German code breaking in World War II
German code breaking in World War II achieved some notable successes cracking British naval ciphers until well into the fourth year of the war, using the extensive German radio intelligence operations during World War II. Cryptanalysis also suffered from a problem typical of the German armed forces of the time: numerous branches and institutions maintained their own cryptographic departments, working on their own without collaboration or sharing results or methods. This led to duplicated effort, to a fragmentation of potential, and to lower efficiency than might have been achieved. There was no central  German cryptography agency comparable to Britain’s Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), based at Bletchley Park. History. Departments. In Germany, each cryptographic department was responsible for cryptanalytic operations. They included: While most contributed little to the German war effort, the Navy's "OKM" did have some remarkable successes in breaking Allied codes. The "2. Abteilung der Seekriegsleitung" included the "Marinenachrichtendienst" ("M.N.D.") and its "III. Abteilung", radio intelligence. The "B-Dienst" ("Beobachtungsdienst", "surveillance service",) and the xB-Dienst ("decryption service") were able to break into several important Allied radio communication circuits. B-Dienst. The "B-Dienst", created in the early  1930s, had broken the most widely used British naval code by 1935. When war came in 1939, "B-Dienst" specialists had broken enough British naval codes that the Germans knew the positions of all British warships. They had further success in the early stages of the war as the British were slow to change their codes. The "B-Dienst" could regularly read the British and Allied Merchant Ships (BAMS) code, which proved valuable for U-boat warfare in the early phases of the Battle of the Atlantic. In February 1942, "B-Dienst" broke the code used for communication with many  of the Atlantic convoys. Before the US entered the war at the end of 1941, "B-Dienst" could also read several American codes. This changed after April 1942, when the US Navy changed their code systems, but earlier, the ability to read American message traffic contributed to the success of Operation "Paukenschlag" (Operation "Drumbeat"), the destructive U-boat attacks off the American East Coast in early 1942. In 1941, the US Navy refused, for security reasons, to equip the British Navy with their ECM Mark 1 encryption devices, so the British Admiralty introduced "Naval Cypher No. 3" for Allied radio  communication and convoy coordination in the Atlantic. The "B-Dienst" concentrated on deciphering the new code, in September 1942 and from December 1942 to May 1943, 80 percent of the intercepted radio messages were read but only 10 percent were decrypted in time to take action. The British Naval Cypher No. 5 is also known to have been broken by the "B-Dienst", as were various low-grade British Naval and Air codes, including COFOX, MEDOX, FOXO, LOXO, SYKO, Air Force code and Aircraft Movement code. The US "Hagelin" M-209 field cipher machine and the French "Anglp" code were also  often read. In addition, "B-Dienst" cracked Soviet and Danish code systems. Radiotelephone interception. Apart from the notable successes of the German navy's decryption services, there were also some useful results from other institutions. For example, the "Reichspost" was able to descramble scrambled voice transmission of the transatlantic radiotelephone connection between the USA and Great Britain. For this purpose, an interception and descrambling facility was built in Noordwijk, in occupied Holland. From 1940, the Mail Service's descrambling specialists intercepted and understood classified telephone conversation between President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The facility relocated to  a purpose built bunker facility in Valkenswaard where it remained until August 1944 when the facility had to relocate to Germany, the interception potential decreased, so did the number of phone calls intercepted. This was not codebreaking, but an adjunct to it - the exploitation of understanding of a sophisticated technology for the purpose of data interception. Co-operation with Italy. Another success was the "OKW/Chi" 1941 cryptanalysis of the "Black" code used by US diplomats. Due to this, a huge interception facility in Lauf (Bavaria) could decrypt communication between US diplomats and Washington DC. The specialists in Lauf concentrated  on messages from Bonner Fellers relating to the North African Campaign, so they could pass information to "Feldmarschall" Erwin Rommel about Allied plans and operations. The Germans also received the "Black" code from the Italians; Italian spies had photographed the code tables in the US embassy in Rome in September 1941. While the Germans appreciated the gift from their ally, they did not explain that they were already able to read "Black" code messages. In general, however, German performance in code breaking was weak due to the fragmentation of responsibility and specialized personnel. The Navy's "B-Dienst" was an  exception to the rule, although its successes largely ended when the Allies began using more sophisticated encryption methods by 1943.