Debate: The situation in Myanmar
Date: TUESDAY, 9 FEBRUARY 2021
Speaker: Josep Borrell Fontelles
Language: EN

Should the European Union not use or trigger the Everything But Arms (EBA) withdrawal procedure? The grave situation and the grave regression in human rights caused by the military coup – if not now, when? Some of you have asked that. But look, the EBA withdrawal is certainly a powerful instrument, which can foster positive change in partner countries. With Myanmar, it was actually delivering some, although limited, positive results, notably on social and labour rights. But the power of this instrument lies in the threat of the withdrawal – not in the withdrawal itself but in the threat, for example, in the process of monitoring before the actual decision is initiated. But take care because the EBA is a blunt instrument. Inasmuch as it affects the economy or at least the economic sector widely, even if used to cover only some specific tariff lines, it is not the best suited to be applied surgically to target specific individuals, companies or business interests. In the case of Myanmar, the aim is to target military interests as they are responsible for the current situation, not the whole economy.  According to the information available, military interests are focused on sectors that would not be affected by EBA preferences. In fact, most of Myanmar’s exports under the EBA regime are in the clothing sector, which employs more than 500 000 workers, mostly female workers, poor people. If we take this decision, they will suffer, not the military. In sum, withdrawing the EBA preferences would hit Myanmar’s economy hard, putting half a million low skilled workers at risk of poverty and leaving military interests almost untouched. Is that what we want? No. So take care when you ask to use some elements of our toolbox.  Another issue that has been raised by honourable Members is how the European Union should review its policy towards Myanmar if the legitimate government is not restored. It’s a legitimate question but, at present, our policy has two short—term objectives. Let’s concentrate on them: the immediate and unconditional release of those jailed because of the coup and the development of some form of dialogue. That’s what we should be focusing on. The policy options I outlined in my intervention are aimed at driving change in the short term in order to avoid the military government becoming a fait accompli and it becoming impossible to get rid of them.  There have been other military rules in Myanmar and these previous military rules lasted over five decades – five decades, 50 years, half a century – despite strong sanctions from almost the entire world. This shows that sometimes sanctions don’t work. We have to avoid repeating this situation. Our key objective remains to restore dialogue.  Incidentally, the need for dialogue was also the key message given by the respected Cardinal Bo, and it’s clear that the current crisis emerged from the military’s reluctance to cede power to the civilian side, but also from the breakdown of all channels of dialogue between the civilian and the military.  Dialogue has to be restored. There are many people who believe that dialogue is bad and you should not talk with the bad people. Well, sometimes you have to talk with the bad people precisely because they are bad people.  If the situation does not change, we will reassess the situation and re—examine our toolbox, having in mind the same principles I outlined before: be strong to affect change, and be careful to avoid undue impact on the general population and the most vulnerable. On the third issue, Ms Rookmaker asked me if I believe it’s good to coordinate with the US. Yes, for sure. In Myanmar we, the European Union, cannot seriously pretend to create the dynamics of change without coordination with the big powers, and the big powers there are the US, China and ASEAN.  From the outset, we, the European Union and our External Action Service and I, have been striving to coordinate this action and consult with as many relevant parties as possible. Naturally, we were closely involved in working with our G7 partners, but not only the traditional ones: the US, the UK, Canada, Norway and Australia. We also wanted to engage with other relevant stakeholders – India, China, ASEAN – and, in the case of the Rohingya crisis, the military coup in Myanmar is, first and foremost, a regional security issue. In addition to the humanitarian crisis, it’s a regional security issue and regional countries have the right and the duty to be first in line to respond. But this response has not been overwhelming. China, as you could have expected, did not even qualify the event as a coup, but a major government reshuffle. A reshuffle – you know, they change the government and it’s just a reshuffle. ASEAN was not able to reach consensus on any statement and resorted to a statement of the Chair. I know that sometimes it is difficult to get an agreement and it is the Chair who has to take responsibility, but is not the same thing. Brunei, for example, with very toned down language, was in in fact agreeing with Myanmar. In ASEAN the principle of non—interference in the internal affairs of other countries prevails.  There were many other issues. I would be delighted to continue answering them, going deeply into the subject. For example, should we, the European Union and the Member States, recall our ambassadors from Myanmar? Yes, it would send a strong signal, but I do not favour recalling our ambassadors. It would cut our channels of communication at a moment where we should facilitate dialogue. Once again, don’t lose the possibility of keeping dialogue open, even with the evil. It would also reduce our capacity to appraise the situation on the ground and our ability to gather information, but this is something that has to be checked permanently in order to fine-tune our tools to the situation.  There are many issues. Why do we, the European Union, only deploy a small electoral mission instead of a fully-fledged observation mission? You know how important our electoral observation missions are and how much I praise the work that we are doing there. The civil servants of this House and the Members of this House engage in these kinds of activities. However, the COVID—19 pandemic and the strict lockdown in Myanmar prevented the deployment of a fully—fledged exploratory mission, which, as you know, is a prerequisite for the observation mission.  But we were nevertheless able to engage with all relevant stakeholders and they are finalising their report. Our reporter will very much take into account what is happening in Rakhine State. The elections where they are open to the participation of the Rohingya and to the Rakhine people, but the actual result would have most likely further eroded the share of the military—backed party, if they could participate fully. In a nutshell, we have been a strong supporter of Myanmar’s democratic transition in the last 10 years. Yes, we had strong disagreements with the civilian government, notably after the 2017 events against the Rohingya, but we will not stop advocating for the return of the government and for holding the perpetrators of the worst human rights violations accountable. We are calling for national democracy to be upheld by Myanmar. With all its shortcomings, Myanmar remains a positive experiment in the region and we have to help them by acting strongly, quickly and in coordination with all our partners.  Thank you very much for your attention and thank you for holding this debate on something which is far away from us geographically but, once again, close to our minds and principles if we really want to be considered an institution that has human rights as the basis of its behaviour.