CAR
Guyana

Country table
F ina nc ia l Im ple m e nt a t io n
Nr B S pro grammes

2 0 13

2 0 14

/

/

Haiti
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

2

2

67

141

GGDC/SB C
Co mmitments (to tal)

PAC
Dom inican
Republic

Jam aica
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

8

194

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

7

4

194

130

St. Kitts and
Nevis

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

56

23

2 0 15

Trinidad and
Tobago
2 0 13

2 0 14

2

3

24

45

2 0 15

Cook Islands
(NZ)
2 0 13

2 0 14

3

1

52

3

2 0 15

Solom on
Islands

Sam oa
2 0 13

2 0 14

1

3

3

24

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

3

1

47

13

Tim or-Leste

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2

/

16

/

2 0 15

Tonga
2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

4

12

Vanuatu
2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

1

1

1

6

12

SB C

Of which, new co mmitments

0

Disbursements Fo recast (1st trim)

/

13

Disbursements

/

0

GGDC

141
0

0

0

34

0

34

100%

11%

2 0 15

30

0

23

35

27

29

43

35

63%

43%

0

30

27

23

9

23

23

P lanned variable tranche share (A VR)

47%

Fixed tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

0%

100%

100%

100%

184%

78%

Variable tranche disbursed (% planned; A VR)

0%

0%

174%

Disbursements o utstanding (year end)

48

74

43

B S Disbursements as % o f to tal ODA

0%

37%

66%

P o v e rt y re duc t io n & inc lus iv e gro wt h

0
11

3

17

9

74%

0%

2008

2 0 10

2003

0

16

10

15

11

/

100%

0
13

1

0
-

84%

0%

/

78%

/

102%

7

15

18

89%

89%

100%

2008

2 0 12

0
2

2

1

100%

59%

2003

0

12
-

33%

14

5
/

100%

0
-

0

-

0

39%

16%

1

0

17

/

0

2

/

1

31%

0%

12

1
-

4

-

3

50%

/

100%

0
3

-

0

-

0

26%

0%

/

0%

/

/

/

0%

/

/

/

2

17

15

3

3

8

82%

0%

6%

86%

0%

4

0%

0%

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 1.25)

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

6%

3%

2%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

P o verty headco unt ratio ($ 2)

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

15%

11%

9%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Gini co efficient

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

52

49

46

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Inco me share lo west 20%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

3.8%

4.5%

5.0%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

5.2%

3.8%

3.8%

4.2%

2.8%

0.5%

1.7%

4.8%

7.3%

5.1%

3.8%

7.0%

3.5%

1.7%

1.1%

1.2%

/

/

/

-1.1%

1.9%

2.8%

3.0%

1.5%

6.6%

6.8%

-0.3%

2.3%

2.7%

2.0%

2.9%

-4.0%

2006

2 0 10

Real GDP gro wth (%)
P F M , T ra ns pa re nc y ( P E F A )

2008

3.3%

0.2%

2 0 12

2007

2007

2008

2 0 11

2008

3.3%

5.4%

2 0 12

2007

2 0 10

2 0 10

2006

Credibility o f the budget

/

/

/

D+

/

C

B

/

/

C+

/

/

/

/

/

B

/

/

/

C+

/

B

B

/

B

/

C

C+

/

C

/

B+

/

A

/

/

Co mpr. & Transparency

/

/

/

C+

/

D+

B

/

/

C+

/

/

/

/

/

B+

/

/

/

B

/

B+

C+

/

C

/

C+

B

/

C+

/

B

/

C+

/

/

P o licy-based budgeting

/

/

/

C

/

D+

B

/

/

D+

/

/

/

/

/

C+

/

/

/

C

/

B

C+

/

C

/

C+

B+

/

C

/

B

/

C+

/

/

P red. & co ntro l B udget ex;

/

/

/

C

/

D+

C

/

/

C

/

/

/

/

/

C+

/

/

/

C+

/

C+

C

/

D+

/

C

C

/

C

/

B

/

C

/

/

A cco unting, Reco rding & Rep.

/

/

/

D+

/

D

C

/

/

C

/

/

/

/

/

C+

/

/

/

C+

/

C+

C

/

C

/

C+

C

/

C+

/

C

/

B

/

/

External scrutiny and audit

/

/

/

D+

/

C

B

/

/

D+

/

/

/

/

/

C

/

/

/

D+

/

D+

D+

/

C

/

D+

C

/

C

/

D+

/

D+

/

/

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

2008

2 0 10

2 0 12

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

12

14

29

/

/

/

33

33

38

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

34

36

/

/

/

/

/

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13

Open budget index
C o nt ro l o f c o rrupt io n

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

2 0 13 0 0 - 0 6 0 7 - 12

/
2 0 13

WGI Co ntro l o f co rruptio n

-0.48

-0.60

-0.64

-1.53

-1.21

-1.15

-0.45

-0.41

-0.37

-0.55

-0.75

-0.85

0.47

1.02

0.98

-0.12

-0.28

-0.35

0.10

0.01

/

0.08

0.16

0.20

-0.67

-0.47

-0.45

-0.64

-0.97

-0.84

-0.80

-0.51

-0.08

-0.34

0.35

0.38

M a c ro e c o no m ic m a na ge m e nt , D R M

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

2 0 13

2 0 14

2 0 15

Gen. go v. gro ss debt (%GDP )

57%

66%

71%

22%

27%

28%

142%

141%

133%

35%

35%

31%

105%

81%

74%

37%

38%

39%

/

/

/

54%

55%

55%

16%

13%

14%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

20%

18%

25%

Reserve co verage (m. impo rts)

4.3

4.4

4.3

6.7

5.4

5.5

3.0

3.9

4.1

2.9

2.9

2.7

9.0

9.3

7.9

11.7

12.4

12.7

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Gen. go v. net lend/bo rr (%GDP )

-4.3%

-5.2%

-4.6%

-7.2%

-6.4%

-3.1%

0.1%

-0.4%

-0.2%

-3.6%

-3.0%

-2.4%

12.3%

10.3%

1.4%

-2.0%

-4.0%

-3.8%

/

/

/

-3.8%

-5.3%

-3.3%

4.4%

1.9%

-2.1%

59.9% 25.3%

9.7%

0.0%

0.3%

-1.0%

-0.2%

0.9%

-5.6%

Gen. go v. expenditure (%GDP )

30%

34%

33%

28%

26%

24%

27%

27%

27%

18%

18%

17%

34%

33%

31%

35%

35%

34%

/

/

/

38%

44%

39%

50%

44%

48%

22%

29%

34%

28%

30%

30%

22%

23%

27%

Current A cco unt bal. (%GDP )

-13%

-16%

-16%

-7%

-6%

-3%

-9%

-6%

-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-7%

-11%

-16%

7%

8%

5%

/

/

/

0%

-4%

-7%

-4%

-9%

-8%

45%

26%

11%

-13%

-9%

-7%

-3%

-1%

-14%

Revenue excl grants (% GDP )

25%

26%

27%

13%

12%

14%

27%

27%

26%

14%

15%

14%

39%

34%

29%

32%

32%

31%

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

Annex 2 – Budget Support/Non-Budget Support Country Group Lists
As used in part III calculation of group averages:
EU Budget support country list

Non- budget support EU aid recipients

LIC

LMIC

UMIC

HIC

LIC

LMIC

Bangladesh

Armenia

Algeria

Barbados

Afghanistan

Cameroon

Angola

Antigua &
Barbuda

Benin

Bhutan

Azerbaijan

Chad

Djibouti

Argentina

Chile

Burkina Faso

Bolivia

Botswana

Comoros

Egypt

Belarus

Burundi

Cabo
Verde

Colombia

Congo,
Dem. Rep.
of

Kiribati

Belize

Cambodia

Cote
d'Ivoire

Cook Isl

Eritrea

Micronesia

Brazil

C.A.R.

El Salvador

Costa Rica

Ethiopia
GuineaBissau

Georgia

Dominica
Dominican
Republic

Haiti

Guatemala

Ecuador

Myanmar

Liberia

Guyana

Grenada

Somalia

Madagascar

Honduras

Jamaica

Zimbabwe

Malawi

Kyrgyz Rep.

Jordan

Mali
Mozambique
Nepal
Niger

Indonesia
Lao PDR
Lesotho
Mauritania

Mauritius
Namibia
Peru
Seychelles

Rwanda

Moldova

South
Africa

Uzbekistan

Sierra Leone

Morocco

Tonga

Yemen,
Rep.

Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda

Pakistan
Paraguay
Philippines
Samoa
Senegal
Solomon
Islands
TimorLeste
Ukraine
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Zambia

Tunisia

Ghana

St. Kitts
and
Nevis
Trinidad
&
Tobago
Uruguay

UMIC

Gambia,
The
Guinea

Mongolia

Fiji

Nicaragua

Gabon

Kenya

Nigeria

Kazakhstan

Papua New
Guinea
Rep.of
Congo
Sao Tome
& Principe
South
Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Syria

HIC

Lebanon
Malaysia
Maldives
Marshall Isl
Mexico
Palau
Panama
St. Lucia
St. Vincent &
the
Grenadines
Suriname
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Venezuela

Footnote: Budget support countries have at least one ongoing budget support operation. Egypt was exceptionally excluded because no disbursements have taken
place over the last 2 years and no disbursement is forecasted to take place in 2015. Guinea and Sao Tome & Principe were considered Non-BS countries despite BS
commitments are forecasted for 2015. India (BS) and China (non-BS) were excluded from the part III analysis due to their size.

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