2021 Salisbury rail crash
On 31 October 2021, two trains, travelling on converging lines, collided at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, approximately northeast of Salisbury railway station in Wiltshire, United Kingdom. Fifteen people, including one of the train drivers, were taken to hospital. Incident. On 31 October 2021, Great Western Railway's (GWR) 17:08 to service (reporting number 1F30) operated by two-carriage Class 158s 158762 and 158763 was passing through Salisbury Tunnel Junction where the Wessex Main Line converges with the West of England Main Line. At the same time, the South Western Railway's (SWR) 17:20 to service (reporting number  1L53) operated by three-carriage Class 159 159102 was approaching the junction. The SWR train failed to stop at signal SY31, from Salisbury Tunnel Junction, which was displaying a red aspect. At 18:45, the leading carriage of the SWR train collided into the side of the third carriage of the GWR train, causing both trains to derail as they entered Fisherton Tunnel. The rear two carriages of the GWR train and front two carriages of the SWR train were derailed. Emergency services, including Wiltshire Police and the British Transport Police, attended the scene, as did the Dorset & Wiltshire Fire and  Rescue Service who declared a major incident. National Police Air Service and HM Coastguard despatched helicopters to the scene. The railway lines through the tunnel were closed as a result of the incident. The accident was the first involving a collision between two moving in-service passenger trains in the United Kingdom since the Ladbroke Grove rail crash on 5 October 1999. Passengers and crew. Of the 92 passengers on board the trains, 13 were injured. All bar one were taken by ambulance to Salisbury District Hospital. Four of those taken to hospital were admitted, with three of them being  discharged later, and nine were treated for their injuries before being sent home. Thirty other people walked to a temporary casualty centre established in a local church. The driver of the SWR train was initially trapped in his cab before being freed and taken to hospital, where his injuries were described as life-changing. He was flown to Southampton General Hospital for treatment. Aftermath. The accident closed both the Wessex Main Line and West of England Main Line, affecting services between Portsmouth Harbour and and between and respectively. Network Rail stated that the track at the junction required heavy refurbishment  and that the track through the tunnel may also need to be relaid. Unit 158762 was the leading unit of 1F30. It was not damaged, and was removed by rail on 4 November. One of the remaining five carriages was removed from the site that day. It was lifted from the railway by a large crane and removed by road. Class 59 locomotive 59003 was used to drag the derailed carriages out of the tunnel. The A30 London Road was closed until 9 November to allow for the recovery of the carriages and for investigators to carry out their work . The line through the tunnel reopened on 16 November. Investigations. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) deployed a team of inspectors to the scene. The Office of Rail and Road are also investigating. The British Transport Police also opened an investigation. On 2 November the RAIB stated that initial evidence indicated that, although the SWR driver had applied the brakes, his train had failed to stop at a signal and collided with the GWR train; wheel slide, as a result of low railhead adhesion, was the most likely cause. Announcing a formal investigation on 3 November, the RAIB said that  the On Train Data Recorder showed that the driver had made an emergency brake application twelve seconds after he initially applied the brakes, and that a further emergency brake demand had been made by the Train Protection & Warning System fitted to the train. RAIB will examine how Network Rail managed the risk of loss of adhesion at the track site and also any SWR policy for preventing or mitigating wheel slip on their trains. SWR commented that its driver had acted in an "impeccable way in a valiant attempt to keep passengers safe". The West of England Line had not  had a Rail Head Treatment Train over it since 29 October, although one had been scheduled to travel over the line before the accident occurred. An interim report was published on 21 February 2022. RAIB Interim report. The interim report found that the driver of 1L53 approached signal SY29R at and shut off power. The line at this point was on a 1 in 169 falling gradient. The signal was displaying a double yellow aspect. About a mile (1,600 m) past the signal the train was travelling at and a brake application was made and the wheels began to slide . A full service brake application was followed by an emergency brake application. As the train approached signal SY31, the overspeed sensor fitted to the train detected that the train was travelling in excess of the permitted when a red aspect was displayed and the TPWS demanded emergency braking, which was already being applied by the driver. The front carriage of 1L53 collided with the rear carriage fo 1F30 at a speed between . The collision caused the coupling between units 158762 and 158763 to break. The unit at the front of the train was undamaged and came to a halt inside  the tunnel. Both carriages of the unit at the rear of 1F30 were derailed against the tunnel wall. The front two of the three carriages of 159102 were derailed. The driver of 1L53 was knocked unconscious and trapped in his cab. The alarm was raised by the driver of 1F30 using the GMSR radio system. Subsequent analysis of the railway line approaching Salisbury Tunnel Junction revealed that the line was contaminated by the residue of fallen leaves between and (distances measured from London Waterloo). A coefficient of friction of between 0.2 and 0.02 was recorded, with most of the readings  towards the lower end of the scale. The last Rail Head Treatment Train had passed over the line at 11:06 on 30 October, and the next one was scheduled to pass over at 23:00 on 31 October. The gap of 36 hours was in excess of Network Rail Wessex's requirement to treat the line at least once every 24 hours. Reporting of the story. Initial reports of the accident, based on a leaked Network Rail log, led to highly inaccurate reporting of the accident in its immediate aftermath. The "Evening Standard" reported that a derailed locomotive had been left  a sitting duck for seven minutes after the rear carriage of a train derailed and was then run into by another train after signalling failed. "Rail" editor Nigel Harris pointed out that the only facts in the story were the location and services involved. The leak led to the "MailOnline" reporting similarly, with a "senior Network Rail manager" quoted as saying ""According to my system, the signalling system was aware seven minutes before impact. It should've automatically stopped the train. It should've automatically set all signals to red. If the driver didn't see the signal, the system  should've made the train stop."" An initial statement put out by Network Rail also contained incorrect facts. Although it was quickly corrected, Harris said that "the genie was already out of the bottle". The Network Rail log initially reported that the GWR driver had reported hitting an obstruction and derailing. The log was updated seven minutes later to record the collision, which is where the press got their "seven minutes sitting duck" scenario. Under the current system, Train Operating Companies, the British Transport Police, and the Office of Rail and Road can all issue statements. "Rail" contributor Christian Wolmar  also criticised the early coverage. In his opinion, the initial errors were made worse by Network Rail's Safety and Engineering Director Martin Frobisher, who appeared on BBC Radio 4's programme on 1 November and did not correct any of the errors at a time when, according to Wolmar, he must have known them to be untrue. Wolmar praised the RAIB for publishing its initial report just three days after the accident.