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StyleRug Editorial August 23, 2013 Issue 1, 2006 Journal for Juridical Science - Volume 31,
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Polygyny and HIV / AIDS : a health and human rights approach
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 1 –38 (2006)
<b>Poliginie en MIV / VIGS : &apos;n gesondheids- en menseregtebenadering</b>
<br>Daar is in empiriese studies uitgewys dat konkurrente seksuele netwerke die koerse van MIV-oordrag betekenisvol verhoog in vergelyking met voortvloeiende monogamie of sporadiese seksuele ontmoetings. Hierdie referaat ondersoek hoe state se regskondonasie van diskriminerende, konkurrente seksuele netwerke van hoë risiko, insluitende poliginie, vroue se menseregte skend en hul seksuele en reproduktiewe gesondheid ondermyn. As gevolg van die geslagsongelykmatigheid daarvan en die verergering van huweliksongelykheid, plaas poliginie vroue voor &apos;n groter risiko van MIV-infeksie en beperk dit hul vermoë om aan te dring op getrouheid van die lewensmaat, om te onderhandel vir die gebruik van kondome en om hoërisikoverhoudings te laat vaar. Die voortgesette regserkenning van poliginie by die punt van huweliksvorming deur die meerderheid van state in Suider- Afrika, skend vroue se gelykheids-, gesondheids- en waardigheidsregte. Hierdie referaat beklemtoon state se internasionale verpligtinge om op te hou om parallelle regstelsels in ag te neem wat ongelykheid binne huwelike en gesinslewe in stand hou. In &apos;n poging om poliginie te ontmoedig, stel hierdie referaat &apos;n benadering van betrokkenheid voor waar daar voortgegaan sal word om vroueregte te beskerm binne bestaande verbintenisse, terwyl die praktyk ontmoedig sal word by die punt van huweliksvorming. Om vorentoe te beweeg kan MIV-voorkomingsprogramme bruikbare forums verskaf om sosiale geregtigheid en gelykheid binne die huwelik en intieme verhoudings te bevorder wanneer hul getuienisgebaseerd is en op die diverse realiteite van vroue se geleefde seksuele en huwelikservaringe reageer. Programme wat sosiale konstruksies van geslag en seksualiteit aanspreek sal waarskynlik bewys dat dit die effektiefste is in die ontmoediging van poliginie en die bevordering van transformerende geslagsgelykheid.
Concurrent sexual networks have been identified in empirical studies as significantly amplifying rates of HIV transmission in comparison to sequential monogamy or sporadic sexual encounters. This paper examines how states&apos; legal condonation of discriminatory, high-risk concurrent sexual networks, including polygyny, violates women&apos;s human rights and undermines their sexual and reproductive health. Because of its gender asymmetry and aggravation of marital inequality, polygyny places women at a greater risk of HIV infection and restricts their ability to insist on partner fidelity, negotiate condom use and leave high-risk relationships. The continued legal recognition of polygyny at the point of marriage formation by the majority of Southern African states violates women&apos;s equality, health, and dignity rights. This paper stresses states&apos; international obligations to cease deferring to parallel legal systems that perpetuate inequality within marriage and family life. In moving to discourage polygyny, this paper posits an engagement approach that would continue to protect women&apos;s rights within existing unions while discouraging the practice at the point of marriage formation. Going forward, HIV prevention programmes can provide useful fora to advance social justice and equality within marriage and intimate relationships when they are evidence-based and respond to the diverse realities of women&apos;s lived sexual and marital experiences. Programmes that address social constructions of gender and sexuality will likely prove the most effective in discouraging polygyny and advancing transformative gender equality.
Kafka&apos;s African nightmare - bureaucracy and the law in pre- and post-apartheid South Africa
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 39 –60 (2006)
<b>Kafka se Afrika-nagmerrie - burokrasie en die reg in voor- en na-apartheid Suid-Afrika</b>
<br>Hierdie artikel ondersoek die regstelsel van beide voor- en na-apartheid Suid-Afrika, deur die lens van Franz Kafka se bekende roman "The Trial" (Die Verhoor). Die sentrale argument van die artikel is as volg. Franz Kafka se nagmerrie-visioen dien nie alleenlik as &apos;n historiese verwysingspunt wat die kranksinnigheid van apartheid se regsburokrasie voorspel nie. Dit dien ook as &apos;n opdrag aan Suid-Afrika se regsgeleerdes, om te verseker dat die nalatenskap van die apartheid-era nie dienslewering in die nuwe demokratiese Suid-Afrika benadeel nie. Die artikel begin met &apos;n bespreking van die eg Kafka-agtige aard van die reg in Suid-Afrika gedurende die apartheid-era. Die sentrale regspilare van die apartheidstelsel word bespreek, asook die menslike prys wat deur die apartheidsbeleid geëis is. Daarna volg &apos;n bespreking van die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel na afloop van die apartheid-era. Alhoewel &apos;n reuse verskuiwing weg van die apartheidsnagmerrie erken word, word sekere onrusbarende neigings binne die burokrasie wat die demokratiese Suid- Afrikaanse staat bedien, uitgelig. Die artikel ondersoek en bespreek verskeie pogings aangewend deur die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel om hierdie tendense teë te werk, insluitende verskeie regstappe toegepas sedert die einde van apartheid, asook die ontwikkeling van innoverende toesighoudende interdikte deur die hof.
This article sets out to examine the legal system of both pre and post-apartheid South Africa, through the lens of Franz Kafka&apos;s seminal novel "The Trial". The central contention of the article is that Franz Kafka&apos;s nightmare vision serves not only as a historical point of reference anticipating the insanity of the apartheid legal bureaucracy, but also acts as an injunction to South Africa&apos;s judges and lawyers to ensure that the legacy of the apartheid period does not negatively affect service delivery in post-apartheid democratic South Africa. The article begins with a discussion of the truly Kafkaesque nature of law in South Africa during the apartheid era. The main legislative pillars of the apartheid system are discussed, as well as the human cost exacted by apartheid policies. The article then moves to a discussion of the South African legal system following the apartheid era. While acknowledging the massive shift away from the nightmare of apartheid, certain disturbingly Kafkaesque trends are noted within the bureaucracy serving the democratic South African state.Various efforts by the South African legislature and courts to combat these trends are analysed and discussed, including various legislative measures enacted since the demise of apartheid, and the development of innovative supervisory interdicts by the courts.
The mixed legacy underlying Rawls&apos;s Theory of justice
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 61 –79 (2006)
<b>Die gemengde erfenis onderliggend aan Rawls se teorie van geregtigheid</b>
<br>Rawls se werk, A <i>theory of justice, &lt;/i&gt; moet verstaan word vanuit die konteks van feitlike benaderings tot die regswetenskap (soos die &lt;i&gt;positivisme&lt;/i&gt; en <i>pragmatisme</i>). Hierdie denkrigtings het alle normatiewe oorwegings ge-elimineer. Rawls daarenteen argumenteer dat rekening gehou moet word met normatiewe regsbeginsels deur uit te gaan van &apos;n idée wat gedurende die Verligting na vore gekom het, naamlik die sogenoemde sosiale kontrak. Nogtans demonstreer die wyse waarop hy oor <i>reg, moraliteit&lt;/i&gt; en &lt;i&gt;deugde&lt;/i&gt; praat tegelyk sy afhanklikheid antieke Griekse en Middeleeuse opvattinge. Sy aanname is dat dit vir normale mense moontlik is om tot &apos;n rasionele konsensus te kom deur te aanvaar dat hierdie individue nie alleen oor &apos;n morele besef beskik nie maar dat hulle ook daartoe in staat is om afstand te neem van hul feitlike sosiale posisie en relasies (die kleed van onwetendheid) sodat hulle ontvanklik kan wees vir morele beginsels wat aanvaarbaar is vir elke ontwikkelde mens. Die artikel begin deur die historiese wortels van die idée van &apos;n regverdige samelewing te ondersoek deur die kontrastering van die klassieke Griekse en Middeleeuse ideale met moderne benaderinge sedert die Renaissance, in die besonder die verantwoording wat te vinde is in die teorieë oor die veronderstelde sosiale kontrak wat vermeend ten grondslag lê aan &apos;n geordende en regverdige samelewing. Die onopgesloste probleme van hierdie tradisie, in die besonder rakende die tekortkominge wat aanwesig is beide in atomistiese en holistiese oriëntasies soos ingebed in die hoofstroom sieninge van mens-wees en die plek van die mens in die menslike samelewing en die staat word dan in verband gebring met die gemengde aannames wat onderliggend is aan Rawls se teorie op &apos;n basiese vlak. Die bedoeling is om te argumenteer dat alhoewel Rawls die &lt;i&gt;intensie&lt;/i&gt; besit om die basiese elemente van &apos;n konstitusionele demokrasie te propageer, hierdie doelstelling bedreig word deur die latente &lt;i&gt;holistiese&lt;/i&gt; ondertone wat sy ganse teorie vergesel.
The <i>Theory of justice&lt;/i&gt; advanced by Rawls must be understood within the context of factual legal approaches (such as &lt;i&gt;positivism&lt;/i&gt; and <i>pragmatism</i>) that eliminated normative considerations. By contrast, Rawls argues for an account of the role of normative legal principles by proceeding from an idea introduced during the Enlightenment, namely that of a <i>social contract</i>. However, the way in which he speaks about <i>law, morality&lt;/i&gt; and &lt;i&gt;virtues&lt;/i&gt; clearly demonstrates his indebtedness to Ancient Greek and Medieval conceptions as well. His assumption is that it is possible for normal human beings to arrive at a rational consensus by assuming that these individuals not only do have a normative (moral) awareness but that they are also capable to take distance from their factual societal position and relations (the veil of ignorance) in order to be open to moral principles acceptable to every normally developed human being. This article sets out to investigate the historical roots of the idea of a just society by contrasting the classical Greek and Medieval ideals with that of modern approaches since the Renaissance, particularly the account found in natural law theories about the supposed <i>social contract&lt;/i&gt; lying at the foundation of an ordered and just society. The open-ended problems present within this legacy - particularly regarding the inherent shortcomings of both &lt;i&gt;atomistic&lt;/i&gt; and &lt;i&gt;holistic&lt;/i&gt; orientations implicit in the mainstream views on being human and on the place of the latter within human society and the state - are then related to the mixed assumptions underlying Rawls&apos;s theory at a basic level. It will be argued that although his &lt;i&gt;intention&lt;/i&gt; is to advocate the basic elements of a constitutional democracy, this aim is threatened by the latent &lt;i&gt;holistic&lt;/i&gt; undertones accompanying his entire theory.
The protection of prisoners&apos; rights to health care services in South African law : is it adequate?
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 80 –100 (2006)
<b>Is die beskerming van gevangenes se regte op gesondheidsdienste in Suid-Afrika voldoende?</b>
<br>&apos;n Onlangse koerantartikel beeld &apos;n somber prentjie uit van die situasie agter die mure van die grootste gevangenis in die Suidelike halfrond. Dit is aan die lig gebring dat ten minste vier gevangenes elke maand by die Westville gevangenis aan MIV / VIGS doodgaan, omdat die Departement van Korrektiewe Dienste nie die bronne het om mediese behandeling te verskaf nie. In terme van Artikel 35(2)(e) van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet is gevangenes geregtig op mediese behandeling op staatsonkoste, afhangende natuurlik van die staat se bronne. Die kwessie van die beskikbaarheid van bronne het &apos;n spervuur van sake reg na vore gebring wat &apos;n uitdaging rig teen Artikel 35(2)(e). Hierdie artikel ondersoek sommige van hierdie sake en probeer ook lig werp op die nood van gevangenes om toegang te verkry tot hulle reg tot gesondheidsorgdienste.
A recent newspaper article1 depicted a dismal picture of the situation behind the walls of the largest prison in the Southern hemisphere. It was revealed that at least four prisoners die of HIV / AIDS at Westville Prison every month because the Department of Correctional Services does not have the resources to provide treatment. In terms of Section 35(2)(e) of the South African Constitution prisoners are entitled to medical treatment at state expense, dependant of course on the availability of resources. The issue of the availability of resources has seen a barrage of case law being brought to the fore challenging section 35(2) (e). This article examines some of these cases and also attempts to shed light on the plight of prisoners in accessing their rights to health care services.
An international perspective of restorative justice practices and research outcomes
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 101 –120 (2006)
<b>&apos;n Internasionale perspektief van herstellende geregtigheidspraktyke en navorsingsuitkomste</b>
Are the restrictive provisions of sections 2(1)(c) and 5(5)(b) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 unconstitutional?
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 121 –133 (2006)
<b>Is die beperkende bepalings van artikels 2(1)(c) en 5(5)(b) van die <i>Wet op die Keuse vir die Beeïndiging van Swangerskap&lt;/i&gt; 92 van 1996 onkonstitusioneel?</b>
<br>Artikels 2(1)(c) en 5(5)(b) van die <i>Wet op die Keuse vir die Beeïndiging van Swangerskap</i>
92 van 1996 laat in beperkte gevalle beeïndiging van swangerskap na die 20ste week van die swangerskap toe. Geen voorsiening word gemaak vir die beeïndiging van &apos;n swangerskap wat onstaan as gevolg van verkragting of bloedskande nie. Vrouens wat slagoffers van verkragting of bloedskande is en wat, vir redes buite hul beheer, die besluit om die swangerskap te beeïndiging uitstel tot die derde trimester sal dus nie kwalifiseer vir &apos;n wettige beeïndiging van die swangerskap nie tensy haar geval gedek word deur die bestaande gronde waarvoor voorsiening gemaak word in die <i>Wet op die Keuse vir die Beeïndiging van Swangerskap.&lt;/i&gt; Die bepalings van die <i>Wet op die Keuse vir die Beeïndiging van Swangerskap&lt;/i&gt; wat handel oor die derde trimester is baie meer beperkend as die bepalings van artikel 3(1) van die <i>Aborsie en Sterilisasie Wet&lt;/i&gt; 2 van 1975. Laasgenoemde wet het nie &apos;n trimester benadering gevolg nie, maar het wel op enige stadium van die swangerskap beeïndiging van swangerskap, wat onstaan het as gevolg van verkragting of bloedskande, toegelaat. Die beeïndiging van swangerskap in terme van die bepalings van 3(1) van die <i>Aborsie en Sterilisasie Wet&lt;/i&gt; 2 van 1975 was wel onderworpe aan die voorwaarde dat die oorsaak van die swangerskap bewys moes word. Die uitsluiting van die beeïndiging van swangerskap gedurende die derde trimester waar die swangerskap deur verkragting or bloedskande veroorsaak is plaas &apos;n "onnodige las" op slagoffers van verkragting of bloedskande en die uitsluiting is onkonstitusioneel.
Sections 2(1)(c) and 5(5)(b) of the <i>Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act&lt;/i&gt; 92 of 1996 only allow a termination after the 20th week of gestation on very limited grounds. No provision is made for terminations of pregnancies arising from rape or incest. Therefore women survivors of rape or incest who, for reasons beyond their control, postpone their decisions to terminate until the third trimester will not qualify for a legal abortion unless they fall under the existing grounds in the <i>Choice Act.&lt;/i&gt; The provisions of the <i>Choice Act&lt;/i&gt; regarding the third trimester are more restrictive than those in section 3(1) of the A<i>bortion and Sterilization Act&lt;/i&gt; 2 of 1975. The latter did not adopt a trimester approach and allowed a termination on the grounds of rape or incest at any stage of the pregnancy - subject to certain conditions concerning the verification of the cause of the pregnancy. By excluding rape and incest as grounds for termination of pregnancy in the third trimester the <i>Choice Act&lt;/i&gt; imposes an "undue burden" on women who are survivors of rape or incest and their exclusion is unconstitutional.
Breach of confidentiality and the duty to warn in medical law : examples from clinical psychiatry
Journal for Juridical Science 31, pp 134 –142 (2006)
This article addresses various factors involved in the tension that may arise between breach of confidentiality on the one hand, and dereliction of the duty to warn, on the other, in the context of medical law. Per illustration, examples from clinical psychiatric practice, in which the sharing of personal information is especially relevant, are featured. In sum, a practitioner must be reasonable in negotiating the proverbial tightrope: if he or she reveals too much, liability can arise, and, if he or she reveals too little, liability can arise. In medical law, the standard of reasonableness is measured with reference to "the reasonable practitioner". Weighing up various factors (discussed herein), the reasonable practitioner takes confidentiality as the point of departure; only if there is a compelling reason to override confidentiality, will it afford legal justification to the practitioner.
<b>Vertroulikheid en waarskuwingspligte in die geneeskundige reg : voorbeelde uit kliniese psigiatrie</b>
<br>Hierdie artikel neem verskeie faktore wat &apos;n rol speel in die spanning wat kan ontstaan tussen die vertroulikheidplig aan die een kant, en die waarskuwingsplig aan die ander kant, onder die loep. Per illustrasie, word voorbeelde uit die kliniese psigiatriese praktyk, waar persoonlike informasie veral relevant is, vertoon. Ter opsomming moet &apos;n praktisyn redelik wees in die wyse waarop hy of sy oor die spreekwoordelike dwarslyn loop: as hy of sy te veel ontbloot, kan dit tot aanspreeklikheid lei, en, as hy of sy te min ontbloot, kan dit immers ook tot aanspreeklikheid lei. In die geneeskundige reg word die redelikheidstandaard gemeet aan die hand van "die redelike praktisyn". Die redelike praktisyn weeg verskeie faktore op (bespreek in hierdie artikel), met vertroulikheid as uitgangspunt; slegs as daar &apos;n grondige rede is om vertroulikheid in te kort, sal dit &apos;n geregtelike regverdigingsgrond aan die praktisyn verleen.