IAEA
Atom.s for Peace
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Agence Internationale de l'énergie atomique
MeiKAyHapoflHoe areHTCTSo no aroMHOM 3HeprviH
Organismo Internacional de Energla Atómlca

Mr M. E. P. Dierikx
Director-General of Energy,
Telecommunications and Competition
Nuclear Installations and Safety Department
Bezuidenhoutseweg 73
2500 EK
DEN HAAG
THE NETHERLANDS

Vienna Inteniarronal Centre, PO Box 100, 1400 Vienna, Austria
Phone: (+43 1) 2600 • Fa.x: (+43 1) 26007 •
Email; Official.Mail(^iaea.org • Internet: http://ww'w.iaea.org
In reply please refer to:
Dial directly to extension: (+43 1 ) 2600-22621

2013-11-21

Dear Mr Dierikx,
This letter is in response to your letters dated 17 September and 24 October 2013 in which you
requested the IAEA to assess the two variants in relation to the creation of an Authority for Nuclear
Safety and Radiation Protection in the Netherlands.
I have requested my staff to perform this assessment, based on IAEA Safety Standards and taking into
account the relevant results frorh the completed IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service)
Missions.
As part of this process, I was informed that IAEA staff and your staff had a very productive exchange
of information and they further clarified some elements needed for completing the assessment.
The results of this assessment are attached to this letter and consist of:

02

A document addressing various aspects of regulatory independence, based on the relevant
IAEA Safety Standards;
An analysis of the two variants based on the key points included in the table attached to your
letter dated 24 October, describing the legal framework applicable to agencies and
independent administrative authorities. This analysis contains the IAEA comments for each
item.
The document sent to you in response to your letter dated 17 September, consisting of a table
reviewing the two options against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards. This document reflects
the assessment of the proposed variants in a broader perspective and is not limited to the
independence aspects.
The assessment of the proposed variants is based on the general understanding of the information
provided. In order to fully assess compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards, the chosen variant
should be reviewed in detail through various mechanisms including self-assessment and a peer review,
such as an IRRS mission.
In response to your request to identify which variant provides "the best guarantee for independence",
the result of the assessmem indicates that for both variants, compliance with IAEA Safety Standards
does not appear to be fully achieved. The most significant concern is related to the position of the

Page 2

future regulatory body; the two options place the regulatory body under the Minister of Economic
Affairs, which is responsible for the national energy policy and this may result in potential conflicts
between energy supply issues and safety considerations.
From the assessment, the IAEA concluded that the variant where the ANVS will be established as an
"Independent Administrative Authority (lAA)", is preferable, given that the "deviations" from the
"Framework Act on lAA's" described in your table attached to your letter dated 24 October, are
implemented. Even if this option is chosen, the main concern regarding the position of the regulatory
under the Minister of Economic Affairs remains, if this Minister retains responsibilities for the
national energy policy. In addition, it would be necessary to conduct a comprehensive assessment of
the lAA option once finalized (including, a review of the implementing documents / legal provisions).
The conduct of an IRRS mission at the end of 2014 will constitute a good opportunity to further
analyse the compliance of the Netherlands' existing nuclear regulatory framework with the IAEA
Safety Standards.
We are looking forward to our future cooperation and providing support as necessary for the
establishment of an independent regulatory body in the Netherlands.
Yours sincerely

£n'\s Flory
Deputy Director General
Head of the Department of
Nuclear Safety and Security

cc: Permanent Mission of the Netherlands

Independence of Regulatory Bodies

SF-1 - Fundamental Safety
Principle 2: Role of government "An effective legal and governmental framework for safety,
including an independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained".
3.8. A properly established legal and governmental framework provides for the regulation of facilities
and activities that give rise to radiation risks and for the clear assignment of responsibilities. The
government is responsible for the adoption within its national legal system of such legislation,
regulations, and other standards and measures as may be necessary to fulfil all its national
responsibilities and international obligations effectively, and for the establishment of an independent
regulatory body.
3.10. The regulatory body must:
- Have adequate legal authority, technical and managerial competence, and human and financial
resources to fulfil its responsibilities;
- Be effectively independent of the licensee and of any other body, so that it is free from any undue
pressure from interested parties;
- Set up appropriate means of informing parties in the vicinity, the public and other interested parties,
and the information media about the safety aspects (including health and environmental aspects) of
facilities and activities and about regulatory processes;
- Consult parties in the vicinity, the public and other interested parties, as appropriate, in an open and
inclusive process.
GSR Part 1 - Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety
Requirement 3: Establishment of a regulatory body
The government, through the legal system, shall establish and maintain a regulatory body, and shall
confer on it the legal authority and provide it with the competence and the resources necessary to
fulfil its statutory obligation for the regulatory control of facilities and activities.
Requirement 4: Independence of the regulatory body
The government shall ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent in its safety related
decision making and that it has functional separation from entities having responsibilities or interests
that could unduly influence its decision making.
2.8. To be effectively independent, the regulatory body shall have sufficient authority and sufficient
staffing and shall have access to sufficient financial resources for the proper discharge of its assigned
responsibilities. The regulatory body shall be able to make independent regulatory judgements and
decisions, free from any undue influences that might compromise safety, such as pressures associated
with changing political circumstances or economic conditions, or pressures from government
departments or from other organizations.
Furthermore, the regulatory body shall be able to give independent advice to government departments
and governmental bodies on matters relating to the safety of facilities and activities.
Requirement 17: Effective independence in the performance of regulatory functions
The regulatory body shall perform its functions in a manner that does not compromise its effective
independence.

What is independence?
Principle 2 of Safety Fundamentals (SF) -1 "Role of government" provides that "An effective
legal and governmental framework for safety, including an independent regulatory body, must be
established and sustained".
It further describes that "the regulatory body must:
—Have adequate legal authority, technical and managerial competence, and human and financial
resources to fulfil its responsibilities;
—Be effectively independent of the licensee and of any other body, so that it is free from any undue
pressure from interested parties"; (Para. 3.10)
In addition. Requirement 3 of GSR Part 1 "Establishment of a regulatory body" provides that
"The government, through the legal system, shall establish and maintain a regulatory body, and shall
confer on it the legal authority and provide it with the competence and the resources necessary to
fulfil its statutory obligation for the regulatory control of facilities and activities".
Based on the IAEA Safety Standards, concrete criteria to establish the regulatory independence
include:
— Legal authority
— Competence - technical and managerial (the regulatory body should have the necessary level of
competence in order to be an "intelligent customer", e.g. to review and take informed technical
decisions as a result of review and assessment/ inspection conducted by external organizations
(e.g. technical support organizations, etc.)
— Resources - financial and human (to discharge its responsibilities - regulatory control of facilities
ad activities)
— Absence of undue pressure from interested parties
This will require a legislation covering both the powers and capabilities of the regulatory body (as
well as its relationships with other governmental bodies, the regulated industry and the public).
The "effective" independence
Requirement 4 of GSR Part 1, "Independence of the regulatory body", provides that "The
government shall ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent in its safety related
decision making and that it has functional separation from entities having responsibilities or interests
that could unduly influence its decision making". This requirement is the first step in establishing an
independent regulatory body and addresses mainly the legislative framework aspects for ensuring
independence.
Furthermore, INSAG-17 - "Independence in regulatory decision making" provides insights on how to
practically achieve independence in regulatory decision making as in line with the principles stated in
SF-l. Article 16 of the document makes the link between the legal framework and the need for safety
objectives that would prevent the undue influence on regulatory body in relation to regulatory
oversight.
In addition, Requirement 17 of GSR Part 1 "Effective independence in the performance of
regulatory functions" provides that "The regulatory body shall perform its functions in a manner that
does not compromise its effective independence".
Therefore, the effective independence of the regulatory body, which primarily relates to its freedom
from unwarranted interference in its regulatory functions, and it was formalised in the legislative
framework, is further reflected in the execution of the regulatory functions. This is the second step in
establishing an independent regulatory body and addresses mainly the aspects for ensuring

independence in performance of regulatory functions. Independence in the performance of the
regulatory functions is ensured through competence of staff, as well as by implementing the
regulatory body's values and ethical programmes, at all organizational levels.

The positioning of the regulatory body
An independent regulatory body will not be entirely separate from other governmental bodies.
However, the regulatory body shall be able to make independent regulatory judgements and decisions,
free from any undue influences that might compromise safety, such as pressures associated with
changing political circumstances or economic conditions, or pressures from government departments
or from other organizations.
In addition, in the event that the licensee is a branch of government, this branch must be clearly
identified as distinct from the branches of government with responsibilities for regulatory functions,
to ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent in its safety related decision making and
that it has functional separation from entities having responsibilities or interests that could unduly
influence its decision making.
How is the independence guaranteed?
It is through the legal system that the government shall establish and maintain the regulatory body,
confer it the legal authority and provide it with the competence and the resources necessary to fulfil its
statutory obligation for the regulatory control of facilities and activities.
It is important that the national legislation contains provisions that ensure that the regulatory body is
provided with adequate personnel,financing,office quarters, information technology, support services
and other resources.
Other aspects of independence include:
Political
The RB must not be subject to any political influence or pressure in taking specific safety decisions.
However, the RB remains accountable to government and parliament as well as to the general public
with regard to effectively and efficiently fulfilling its mission to protect workers, the public and the
environment from radiation hazards (e.g. through regular, public reporting to government and
parliament and through professionally recognized audit and peer review procedures).
Financial
Adequate and stable financing for all regulatory activities is fundamental to independence. The
financing mechanism should be clearly defined in the legal framework.
Within the limit on its total budget, the RB needs to have a high degree of independence in deciding
how the budget is to be distributed between its various regulatory activities for the greatest
effectiveness and efficiency.
The budget for the RB should NOT:
- depend on fines collected from licensees;
- be decided by or be subject to the approval of those parts of the government which are responsible
for exploiting or promoting nuclear technologies;
Competence
The independence in the RB's decision making depends heavily on the competence of its staff. 3
types of competence are needed:

- Competence in applying the regulatory processes with their underpinning legal framework, ethical
principles and codes of conduct.
- Competence with regard to the installations, organizations and activities of the licensees.
- Competence in the relevant scientific and technological areas.
Public Information
The regulatory body needs to have the authority and the obligation to communicate its regulatory
decisions and their documentation to the licensee(s) concerned, but also to make this information
available as far as possible to the public.
The regulatory body shall promote the establishment of appropriate means of informing and
consulting interested parties and the public about the possible radiation risks associated with facilities
and activities, and about the processes and decisions of the regulatory body.
The regulatory body shall establish, either directly or through authorized parties, provision for
effective mechanisms of communication, and it shall hold meetings to inform interested parties and
the public and for informing the decision making process. This communication shall include
constructive liaison such as:
- Communication with interested parties and the public on regulatory judgements and decisions;
- Making information on incidents in facilities and activities, including accidents and abnormal
occurrences, and other information, as appropriate, available to authorized parties, governmental
bodies, national and international organizations, and the public.
Transparency is a means to promote independence in regulatory decision making and to demonstrate
such independence to politicians, licensees and other stakeholders, as well as the general public.
International
A systematic programme for peer reviews of regulatory effectiveness is a useful tool to promote and
enhance independence in decision making by the RB.
This includes e.g.: participation in various types of international professional co-operation, external
peer reviews, either of a specific regulatory activity or of the RB as a whole.
The IAEA offers a range of such review services, performed at the request of the RB or the
government.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013..
Review of Options 1 and 2 - Preliminary comments
Options 1 and 2' tend to be very similar except when it comes to the Organizational aspects. To that extent. Option 2 is more favourable. However, having the Ministry of
Economic Affairs as "politically" responsible of that future RB raises some concerns addressed in the below tables and in document A.

1. General

SF-1/GSR Parti

Even though the Minister of Economic Affairs is
responsible for energy policy, he does not promote
nuclear power. The initiative for a new nuclear
(power) plant is in the Netherlands up to the market.
The Minister of Economic Affairs is not responsible
for any nuclear installation.

GSR Part 1
Requirement 4: Independence of the regulatory
body
The government shall ensure that the regulatory body
is effectively independent in its safety related decision
making and that it has functional separation from
entities having responsibilities or interests that
The Minister of Infrastructure and Environment is could unduly influence its decision making.
responsible for environment and external safety.
2.7. An independent regulatory body will not be
The description of the variants we have the political entirely separate from other governmental bodies. The
responsibility of the Minister of Economic Affairs government has the ultimate responsibility for
involving those with legitimate and recognized
(EZ) as starting point.
interests in its decision making. However, the
government shall ensure that the regulatory body is
able to make decisions under its statutory obligation
for the regulatory control of facilities and activities,
and that it is able to perform its functions without
undue pressure or constraint.

' Option 1 refers to ILT-variant and Option 2 refers to lAA-variant.

Comments
The delineation between policy and promotion should
be clarified.
The responsibility for energy policy might imply that
energy supply issues may prevail over safety
considerations.

2. Organisation ANVS

SF-1/GSR Part 1

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 20 )3,:.
Comments

This structure appears to be a complicated structure.
GSR Part 1
Requirement 3: Establishment of a regulatory
The fact that the minister is "politically responsible
body
The government, through the legal system, shall for the ANVS" and is "accountable to the Parliament"
establish and maintain a regulatory body, and shall should be clarified but as in the first reading, it does
confer on it the legal authority and provide it with the not seem to be granting a sufficient level of
competence and the resources necessary to fulfil its independence to the regulatory body.
statutory obligation for the regulatory control of
The Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate facilities and activities.
monitors and encourages compliance with both
national and European legislation and regulations in Requirement 16: Organizational structure of the
favour of a safe and sustainable human environment regulatory body and allocation of resources
and transport. The activities of the inspectorate focus The regulatory body shall structure its organization
on good provision of services, fair enforcement and and manage its resources so as to discharge its
appropriate detection. If appropriate this is executed responsibilities and perform its functions effectively;
in collaboration with other inspectorates, is risk- this shall be accomplished in a manner commensurate
driven, is based on mutual trust with the supervised with the radiation risks associated with facilities and
organisation and moreover is focused on reducing the activities.
burden of supervision. Policy-makers determine the
rules; people and businesses are responsible for
compliance and the inspectorate monitors and
enforces.

Option 1
The Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Protection (ANVS) is part of the Human Environment
and Transport Inspectorate (ILT). The ILT is an
agency headed by the Inspector General (IG).
Organizational the ILT is part of the Ministry of
Infrastructure and Environment.

The independence of the ANVS is regulated by law.
The ANVS comes to an independent opinion, no
intervention or hierarchical influences on decisions
are possible. The Minister is politically responsible
for the ANVS and: ensures that the functions and
powers of the ANVS are established by law and
which is secured to the ANVS can independently
judge and take decisions on the basis of specific
expertise, ensures the delivery and adoption of the
budget and the formation of the ANVS, is
accountable to Parliament on how the ANVS
performs its tasks. The ANVS in organizational sense
is part of the ILT, the director ANVS is in
organizational
sense and
managerial sense
accountable to the IG and uses the facilities of the
ILT. The director of the ANVS is operationally

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013

-

responsible for the functioning of the administration,
but doesn't need to explain to the Inspector General
the substantive judgments and decisions made.
Option 2
The AJVVS is an independent administrative
authority (lAA), established by law, with its own
management, budget, staff and legal powers. The
ANVS reports directly to the Minister of Economic
Affairs. The only responsibilities of the Minister of
Economic Affairs are: arranging that the tasks
and powers of the ANVS will be laid down in
legislation and that the law will guarantee that the
ANVS as an autonomous organisation and can
judge independently on the basis of speciflc
expertise, appointing (and dismissing) the
members of the board of the ANVS, supplying and
determining the budget (including the budget for
stafO of the ANVS, being accountable to the
Parliament of the general way ANVS performs its
tasks.

Considering the responsibilities of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, the following points might
represent a threat for the independence of ANVS:
- The fact that ANVS reports directly to the Minister
of Economic Affairs (which is accountable to the
Parliament of the general way ANVS performs its
tasks) - It would be better if ANVS would report
directly to the Parliament.
- The fact that the Minister of Economic Affairs is
appointing (and dismissing) the members of the board
of the ANVS. The appointment could be at higher
level, (e.g. Prime minister, the President or the
Congress, - which is the case in France or in the US).
And the dismissing shall be strictly regulated.
- The fact that the Minister of Economic Affairs is
determining the budget (including the budget for
staff) of the ANVS. The RB should be able to manage
its resources.

An element missing in the 2 options when it comes to the organizational aspects is the structure of ANVS: will there be commissioners? And if yes how many? How
will they be appointed?

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013.^

3. Components

SF-1 / GSR Part 1

Comments

Option 1
In the ANVS as part of the ILT the following
organisations will be merged:
the Nuclear Physics Service (at this time part of the
ILT), the Nuclear Installations and Safety Department
(at this time part of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs), the Nuclear Radiation Team of the NL
Agency. The laboratory for nuclear radiation of the
National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment will support the Nuclear Safety and
Radiation Protection Authority, but will be situated in
Bilthoven.

IAEA Safety Glossary: A regulatory body is an
authority or a system of authorities designated by the
government of a State as having legal authority for
conducting the regulatory process, including issuing
authorizations, and thereby regulating nuclear,
radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.

Even though the IAEA Safety Standards do not
recommend a particular model, having a single
organization in charge of radiation safety and nuclear
safety is seen as more practical. Based on IAEA
Member States example, the latest trend seems to be
the merger of several authorities into ones and thus
the gathering all regulatory functions under the
responsibility of one single regulatory body.

GSR Parti
Requirement 7: Coordination of different
authorities with responsibilities for safety within
the regulatory framework for safety
Where several authorities have responsibilities for
safety within the regulatory framework for safety, the
government shall make provision for the effective
In the Independent Regulatory Body the following coordination of their regulatory functions, to avoid
any omissions or undue duplication and to avoid
organisations will be merged:
the Nuclear Installations and Safety Department conflicting requirements being placed on authorized
that will be detached from the Ministry of parties.
Economic Affairs, the Nuclear Physics Service that
will be detached from the ELT, the Nuclear
Radiation Team of the NL Agency that will be
detached from the NL Agency. The laboratory for
nuclear radiation of the National Institute for
Public Health and the Environment in Bilthoven
will support the ANVS, but will be situated in
Bilthoven.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013
4. Facilities and Support

SF-1 / GSR Part 1

Requirement 20: Liaison with advisory bodies and
Option 1
The ANVS will be housed at the ILT and will make support organizations
use of the facilities and support provided by the ILT. The regulatory body shall obtain technical or other
For the tasks and responsibilities in other areas, the expert professional advice or services as necessary in
ILT is provided with management systems, processes, support of its regulatory functions, but this shall not
ICT resources and facility provisions, etc.
relieve the regulatory body of its assigned
For the development of policies and regulations in the responsibilities.
field of nuclear safety and radiation the ANVS may
make use of support systems provided by Ministries 4.18. The regulatory body may decide to give formal
to be supported (mainly Economical Affairs, Health status to the processes by which it is provided with
and Social Affairs). If necessary and possible, the expert opinion and advice. If the establishment of
Director of the ANVS isfreeto organize support form advisory bodies, whether on a temporary or a
permanent basis, is considered necessary, it is
outside of the ILT
essential that such bodies provide independent advice,
whether technical or non-technical in nature.
Option 2
The ANVS will make use of the support and
facilities provided by the "Shared Service
Organisation Management of the State" (provides
services
for
autonomous
administrative
authorities) and will be housed for reasons of
efficiency at another government department(s). If
necessary the ANVS may make use of support
features provided by the department in which the
ANVS will be housed. When this is the case,
agreements will be signed. For the development of
policies and regulations in the field of nuclear
safety and radiation ANVS may make use of
support systems provided by the Ministries to be
supported (mainly Economic Affairs, Health,
Social Affairs).

Comments
Does the reference to the "use of support systems
provided by Ministries to be supported (mainly
Economical Affairs, Health and Social Affairs) for the
development of policies and regulations in the field of
nuclear safety and radiation the ANVS" mean use of
TSO? If yes, the issue of independence might be
carefully looked at too.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 20.13.
5. Judging and decision making

SF-1/GSR Parti

Comments

The part "judgments and decisions are made by the
GSR Part 1
Requirement 3: Establishment of a regulatory director of the ANVS, without being hierarchal
influenced" needs to be redrafted
body
The government, through the legal system, shall
establish and maintain a regulatory body, and shall
confer on it the legal authority and provide it with the
competence and the resources necessary to fulfil its
statutory obligation for the regulatory control of Here Option 2 is better.
The ANVS, being an independent administrative facilities and activities.
authority, is able to judge independently, without
being influenced by political, administrative or 2.8. To be effectively independent, the regulatory
societal forces, on its own functions and powers, body shall have sufficient authority and sufficient
own HRM-policy, the choice of juridical options staffing and shall have access to sufficient financial
resources for the proper discharge of its assigned
and means to inform the public.
responsibilities. The regulatory body shall be able to
make independent regulatory judgements and
decisions, free from any undue influences that might
compromise safety, such as pressures associated
with changing political circumstances or economic
conditions, or pressures from government
departments or from other organizations.
Furthermore, the regulatory body shall be able to give
independent advice to government departments and
governmental bodies on matters relating to the safety
of facilities and activities.

Option 1
The ANVS is independent in its judgment and decides
without being influenced by political, administrative
or social forces. Judgments and decisions are made by
the director of the ANVS, without being hierarchal
influenced.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sppt 20.il3.
6. Legal status ANVS

SF-1/GSR Parti

SF-1
Option 1
The minister of Economic Affairs takes care of the Principle 2: Role of government "An effective legal
legal position of the ANVS and ensures that its and governmental framework for safety, including an
independent regulatory body, must be established and
authority and responsibility are laid down in law.
sustained".
3.8. A properly established legal and governmental
The minister of Economic Affairs ensures that the framework provides for the regulation of facilities and
ANVS is established by law as an independent activities that give rise to radiation risks and for the
administrative
authority
with
its
own clear assignment of responsibilities. The government
management, budget, civil service and legal is responsible for the adoption within its national legal
system of such legislation, regulations, and other
powers.
standards and measures as may be necessary to fulfil
all its national responsibilities and international
obligations effectively, and for the establishment of
an independent regulatory body.
GSR Part 1
Requirement 3: Establishment of a regulatory
body
The government, through the legal system, shall
establish and maintain a regulatory body, and shall
confer on it the legal authority and provide it with the
competence and the resources necessary to fulfil its
statutory obligation for the regulatory control of
facilities and activities.

Comments
Is it really the responsibility of this Ministry? Isn't the
Ministry supposed to provide input and the
Parliament to draft the law?
From the French example, in most cases, laws are
Drafted by the Government (Projet de Loi) and
adopted (possibly amended) by the Parliament. In a
limited number of cases, the Parliament itself can
draft laws (Proposition de Loi).

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013
Comments

7. Responsibility for the budget of ANVS

SF-1 / GSR Part 1

Option 1
The minister of EZ provides for a separate budget for
the ANVS which should be outlined as such in the
budget of EZ. This budget will be put at the disposal
of the director of the ANVS by the ILT. The director
ANVS is, without interference of the IG ILT,
accountable for the deployment of the financial
means. The director ANVS is directly accountable to
the minister of EZ.

Both options seem to be in line with GSR Part 1 as in
GSR Part 1
Requirement 16: Organizational structure of the both cases, it seems that the Chair of ANVS is
responsible for the allocation of resources. The word
regulatory body and allocation of resources
The regulatory body shall structure its organization "accountable" might be replaced by "responsible" for
and manage its resources so as to discharge its better clarity (see e.g. in option 2, "The chairman of
responsibilities and perform its functions effectively; the board is, without interference of the minister of
this shall be accomplished in a manner commensurate EZ, accountable for the deployment of the financial
with the radiation risks associated with facilities and means").
activities.

Option 2
The minister of EZ provides for a separate budget
for the ANVS which should be outlined as such in
the budget of EZ. This budget will be put at the
disposal of the chairman of the board of ANVS.
The chairman of the board is, without interference
of the minister of EZ, accountable for the
deployment of thefinancialmeans. The Chairman
of the board is accountable to the minister of EZ
for the performance of the ANVS.

4.4. Requirement 3 establishes that the government
shall be responsible for ensuring that the regulatory
body has sufficient resources to fulfil its statutory
obligations.
4.5. The regulatory body has the responsibility for
structuring its organization and managing its available
resources so as to fulfil its statutory obligations
effectively. The regulatory body shall allocate
resources commensurate with the radiation risks
associated with facilities and activities, in accordance
with a graded approach. Thus, for the lowest
associated radiation risks, it may be appropriate for
the regulatory body to exempt a particular activity
from some or all aspects of regulatory control; for the
highest associated radiation risks, it may be
appropriate for the regulatory body to carry out a
detailed scrutiny in relation to any proposed facility or
activity before it is authorized, and also subsequent to
its authorization.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013 .

8. Human resource management policy ANVS

SF-1/GSR Parti

Comments

Option 1
The minister of Economic Affairs will arrange for
enough formation that will be made available to the
director of the AN VS through the ILT. The director of
ANVS shall independently decide on how to manage
this fomiation. The director of the ANVS shall decide
on the Human Resource Management of the ANVS.
Support of Human Resource Management will take
place from the ILT. The director of ANVS will decide
on the level of support.

GSR Part 1
Requirement 11: Competence for safety
The government shall make provision for building
and maintaining the competence of all parties having
responsibilities in relation to the safety of facilities
and activities.

Both options seem in line with GSR Part I as the
Ministry will make sure that training are in place
while ANVS will be in charge of its Human
Resources Management.

The minister of Economic Affairs will arrange for
enough formation. This formation will be made
available to the chairman of the board of the
ANVS. The chairman of the board of the ANVS
will decide on the deployment of people, without
interference from, or accountability to the
responsible minister. The chairman of the board of
the ANVS will also decide on the policy for the
Human Resource Management of the ANVS.
Support of Human Resource Management will
take place from the "Shared Service Organisation
Management of the State", and if effective and
efficient, support will be drawn from the State
Service(s) at which the ANVS is accommodated.
The managing director of the ANVS will decide on
the level of support.

2.34. As an essential element of the national policy
and strategy for safety, the necessary professional
training for maintaining the competence of a
sufficient number of suitably qualified and
experienced staff shall be made available.
2.35. The building of competence shall be required
for all parties with responsibilities for the safety of
facilities and activities, including authorized parties,
the regulatory body and organizations providing
services or expert advice on matters relating to safety.
Competence shall be built, in the context of the
regulatory framework for safety, by such means as:
—^Technical training;
—Leaming through academic institutions and other
leaming centres;
—Research and development work.
Requirement 18: Staffing and competence of the
regulatory body
The regulatory body shall employ a sufficient number
of qualified and competent staff, commensurate with
the nature and the number of facilities and activities
to be regulated, to perform its functions and to
discharge its responsibilities.

However some clarification might be needed in
Option 2 regarding the Support of ffuman Resource
Management will take place from the "Shared Service
Organisation Management of the State", and if
effective and efficient, support will be drawn from the
State Service(s) at which the ANVS is
accommodated".

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013; Comments

9. Legal instruments ANVS

SF-1/GSR Parti

Option 1
The minister of EZ provides the legal instruments to
be used by ANVS by law. The director of ANVS can
use these legal instmments to his own discretion,
without interference of anyone or accountability to
anyone.

Are the "legal instruments" referring to the adoption
GSR Part 1
Requirement 22: Stability and consistency of of regulations and guides by ANVS as well as the
establishment of enforcement policy?
regulatory control
The regulatory body shall ensure that regulatory
In addition, the director of ANVS cannot use "these
control is stable and consistent.
legal instruments to his own discretion" but has to
4.26. The regulatory process shall be a formal process follow regulatory processes based on its mandate (as
that is based on specified policies, principles and provided by the law), specified policies, principles
associated criteria, and that follows specified and associated criteria. Those regulatory processes
procedures as established in the management system. should be documented as part of the management
The process shall ensure the stability and consistency system.
of regulatory control and shall prevent subjectivity in
decision making by the individual staff members of Finally, one cannot be without "accountability to
the regulatory body. The regulatory body shall be able anyone". Indeed if the RB must not be subject to any
to justify its decisions i f they are challenged. In political influence or pressure in taking specific safety
connection with its reviews and assessments and its decisions, the RB remains accountable to government
inspections, the regulatory body shall inform and parliament as well as to the general public with
applicants of the objectives, principles and associated regard to effectively and efficiently fulfilling its
criteria for safety on which its requirements, mission to protect workers, the public and the
judgements and decisions are based.
environment from radiation hazards (e.g. through
regular, public reporting to govemment and
parliament and through professionally recognized
Requirement 32: Regulations and guides
The regulatory body shall establish or adopt audit and peer review procedures).
regulations and guides to specify the principles,
requirements and associated criteria for safety upon
which its regulatory judgements, decisions and
actions are based.

The ANVS as an independent administrative
authority possesses by law various legal
instruments to fulfil its tasks. The ANVS can use
these instruments to its own discretion, without
interference or being accountable.

Requirement 30: Establishment of an enforcement
policy
The regulatory body shall establish and implement an
enforcement policy within the legal framework for
responding to non-compliance by authorized parties
with regulatory requirements or with any conditions
specified in the authorization.

10

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept20|3
10. Means to inform the public of the ANVS

SF-1/GSR Parti

Comments

SF-1
In both cases, it would be better to avoid using
3.10. The regulatory body must:
wording like "perception' and better use "regulatory
- Set up appropriate means of informing parties in the judgements and decisions'
vicinity, the public and other interested parties, and
the information media about the safety aspects
(including health and environmental aspects) of
facilities and activities and about regulatory
processes;
Option 2
Consult parties in the vicinity, the public and other
The ANVS is capable to inform the public, as
interested
parties, as appropriate, in an open and
independent governing body and to its own
inclusive
process.
perception, on nuclear safety and radiation
protection, without political, governmental and
GSR Part 1
social influence.
Requirement 36: Communication and consultation
with interested parties
The regulatory body shall promote the establishment
of appropriate means of informing and consulting
interested parties and the public about the possible
radiation risks associated with facilities and activities,
and about the processes and decisions of the
regulatory body.

Option 1
The minister of Economic Affairs will by law
establish the authority of the ANVS to inform the
public, to its own perception, on nuclear safety and
radiation protection, without political, administrative
or social influence on form and content.

4.66. The regulatory body shall establish, either
directly or through authorized parties, provision for
effective mechanisms of communication, and it shall
hold meetings to inform interested parties and the
public and for informing the decision making process.
This communication shall include constructive liaison
such as:
(a) Communication with interested parties and the
public on regulatory judgements and decisions; [...]
(d) Communication on the requirements, judgements
and decisions of the regulatory body, and on the bases
for them, to the public;

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - broader perspective - Sept 2013
11. ANVS Management system

SF-1 / GSR Part 1

Comments

Option 1
The setting up of the management system for ANVS
is linked to the ANVS mission which is to foster
safety culture and aiming at continuous improvement.
To attain this director of ANVS will develop a
specific, own, management system. The focus of this
management system is a comprehensive management
of the activity chain, and the leaming organisation
concept. As far as the substantial orientation is
concemed, the director will make specific appropriate
choices, linked to the intemationally established goals
of the Nuclear Regulatory Body. As for the processrelated organisation of the managements system, the
ANVS director can join the IL T management system,
where useful and possible. The director will be
accountable towards the minister for the safety culture
of the organisation.

GSR Part 1
Requirement 19: The management system of the
regulatory body
The regulatory body shall establish, implement, and
assess and improve a management system that is
aligned with its safety goals and contributes to their
achievement.

The mission of the RB as stated in both cases is too
limited - as only focusing on safety culture. It should
be reviewed and the description and implementation
of the management system should be based on
Requirement 19 of GSR Part 1.

Option 2
The mission of ANVS is: ANVS fosters safety
culture in industries, authorities and organisations
with the ultimate goal of a nuclear safe
Netherlands and an appropriate protection of the
population against the dangers arising from
ionizing radiation. This mission contains the
responsibility for the whole chain of activities. The
chairman of the board of the ANVS sets up his
own management system. The management system
is based upon safety, an explicit safety culture and
continuous
improvement,
comprehensive
management of the whole chain of activities and
upon the concept of a learning organisation. The
chairman of the board of the ANVS is responsible
for his own safety culture and accountable towards
the minister of E Z for the functioning of the
organisation.

4.14. The regulatory body shall establish and
implement a management system whose processes are
open and transparent. The management system of the
regulatory body shall be continuously assessed and
improved.

A reference to all main regulatory flmctions
(Authorisation and notification, review and
assessment, inspection, enforcement, development of
regulations and guides, emergency and preparedness)
should be introduced. The organisation could be
presented in a more understandable way i f a link
between regulatory functions and RB organisation
could appear.

4.15. The management system of the regulatory body
has three purposes:
(1) The first purpose is to ensure that the
responsibilities assigned to the regulatory body are
properly discharged.
(2) The second purpose is to maintain and improve
the performance of the regulatory body by means of
the planning, control and supervision of its safety
related activities.
(3) The third purpose is to foster and support a safety
culture in the regulatory body through the
development and reinforcement of leadership, as well
as good attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety
on the part of individuals and teams.
4.16. The management system shall maintain the
efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory body in
discharging its responsibilities and performing its
functions. This includes the promotion of
enhancements in safety, and the fulfilment of its
obligations in an appropriate, timely and cost
effective manner so as to build confidence.

12

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013:
General C o m m e n t s
The IAEA comments provided in the table below are made in relation to the relevant IAEA Safety Standards (i.e. S F - 1 , Fundamental Safety and GSR Part 1, Legal
Governmental and Regulatory Framework for Safety),and reflect the general understanding of the information provided. I t should be noted that, based on this analysis,
some inconsistencies were Identified.
The most significant comment is that neither of the two proposed options appears to be in compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards. The two options place the RB
under the MInisty of Economics, which is responsible for the national energy policy and this may result in potential conflicts between energy supply issues and safety
considerations.
As stated in GSR Part 1, "2.8. To be effectively independent, the regulatory body shall have sufficient authority and sufficient staffing and shall have access to sufficient
financial resources for the proper discharge of its assigned responsibilities. The regulatory
body shall be able to make independent
regulatory
judgements
and
decisions,
free from any undue influences
that might compromise
safety, such as pressures
associated
with changing
political
circumstances
or
economic
conditions,
or pressures
from government
departments
or from other organizations.
Furthermore,
the regulatory body shall be able to give
independent advice to government departments and governmental bodies on matters relating to the safety of facilities and activities".
The proposed option for lAA indicated that some "deviations" from the current Framework Act on lAA's [Kaderwet ZBO's] are possible, but, a comprehensive assessment
of the lAA option cannot be be performed without reviewing the implementing documents (legal provisions)
From the overall documentation provided in t h e attached overview a s well a s in information provided earlier (letter of t h e 17**^ of S e p t e m b e r a n d its t w o
a p p e n d i c e s ) , the I A E A ' s v i e w would be that the variant 2. w h e r e t h e ANVS is e s t a b l i s h e d a s a n independent a d m i n i s t r a t i v e authority flAA'). is
preferable, given that t h e " d e v i a t i o n s " described a r e implemented. E v e n if this option is c h o s e n , t h e main c o n c e r n regarding t h e position of t h e R B
under t h e Minister of Economic Affairs r e m a i n s , if this Minister retains responsibilities for the national energy policy.

I n d e p e n d e n t Administrative
Authorithy
(lAA)
Pursuant
to the
Framework
Act on lAA's [Kaderwet
ZBO's]

Agency
P u r s u a n t to the A g e n c i e s
Regulation [Regeling
Agentschappen]

Key points of definition

Key points:
1. Independent Administrative
Authority
2. Vested with public authority
3. Not hierarchically subordinate
to a minister

Key points:
1. Internally independent part of a
ministry
2. Engaged in enforcement
3. Own governance model

IAEA Comments

Relevant IAEA Safety Standards

Comments

GSR Part 1
Requirement 4: Independence of
the regulatory body
The government shall ensure that the
regulatory
body
is
effectively
independent in its safety related

From the information provided, the lAA
variant seems preferable.
The relation between the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and the lAA as described in
Key Point 3 "Not hierarchically subordinate to

4. Not necessarily restricted to
enforcement
Section 1

Section 1

In this Act, the following terms
shall be understood to have the
meanings assigned to them
below:

In this Regulation , the following
terms shall be understood to have
the meanings assigned to them
below:

a. Independent Administrative
Authority: A public body of the
central government, vested with
public authority by law, pursuant
to law by an order in council (a
governmental decree), or
pursuant to law by ministerial
regulation, and that is not
hierarchically subordinate to a
minister;
b. Our Minister: the responsible
minister.

a. Agency: an internally independent
enforcement unit of a ministry that
has its own governance model and
financial accounting system;

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
decision making and that it has a minister" is unclear.
functional separation from entities
having responsibilities or interests If lAA is part of the central government,
that could unduly influence its rather than of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, it would give the RB a higher degree
decision making.
of independence from possible undue
2.7. An independent regulatory body influence.
will not be entirely separate from
other governmental bodies. The More explanation regarding the
government
has
the
ultimate characteristics of "vested with public
responsibility for involving those with authority" is necessary.
legitimate and recognized interests in
its decision making. However, the The functions of the RB should not be
government shall ensure that the restricted to enforcement as the "Agency"
regulatory body is able to make option implies
decisions
under
its
statutory
obligation for the regulatory control of Indeed, the functions of the RB should not be
facilities and activities, and that it is restricted to enforcement but should include
able to perform its functions without the full set, i.e.:
undue pressure or constraint.
—Preparation of regulations and guides;
—Authorization of facilities and activities;
—Review and assessment of information
2.8. To be effectively independent,
relevant to safety;
the regulatory body shall have
sufficient authority and sufficient
—Inspection of facilities and activities;
staffing and shall have access to
—Enforcement of compliance with regulations
sufficientfinancialresources for the
and standards.
proper discharge of its assigned
responsibilities. The regulatory body
shall be able to make independent
regulatory judgements and decisions,
free from any undue influences that
might compromise safety, such as
pressures associated with changing
political circumstances or economic
conditions, or pressures from
government departments or from
other organizations. Furthermore, the
regulatory body shall be able to give
independent advice to government
departments and governmental
bodies on matters relating to the
safety of facilities and activities.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Subordinate - not subordinate
Key points:
1. A m e m b e r of a n l A A cannot be
subordinate to a minister.

Section 9
A member of an Independent
Administrative Authority cannot
also be a civil servant subordinate
to Our Minister.

Section 16
The personnel working for an
Independent Administrative Authority
are subject t o the authority of that
Independent Administrative Authority
and are accountable regarding their
work solely to that Authority.

Key points:
1. Director a n d a l s o personnel a r e
subordinate to a minister.

Section 1
a.

Agency: .... unit of a ministry.

Relevant I A E A Safety S t a n d a r d s

Comments

GSR Part 1
Requirement 4: I n d e p e n d e n c e of
the regulatory body
The government shall ensure that the
regulatory
body
is
effectively
independent in its safety related
decision making and that it h a s
functional
separation
from
entities having responsibilities or
interests
that
could
unduly
influence its decision m a k i n g .

What does " m e m b e r " mean? A staff member?
A commissioner?
From t h e information provided, t h e l A A
variant seems preferable but see o u r
c o m m e n t a b o v e (i.e. The relation between
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the lAA
as described in Key Point 3 "Not hierarchically
subordinate to a minister" is unclear if lAA).
If it is a fact that the staff of an lAA is not
subordinate to a ministry, this would give the
RB a higher degree of independence from
possible undue influence.
However, this appears to be in contradiction
with the fact that a Minister can give general
instructions as indicated below.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Performance of duties a s s i g n e d by l a w
Key points:
1. Minister c a n give general
instructions.

Key points:
1. Minister c a n give general and
also specific instructions.

Section 21

Section 10:22
Administrative

Our Minister may adopt policy
rules regarding the
performance of duties by an
Independent Administrative
Authority.

1.

General
Law Act [Awb"]

If a statutory power to take
decisions has been allocated to a
person or board working subject to
the responsibility of a public body,
said public body may give
instructions on a case-by-case
basis or in general regarding the
exercise of the power allocated.

T h e F r a m e w o r k Act on l A A s may be deviated from if this is n e c e s s a r y in
connection with international r e q u i r e m e n t s . I f the Dutch Nuclear Safety
and Radiation Protection Authority ( A N V S ) is to be organised a s an
l A A , it is possible not to e m p o w e r the Minister in question to give
general instructions.

Relevant I A E A Safety S t a n d a r d s

Comments

2.7. An independent regulatory body
will not be entirely separate from
other
governmental
bodies. The
government
has
the
ultimate
responsibility for involving those with
legitimate and recognized Interests in
its decision making. However, the
government shall ensure that the
regulatory body is able to m a k e
decisions
under
its
statutory
obligation
for
the
regulatory
control of facilities and activities,
and that it is able to perform its
functions without undue p r e s s u r e
or constraint.

From the information provided and w i t h
the proposed " d e v i a t i o n " , the l A A
variant, is preferable. T h e Ministry of
Economic Affairs s h o u l d not be
e m p o w e r e d to give instructions to the
RB.
In addition, it is not clear what "general
instructions" mean.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Appointment, s u s p e n s i o n , and removal from office

The minister, together with the
Minister for Housing a n d Civil
S e r v i c e , or the Minister for
Housing a n d Civil S e r v i c e by
Royal Decree, appoints,
s u s p e n d s , a n d r e m o v e s from
office.

T h e minister appoints t h e
m e m b e r s of a n l A A a n d m a y
s u s p e n d t h e m or r e m o v e t h e m
from office.
Removal from office is only
possible for compelling
r e a s o n s relating to the person
in q u e s t i o n .

Removal from office possible on
grounds including
unsatisfactory performance.

T h e minister d e t e r m i n e s the
remuneration for a n l A A .

Section 12
1.

2.

Our Minister appoints the
members of an Independent
Administrative Authority and may
suspend them or remove them
from office.
Suspension and removal from
office are possible only for
reasons of unsuitability or
incompetence as regards the
position held, or for other
compelling reasons related to the
person in question. The person
concerned may also be
discharged at his own request.

Section 14
1.

Remuneration or compensation
shall be paid to members of a

Basic principles set out in the
General Public Service
Regulations
[ARAR}

Section 91
1.

Without prejudice to the provisions
of Section 8 1 ( l ) ( k ) , the civil
servant can be suspended from
office:
a.

b.

c.

if a criminal prosecution has
been instituted against him
regarding a crime;
if he has been notified by the
competent authority of its
intention to punish him with
unconditional removal from
office, or if that punishment
has been imposed on h i m ;
if, in the opinion of the
competent authority, such is
required by the interest of the
service.

Relevant I A E A Safety S t a n d a r d s

Comments

Requirement 16: Organizational
structure of t h e regulatory body
and allocation of r e s o u r c e s
The regulatory body shall structure its
organization
and
manage
its
resources so as to discharge its
responsibilities
and
perform
its
functions effectively; this shall be
accomplished
in
a
manner
commensurate with the radiation
risks associated with facilities and
activities.

From the information provided, and given
that the "deviation" specified at the end is
implemented, the lAA variant is preferable.

4.4. Requirement 3 establishes that
the g o v e r n m e n t shall be
responsible for e n s u r i n g that t h e
regulatory body h a s sufficient
r e s o u r c e s to fulfil its statutory
obligations.
4.5. The regulatory body has the
responsibility f o r s t r u c t u r i n g i t s
organization and managing its
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s so as t o f u l f i l
its s t a t u t o r y obligations
e f f e c t i v e l y . The regulatory body
shall allocate resources
commensurate with the radiation
risks associated with facilities and
activities, in accordance with a
graded approach.

For a higher level of independence, it is
recommended not to have the Ministry of
Economic Affairs be responsible for the
appointment, suspension or removal and
remuneration of the RB's personnel.
Just like in the previously supplied table, it is
noted that an element missing in the 2
options when it comes to the organizational
aspects is the structure of ANVS. E.g. will the
RB have commissioners?

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Independent Administrative
Authority.
2. The amount of the remuneration
or compensation shall be
determined by Our Minister.

2. Suspension shall be effectuated by
the authority that is empowered to
appoint to the office from which the
civil servant is suspended. Should
that power be vested in Us, then
suspension shall be effectuated by
Our Minister.
Section 93
Removal from office shall be
effectuated by the authority that is
empowered to appoint to the office
from which the civil servant is
removed. The proposal for removal
from office of the civil servant within
the meaning of Section 4(5)(a) shall be
made by Our Minister of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations. Removal from
office of the civil servant within the
meaning of Section 4(5)(b) or (c) shall
be in agreement with Our Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
Section 96
1. In the context of a reorganisation, a
civil servant may be honourably
removed from office if it is not
possible to reallocate him to a
suitable position.

Section 97(b)
1. Removal from office within the
meaning of Section 125(e)(2) of the
Central and Local Government
Personnel Act [Ambtenarenwet]
shall require agreement with Our
Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations. The latter shall

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - O.ct 2Q13
be required to seek the advice of
the Advisory Committee on Basic
Rights and Professional Duties of
Civil Servants [Adviescommissie
grondrechten en functie-uitoefening
ambtenaren].
2. Should the proposal for removal
from office derive from Our Minister
of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, the agreement of Our
Prime Minister shall be required.
Section 98
1. Other than at the request of the civil
servant, by way of punishment, or
pursuant to the provisions of
Section 7 of the Incompatibility of
Offlce (States General and
European Parliament) Act [Wet
Incompatibiliteiten Staten-Generaal
en Europees Parlement], Sections
95, 96, 96(a), 96(b), 96(c) and 97
of this Decree and the provisions of
Section 125(e)(2) of the Central
and Local Government Personnel
Act, a civil servant may be removed
from office on the grounds of:
a. the loss of a requirement for
appointment imposed by the
competent authority in a
regulation prior to the
appointment, unless the
requirement only applies to the
commencement of the office;
b. entering into a degree of
relationship by marriage such
as to exclude appointment to
the office;
c. a court ruling, no longer open
to appeal, whereby the civil
servant has been placed under

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
legal guardianship;
being made subject to
committal for failure to comply
with a judicial order in respect
of debt pursuant to a court
ruling that is no longer open to
appeal;
e. imposition, no longer open to
appeal, of a custodial sentence
due to the commission of a
crime;
f. incapacity for work due to
illness;
g. incompetence or unsuitability
for the office held otherwise
than due to a mental or
physical disorder;
h. reaching retirement age;
i. the provision of incorrect or
incomplete information upon or
in connection with the
assumption of office and/or
assessment, if, were such not
to have been done, the civil
servant would not have been
appointed or approved, unless
the civil servant can
demonstrate that he acted in
good faith.

d.

Section 99
3. A civil servant with a permanent
appointment may also be removed
from office on grounds other than
those set out in Section 98 or
referred to in that section. Such
removal from office shall be
honourable.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
2.
T h e F r a m e w o r k Act on l A A s may be deviated from if this is n e c e s s a r y in
connection with international r e q u i r e m e n t s . I f the ANVS is to be
organised a s a n l A A , it is possible for the appointment ( a n d a l s o
s u s p e n s i o n or removal from office) of the m e m b e r s of the l A A to be
effectuated not by the responsible minister but, a s in the c a s e of the
ARAR, by the responsible minister in a g r e e m e n t with the Minister for
Housing and Civil S e r v i c e or by the Minister for Housing and Civil
S e r v i c e by Royal D e c r e e (depending on the s a l a r y s c a l e g r a d e ) . T h e
grounds for removal from office s e t out in the F r a m e w o r k Act on l A A s
s h a l l , h o w e v e r , continue to apply. Also, the matter of remuneration
should not be left to the responsible minister alone but d e c i s i o n s
should be made by him together with the Minister for Housing and Civil
Service.

A s noted a b o v e , this deviation s h o u l d be
implemented.

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Termination
1. Government and Parliament
jointly (by m e a n s of legislation)

1. By the responsible minister
together with the Minister of
Finance.

Section 8. Termination of a n
agency
1. Termination of an agency shall be
effectuated by a decision,
accompanied by reasons, by the
responsible minister; this shall be
co-signed by the Minister of
Finance.

Relevant I A E A Safety S t a n d a r d s
Requirement 3: E s t a b l i s h m e n t of
a regulatory body
The government, through the legal
system, shall establish and maintain
a regulatory body, and shall confer on
it the legal authority and provide it
with the competence and the
resources necessary to fulfil its
statutory obligation for the regulatory
control of facilities and activities.

The House of Representatives shall
be informed separately of the
decision to terminate.

The decision to terminate shall be
published in the Government
Gazette
[Staatscourant].
The responsible minister shall send
a copy of the decision to terminate
the agency to the Netherlands
Court of Audit [Algemene
Rekenkamer].

10

Comments
From the information provided a b o v e ,
the l A A variant is preferable.
In general, to grant sufficient authority to the
RB, it is suitable that the RB is established by
a high level legal instrument such as a law.
In a similar way, the dissolution of the RB
should be decided at the highest level (here
Government and Parliament).

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Governance a n d accountability

Key points:

Key points:

1. I f t h e Act establishing a
independent administrative
authority prescribes internal
rules of procedure
[bestuursreglement"], t h e s e
must be approved by t h e
minister.
2. l A A s e n d s a n annual report on
the performance of its duties
and t h e policy conducted to
the Minister a n d Parliament.
3. l A A provides t h e Minister with
the information n e c e s s a r y for
him to perform his duties.
4. T h e Minister c a n r e v e r s e a
decision adopted by the l A A .
5. I n t h e e v e n t of neglect of
duties, t h e minister c a n take
the n e c e s s a r y m e a s u r e s .

1. T h e g o v e r n a n c e model c o n s i s t s
of a n o w n e r , a s s i g n m e n t giver,
and contractor.
2. T h e o w n e r is r e s p o n s i b l e for
supervising t h e policy a n d t h e
general c o u r s e of affairs, for
e x a m p l e t h e auditing a n d
approval of the budget, t h e
r a t e s , a n d t h e annual plan.
3. T h e a s s i g n m e n t giver formulates
the a s s i g n m e n t and t h e desired
result of t h e a g e n c y .
4. T h e contractor e n s u r e s t h e
performance of t h e a g r e e m e n t s
m a d e and the rendering of
account.
5. T h e Financial a n d Economic
Affairs Department [ F E Z ]
e x e r c i s e s financial s u p e r v i s i o n
of t h e a g e n c y .
6. T h e Minister c a n give general or
specific instructions in a d v a n c e .

Section 11

Section 1

1.

I f an Independent Administrative
Authority adopts internal rules of
procedure pursuant to a statutory
provision, these must be
approved by Our Minister.

2.

Our Minister may refuse such
approval if he considers that
there is a conflict with the law or
on the grounds that he believes
that said rules of procedure

m. Owner. The party within the
ministry concerned designated as
responsible for supervising the
contractor's policy and the general
course of affairs within the agency;
n. Assignment giver. The party within
the ministry that has given the
agency an assignment to deliver
products or services and that
allocates a contribution for that
purpose;

Relevant I A E A Safety S t a n d a r d s

Requirement 3: E s t a b l i s h m e n t of
a regulatory body
The government, through the legal
system, shall establish and maintain
a regulatory body, and shall confer
on it the legal authority and provide
it with the competence and the
resources necessary to fulfil its
statutory obligation for the regulatory
control of facilities and activities.

Comments

From t h e information provided a b o v e ,
both v a r i a n t s s e e m similarly
satisfactory.
Enabling the RB to be fully responsible for the
definition of its internal rules would grant it a
higher level of independence.
The submission by the RB of annual reports
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs is not
problematic if the Parliament and other
Ministries also receive it.
The capacity of the Minister of Economics t o
reverse a safety decision adopted by the lAA
would be inappropriate.

11

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013f
impede the proper fulfilment of
the tasks of the Independent
Administrative Authority.
Section 18
1. Before 15 March of each year, the
lAA shall draw up an annual
report. Said annual report shall
describe the performance of the
lAA's duties and the policy
conducted. Said annual report
shall also describe the policy
conducted with regard to quality
assurance.
2. Said annual report shall be
submitted to Our Minister and to
both houses of Parliament.
Section 20

0. Contractor. The party within the
agency bearing final responsibility.
Section 9. Governance model
1. An agency shall have a governance
model in which three different roles
are distinguished, namely those of
the owner, assignment giver, and
contractor. These roles shall not be
combined.
2. In deviation from Subsection 1, the
roles of assignment giver and
owner may be combined if services
are provided only within the
ministry concerned, if reasons are
given and if sufficient checks and
balances are guaranteed between
the parties involved.
Section 10. Responsibilities of the
owner

1. An Independent Administrative
Authority shall provide Our
The owner, who is responsible for
Minister, on request, with all
supervising the contractor's policy
information required for him to
and the general course of affairs
perform his duties. Our Minister
within the agency, shall ensure:
may require that he be enabled to
inspect all business data and
a. the construction of a governance
records if such is reasonably
model such as to comply with the
necessary for him to perform his
requirements of the present
duties.
Regulation;
b. the long-term continuity of the
agency;
2. In providing the information
c. the assessment and approval of the
referred to in Subsection 1, an
budget, the rates, the annual plan,
Independent Administrative
the loan applications, the financial
Authority shall if necessary
statements, and the agreements
indicate which information is of a
on how thefinancialconsequences
confidential nature. The
of unforeseen developments shall
confidentiality of the information
be assigned to the owner,
may arise from the nature of that
assignment giver, and contractor;
information or from the fact that
natural persons or legal entities
d. that no later than the first
provided it to the Independent
supplementary budget act
12

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on Independence - Oct 2013.
Administrative Authority on
condition that it should be
classified as confidential.
Section 22
1. Our Minister shall be empowered
to reverse a decision adopted by
an Independent Administrative
Authority.
2. Such reversal decision shall be
announced in the Government
Gazette.
Section 23
1. Should Our Minister consider that
an Independent Administrative
Authority is seriously neglecting
its duties, is entitled to take the
necessary measures.
2. Except for urgent cases, said
measures shall not be taken until
the Independent Administrative
Authority has been given the
opportunity to perform its duties
properly after all within a period
to be determined by Our Minister.
3. Our Minister shall immediately
inform both houses of the States
General of measures he has
taken within the meaning of
Subsection 1.

[suppletoire begrotingswet], any
negative cash reserve in the case
of obligations/cash agencies
[verplichtingenkasagentschappen], or any
negative equity in the case of
income/expenditure agencies
[baten-lastenagentschappen], shall
be supplemented up to a balance
or equity of at least zero (in
accordance with Section 22(3) or
Section 25(2), respectively).
Section 11. Responsibilities of the
assignment giver
• The assignment giver shall be
responsible for:
a. careful formulation of the
assignment, with as detailed a
description as possible of the
desired result;
b. timely involvement of the
contractor in the event of
unforeseen developments that may
affect performance of the
assignment;
c. the recording, together with the
contractor, of performance
indicators and reporting
agreements, so that performance
of the assignment can be
monitored.
Section 12. Responsibilities of the
contractor
• The contractor shall be responsible
for:
a. the consistency of the internal
organisation;
b. the effective, lawful, and
professional performance of the
13

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
agreements made with the
assignment giver(s) and owner,
and the rendering of account in
that regard;
c. timely involvement of the
assignment giver(s) in the event of
unforeseen developments that may
affect performance of the
assignment;
d. thefinancialand material
management, including the
implementation of the budget, and
the rendering of account regarding
those points.
Section 20. Public annual report
If an agency publishes a public
annual report, it shall mention the
special status of said report in said
annual report.
Section 30. Supervision
The Financial and Economic Affairs
Department of the ministry in
question shall supervise an agency
in accordance with the provisions
of Sections 6, 10, and 12(1) of the
Financial and Economic Affairs
Department Tasks Decree [Besluit
Taak FEZ].
Section 31. Systemic
responsibility
The Minister of Finance shall
supervise the organisation of the
agencies and implementation of the
budgets.
The Framework Act on lAAs may be deviated from if this is necessary in
connection with international requirements. If the ANVS is to be

14

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
organised as an lAA, the following alterations may be made:
1. The responsible minister may be allocated no power, or limited
power, to reverse decisions adopted by the lAA.
2. The annual report of the ANVS will be sent not only to the Minister of
Economic Affairs and Parliament but also to the Minister of Social
Affairs and Employment and the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport.
If it is determined that the annual report will be sent to Parliament
through the intervention of a minister, then the period will also be
determined within which he must do so, and that he cannot alter the
report.
3. The option to request information from the ANVS in order to perform
his duties will also be allocated to the Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment and the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport.
4. In the event of the ANVS neglecting its duties, the power to take the
necessary measures will be assigned to the Cabinet, which will decide
pursuant to a proposal by the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister
of Social Affairs and Employment, or the Minister of Health, Welfare
and Sport. The Minister of Economic Affairs will implement such
decision.
5. Rules of procedure are optional. There are no plans to prescribe
internal rules of procedure for the ANVS as an lAA. However, if that
should be done, then in any case will the responsible minister not have
the power of approval.

15

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Budget a n d funding

Key points:
1. T h e l A A s e n d s a draft
budget to t h e Minister.
2. T h e l A A ' s budget i s a
s e p a r a t e section in the
Minister's budget a c t .
3. T h e budget is adopted in
the form of legislation by
the g o v e r n m e n t a n d
Parliament.

Key points:
1. T h e a g e n c y ' s budget is a
s e p a r a t e section in t h e
Minister's budget a c t .
2. T h e budget is adopted in t h e
form of legislation by t h e
government a n d Parliament.

Section 25

Section 14. Funding

An Independent Administrative
Authority that forms part of the
State shall submit an annual draft
budget for the ensuing year,
before 1 April, to Our Minister.

Section 30
If significant differences arise, or
seem likely to arise, in the course
of the year between the actual
and budgeted revenue and
charges, or income and
expenditure, the Independent
Administrative Authority shall
immediately inform Our Minister,
stating the reasons for those
differences.

Relevant I A E A Safety S t a n d a r d s

Requirement 3: E s t a b l i s h m e n t of
a regulatory body
The government, through the legal
system, shall establish and maintain
a regulatory body, and shall confer on
it the legal authority and provide it
with the competence a n d t h e
resources necessary t o fulfil its
s t a t u t o r y o b l i g a t i o n for the
regulatory control of facilities and
activities.

Agencies shall receive contributions
for the products and services that
they deliver. Said contributions
shall be paid on the basis of the
agreements made with the
agency's assignment giver(s)
regarding quantity, quality, and
price. This means that the
contributions are linked to
performance.

16

Comments

From t h e information provided, both
v a r i a n t s s e e m similarly s a t i s f a c t o r y .

IAEA Assessment of the 2 variants - focus on independence - Oct 2013
Remarks:
The Framework Act on lAAs must be declared explicitly applicable to the organisation concerned by the responsible minister. In each case, it must
also be stated which sections of the Framework Act are declared to be applicable. The ministerial powers regarding an Independent Administrative
Authority can be tailor-made. However, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations must agree. Deviations must also be substantiated, and
require the explicit agreement of the Council of Ministers and ultimately the legislature.
Arrangements regarding a specific agency (duties) must be laid down, for example in a protocol with the owner and the mandate regulations.
After 1 January 2014, the appointment procedure for an Independent Administrative Authority will be the same as for services and agencies, i.e. a
decision by the Minister for Housing and Civil Service and the responsible minister.
In the Netherlands, the government and Parliament are jointly the legislature. A Bill for establishing the ANVS as an lAA will be prepared by the
Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, and the Minister for Housing
and Civil Service jointly.
The ANVS will not be responsible for decreeing the National Programme for Radioactive Waste (or for the preparations for setting it up) (that
responsibility remains with the Minister of Economic Affairs). The ANVS does, however, determine the aspects of nuclear safety and radiation
protection in that programme.

17