Southall rail crash
The Southall rail crash occurred on 19 September 1997, on the Great Western Main Line at Southall, west London. An InterCity 125 high speed passenger train (HST) failed to slow down in response to warning signals and collided with a freight train crossing its path, causing seven deaths and 139 injuries. The signaller was unaware that the AWS (automatic warning system), which warns drivers of adverse signals, had been turned off in the cab of the express. As a result, the signaller set a route which would stop the express and allow the freight train to cross  in front of it. If the signaller had known that the AWS in the express wasn't working, he would have been prevented by the operating rules from setting a conflicting route. The passenger train operating company had failed to inform Railtrack and the signaller that the safety system was inoperative. The HST driver, Larry Harrison, did not apply the brakes until it was too late because he was packing his bag and did not see the cautionary signals. He was charged with manslaughter by gross negligence but the case collapsed. Great Western Trains, whose managing director survived the crash  in one of the most badly affected carriages, was fined for failure to ensure High Speed Trains had their automatic warning system working during long journeys. Accident. The collision occurred as the 10:32 Great Western Trains (GWT) InterCity 125 HST returned from Swansea toward London Paddington. The train was formed of Class 43 power car 43173, eight Mark 3 carriages and power car 43163; the driver boarded the train at Cardiff. The first driver found that a fault with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) prevented the brakes from releasing (a recurrence of the previous day but the whole system had  not malfunctioned since December 1996) so he isolated (disabled) it at 06:00 but did not report the failure to the signaller and to Railtrack — required by the Rulebook — to enable extra signalling precaution. The train driver passed two warning signals (a double yellow followed by a single yellow) without slowing the train down, and only reacted by applying the emergency brake when the red danger signal came into view. As the tracks straightened ahead of the HST, the driver saw the Hanson-operated Class 59 locomotive 59101 "Village of Whatley" a mile in the distance, moving "at a funny angle  and realised that it was crossing his path (the Up Main line). The freight train, which was formed of 20 empty bogie hopper wagons, was coming from London on the Down Relief line toward the north side, and had been signalled to cross the main lines at Southall East Junction on its way into Southall Yard on the south side. A collision was now inevitable. The HST was travelling at when the driver saw the danger signal, so even though he applied the emergency brake the collision occurred at more than . Alan Bricker, the driver of the freight locomotive, observed 	Southall rail crash
3677582	the approaching HST and expected it to stop, but was alarmed by its speed and apparent brake application. He was praised for trying to accelerate his train out of its path of the HST. The later accident report found that: Seven passengers died; six at the scene and one in hospital. The driver said he was aware of the isolated AWS and refers to putting items in his bag before the incident twice in his tape-recorded conversation with signallers at the nearest trackside telephone: He did not see the preceding signals; functioning AWS would have given him an audible 	Southall rail crash
3677583	warning that he was running towards a signal at danger and needed to start braking. Failure to press the AWS cancelling button to acknowledge the warning would have caused the emergency brake to apply. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) equipment would have almost certainly prevented the accident. The train was fitted with ATP but this was switched off. The equipment, both at trackside and in the London-end power car was fully operational, but was not switched on because neither drivers Harrison nor Tunnock were then qualified to drive with ATP. The AWS had been reinstated at the depot overnight without 	Southall rail crash
3677584	the mandated electrical tests on it being carried out. If the AWS or the ATP equipment on the HST had been working, the chance of the accident occurring would have been highly unlikely. From 1996, 125mph HST trains were driven by one driver only following the removal of a requirement for a second driver, and the driver admitted a lack of focus. Aftermath. Following this accident and the Ladbroke Grove rail crash, First Great Western (as GWT had become) required all its trains to have ATP switched on. If the equipment is faulty the train is taken out of 	Southall rail crash
3677585	service. It emerged after the incident that the reset switch of the warning system had contamination on its electrical contact surfaces which rendered its performance intermittent, hence its disabling at Oxford the day before the crash. The HST driver, Larry Harrison, was charged with manslaughter by gross negligence but the case collapsed. GWT was fined £1.5 million for not having a system to ensure HSTs were not operated for long journeys with AWS inoperative. The action of the signaller in stopping a high-speed passenger train to allow a slow freight train to cross in front of it has 	Southall rail crash
3677586	been criticised. However, this is standard procedure when regulating trains to minimise overall delay; there was no reason for the signaller to expect that the HST driver would not stop at the red signal protecting the crossover. At the time there was no requirement for the signaller to have been informed that the HST was in service with its AWS isolated. The rulebook was altered to cover this; Driver...if you become aware that the AWS has become defective when it is required to be in operation, you must...tell the signaller" The key point identified in the report was  that drivers had become increasingly reliant on AWS with single-manning and high speeds, and that it was no longer acceptable to run trains at full speed if the equipment was inoperative. The rulebook was changed, so that if AWS is isolated the train may only run at high speed with a competent person accompanying the driver in the cab. This person must have full knowledge of the route and know how to stop the train; "If a competent person is provided...proceed at normal permissible speed to the location where the train can be dealt with. During poor visibility , the train speed must not exceed 40 mph (65 km/h)" or "If a competent person is not provided...proceed at a speed not exceeding 40 mph (65 km/h), or any lower permissible speed that may apply, to the location where a competent person is available or to the location where the train can be dealt with" Among survivors in the two most severely stricken coaches in front of the buffet car were Richard George, then managing director of GWT, who played a valuable role in establishing calm, and four injured members of staff in the buffet car, who  quickly organised help for passengers. After the completion of the inquiry, power car 43173 was scrapped at a remote site, MoD Shoeburyness. As of 2021, power car 43163, which sustained minor damage in the accident is in service with Abellio ScotRail, having been transferred to the fleet in 2018 among other HSTs. In 2003, a memorial plaque was unveiled at .