Offshore financial centre
An offshore financial centre (OFC) is defined as a "country or jurisdiction that provides financial services to nonresidents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and the financing of its domestic economy." "Offshore" does not refer to the location of the OFC, since many Financial Stability Forum–IMF OFCs, such as Luxembourg and Hong Kong, are located "onshore", but to the fact that the largest users of the OFC are nonresident, i.e. "offshore". The IMF lists OFCs as a third class of financial centre, with international financial centres (IFCs), and regional financial centres (RFCs); there  is overlap (e.g. Singapore is an RFC and an OFC). During April–June 2000, the Financial Stability Forum–International Monetary Fund produced the first list of 42–46 OFCs using a qualitative approach. In April 2007, the IMF produced a revised quantitative-based list of 22 OFCs, and in June 2018, another revised quantitative-based list of eight major OFCs, who are responsible for 85% of OFC financial flows, which include Ireland, the Caribbean, Luxembourg, Singapore, Hong Kong and the Netherlands. The removal of foreign exchange and capital controls, the early driver for the creation and use of many OFCs in  the 1960s and 1970s, saw taxation and/or regulatory regimes become the primary reasons for using OFCs from the 1980s on. Progress from 2000 onwards from IMF–OECD–FATF initiatives on common standards, regulatory compliance, and banking transparency, has significantly weakened the regulatory attraction of OFCs. Academics now consider OFCs to be synonymous with tax havens, with a particular focus on corporate tax planning BEPS tools, tax-neutral asset structuring vehicles, and shadow banking/asset securitization. Research in 2013–14 showed OFCs harboured 8–10% of global wealth in tax-neutral structures, and acted as hubs for U.S. multinationals in particular, to avoid  corporate taxes via base erosion and profit shifting ("BEPS") tools (e.g. the double Irish). A study in 2017 split the understanding of an OFC into 24 Sink OFCs (e.g. traditional tax havens, to which a disproportionate amount of value disappears from the economic system), and five Conduit OFCs (e.g. modern corporate tax havens, through which a disproportionate amount of value moves toward the Sink OFCs). In June 2018, research showed that OFCs had become the dominant locations for corporate tax avoidance BEPS schemes, costing US$200 billion in lost annual tax revenues. A June 2018 joint-IMF study showed much  of the FDI from OFCs, into higher-tax countries, originated from higher-tax countries (e.g. the UK is the second largest investor in itself, via OFCs). Definitions. Core definition. The definition of an "offshore financial centre" dates back to academic papers by Dufry & McGiddy (1978), and McCarthy (1979) regarding locations that are: "Cities, areas or countries which have made a conscious effort to attract offshore banking business, i.e., non-resident foreign currency denominated business, by allowing relatively free entry and by adopting a flexible attitude where taxes, levies and regulation are concerned.”" An April 2007 review of the historical definition  of an OFC by the IMF, summarised the 1978–2000 academic work regarding the attributes that define an OFC, into the following four main attributes, which still remain relevant: In April 2000, the term rose to prominence when the Financial Stability Forum ("FSF"), concerned about OFCs on global financial stability, produced a report listing 42 OFCs. The FSF used a qualitative approach to defining OFCs, noting that: "Offshore financial centres (OFCs) are not easily defined, but they can be characterised as jurisdictions that attract a high level of non-resident activity [...] and volumes of non-resident business substantially exceeds the volume  of domestic business." In June 2000, the IMF accepted the FSF's recommendation to investigate the impact of OFCs on global financial stability. On the 23 June 2000, the IMF published a working paper on OFCs which expanded the FSF list to 46 OFCs, but split into three Groups based on the level of co-operation and adherence to international standards by the OFC. The IMF paper categorised OFCs as a third type of financial centre, and listed them in order of importance: International Financial Centre ("IFC"), Regional Financial Centres ("RFC") and Offshore Financial Centres ("OFC"); and gave a definition  of an OFC: The June 2000 IMF paper then listed three major attributes of offshore financial centres: A subsequent April 2007 IMF on OFCs, established a quantitative approach to defining OFCs which the paper stated was captured by the following definition: The April 2007 IMF paper used a quantitative "proxy text" for the above definition: "More specifically, it can be considered that the ratio of net financial services exports to GDP could be an indicator of the OFC status of a country or jurisdiction". This approach produced a revised list of 22 OFCs, however, the list had a strong correlation  with the original list of 46 OFCs from the IMF's June 2000 paper. The revised list was much shorter than the original IMF list as it only focused on OFCs where the national economic accounts produced breakdowns of net financial services exports data. By September 2007, the definition of an OFC from the most cited academic paper on OFCs, showed a strong correlation with the FSF–IMF definitions of an OFC: Link to tax havens. The common FSF–IMF–Academic definition of an OFC focused on the "outcome" of non-resident activity in a location (e.g. financial flows that  are disproportionate to the indigenous economy), and not on the reason that non-residents decide to conduct financial activity in a location. However, since the early academic papers into OFCs in the late 1970s, and the FSF-IMF investigations, it has been consistently noted that tax planning is one of the prime drivers of OFC activity. The other most commonly noted prime driver is favorable regulation, or regulatory arbitrage, such as in OFCs like Liberia, that focus on shipping. In April–June 2000, when the FSF–IMF produced lists of OFCs, commentators highlighted the similarity with tax haven lists. Large  projects were carried out by the IMF and the OECD from 2000 onwards, on improving data transparency and compliance with international standards and regulations, in jurisdictions that had been labeled OFCs and/or tax havens by the IMF–OECD. The reduction in "banking secrecy" as a result of these projects, led the leading academics who study tax havens and OFCs, to conclude that by 2010 onwards, the term tax haven and the term OFC had become practically synonymous: For example, all of the Top 10 tax havens, featured in the various post–2010 tax haven lists, bar the British Virgin Islands and  Puerto Rico, appeared in the shorter of 22 OFCs. The British Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were not included in the IMF 2007 study due to data issues. Conduit and Sink OFCs. While from 2010 onwards, academics began to treat tax havens and OFCs as practically synonymous, the OECD and the EU went in a different direction. By 2017, the OECD's list of tax havens only contained Trinidad & Tobago, while the EU's 2017 "blacklist" of 17 tax havens, only contained one jurisdiction, Samoa, in the top 20 tax havens, as ranked by academics and non-governmental organisations. In  July 2017, the University of Amsterdam's CORPNET group ignored any definition of a tax haven and followed a quantitive approach, analyzing 98 million global corporate connections on the Orbis database. CORPNET used a variation of the technique in the IMF's 2007 OFC working paper, and ranked the jurisdictions by the scale of international corporate connections relative to the connections from the indigenous economy. In addition, CORPNET split the resulting OFCs into jurisdictions that acted like a "terminus" for corporate connections (a Sink), and jurisdictions that acted like "nodes" for corporate connections (a Conduit). CORPNET's Conduit and Sink  OFCs study split the understanding of an offshore financial centre into two classifications: Sink OFCs rely on Conduit OFCs to reroute funds from high-tax locations using the BEPS tools which are encoded, and accepted, in the Conduit OFC's extensive networks of bilateral tax treaties. Because Sink OFCs are more closely associated with traditional tax havens, they tend to have more limited treaty networks. CORPNET's lists of top five Conduit OFCs, and top five Sink OFCs, matched 9 of the top 10 havens in the Hines 2010 tax haven list, only differing in the United Kingdom, which only  transformed their tax code in 2009–12, from a "worldwide" corporate tax system, to a "territorial" corporate tax system. All of CORPNET's Conduit OFCs, and eight of CORPNET's top 10 Sink OFCs, appeared in the of 22 OFCs. Lists. FSF–IMF 2000 list. The following 46 OFCs are from the June 2007 IMF background paper that used a qualitative approach to identify OFCs; and which also incorporated the April 2000 FSF list which had also used a qualitative approach to identify 42 OFCs. (*) Groups are as per the IMF June 2000 categories: (‡) Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat and Palau were not  on the FSF April 2000 list of 42 OFCs but were on the IMF June 2000 list of 46 OFCs. IMF 2007 list. The following 22 OFCs are from an April 2007 IMF working paper that used a strictly quantitative approach to identifying OFCs (only where specific data was available). (†) In on both the April 2000 FSF list of 42 OFCs, and the June 2000 IMF list of 46 OFCs. (Top 5 Conduit OFC) The IMF list contains all 5 largest Conduit OFCs: Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Singapore and Ireland (Top 10 Sink OFC) The IMF list contains 8 of  the 10 largest Sink OFCs: missing British Virgin Islands (data was not available), and Taiwan (was not a major OFC in 2007). IMF 2018 list. The following 8 OFCs (or also called "pass through economies") were co-identified by an IMF working paper, as being responsible for 85% of the world's investment in structured vehicles. (†) In the April 2000 FSF list of 42 OFCs, the June 2000 IMF list of 46 OFCs, and the April 2007 IMF list of 22 OFCs. (Top 5 Conduit OFC) The IMF list contains 3 of the largest Conduit OFCs: Netherlands, Singapore and Ireland  (Top 5 Sink OFC) The IMF list contains 4 of the 5 largest Sink OFCs: missing Jersey (4th largest Sink OFC), but includes the Cayman Islands (10th largest Sink OFC). FSF 2018 Shadow Bank OFC list. Shadow banking is a key service line for OFCs. The Financial Stability Forum ("FSF") produces a report each year on "Global Shadow Banking", or "other financial intermediaries" ("OFI"s). In a similar method to the various IMF lists, the FSF produces a table of the locations with the highest concentration of OFI/shadow banking financial assets, versus domestic GDP, in its 2018 report, thus creating  a ranked table of "Shadow Banking OFCs". The fuller table is produced in the section, however, the 4 largest OFCs for shadow banking with OFI assets over 5x GDP are: Countermeasures. Offshore finance became the subject of increased attention since the FSF–IMF reports on OFC in 2000, and also from the April 2009 G20 meeting, during the height of the financial crisis, when heads of state resolved to "take action" against non-cooperative jurisdictions. Initiatives spearheaded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and the International Monetary  Fund have had an effect on curbing some excesses in the offshore financial centre industry, although it would drive the OFC industry towards a for institutional and corporate clients. The World Bank's 2019 World Development Report on the future of work supports increased government efforts to curb tax avoidance. Tax services. Early research on offshore financial centers, from 1978 to 2000, identified reasons for nonresidents using an OFC, over the financial system in their own home jurisdiction (which in most cases was more developed than the OFC). Prominent reasons in these lists were: The third reason, "Manage around currency  and capital controls", dissipated with globalisation of financial markets and free-floating exchange rate mechanisms, and ceases to appear in research after 2000. The second reason, "Favourable regulations", had also dissipated, but to a lesser degree, as a result of initiatives by the IMF–OECD–FATF post–2000, promoting common standards and regulatory compliance across OFCs and tax havens. For example, while the EU–28 contains some of the largest OFCs (e.g. Ireland and Luxembourg), these EU–OFCs cannot offer regulatory environments that differ from other EU–28 jurisdictions. By 2010, leading tax academics saw little difference between tax havens and OFCs , and treated the terms as synonymous. In August 2013, Gabriel Zucman showed OFCs housed up to 8–10% of global wealth in tax–neutral structures. Others show that the main reason why private equity funds and hedge funds set up in OFCs, such as the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg, is to facilitate the personal tax planning of the managers. In August 2014, Zucman showed OFCs being used by U.S. multinationals, in particular, to execute base erosion and profit shifting ("BEPS") transactions to avoid corporate taxes. In Q1 2015, Apple executed the largest BEPS transaction in history, moving US$300 billion in  intellectual property ("IP") assets to Ireland, an IMF OFC, to use the Irish "Green Jersey" BEPS tool (see "Leprechaun economics"). In August 2016, the EU Commission levied the largest tax fine in history, at US$13 billion, against Apple in Ireland for abuse of the double Irish BEPS tool from 2004 to 2014. In January 2017, the OECD estimated that BEPS tools, mostly located in OFCs, were responsible for US$100 to 240 billion in annual tax avoidance. In June 2018, Gabriel Zucman ("et alia") showed that OFC corporate BEPs tools were responsible for over US$200 billion in annual  corporate tax losses, and produced the a table (see below) of the largest BEPS locations in the world, which showed how synonymous the largest tax havens, the largest Conduit and Sink OFCs, and the largest of OFCs had become. In June 2018, another joint-IMF study showed that 8 "pass-through economies", namely, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Singapore; host more than 85 per cent of the world's investment in special purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons. (*) One of the largest 10 tax havens  by James R. Hines Jr. in 2010 (the Hines 2010 List). (†) Identified as one of the 5 Conduits (Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), by CORPNET in 2017. (‡) Identified as one of the largest 5 Sinks (British Virgin Islands, Luxemburg, Hong Kong, Jersey, Bermuda), by CORPNET in 2017. (Δ) Identified on the of 22 OFCs (note the IMF could not get sufficient data on The British Virgin Islands in 2007 for its study but did list the Cayman Islands). (⹋) Identified on the of 8 major OFCs, or "pass through economies" (note the Caribbean contains the British Virgin  Islands and the Cayman Islands). Finance services. Shadow banking. Research into OFCs highlighted shadow banking as an original service of OFCs. Shadow banking enabled pools of "offshore" capital, mostly dollars, that had escaped capital controls in the 1960s and 1970s, and thus the main "onshore" banking systems, to be recycled back into the economic system while paying interest to the capital's owner, thus encouraging them to keep their capital offshore. They highlight the Eurodollar capital market as particularly important. However, as OFCs developed in the 1980s, it became apparent that OFC banks were not just recycling Eurodollars from foreign  corporate transactions, but also capital from tax avoidance (e.g. money being hidden in tax havens), and also from other criminal and illegal sources. Many OFCs, such as Switzerland, had bank secrecy laws protecting the identity of the owners of the "offshore" capital in the OFC. Over the years, a has weakened the ability of OFCs to provide bank secrecy. Shadow banking, however, remains a key part of OFCs services, and the Financial Stability Forum list of major shadow banking locations are all recognized OFCs. Securitisation. OFCs, however, have expanded into a related area to shadow banking, which is asset securitisation . Unlike traditional shadow banking, where the OFC bank needs to access a pool of "offshore capital" to operate, securitisation involves no provision of capital. OFC securitisation involves the provision of legal structures, registered in the OFC, into which foreign capital is placed to finance foreign assets (e.g. aircraft, ships, mortgages assets etc.), used by foreign operators and foreign investors. The OFC thus behaves more like a "legal conduit" rather than providing actual banking services. This has seen a rise in large specialist legal and accounting firms, who provide the legal structures for securitisations, in OFC locations. In normal securitisations, the  foreign capital, assets and operators can all come from major "onshore" locations. For example, Deutsche Bank in Germany might lend Euro 5 billion into an Irish Section 110 SPV (the Irish securitisation legal structure), which then buys Euro 5 billion in aircraft engines from Boeing, and then leases the engines to Delta Airlines. The reason why Deutsche Bank would use an Irish Section 110 SPV is that it is tax neutral, and that it has certain legal features, particularly orphaning, which are helpful to Deutsche Bank, but which are not available in Germany. Orphaning poses considerable risks of tax abuse  and tax avoidance to the tax base of higher-tax jurisdictions; even Ireland discovered a major domestic tax avoidance scheme in 2016, by U.S. distressed debt funds, using the Irish Section 110 SPVs, on Irish domestic investments. Defences. Better regulations. OFCs sometimes market themselves as "leaders in regulation" operating under the highest standards with the most advanced legal systems. Because OFCs are willing to create legal structures for broad classes of assets, including intellectual property ("IP") assets, cryptocurrency assets, and carbon credit assets, there is a justification that OFCs are often at the forefront of certain types of regulation. However , in the area of more general regulation, there is little real evidence to support these claims. In addition, there are contrary examples, even from the biggest OFCs, of poor regulation and oversight. (see here). Supporters of OFCs also claim that the costs of regulation and operation in OFCs are lower than in the major financial centres due to scale effects and cheaper operating locations. However, there have been no credible studies or evidence put forward, as yet, to demonstrate that it is cheaper to operate from OFCs than major IFCs/RFCs. There is evidence that OFCs have faster approval times , even 24 hours, for approval of new legal structures and special purpose vehicles, however critics highlight this aspect as a sign of weaker regulation and oversight in OFCs (e.g. brass plate company). Securitisation transactions. One of the most important service lines for OFCs is in providing legal structures for global securitisation transactions for all types of asset classes, including aircraft finance, shipping finance, equipment finance, and collateralised loan vehicles. OFCs provide what are called "tax neutral" special purpose vehicles ("SPVs") where no taxes, VAT, levies or duties are taken by the OFC on the SPV. In addition, aggressive legal structuring , including Orphan structures, is facilitated to support requirements for Bankruptcy remoteness, which would not be allowed in larger financial centres, as it could damage the local tax base, but are needed by banks in securitisations. As the "effective" tax rate in most OFCs is near zero (e.g. they are really tax havens), this is a lower risk, although, the experience of U.S. distressed debt funds abusing Irish Section 110 SPVs in 2012–2016 is notable. However, OFCs play a key role in providing the legal structure for global securitisation transactions that could not be performed from the main financial centres. Promotion  of growth. The most controversial claim is that OFCs promote global economic growth by providing a preferred platform, even if due to tax avoidance or regulatory arbitrage reasons, from which global capital is more readily deployed. There are strong academic advocates, and studies, on both sides of this argument. Some of the most cited researchers into tax havens/offshore financial centres, including Hines, Dharmapala and Desai show evidence that, in certain cases, tax havens/OFCs, appear to promote economic growth in neighbouring higher-tax countries, and can solve issues that the higher-tax countries can have in their own tax  or regulatory systems, which deter capital investment. The most cited paper specifically on OFCs, also came a similar conclusion (although recognising that there are strong negatives as well): However, other major tax academics take the opposite view and accuse Hines (and others) of mixing cause and effect (e.g. the capital investment would have come through the normal taxed channels had the OFC option not been available), and include papers by Slemrod, and Zucman. Critics of this theory also point to studies showing that in many cases, the capital that is invested into the high tax economy via the OFC, actually  originated from the high-tax economy, and for example, that the largest source of FDI into the U.K., is from the U.K., but via OFCs. This claim can get into wider, and also contested, economic debates around the optimised rate of taxation on capital and other free-market theories, as expressed by Hines in 2011. Structures. Legal structures. The bedrock of most offshore financial centres is the formation of offshore legal structures (also called tax-free legal wrappers): Ship and aircraft registrations. Many offshore financial centres also provide registrations for ships (notably Bahamas and Panama) or aircraft (notably Aruba, Bermuda  and the Cayman Islands). Aircraft are frequently registered in offshore jurisdictions where they are leased or purchased by carriers in emerging markets but financed by banks in major onshore financial centres. The financing institution is reluctant to allow the aircraft to be registered in the carrier's home country (either because it does not have sufficient regulation governing civil aviation, or because it feels the courts in that country would not cooperate fully if it needed to enforce any security interest over the aircraft), and the carrier is reluctant to have the aircraft registered in the financier's jurisdiction (often  the United States or the United Kingdom) either because of personal or political reasons, or because they fear spurious lawsuits and potential arrest of the aircraft. For example, in 2003, state carrier Pakistan International Airlines re-registered its entire fleet in the Cayman Islands as part of the financing of its purchase of eight new Boeing 777s; the U.S. bank refused to allow the aircraft to remain registered in Pakistan, and the airline refused to have the aircraft registered in the United States. Insurance. A number of offshore jurisdictions promote the incorporation of captive insurance companies within the jurisdiction to  allow the sponsor to manage risk. In more sophisticated offshore insurance markets, onshore insurance companies can also establish an offshore subsidiary in the jurisdiction to reinsure certain risks underwritten by the onshore parent, and thereby reduce overall reserve and capital requirements. Onshore reinsurance companies may also incorporate an offshore subsidiary to reinsure catastrophic risks. Bermuda's insurance and re-insurance market is now the third largest in the world. There are also signs the primary insurance market is becoming increasingly focused upon Bermuda; in September 2006 Hiscox PLC, the FTSE 250 insurance company announced that it planned to relocate to  Bermuda citing tax and regulatory advantages. Collective investment vehicles. Many offshore jurisdictions specialise in the formation of collective investment schemes, or mutual funds. The market leader is the Cayman Islands, estimated to house about 75% of world's hedge funds and nearly half the industry's estimated $1.1 trillion of assets under management (although statistics in the hedge fund industry are notoriously speculative), followed by Bermuda, although a market shift has meant that a number of hedge funds are now formed in the British Virgin Islands. But the greater appeal of offshore jurisdictions to form mutual funds is usually  in the regulatory considerations. Offshore jurisdictions tend to impose few if any restrictions on what investment strategy the mutual funds may pursue and no limitations on the amount of leverage which mutual funds can employ in their investment strategy. Many offshore jurisdictions (Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Guernsey) allow promoters to incorporate "segregated portfolio companies" (or SPCs) for use as mutual funds; the unavailability of a similar corporate vehicle onshore has also helped fuel the growth of offshore incorporated funds. Banking. Traditionally, a number of offshore jurisdictions offered banking licences to institutions with relatively little scrutiny. International initiatives  have largely stopped this practice, and very few offshore financial centres will now issue licences to offshore banks that do not already hold a banking licence in a major onshore jurisdiction. The most recent reliable figures for offshore banks indicates that the Cayman Islands has 285 licensed banks, the Bahamas has 301. By contrast, the British Virgin Islands only has seven licensed offshore banks.