Thing v. La Chusa
Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644 (1989), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of California that limited the scope of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The majority opinion was authored by Associate Justice David Eagleson, and it is regarded as his single most famous opinion and representative of his conservative judicial philosophy. Factual background. John Thing, a minor and son of plaintiff Maria Thing, was injured when he was struck by a car driven by James La Chusa. The plaintiff was close by, but did not see or hear  the accident. The plaintiff's daughter informed her of the accident, and when the plaintiff arrived on the scene she saw her bloody and unconscious son and suffered emotional distress as a result. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. Opinion of the Court. Majority opinion. In an effort to limit a potential runaway tort and to avoid the burdensome case-by-case analysis warned of in "Dillon v. Legg", the court refined the necessary elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress first enunciated in "Dillon" into a bright -line rule: Based on the strict formulation of the second element, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover because she was not present at the scene and not aware of the injury at the time of the accident. Kaufman's concurrence. Justice Kaufman's concurrence criticized both the rigid rules of the majority opinion and the flexible guidelines advocated by Justice Broussard's dissent. Kaufman bemoaned the guidelines of "Dillon v. Legg" as hopelessly arbitrary, and advocated a return to the zone of danger rule as enunciated in "Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co." Mosk's dissent . Justice Mosk's dissent voiced substantial agreement with Broussard's dissent, but also made a point of criticizing the majority's perspective on precedent. Mosk noted that a long list of California cases, including "Archibald v. Braverman", "Krouse v. Graham", "Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals", and "State Rubbish Association v. Siliznoff" evidenced an enduring theme of expanding tort liability for emotional distress. Broussard's dissent. Justice Broussard's dissent criticized the rigid rules imposed by the majority decision as arbitrary and something that can inevitably lead to under-compensation for real emotional distress injuries. Instead of bright line rules, Broussard  advocated that liability be determined by the application of well developed tort principles of foreseeability and duty.