Debate: EU-Russia relations, European security and Russia’s military threat against Ukraine
Date: WEDNESDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 2022
Speaker: Josep Borrell Fontelles
Language: EN

The issue – and Guy has already said this – is that Ukraine is not a military threat to Russia, but it is a political threat because, if Ukraine builds a vibrant democracy and grows into a prosperous economy, then it will be an example, and in Putin’s Russia, after 20 years of his government, the economy is in bad shape and the system is more and more autocratic or authoritarian. Even today, we can see that the opposition politician Navalny, inside the penal colony, has another trial starting against him, regrettably without any possibility of observation. So as the Ukrainians continue to advance on their reforms, building a democracy and a prosperous economy, it is something that Russia’s Putin can certainly not look at with good eyes. But the Ukrainians have certainly made their choice, and I think that most of them prefer to live under democracy, the rule of law and a free market economy than look into what’s happening in Russia. And this is the real issue. The real issue is how we can support Ukraine on this path to democracy and economic prosperity. It is impossible to answer, or even to refer to, all the questions that you have raised today. I just want to answer in particular Hilde Vautmans, when she asked me directly if I could assure you that this unity has not been jeopardised by the initiatives taken by some Member States. Certainly, I can assure you. Plusieurs membres de l’Union européenne, en particulier la France – je le dis en français – et le président Macron, mais aussi l’Allemagne, ont pris des initiatives politiques pour essayer de favoriser un règlement pacifique de la crise. Toutefois, toutes ces initiatives ont été menées en cohérence avec les positions de l’Union et dans des conditions de grande transparence. Nous avons été informés en amont et en aval de ces initiatives. Je pense que, autour de l’Ukraine, il s’est bâti un climat de confiance entre les États membres à propos de la crise. Je crois que c’est la meilleure façon de répondre à l’agression russe. Soyez donc tranquilles, Mesdames et Messieurs les Députés, les initiatives qui ont été prises ici et là par plusieurs États membres n’ont pas affaibli l’unité européenne. Au contraire, elles nous ont permis d’être plus actifs et de participer davantage aux démarches diplomatiques qui ont eu lieu.  Some other Members have been saying that we have been negotiating with Russia and asking if there have been any concessions. Certainly not. First, we haven’t been negotiating with Russia so, if there is no negotiation, there are no concessions. We have just been answering letters in a very united way, and certainly my political director held talks with his Russian counterpart about the European situation in general in January. They discussed the political situation around the Ukrainian crisis, but I cannot consider that negotiations, so don’t be worried about possible concessions from one side or the other. There are many issues about the diversification of the energy supply, but I think the President of the Commission has given a very complete answer on all the work that she personally and my colleagues, Commissioners and myself have been doing with other suppliers of gas – Norway, Algeria, Azerbaijan, the US. We have also been talking with countries in the Pacific which can reroute some supplies of gas. This amount of work presents us with the advantage of being ready and able to face a crisis in an emergency. What I want to stress is that, in the face of the Russian military threat, we believe that a diplomatic way out of the crisis that Russia has caused is still possible. This is our top priority and what we are investing all our efforts in. Let me stress that. We still believe that a diplomatic way out of the crisis is possible but, in parallel, we have accelerated the work on restrictive measures – that is what the Treaty calls it when we use sanctions (the word sanctions is not in the Treaty, just restrictive measures), including sectoral, financial and individual sanctions that would be adopted in close coordination with like—minded countries in Europe and across the Atlantic in case of military aggression. Be sure of that. And be sure also that, even if Moscow has deliberately been bypassing Europe in security discussions because President Putin profoundly disagrees with the values that we, the European Union, practice and defend. And this is a real problem. They disagree with our values and with our way of living, the European way of living. What do we represent? A combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion. And this is why, since the beginning of the crisis, we have been expressing our principal positions about the main parameters that have defined European security architecture for the last 30 years. But we have to think about what Russia is looking for.  The second purpose, linked to the first, is also intended to test the possibility of a decoupling between the United States and Europe, particularly after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. In this respect, they should be quite disappointed, because our unity has been increased, not weakened. Finally, he seeks to reconstitute the former Soviet sphere by raising fears about NATO enlargement. And it’s true that the question of NATO enlargement plays an important role on the Russian psychology in its relationship to the West. But to try to reduce everything in this crisis to the question of NATO enlargement or to think that, once a possible guarantee of Ukraine’s membership or non-membership of NATO could be obtained, this would solve everything and we would go back to normal, is illusory. It’s illusory simply because, when you look at what is happening in Belarus (and no one has ever said that Belarus could join the European Union or NATO), we have been witnessing a real Russian stronghold on the country since Lukashenko was in trouble and played for his survival at the price of integration and even absorption into a greater Russia. So no, don’t reduce that to NATO expansion. The big problem is the fight between two different political and economic systems. What do we represent? Our values and their values, our way of living and their way of living. This is the real fight. It is not a fight between armies. It is a fight about ideas, which are sometimes much more important. Until now, nothing is played, nothing is won, but we have to keep vigilant. What we must avoid, basically, is a re-edition of the Crimea scheme, where we were quite surprised by the invasion and reacted with sanctions, but nothing more. Now we must show that any invasion of Ukraine, whatever form it takes, be it annexation of Donbas or isolated military incursions into the rest of Ukraine, would be prohibitively expensive for Russia and for its oligarchs. So the package of sanctions that we have been working on, that we have ready to implement, has to be strong and credible. But at the same time, we must not close the door to a discussion. Even when discussing, we must apply the rules of social distancing. We must therefore combine firmness and determination with a willingness to engage in a dialogue as soon as Russia agrees to play the game of negotiation and to move away from the logic of ultimatum and military intimidation that it has been practising for several months now. Mr Lavrov has just declared that he’s ready to continue discussions, so let’s do it. Let’s discuss seriously but without lowering our guard. I hope this debate will have marked this path.