content: text: laboratory experiments that have formed key pillars of the field, such as those experiments depicted in
Examples 1 and 2 in the book's Introduction section. The thought experiments in Section 1 are, for the
most part, re-castings of the simple cognitive tests devised by psychologists and economists over the
past three-to-four decades to illustrate the fallacies, miscalculations, and biases distinguishing Homo
sapiens from Homo economicus. Similarly, the laboratory experiments presented in Section 2 are, for the
most part, re-castings of the seminal experiments conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (among many
others). These experiments helped motivate the revised theories of human choice behavior, such as
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory, which form another pillar of behavioral economics.
Alongside these experiments, Section 2 presents the revised theories of human choice behavior with
varying degrees of rigor. This is where the theoretical bases of Homo economicus' rational choice
behavior are examined, and where key refinements to this theory are developed-theoretical
refinements underpinning the myriad departures from rational choice behavior we witness Homo
sapiens make in this section's laboratory and field experiments (and which are examined further in
Sections 3 and 4).

content: text: Section 3 submerses the student in the world of behavioral game theory. Here we explore games
such as Ultimatum Bargaining presented in Example 5. We follow Camerer (2003)'s lead, first by
characterizing the games analytically (i.e., identifying solution, or equilibrium, concepts that are
predicted to result when members of Homo economicus play the games), and then by discussing
empirical results obtained from corresponding field experiments conducted with Homo sapiens. It
is within the context of these games and field experiments that theories of social interaction are
tested concerning inter alia trust and trustworthiness, honesty, fairness, reciprocity, etc. As with the
thought and laboratory experiments presented in Sections 1 and 2, the games and field experiments
presented in Section 3 are meant to be replicated with students as subjects and the instructor as the
experimenter, or researcher.

content: text: Finally, Section 4 wades into the vast sea of empirical research and choice architecture. Here the
student explores studies reporting on (1) the outcomes of actual policy nudges, such as the SMarT
retirement-savings plan presented in Example 3 of the Introduction, (2) analyses of secondary datasets
to test for choice behavior consistent with the revised theories discussed in Section 2, such as the test
for loss aversion in Example 4 of the Introduction, and (3) analyses of primary datasets obtained from
novel field experiments to further test the revised theories. The main purpose of this section is not
only to introduce the student to interesting empirical studies and policy adaptations in the field of
behavioral economics, but also, in the process, to incubate in the student an abiding appreciation for
the obscure settings that sometimes lend themselves to such study.3

content: text: THE TEXTBOOK'S DIFFERENT LEVELS OF RIGOR

content: text: Because the mathematical and computational rigor of material presented in this textbook varies
throughout, particularly in Sections 2 - 4, the extent of the rigor used in the presentation of a
given topic is indicated with superscripts. Topics without a superscript are considered basic and
universal enough that backgrounds in economics, mathematics, or statistics are not required for the
reader to understand the material. Topics with a single asterisk (*) indicate that higher mathematical
reasoning skills are recommended for the reader to fully grasp the material. Topics with a double

content: text: 3. Our approach to studying behavioral economics is focused on the underlying laboratory experimentation and behavioral
games that form the bedrock of the field. As such, we eschew delving into related fields such as neuroeconomics and
auction theory. See Cartwright (2018) and Just (2013) for introductions to the former and latter fields, respectively.

content: text: XX ARTHUR J. CAPLAN