Battle of Isaszeg (1849)
The Battle of Isaszeg (6 April 1849) took place in the Spring Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence from 1848 to 1849, between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Revolutionary Army supplemented by Polish volunteers. The Austrian forces were led by Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz and the Hungarians by General Artúr Görgei. The battle was one of several engagements between the Hungarian Revolutionary Army and the Imperial counter-revolutionary main army and was one of the turning points of the Hungarian War of Independence. The Hungarian victory precipitated a series of  setbacks to the Habsburg Imperial Armies in April–May 1849, forcing them to retreat from occupied central and western Hungary towards the western border and convinced the Hungarian National Assembly to issue the Hungarian Declaration of Independence (from the Habsburg Dynasty). Windisch-Grätz was dismissed from the leadership of the Imperial forces in Hungary on 12 April 1849, six days after the defeat. Background. After the Battle of Kápolna (26–27 February 1849) the commander of the Austrian imperial forces, Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz, thought that he had destroyed the Hungarian revolutionaries once and for all. In his report  of 3 March sent to the imperial court in Olmütz, he wrote: "I smashed the rebel hordes, and in a few days I will be in Debrecen" (the temporary capital of Hungary). In spite of this he did not attack the Hungarian forces, as he lacked reliable information about the numbers facing him if he crossed the Tisza river and because of his caution, lost the opportunity to win the war. While he was deciding whether to attack or not, the Hungarian commanders, who were discontented with the disappointing performance of Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński as high commander of the  Hungarian forces, blaming him for losing the Battle of Kápolna, had started a "rebellion". At a meeting in Tiszafüred, they forced the Government Commissioner Bertalan Szemere to depose the Polish general and put Artúr Görgei in command. This so infuriated Lajos Kossuth, the President of the National Defense Committee (the interim government of Hungary), that he wanted to execute Görgei for rebellion. Finally, he was persuaded by the support of the Hungarian generals for Görgei to change his mind and accept the removal of Dembiński, although his dislike of Görgei prevented him from accepting Szemere's choice of successor and  he named Lieutenant General Antal Vetter high commander instead. Vetter became ill on 28 March an after two days Kossuth was forced to accept Görgei as temporary high commander of the Hungarian main forces. Windisch-Grätz's uncertainty was amplified by diversionary Hungarian attacks in the south at the Battle of Szolnok on 5 March and in the north, where on 24 March the 800-strong commando of Major Lajos Beniczky attacked the Imperial detachment under Colonel Károly Almásy at Losonc. Half of Almásy's soldiers were captured and Almásy reported to Windisch-Grätz that he had been attacked by  a 6,000-strong army. Because of this the Austrian marshal scattered his troops in all directions to prevent a surprise attack, his main concern being a manoeuvre to bypass his northern flank, which he feared would raise the siege of the fortress of Komárom and cut his supply lines. On 30–31 March plans were made for a Hungarian Spring Campaign, led by General Görgei, to liberate the occupied Hungarian lands which lay to the west of the Tisza river, consisting of most of the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarian forces numbered some 47,500 soldiers and 198 guns , organised in four corps led by Generals György Klapka (I Corps), Lajos Aulich (II Corps), János Damjanich (III Corps) and András Gáspár (VII Corps). Windisch-Grätz had 55,000 soldiers and 214 guns and rockets in three corps, led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić (I Corps), Lieutenant General Anton Csorich (II Corps), General Franz Schlik (III Corps) and the division led by Lieutenant General Georg Heinrich Ramberg. The Hungarian plan, elaborated by Antal Vetter, was for VII Corps to divert the attention of Windisch-Grätz by making an attack from the direction of Hatvan, while I, II and III corps  encircled the Austrian forces from the south-west, cutting them off from the capital cities (Pest and Buda). According to the plan, VII corps had to stay at Hatvan until 5 April and then reach Bag the following day. The attack on the Austrian forces had to occur from two directions at Gödöllő on 7 April, while I Corps advanced to Kerepes and fell on the Austrians from behind, preventing them from retreating towards Pest. The key to the plan was for the Austrians not to discover the Hungarian troop movements until their encirclement was complete. Prelude. On 2 April , the preliminary fighting began when the VII Corps clashed with the Austrian III Corps at the Battle of Hatvan. Schlik had wanted to obtain information for Windisch-Grätz about the positions and numbers of the Hungarian army and had moved towards Hatvan but was defeated there by the VII Corps and forced to withdraw without accomplishing his purpose. Windisch-Grätz assumed that Schlik had come up against the main Hungarian army and remained ignorant of the true whereabouts of the Hungarian army. The other three Hungarian corps moved south-west as planned and on 4 April met and defeated the  Austrian I Corps at the Battle of Tápióbicske. Although Klapka's attack at Tápióbicske had revealed where the Hungarian troops really were, Görgei decided to continue with the plan. After the fighting on 4 April, Jelačić, the Ban of Croatia, claimed to Windisch-Grätz that he had actually been victorious, which misled the Field Marshal into ordering him to pursue the Hungarians. Rather than fleeing, the Hungarians were closing in on Windisch-Grätz's headquarters at Gödöllő, even as he was planning an attack on them for the following morning. On 5 April he sent two companies of lancers, two  companies of light horse and two rockets under the command of Lieutenant General Franz Liechtenstein on a reconnaissance mission to Hatvan. After a skirmish with four companies of Hungarian hussars, they retreated none the wiser. Fearing that the Hungarian main forces would get around him from the south and cut his lines to the capital, or from the north and liberate the fortress of Komárom from the Austrian siege, he sent the Autrian III Corps to Gödöllő and I Corps southwards to Isaszeg. Two brigades of the Austrian II Corps were also sent to Vác, and Lieutenant General Georg Heinrich  Ramberg ordered to join him with his brigade; two brigades remained in Pest. Windisch-Grätz had scattered his forces over , too far apart for mutual support. Although the Hungarian front line was only -long, Görgei could only deploy two thirds of his troops at any point in the battle because of his orders to his generals regarding their movements prior to the attack on 7 April, the day the battle was to begin. Gáspár was ordered to move from the north and occupy Bag and III Corps was to move forward from Tápiószecső and occupy Isaszeg. I Corps also had  to move towards Isaszeg, while one of his brigades was to take Pécel and II Corps had orders to take up a position at Dány and Zsámbok. Görgei's plan was for Gáspár to pin the Austrian left wing while the other three corps attacked at Isaszeg. This would push the Austrians northwards from Pest, enabling the liberation of the Hungarian capital on the Eastern bank of the Danube. This forced a dilemma onWindisch-Grätz, to accept a battle where the Hungarians had superiority or to retreat to Pest, which was hard to defend, being open to attacks from three  directions. It also had only one unfinished bridge (the Chain Bridge), to allow his troops to cross the Danube to Buda on the other side, should he need to retreat, which would have been impossible. Windisch-Grätz chose the lesser of two evils. On the morning of 6 April at 6:00 a.m., the Austrian troops retreated towards Gödöllő. Jelačić arrived at Isaszeg at 11:00 a.m. and set up camp on the heights near the village, reporting to Windisch-Grätz that Hungarian troops were following him from the south. The Field Marshal ordered him to find out the enemy strength and  if he had enough forces, to enter into battle with them. Battle. On 6 April Görgei gave orders for his troops to move and occupy the forming up points ready for the Hungarian attack due the next day. He would be in Kóka, from Isaszeg. When the troops moved to the places where they were supposed to wait, they encountered Austrian soldiers and an encounter battle began; both commanders were surprised, causing haste and confusion. Gáspár moved with his 14,258 troops and 66 guns to Aszód, Tura and Bag on the bank of the river Galga at 12:30 p.m. He  sent Colonel György Kmety with a division to occupy Hévízgyörk, where they stumbled on Schlik's cavalry; after the Austrians retreated, the Hungarians halted. Gáspár did not move his troops forward even after hearing gunfire, claiming that he was obeying the orders he had received from Görgei the previous day to remain in that position until the following day, which meant that III Corps, the largest of the four Hungarian corps (I: 10,817 men, II: 8,896, III: 11,592), was absent throughout the battle. At the same time, Klapka's and Damjanich's two corps arrived in the vicinity of Királyerdő  (King's Forest) east of Isaszeg. Here Damjanich's troops attacked the rear brigade of Austrian I Corps, chasing it out of the forest to Isaszeg and setting fire to the forest in several places. Then Klapka's troops attacked Major-General Franz Adam Grammont von Linthal's brigade, chasing it towards Isaszeg. The Hungarian 34th Battalion (István Zákó) and 28th Battalion (János Bobich) arrived but the superiority of Austrian I Corps, with its three infantry brigades and three cavalry brigades caused the two battalions many losses and forced them to retreat towards the woods. The attack of the Austrian  cuirassiers was finally repelled by the fire of Klapka's 44th and 47th battalions, then they were also attacked from the flank by the Bódog Báthory Sulcz's brigade and finally the two Hungarian battalions chased the Austrian kaiserjägers out from Királyerdő woods. The Hungarian troops were prevented from leaving the woods by the fire of the Croatian seressaners, positioned on a height near Isaszeg. At 2:00 p.m. the units of Damjanich's III Corps crossed the wood, and after chasing Daniel Rastić's brigade from the forest, positioned themselves at the western end of it. Rastić retreated across the  Rákos creek, where together with Schultzig's division, which had been sent to help by Jelačić, he repelled the attack of Zákó's brigade of Klapka's corps. This event also threw Bobich's brigade of the same corps into disarray, causing them to retreat. At this moment Klapka, a very capable Hungarian general and one of the heroes of the Hungarian war of independence, inexplicably lost his head and left his commanders to their own devices. One of them, János Bobich, started an attack but was repelled by enemy fire. Damjanich sent one brigade to reinforce Klapka and another  to the northern end of the forest. He then positioned his guns on high ground and his cavalry in the angle of the forest, between him and Klapka in the middle of the Hungarian front. Damjanich intended to attack to relieve the pressure on Klapka but the latter, feeling that his situation was hopeless, started to withdraw his troops before help arrived. Damjanich remained and when he saw the Austrian troops pursue Klapka, sent one of his best units, the 9th Battalion, together with the 3rd Battalion, to help Klapka. Klapka's two brigades (Zákó and Bobich), together with Damjanich 's two battalions counter-attacked and pushed Jelačić's troops onto the heights on the right bank of the Rákos creek. Aulich's II Corps stood still in Dány and Zsámbok, despite the fact that he had received a message from Damjanich to hurry to the battlefield. Aulich, like Gáspár, insisted on obeying Görgei's orders of the day before to remain in position. After orders from the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel József Bayer, he finally ordered his troops to move towards Isaszeg. At 3:00 p.m. the four Hungarian corps were fighting in an uncoordinated manner; Görgei was  still in Kóka, ignorant of what was going on, preparing for a battle that he thought would start the following day. At this point a Hungarian hussar arrived and informed him that the battle had begun and was about to be lost. Hearing this, Görgei mounted and hurried towards the battlefield. Damjanich continued his attack against the heights defended by Jelačić's troops but his men were caught by surprise from the north by Franz Liechtenstein's division, sent by Schlick. Damjanich had not secured his northern flank because he thought that Gáspár would attack and pin Schlick in position . Now the III Corps was caught between two fronts, forcing Damjanich to retreat to Királyerdő, recover the lost ground there and defend his position from the attacks of the Austrian infantry. At 4:00 p.m., Klapka's two engaged brigades could not continue the fight alone, so they too retreated into the forest. Jelačić ordered a general attack against the Hungarians from all directions. This was a critical moment of the battle, because there were 26,000 Austrian troops on the battlefield against 14,000 Hungarians, with only half of the Hungarian artillery. Aulich's troops were in Dány and VII Corps had  not moved. Görgei arrived at the eastern edge of the Királyerdő forest at 4:00 p.m., just as Aulich's corps arrived and was about to join the battle. He was also told that VII Corps had occupied its position on the Galga river line. Görgei made the mistake of not sending an order to Gáspár to advance, thinking that he was already doing so, whereas Gáspár was just standing in position waiting for new orders. Görgei wrote in his memoirs that he was misinformed by the hussar who brought Gáspár's report, saying that his commander was advancing towards Gödöllő . Görgei now thought that he would easily encircle and destroy the Austrian main body if Gáspár's corps attacked the Austrians from the north-east, as Damjanich's troops would hold the line in the forest and Klapka would attack and chase the Austrians to the north. The plan failed because of Görgei's failure to send the message and because Gáspár chose to remain in his position despite hearing the cannonade. The Hungarian difficulties did not end with the arrival of Görgei and Aulich. Klapka was still retreating and the places on the edge of the forest that he  left empty could be occupied by the Austrian troops, cutting the Hungarian army in two. Görgei distributed the battalions of II Corps among the endangered zones with four battalions to the right wing to help Damjanich, two in the middle to fill the gap created by Klapka's retreat and the 61st Battalion to help Klapka on the left wing. Görgei also consulted with Klapka, who wanted to continue his retreat, saying that his troops had run out of ammunition and were very tired, so "today it is impossible to obtain victory, but tomorrow it will be possible again". Görgei  replied: ""[...] the quickness of your infantry's retreat shows that they are not that tired, so they can try some bayonet attacks, and for these they have enough cartridges even if they have indeed really used them all. We have to win today, or we can go back to the swamps of the Tisza! Only two solutions exist, we have no third. Damjanich is still holding out at his post, and Aulich is advancing - we must win!"" These words convinced Klapka to order his troops to move forward again and occupy Isaszeg. Görgei hurried to the right flank and told  Damjanich that he had convinced Klapka to stop the retreat and attack. Damjanich showed no confidence in Klapka but obeyed his commander and continued to resist Liechtenstein's attacks. The eventual arrival of Aulich's four battalions created confusion, because the III Corps troops thought that they were Austrians and briefly opened fire. The long fight on the right flank disordered Damjanich's battalions, so he could not use his ten battalions to attack the five Austrian infantry battalions which faced them. This task was made impossible also by the numerical superiority of the Austrian cavalry, which had 34 squadrons  against 17 on the Hungarian side and by their artillery, as they had twice as many guns as Damjanich; on the right flank nothing in particular happened until around 11:00 p.m. The 25th, 48th, 54th, 56th battalions of II Corps, together with III Corps, pushed the Autrians towards Gödöllő. On the left flank victory came earlier, because around 7:00 p.m. Klapka and Aulich's troops finally started their attack and managed to emerge from the Királyerdő forest with the help of the Hungarian guns, captured the burning village of Isaszeg with a bayonet charge and repulsed the Austrian troops from  the right bank of the Rákos creek. Jelačić's cavalry, comprising cuirassiers under Major General Ferenc Ottinger, crossed the Rákos creek to counter-attack but the Hungarian artillery and cavalry (mainly Colonel József Nagysándor's hussars) chased them back. Bayer ordered I Corps to pursue the Austrans and advance to Kerepes but Klapka refused, pointing to the fatigue of his troops. The hastily retreating Austrians were only pursued by György Kmety's division but he could not catch them. Of the Hungarian corps commanders it was Klapka, despite his initial setbacks, who decided the fate of the battle for the  Hungarians. At 7:00 p.m. Windisch-Grätz thought he had won a victory, but by around 9:00 p.m. had been forced to order his troops to retreat. Even after the battle was decided by the attack of I Corps, Görgei was still uncertain about the result, because on the right wing and in the centre the fighting continued until late in the evening. Only when he moved to the left flank did he learn from Aulich that Austrian I Corps had begun retreating towards Gödöllő and realised that the Hungarians had won the battle. Aftermath. The battle of Isaszeg, following the  Battle of Kápolna, was the second confrontation between the Hungarian revolutionary and the Austrian armies. Although it was not a crushing defeat for either of the combatants, it influenced the morale both of the victors and of the defeated. While the Hungarian generals, with the exception of Ándrás Gáspár, showed the ability to take decisions when they were on their own, the Imperial generals, other than Franz Schlik, failed from this point of view. Windisch-Grätz misunderstood the situation completely before the battle, scattering his troops, so that Anton Csorich's II Corps and Georg Heinrich Ramberg's division could  not participate in the battle. Although Görgei had made mistakes too, such as wrongly believing that Gáspár had joined the battle, he succeeded in committing the majority of his troops and winning the battle. The battle of Isaszeg was in contrast to the Battle of Kápolna where, in a similar situation, the Hungarian commander Henryk Dembiński had failed to co-ordinate his troops on the battlefield, allowing Windisch-Grätz to win. The most important result of the battle was that the military initiative was taken for two months by the Hungarian army, while the Habsburg army was defeated in a  series of battles (Battle of Vác, Battle of Nagysalló, Battle of Komárom, Siege of Buda), and forced to retreat towards the west. Also the Battle of Isaszeg played a decisive role in Windisch-Grätz being relieved of command of the Habsburg armies by the emperor on 12 April, who named Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Welden in his place, although until his arrival his duties were fulfilled by Josip Jelačić. The changes in the leadership did not produce a change in the military situation for the Austrian side, their situation continuing to worsen day by day because of the new defeats they  suffered, which caused their retreat from almost all the territory they occupied in Hungary between December and March. On the day after the battle of Isaszeg, Lajos Kossuth, the President of the National Defense Committee arrived in Gödöllő and moved into the Grassalkovich Palace, which had been Windisch-Grätz's headquarters until the previous day. Here he formulated the Hungarian Declaration of Independence, which declared the removal of the House of Habsburg from the leadership of Hungary and Hungary's total independence. Although independence was declared on 14 April 1849 in Debrecen, it was decided in Gödöllő following the victories  of the Spring Campaign, and in particular the Battle of Isaszeg. Also in Gödöllő the plan for the second phase of the Spring Campaign was formulated. This plan was based on making the Imperial high command believe that the Hungarian army wanted to liberate the capitals of Hungary: Pest and Buda, when in fact their main forces would move north, liberating the Hungarian fortress of Komárom, besieged since January by the Imperial forces. While II Corps under Lajos Aulich remained in front of Pest, with the duty of misleading the Imperial forces, making such brilliant military manoeuvres that the Austrian  commanders thought that the Hungarian main forces were still in front of the capital planning to make a frontal attack against it, the I, III and VII Corps accomplished the campaign plan perfectly, and on 26 April relieved the fortress of Komárom. This forced the main Austrian forces based in the capital, except for 4,890 soldiers who were left to hold the fortress of Buda, to retreat to the Austrian border, thus liberating almost all of Hungary from Austrian occupation. Legacy. The famous Hungarian Romantic novelist Mór Jókai made the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence the subject of his  popular novel A kőszívű ember fiai (literally: The Sons of the Man with a Stone Heart, translated into English under the title: The Baron's sons). In chapters XIX and XX, the Battle of Isaszeg is vividly presented as one of the main plot events of the novel, in which several of his main characters appear as fighters in the ranks of both the Hungarian and the Austrian army. This novel was also adapted as a movie in 1965, having the same title (A kőszívű ember fiai) as the novel, and including the Battle of Isaszeg as one of its  most important scenes. Nowadays the battle is re-enacted every year on its anniversary, 6 April, in and around Isaszeg.