Ministry of Economic Affairs

Netherlands’ NAcP
National Action Plan (NAcP) for the
follow-up of post-Fukushima Dai ichi
related activities
Report for the ENSREG-led
NAcP Peer Review Workshop
to be held in April 2013

December 2012

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Abstract
This is the National Action Plan (NAcP) of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the follow up of
Fukushima Dai ichi related activities at the single NPP in the Netherlands as well as at the
governmental bodies involved. The report will be subject to Peer Review within the ENSREG
Stress Test Action Plan. In April 2013 there will be an ENSREG-led NAcP Peer Review
Workshop where the results of the National Action Plans will be discussed.
This National Action Plan reflects the intended focus of aforementioned meeting. It is structured
along six main topics identified by ENSREG and the Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. For each topic it presents the analyses conducted, activities performed by the
operator and those performed by the regulator. It also provides for a tabled summary of the
planning of activities at the Licensee (EPZ of NPP Borssele).

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Contents
List of tables

5

List of figures

6

List of Symbols and Abbreviations

7

Introduction

11

PART I
0.

1.

2.

3.

15

0.0

Introduction

15

0.1

Tabled summary of items reported

16

External Events (Natural Hazards)

21

1.0

Introduction

21

1.1

Tabled summary of items reported

22

Design Issues

27

2.0

Introduction

27

2.1

Tabled summary of items reported

28

Severe Accident Management and Recovery (on site)

37

3.0

Introduction

37

3.1

Tabled summary of items reported

38

Topics 4, 5 and 6

47

National Organisations

47

4.0

Introduction to National Organisations

47

4.0.a Regulatory Body (RB)

47

4.0.b Governmental supporting organisations: RIVM

49

4.0.c Education and training organisations

49

4.0.d Technical (Support) Organisations

49

4.0.e Utility N.V. EPZ

49

4.0.f

50

4.1
5.

15

General

PART II
4.

Topics 0, 1, 2 and 3

Vendor

Tabled summary of items reported

51

Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident
Management (off site)

57

5.0

57

Introduction to organisation of EPR and PAM in the Netherlands

5.0.a Regulatory frame work - National Plan for Nuclear Emergency
Management and Response, NPK
57
Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

5.1
6.

6.1
PART III

5.0.c Training and exercises and their organisation

57

Tabled summary of items reported

59
63

Introduction to contributions of the Netherlands to international
cooperation

63

Tabled summary of items reported

64

Additional Topics

71

Specification of Additional Topics

71

7.0

Introduction

71

7.1

Tabled summary of items reported on ‘Additional Topics’

72

Implementation of Activities

73

PART IV
8.

57

International Cooperation
6.0

7.

5.0.b Organisation - National Nuclear Assessment Team, EPAn

Specification of the Implementation of Activities

73

8.0

Introduction

73

8.1

Tabled summary of national implementation of post-stress test actions 74

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

List of tables
Table 0-1

Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 0 ‘General’. In the first
column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found
between parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘0.x’ which results
from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column presents
the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and
the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents the
reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers
mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, in which these
national Actions can be found with their planning................................................. 16

Table 1-1

Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 1 – External Events / Natural
Hazards. In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations
(items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘1.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second
column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the
associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth
column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations,
the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP,
where these national Actions can be found with their planning. ............................ 22

Table 2-1

Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 2 – Design Issues. In the first
column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found
between parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘2.x’ which results
from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column presents
the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and
the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents the
reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers
mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, in which these
national Actions can be found with their planning................................................. 28

Table 3-1

Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 3 – Severe Accident
Management (SAM). In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG
observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with
the format ‘3.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives
the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth
column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations,
the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP,
where these national Actions can be found with their planning. ............................ 38

Table 4-1

Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 4 –National Organisations. In
the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is
found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘4.x’ which
results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column
presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated
Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents
the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action
numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, where these
National Actions can be found with their planning. ............................................... 51

Table 5-1

Tabled summary of items reported for ‘Emergency Preparedness and
Response and Post Accident Management off-site’ In the first column, the
original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
parentheses, combined with a code with the format ‘5.x’ which results from a
renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB. The second column presents the
ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the
fourth the source of the observation. The fifth column presents the reflections of
the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in
the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can
be found with their planning................................................................................... 59
Table 6-1

Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 6 – International
Cooperation. In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG
observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with
the format ‘6.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives
the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation. The fifth
column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations,
the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to Part IV of this NAcP,
where these national Actions can be found with their planning ............................. 64

Table 7-1

Additional Topics regarding licensees, specific for the Netherlands and not
inventoried or listed by ENSREG and/or CNS .................................................. 72

Table 8-1

National post-stress test Actions – initiated by or imposed on Licensee EPZ
(operator of one NPP unit). This is the official national list of Actions. Mx-,
Px- and Sx- numbers between parentheses refer to original list of proposed
measures of licensee EPZ. Other numbers in between parentheses: NR refers to
section in National Report (2011), PR refers to section in Peer Review Report
(2012)...................................................................................................................... 74

Table 8-2

National post-stress test actions – acting on and initiated by the national
RB........................................................................................................................... 81

List of figures
Figure 1

Regulatory structure in the Netherlands, with the ministry of EZ as the principal
responsible authority for conducting the regulatory process under the Nuclear
Energy Act. ............................................................................................................. 48

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

List of Symbols and Abbreviations
AC

Alternating Current

BORI

‘Back Office Radiologische Informatie’; back-office of the National Nuclear
Assessment Team for radiological analyses and information

CNRA

Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (of the OECD/NEA)

CNS

Convention on Nuclear Safety

CP

Contracting Parties

CSA

Complementary Safety margin Assessment, a.k.a. ‘stress test’

CSNI

Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (of the OECD/NEA)

DBA

Design Basis Accident

DBE

Design Basis Earthquake

DBF

Design Basis Flood

DC

Direct Current

DG

Diesel Generator

EDG

Emergency Diesel Generator

EDMG

Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines

EIA

Environmental Impact Assessment

EL&I

Former ‘Ministerie van Economische zaken, Landbouw & Innovatie’;
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture & Innovation, now ‘Ministry of
Economic Affairs’ (EZ).

ENSREG

European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

EOP

Emergency Operating Procedure

EPRI

Electric Power Research Institute

EPZ N.V.

Elektriciteits-Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ, licensee of the
Borssele NPP

ERO

Emergency Response Organisation

EU

European Union

EUROSAFE

Forum organized by European TSOs

EZ

‘Ministerie van Economische Zaken’; Ministry of Economic Affairs

10EVA13

Current 10 yearly safety evaluation; periodic safety review (PSR)

HERCA

Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities

HF

Human Factors

HOF

Human and Organisational Factors

ICMS

‘Intensivering Civiel-Militaire Samenwerking’; intensifying civil-military
cooperation

IenM

‘Ministerie van Infrastructuur & Milieu’; Ministry of Infrastructure & the
Environment

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

I&C

Instrumentation and Control

ILT

Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate

IPPAS

International Physical Protection Advisory Service

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

KCB

Kerncentrale Borssele; NPP Borssele

KFD

Kernfysische Dienst; Department for Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards,
and Radiation Protection of ILT

KNMI

‘Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut’; Royal Netherlands
Meteorological Institute

KTA

Kerntechnische Ausschuss

KWU

Kraftwerk Union

LOCC

‘Landelijk Operationeel Coördinatiecentrum’, national operational
coordination centre for operational and logistic assistance and support

LOOP

Loss Of Offsite Power

LUHS

Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink

MCR

Main Control Room

mSv

milliSievert

MWe

Megawatts Electrical

MWth

Megawatts Thermal

NAcP

National Action Plan (for post-fukushima Dai ichi activities)

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD

NERIS

European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological
Emergency Response and Recovery

NIV

‘Projectdirectie voor Nucleaire Installaties en Veiligheid’; directorate for
nuclear installations and nuclear safety

NL

Netherlands

NMR

‘Nationaal Meetnet Radioactiviteit’; national radiological monitoring
network

NPK

‘Nationaal Plan Kernongevallenbestrijding’; national plan for nuclear
emergency management and response

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (in the USA)

NRG

Nuclear Research & consultancy Group (in the Netherlands)

NS 1

Nood Stroom net 1 (Emergency Grid 1)

NS 2

Nood Stroom net 2 (Emergency Grid 2)

OECD

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAR

Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner

PGA

Peak Ground Acceleration

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
PORV

Power-Operated Relief Valve

PRA

Probabilistic Risk Analysis

PSA

Probabilistic Safety Analysis

PWR

Pressurised Water Reactor

RB

Regulatory Body or ‘regulator’

RCS

Reactor Coolant System

RIVM

‘Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu’; National Institute for
Public Health and the Environment

ROT

Regional Operational Team

RPV

Reactor Pressure Vessel

RWS

‘Rijkswaterstaat’, executive arm of Ministry of I&M, responsible for the
design, construction, management and maintenance of the main
infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands

SALTO

Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation

SAM

Severe Accident Management

SAMG

Severe Accident Management Guidelines

SBO

Station Blackout

SFP

Spent Fuel Pool

SG

Steam Generator

SMA

Seismic Margin Assessment

SOER

Significant Operating Experience Report (WANO)

SSCs

Structures, Systems and Components

TSO

Technical Support Organisation, in this NAcP organizations supporting
Regulatory Bodies.

UPS

Uninterrupted Power Supply

US, USA

United States, United States of America

WANO

World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA

Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

xCNS

Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety – in this NAcP reference is made to the 2nd xCNS

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Introduction
This section starts with the background of the National Action Plan (NAcP) Peer Review
Workshop to be organised by ENSREG from 22 to 26 April 2013 and then sets out the purpose
and scope of this document: ‘Netherlands’ Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi
related activities’. It then continues with the intended audience, links to detailed information on
the single operating Dutch Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and introduction to the Regulatory
Body. The introduction finishes with a description of the structure of the present report.
Background

In 2011 the licensees of NPPs in the EU produced their reports (‘Licensee Reports’) on the
‘stress test’ of their facilities, in accordance with the ENSREG specifications. In a second step,
the regulatory bodies evaluated these reports, and reported their findings in ‘National Reports’
and submitted these to ENSREG. Later in a third step there was a Peer Review of these reports.
This yielded a set of so-called Country Reports and a Summary Report with recommendations
for consideration by the participating countries, which was endorsed by ENSREG in April 2012.
This publication was one of the actions of the ENSREG action plan to assist the member states.
In parallel with the European efforts, the international community took important steps. On the
5th regular review conference of the CNS (4 – 14 April 2011) it was decided to organize from 27
– 31 August 2012 a 2nd CNS Extraordinary Meeting1 on the lessons learnt after ‘Fukushima Daiichi’. In May 2012, all participating countries submitted a National Report to the CNS
secretariat, dedicated to the purposes of this 2nd Extraordinary Meeting (‘xCNS’). A summary of
the findings of the meeting was published in a CNS summary report2.
Since then ENSREG has pursued continuation of the efforts of European countries in
strengthening nuclear safety. Among others it published a ‘Compilation of recommendations
and suggestions’3 (July 2012).
It has been decided that in December 2012 National Action Plans (NAcPs) on the follow-up of
post-Fukushima actions, will be submitted to ENSREG to be discussed in a dedicated ENSREG
National Action Plan Peer Review Workshop in April 2013. The NAcP Review Workshop will
be a focused review meeting, concentrating on actions and their implementation, responses and
new developments that have been initiated or influenced by the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, and have been presented earlier in National Reports to
ENSREG and the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS.
Purpose and Scope of this National Action Plan

This NAcP has been drafted observing the requirements of ENSREG and aims to present the
current status of implementation of most actions reported earlier and presenting further planning
and specification of actions agreed with the licensee.
The NAcP addresses the six topics identified in the ‘Guidance for National Reports’ of the 2nd
Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS. For the first three topics the elaboration is in line with those
of the ENSREG-led Complementary Safety Assessment (CSA, a.k.a. ‘stress test’).
The ENSREG secretariat has provided detailed guidance on the structuring of the NAcP. Per
ENSREG guidance, the NAcP features four main parts.
1

The first Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS on 28 September 2009 was dedicated to the revision of the Guidelines
regarding National Reports and rules of procedure and guidelines for training purposes.
2
Mr Li Ganjie, Mr William Borchardt, Mr Patrick Majerus, ‘2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to
the Convention of Nuclear Safety 27-31 August 2012 – Final Summary Report’, IAEA, CNS/ExM/2012/04/Rev.2,
August 2012.
3
‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions – Peer review of stress tests performed on European nuclear
power plants’, ENSREG, 26 July 2012

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
Part I

This part features the topics of the ENSREG-led CSA.
•

Topic 1: External Events

•

Topic 2: Design Issues

•

Topic 3: Severe Accident Management and Recovery (On-Site)

Part II

This part features the remaining topics of the Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS.
•

Topic 4: National Organisations

•

Topic 5: Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post-Accident Management (Off-Site)

•

Topic 6: International Cooperation

Part III

•

Generic activities and conclusions from National Review and related discussions.

Part IV

•

National implementation of activities, with schedules.

Further explanation of the Dutch approach to the reporting in the NAcP can be found in the last
section of the Introduction; ‘Structure of the Dutch National Action Plan (NAcP)’.
Intended Audience

This National Action Plan (NAcP) is mainly targeted at regulatory bodies of other states that
have participated in ENSREG-led Complementary Safety Assessments (a.k.a. ‘stress tests’) and
related Peer Review, to enable them to perform a peer review of the present NAcP. As agreed
the report is written in English. Nevertheless, it will be made available to the general public.
The report will also be sent to the Dutch Parliament.
Detailed information on the Borssele NPP and its robustness

Detailed information on the Borssele NPP and assessment of its robustness can be found in:
•

The self assessment by utility EPZ, also called ‘Complementary Safety margin Assessment’
(CSA), following the format prescribed by ENSREG, can be found at:
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-enpublicaties/rapporten/2011/11/02/final-report-complementary-safety-marginassessment/complementary-safety-margin.pdf

•

The regulatory body’s evaluation of the CSA performed by utility EPZ:
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-enpublicaties/rapporten/2011/12/20/netherland-s-national-report-on-the-post-fukushimastress-test/netherland-s-national-report-on-the-post-fukushima-stress-test.pdf

Regulatory Body or Regulator

All nuclear facilities in the Netherlands, including the NPP of Borssele, operate under licence,
awarded after a safety assessment has been carried out.
The licence is granted by the regulatory body under the Nuclear Energy Act. The ‘regulatory
body’ is the authority designated by the government as having legal authority for conducting the
regulatory process, including issuing licences, and thereby regulating nuclear, radiation,
radioactive waste and transport safety, nuclear security and safeguards.
For more information on the regulatory body, refer to chapter 4.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
Structure of the Dutch National Action Plan (NAcP)

The present NAcP (version 2012) is designed to be a ‘stand alone’ document to facilitate the
international review by regulatory bodies of other nations. On the other hand it refers to publicly
available material.
The information is presented largely in tables to provide maximum clarity.
The present NAcP has four main parts, per ENSREG-guidance.
The first two parts present the national (Dutch) positions on international post-Fukushima Dai
ichi observations collected by ENSREG and/or CNS. Utmost care has been taken to ensure the
correctness of the texts provided by the Dutch RB. However, the texts of these first two parts,
being reflections of the Dutch RB on ENSREG and/or CNS-collected observations, may not
exactly match the wordings of official RB positions regarding the single NPP in the
Netherlands.
The third part presents actions that are specific for the Netherlands and that have not been
inventoried by ENSREG and/or CNS. The fourth part presents details about all post-Fukushima
actions and their planning in the Netherlands. Below, the four parts are described in more detail.
PART I
Chapter 0 ‘General’ addresses general conclusions as described in the ENSREG document
‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions’ and the way these apply to the situation in
the Netherlands.
Chapter 1 on ‘External Events’ addresses conclusions and activities related to External Events,
as described in the ENSREG document ‘Compilation of recommendations and suggestions’.
Actions proposed are described to limited detail.
Chapter 2 on ‘Design Issues’ focuses on actions to prevent severe damage to the reactor and the
spent fuel pool, including any last resort means, as well as an evaluation of the time available to
prevent severe damage. The focus is on LOOP-SBO events and LUHS events.
Chapter 3 addresses the ‘Severe Accident Management’ (SAM) and Recovery on site. It focuses
on actionss to improve the capability in terms of mitigating actions taken if severe reactor or
spent fuel pool damage occurs, in order to prevent large radioactive releases.
PART II
Chapter 4 ‘National Organisations’ reviews actions taken by the organisations involved in
maintaining and enhancing nuclear safety, and on the strength of these organisations. This
review extends past governmental organisations, incorporating vendors and Technical Support
Organisations cooperating with the governmental organisations in maintaining a high level of
safety.
Chapter 5 is about ‘Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident Management off
site’. These are essential to prevent or reduce the potential health effects of a release of
radioactive materials.
Chapter 6 ‘International Cooperation’ considers just that. The present report considers the
actions taken to strengthen the global nuclear safety regime and reports on actions that have
been taken or are being planned to enhance international cooperation.
PART III
Chapter 7 ‘Additional Topics’ addresses generic activities and conclusions from the National
Review and related discussions that have not been addressed in Parts I and II.
PART IV
Chapter 8 ‘Implementation of Activities’ identifies timelines and key milestones of each
improvement activity in the Netherlands.

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

PART I

Topics 0, 1, 2 and 3

Part I of this National Action Plan (NAcP) consists of the Chapters 0, 1, 2 and 3. Activities in
the domain of Part I mostly are the responsibility of the licensee. However governmental bodies
have many associated tasks like assessing actions proposed by the licensee, reviewing the
progress of actions agreed, imposing actions and overseeing their correct implementation.

0.

General

0.0

Introduction

This chapter of the present NAcP addresses issues of a general nature that do not fit in one of
the categories ‘natural hazards’, ‘design issues’ and ‘severe accident management’ or apply to
more than one category.
The items reported have been listed in a table, refer to section 0.1.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

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Tabled summary of items reported

a. The peer review Board recommends that WENRA, involving
the best available expertise from Europe, develop guidance on
natural hazards assessments, including earthquake, flooding and
extreme weather conditions, as well as corresponding guidance
on the assessment of margins beyond the design basis and cliffedge effects.

b. Thereby the harmonization of licensing basis methods, the
use of deterministic and probabilistic methods, the definition of
probabilistic thresholds and clarification of the BDBA/DEC
scenarios considered in the safety assessment should be
integrated. Further studies should use state-of-the-art data and
methods and address trends in hazard data.

0.1 (1)

0.1 (1)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

16

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

general

general

Source

Theme

b. The RB notes the use of deterministic &
probabilistic methods is an established
practice in the Netherlands. BDBAs are
part of the safety assessments, but the
stress test may have an influence on the
future scope of these studies. The use of
state-of-the-art data is compulsory. The
NL expertise on magnitudes and frequency
of earthquake and flooding hazards rests
with several governmental bodies. The
Dutch RB has required the NPP to specify
a list of SSCs that are necessary for

a. Several studies contracted by the
Regulatory Body (RB) have been
performed to develop guidance on external
hazards. A final guidance document has
not been established yet. The RB
participates in the WENRA T1 task force.

NL Implementation

Table 0-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 0 ‘General’.
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘0.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, in which these national Actions can be found with their planning.

0.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

c. It should be stated, that safety assessments should benefit
from timely operational experience feedback and include
organizational and human aspects, and that regulations and
regulatory guidance should be regularly updated. In order to
avoid blind spots, a peer review of assessments should be
considered.

a. The peer review Board recommends that ENSREG underline
the importance of periodic safety review. In particular,
ENSREG should highlight the necessity to reevaluate natural

0.1 (1)

0.2 (2)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

general

general

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

17

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,

Source

a. The NL has a practice of PSRs for
NPPs. There are 10-yearly PSRs and 2yearly smaller exercises. Natural hazards

c. The current practice is that operational
experience and maintenance status is fed
into the PSA model. HF aspects are
mandatory aspects to be considered by the
licensee.
The Dutch regulations and guides for
existing reactors have been updated
recently, taking into account the WENRA
RLs. A project is underway to define
regulations for new (research)reactors,
considering its application for the existing
ones as well. Major safety assessments
generally are reviewed and assessed by or
together with the TSO.

(severe) accident management and assign
to these SSCs the required qualifications
and availability under accident conditions.
This is related to Action 27 (refer to Part
IV of this NAcP): "Assessment of the need
to upgrade equipment and/or
instrumentation dedicated to SAM
purposes".

NL Implementation

Necessary implementation of measures allowing prevention of
accidents and limitation of their consequences in case of
extreme natural hazards is a finding of the peer review that
national regulators should consider.

0.4 (4)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Urgent implementation of the recognised measures to protect
containment integrity is a finding of the peer review that
national regulators should consider.

hazards and relevant plant provisions as often as appropriate but
at least every 10 years.
b. External hazards and their influence on the licensing basis
should be reassessed periodically using state-of-the-art data and
methods. PSR was identified as one good tool.

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

0.3 (3)

ENSREG
No.

general

general

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

18

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Various measures have been proposed by
licensee and endorsed by the RB. In
addition the RB has demanded compliance
with some extra post-stress test

In the NL there is one water cooled reactor
(PWR) type. The necessary facilities are in
place like autocatalytic recombiners,
means to depressurize and to lower H2
concentrations, associated procedures,
(filtered) containment venting facilities
and associated procedures, etc.
In addition, the RB has demanded the
licensee to perform additional studies to
establish the reliability of the facilities
present.
Depressurisation of primary system and
procedures (EOPs and SAMGs) are
implemented fully with special SA-proof
valves. One of the identified measures
from the stresstest is ensuring the
availability of the filtered containment
venting system under seismic conditions
(Action 14 / M10).

are part of the 10-yearly PSRs. At this
moment the 4th PSR is ongoing at Borssele
NPP.
b. PSRs are mandatory in the NL.

xCNS

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

NL Implementation

Source

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

ENSREG
No.

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

19

Source

requirements. E.g. ensure availability of
venting systems and others after seismic
events etc.

NL Implementation

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

20

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

1.

External Events (Natural Hazards)

1.0

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the natural external hazards earthquakes, flooding and extreme weather
conditions. The items reported have been listed in a table, refer to section 0.
The phenomena loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate heat sink may be caused by natural
or man-made extreme events. In the present NAcP, these topics are addressed in chapter 2
‘Design Issues’.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

21

Tabled summary of items reported

Deterministic methods should form the basis for hazard
assessment. Probabilistic methods, including probabilistic safety
assessment (PSA), are useful to supplement the deterministic
methods.

Hazard Frequency
The use a return frequency of 1E-4 per annum (0.1g minimum
peak ground acceleration for earthquakes) for plant reviews/backfitting with respect to external hazards safety cases.

1.1 (5)

1.2 (6)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

natural
hazards

22

xCNS

Source

natural
hazards

Theme

Earthquake: A new seismic safety
assessment is being conducted
(SMA). The DBE has a PGA 0.06 g at
ground level and 0.075 at pile
foundation level corresponding with a
return period > 1 E4. However
according to the stress test analysis it
is judged that there is a safety margin
up to at least 0.15 g. Post-stresstest,
the PSR will consider a DBE 0.1 g at
free field, as per IAEA guidance.
Flood: KCB has the wet side concept
which can withstand high tides with a

This is the long standing practice in
the NL. The licensee has a full scope
PSA (PSA 1, 2 and 3) for all
operational states, which is
continuously updated with operating
and maintenance data.

NL Implementation

Table 1-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 1 – External Events / Natural Hazards.
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘1.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning.

1.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Secondary Effects of Earthquakes
The possible secondary effects of seismic events, such as flood or
fire arising as a result of the event, in future assessments.

Protected Volume Approach
The use of a protected volume approach to demonstrate flood
protection for identified rooms or spaces.

1.3 (7)

1.4 (8)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

natural
hazards

natural
hazards

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

23

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Source

The Protected Volume Approach has
been implemented since 1984 and
modified in the PSRs of 1993 and

Flood as a result of a local earthquake
is not a likely scenario for the
Netherlands. Floods from other
origins are more likely.
Fire from earthquakes is a possible
scenario. Fire fighting systems (and
some other not seismically qualified
systems) and their resistance against
seismic impact are subject of a study
that is being conducted;
Action 12 (M8): Ensuring the ability
of fire annunciation and suppression
systems after seismic events.
Action 33 (S3): Study Seismic Margin
Assessment (SMA)

return period of longer than 1M years
(DBF). There is also protection by
dykes which is not part of the NPP
design, but protects the plant against
waves with a return frequency of 10-4
per annum. The seadyke was
improved in 2012. The NPP KCB has
to analyze if the multiple layer
concept of IAEA-regulation is
fulfilled.

NL Implementation

Early Warning Notifications
The implementation of advanced warning systems for
deteriorating wheather, as well as the provision of appropriate
procedures to be followed by operators when warnings are made.

Seismic Monitoring
The installation of seismic monitoring systems with related

1.5 (9)

1.6 (10)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

natural
hazards

natural
hazards

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

24

ENSREG
Compilation of

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Source

Seismic monitoring systems will be
operational from June 2013. This

Early warning and appropriate
procedures for high tide exist and are
in preparation for extreme weather.
Action 23 (P3) ' Develop check-lists
for plant walk-downs and the
necessary actions after various levels
of the foreseeable hazards', will assure
adequate preparation in case of
extreme weather.

2006. It is known at EPZ as
"beveiligde zone". Measures are being
implemented to increase the margin
within which certain volumes will
remain 'dry', e.g.:
Action 18 (M11): Wave protection
beneath entrances;
Action 2 (M2): Storage facilities for
portable equipment - enhancing
robustness warehouse for SAM
equipment;
Action 1 (M1): Emergency Response
Centre (ERC) - study and consider
options to better protect ERC like
alternative location ERC, new
building, strengthening current
building etcetera.

NL Implementation

Flooding Margin Assessments
The analysis of incrementally increased flood levels beyond the
design basis and identification of potential improvements, as
required by the initial ENSREG specification for the stress tests.

1.8 (12)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Qualified Walkdowns
The development of standards to address qualified plant
walkdowns with regard to earthquake, flooding and extreme
weather – to provide a more systematic search for nonconformities and correct them (e.g. appropriate storage of
equipment, particularly for temporary and mobile plant and tools
used to mitigate beyond design basis (BDB) external events).

procedures and training.

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

1.7 (11)

ENSREG
No.

natural
hazards

natural
hazards

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

25

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Recommendations

Source

This is the current practice. The
flooding margin assessment was
performed by incrementally
increasing the flood levels beyond the
DBF levels in the flooding studies
performed in the frame work of the
past stress test.

The Dutch RB has the opinion
standards for such checklists should
be developed by international expert
groups which will also contribute to
harmonisation of such standards.

Periodic walkdowns to check
availability and correct storage of
ERO equipment exist. Walkdowns as
reaction to early warnings (severe
weather approaching) are under
development.
Action 23 (P3) ' Develop check-lists
for plant walk-downs and the
necessary actions after various levels
of the foreseeable hazards'.

measure was planned before the
Fukushima Dai ichi accident.

NL Implementation

External Hazard Margins
In conjunction with recommendation 1 and 17, the formal
assessment of margins for all external hazards, including seismic,
flooding and severe weather, and identification of potential
improvements.
Licensing basis protection against external hazards (e.g. flood
seals and seismic supports) should be verified to be effective.
Margin assessments should be based on periodic re-evaluation of
licensing basis for external events considering possible cliff-edge
effects and grace periods.

1.9 (13)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.
ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

natural
hazards

26

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Margin assessments were part of the
stress test performed in 2011.
Licensee has to perform additional
studies on seismic (SMA, e.g. Action
33 S3), flooding and extreme weather
hazards. E.g.:
Action 33 (S3): Study Seismic
Margin Assessment (SMA);
Action 30 (S2): Investigate measures
to further increase safety margin in
case of flooding - this includes study
of flooding (Action 31) and
superstorms (Action 32).

NL Implementation

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

2.

Design Issues

2.0

Introduction

This chapter ‘Design Issues’ focuses on the hazards loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate
heat sink. These may be caused by natural or man-made extreme events. In general these topics
are referred to in terms of Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP), Station Blackout (SBO) and Loss of
Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS). These are all considered to be within the design basis of the NPP.
In addition loss of all AC power is considered.
The items reported have been listed in a table, refer to section 2.1.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

27

Tabled summary of items reported

Alternate Cooling and Heat Sink
The provision of alternative means of cooling including alternate
heat sinks.

AC Power Supplies
The enhancement of the on-site and off-site power supplies.

2.1 (14)

2.2 (15)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

design
issues

design
issues

Theme

28

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

Source

Examples are:
Action 9 (M5): Reduction of time to
connect mobile diesel generator to 2
hrs,
Action 10 (M6): Establishing ability
to transfer diesel from any of the
storage tanks to active diesels;
Action 36 (S4): Study regarding
strenghtening off-site power supply;
Action 37 (S5): Study for more
extensive use of steam for powering
emergency feed water pump;

Ample means of alternate cooling and
heat sink are available. Borssele has
ground water pumps, fire water pool
and can apply feed and bleed. Refer to
National Report on the stress test of
the Netherlands (2011) for details.

NL Implementation

Table 2-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 2 – Design Issues.
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘2.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, in which these national Actions can be found with their planning.

2.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

DC Power Supplies
The enhancement of the DC power supply.

2.3 (16)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

design
issues

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

29

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

Source

Action 43: Reassessment of
alternative power sources (alternative
to emergency grids);
Action 44: Better arrangements for
mobile diesel generator and batteries;
This includes studies of small mobile
emergency power facilities for
recharging purposes or as backup
facility, as well as drafting of
instructions for using such facilities.
Action 16 (M9): Increasing autarky
time beyond 10h.

Action 43: Reassessment of
alternative power sources (alternative
to emergency grids) including
reassessment of the possibility of
having extra fixed external
connections for mobile diesel
generator.

NL Implementation

Operational and Preparatory Actions
Implementation of operational or preparatory actions with respect
to the availability of operational consumables.

Instrumentation and Monitoring
The enhancement of instrumentation and monitoring.

2.4 (17)

2.5 (18)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

design
issues

design
issues

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

30

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Source

Action 27: Assessment of the need to
upgrade equipment and/or
instrumentation dedicated to SAM
purposes (increasing robustness of
existing equipment/instrumentation,
protection of
equipment/instrumentation against
BDB hazards, periodic test/inspection
program of those
equipment/instrumentation, well
defined and trained procedures to use
those equipment / instrumentation).

Examples are:
Action 10 (M6) - Establishing ability
to transfer diesel fuel from all storage
tanks to active diesels
Action 42 - Study amount of
lubrication oil in crisis situations
Action 19 (P1) Also the introduction
of EDMGs to restore equipment in
case of extreme external events
Action 27 Assessment of the need to
upgrade equipment dedicated to SAM
purposes.

NL Implementation

Shutdown Improvements
The enhancement of safety in shutdown states and mid-loop
operation.

Reactor Coolant Pump Seals
The use of temperature-resistant (leak-proof) primary pump seals.
Study of RCP pump seal leakage following long term AC power
failure.

Ventilation
The enhancement of ventilation capacity during SBO to ensure
equipment operability.

2.6 (19)

2.7 (20)

2.8 (21)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

31

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

design
issues

design
issues

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Source

design
issues

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

The licensee states that: Equipment
required to be operational under SBO
conditions are supplied by the SBO
diesels. This includes the required
ventilation systems. In case of
complete loss of AC, no forced
ventilation is required for operable
equipment.

The licensee states that the Sulzer
MCPs have a sealing concept that is
not dependent on AC (once MCPs
stopped).

There are several measures being
implemented, related to this topic,
e.g.:
Action 21 (P2): Training of the
procedure to ensure water supply
during midloop operation and loss of
AC power
Action 22: Prepare and validate the
capabilities to cope with SBO during
midloop operation
Action 29 (S1): A reserve SFP
cooling system independent of power
supply

NL Implementation

Main and Emergency Control Rooms
The enhancement of the main control room (MCR), the emergency
control room (ECR) and emergency control centre (ECC) to
ensure continued operability and adequate habitability conditions
in the event of a station black-out (SBO) and in the event of the
loss of DC (this also applies to Topic 3 recommendations).
Habitability of control rooms/emergency centers under DEC
conditions.

2.9 (22)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.
ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

design
issues

32

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

There are several measures being
implemented that are related to this
topic, e.g.:
Action 1 (M1) and Action 4 :
Realization of a emergency response
centre facility that can give shelter to
the emergency response organization
after all foreseeable hazards,
including habitability (analysis of the
potential doses to workers during
severe accident management
activities, including habitability of
MCR and ECR).
Action 43: Reassessment of
alternative power sources (alternative
to external grid)
Action 44: Better arrangements for
mobile diesel generator and batteries
This includes studies of small mobile
emergency power facilities for
recharging purposes or as backup
facility, as well as drafting of
instructions for using such facilities.

NL Implementation

Spent Fuel Pool
The improvement of the robustness of the spent fuel pool (SFP).

Separation and Independence
The enhancement of the functional separation and independence of
safety systems.

Flow Path and Access Availability
The verification of assured flow paths and access under SBO
conditions. Ensure that the state in which isolation valves fail and
remain, when motive and control power is lost, is carefully
considered to maximise safety. Enhance and extend the
availability of DC power and instrument air (e. g. by installing
additional or larger accumulators on the valves). Ensure access to
critical equipment in all circumstances, specifically when

2.10 (23)

2.11 (24)

2.12 (25)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

design
issues

33

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

Source

design
issues

design
issues

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

The operability of the major safety
valves has been checked. The PORVs
need DC power.
Further analysis is ongoing.

Separation & independence are part of
the design basis. However several
measures will enhance these. Refer to
other topics in this table.

Action 6 (M3) Possibility for refilling
the SFP without entering containment,
design & implementation of coupling
to system that provides water for fire
fighting (UJ);
Action 7 (M4) Additional possibilities
for refilling the SFP (and sustaining
cooling), design & implementation;
Action 29( S1) Reserve SFP cooling
system independent of power supply;
Action 33 (S3) Study SMA will also
contribute to more certainty of the
robustness of the SFP.
Also refer to ENSREG point 2.17 (30)
of this table.

NL Implementation

Bunkered/Hardened Systems
The provision for a bunkered or “hardened” system to provide an
additional level of protection with trained staff and procedures
designed to cope with a wide variety of extreme events including
those beyond the design basis (this also applies to Topic 3
recommendations).

2.14 (27)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Mobile Devices
The provision of mobile pumps, power supplies and air
compressors with prepared quick connections, procedures, and
staff training with drills.

electrically operated turnstiles are interlocked.

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

2.13 (26)

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

design
issues

34

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

Source

design
issues

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

The NPP has bunkered systems,
however some measures will be
implemented that will further enhance
nuclear safety, e.g.:
Action 1 (M1), Emergency Response
Centre (ERC) - study and consider
options to better protect ERC like
alternative location ERC, new
building, strengthening current
building etc

Action 19: Further development of
EDMGs.

Several measures are implemented
that are related to this topic, e.g.:
Action 44 : Better arrangements for
mobile diesel generator and batteries
This includes studies of small mobile
emergency power facilities for
recharging purposes or as backup
facility, as well as drafting of
instructions for using such facilities.
Action 9 (M5), Reduction of the time
to connect mobile diesel generator to
2 hours

NL Implementation

Multiple Accidents
The enhancement of the capability for addressing accidents
occurring simultaneously on all plants of the site and consideration
of the site as a whole for a multi-units site in the safety
assessment.

Equipment Inspection and Training Programs
The establishment of regular programs for inspections to ensure
that a variety of additional equipment and mobile devices are
properly installed and maintained, particularly for temporary and
mobile equipment and tools used for mitigation of BDB external
events. Development of relevant staff training programmes for
deployment of such devices.

Further Studies to Address Uncertainties
The performance of further studies in areas were there are
uncertainties. Uncertainties may exist in the following areas:

2.15 (28)

2.16 (29)

2.17 (30)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

35

ENSREG
Compilation of

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

design
issues

design
issues

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

Source

design
issues

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

a. Integrity of the SFP is part of the
SMA. Impact on liner of boiling
effects is under consideration.

Equipment and training programs are
in place. However enhancement of
these is part of the focus of several
measures like:
Action 27B, Study regarding the need
to upgrade equipment dedicated to
SAM purposes,
Action 19 (P1) Further development
of EDMGs and associated training
programme.

The Borssele site features one NPP
and a coal fired plant. Effects of the
coal fired plant and other nearby
industry on NNP risk has been studied
during the CSA and in preparing the
Safety Analysis Report; no specific
issues have been identified.

Action 2 (M2), Storage facilities for
portable equipment - enhancing
robustness warehouse for SAM
equipment.
Action 19 (P1) addresses training;
'Develop set of EDMGs and
implement training program'.

NL Implementation

a. The integrity of the SFP and its liner in the event of boiling or
external impact.
b. The functionality of control equipment (feedwater control
valves and SG relief valves, main steam safety valves, isolation
condenser flow path, containment isolation valves as well as
depressurisation valves) during the SBO to ensure that cooling
using natural circulation would not be interrupted in a SBO.
c. The performance of additional studies to assess operation in the
event of widespread damage, for example, the need different
equipment (e.g. bulldozers) to clear the route to the most critical
locations or equipment. This includes the logistics of the external
support and related arrangements (storage of equipment, use of
national defence resources, etc.).

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

ENSREG
No.

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

b. Refer to ENSREG point 25.
c. Action 19(P1) Develop set of
EDMGs and implement training
programme, the licensee was in the
process of developing EDMGs before
the start of the ENSREG-led CSA.

Recommendations

36

NL Implementation

Source

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

3.

Severe Accident Management and Recovery (on site)

3.0

Introduction

This chapter focuses on SAM and Recovery on site.
The items reported have been listed in a table, refer to section 3.1.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

37

Tabled summary of items reported

WENRA Reference Levels
The incorporation of the WENRA reference levels
related to severe accident management (SAM) into
their national legal frameworks, and ensure their
implementation in the installations as soon as
possible.

3.1 (31)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management

38

Source

Theme

Action 39 (S7) In previous periodic safety
reviews an extensive set of formal analyses has
been performed to address the threats of hydrogen
to the containment. In 10EVA13 these studies
will be reviewed and where necessary renewed
and extended, e.g. the management of hydrogen
from the SFP, into the filtered containment
venting system and into the neighbouring
buildings.
Action 14 (M10) Ensuring the availability of the

WENRA RLs have been implemented fully into
the regulations. This has been verified in the
WENRA RH project dating from 2005-2008. The
implementation in NPP KCB was complete too.
The issue of molten corium stabilization /in
vessel retention has been analyzed in PSRs before
and will be analyzed again in the upcoming PSR
2013.

NL Implementation

Table 3-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 3 – Severe Accident Management (SAM).
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘3.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning.

3.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

SAM Hardware Provisions
Adequate hardware provisions that will survive
external hazards (e.g. by means of qualification
against extreme external hazards, storage in a safe
location) and the severe accident environment (e.g.
engineering substantiation and/or qualification
against high pressures, temperatures, radiation
levels, etc), in place, to perform the selected
strategies.

Review of SAM Provisions Following Severe
External Events
The systematic review of SAM provisions focusing
on the availability and appropriate operation of plant
equipment in the relevant circumstances, taking
account of accident initiating events, in particular
extreme external hazards and the potential harsh
working environment.

3.2 (32)

3.3 (33)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management

severe
accident
management

39

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Action 26: Improvements of SAMGs and EOPs
(e.g. focusing on longer term accidents and
including better training provisions)
Action 27: Assessment of the need to upgrade
equipment and/or instrumentation dedicated to
SAM purposes.

Action 1 (M1), Action 2 (M2), Action 3, Action
4, Action 12 (M8), Action 14 (M10), Action 19
(EDMGs) and Action 27.
Also refer to ENSREG No. 2.14 (27) in Table 2-1
of section 2.1 of this NAcP.

containment venting system TL003 after seismic
events would increase the margin in case of
seismic events.

NL Implementation

Enhancement of Severe Accident Management
Guidelines (SAMG)
In conjunction with the recommendation 4, the
enhancement of SAMGs taking into account
additional scenarios, including, a significantly
damaged infrastructure, including the disruption of
plant level, corporate-level and national-level
communication, long-duration accidents (several
days) and accidents affecting multiple units and
nearby industrial facilities at the same time.

Analysis of human resources, communication,
personnel training and guidance during severe long
term accidents (esp. multi-unit) and validation of
effectiveness through exercises.

SAMG Validation
The validation of the enhanced SAMGs.

3.4 (34)

3.5 (35)

3.6 (36)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

severe
accident
management

40

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

xCNS

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

severe
accident
management

severe
accident
management

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

This is part of the measures mentioned with
ENSREG No. 3.4 (34).

This is addressed in measures mentioned with
ENSREG topic 34. In addition there is:
Action 5 'Assessing ERO staffing regarding its
adequacy 24/7.'
Action 11 (M7) attention to communication
issues; 'Establishing independent voice and data
communication under adverse conditions'.

Several measures are being implemented to
further enhance the SAMGs, including training of
long term SAMG measures (Action 24),
developing specific SAMGs for the SFP (Action
25), assessment of the need to upgrade equipment
for SAM (Action 27).
In addition there are actions on EDMGs (like
Action 19).
For communication issues refer to ENSREG No.
3.5 (35) of this table.

NL Implementation

SAM Exercises
Exercises aimed at checking the adequacy of SAM
procedures and organisational measures, including
extended aspects such as the need for corporate and
nation level coordinated arrangements and longduration events.

SAM Training
Regular and realistic SAM training exercises aimed
at training staff. Training exercises should include
the use of equipment and the consideration of multiunit accidents and long-duration events. The use of
the existing NPP simulators is considered as being a
useful tool but needs to be enhanced to cover all
possible accident scenarios.

Extension of SAMGs to All Plant States
The extension of existing SAMGs to all plant states
(full and low-power, shutdown), including accidents

3.7 (37)

3.8 (38)

3.9 (39)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management

41

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management

severe
accident
management

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

The SAMGs cover all plant states. Dedicated
SAMGs are being developed for the SFP.

Refer to ENSREG No. 3.4 (34) for enhancing
training SAM. Also refer to ENSREG No. 3.7
(37) of this list. A full scope simulator (in Essen,
Germany) is used regularly, but its purpose does
not extend to SAM exercises. KCB uses a
desktop simulator for support of its
exercises/training of severe accidents and the
improvement of this facility is under
consideration.

SAM exercises are a frequent phenomenum at
Borssele NPP. Structures & procedures are in
place for interfacing with the national and local
authorities in crisis situations. Exercises often
involve more than 1,000 people. There are
additional exercises for specific scenarios (like
flooding) in cooperation with the armed forces.
Related Actions are: Action 24 (training of long
term-term SAM measures should improve the
reliability of existing procedures), Action 26
(improvements to SAMGs and EOPs, e.g.
focusing on longer term accidents and including
better training provisions, and Action 27 (well
defined and trained procedures to use those
equipment/instrumentation).

NL Implementation

Presence of Hydrogen in Unexpected Places
The preparation for the potential for migration of
hydrogen, with adequate countermeasures, into
spaces beyond where it is produced in the primary
containment, as well as hydrogen production in
SFPs.

3.11 (41)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Improved Communications
The improvement of communication systems, both
internal and external, including transfer of severe
accident related plant parameters and radiological
data to all emergency and technical support centre
and regulatory premises.

initiated in SFPs.

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

3.10 (40)

ENSREG
No.

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations,
xCNS

severe
accident
management

42

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

Source

severe
accident
management

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

The SFP is in the containment of Borssele NPP.
So the facilities to lower H2 concentration
(autocatalytic recombiners, ventilation, dispersion
over larger volumes etc) that are present in the
containment also apply to the SFP.
Action 39 (S7): In previous periodic safety
reviews an extensive set of formal analyses has
been performed to address the threats of hydrogen
to the containment. In 10EVA13 these studies
will be reviewed and where necessary renewed
and extended, e.g. the management of hydrogen
from the SFP, into the filtered containment
venting system and into the neighbouring
buildings.

Structures and procedures are in place to
communicate and cooperate with local and
national authorities in crisis situations. Plant data
can be shared with the authorities. All important
plant data and radiological data are available in
the ECC and the TSC. Some enhancement of
communication systems is being pursued (Action
11 / M7 Establishing independent voice and data
communication under adverse conditions)

NL Implementation

Large Volumes of Contaminated Water
The conceptual preparations of solutions for postaccident contamination and the treatment of
potentially large volumes of contaminated water.

Radiation Protection
The provision for radiation protection of operators
and all other staff involved in the SAM and
emergency arrangements.

On Site Emergency Centre
The provision of an on-site emergency centre
protected against severe natural hazards and
radioactive releases, allowing operators to stay
onsite to manage a severe accident.

Support to Local Operators
Rescue teams and adequate equipment to be quickly
brought on site in order to provide support to local
operators in case of a severe situation.

3.12 (42)

3.13 (43)

3.14 (44)

3.15 (45)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

43

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management

severe
accident
management

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management
severe
accident
management

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

At Borssele NPP, there are procedures for
bringing new or additional staff on site in case of
severe situations. A recent exercise (with the
armed forces) showed it is possible to bring staff
and equipment on site under flooding conditions.
It has been arranged to have these exercises with
the armed forces each year, the next exercise has
been scheduled for 30th January 2013.
Action 19 (development of EDMGs and training
program) will among others identify necessary
staff, equipment and procedures.

Borssele NPP has an on-site Emergency
Response Centre (ERC). The protection against
extreme severe natural hazards is being reevaluated (flooding, seismic events). This
includes the protection against radiation from
radioactive releases. (Actions 3 and 4).

In Dutch legislation there are dose limits for
several categories of staff involved in crisis
situations. An analysis is being conducted to
analyse the potential dose to workers (Action 4).

Enhancement of the means to handle
contaminated water is being pursued in Action 45
'procedures for handling of large amounts of
radioactively contaminated water'

NL Implementation

Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs)
A comprehensive Level 2 PSA as a tool for the
identification of plant vulnerabilities, quantification
of potential releases, determination of candidate
high-level actions and their effects and prioritizing
the order of proposed safety improvements.
Although PSA is an essential tool for screening and
prioritising improvements and for assessing the
completeness of SAM implementation, low
numerical risk estimates should not be used as the
basis for excluding scenarios from consideration of
SAM especially if the consequences are very high.

Severe Accident Studies
The performance of further studies to improve
SAMGs.

3.16 (46)

3.17 (47)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

44

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

ENSREG
Compilation of
Recommendations

severe
accident
management

severe
accident
management

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

This is covered by Actions 24, 25, 26 and 27 as
explained before and Action 3 and 4 (severe)
accident management under all extreme
circumstances).
Furthermore the areas of study related to this item
are important and will be covered in international
framework.

Borssele NPP features a full scope PSA,
including PSA-1, PSA-2 and PSA-3.
During the PSR, the PSA is used to identify
potential weaknesses. The development of the
PSA is driven by the instrument of PSR in
combination with the IAEA IPSART missions,
initiated by the RB. The upcoming IPSART
follow-up mission in April 2013 will address a
number of post-stress test (post-Fukushima Dai
ichi) aspects.

NL Implementation

Containment venting for new NPPs

3.18 (48)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG /
xCNS

ENSREG
No.

severe
accident
management

Theme

xCNS

Source

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

45

The NPP Borssele has facilities for filtered
containment venting, dating from long before
'Fukushima'.
For new NPPs in the Netherlands it is expected it
will be part of the requirements.
There is one action regarding this system:
Action 14 (M10) Ensuring the availability of the
containment venting system TL003 after seismic
events.

NL Implementation

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

46

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

PART II Topics 4, 5 and 6
Part II of this report consists of the Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Activities in the domain of Part II
mostly are the responsibility of governmental bodies.

4.

National Organisations

The licensee is primarily responsible for nuclear safety. However, the government, the
regulator, technical support organizations, vendors, service providers and other stakeholders are
also important to improve and to maintain a high standard of safety. Section 4.0 presents a
general introduction to the various National Organisations relevant for nuclear safety. The
developments and actions regarding National Organisations have been listed in a table, refer to
section 4.1.

4.0

Introduction to National Organisations

4.0.a Regulatory Body (RB)
All nuclear facilities in the Netherlands, including the NPP of Borssele, operate under licence,
awarded after a safety assessment has been carried out. The licence is granted by the regulatory
body under the Nuclear Energy Act.
The ‘Regulatory Body’ is the authority designated by the government as having legal authority
for conducting the regulatory process, including issuing licences, and thereby regulating
nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety, nuclear security and safeguards.
In the Netherlands the minister of Economic Affairs (EZ4) is the principal responsible authority
for conducting the regulatory process under the Nuclear Energy Act and for the main functions
of the Regulatory Body.
The structure of the current regulatory body is presented in the figure below.

4

Dutch: EZ, ‘Economische Zaken’ (i.e. Economic Affairs)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

47

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Figure 1

Regulatory structure in the Netherlands, with the ministry of EZ as the principal
responsible authority for conducting the regulatory process under the Nuclear
Energy Act.

Within the ministry of EZ, the ‘programmadirectie voor Nucleaire Installaties en Veiligheid’
(NIV), i.e. Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Safety Directorate, is involved in the preparation
of legislation, formulating policies (excluding energy policy) and licensing.
The nuclear inspectorate, the ‘Kernfysische dienst’ (KFD) is within the general responsibility of
the Minister of EZ the responsible organisation for the independent oversight (safety
assessment, inspection and enforcement) of the safety, security and non-proliferation of
activities and facilities (including nuclear facilities). The KFD is embedded in an organisational
division of the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT), which is the inspection
branch of the ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (IenM).
Activities of the RB on regulation

Not related to Fukushima Dai-ichi, an update and extension of Dutch Safety Rules (which are
based on IAEA-requirements and guides) has been introduced for the existing NPP. A new
regulation framework is developed based on IAEA requirements.
Implementation of COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 on nuclear
safety also has no direct relation with the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
The Netherlands has brought this directive into force on July 22, 2011: Regulation of the
Minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture (EL&I) and Innovation and the Minister of Social
Affairs and Labour of 18 July 2011, No WJZ/11014550, concerning the implementation of
Directive No 2009/71/Euratom of the Council of the European Union 25 June 2009 establishing
a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations ( PB EU L 172/18). The
Netherlands forth withed to inform the European Commission thereof. This regulation
prescribes the systematic evaluation and investigation of the nuclear safety of nuclear
installations during the lifetime of the nuclear installation. Also, the regulation prescribes inter
alia that:
•

Licensees should give sufficient priority to nuclear safety systems;

•

Licensees must provide adequate human and financial resources to meet the obligations on
the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation;

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

48

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
•

All parties, including the licensee, are required to provide a mechanism for educating and
training their staff responsible for the safety of nuclear plants to meet the expertise and
competence in the field of nuclear safety to be maintained and developed.

4.0.a.1 Emergency preparedness organizations
This issue is addressed in chapter 5.

4.0.b Governmental supporting organisations: RIVM
The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) is a specialised Dutch
government agency. Its remit is to modernise, gather, generate and integrate knowledge and
make it usable in the public domain. By performing these tasks RIVM contributes to promoting
the health of the population and the environment by providing protection against health risks
and environmental damage.
The RIVM among others coordinates the back-office of the National Nuclear Assessment Team
for radiological analyses and information (BORI).This issue is also addressed in chapter 5.
The RIVM supports the Ministries with scientific studies. RIVM works together with other
(governmental) expert organisations as the Royal National Meteorological Institute (KNMI)
with models for the prediction of the effects of discharges of radioactive material in the air.
RIVM also operates the national radiological monitoring network.

4.0.c Education and training organisations
The RID/R3 organisation at the Technical University in Delft and the Nuclear Research &
consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten and Arnhem provide education and training in nuclear
technology and radiation protection to clients from nuclear and non-nuclear businesses and
various governmental organisations. NRG also provides training for the NPP staff.
For the education and training in radiation protection a national system exists with four levels of
education. The government recognizes training institutes for a specific training of radiation
protection. For getting a degree in radiation protection, an exam has to be passed.
A change in the system of education for radiation protection is under construction. Registration
of radiation protection experts of the levels 2 and 3 is foreseen in 2013. There are formal
requirements to obtain registration certificates are laid down for the initial education, for
continuing education and for work experience.

4.0.d Technical (Support) Organisations
GRS, Germany

The Dutch Regulatory Body (RB) cooperates with the Technical Support Organization (TSO)
from Germany, GRS. This is TSO for the German national regulator and one of the large
German TSOs. Occasionally GRS provides education and training for governmental and
commercial organisations.
NRG, Netherlands

The Nuclear Research & consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten and Arnhem provides consultancy
services to government and industry and operational support to utilities.

4.0.e Utility N.V. EPZ
N.V. EPZ operates the only NPP in the Netherlands, in Borssele, the KCB. The KCB shares its
site with a conventional power plant which is mainly a coal fired plant and seven wind turbines.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

49

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

4.0.f

Vendor

The architect engineer and original vendor of the Borssele NPP is Siemens-KWU. The nuclear
part of Siemens-KWU is now named Areva NP GmbH. For the non-nuclear part of the plant,
the vendor is Siemens AG.
Both companies are contracted by EPZ for specialised services in their respective areas.
With respect to nuclear incidents, the Areva NP Emergency response support service is
particularly noteworthy. Areva NP maintains an emergency support organisation for its
customers. KCB is one of the customers that has a contract in place for support during and after
incidents, with the emphasis on beyond design-base incidents including core melt scenarios. In
both Areva NP crisis centres (Erlangen and Offenbach) real-time KCB process information can
be displayed and all necessary documentation is kept current and available on a dedicated
computer. Specialised equipment for (post-) accident support can be made available through
Areva. The Areva NP crisis centre participates yearly in three to four emergency exercises with
the ERO of EPZ. During these exercises the full scope simulator in Essen is used with
forwarding of the process data of the simulator to both Areva NP crisis centres.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

50

Tabled summary of items reported

a. Review and revision of nuclear Laws, Regulations and
Guides.
b. Where the RB is constituted of more than one entity, it is
important to ensure efficient coordination.
c. Emphasis on the need for comprehensive periodic reviews of
safety, using state-of-the-art techniques.
d. To remind CP that national safety frameworks include the
RB, TSO and Operating Organisations.
e. Wide participation in safety networks for operating
organizations, RB and TSOs will strengthen them.

4.1 (101)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.
xCNS

National
organisations

51

Source

Theme

a. The RB is revising and drafting nuclear
regulations and guides.
b. The RB is constituted of two entities (NIV and
KFD) residing in two ministries, NIV is
responsible for licensing and regulations, KFD is
responsible for supervision. Coordination is
provided and will be subject to review in the IRRS
self assessment. For details on current
organisation of the RB, refer to section 4.0.
c. The licensees of power and research reactors
are required by law and through the licence to
perform PSRs, every two years and 10 years.
d. The safety framework in the Netherlands
includes the RB and the Operating Organisations.
To date there is no national dedicated TSO.
Organisations are contracted to support the RB
with various tasks. Support is provided by foreign
TSOs and national and international consultancy
organisations.
e. The RB and the licensees are participating in

NL Implementation

Table 4-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 4 –National Organisations.
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘4.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, where these National Actions can be found with their planning.

4.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Changes to functions and responsibilities of the RB.
a. Effective independence of the RB is essential, including the
following aspects:
b. Transparency in communicating its regulatory decisions to
the public.
c. Competent and sufficient human resources.
d. Adequate legal powers (e.g. suspend operation).
e. Financial resources.

4.2 (102)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

xCNS

National
organisations

52

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Present situation:
a. The nuclear safety policy is independent from
energy policy.
b. It is transparent in its communication of
regulatory decisions to the public; such decisions
are published with supporting documentation on
governmental websites. Information about
supervision issues is also published on the website
of the KFD. A special act gives citizens the right
to request information related to an administrative
matter as contained in documents held by public
authorities or companies carrying out work for a
public authority.
c. Recently the RB staffing has been strengthened
and the staffs receive dedicated training.
d. The RB has adequate legal powers; if needed it
can suspend operation of a nuclear facility.
e. The financial resources seem adequate. The
situation is under evaluation.
Action: New financing mechanisms are being
studied for handling of license applications and
supervision.
Action: Evaluation in the framework of the IRRS
self assessment and coming mission.

international activities and working groups of
WANO, OECD/NEA, WENRA, EU (e.g.
ENSREG) and IAEA.

NL Implementation

Importance of inviting IRRS missions, and to:
• Effectively implement the findings.
• Make the findings and their means of resolution publicly
available.
• Invite follow -up missions.

Review and improvements to aspects of National EP&R
• How to routinely exercise:
- All involved organizations, up to ministerial level
- Scenarios based on events at multi-unit sites
• How to train intervention personal for potentially severe
Accident conditions
• Rapid intervention team to provide support to sites
• Determination of the size of the Emergency Planning Zone is
variable
• Trans- border arrangements need to be further considered and
exercised
• The use of regional centers to provide support to sites
• Education of the public and the media in aspects related to
emergencies (e.g. radiation does and their effects)

Openness, transparency and communication improvements:
a. Communication with stakeholders is a continuous activity
not just in an emergency
b. Active stakeholder engagement in the decisionmaking
process builds public confidence
c. International bilateral cooperation can be beneficial (eg joint
regulatory inspections)

4.3 (103)

4.4 (104)

4.5 (105)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

xCNS

xCNS

EP&R

National
organisations

53

xCNS

Source

National
organisations

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

a. RB and operator communicate with the public.
Meetings are organised at special occasions,
however these are frequent. Via websites
information is provided continuously. Parliament
is informed by the RB via the ministry of
Economic Affairs.
b. Stakeholder involvement is embedded in the

The Netherlands has a national EP&R plan, refer
to chapter 5 for a description. It includes the lines
of command, communication and informing the
public. The EP&R is regularly trained, often in
large scale exercises involving some 1,000 staff
and occurring once in every 4-5 years.
For Training and Exercises the NL has a long
range policy plan. Based on this plan and the
lessons learned from exercises, every year, a
yearly schedule for training and exercise is
developed.
There are arrangements with bordering countries
for crisis situations. There are MoUs with
Belgium and Germany. In addition there is a MoU
with Great Britain, supported by infrequent
meetings.

Action: The RB will be subjected to an IRRS
mission in 2014.
Action: In advance of the IRRS mission, the RB
will perform a self assessment.

NL Implementation

54

a. The Netherlands’ RB produced the present
NAcP and participates in all CNS and ENSREGled efforts to enhance nuclear safety. In the
Netherlands for all nuclear installations stress tests
have been performed: research reactors,
enrichment facilities and waste management
facilities. The NPP Dodewaard which is in safe
enclosure (fuel removed) was not considered
relevant.

xCNS

NL Implementation

National
Post- Fukushima safety reassessments and action plans.
organisations
a. All CP should perform a safety reassessment and the
resolution of their findings should be progressed through a
national action plan or other transparent means and should not
be limited to NPPs in operation.
b. Established safety networks should be efficiently used by CP
to disseminate and share relevant information.

Source

process of the EIA (under the Environmental
Protection Act) and licensing. The Licensee
makes considerable efforts to communicate with
stakeholders.
c. Based on bilateral agreements and MoUs,
cooperation with bordering countries (Belgium,
Germany) is operational. Arrangements for
bilateral information exchange (preparation and
response) are in place.
d. The RB is aware of the different backgrounds
of informed groups and the general public. The
ministries, of which the RB is part of, often
produce easy to understand press releases, as well
as detailed reports. Of some reports, there are
detailed and summary versions.
e. The operator presents its activities via
presentations, dedicated websites and publicly
available reports. The RB publishes its findings
related to the performance of the licensee on
governmental websites.

Theme

d. The proper balance of understandable information provided
to informed groups and the general public needs to be
addressed
e. The transparency of the operators activities needs to be
enhanced.

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

4.6 (106)

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Human and organizational factors (HOF)
a. There is a need to further develop human resource capacity
and competence across all organizations in the field of nuclear
safety.
b. Governmental level commitment is needed to ensure alongterm approach is developed for capacity building.
c. Collaborative work is needed in the area of improving and
assessing HOF, including safety culture.
d. The role of sub-contractors may be important; can they be
harnessed quickly?

4.7 (107)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

xCNS

National
organisations

55

Source

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

a. Recently the RB staffing (both NIV and KFD)
has been strengthened and the staff receives
dedicated training. The common project 'lessons
learned Fukushima' and the self-assessment for
the IRRS will promote the knowledge throughout
the whole organisation of the RB.
Licensee EPZ is in the process of further
enlarging HR capacity and competence since the
signing of the Covenant that allows Borssele to
operate till 2034. As of November 2012, the NPP
organisation has about 75 fte more than the
organizational chart lists. This surplus is in initial
training and/or in knowledge transfer phase.
b. The long-term approach (capacity plan) will be
evaluated in the IRRS self assessment and
mission.
c. The KFD is involved in OECD working group
'OECD/NEA WG HOF' .
Licensee EPZ: HOF has been a focus point at
Borssele NPP already for several years. INPO
guides and practices (e.g. AP928, AP913) are
introduced to improve on work management and

b. The RB participates in most relevant networks
to share information.

NL Implementation

Public discussion of safety issues should be encouraged
(Transparency)

An open and trustful relationship between regulators, operators
and the public with keeping in mind their respective roles and
functions are essential.

Recognizing differences in national cultures, each CPs should
define appropriate actions to ensure that the desired safety
culture characteristics are achieved in the regulatory and
operational organizations.

4.8 (133)

4.9 (134)

4.10 (135)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

National
Organisations

National
Organisations

National
Organisations

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

56

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

Source

In the light of the self-assessment within the
framework of the IRRS-mission special attention
will be paid to explain the management of Safety
Culture within the Regulatory Body.

The RB endorses this objective. The supervision
on safety culture at the operating organisation
already is an important part of the yearly
inspection programme.

The RB endorses and practices this objective.

The RB endorses and practices this objective.

preparation. Also a loop flow simulator is in
development to practice worker and supervisor
skills and behaviours. HOF are an explicit part of
WANO Peer Reviews. The Borssele NPP had a
WANO Peer Review last September-October
(2012).
d. The RB makes use of foreign TSOs. One of the
future actions of KFD is to have TSO-support
during the accident itself.
Licensee EPZ addresses the contractor
involvement in the HOF improvement program.

NL Implementation

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

5.

Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post
Accident Management (off site)

Off site emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) and post accident management (PAM)
mainly is a national responsibility. Nevertheless utility’s responsibility is also important
especially regarding technical information on plant conditions and the potential risk for
emissions.
Section 5.0 presents a general introduction to the EP&R and PAM in the Netherlands. The
developments and actions regarding EP&R and PAM have been listed in a table, refer to section
5.1.

5.0

Introduction to organisation of EPR and PAM in the
Netherlands

5.0.a Regulatory frame work - National Plan for Nuclear Emergency
Management and Response, NPK
Chapter VI of the Dutch Nuclear Energy Act describes the responsibilities and tasks of the
authorities that are responsible for nuclear emergency management (preparation and response)
Under Article 40 of the Act, the national government is responsible for the preparatory work
and for actually dealing with any emergency that may occur in case of nuclear accidents.
The operational structure of nuclear emergency preparation and response is described in the
National Plan for Nuclear Emergency Management and Response: NPK5 and the NPK
Response Plan.

5.0.b Organisation - National Nuclear Assessment Team, EPAn
The key organization in this structure is the National Nuclear Assessment Team, (‘EPAn’)6.
This team advises the policy teams on local and national level when there is a real threat of an
off-site emergency in a nuclear installation or a radioactive release (in the Netherlands or in a
neighbouring country). This team consists of a front-office, where the emergency situation is
analysed and advice on measures is drafted, and back-offices for radiological, and medical
information. The back-office for radiological information provides projected dose data on the
basis of dispersion calculations and monitoring data concerning the environment, drinking water
and foodstuff. It is located within the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment
(RIVM7). RIVM operates the national radiological monitoring network (NMR8) and in addition
monitoring vans. It also collects data from other institutes. Alongside the radiological experts,
the inspectorate of the nuclear regulatory body (KFD) has an important role in assessing the
status of the relevant nuclear installation, the accident prognoses and the potential source term.
In addition, KFD inspectors go to the nuclear installation to closely monitor the events and
support the oversight process.

5.0.c Training and exercises and their organisation
Based on the NPK, the Dutch training and exercise programme for nuclear emergency
management and response is based on a four-years training- and exercise-cycle that is
implemented in the annual programmes. Training is organized for different topics e.g. the use of
5

Dutch: ‘National Plan Kernongevallenbestrijding’, NPK
Dutch: ‘Eenheid Planning en Advies nucleair’, EPAn
7
Dutch: ‘Rijksinstituut voor volksgezondheid en milieu’, RIVM
8
Dutch: ‘Nationaal Meetnet Radioactiviteit’, NMR
6

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

57

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities
Emergency Information and Decision Support Systems, and some exercises. A full scale
exercise is planned approximately every five years. In these national exercises the interaction
between generic national emergency management structures and nuclear emergency
management and response are integrated.
Officials of different departments and organisations of the National Nuclear Assessment Team
(EPAn) participate in exercises and trainings. They all have their own expertises and roles
during such an exercise and during an actual accident-response. Examples of such roles are
performing radiological/technical analyses, advising on health aspect, etc.
Nuclear and radiological training and exercises are organised by the Ministry of Infrastructure
and the Environment (IenM/ILT), under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
(EZ). The Ministry of Safety and Justice is responsible for the generic national responseorganisation and for exercises to train this organisation. Ministries work together in the
organisation of integrated large scale exercises.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

58

Tabled summary of items reported

Expansion of the set of scenarios on which the plan was based
– NPP PLUS Infrastructure / NPP PLUS chemical plant

Increasing the scope of off-site exercise programs to reflect
NPP plus external infrastructure simultaneous problems

Blending mobile resources into planning and drill programs

5.1 (108)

5.2 (109)

5.3 (110)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

Theme

59

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

Source

Mobile monitoring equipment is included in
exercising; other mobile equipment eg. diesel
engines or fuel tanks can be supported in the
framework of the national mechanism assistance
program from the ministry of Defence ("ICMS").
Licensee EPZ has annual exercises together with the
armed forces, simulating harsh conditions.

Under consideration.

External threats other than nuclear facilities (e.g.
transport, chemical plants) have been considered in
safety assessments, up to certain levels of severity in
the process of licensing the NPP. In the EP&R
multiple scenarios, multiple units (there is only one
NPP) and damage of infrastructure are not fully
taken into account yet.
Action: Damage to infrastructure (hampering EP&R
activities) is subject to renewed evaluation in the
light of post-Fukushima learning.

NL Implementation

Table 5-1 Tabled summary of items reported for ‘Emergency Preparedness and Response and Post Accident Management off-site’
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘5.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning.

5.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Performing of longer term exercises to reflect the challenges of EP&R
extreme events

Enhancing radiation monitoring and communication systems
by additional diversification / redundancy

Development of a common source term estimation approach

5.6 (113)

5.7 (114)

5.8 (115)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Exercising all interface points (national, regional,
municipal,…)

5.5 (112)

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

Increasing emphasis on drilling with neighbouring countries

5.4 (111)

Theme

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

60

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

Source

This is being developed by a Working Group with
participation by licensee EPZ, inspectorate KFD and
governmental institute RIVM (National Institute for

The Netherlands has an extensive radiation
monitoring network. There are several
communication systems available in crisis situations,
providing redundancy and diversity.
The communication via the National Radiation
Monitoring Network proved to be robust in the
assessment in 2009. Redundant power supply,
telephone lines, dedicated internet etc.
communication is available.
Expansion of mobile monitoring equipment is
ongoing.
Assessment for further improvement of monitoring
and communication systems is ongoing (postFukushima).

In NL every year a national exercise is preformed.
Extreme events like high tides/flooding, extreme
weather, forest fire, loss of electricity, cyber crime
etc. are part of the exercises.

During exercise and training all interface points are
involved.

On a regular base, several national exercises in NL
or the bordering countries are joint exercises.
Bilateral exercise planning and organization is
ongoing.

NL Implementation

Provide access to a “big picture” (international picture) of
radiological conditions

Development of reference level for trans-border processing of
goods and services such as container transport

Re-examination of approach and associated limits to govern
the “remediation” phase

Develop criteria for the return to evacuated area and criteria
for return to normal from emergency state

Improvement of the approach to establish contamination
monitoring protocols and locations during the recovery phase

Hardening of support infrastructure (Emergency Response
Centers, Sheltering facilities, essential support facilities (like
Corporate Offices) with back-up power, environmental
radiological filtering, etc.

Analyzing medical and human aspects of response to support
Emergency workers

5.9 (116)

5.10 (117)

5.11 (118)

5.12 (119)

5.13 (120)

5.14 (121)

5.15 (122)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

61

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

Source

Back-Office Health Information is involved.

The National Operational Coordination Centre
("LOCC") organises operational and logistic
assistance and facilities.

Refer to ENSREG No. 5.11 (118) of this table.

Refer to ENSREG No. 5.11 (118) of this table.

Framework and mechanism for remediation and
recovery is developed.
Further implementation and policy development is
ongoing.

Some international reference levels are available.
Further policy development is ongoing.

There are no dedicated arrangements; USIE (Unified
System for Information Exchange in Incidents and
Emergencies) and ECURIE (European Community
Urgent Radiological Information Exchange)
information exchange and sharing of information
with other RBs are the common sources of
information.

Public Health and the Environment).

NL Implementation

Implementation of processes to enable access to inter-country
support including customs processes for access for diplomats
and emergency response personal

Systematic assessment of all aspects of organizations that
contribute to emergency response using tools like job and task
analysis

Develop radiological reference levels for rescue and
emergency response personnel in extreme events

Develop reference levels for the application of immediate
countermeasures such as sheltering, iodine distribution and
evacuation

5.16 (123)

5.17 (124)

5.18 (125)

5.19 (126)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

EP&R

Theme

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

62

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

xCNS

Source

These have been documented in the official '
Responsplan NPK'.

Such reference levels are documented in Dutch
regulations, like 'Besluit Stralenbescherming' and
'Responsplan NPK'.

Improvement is under consideration.

Improvement is under consideration.

NL Implementation

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

6.

International Cooperation

Section 6.0 presents a general introduction to contributions of the Netherlands to international
cooperation. The developments and actions regarding this topic have been listed in a table, refer
to section 6.1.

6.0

Introduction to contributions of the Netherlands to international
cooperation

The regulatory body in the Netherlands has always participated in the most important
international organisations like OECD/NEA, IAEA and Euratom. Also the Netherlands is a
‘Contracting Party’ to various (nuclear safety-related) conventions.
International cooperation

Regular exchange meetings are taking place with Germany and Belgium, also in relation with
post-Fukushima Dai-ichi lessons learned. Other ways of communications are established
through the incident reporting and communication channels that are well established (e.g.
IAEA/NEA IRS9, IRSRR10, INES, NEA/CNRA/WGPC11).
International organisations, apart from the above mentioned, with which there is cooperation are
for instance WENRA, ENSREG, EUROSAFE Forum, HERCA12 and NERIS13.
The regulatory body in the Netherlands participates in working groups of IAEA (Safety
Standard Committees), WENRA (reactor harmonisation working group), and ENSREG (nuclear
safety, decommissioning/waste). There is also cooperation in various OECD/NEA committees
like the NEA/CSNI14 and NEA/CNRA15 and their working groups. Examples of CNSI-groups
are WGFS, WGAMA, WGRISK, WGHOF, and WGIAGE. CNRA-groups are WGIP and
WGOE.
Peer reviews

International peer reviews have always been part of the strategy for improvement. Regularly
OSART (once in 10 years) and INSARR missions are invited. Also there is a lot of experience
with other missions like IPSART, AMAT/SALTO, IPPAS, and Waste Safety Appraisal. In
2014 there will be an IRRS mission. Members of the regulatory body have participated in
several IRRS missions to France, Germany and Sweden.

9

IRS: IAEA and OECD/NEA Incident Reporting System, using operational experience to improve safety
IRSRR: Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors at the IAEA
11
NEA/CNRA/WGPC: Working Group on Public Communication of Nuclear Regulatory Organisations
12
HERCA: Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities
13
NERIS: European platform on preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergency response and recovery
14
CSNI: Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations
15
CNRA: Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities
10

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

63

Tabled summary of items reported

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Several of the actions mentioned in this and other tables of the report are related to the IAEA action plan.

Strengthening the peer reviews process of CNS and of missions (IAEA,
WANO and Industry)
a Effectiveness of IAEA peer review processes should be reviewed in
response to concerns raised by the public and Non Governmental
Organizations.
b. The CNS national reports should include how peer review and mission
findings have been addressed.
c. Processes and initiatives should be strengthened to ensure
implementation of findings of the peer review and missions.
d. CNS review meetings should ensure robust peer reviews and reporting
of peer review results and findings.

6.1 (127)

16

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.
xCNS

International
cooperation

64

Source

Theme

The RB endorses this objective. RB
and licensee are in their respective
roles involved in the Peer Review
process of CNS, IAEA activities,
WANO evaluations and missions
etc.
a. The RB endorses efforts to
improve the process.
b. The Dutch CNS reports have
addressed the topic of Peer Review
in much detail to disseminate this
concept and its benefits. In future
CNS reports the findings and their
resolution will be presented.
c. The RB already incorporates the
findings of international peer
review efforts in its own national
evaluations and actions. Almost all

NL Implementation

Table 6-1 Tabled summary of items reported for Topic 6 – International Cooperation16.
In the first column, the original numbering of ENSREG observations (items) is found between parentheses, combined with a code with the format
‘6.x’ which results from a renumbering per theme by the Dutch RB.
The second column presents the ENSREG observations, the third column gives the associated Theme, and the fourth the source of the observation.
The fifth column presents the reflections of the Dutch RB on the ENSREG observations, the Action numbers mentioned in the reflections refer to
Part IV of this NAcP, where these national Actions can be found with their planning

6.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

65

International
Strengthening the peer reviews process of CNS and of missions (IAEA,
cooperation
WANO and Industry) - continue
e. Plant design safety features and related modifications should be
considered in WANO and OSART missions.
f. Better coordination of WANO and IAEA peer review activities should
be established.
g. International experience gained from the review of Russian designs after
Chernobyl could be considered as an example of good international
practice.

6.2 (128)

Theme

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

xCNS

Source

e. The Dutch RB and NPP-licensee
endorse this intention.
f. Coordination of missions is
essential for keeping them effective
& efficient and prevent
unnecessary burden on human
resources of licensees and RB.
WANO and IAEA have concluded
an agreement.
The Dutch RB will take into
account coordination in the
planning of future missions.
g. The Dutch RB agrees with this
statement.

IAEA missions are organised by
the RB as part the supervision
strategy.
The RB will study possibilities to
strengthen further the
implementation of measures.
d. The Dutch RB endorses this
intention.

NL Implementation

Optimisation of the Global Safety Regime
a. Primary responsibility for safety remains with operators.
b. The collective responsibility of the various institutions and
organizations should be optimized.
c. The growing number of international meetings, assessments, peer
reviews and expanding mandates is placing high demands on existing
human resources, which may become counter productive.
d. Efforts should be continued to reduce duplication of initiatives and
actions by various organizations such as IAEA, NEA, EU, WANO, etc.
e. The respective roles and objectives of the various organizations,
institutions and missions should be recognized in the optimization process.

Strengthening communication mechanisms through regional and bilateral
cooperation
a. Initiatives relating to the Regional Crisis center for operators of NPPs
with VVER type reactors as being implemented by Moscow WANO
Center and also considered by some other vendor countries.
b. Bilateral agreements between vendor countries and new embarking
countries, complemented by IAEA Standards and review processes, have
been reported to be effective and should be encouraged.
c. Strong support of political leaders is important to establish the necessary
nuclear safety infrastructure.
d. Countries with established nuclear programmes should assist with the
establishment of nuclear and regulatory infrastructure.
e. Countries should cooperate with neighbouring and regional countries
and exchange information on their civil nuclear power programmes.

6.3 (129)

6.4 (130)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

xCNS

xCNS

International
cooperation

International
cooperation

66

Source

Theme

The Dutch RB endorses this
objective.
a. The Dutch RB agrees with
statement
b. The Dutch RB agrees with
statement
c. The Dutch RB agrees with
statement
d. The Dutch RB agrees with this
statement. Countries with
established nuclear programmes
already contribute to the
establishment of infrastructure
elsewhere by disseminating their
experience, publishing their
regulation and actions on the

a. This is the basis of most
regulatory frameworks and thus
also applies to the Dutch situation.
It should be ensured this principle
applies globally.
b. The Dutch RB endorses this
statement.
c. The Dutch RB agrees with this
statement.
d. The Dutch RB endorses this
statement.
e. The Dutch RB endorses this
statement.

NL Implementation

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

67

Theme

Source

Action: The RB in the Netherlands
will undergo an IRRS mission for
the first time in 2014 (follow-up in
2017). This will claim a
considerable part of available
resources at the RB.
e. The RB agrees with this
statement. Examples of the Dutch
activities are participation in
activities in WENRA, ENSREG
and other EU activities like the EU
HERCA WG Emergencies.
Also bilateral contacts with
neighbouring countries Belgium
and Germany on EP&R are
frequent.

internet and participating in various
international processes.
The Netherlands has a small
nuclear programme and a dedicated
but lean RB. Its contribution to
international assistance programs is
expected to be constrained by the
allocation of resources to national
day-to-day duties and international
processes under the CNS,
ENSREG activities, IRRS and the
like.

NL Implementation

Effectiveness of experience feedback mechanisms
a. Information exchange and feedback should be enhanced by using the
established mechanisms (eg. IRS, INES) and organisations (eg. WANO).
b. The sharing and utilisation of information is limited and not always
necessarily well coordinated or disseminated. This has been identified as
an area for improvement.
c. All nuclear power plants should share Operating Experience.
d. The current focus is on reporting events and not necessarily on learning
from the events. Effectiveness of Operating Experience Feedback should
be assessed and its implementation should be included in peer reviews.

6.5 (131)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

xCNS

International
cooperation

68

Source

Theme

a. The Dutch RB and licensees
already use these mechanisms.
b. The RB agrees that sharing and
utilization of information can be
improved.
The Dutch RB will seek gradual
increase dissemination of
information.
c. The single operating NPP in the
Netherlands is part of the WANO
and the German VGB network. The
operator actively collects relevant
information from workshops,
conferences and regular
participation in experience
feedback working groups like
WANO and VGB. German full
phase out by 2022 will hamper the
option VGB. Therefore the NPP is
considering becoming a member of
the WH-owners group.
The Dutch RB will evaluate the
possibility to increase exchange of
information with other regulators
of German design plants like Spain
and Switzerland.
d. In the Netherlands the focus is
on learning from events.
The RB will evaluate the

NL Implementation

Strengthening and expanded use of IAEA Safety Standards
a. The Safety Fundamentals remain appropriate as a sound basis for
nuclear safety when properly implemented.
b. Implementation should strike the right balance between prevention and
mitigation.
c. The IAEA Safety Standards should be taken into account in developing
national nuclear safety regulations.
d. These Safety Standards have a role to play in seeking continuous
improvements to safety at existing nuclear power plants.

6.6 (132)

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement identified by ENSREG / xCNS

ENSREG
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

xCNS

International
cooperation

69

Source

Theme

The RB endorses the statement.
a/b. The nuclear safety framework
in the Netherlands is under review.
The question to incorporate the
Safety Fundamentals is being
discussed.
c. IAEA Safety Standards, they are
the basis for parts of the
Netherlands' nuclear regulation.
d. Continuous improvement
already is incorporated in the
national framework through the
implementation of the EU-Nuclear
Safety Directive.

possibility to increase the feedback
on improvements in the
Netherlands.

NL Implementation

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

70

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

PART III Additional Topics

7.

Specification of Additional Topics

7.0

Introduction

This chapter addresses topics, not identified in the ENSREG-led Peer Review or the
Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS, but that have been identified in the national review.

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

71

Tabled summary of items reported on ‘Additional Topics’

72

All licensees with nuclear installations have undertaken a Complementary Safety Assessment (a.k.a. stresstest) to assess the robustness of their
facilities. This applies to waste management facilities, research reactors, nuclear research laboratories, and the enrichment plant

1

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Measure / Requirement

No.

Table 7-1 Additional Topics regarding licensees, specific for the Netherlands and not inventoried or listed by ENSREG and/or CNS

All Actions on the part of the Regulatory Body (RB) can be found in a table in Part IV of the present report. The next table presents Actions on the part of
licensees in the Netherlands. However, all Actions on the part of the licensee of the NPP already have been addressed in Part I and II, and their planning can
be found in Part IV of the present report. The Actions listed below extend to all licensees, so also to those not operating the NPP.

7.1

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

PART IV Implementation of Activities

8.

Specification of the Implementation of Activities

8.0

Introduction

This chapter presents the measures agreed with or imposed on the licensee (EPZ). It also details
their planning and status. In addition it presents a numbered list with Actions on the part of the
Regulatory Body (RB).

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

73

Tabled summary of national implementation of post-stress test actions

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

SAM

SAM

SAM

1 (M1)

2 (M2)

3 (NR
7.3.1)

4 (PR
4.2.4.2)

5 (NR
6.1.5)

6 (M3)

74

A possibility for refilling the spent fuel pool without entering the
containment - this will increase the margin to fuel damage in certain
adverse containment conditions.

Reassessment of ERO Staffing regarding its adequacy 24/7

Analysis of potential doses to workers

Improvement of accessibility under extreme conditions

Storage facilities for portable equipment (needed for accident
management), study and consideration of options to improve
resistance against external hazards

Emergency Response Centre (ERC) - study and consider options to
better protect ERC like alternative location ERC, new building,
strenghtening current building etc.

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

23

35

22, 32, 43, 44

32, 44

1, 8, 27, 32, 44

1, 8, 22, 27, 32, 44

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

implemented

in progress

in progress

in progress

in progress

in progress

Status

end-2012

eval March2013
impl end-2013

April 2013

end 2014

end 2014

end 2014

Finalization

Table 8-1 National post-stress test Actions – initiated by or imposed on Licensee EPZ (operator of one NPP unit).
This is the official national list of Actions. Mx-, Px- and Sx- numbers between parentheses refer to original list of proposed measures of licensee
EPZ. Other numbers in between parentheses: NR refers to section in National Report (2011), PR refers to section in Peer Review Report (2012).

This section features two tables, one table with the Actions initiated by or imposed on licensee EPZ, and another table with Actions mainly related to the
functioning of the Regulatory Body (RB).

8.1

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

design
issues

7 (M4)

8 (NR
7.3.1)

9 (M5)

10 (M6)

11 (M7)

12 (M8)

75

Ensuring the availability of fire annunciation and fixed fire
suppression systems in vital areas after seismic events - this will
improve fire fighting capabilities and accident management measures
that require transport of water for cooling/suppression.

Establishing independent voice and data communication under
adverse conditions, both on-site and off-site, would strengthen the
emergency response organisation. Includes evaluation current means,
procurement satellite communication apparatus, and arrangements
with Ministry of Defence.

Establishing ability to transfer diesel fuel from storage tanks of
inactive diesels to active diesel generators. Phase 1: emergency grid 1
EDGs, Phase 2: remaining diesels.

Reduction of the time necessary to connect the mobile diesel
generator to Emergency Grid 2 to 2 hours - this will increase the
margin in case of loss of all AC power supplies including the SBO
generators.

Improvement of possibilities to sustain cooling SFP
- this is covered under action 7 (M4).

Additional possibilities for refilling the spent fuel pool - this will
increase the number of success paths and therefore increase the
margin to fuel damage in case of prolonged loss of spent fuel pool
cooling.

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

in progress

in progress

35

7, 32

in progress

in progress

15, 17

15, 26

in progress

23

refer to 7

Status

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

studies mid2014
impl's end-2016

end-2013

mid-2014

apr-13

end-2013

Finalization

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

13 (NR
7.3.1)

14 (M10)

15 (NR
7.3.1)

16 (M9)

17 (NR
7.3.1)

76

Increasing the autarky time beyond 10 hours (M9). Further study to
define its proper implementation.
This is covered in action 16 (M9).

Increasing the autarky-time beyond 10 h - this will increase the
robustness of the plant in a general sense.

Technical and organisational improvement of availability under
earthquake conditions of systems for containment filtered venting and
fire fighting - should be based on results of advanced seismic
analysis.
This is covered in actions 12 (M8) and 14 (M10).

Ensuring the availability of the containment venting system TL003
after seismic events - this will increase the margin in case of seismic
events.

Quality fire fighting systems buildings 01/02 and 35 for a DBE.
This is covered under action 12 (M8).
[The fire fighting systems in buildings 01/02 (dome) and 35 (backup
control room) are not designed for operability after occurrence of the
design base earthquake (DBE). To enhance their reliability after a
DBE they should be qualified. However, any enhancement should be
based on the results of the proposed advanced seismic analysis. This
position is linked to licensee's proposal S3 (Action 33) but also (for
implementation) to its measure M8 (Action 12).]

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

16

3, 31, 32, 48

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

in progress

in progress

refer to 14 &
12

in progress

refer to 12

Status

Sep-13

studies end2012
impl's end-2016

studies end2013
impl's end-2016

Finalization

design
issues

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

18 (M11)

19A (P1)

19B (P1)

20 (NR
7.3.2)

21 (P2)

22 (PR 3.3)

23 (P3)

24 (NR
6.1.5)

25 (PR

Develop specific SAMG for SFP

Training of long term SAMG measures

77

Develop check-lists for plant walk-downs and the necessary actions
after various levels of the foreseeable hazards

Prepare and validate capabilities to cope with SBO during mid-loop
operation.

Training of the procedure to ensure water supply during mid-loop
operation and loss of AC power

Developing set of EDMGs - This is covered in action 19A and 19B

Develop set of EDMGs and implement training program (phase 2)

Develop set of EDMGs and implement training program (phase 1)

Wave protection beneath the entrances to the bunkered back-up
injection- and feedwater systems and to the bunkered emergency
control room - this will mitigate the sensitivity to large waves
combined with extreme high water and will make the plant fully
independent from the dike.

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

34, 47

34, 47

19

19

in progress

in progress

in progress

in progress

implemented

refer to 19

in progress

in progress

in progress

8

17, 27, 29, 30, 32,
45

Status

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

end-2013

study end-2013
training March2015

extr weather &
flooding: Jan
2013.
earthquakes:
May-2014

study end-2012
impl's end-2013

end-2012

end-2013

end-2013

mid-2013

Finalization

SAM

SAM

SAM

SAM

27A (NR
7.3.2)

27B (NR
7.3.2)

27C (NR
7.3.2)

28 (NR
7.3.2)

78

Develop set of clear criteria to provide a basis for deciding when to
switch the turbine oil pump off to increase the battery time. Disabling
this pump will damage the turbine

Assessment of the need to upgrade equipment and/or instrumentation
dedicated to SAM purposes. Part C includes study of periodic
test/inspection programs for equipment & of well defined and trained
procedures to use the equipment.

Assessment of the need to upgrade equipment and/or instrumentation
dedicated to SAM purposes . Part B includes study of accessibility of
locations for manual operation, including relocation options.

Assessment of the need to upgrade equipment and/or instrumentation
dedicated to SAM purposes (hardened core approach). Part A
includes: study increasing robustness existing equipment & study
protection of equipment against BDB extreme hazards

Improvement of SAMGs and EOPs focusing on long term accidents.
Operator EPZ will also become member of the Westinghouse Owner
Group

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

SAM

Topic

26 (PR
4.2.4.2)

4.2.2.2)

NL Action
No.

1, 17, 18, 29, 32,
33

1, 17, 18, 32, 33,
47

33, 34, 47

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

implemented

in progress

in progress

in progress

in progress

Status

end-2012

end-2013

end-2013

end-2013

end-2013

Finalization

SAM

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

29 (S1)

30 (S2)

31 (NR
7.3.3)

32 (PR
2.3.3)

33 (S3)

34 (NR
7.3.3)

35 (PR
2.1.3)

79

Consider update hazard assessment, including DBE and liquefaction.
This is covered by action 33 (S3)

Study SMA - this is covered by action 33 (S3)

Study Seismic Margin Assessment, this includes various studies:
Study SMA and SPSA methods
Evaluation KNMI: Recommendation study 'Seismic Hazard in
context IAEA'
Drafting of proposal SMA
Determining RLE
Undertake SMA

Study super storms - this is covered by action 30 (S2).

Study flooding - this is covered by action 30 (S2).

Investigate measures to further increase the safety margins in case of
flooding (survey & analysis).
When needed, proposal for modifications and implementation.

Study of a reserve SFP cooling system independent of power supply.
This is also addressed in action 7 (M4).

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

7, 13, 23

13

19, 23

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

refer to 33

refer to 33

in progress

refer to 30

refer to 30

in progress

in progress

Status

end-2013

study end-2012
impl's end-2016

study end-2013
impl's end-2016

Finalization

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

design
issues

SAM

design
issues

SAM

design
issues

36 (S4)

37 (S5)

38 (S6)

39 (S7)

40 (NR
7.3.3)

41 (PR
2.3.3)

42 (NR
5.1.5)

43 (NR
5.1.5)

80

Re-assessment of alternative power sources (alternative to emergency
grids). This includes planning and implementing extra external
connection points for mobile diesel generator and the fire fighting
system (water supply)

Study amount of lubrication oil (for diesels) in crisis situations

Study freezing of underground piping, operation of diesels in cold
conditions, effects of snow. This is covered in action 40.

Water accumulation if drain pipes are blocked during fire fighting;
studies and when needed implementation of measures. The studies
will also cover prevention of freezing of underground piping, other
weather related hazards.

Study hydrogen threat to containment. The NPP has ample provisions
to deal with this threat. Nevertheless additional studies will be
undertaken.

Study impact aircraft impact on safety functions

Study more extensive use of steam for powering an emergency feed
water pump; includes studies and when needed implementation.

Study on strengthening off-site power supply, includes studies and
when needed implementation.

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

15, 16, 22, 26

17

31

15

15

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

in progress

in progress

refer to 40

in progress

in progress

in progress

in progress

in progress

Status

Jan-14

mid-2014

mid-2014

March 2014

end 2013

studies end2013
impl's end-2016

end-2013

Finalization

SAM

SAM

SAM

44 (PR
4.2.4.2)

45 (NR
6.4.3)

46 (PR 4.3)

Unambiguous tagging of keys of rooms in bunkered building (ECR).
Keys will be numbered and the necessity of having SAMG
documentation in the ECR will be evaluated.

Study of procedures for handling of large amounts of radioactively
contaminated water. Includes study & when needed implementation.

Better arrangements for mobile diesel generators and batteries.
This includes study of small emergency power generators or fuel
cells as a means for recharging or backup power. Possibly also
instructions for recharging or switching to such power sources.

Action / Activity

national
organisation

national
organisation

RB-4.001

RB-4.002

81

The RB is in the process of drafting requirements related to internal
& external hazards - they will be implemented in the regulatory
framework.

The RB is drafting requirements for the design and construction of
new nuclear reactors - they will be implemented in the regulatory
framework.

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

Table 8-2 National post-stress test actions – acting on and initiated by the national RB

Topic

NL Action
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

101

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
level

in progress

16, 22, 26

in progress

in progress

Status

implemented

in progress

Status

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
Level

draft 2013
final 2014

draft 2013
final 2014

Finalization

2012

study mid-2013
impl end-2013

study mid-2013
impl end-2013

Finalization

national
organisation

national
organisation

national
organisation

national
organisation

national
organisation

RB-4.003

RB-4.004

RB-4.005

RB-4.006

RB-4.007

82

The Netherlands is implementing the IAEA action plan. A number of
actions are already practice, like the adoption of the IAEAregulations, the IAEA missions, and evaluation and strengthening of
EP&R.

In the light of the self-assessment within the framework of the IRRSmission special attention will be paid to explain the management of
Safety Culture within the Regulatory Body.

Consequences of German phase out.
The Dutch RB will study the possible long term impact of the
German phase out on the operation of the German-design Dutch
NPP.
The Dutch RB will evaluate the possibility to increase exchange
information with other regulators of German design plants like Spain
and Switzerland.

RB evaluation in the framework of the IRRS self assessment and
coming IRRS mission. In the self-assessment the RB will take notice
of the xCNS summary 'Action oriented objectives for strengthening
Nuclear Safety'.

The RB is studying new financing mechanisms for handling of
license applications and supervision.

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

no end date

in progress

2014

end 2013

in progress

131

2014

2014

Finalization

in progress

in progress

102

135

in progress

Status

102

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
level

national
organisation

EP&R

EP&R

international
cooperation

international
cooperation

international
cooperation

international
cooperation

international
cooperation

international
cooperation

RB-4.008

RB-5.001

RB-5.002

RB-6.001

RB-6.002

RB-6.003

RB-6.004

RB-6.005

RB-6.006

Collaboration in international forums is continued

Two workshops of Dutch RB with peers in Belgium (FANC)

Harmonisation effort with neighbouring countries regarding
emergency countermeasure zones (and associated intervention
levels) and responses

83

EU/ENSREG, participation in workshops 'Natural Hazards' and
'Emergency response', publication guidance documents planned for
review.

EU/ENSREG, participation in Peer Review Workshop regarding
National Action Plans (post Fukushima measures)

Drafting and publishing national report for CNS 2014

Damage to infrastructure (hampering EP&R activities) is subject to
renewed evaluation in the light of post-Fukushima learning

Planning and organisation of bilateral exercises with Belgium and
Germany is ongoing.

Taking into account the European developments on this matter,
research is in progress into clearance levels and protocols for
measurement, decontamination and clearance, applicable to
clearance of containers and other materials

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

101

108

111

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
level

in progress

planned

planned

planned

planned

planned

in progress

no end date

2013

2014

Nat Haz, June
2013
Em zones,
March 2013

April 2013

August 2013

no end date

no end date

end 2013

in progress

in progress

Finalization

Status

international
cooperation

RB-6.007

cooperation with foreign TSOs

Action / Activity

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

Topic

NL Action
No.

84

Related
Recommendation
No. on European
level
in progress

Status

no end date

Finalization

The Netherlands’ National Action Plan 2012 for post-Fukushima Dai ichi related activities

Ministry of EZ, December 2012

85

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