Debate: Russia, the case of Alexei Navalny, military build-up on Ukraine's border and Russian attack in the Czech Republic
Date: WEDNESDAY, 28 APRIL 2021
Speaker: Josep Borrell Fontelles
Language: EN

To start with, let me tell you that just now I got the news that Russia has expelled, some moments ago, seven diplomats from Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Maybe they were listening to this debate and they took some measures about it. So, as you see, the confrontation continues. I’d like to try to answer some specific issues raised, but at the same time to go a little bit above and to have a look at the general approach that we have to follow with Russia in the coming new geopolitical landscape.  After listening to all of you, I think that we agree – or most of you agree – on the fact that we are going to face a long hard period of political confrontation with Russia, and we must prepare for that. I think this is an undeniable reality because Russia now is convinced that its confrontation with Europe, in general with the West – Europe, the United States – is the surest way to reinforce the legitimacy of Russian power. Have a look at the speech by President Putin the last day, his message to the nation in the Duma, have a look at the part related to foreign policy, and you will see clearly how it is the way I am saying, that the confrontation with the West is part of the reinforcement of their legitimacy towards the interior.  On the other hand, it says that the defence of human rights, or when we require them about human rights issues, for them is an existential threat. And when I went to Moscow I explained clearly in front of them that, sorry, you signed the Convention on Human Rights of the Council of Europe, and we too are partners in this Convention and we have the right to analyse and follow how you fulfil this obligation that you signed. But for them it is an existential threat because it is a regime with a very weak economic performance, mediocre I would say, and the prospects for them are not good.  Climate change and the answer to climate change, especially coming from us with our climate plans, will make it more difficult. Yes, they have strong military power and they use it and they deploy it when needed – Syria, even Libya, the Caucasus – and they have a real technological potential, but economically speaking Russia is the size of Italy, not much more than Spain. They have also the energy weapon. Many of you have been talking about it, relating to Nord Stream. I will say something about it. It’s very much present in the relationship between Russia and Europe, the energy question, and it plays an important role for their future because Russia is,  C’est l’économie de la rente, l’exploitation des ressources naturelles. Sans cela, ils auraient vraiment un problème – ils ont déjà un problème. The Green Deal, as I was saying, will increase these problems. This is why the Russian power is engaged in a spiral in which internal repression plays an important role. With respect to Belarus, have a look at the recent visit of Lukashenko to Moscow and you will learn about the relationship between Moscow and Belarus. I don’t want to use words that can create alarm, but it’s clear that the main lesson that we can take about the situation in Belarus comes from the visit of Lukashenko to Moscow. About Ukraine. Russia is not only aiming and increasing its military intimidation – not only military intimidation – but at the political level is moving further saying that the Ukrainian conflict, and many of you have been mentioning it, does not concern Russia: ‘Oh my God, what do we have to do with the Ukrainian conflict?’ Even more, that the Minsk Agreement was just a signature to look for a temporary solution, and it is nothing more than that. This is something that Moscow is starting to say openly, and they present themselves as a mediator in a conflict in which they are not part.  All in all, it creates a dynamic and Russia is probably engaging on the way of a strategic alliance with China with three objectives in mind. First, to reduce its technological and economic dependency on the West. If you talk with the European firms which are investing in Russia, they will tell you that Russian technology standards and the Chinese technology standards are winning the battle, more and more. It is the Chinese technology which is taking the market, against us. Even if this leaning towards China will eventually make Russia dependent on this big country, for them they need an alternative to look for outlets in terms of energy. Here we are not buying so much amounts of gas and oil. Who will buy it? There’s no one else big enough to replace us. Yes, there is a lot of infrastructure to be built in order to transport this energy, but this alliance with Beijing is, among other things, a way of looking for someone else interested in burning gas and oil from Russia. This alliance with Beijing will profoundly modify the international language on human rights and favour a division of international relations which would have considerable implications in particular for the management of the net and energy policy, world energy policy, the geopolitics of energy. This is something that we have to keep in mind when we talk about our relations with Russia. We want to understand really what is at stake. Mr Putin has been saying clearly that they are officially recognising the use of instruments of asymmetric action. And we know very well how these asymmetric actions are being performed – for espionage and cyber—attacks and to support ultra—conservative forces and practise disinformation. This is the landscape, and in face of this landscape we have no other solution than to stick to the line that I propose and sensitise on using these three verbs that I would like to repeat as many times as needed in order to create a certain way of understanding the problem: to contain, to push back and engage. To push back and prevent Russia from crossing red lines, especially when the sovereignty of European states are at stake. We have seen this recently about the Czech Republic. Contain – we must support all of those who are the object of Russian pressure and, I think, particularly countries in the Eastern Partnership. But this doesn’t prevent us from having to engage, which is the third pillar, because Russia exists and there are files and ways, and we have an interest to work with it – on Iran, and now on climate change. By the way, listen to the leaks, about the conversation with the Iranian Minister Zarif. While it appears clear that Russia was trying to put obstacles to the negotiations on the JCPOA, trying to prevent agreement to be reached. Listen to these leaks. They are very, very clear about what happened at that time, but that can also happen now. But we have to count on Russia about the Iranian nuclear deal. It’s part of it. But this strategy of pushing back, containing and engaging will only succeed if we fulfil two essential conditions. The first one is that Member States remain solidly united and avoid free riding on Moscow when Moscow tries to divide us. Only if Member States take a firm position when they come to Brussels and go back to their capitals, we will be able to face Russia.  And Mr Bütikofer has said that, and I agree with him when he says it is in the capitals where we can have a stronger responsibility about policy towards Russia. Because we, the European Union, we tried to build a common foreign policy but for a policy, like it or not, remains according to the Treaty, an exclusive competence of the Member States. And the fact that you here, the European Parliament, talk with me, the High Representative, about how to deal with Russia doesn’t make you severe the basic principle of the foreign policy belonging to the Member States and have to make them agree. And if they don’t agree then we don't have a policy. Thank you to Mr Bütikofer for remembering that at the end we have to look also to the Member States, it means to the governments of the countries that you represent here. If they take a firm position in Brussels and then they go back to their capitals and forget about their commitments and to free riding on the relationship with Russia, it’s very difficult to have a common policy, and if we don’t have a common policy then the European Union doesn’t have the tools in order to do the job that you’re asking me to do. And this has some relationship for sure with Nord Stream that has been mentioned here several times.  The second condition, and I want to stress it also, is that the countries of the Eastern Partnership, which we help to face the Russian pressure, must imperatively reform themselves. They need to use our help and our support, not as a rent but as an instrument for more internal reforms. Yes, they are suffering under Russian pressure. The best way of facing this pressure is reforming, becoming fully democratic countries in order to build an economic prosperity and a coherent society. In freedom. With our support. It is the best way of supporting the Russian pressure and it is why we have to condition our support, big support. I don’t know, I don’t think they don’t deserve it, but as always, this support has to produce results, and we have to be very much exigent in order to be sure that our policy of supporting is well-oriented to the results that we require and for sure they pay require also. Some details, questions like the use of Swift. Well, Swift is an international organisation, a private international organisation, in which the European Union has no power. We should be together with a lot of other people in order to be able to influence the decision about Swift. Sanctions: sanctions to the oligarchs. I would like very much to have a reason that can be legally supported, but our instruments, the last one – the human rights instrument that we approved and that we have been using for the first time against Russia and China – doesn’t consider corruption among one of the reasons to be employed. Sorry, that’s what we have approved. And about Nord Stream, that many of you have been mentioning. Yes, it’s a controversial infrastructure. And the European Commission has already said that this infrastructure does not lead to diversify the energy sources of the European Union, which is one of the objectives of our Energy Union. But this is a private endeavour. The European Union does not have the means and tools to decide what to do with Nord Stream 2. It is a matter of private firms and it is a matter for the Germans.  But we can do, when Nord Stream starts operating, if it does, is to require that it will be working in a non-discriminatory and in a transparent way with an adequate degree of regulatory oversight in line with the key principles of international and European Union energy law. I want to remind you that the Gas Directive that entered into force a couple of years ago in May 2019 gives the Union the competence to apply the European Union energy law on interconnection from third countries. And it is what we are going to do. But at the same time, don’t ask me to support the American sanctions against the firms that are building Nord Stream 2. I am against extraterritorial sanctions imposed by the United States – everywhere. I cannot not be depending on the colour of the people affected to be in favour or against it. You have to keep coherence. Well, these are some reflections about what you have been saying during this long exchange of views. To summarise, we must continue refuting Russia’s attempt to portray itself as a mediator in Ukraine and we must continue passing strong messages about the three issues that we have been discussing today. With regard to the Navalny case, let me say that there is a place in which we can do something. It is the Council of Europe. In the Council of Europe something can be done, more than here. The European Union members are members of the Council of Europe and nobody has been going to the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights, nobody as often as Navalny. And rarely has this system of collective human rights protection been as modest on the answer. And that’s important to take into consideration, because Navalny went to the court 20 times. He has been detained 10 months in house arrest, twice sentenced for corruption in fake trials, and every time the European Court of Human Rights had been ruling in his favour. He has been attacked three times, the last one with Novichok. And no real action has been taken. And I think that the Council of Europe could do more, because this is a democratic place where democracies sit around – Russia is part of this assembly. And I think that clear decisions from the European Court of Human Rights can help to face this problem: the issue of Mr Navalny. Well, we will have to continue talking about Russia. I want to insist that the word ‘engage’ is part of these three verbs, and we have a lot of work to do in order to create unity among us to impose reforms in the eastern border countries and to maintain with Russia the dialogue needed in order to work together on issues on which we need to work together. I don’t have any kind of interest in escalating against Russia. We don’t need to escalate; we need just to keep firm in defending our principles using the tools and means that we have. But please, look for solutions in the Member State capitals. Don’t believe that everything can be decided here by me, by the European Commission or by the European Parliament, because foreign policy is something that today is still a matter for the Member States. Help me to build a common foreign policy towards Russia.