The Ethics of Ambiguity
The Ethics of Ambiguity () is Simone de Beauvoir's second major non-fiction work. It was prompted by a lecture she gave in 1945, after which she claimed that it was impossible to base an ethical system on her partner Jean-Paul Sartre's major philosophical work "Being and Nothingness" (). The following year, over a six-month period, she took on the challenge, publishing the resulting text first as installments in "Les Temps modernes" and then, in November 1947, as a book. Contents. "The Ethics of Ambiguity" consists of three parts and a short conclusion. Part  I. "Ambiguity and Freedom," lays out the philosophical underpinnings of Beauvoir's stance on ethics. She asserts that man is fundamentally free, a freedom that comes from his "nothingness," which is an essential aspect of his ability to be self-aware, to be conscious of himself: "... the nothingness which is at the heart of man is also the consciousness that he has of himself." But man is also a thing, a "facticity," an object for others. The ambiguity is that each of us is both subject and object, freedom and facticity. As free, we have the ability to take note  of ourselves and choose what to do. As factic, we are constrained by physical limits, social barriers and the expectations and political power of others. Beauvoir rejects any notion of an absolute goodness or moral imperative that exists on its own. "...there exists no absolute value before the passion of man, outside of it, in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful." Values come only from our choices. Human freedom can be only in concrete projects, not in the abstract. Freedom "requires the realization of concrete ends, of particular projects." The types of particular content that  are suitable are discussed in Part III. Part II. Part II, "Personal Freedom and Others," examines a number of different ways that people try to deny their freedom, as freedom can be uncomfortable and disquieting. The freedom to choose entails the freedom to try to avoid one's freedom. Before we can even do that, however, we start as children, who take the values of the adults around them as ready-made things. She calls this the attitude of "seriousness," in which the child "escapes the anguish of freedom" by thinking of values as existing objectively, outside himself, rather than  as an expression of his freedom. Once past childhood, one can be a "sub-man" who avoids all questions of freedom and assumes himself not free. The next rung up the hierarchy is the "serious man" who "gets rid of his freedom by claiming to subordinate it to values which would be unconditioned," in effect reverting to a kind of childhood. Both the sub-man and the serious man refuse to recognize that they are free, in the sense of being able to choose their own values. Several other types recognize their freedom, but misuse it. The "nihilist", having failed  at life, decides not to try anything at all. "Conscious of being unable to be anything, man then decides to be nothing. ... Nihilism is disappointed seriousness which has turned back upon itself." The "adventurer" is one who engages vigorously in various life projects, but without caring for the goal. The adventurer "does not attach himself to the end at which he aims; only to his conquest. He likes action for its own sake." And he tramples on others in the process: "[T]he adventurer shares the nihilist’s contempt for men." Finally the "passionate man" cares enthusiastically about his goal, but  shares a similar contempt for others: "Not intending his freedom for men, the passionate man does not recognize them as freedoms either. He will not hesitate to treat them as things." And finally there is "genuine freedom", which takes the excitement of the adventurer and the passion of the passionate man and includes with them a concern for other people, other freedoms, as well. "Passion is converted to genuine freedom only if one destines his existence to other existences ..." "To will oneself free is also to will others free." Part III. Part III, "The Positive Aspect of Ambiguity," examines the  intricacies and nuances of genuinely free action in the world. It includes five sections. The brief Conclusion sums up Beauvoir's view of human freedom: "... we are absolutely free today if we choose to will our existence in its finiteness, a finiteness which is open on the infinite." She ends with a call for us to realize and act on this fundamental truth of our existence.