British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government Service Employees' Union
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government Service Employees' Union  3 SCR 3, – called Meiorin for short – is a Supreme Court of Canada case that created a unified test to determine if a violation of human rights legislation can be justified as a "bona fide" occupational requirement (BFOR). Background. Before "Meiorin", Human Rights violations were treated in one of two ways; either as "direct discrimination", pursuant to the analysis in "Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Etobicoke (Borough of)",  1 SCR  202; or as "adverse effects discrimination", pursuant to the analysis in "Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons-Sears Ltd",  2 SCR 536. Academic writing deeply criticized this bifurcation of analysis as arbitrary and unhelpful in protecting equality rights. With the "Meiorin" case, the court decided to confront this criticism and refashion the analysis. Facts. Tawney Meiorin was employed as a firefighter by the British Columbia Ministry of Forests. Three years after being hired, the government adopted a series of fitness tests that all employees were required to pass. She passed all the tests except for one that required her  to run 2.5 km in 11 minutes. After four attempts, her best time was 49.4 seconds over the maximum allowed. As a result, she was fired. Reasoning of the Court. Though the fitness tests had a valid purpose of ensuring safety, the court found that the research that the tests were based on was incomplete and "impressionistic" and did not take into account the differences between men and women in establishing a standard. To reach this conclusion, the court examined the previous methods of analyzing Human Rights violations, noting where they were deficient, and then proposed a new ""Meiorin" Test  to which the current facts are applied. McLachlin J (as she then was) noted that the greatest deficiency in having two different approaches is that one afforded a greater amount of remedy than the other which provoked parties to abuse this distinction. There was the further problem that it had the overall effect of legitimizing systemic discrimination. As well, it created a dissonance between Human Rights analysis and Charter" analysis. Section::::"Meiorin" test. An employer can justify the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of probabilities: Rational connection. In practice, this step has been shown to be easily satisfied. It  is mostly used to motivate the parties to identify what the general purpose or goal of the standard is, and will only fail in the most egregious cases. This step has a close connection to the "rational connection" inquiry within the Oakes test which has been shown to have similar effect. Good faith. This step addresses the subjective element of test. Though it is not essential to the determination of a BFOR it captures many "direct discrimination" cases. Undue hardship. This step is the most decisive of them all. It must show that reasonable alternatives and accommodations have been looked  into and reasonably dismissed due to undue hardship. Sopinka J, in "Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud"  2 SCR 970, stated, "[T]he use of the term 'undue' infers that some hardship is acceptable; it is only 'undue' hardship that satisfies this test." The exact measurement of undue hardship is the combination of a variety of factors. Wilson J identified several in "Alberta Dairy Pool" including financial costs of accommodations, interchangeability of the workforce and facilities, and the interference of other employees rights. At paragraph 65 of "Meiorin", McLachlin J suggests six lines of inquiry to consider: British