Total Package Procurement
Total Package Procurement (TPP or alternatively TPPC) was a major systems acquisition policy introduced in the United States Department of Defense in the mid-1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara. It was conceived by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, Robert H. Charles. TPP involves combining as a single package for the procurement a number of related requirements including the design, development, production and support of major systems. This concept was a "pendulum reaction" to the prior cost reimbursement policies in major weapon systems. Total Package Procurement was not successful and was abandoned shortly after  MacNamara left office. Description. TPP is a method of procuring at the outset of the acquisition phase under a single contract containing price, performance and schedule commitments, the maximum practical amount of design, development, production and support needed to introduce and sustain a system or component in the inventory. The purpose of TPP was to procure under the influence of competition as much of the total design, development, production and support requirements for a system or component as may be practicable thereby: Results. Total Package Procurement did not succeed. The unique complexity of shipbuilding made Total Package Procurement particularly inappropriate  for these programs. Notable programs that encountered major problems with the TPP approach were the Air Force's Lockheed C-5 Galaxy and AGM-69 SRAM, the Army's Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne, the Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships (LHA), and the Spruance-class destroyers. Elimination. Upon taking office as Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1970, David Packard issued a May 28, 1970 memorandum that contained a number of major reforms designed to address "the real mess we have on our hands." A key reform was elimination of TPP except in rare situations.