Debate: Rising energy prices and market manipulation on the gas market
Date: TUESDAY, 8 MARCH 2022
Speaker: Cristian-Silviu Buşoi
Country: Poland
Language: EN

It is important to note, first, that energy prices did not rise overnight and there are many factors, some with more impact than others. Whether we are talking about a sudden increase in demand at international level, especially in Asia, the decrease of internal gas production in the EU, the speculation on the EU ETS that might climb the price of carbon allowances and – especially – the game that Gazprom was playing to increase profits and the dependence of some EU countries on its resources, all these causes contribute to rising energy prices and, of course, now there is the unfortunate war started by Russia.  Gas prices peaked in December 2021, when they were 4.5 times higher than in January 2021, driven by global supply and demand dynamics, exacerbated by factors linked to the pandemic and geopolitical tensions combined with lower than expected imports of fossil gas in Europe, especially from Russia. This has led to fossil gas storage reaching lower than average levels and increasing inflation rates across the Union.  We welcomed the Commission toolbox in October 2021 as a necessary support to assist Member States to find solutions at their hands to palliate the effects of this sharp increase on vulnerable consumers and businesses. I welcome the second toolbox, the communication just launched this afternoon by the Commission, which will be presented in the ITRE Committee next week.  At the time of negotiating this oral question in our committee, Russia had not invaded Ukraine. It had not even started its so-called military exercises at its border. If anything, the events of the past two weeks have only confirmed that we are right to have suspicions of deliberate interference in the EU energy markets. What is clear is that we are certainly more vulnerable than we were a year ago. Our citizens are suffering the consequences of these rising prices in their own pockets. Inflation is heavy on our economy and our industries need our support too. Our gas reserves are sufficient for our immediate needs, but lower than average, and we must replenish them for the next winter, too. As the economy is starting to recover from the pandemic, the EU and the Member States must find structural solutions to protect and support households, as well as EU industries and enterprises – especially SMEs and micro—enterprises.  We welcome the new communication adopted today by the Commission on Joint European action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy and will give it all our attention in the coming days, together with all our work being carried out in the revision of the Internal Market for Gas Package.  Nevertheless, today we focus a little bit on the matter of potential manipulation in the gas market. We understand that the Commission is carrying out an investigation on possible anti-competitive behaviour in the gas market. What are the preliminary findings and when will these conclusions be made public?  At the time of negotiating the Third Energy Package, the Gas Directive included the third-country clause in its Article 11, the so-called Gazprom clause, which established the mechanism to award third-country companies certification to become a transmission system operator in the Union. The certification process required said companies to prove their activities did not endanger the security of supply in the Union.  Has the Commission started to review the certifications awarded? If not, why not? Has the effectiveness of Article 11 in reducing the risks to security of energy supply in the Member States been assessed? Such an assessment would be very welcome for our work on the revision of the Gas Directive.  With regard to strategic levels of storage, do the current levels exacerbate our vulnerability to external pressures in the short term? Are the specific thresholds for storage levels defined? What is the current picture of the liquefied natural gas carrier (LNGC) situation in the Union with regard to third-country operators? Could it also be a source of interference? Which concrete market structural changes at EU level could allow Member States to protect consumers in the future against the volatility of the international gas market?  Finally, what concrete actions will the Commission undertake to inform EU citizens better about the causes behind the dramatic increase in energy prices they are suffering from?