Longzhong Plan
The Longzhong Plan is the name given to a strategic plan by Zhuge Liang, a statesman of the Shu Han state in the Three Kingdoms period (220–280) of China. Zhuge Liang presented the plan to Liu Bei, a warlord who became the founding emperor of the Shu Han state, sometime in 207 towards the end of the Eastern Han dynasty when Liu Bei visited him at his residence in Longzhong (隆中), an area in the west of present-day Xiangyang, Hubei. The Longzhong Plan formed the basis for the establishment of the Shu Han state. In essence, the  plan required Liu Bei to gain control over Jing and Yi provinces, which covered present-day Hubei and Hunan, and Sichuan and Chongqing, respectively, so as to secure a viable base for staging attacks against Liu Bei's rival, Cao Cao, and his territories in central and northern China. The plan also required Liu Bei to form a strategic alliance with another warlord, Sun Quan, who was based in eastern China. Details. Zhuge Liang's biography in the historical text "Records of the Three Kingdoms", written by Chen Shou in the late third century, recorded the details of the private  conversation between him and Liu Bei in his house in Longzhong. Liu Bei said: Zhuge Liang replied: The plan envisaged that Liu Bei would take over Jing and Yi provinces, both of which were governed by the warlords Liu Biao and Liu Zhang respectively. The Longzhong Plan noted that Cao Cao controlled the North China Plain, which was key to mastery of China, and that Sun Quan held the lower Yangtze River region, known as "Jiangdong". In view of this, a move to occupy Jing and Yi provinces was vital for success. The essential outlines of the plan held remarkable  foresight in envisaging the tripartite division of China. The other crucial aspect of the plan was the proposal for forming an alliance with Sun Quan in order to deter and resist Cao Cao. Other minor aspects included the institution of economic, legal and administrative reforms as well as developing cordial relations with the non-Han Chinese peoples located in the west and south. Such a policy would reduce resistance and increase much-needed manpower and economic resources. The culminating clause was a two-pronged northern campaign which would end in the seizure of the North China Plain and the reestablishment  of the Han dynasty. One advance would be from Yi Province in the west, north through the Qin Mountains, which debouches into the Wei River valley and achieving a strategic position in the west from which to dominate the great bend of the Yellow River and the Guanzhong region. The second advance would be from Jing Province north toward Luoyang, the old imperial capital of the Han dynasty, and the surrounding plains. Such a campaign would presumably occur at an opportune moment of destabilisation of Cao Cao's regime but that moment was not specified. Nor was the role of  Sun Quan in the offensives identified; though it would be assumed that he would tie down at least some of Cao Cao's forces. From 214 onwards, Liu Bei controlled both Jing and Yi provinces after seizing Yi Province from Liu Zhang. In 219, he won a decisive victory over Cao Cao and occupied Hanzhong Commandery. That autumn, his commander in Jing Province, Guan Yu, struck north against Cao Cao's positions on the Han River. This offensive may have been part of the planned two-pronged attack. For the first few months, Guan Yu's attack was remarkably successful  and Cao Cao even considered evacuating the imperial capital, Xuchang. At this point, however, Sun Quan took the opportunity to launch a surprise attack and rapidly seized Jing Province. Liu Bei tried unsuccessfully to recapture Jing Province during the Battle of Xiaoting of 222–223, and died shortly thereafter. Even with the loss of Jing Province, Zhuge Liang may have attempted to carry out a modified version of the Longzhong Plan in the form of the Northern Expeditions, although it is arguable that those campaigns had different tactical and strategic goals. Criticism. The Qing dynasty scholar Wang Fuzhi was critical of  the strategic goal of the Longzhong Plan because the two-pronged offensive that was intrinsic to the plan did not make a distinction as to which prong was the decoy and which was the main force. He alludes to the plan as being without any subtlety: such as using the stratagem "make a sound in the east but strike in the west" (聲東擊西 "shēng dōng jī xī"). Nor did it incorporate any hint of the interplay between "zheng" (正) and "qi" (奇) - the orthodox, apparent, and overt military operation and a surprise, covert, or unexpected military action which brings about  victory for a weaker force. Wang Fuzhi notes that one who seeks to seize the empire from a comparatively weak position must be flexible in strategic planning in order to grasp the opportunity to use "qi" to obtain victory. Others charge that the political goal of the Longzhong Plan was flawed because the restoration of the Han dynasty was unrealistic. The Cao Wei state, which Zhuge Liang considered to be an illegitimate successor to the Han dynasty, had effectively dealt with economic and political issues and had gained the support of the people. The military historians at the Military Science  Academy in Beijing view Zhuge Liang's political goal as inappropriate and unrealistic even in 207 when the plan was formulated and totally irrelevant by the time of the Northern Expeditions. The idea of seizing Jing Province in the Longzhong Plan was a flawed concept because Sun Quan would never accept Liu Bei in control of this critical area, crucial for the security of his base in Jiangdong. In essence, Zhuge Liang is charged with failing to make an objective analysis of the political situation in 207.