Alfred von Schlieffen
Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, generally called Count Schlieffen (; 28 February 1833 – 4 January 1913) (5 feet 10 or 1.78 m), was a German field marshal and strategist who served as chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. His name lived on in the 1905–06 "Schlieffen Plan", then "Aufmarsch I", a deployment plan and operational guide for a decisive initial offensive operation/campaign in a two-front war against the French Third Republic. Biography. Born in Prussia, Germany, on 28 February 1833 as the son of a Prussian Army officer, he was part of  an old Prussian noble family, the Schlieffen family. He lived with his father, Major Magnus von Schlieffen, on their estate in Silesia, which he left to go to school in 1842. Growing up, Schlieffen had shown no interest in joining the military and so he did not attend the traditional Prussian cadet academies. Instead, he studied at the University of Berlin. While he was studying law, he enlisted in the army in 1853 for his one year of compulsory military service. Then, instead of joining the reserves, he was chosen as an officer candidate. He thus started a long military  career, working his way up through the officer ranks, eventually completing 53 years of service. In 1868, fifteen years into his military career, Schlieffen married his cousin Countess Anna Schlieffen. They had one healthy child (Elisabeth Auguste Marie Ernestine Gräfin von Schlieffen, 13 September 1869 – 23 September 1943), but after the birth of a second (Marie, who became a nun), his wife died. Schlieffen then focused all of his attention on his military work. Military service. On the recommendation of his commanders, Schlieffen was admitted to the General War School in 1858 at the age of 25, much earlier than  others. He graduated in 1861 with high honours, which guaranteed him a role as a General Staff officer. In 1862, he was assigned to the Topographic Bureau of the General Staff, providing him with geographical knowledge and a respect for the tactical and strategic value of terrain and weather that would serve him well throughout his career, particularly in the war games he conducted and in the devising of various war plans including the famous Schlieffen Plan. In 1865 he was transferred to the German General Staff proper, though his role was initially a minor one. He first saw active  war service as a staff officer with the Prussian Cavalry Corps at the Battle of Königgrätz of 1866, during the Austro-Prussian War. The tactical "battle of encirclement" conducted there was from that point forward a constant feature of his tactical doctrine, even as his strategic doctrine consistently favoured the counter-offensive due to both his understanding of terrain and his respect for von Clausewitz's assessment of the constantly-diminishing strength of the offensive. During the Franco-Prussian War, he commanded a small force in the Loire Valley in what was one of the most difficult campaigns fought by  the Prussian Army. In France, Frederick I, Grand Duke of Baden, promoted him to Major and head of the military-history division. After years working alongside Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Waldersee, on 4 December 1886 he was promoted to Major General, and shortly afterwards, with the retirement of Moltke, became Waldersee's Deputy Chief of Staff. Not long after this he became "Quartermeistergeneral", then Lieutenant General on 4 December 1888, and eventually General of the Cavalry on 27 January 1893. In 1904, on the occasion of the Herero rebellion in German South West Africa (present-day Namibia), Chief  of the General Staff Schlieffen was supportive of Lothar von Trotha's genocidal policies against the Herero and Namaqua peoples, saying "The race war, once commenced, can only be ended by annihilation or the complete enslavement of one party". He agreed in principle with Trotha's notorious "Vernichtungsbefehl" ("extermination order") of 2 October 1904, even justifying the many cases of killing of Herero women by the Germans, writing "If ... women have been shot, then one must remember that women have not only participated in the fighting, they have also been the main originators of the cruel and horrible martyrdom that  our wounded have often been subjected to, and that the sight of these victims ... provoked the comrades to forgivable fury." Only after the intervention of Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow and the fear that Germany's international image will be stained did Schlieffen agree, in December 1904, to repeal Trotha's orders to kill on the spot unarmed and surrendering Hereros. In August 1905, at the age of 72, Schlieffen was kicked by a companion's horse, making him "incapable of battle". After nearly 53 years of service, Schlieffen retired on New Year's Day, 1906. He died on 4 January  1913, just 19 months before the outbreak of the First World War. His apocryphal last words are said to have been, "Remember: keep the right wing very strong," (in reference to the main strategic manoeuvre of "Aufmarsch I West"), but nobody actually present is known to have said that. Furthermore, the origin of this tale is unknown but seems to have occurred only several decades after his death. The German Army. For Schlieffen, the smaller rate of conscription into the German army (55 per cent, compared to France's rate of 80 per cent), created a numerical imbalance, which was  worsened by the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1896. German tactical and operational abilities could not compensate for this quantitative inferiority. Schlieffen had wanted to institute universal conscription and raise as many combat units from trained reservists as possible. Conscription policy was controlled by the Prussian Ministry of War, which answered to the . Schlieffen planned to create masses of new units when war came, when he would assume command of the army. Upon mobilisation, large numbers of reservists would be assigned to replacement battalions (), while waiting to join the field army. From June 1891, Schlieffen proposed to form into brigades in  the field army but the units were not effective forces. Replacement units as field units would also not be able to replace field army casualties. The War Ministry rejected Schlieffen's proposals and nothing was done until 1911, six years after Schlieffen's retirement, when six divisions were formed by General Erich Ludendorff. Schlieffen continued to believe in the mass use of , making them fundamental to the (memorandum or think piece) which became known as the Schlieffen Plan (January 1906). The was not a campaign plan, as Schlieffen had retired on 31 December 1905 and the 96 divisions needed to  carry out this one-front war plan did not exist (in 1914 the German army had 79, of which 68 were deployed in the west). Rather, it was a demonstration of what Germany might accomplish if universal conscription was introduced. Schlieffen thought that even this hypothetical 96-division German army would probably not be able to defeat France, Without twelve divisions on the right flank (in 1914 the German army had six which operated in Lorraine), outflanking Paris was impossible. Schlieffen admitted in the that units could not catch the right wing by foot-marching nor would the rail system  suffice to move twelve divisions to Paris. If they could not be sent to the right wing, they could be deployed practically anywhere else on the German front, either between Verdun and Mézières, at Metz or on the right bank of the Moselle. There is no evidence that Schlieffen conducted an exercise to test a scheme of manoeuvre similar to the one in the , an envelopment of Paris by the right flank, which would be surprising if this represented the pinnacle of Schlieffen's strategic thought. None of Schlieffen's surviving deployment plans (), General staff rides () or war games () bear  any resemblance to the manoeuvre of the Schlieffen Plan; the plans are consistent with Schlieffen's counter-attack doctrine. On 11 December 1893 Schlieffen wrote a that represented the completion of his idea of mass warfare. When war came, the German government ought to declare full mobilisation in East Prussia, owing to its vulnerability to Russian cavalry raids. The East Prussian militia would use prepared equipment; behind this militia screen the German field army would deploy and then throw back the Russians. War planning. The cornerstone of Schlieffen's war planning was undoubtedly the strategic counter-offensive. Schlieffen was a  great believer in the power of the attack in the context of the defensive operation. Germany's smaller forces relative to the Franco-Russian Entente meant that an offensive posture against one or both was basically suicidal. On the other hand, Schlieffen placed great faith in Germany's ability to use its railways to launch a counter-offensive against a hypothetical French or Russian invasion force, defeat it, then quickly re-group her troops and launch a counter-offensive against the other. To quote Holmes: Schlieffen also recognised the need for "offensive" planning, however, as failing to do so would  limit the German Army's capabilities if the situation called for them. In 1897, starting from a plan of 1894, Schlieffen developed a tactical plan that – acknowledging the German army's limited offensive power and capacity for strategic manoeuvres – basically amounted to using brute force to advance beyond the French defences on the Franco-German border. To complement this unsophisticated manoeuvre and improve its chances of success he deemed it necessary to outflank the fortress line to the north and focus on destroying it from north–south starting at Verdun. This was, it must be stated, a "tactical" plan centred  around the destruction of the fortress-line that called for very little movement by the forces involved. In 1905, however, Schlieffen developed what was truly his first plan for a "strategic offensive operation" – the "Schlieffen plan Denkschrift" (Schlieffen plan memorandum). This plan was based on the hypothesis of an isolated Franco-German war which "would not" involve Russia and called for Germany to attack France. The rough draft of this plan was so crude as not to consider questions of supply at all and be vague on the actual number of troops involved, but theorised that Germany would need to  raise at least another 100,000 professional troops and 100,000 "ersatz" militiamen (the latter being within Germany's capabilities even in 1905) in addition to being able to count on Austro-Hungarian and Italian forces being deployed to German Alsace-Lorraine to defend it. The German Army would then move through the Dutch province of Maastricht and northern Belgium, securing southern Belgium and Luxembourg with a flank-guard to protect both Germany and the main force from a French offensive during this critical manoeuvre [this being the point of the 1913 French Plan XVII]. But it is here, in the second  and final phase of the operation, that Schlieffen shows his true genius: he notes the immense strength of the French "second defensive area" in which the French can use the fortress-sector of Verdun, "Fortress Paris", and the River Marne as the basis of a "very" strong defensive line. Appreciating its defensive power, Schlieffen knew that he would have to try to force the French back from the Marne or at least secure a bridgehead over the Marne and/or Seine if he did not want the second German operation/campaign of the war to result in heavy losses. To do  this, Schlieffen insisted that they cross the Seine "to the west" of Paris and, if they managed to cross in strength against sufficiently weak opposition, then they might even be able to force the French back from the westernmost sections of the Marne and surround Paris. However, the bulk of Schlieffen's planning still followed his personal preferences for the counter-offensive. "Aufmarsch II" and "Aufmarsch Ost" (later "Aufmarsch II West" and "Aufmarsch I Ost", respectively) continued to stress that Germany's best hope for survival if faced by a war with the Franco-Russian entente was a defensive strategy . This "defensive strategy", it must be noted, was reconciled with a very offensive "tactical" posture as Schlieffen held that the "destruction" of an attacking force required that it be surrounded and attacked from all sides until it surrendered, and not merely repulsed as in a "passive" defense: In August 1905 Schlieffen was kicked by a companion's horse, making him "incapable of battle". During his time off, now at the age of 72, he started planning his retirement. His successor was yet undetermined. Goltz was the primary candidate, but the Emperor was not fond of him. A favourite of the  Emperor was Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who became Chief of Staff after Schlieffen retired. Moltke went on to devise "Aufmarsch II Ost", a variant upon Schlieffen's "Aufmarsch Ost" designed for an isolated Russo-German war. Schlieffen seems to have tried to impress upon Moltke that an offensive strategy against France could work only for isolated Franco-German war, as German forces would otherwise be too weak to implement it. Thus, Moltke still attempted to apply the offensive strategy of "Aufmarsch I West" to the two-front war Germany faced in 1914 and Schlieffen's defensive plan "Aufmarsch II  West". With too few troops to cross west of Paris, let alone attempt a crossing of the Seine, Moltke's campaign failed to breach the French "second defensive sector" and his troops were pushed back in the Battle of the Marne. Influence. Schlieffen was perhaps the best-known contemporary strategist of his time, but he was criticised for his "narrow-minded military scholasticism." Schlieffen's operational theories were to have a profound impact on the development of manoeuvre warfare in the 20th century, largely through his seminal treatise, "Cannae", which concerned the decidedly un-modern battle of 216 BC in  which Hannibal defeated the Romans. Cannae had two main purposes. First, it was to clarify, in writing, Schlieffen's concepts of manoeuvre, particularly the manoeuvre of encirclement, along with other fundamentals of warfare. Second, it was to be an instrument for the Staff, the War Academy, and for the Army all together. His theories were studied exhaustively, especially in the higher army academies of the United States and Europe after the First World War. American military thinkers thought so highly of him that his principal literary legacy, "Cannae", was translated at Fort Leavenworth and distributed within the US Army and  to the academic community. Along with the great militarist man that Schlieffen is famous for being, there are also underlying traits about Schlieffen that often go untold. As we know, Schlieffen was a strategist. Unlike the Chief of Staff, Waldersee, Schlieffen avoided political affairs and instead was actively involved in the tasks of the General Staff, including the preparation of war plans and the readiness of the German Army for war. He focused much of his attention on planning. He devoted time to training, military education and the adaptation of modern technology for the use of military purposes and strategic  planning. It was evident that Schlieffen was very much involved in preparing and planning for future combat. He considered one of his primary tasks was to prepare the young officers a way that they would accept responsibility for taking action in planning manoeuvres but also for directing these movements after the planning had taken place. In regards to Schlieffen's tactics, General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the Second World War, pointed out that General Dwight Eisenhower and many of his staff officers, products of these  academies, "were imbued with the idea of this type of wide, bold maneuver for decisive results." General Erich Ludendorff, a disciple of Schlieffen who applied his teachings of encirclement in the Battle of Tannenberg, once famously christened Schlieffen as "one of the greatest soldiers ever." Long after his death, the German General Staff officers of the interwar period and the Second World War, particularly General Hans von Seeckt, recognised an intellectual debt to Schlieffen theories during the development of the "Blitzkrieg" doctrine.