TRESOR. Corruption charges in 2011. On November 28, 2011, the Seoul Central District Prosecutor's Office arrested Shin for bribery charges from a lobbying incident that involved , chairman of the shipbuilding company, SLS Group. Shin Jae-min Shin Jae-min (born 29 September 1958) is a South Korean bureaucrat. He was the former Vice Minister of Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. Criticism. Controversial comments. He made a controversial statement of mentioning that the President of South Korea has a legal rights to fire the top executive of the Korean Broadcasting System on 5 July 2008. Corruption charges in 2010. Shin 	Shin Jae-min
10282874	Goring &amp; Streatley Golf Club Goring & Streatley Golf Club Goring & Streatley Golf Club is a golf course in the village of Streatley, in the English county of Berkshire. It takes its name partly from that village, and partly from the adjoining village of Goring-on-Thames in the county of Oxfordshire. The course adjoins the National Trust properties of Lardon Chase, the Holies and Lough Down. The club has an 18-hole , par-71 golf course, which has magnificent views of the Thames, the Goring Gap and the Ridgeway. It was established in 1895 and is famous for producing touring professional Carl Mason. The course was 	Goring &amp; Streatley Golf Club
10282875	designed by Harry Colt, who also designed courses such as; Stoke Park, Sunningdale, Muirfield, Hoylake and Wentworth. The Pro Shop is run by the JD Gold Academy which currently also runs Drayton Park, Carswell and The Springs. The Club Professional is Lyle Hastie. Apart from golf, the club runs a successful restaurant called Woodlands which holds Sunday lunches every Sunday and has the capacity to cater for large functions, including weddings and funerals. Goring & Streatley Golf Club Goring & Streatley Golf Club is a golf course in the village of Streatley, in the English county of Berkshire. It takes its name 	Goring &amp; Streatley Golf Club
10282876	TRESOR TRESOR TRESOR (recursive acronym for TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM", and also the German word for a safe) is a Linux kernel patch which provides encryption using only the CPU to defend against cold boot attacks on computer systems by performing encryption inside CPU registers rather than random-access memory (RAM). It is one of two proposed solutions for general-purpose computers. The other, called "frozen cache" uses the CPU cache instead. It was developed from its predecessor AESSE, presented at EuroSec 2010 and presented at USENIX Security 2011. The authors state that it allows RAM to be treated  as untrusted from a security viewpoint without hindering the system. Motivation. In computer security, a common problem for data security is how an intruder can access encrypted data on a computer. Modern encryption algorithms, correctly implemented and with strong passwords, are often unbreakable with current technology, so emphasis has moved to techniques that bypass this requirement, by exploiting aspects of data security where the encryption can be "broken" with much less effort, or else bypassed completely. A cold boot attack is one such means by which an intruder can defeat encryption despite system security, if they can gain physical access  to the running machine. It is premised on the physical properties of the circuitry within memory devices that are commonly used in computers. The concept is that when a computer system has encrypted data open, the encryption keys themselves used to read or write that data are usually stored on a temporary basis in physical memory, in a plain readable form. (Holding these keys in "plain" form during use is hard or impossible to avoid with usual systems since the system itself must be able to access the data when instructed by the authorized user). Usually this is no benefit  to an unauthorised intruder, because they cannot access or use those keys—for example due to security built into the software or system. However, if the memory devices can be accessed outside the running system without loss of contents, for example by quickly restarting the computer or removing the devices to a different device, then the current contents—including any encryption keys in use—can be plainly read and used. This can be important if the system cannot be used to view, copy or access that data—for example the system is locked, or may have booby traps  or other intrusion controls, or is needed in a guaranteed untouched form for forensic or evidentiary purposes. Since this is a physical property of the hardware itself, and based on physical properties of memory devices, it cannot be defeated easily by pure software techniques, since all software running in memory at the point of intervention becomes accessible. As a result, any encryption software whose keys could be accessed this way is vulnerable to such attacks. Usually a cold boot attack involves cooling memory chips or quickly restarting the computer, and exploiting the fact that data is not immediately lost  (or not lost if power is very quickly restored) and the data that was held at the point of intervention will be left accessible to examination. Cold boot attacks can therefore be a means of unauthorized data theft, loss or access. Such attacks can be nullified if the encryption keys are not accessible at a hardware level to an intruder–i.e., the devices in which the keys are stored when in use are not amenable to cold boot attacks–but this is not the usual case. TRESOR's approach. TRESOR is a software approach that seeks to resolve this insecurity  by storing and manipulating encryption keys almost exclusively on the CPU alone, and in registers accessible at ring 0 (the highest privilege level) only—the exception being the brief period of initial calculation at the start of a session. This ensures that encryption keys are almost never available to userspace code or following a cold boot attack. TRESOR is written as a patch to the kernel that stores encryption keys in the x86 debug registers, and uses on-the-fly round key generation, atomicity, and blocking of usual access to the debug registers for security. TRESOR was foreshadowed by a  2010 thesis by Tilo Muller which analyzed the cold boot attack issue. He concluded that modern x86 processors had two register areas where CPU-based kernel encryption was realistic: the SSE registers which could in effect be made privileged by disabling all SSE instructions (and necessarily, any programs relying on them), and the debug registers which were much smaller but had no such issues. He left the latter for others to examine, and developed a proof of concept distribution called "Paranoix" based on the SSE register method. Its developers state that "running TRESOR on a 64-bit CPU that supports  AES-NI, there is no performance penalty compared to a generic implementation of AES", and run slightly faster than standard encryption despite the need for key recalculation, a result which initially surprised the authors as well. Potential vulnerabilities. The authors' paper notes the following: TRESOR TRESOR (recursive acronym for "TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM", and also the German word for a safe) is a Linux kernel patch which provides encryption using only the CPU to defend against cold boot attacks on computer systems by performing encryption inside CPU registers rather than random-access memory (RAM). It is one of