The alleged ‘essentialism’ of Dooyeweerd | Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap | Journal for Christian Scholarship
Vol. 53 No. 2 (2017) /
The alleged ‘essentialism’ of Dooyeweerd
Ed Echeverria argumenteer dat Jonathan Chaplin sosiale konstruktivisme probeer omseil deur die normatiwiteit (struktuur-tipiese invariansie) van samelewingsentiteite in die konstante moontlikhede van die geskape natuur van die menslike persoon te fundeer. Volgens Echeverria is dit egter nog steeds “essensialisties”. Echeverria se eie oplossing is om terug te keer tot die metafisiese erfenis van Bavinck se weergawe van die Thomisme. Hy doen dit deur uit te gaan van invariante (ante rem) goddelike idees in die Logos (in re). Die outeur argumenteer dat Chaplin en Echeverria ? omvattende en sistematiese nadenke oor die funderende samehang tussen konstansie en dinamiek (verandering) van stapel moet stuur. So ? analise moet ag gee op die uniekheid en samehang tussen die kinematiese en fisiese aspekte en wel deur rekenskap te gee van Plato se insig, naamlik dat verandering slegs vasgestel kan word op die basis van duursaamheid. Hierdie insig het natuurwetenskaplike beslag gekry deur die denke van Galileo (inertia) en Einstein. Daar word ook aangevoer dat Echeverria nie besef het nie dat die klassieke realistiese metafisika se onderskeiding tussen universalia ante rem en universalia in re onderskeidelik op ? verselfstandiging van God se wet vir (Plato) en die ordelikheid van (wet-matigheid) skepsele berus (Aristoteles). Die implikasie is dat Plato iets gesien het van God se wet as orde vir, terwyl Aristoteles iets van die universele kant van die dinge raak-gesien het. Aristoteles verdedig die siening dat wanneer hierdie huis tot niet gaan dit nie huis-wees is wat vergaan het nie. Essensialisme kan nie bloot gelykgestel word aan die bestaan van natuurlike en samelewingsentiteite of die bestaan van invariante (modale en tipiese) beginsels nie. Veeleer moet essensialisme gesien word as ? verselfstandiging (reïfikasie) van dinge (? erfenis van die Grieks-Thomistiese substansie-begrip). Die keersy van essensialisme is in die funksionalisme te vinde – en Dooyeweerd is nóg aan substansialisme, nóg aan funksionalisme skuldig.
Ed Echeverria argues that Jonathan Chaplin attempts to avoid social constructivism by grounding the normativity (structural-typical invariance) of societal entities in the invariant “possibilities or potentials given with the created nature of the human person” – which is, according to Echeverria, still “essentialist”. His own “solution” is to return to the metaphysical legacy of Bavinck’s version of Thomism by proceeding from invariant (ante rem) Divine ideas and ideas in the Logos (in re). The author argues that Chaplin and Echeverria need to contemplate in a more comprehensive and systematic way the foundational coherence between constancy and dynamics (change, variability). A systematic analysis has to consider the uniqueness and coherence between the kinematic and physical aspects – accounting for Plato’s insight that change can solely be detected on the basis of something constant (persistent) – articulated in natural scientific terms by Galileo (inertia) and Einstein. It is also argued that Echeverria does not realize that the classical realistic distinction between universalia ante rem and universalia in re respectively rests upon the reification of God’s law for (Plato) and the orderliness (law-conformity) of creatures (Aristotle). The implication is that Plato stumbled upon God’s law as order for and Aristotle upon the universal side of entities. Aristotle holds that when this house does not exist anymore it is not houseness that is destructed. Essentialism cannot be equated merely by acknowledging the existence of (natural and social) entities or the existence of invariant (modal and typical) principles, but in the reification of entities (a legacy of the Greek-Thomistic substance concept). Its counterpole is found in functionalism, the reification of modal functional relationships – but Dooyeweerd is not guilty of either substantialism (essentialism) or functionalism.
Strauss, D. (2017). The alleged ‘essentialism’ of Dooyeweerd. Tydskrif Vir Christelike Wetenskap | Journal for Christian Scholarship, 53(2), 229-250. Retrieved from https://pubs.ufs.ac.za/index.php/tcw/article/view/424
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