Schulze STV
Schulze STV is a draft single transferable vote (STV) ranked voting system designed to achieve proportional representation. It was invented by Markus Schulze, who developed the Schulze method for resolving ties using a Condorcet method. Schulze STV is similar to CPO-STV in that it compares possible winning candidate pairs and selects the Condorcet winner. It is not used in parliamentary elections. The system is based on Schulze's investigations into vote management and free riding. When a voter prefers a popular candidate, there is a strategic advantage to first choosing a candidate who is unlikely to win  (Woodall free riding) or omitting his preferred candidate from his rankings (Hylland free riding). According to Schulze, vote management is party coordination of free riding. Although Schulze STV is resistant to both types of free riding, Hylland free riding is impossible to eliminate. Schulze created a criterion known as "weak invulnerability to Hylland free riding". A method meets this criterion if it is invulnerable to Hylland free riding, except in cases where the Droop proportionality criterion would be violated. Schulze STV meets this criterion. Scenario. Each voter ranks candidates in their order of preference. In a hypothetical election, three candidates  vie for two seats; Andrea and Carter represent the Yellow Party, and Brad represents the Purple Party. Andrea is a popular candidate, and has supporters who are not Yellow Party supporters. It is assumed that the Yellow Party can influence their own supporters, but not Andrea's. There are 90 voters, and their preferences are In the STV system, the initial tallies are: The quota is determined according to formula_1 Andrea is declared elected and her surplus, formula_2, is distributed with Brad is also elected. The Schultze STV system has three possible outcomes (sets of winners) in the election: Andrea  and Carter, Andrea and Brad, and Carter and Brad. In this system, any candidate with more than the Droop quota of first choices will be elected. Andrea is certain to be elected, with two possible outcomes: Andrea and Carter, and Andrea and Brad. Resistance to vote management. In vote management, a party instructs its voters not to rank a popular party candidate first. If the Yellow Party's leaders instruct their supporters to choose Carter first (followed by Andrea), the balloting changes. Unlike STV, however, Schulze STV resists vote management. STV and Schulze STV. Ordinary STV, being based on IRV , can be sensitive to in what order the losers are eliminated: what candidates win may depend on whether a loser has fewer first preferences than another loser. By using Condorcet pair comparisons, Schulze STV (like CPO-STV) greatly reduces this defect. The number of pair comparisons is smaller than CPO-STV, since Schulze STV only compares outcomes differing by one candidate; CPO-STV compares all possible pairs. Potential for tactical voting. Proportional representation systems are much less susceptible to tactical voting systems than single-winner systems such as the first past the post system and instant-runoff voting (IRV), if  the number of seats to be filled is sufficiently large. Schulze STV has additional resistance to forms of tactical voting which are specific to single transferable voting methods. All forms of STV that reduce to IRV in single winner elections fail the monotonicity criterion. This means that it is sometimes possible to benefit a candidate by ranking them "lower" than one's true order of preference, or to harm a candidate by ranking them "higher". This isn't the case for Schulze STV. When some voters rank candidate formula_5 higher without changing the order in which they rank the other  candidates relatively to each other, then the strength of the vote management of the candidates formula_6 against candidate formula_5 can't increase. I. e. the strength of any vote management and the strength of beatpaths is monotonic in formula_5 and the monotonicity follows from that of the underlying Schulze method. As Schulze STV reduces to the Schulze method in single winner elections, it fails the participation criterion, the later-no-harm criterion and the later-no-help criterion, whereas traditional forms of STV (that reduce to IRV in single winner elections) fulfill later-no-help and later-no-harm. STV  methods which make use of Meek's or Warren's method are resistant to Woodall Free Riding, but are still vulnerable to Hylland Free Riding. Schulze's method is not vulnerable to Hylland Free Riding, except where necessary in order to meet the Droop proportionality criterion. A method which doesn't meet the Droop proportionality criterion has the potential to give disproportional results, unless it meets a similar proportionality criterion. Thus, Schulze STV can be considered invulnerable to Hylland Free Riding to as great an extent possible, subject to actually being a proportional representation method. Complexity. Schulze STV is no  more complicated for the voter than other forms of STV; the ballot is the same, and candidates are ranked in order of preference. In calculating an election result, however, Schulze STV is significantly more complex than STV. Although it is less complex than CPO-STV, computer calculation would be required for large-scale elections. Computing the result would still be difficult in some cases, since Schulze STV does not have polynomial runtime.